[Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan, delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation, deciding that the parties intended to authorize class-wide arbitration, did not exceed his powers. When parties agree to arbitration, the price of that decision is that an arbitrator may not interpret the contract correctly. Under the Federal Arbitration Act a court cannot overrule the arbitrator as long as the arbitrator provides an interpretation of the contract.
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote a concurrence in which he noted that absent members of the plaintiff class did not consent to the arbitrator's authority and that an arbitrator may only authorize class-wide arbitration when given permission. However, since the petitioner submitted to the arbitration the question of abitrability cannot be raised. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence.


[Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Several groups, including attorneys, journalists, and human rights organizations, brought a facial challenge to a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The provision creates new procedures for authorizing government electronic surveillance of non-U.S. persons outside the U.S. for foreign intelligence purposes. The groups argue that the procedures violate the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III of the Constitution, and the principle of separation of powers. The new provisions would force these groups to take costly measures to ensure the confidentiality of their international communications. The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the government, holding that the groups did not have standing to bring their challenge. The groups only had an abstract subjective fear of being monitored and provided no proof that they were subject to the FISA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the groups had standing based on a reasonable fear of injury and costs incurred to avoid that injury.


[Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the respondents did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution because no injury occurred. Claiming a reasonable likelihood that their communications would be intercepted under FISA is not enough to show future injury for standing purposes. The Court also refused to acknowledge a present injury stemming from the respondents' choice to take costly measures to protect their confidential communications.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the future harm to respondents is not speculative and therefore should be sufficient to establish standing. Since there is a high probability that the government will intercept at least some of the respondents' communications, the respondents should have standing to bring the suit. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Johnson v. Williams (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1999, Tara Williams was charged with the 1993 robbery-murder of Hung Mun Kim. During jury deliberations at Williams' trial, the judge received a jury note saying that one of the jurors, juror number six, expressed an intention to disregard the law due to a concern about the severity of the charge of first-degree murder. After an inquiry and evidentiary hearing, the judge dismissed the juror for bias.
Williams appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it removed juror number six, because the removal of the "lone holdout" juror violated Williams' Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury. The California Court of Appeals rejected her claim as meritless, and the California Supreme Court denied further direct appellate review.
Williams filed a state habeas corpus petition in Los Angleles County Superior Court. The court denied the petition, ruling that the issues raised in the petition were issues for direct appeal, not collateral attack. Williams next filed a federal habeas corpus petition, in which she again challenged the removal of juror number six. The magistrate judge concluded that the trial court's factual finding of bias was entitled to deference and that the discharge of juror number six did not constitute a constitutional violation. The district court adopted the report of the magistrate judge and dismissed the petition with prejudice.
Williams appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that the deferential-review standard did not apply because the California Court of Appeal had only reviewed her state claim and had not adjudicated her federal constitutional claim. The appellate court then conducted a review of Williams' federal claim and concluded that the Sixth Amendment does not allow a trial judge to discharge a juror on account of his views on the merits of the case. The State of California appealed to the appellate court's decision.


[Johnson v. Williams (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanding for further proceedings. The Court held that Williams' entire claim had been "adjudicated on the merits," even though the California court did not expressly address the federal law claim. To adjudicate a claim on its merits, a state court is only required to evaluate the evidence and arguments; it is not required to expressly address every single claim. When a defendant presents a federal claim to a state court and the state court denies relief, it must be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on its merits. It is up to the defendant to rebut this presumption in order to seek federal habeas relief. To rule otherwise would unreasonably burden the state courts and require them to spend time expressly addressing even the most insignificant claims.


[Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
When the biological mother of Baby Girl became pregnant she did not live with the father and the father did not support the mother financially. The mother sent the father a text message asking if he would rather pay child support or relinquish his parental rights. He sent a text back, saying that he would relinquish his rights, though he later testified that he thought he was relinquishing his rights only to the mother. The biological father was a registered member of the Cherokee Nation. The biological mother attempted to verify this status, but spelled the father's name wrong and misrepresented his birthday in the request, so the Nation could not locate the father's registration. The mother listed Baby Girl's ethnicity as "Hispanic" instead of "Native American" on the birth certificate. The mother decided to put Baby Girl up for adoption because she had two other children that she struggled to support.
Adoptive Couple, who resided in South Carolina, began adoption proceedings in that state. The Cherokee Nation finally identified the father as a registered member and filed a notice of intervention, stating that Baby Girl was an "Indian Child" under the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The father stated that he did not consent to the adoption and would seek custody of Baby Girl. After trial, the family court denied Adoptive Couple's petition for adoption and granted custody to the biological father. The court held that the biological father was a "parent" under the ICWA because of his paternity and pursuit of custody as soon as he learned that Baby Girl was being put up for adoption. Adoptive Couple did not follow the procedural directives in the ICWA to obtain the father's consent prior to initiating adoption proceedings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed.


[Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, a non-custodial parent cannot invoke the ICWA to block an adoption voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent. The Court did not rule on the definition of "parent," but, for the sake of argument, assumed that the biological father was a "parent" under the ICWA. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the ICWA was designed to stop the practice of unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian families "due to the cultural insensitivity and bias of social workers and state courts." In this case, however, the Court noted that the biological father never had either legal or physical custody of Baby Girl and had previously relinquished his parental rights. Because the biological father gave up custody before birth, and because Baby Girl had never been in his legal or physical custody, the ICWA's goal to prevent the breakup of Indian families did not apply. Furthermore, the Court held that the ICWA's preference for placing an Indian child with family, other members of the tribe, or other Indian families did not apply in this case because no other parties beside the adoptive parents had come forward to adopt Baby Girl. The Court feared that applying the lower court's rationale could lead to a scenario where a biological Indian father could play an "ICWA trump card" to override the mother's decision and the child's best interests.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas stated that the federal government, in passing the ICWA, may have interfered in the area of family law, a topic constitutionally reserved to the states. However, because the majority opinion avoided constitutional problems, he concurred with the decision. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate concurrence in which he stated that the majority's decision may adversely affect parents without looking at whether the parent would look out for the child's best interest, and that the ruling still raised the possibility of allowing an absentee father to re-gain custody with the support of his tribe.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's opinion distorted the statute and led to a result that was both contrary to Congress' intent and potentially devastating to Baby Girl. Additionally, she argued that the majority completely ignores Congress' policy reasons for passing the ICWA and distorts the clear provisions in the act. Finally, Justice Sotomayor stated that the majority's interpretation of the ICWA applies adversely to all noncustodial Indian parents, regardless of whether those parents actively participated in their child's upbringing. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent, and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in part. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the majority's definition of the phrase, "continued custody," should have also included future custody. He also wrote that the majority's decision "needlessly demeans the right of parenthood" by removing a father's right to raise his child.


[Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Association for Molecular Pathology along with several other medical associations, doctors and patients sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Myriad Genetics to challenge several patents related to human genetics. The patents cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and certain mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast cancer. The suit also challenged several method patents covering diagnostic screening for the genes. Myriad argued that once a gene is isolated, and therefore distinguishable from other genes, it could be patented. By patenting the genes, Myriad had exclusive control over diagnostic testing and further scientific research for the BRCA genes. Petitioners argued that patenting those genes violated §101 the Patent Act because they were products of nature. They also argued that the patents limit scientific progress. §101 limits patents to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that isolating a gene does not alter its naturally occurring fundamental qualities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that isolated genes are chemically distinct from their natural state in the human body. In March 2012, Petitioners sought certiorari; the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo Collective Services v. Prometheus Laboratories. On remand, the Federal Circuit again upheld the patentability of the BRCA genes.


[Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that naturally occurring gene sequences, and their natural derivative products, are not patent eligible. Under §101 of the Patent Act, the discovery of natural products does not warrant a patent. However, the Court also held that the creation of a new product in a lab exempts that product from being a product of nature. Therefore, gene sequences refined by synthetic processes to create molecules that do not occur naturally are patent eligible.


[Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Tarrant Regional Water District (Tarrant) supplies water to north-central Texas. In 1955, Congress allowed Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas to negotiate an agreement allocating the water from the Red River, which forms the boundary between southeastern Oklahoma and northeastern Texas. In 1980, the states signed the Red River Compact and Congress ratified it.
In 2007, Tarrant sought to appropriate water from three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas and applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB), which was established to regulate in-state and out-of-state water usage. On November 1, 2007, Tarrant sued the OWRB and sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Oklahoma statutes on water usage. Tarrant argued that the statutes placed burdens on interstate water commerce that are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and overstep the bounds of the Compact that Congress allowed the states to establish. OWRB moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.


[Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, no. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the Compact's silence regarding state lines indicated an understanding that the Compact was meant to respect state lines, so state statutes do not conflict with the Compact's allocation of water. Long-running precedent supports the principle that states do not cede water rights within their own territories. Any other reading of the Compact would create jurisdictional and administrative confusion. The Court also held that the Compact does not violate the Commerce Clause by allowing states to interfere in interstate commerce because the Compact does not leave water unallocated for states statutes to affect.


[Maracich v. Spears (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Michael Eugene Spears and three other lawyers instituted several "group action" lawsuits against several South Carolina car dealerships for allegedly collecting unlawful fees from car buyers. The lawyers obtained the personal information of thousands of car buyers from the South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles through a Freedom of Information Act request. The lawyers used this data to identify potential plaintiffs for the group action, and sent mailings to each of those plaintiffs notifying them of the litigation.
Edward F. Maracich and two other car buyers who received mailings, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, sued the lawyers. The buyers alleged that the lawyers violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) by obtaining their personal information for purposes of mass solicitation. The lawyers argued that they acted properly under the litigation exception to the DPPA. The DPPA allows disclosure of private information in connection with any state or federal litigation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the lawyers, holding that they did not engage in prohibited solicitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the lawyers did engage in solicitation, but their actions were within the litigation exception to the DPPA.


[Maracich v. Spears (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, no. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the exceptions to the DPPA's protections do not encompass the use of personal information for solicitation of legal clients. If the exceptions could be interpreted so broadly, the purpose of DPPA—protecting personal information—would be defeated. The Court also held that solicitation was a distinct act separate from litigation and therefore not subject to the litigation exception to the DPPA. Similarly, the DPPA does not allow access to personal information after a lawsuit has been filed. The Court held that a lawyer would only need to file a placeholder lawsuit to gain access to the personal information database, which would prevent the DPPA from providing sufficient protection.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the DPPA allows the use of DMV-supplied personal information when connected with a specific, concrete legal proceeding. In such cases, the information adds directly to the development of a case. She also argued that the majority's opinion creates a limitation that has no basis in the text of the DPPA. The majority's reading also confuses the interpretation and implementation of the DPPA as a whole. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[McBurney v. Young (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Mark McBurney is a citizen of Rohde Island and a former resident of Virginia where his son lives. When McBurney's wife defaulted on child support obligations, he asked the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (VDCSE) to file a petition for child support on his behalf. After a nine-month delay, the petition was filed and granted. He then filed a Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) request with the VDCSE for all records pertaining to his son and ex-wife. The VDCSE denied the request, arguing that the information was confidential and McBurney was not a citizen of the state. While McBurney eventually obtained most of needed the information through other sources, he never got all of the information from his VFOIA request.
McBurney sued in district court arguing that denial of the VFOIA request violated the privileges and immunities clause and the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled against McBurney. Mc Burney along with two others appealed their VFOIA denials to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court. The Court of Appeals held that VFOIA did not hinder a non citizen's right to pursue buisness in the state and did not place a burden on interstate commerce.


[McBurney v. Young (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito delivered a unanimous opinion affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that VFOIA does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause because VFOIA does not actually violate any fundamental privileges or immunities. Though the Petitioners argued that VFOIA interferes with their fundamental ability to earn a living, own property, and access Virginia courts, the Court rejected these arguments. The Court was also unconvinced that the right to access public information is a fundamental privilege or immunity because neither the Constitution nor the common law guarantees the existence of acts like VFOIA. The Court further held that VFOIA does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because the law does not interfere with the natural functioning of the interstate market. Since VFOIA neither prohibits access to an interstate market nor imposes burdensome regulation on that market, there is no dormant Commerce Clause issue.


[United States v. Apel (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Department of the Air Force owns a section of land that Highway 1 crosses, and the Department has granted roadway easements to the State of California and Santa Barbara County. Highway 1 runs next to the main gate of Vandenberg Air Force Base (Vandenberg). Near the gate is a designated area for public protesting that falls under the Highway 1 easement.
John D. Apel was barred from Vandenberg's property in 2007 for trespassing. In 2010, while the order barring him was still in effect, he entered the designated protest area three times and was asked to leave. On all three occasions the respondent failed to leave. In two separate trials, Apel was convicted of three violations of a federal statute prohibiting a person from reentering a military installation after a commanding officer has ordered him not to reenter. Apel appealed, arguing that the federal statute requires that the base has exclusive possession over the area. The district court affirmed the convictions by holding that, under the terms of the easement, the land is subject to base rules and regulations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because the area is subject to an easement, the federal government does not have an exclusive right of possession, so the conviction cannot stand.


[United States v. Apel (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that there has historically been a great deal of variation in the ownership status of U.S. military sites around the world, so there is no precedent to support the view that a statute does not apply on a base merely because the base does not have exclusive ownership of the land. Although the base granted the easement, it remained under the jurisdiction of the base commander, who remained in control of all points of access to the base.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that, when the government creates specific protest places on its property, the First Amendment requires that the government only impose reasonable limitations that are content-neutral and tailored to serve a significant government interest. Although Apel's removal might not stand up to this constitutional review, the Court was correct in not reaching a decision on this issue. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he argued that the Supreme Court did not address the constitutional issues in this case because they were not addressed by the Court of Appeals. The failure to address these issues does not indicate agreement or disagreement with the views outlined in Justice Ginsburg's concurrence.


[Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In November 2006 election, a majority of Michigan voters supported a proposition to amend the state constitution to prohibit "all sex-and race-based preferences in public education, public employment, and public contracting." The day after the proposition passed, a collection of interest groups and individuals formed the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (Coalition). The Coalition sued the governor and the regents and boards of trustees of three state universities in district court by arguing that the proposition as it related to public education violated the Equal Protection Clause. About a month later, the Michigan Attorney General and Eric Russell, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School, filed separate motions to intervene as defendants, which were granted. Both sides moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to have Russell removed from the case as he did not represent interests separate from those of the Michigan Attorney General. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and granted the motion to remove Russell as an intervenor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding the proposed amendment unconstitutional and upholding the removal of Russell as a party to the litigation.


[Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that this case was not about the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions, but rather about whether the voters of a state can choose to prohibit the use of race preferences in the decisions of governmental bodies, specifically with respect to school admissions. The plurality held that the attempt to define and protect interests based on race ran the risk of allowing the government to classify people based on race and therefore perpetuate the same racism such policies were meant to alleviate. While voters may certainly determine that some race-based preferences should be adopted, it is not the role of the courts to disempower the voters from making such a choice. If certain issues were decided to be too sensitive to be addressed by voters, it would be denying the voters their right to debate and act through the lawful democratic process.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the use of racial preferences might reinforce racial awareness and therefore do more harm than good. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that a state law that provided equal protection by not allowing the use of racial preferences at least facially did not violate the Constitution. Justice Scalia argued that judges should not be in the position of dividing the country into racial blocs and determining what policies are in each one's interests. Additionally, Justice Scalia saw no reason to allow local subordinate authorities to have more power over the use of race-based preferences than the voters of the state. Since the amendment in question prohibits the use of racial preferences, it patently provides equal protection under the law rather than denying it. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, while the Constitution allows local, state, and national communities to implement narrowly tailored, race-conscious policies, it is the voters and not the courts who should determine the merits of such strategies. The amendment better allowed for this process to take place because it took the power to decide whether to implement race-conscious policies away from unelected actors and placed it firmly in the hands of the voters.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the democratic process does not in and of itself provide sufficient protection against the oppression of minority groups, which is why the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment exists. Although equal protection is typically construed as referring to the treatment of different groups under existing laws, it also protects against the implementation of new laws that would oppress certain groups on the basis of race, among other things. Because the amendment in question creates one admission process for those who do think race should be considered and a separate one for those who do not, it places special burdens on minority groups in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Judicial precedent holds that governmental action violates the Equal Protection Clause when it has a racial focus that places a greater burden on minority. The amendment in question both has a racial focus and places a greater burden on the minority; therefore, it violates the Equal Protection Clause, and the voters of a state cannot democratically ratify an amendment that violates the Constitution. Justice Sotomayor argued that the plurality and concurring opinions allow a majority of voters in Michigan to prevent the elected university boards from implementing constitutional race-sensitive admission policies, and therefore they ignore a key purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissenting opinion.
Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) provides that if certain requirements are met, including a compact between the state and the tribe, an Indian tribe can operate a casino on Indian lands. Under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, lands bought with funds from a congressionally established trust are Indian lands. On November 3, 2010, the Bay Mills Indian Community, a federally recognized Indian tribe with a reservation located in northern Michigan, opened a small casino in the town of Vanderbilt, Michigan, on lands purchased with funds from this trust. The state of Michigan sued for closure of the casino by claiming that the Bay Mills casino violated state gaming laws, as well as various provisions of its Tribal-State compact. The district court entered a preliminary injunction ordering Bay Mills to stop the gambling at the Vanderbilt casino. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction and held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over some of the plaintiffs' claims, while Bay Mills' sovereign immunity bars the others.


[Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Indian tribes have sovereign immunity that can only be revoked by Congress. Additionally, the Supreme Court's decision in Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies extended an Indian tribe's sovereign immunity to lawsuits arising out of the tribe's commercial activity. In this case, Congress, via the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, only regulated an Indian tribe's sovereignty for suits concerning gambling activity on Indian lands. Because Michigan's suit against the Tribe was based on the claim that the new gambling activity was taking place off of the Tribe's land, Michigan cannot rely on the sovereignty abrogation in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The Court also held that states may still act against tribe's who establish gambling venues outside of Indian lands, either by denying a gambling license if the establishment is not located on Indian land or by waiving the tribe's sovereign immunity when negotiating the agreement required by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
In her concurrence in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the principle of "comity," or mutual respect between sovereigns, supported the majority's opinion because the Court had previously ruled that states have sovereign immunity against suits brought by Indian Tribes. Furthermore, tribal sovereign immunity should not be abrogated simply because the Tribe was participating in commercial activity, as such a precedent would deter Tribes from participating in commercial activity, which is a necessary aspect of the Tribes becoming actually sovereign as opposed to relying on federal funds.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that a sovereign's immunity relates to immunity within the sovereign's own court system, not to immunity from the courts of other sovereigns. Therefore, an Indian tribe would only be immune from federal and state courts when federal or state law says that Indian tribes are immune. Justice Thomas also argued that any federal law that granted Indian tribes immunity from state courts for off-reservation acts would infringe upon the sovereignty of the individual states. Congress had previously abrogated foreign sovereign immunity when suits are based on a foreign sovereign's commercial activity in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; similarly, in this case, immunity from commercial suits is not fundamental to protecting a Tribe's interest in controlling its internal affairs. Lastly, Justice Thomas stated he would overrule the Court's previous decision in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, which first extended tribal sovereign immunity to a tribe's commercial activities. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Samuel Alito and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that, for the reasons stated in Justice Thomas' dissent, he would also overrule the previous decision in Kiowa. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissent in which she expressed her general concurrence with Justice Thomas's dissent, but she noted a reservation concerning Justice Thomas's expansive view of state sovereignty.


[Mississippi, ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On March 25, 2011, the State of Mississippi sued a group of liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturers and claimed that they harmed consumers by engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices for LCD panels, which artificially inflated prices. On June 9, 2011, the respondents jointly removed the case from the Chancery Court of Hinds County to the federal district court and asserted federal jurisdiction was satisfied under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Class action and mass action suits can be properly removed to federal court under the CAFA.
The State of Mississippi moved to remand the case to state court because the claims in the suit were asserted on behalf of the general public, which prevented the case from falling under federal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion. The respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals of Fifth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the suit qualified as a mass action under the CAFA and that Mississippi brought the case in the interest of individual citizens, so the general public exception was not applicable.


[Mississippi, ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that, while CAFA allows defendants in mass action civil suits to remove the case to federal district court, this case does not qualify as a mass action under CAFA. The plain text of CAFA states that a mass action refers to any case with 100 or more persons seeking to try a case jointly for monetary compensation. The Court held that the language of the statute reinforces the interpretation that "persons" refers to plaintiffs in the sense of real named parties to the suit. Because Mississippi is the only named plaintiff in this case, it does not fulfill the meaning of a mass action under CAFA, and the case should be considered in state court.


[BG Group PLC v. Argentina (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In the early 1990s, BG Group PLC (BG), a British company, made a major investment in Argentina's natural gas industry. Later, in the midst of an economic crisis, Argentina enacted an emergency law that required investors to collect tariff revenues in Argentinian pesos at a rate of one peso per dollar. Given the weak international peso-to-dollar exchange rate, these changes that made it difficult for BG to see a return on its investment. Simultaneously, Argentina adopted legislation that stayed all lawsuits arising from the emergency measures. . BG sought recourse under a bilateral investment treaty (Treaty) between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Treaty required that BG first attempt to resolve its dispute before a "competent tribunal" in Argentina for at least eighteen months. Instead, BG bypassed the Argentinian courts and submitted its dispute directly to an arbitral tribunal. The arbitral panel, seated in Washington, D.C., held that Argentina's changes to its judicial system excused the eighteen-month precondition to arbitration and awarded BG over US$185 million in damages. Argentina petitioned the district court to vacate the award under the Federal Arbitration Act by arguing that the arbitral panel exceeded its powers. The court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the determination of whether BG could submit its dispute directly to arbitration must be made by a court, not the arbitral tribunal.


[BG Group PLC v. Argentina (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the task of interpreting the Treaty's local litigation provision fell to the arbitrator, and courts should give deference to the arbitrator's findings. Whether a party has satisfied a precondition to arbitration is a procedural matter left for arbitrators under ordinary contract law. The fact that the document at issue is a treaty does not make a critical difference because the text contained no evidence that the parties intended to bypass ordinary contract presumptions about who should decide threshold arbitration issues. The Court further held that the arbitrators' determination that the local litigation provision did not act as a bar to arbitration was within their interpretative authority.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in part in which she noted that explicitly labeling a local litigation provision as a condition on the parties' consent to arbitrate would change her analysis. Justice Sotomayor argued that such a label signals the parties' intent for courts, not arbitrators, to decide the issue.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the local litigation provision is a condition to the formation of an agreement between the investors and host country to eventually submit their dispute to arbitration. As courts usually decide issues concerning conditions on a party's consent to arbitrate, Justice Roberts would have remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.


[Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.


[Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears.
In his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the government had not met its burden to show that there was a meaningful difference between non-profit religious institutions and for-profit religious corporations under the RFRA. Because the contraception requirement accommodates the former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later without showing proper cause, the requirement violates the RFRA.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's decision was precluded by the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in which the Court held that there is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. Additionally, judicial precedent states that religious beliefs or observances must not impinge on the rights of third parties, as the sought-after exemption would do to women seeking contraception in this case. Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the majority opinion misconstrued the RFRA as a bold legislative statement with sweeping consequences. Because for-profit corporations cannot be considered religious entities, the burden the respondents claim is not substantial, and the government has shown a sufficiently compelling interest, Justice Ginsburg argued that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. In their separate dissent, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan wrote that the Court need not decide whether for-profit corporations or their owners may sue under the RFRA.


[Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The workers and relatives of workers in the Gonzalez-Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of German-based DaimlerChrysler AG ("the company"), sued the company for violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. They argued that, during Argentina's "Dirty War" of 1976-1983, the company sought to punish plant workers suspected of being union agitators and worked with the Argentinean military and police to do so by passing along information and allowing the plant to be raided. The plaintiffs also argued that the company stood to gain from these actions as they ended strikes and allowed the plant to continue operating at maximum production levels.
The plaintiffs sued the company in district court in California, where some of the company's major subsidiaries are located under the Alien Torts Act, and the company moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for dismissal and held that the company did not have enough contacts in California to warrant a California court exercising jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and held that it is reasonable for a California court to have jurisdiction over a multinational company that is capable of litigating the case regardless of the location and has pervasive business contacts in the state.


[Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the company's slim contacts in California, relative to its other national and international contacts, are not sufficient to render it "at home" in the state for the purpose of general jurisdiction. Because the company had so little connection to California and this suit had nothing to do with the company's conduct in the state, to allow the district court to adjudicate such a case would grant the courts essentially global reach as long as the foreign company in question did any business with the state. The Court also held that subjecting the company to this suit would not be in line with the "fair play and substantial justice" standard the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands.
In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion ignored due process and jurisdiction precedent by basing the decision on the company's contacts outside the state rather than inside. She argued that such a case should be decided based solely on whether a company has sufficient contacts within the state to establish jurisdiction, without considering those contacts in relation to a larger company presence. Because this case dealt with foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign company for actions committed abroad, California jurisdiction should be considered unreasonable without the analysis of the majority opinion.


[Prado Navarette v. California (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On August 23, 2008, the Mendocino County dispatch center received a call from a Humboldt County dispatcher with the information that a silver Ford F150 pickup truck had run an unidentified vehicle off the road at mile marker 88 on southbound Highway 1. The original caller had also provided the license plate number of the pickup truck in question. The dispatch center broadcast that information to officers in the area, and two separate officers soon reported seeing the vehicle and began following it. The officers pulled the vehicle over, and while requesting information from the driver, smelled marijuana. During a search of the vehicle, the officers found four large bags of marijuana in the truck bed. The occupants of the vehicle, Lorenzo Prado Navarette and Jose Prado Navarette, were arrested for transportation of marijuana and possession of marijuana for sale.
At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop and argued that the evidence did not establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing to justify the stop. The state argued that the anonymous tip combined with the officers' observations of details that matched the tip constituted reasonable suspicion of the alleged reckless driving. The magistrate judge denied the motion. After the defendants petitioned for a review of this decision and were denied by both the California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five and the California Supreme Court, the defendants pled guilty. The California Court of Appeals for the First District, Division Five affirmed.


[Prado Navarette v. California (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, which justified the traffic stop. Because the reasonable suspicion standard allows an officer to rely on information beyond what that officer personally observed, a stop based on an anonymous tip does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the officer had reason to believe the information contained in the tip was reliable. In this case, the information came in the form of a call from the driver who had been run off the road, which means that the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge of the incident. Additionally, the timeline of the events suggest that the call was made almost immediately after the incident, so the caller presumably would not have had sufficient time to concoct a story. The Court held that, because the anonymous tip had these indicators of reliability and reported driving behavior consistent with reports of drunk driving that resulted in a car being run off the road, the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion and did not need to observe the alleged behavior at length.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the aspects of the anonymous tip that the majority opinion argues make it reliable do not in fact make the information trustworthy enough to stand uncorroborated. Justice Scalia argued that the supposed eyewitness status of the caller could be afforded to anyone who saw the truck and wanted the driver to be pulled over and that any time at all between the alleged incident and the phone call allowed the caller to create a false story. Since the caller only reported a specific instance of unsafe driving—forcing another car off the road—there was no reason for the police officer to suspect ongoing drunk driving. When the officers observed the car and still did not see any indication of impaired driving, the reliability of the anonymous tip was further undermined, and there was no reasonable suspicion for the officer to conduct a traffic stop. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Fernandez v. California (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On October 12, 2009, Abel Lopez was attacked and robbed by a man he later identified as Walter Fernandez. Lopez managed to call 911, and a few minutes after the attack, police and paramedics arrived on the scene. Detectives investigated a nearby alley that was a known gang location where two witnesses told them that the suspect was in an apartment in a house just off the alley. The detectives knocked on the door of the indicated apartment, and Roxanne Rojas answered. The detectives requested to enter and conduct a search, at which point Walter Fernandez stepped forward and refused the detectives entry. They arrested Fernandez and took him into custody. Police officers secured the apartment, informed Rojas that Fernandez had been arrested in connection with a robbery, and requested to search the apartment. Rojas consented to the search verbally and in writing. During the search, officers found gang paraphernalia, a knife, and a gun.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the warrantless search, and the trial court denied the motion. The jury found Fernandez guilty on the robbery charge, and he did not contest the charges for possession of firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. The California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed and held that the warrantless search was lawful because a co-tenant consented.


[Fernandez v. California (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, although a warrant is generally required for a search of a home, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is whether the search was reasonable. Although warrantless searches are unreasonable when two co-tenants are present and one objects to the search, the Court has held that the same search is reasonable when the objecting tenant leaves. In this case, because the objecting tenant was arrested and no longer present, the Court held that the search was reasonable because the consenting tenant had the authority to allow the police into her home.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he refused the petitioner's argument that general property law should govern in this case. Specifically, he noted that a guest could not trespass on a property if one tenant allowed that guest to enter the property despite a co-tenant's objection. Therefore, he argued that the police could not have infringed on any property rights. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he disagreed with a prior holding regarding warrantless searches, Georgia v. Randolph . There, the Court held that, where two co-tenants are present and one tenant consents to a police search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Instead, Thomas argued that a warrantless police search is constitutional if the police obtain voluntary consent from a person authorized to give that consent.
In her dissent Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg argued that the police, once they were aware of Fernandez' objection, should have gotten a warrant prior to searching the premises. Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


[Walden v. Fiore (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2006 Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson traveled from Las Vegas, Nevada to Atlantic City, New Jersey, to San Juan, Puerto Rico before returning to Las Vegas by way of Atlanta, Georgia. The two are professional gamblers with residences in California and Las Vegas. At a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint in San Juan, Fiore and Gipson were subjected to heightened security because they were travelling on a one-way ticket. TSA officers search the gamblers luggage and found $97,000 in U.S. currency. San Juan Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers arrived and questioned the pair to determine whether the money was the proceeds of illegal drug trade. Fiore and Gipson stated that the cash was their seed money and winnings from gambling. The DEA let Fiore and Gipson board the plane to Atlanta with their luggage.
When Fiore and Gipson landed at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport, Anthony Walden and other DEA agents approached and questioned them. Fiore and Gipson repeated their story and produced records of their travels. When a drug-detecting dog pawed Gipson's bag once, Walden stated that he had probable cause to seize the cash and took both Fiore and Gipson's bags before allowing them to continue on to Las Vegas without the money. When Fiore and Gipson got to Las Vegas they sent records of their gambling earnings along with past tax returns to prove their status as professional gamblers to Walden. Walden refused to return the money and referred the matter to a U.S. Attorney in Georgia based on a false probable cause affidavit. The U.S. Attorney found no probable cause and ordered the money returned. The money was returned to Fiore and Gipson seven months after it was seized.
Fiore and Gipson sued Walden in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging that the seizure violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Walden moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the District Court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the court did have personal jurisdiction because Walden intentionally caused foreseeable harm in Nevada by falsifying the probable cause affidavit and attempting to secure the seized funds permanently for the Atlanta DEA.


[Walden v. Fiore (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, unanswered. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Walden because he lacked contacts with Nevada. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a non-resident defendant have a substantial connection with the state in which he is sued. This connection must arise from the contacts that the defendant himself creates; yet all of Walden's conduct occurred in Georgia. The fact that Fiore and Gibson were injured in Nevada was insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over Walden their only connection to Nevada was that they chose to reside there during the months the money was seized.


[United States v. Quality Stores (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In October 2001, Quality Stores -- a national company -- and its affiliates commenced bankruptcy proceedings. When laying off employees, Quality Stores issued severance pay as part of its employees' gross income and reported the payments for federal income tax purposes as "wages" on W-2 forms. As required for "wages", the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax was paid on severance payments. FICA is a tax imposed on wages earned to fund Social Security and Medicare; both employer and employee pay part of the tax. The employee's part is withheld from his paycheck. Quality Stores contends that severance pay does not qualify as "wages", but rather payments under a Supplemental Unemployment Benefit (SUB) plan that are not taxable under FICA. SUB is a corporate program that creates severance payments in the event of involuntary termination; SUB payments do not qualify as "wages" under FICA because they are given after termination of a job rather than for work completed.
Based on this line of reasoning, Quality Stores filed for a refund from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS did not respond to Quality Stores' request for a refund, neither by allowing the claim nor denying it, and Quality Stores sued the IRS. The federal district court agreed with Quality Stores' view on severance payments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that severance pay satisfies the elements Congress set out to determine SUB payments, which therefore makes such payments exempt from FICA taxes.


[United States v. Quality Stores (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the Federal Insurance Contributions Act's broad definition of wages did include severance pay. Because the statutory definition of wages in FICA is "remuneration for employment," the fact that the employment has ended is irrelevant, as the severance pay is still remuneration for services rendered when the workers were still employed. The Court also held that the specific exemptions that FICA lays out indicate that anything not specifically included in the exemptions should be considered taxable wages. Given the legislative history surrounding the issue, the appropriate reading is that severance payments should be treated as wages and subject to the withholding of taxes.
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Abramski v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In November 2009, Bruce Abramski learned that his uncle wanted to purchase a new 9mm Glock handgun. Abramski offered to purchase this weapon because, as a former Virginia police officer, he could get a discount. On November 17, Abramski purchased the handgun and completed a form distributed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") on which he checked a box indicating that he was not buying the gun on behalf of another person.
In June 2010, Abramski was arrested for suspicion of committing a bank robbery. During a search of his home, the police found a receipt showing that Abramski gave the handgun to his uncle in exchange for $400. The police charged Abramski with violating federal law by making a false, material statement on an ATF form and with respect to information kept by a licensed firearms dealer. Specifically, the government argued that Abramski knowingly made a false statement to a firearms dealer, that he intended to deceive the firearms dealer, and that he made the false statement about a "material fact" when he did not disclose that he was buying the firearm for his uncle. A grand jury subsequently indicted Abramski.
Abramski moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress evidence regarding the receipt. He argued that he legally transferred the firearm to his uncle and therefore never made any false statements to the ATF or the firearms dealer. He also argued that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they did not have a proper warrant to conduct the search of his home from which the receipt resulted. The trial court denied Abramski's motion, stating that, because he did not disclose that the firearm was meant for his uncle, Abramski withheld a "material fact" required when purchasing a firearm. The trial court also held that the police did not violate Abramski's Fourth Amendment rights. Abramski entered a conditional guilty plea and received five years of probation and a $200 fine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[Abramski v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, because the statute clearly sets up a system for verifying the would-be buyer's identity and for the maintenance of the seller's records, it is evidently interested in the final purchaser and not simply the middleman who initially purchases the firearm. Therefore, the statute is meant to keep guns out of the hands of those who cannot legally posses them, and this purpose can only be served if the records reflect the information of the person who actually takes control of the gun after its purchase. Such a reading follows previously established precedent that focuses on a transaction's true participants rather than the initial, nominal ones. In this case, by hiding the fact that Alvarez was the actual buyer, Abramski prevented the gun dealer from interacting directly with Alvarez and violated the statute.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that, because neither Abramski nor his uncle were legally prohibited from owning a gun, the fact that Abramski was buying the gun for his uncle was immaterial to the sale itself. In attempting to otherwise read the statute, the majority opinion ignored the plain language of the statute itself, which is solely focused on the initial sale and not its ultimate consequences. Because there are other situations in which a gun changes hands that the statute does not consider to create a nominal purchaser and a true purchaser, Justice Scalia argued that the majority opinion misconstrues the statute's intended effect and broadens the statute beyond what Congress intended. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
John Dudenhoeffer and Alireza Partivopanah are former employees of Fifth Third Bank and are participants in the Fifth Third Bancorp Master Profit Sharing Plan, an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), which is a defined contribution retirement fund for employees with Fifth Third as a trustee. Participants make voluntary contributions to the ESOP from their salaries and Fifth Third matches the contributions by purchasing Fifth Third stock for their individual accounts. During the time period in question, a large amount of the ESOP's assets were invested in Fifth Third stock. Also during this period, Fifth Third switched from being a conservative lender to a subprime lender and the portfolio became increasingly vulnerable to risk, which it failed to disclose. The price of the stock declined drastically and caused the ESOP to lose tens of millions of dollars. The respondents sued Fifth Third and argued that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty as imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by continuing to invest in Fifth Third stock despite having knowledge of its increasingly precarious value. The federal district court granted Fifth Third's motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because under ERISA, the investment decisions made by ESOP fiduciaries are presumed to be prudent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that, while ESOP fiduciaries have a presumption of prudence, this presumption was an evidentiary matter and thus not grounds for a motion to dismiss.


[Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the presumption of prudence found by the lower courts is not included in ERISA's language; instead, the presumption is a court-made response to the different fiduciary duties of an ESOP fiduciary rather than fiduciaries of other eligible retirement plans under ERISA. Unlike other plans, ESOP plans prioritize buying a company's own stock, as opposed to diversifying retirement funds across a number of different investments. For non-ESOP retirement funds, normal prudence requires fiduciaries to spread the investment risk out across multiple investments, which is a prudential standard that cannot be applied to ESOP. Therefore, some courts had held that ESOP fiduciaries were entitled to a presumption of prudence regarding their choice of whether to purchase their own company stock or not. The Supreme Court, however, held that these differing requirements did not amount to a presumption of prudence for ESOP fiduciaries. Instead, the Court found that ESOP fiduciaries have the same fiduciary duty as non-ESOP fiduciaries, except as it applies to diversification of investments. The Court remanded the case back to the district court, instructing the lower court to analyze Fifth Third's motion to dismiss under the pleading standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, requiring a plaintiff's pleadings contain enough facts to give rise to a plausible entitlement to relief.


[Kansas v. Cheever (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On January 19, 2005, Scott D. Cheever shot and killed Greenwood County Sheriff Matthew Samuels at the residence of Darrell and Belinda Coopers in Hilltop, Kansas. Samuels had gone to the Coopers' residence based on a tip to arrest Cheever for outstanding warrants. He found the Coopers, Cheever, and two others cooking and ingesting methamphetamines. In the following attempts to arrest Cheever and retrieve the injured Samuels, Cheever also shot at several other officers.
At trial, Cheever asserted a voluntary intoxication defense and argued that the methamphetamine use rendered him mentally incapable of the premeditation required for murder. During the course of the trial, the judge ordered Cheever to undergo a psychiatric examination conducted by a psychiatric hired by the government. The prosecution sought to bring the transcript of the interview into evidence to impeach Cheever's testimony regarding the order of events at the Coopers' residence, which the court allowed. After the defense rested their case, the prosecution called the psychiatrist to the stand as a rebuttal witness to respond to the defense's claims regarding Cheever's mental capacity at the time of the crime. The trial court allowed the psychiatrist's testimony as a rebuttal witness. The jury found Cheever guilty and, at a separate sentencing hearing, sentenced him to death. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the admission of the government psychiatrist's testimony into evidence violated Cheever's Fifth Amendment rights.


[Kansas v. Cheever (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the prosecution from introducing psychiatric evidence to rebut psychiatric evidence presented by the defense. To deny the prosecution that right would undermine the adversarial process, because the jury should hear both sides of any discussion of the defendant's mental state at the time of the alleged crime. The Court also held that this ruling was in line with Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that does not allow a defendant to avoid cross-examination. When the defendant's mental state is at issue and the defense offers evidence through expert testimony, it may be rebutted by expert testimony from the prosecution.


[Loughrin v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Kevin Loughrin created a scheme to obtain cash by stealing checks from people's outgoing mail, altering them to make purchases at Target, and returning the purchases for cash. When the scheme came to an end, he and Theresa Thongsarn were indicted on six counts of bank fraud, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and one count of possession of stolen mail. Loughrin moved to dismiss the case and alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act; the district court denied the motion to dismiss. At trial, Loughrin requested that the jury instructions specify that the jury had to find that he had the intent to defraud a financial institution in order to find him guilty of bank fraud. The district court held that such an instruction was not necessary and declined to use it. Loughrin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 36 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.


[Loughrin v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, while one clause of the statute requires the intent to defraud a bank, the second clause does not require it. Instead, this second clause only requires that the defendant intend to obtain any property under the control of a bank. The Court held that requiring these two clauses to be read as having the same intent would render the second one meaningless; the structure of the statute indicated that the two clauses had different requirements. However, because the second clause should not apply to any and all fraud where the defrauder receives a check, the Court stated that the specific language limited its coverage to circumstances where the defendant's false statement "naturally induces" the bank to part with money in its control, instead of where a bank is only tangentially involved.
Justice Antonin G. Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued against the "natural inducement" test promoted by the Court. He argued that the dictionary definition of "by means of" language of the second clause included tangential involvement of a bank, although he agreed that the clause should not apply to all fraud where the defrauder receives a check. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the second clause only requires that the defendant knowingly execute a scheme to obtain bank property, instead of intentionally doing so.


[McCullen v. Coakley (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2007, the Massachusetts state legislature created a 35-foot buffer zone around the entrances, exits, and driveways of abortion clinics. The petitioners, individuals who routinely engage in "pro-life counseling" outside of state abortion clinics, sued in federal district court and argued that the law violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. The district court held that, although the law placed a restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech, the law was constitutional because it was content-neutral and still left adequate, if not perfect, alternative means of communications. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed and held that the Supreme Court, in Hill v. Colorado had already affirmed a similar statute in Colorado that prohibited certain activities within 100 feet of abortion clinics.


[McCullen v. Coakley (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, unanswered. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Massachusetts law was content-neutral on its face because a violation depends not on the speech itself but on the location of the speech, and therefore does not need to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. However, the Court also held that the law is still not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest because it places too great a burden on the petitioners' First Amendment Rights. By denying the petitioners the ability to engage in conversation and leafleting on public streets and sidewalks, the law prevents the petitioners from engaging in exactly the transmission of ideas the First Amendment is meant to protect. The Court also held that, in enacting the law, Massachusetts overlooked other options that could serve the same interests without placing an undue burden on historical avenues of speech and debate.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the law is content-based and therefore must be examined under strict scrutiny. A blanket prohibition of speech in areas where only one type of politically charged speech is likely to occur cannot be content-neutral. Justice Scalia also pointed out that the majority opinion did not address the question of whether Hill v. Colorado should be limited or overruled. Because Justice Scalia argued that the law was content-based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he wrote that Hill should be overruled because it contradicts First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the law's exemption for clinic employees and volunteers constitutes viewpoint discrimination because it silences abortion opponents while allowing clinic workers and supporters to express their views.


[Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In January 2010, Sprint Communications Co. filed a complaint with the Iowa Utilities Board ("IUB") asking for a declaration that it was proper to withhold certain VoIP call access charges from Windstream (formerly Iowa Telecom). Before IUB addressed the complaint, Sprint settled the dispute with Windstream and withdrew its complaint. However, IUB continued the proceeding so that it could decide a greater underlying issue of how VoIP communications should be classified under federal law. In February 2011, IUB issued an order with its own interpretation of VoIP's classification under federal law along with a determination that Sprint was liable to Windstream for the access charges.
Sprint challenged IUB's order by filing a complaint in both state court and federal district court, alleging that federal law preempts the IUB's decision. In order to proceed with the federal complaint first, Sprint filed a motion to stay the state case until resolution of the federal case. In turn, the IUB filed a motion asking the federal court to abstain and dismiss the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Generally, this doctrine states that a federal court shall abstain from hearing a case if there is a threat of interference with a state court proceeding involving important state interests. The district court granted IUB's motion and dismissed Sprint's federal complaint. Sprint appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which upheld the district court's abstention, but determined that a stay on the federal proceedings was more appropriate than dismissal.


[Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that a federal court is not required to abstain from deciding a case simply because there is a case in state court that deals with the same subject matter. Because the Younger doctrine only required a court to abstain when there are parallel criminal cases in federal and state courts or when there are certain civil proceedings that are very similar to criminal ones, it is meant only for exceptional cases. The proceeding in question is civil, not criminal, and does not affect a state court's ability to perform its judicial function, so none of the Younger exceptions are triggered in this case.


[Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (ICON) manufactures and sells exercise equipment throughout the United States. In 2000, ICON obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (the '710 patent) for a system designed to link parts in elliptical exercise machines. In 2010, ICON filed a complaint against another manufacturer and seller of exercise equipment, Octane Fitness (Octane), and claimed that Octane's elliptical design infringed upon the '710 patent.
The federal district court held that Octane's design did not violate ICON's '710 patent. ICON appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. Octane argued that ICON's lawsuit was not based on any real patent infringement, but instead aimed at hampering upstart competitors with expensive, frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, Octane asked the court to apply a patent law attorney fees statute, a statute that awards attorney fees when the plaintiff's suit is found to be "exceptional." The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision, but found that ICON had not acted "exceptionally" under the statute.


[Octane Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellate court construed the attorney fees statute in a manner that was unduly rigid. Restricting the grant of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in all but two exceptions would render the statute meaningless and would contradict patent litigation norms. The appellate court’s interpretation of the statute would also impermissibly encumber the district court’s discretionary power to award such fees. The Court also held that an “exceptional” case is simply one that stands out from others because of its frivolous nature relating to the legal arguments or merits of the claim. District courts may determine exceptionalness by considering the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Finally, the Court rejected the appellate court’s “clear and convincing evidence” standard that successful patent litigants would have to establish in order to receive fees. Instead, the Court held that a simple discretionary inquiry would serve to determine whether granting attorney fees is appropriate.


[Lexmark International v. Static Control Components (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) is a large producer of printers and toner cartridges. In 2002, Lexmark sued Static Control Components, Inc. (SCC) and alleged that SCC violated Lexmark's intellectual property when it manufactured microchips used in the repair and resale of Lexmark toner cartridges. SCC filed a counterclaim and argued that Lexmark, among other things, violated the Lantham Act by engaging in false advertising. The district court dismissed SCC's Lantham Act claims for lack of standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling and held that the lower court employed the wrong test to establish standing.
The Sixth Circuit relied on the "reasonable interest" test to establish standing under the Lantham Act, but unlike its sister circuits, did not use the AGC Factors, which use the same standards as those to establish an antitrust claim. Under this test, a claimant must demonstrate 1) a reasonable interest against the alleged false advertising and 2) a reasonable basis for believing that the alleged false advertising will damage that interest.


[Lexmark International v. Static Control Components (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the Lanham Act allowed any party to sue that had been injured by false advertising. However, because that language is so broad, the Court held that a determination of standing to sue should be based on proof that the plaintiffs' interests fall within the zone of interests protected by the law and that a violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury in question. In order to prove that the plaintiffs' interest fall within the zone of interest the Lanham Act protects, the plaintiffs must prove that they have a commercial interest in reputation or sales. To prove that the injury in question was caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff must show that that economic or reputational injury stemmed directly from the defendant's false advertising. The Court also held that the "reasonable interest" test the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied was not feasible because it was too vague. In this case, Static Control Component's claim satisfied both the zone of interest and proximate cause requirements to pursue a claim under the Lanham Act.


[Harris v. Quinn (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Pamela J. Harris is a personal care assistant who provides in-home care to disabled participants in the Home Services Program administered by a division of the Illinois Department of Human Services (Disabilities Program). The state pays the wages of assistants who work with participants in either the Disabilities Program or a program run by the Division of Rehabilitation Services (Rehabilitation Program). In 2003, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants elected Service Employees International Union Healthcare Illinois & Indiana as their collective bargaining representative. The union and the state negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that included a "fair share" provision, which required all personal assistants who are not union members to pay a proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process and contract administration. The Disabilities Program assistants rejected union membership in 2009.
In 2010, Harris and other personal assistants from both programs sued Governor Pat Quinn and the unions and claimed that the fair share fees violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that the state may require its employees, including personal assistants such as the plaintiffs, to pay fair share fees and further held that the claims of the Disability Program were not ripe for judicial review.


[Harris v. Quinn (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, undecided. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the apparently controlling precedent of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which stated the necessity of the fair share provision to prevent non-union members from taking advantage of the union's collective bargaining, cannot justify the violation of the petitioners' First Amendment rights in this case. Upon review, the Court held that the analysis in the Abood decision fundamentally misconstrued previous judicial precedent on the issue of collective bargaining as well as the differences between union relations in public-and private-sector employment. That precedent especially does not apply in this case because the petitioners are not full public-sector employees but are only considered such for the sake of limited collective bargaining. Because the union's role is so narrow in this case, there is no compelling interest served by forcing the petitioners to contribute that cannot be satisfied by less restrictive means.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that the precedent Abood established was highly influential in protecting the best interests of employees and government entities by enabling the government to bargain with a single body without allowing non-union members to take advantage of these benefits. Although the majority opinion focused on the ways in which the petitioners are not public-sector employees and not subject to this precedent, Justice Kagan emphasized the vast degree of oversight the state exercised over them and the state's interest in working with an effective bargaining agent. Therefore, there is no reason to differentiate this case from the ruling required by the Abood precedent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Petrella v. MGM, Inc. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
After Jake LaMotta retired from boxing, he and Frank Peter Petrella (F. Petrella) created two screenplays and a book based on LaMotta's life. These works were registered with the United States Copyright Office in 1963, 1973, and 1970, respectively. In 1976, LaMotta and F. Petrella signed a written agreement that granted the exclusive rights to the book and the screenplays to Chartoff-Winkler Productions, Inc, which in turn assigned those rights to a subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. (MGM), United Artists Corporation. In 1980, United Artists Corporation registered a copyright for the film "Raging Bull" based on LaMotta and F. Petrella's work. When F. Petrella died in 1981, which was still within the original 28-year period of the copyright, his renewal rights passed to his heirs.
In 1991, Paula Petrella (Petrella), the daughter of F. Petrella, filed an application for the renewal of copyright rights on the 1963 screenplay. In 1998, Petrella's attorney contacted MGM and asserted that Petrella had obtained the rights to the screenplay and its derivative works, which included the movie "Raging Bull," and that MGM was infringing on those rights. MGM argued that the 1963 screenplay was a collaboration between LaMotta and F. Petrella, so MGM retained the rights to the screenplay under the agreement with LaMotta. MGM also argued that there was no "substantial similarity of protectable elements" between the 1963 screenplay and the film. In 2009, Petrella sued MGM for copyright infringement, and the federal district court granted summary judgment for MGM under the doctrine of laches, which prevents a legal claim from being enforced if a long delay in filing the claim adversely affected the defendant's ability to fight the claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Petrella v. MGM, Inc. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the doctrine of laches could not be used to bar a copyright suit that seeks relief for damages that occurred within the three-year timeframe allowed by the Copyright Act. This limitation prevents a defendant from being held liable for multiple violations of the same work. Because Petrella did not seek relief for damages prior to three years before the filing of her suit, the doctrine of laches does not apply to this case. The Court also held that the doctrine of laches has never been used to bar claims for wrongs that occurred within the acceptable timeframe, so there was no precedent for the type of reading that MGM argued was necessary. Because laches originally served as a guide to adjudicating copyright disputes when there was no statutory limitation, there is no reason to use the doctrine to interpret the statute.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the doctrine of laches must be applied to the three-year statute of limitations in order for the courts to protect the equity of the legal system. Allowing the three-year limitation to control every copyright case regardless of the circumstances could create loopholes such as permitting plaintiffs to sue for copyright violations on the same work every three years or to wait long enough that evidence that could be used to defend against the suit is lost. Justice Breyer also argued that judicial precedent held that statutory limitations are subject to further adjustment in the name of equity. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.


[Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Section 125 of the Aviation Transportation Safety Act (ATSA) states that an air carrier who voluntarily reports suspicious transactions or behavior shall not be "civilly liable." The immunity does not apply to disclosures made with "actual knowledge" that the disclosure is false, inaccurate, or misleading. Likewise, the immunity does not extend to an air carrier that makes a disclosure with "reckless disregard" as to its truth or falsity.
William Hoeper, a pilot for Air Wisconsin, made four unsuccessful attempts to become certified to fly another type of aircraft after Air Wisconsin discontinued use of the type of plane that Hoeper had previously piloted. During his fourth and final opportunity to pass the test, Hoeper abruptly ended the test because he believed that the test administrators were deliberately sabotaging his efforts to pass. One test administrator knew that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had issued a firearm to Hoeper in his role as a federal flight deck officer (FFDO). FFDO pilots are not allowed to carry the firearm while traveling as passengers. This administrator booked Hoeper on a flight from the testing center in Virginia to Hoeper's home in Denver and then called the TSA to report that Hoeper was a disgruntled, and possibly armed, employee. In response, TSA officials arrested and searched Hoeper.
Hoeper sued Air Wisconsin in a Colorado state court and alleged defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin moved for a directed verdict based on the argument that it was immune from civil liability under ATSA. Air Wisconsin also argued that Hoeper could not prove "actual malice" because its statements were "substantially true" and therefore protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The jury found that Air Wisconsin's statements to the TSA were false and that it made at least one statement with reckless disregard for the truth, so the jury awarded Hoeper damages. A Colorado appellate court affirmed the verdict. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court's submission of the matter to the jury was improper; however, the error was harmless in this case because Air Wisconsin was not entitled to claim immunity under ATSA. The Colorado Supreme Court further held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the statements were false.


[Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that ATSA immunity protects false statements, as long as they are not materially false within the ATSA context, which means that they would not affect a reasonable security officer's perception of and response to a particular threat. Although Air Wisconsin's report to the TSA contained slight inaccuracies, they would not have influenced a TSA security officer's desire to investigate Hoeper, given the true facts that he was an FFDO and upset about losing his job. The Court further held that the Colorado Supreme Court erred in its analysis of material falsity and that Air Wisconsin was entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that, while he agreed with the majority opinion's ATSA immunity analysis, he would have remanded the case for further proceedings. He argued that the issue of material falsity was an important question for the jury and that a reasonable jury could find that Hoeper's conduct did not justify the making of any report to the TSA. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[Wood v. Moss (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
During the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush's team scheduled a campaign stop in Jacksonville, Oregon. With the approval of local law enforcement agencies, opponents of President Bush organized a peaceful demonstration to protest his policies. The demonstration took place at a public park before moving to the street near the local inn where the President was staying. Eventually, both opponents and supporters of President Bush gathered on the street of near the entrance to the inn, and each group had equal access to deliver its message to the President at the time of his arrival. Before the President arrived, Secret Service agents ordered local police to push protestors away from the immediate area for security reasons. The agents then ordered that the protesters be driven farther away from the inn onto the east side of 5th street. However, agents failed to give the same directive for supporters who remained stationed on the streets close to the inn. The plaintiffs alleged that the orders to move were unintelligibly given and that police proceeded to use force before confirming that the orders were understood or were being followed.


[Wood v. Moss (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the agents had not violated any clearly established law in their attempt to maintain an appropriate level of protection for the President despite his unscheduled detour. Because the plaintiffs were unable to establish that the Secret Service agents engaged in crowd control should have been aware of their duty to ensure that different groups obtained equal access to the President, the agents are eligible for qualified immunity. The Secret Service agents' actions were in direct response to the relative security risks the groups posed based on their locations, and so their actions did not violate the First Amendment.


[Burt v. Titlow (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In August 2000, Vonlee Nicole Titlow helped his aunt Billie Rogers murder his wealthy uncle Donald Rogers. After Titlow was charged with first-degree murder, the prosecution offered him a plea bargain. In exchange for testifying against Billie Rogers, Titlow could plead guilty to manslaughter and receive a reduced sentence. After consulting with his attorney, Titlow accepted the deal. However, before sentencing, Titlow spoke to a sheriff's deputy who suggested that he withdraw his guilty plea and consult another attorney. Titlow followed the deputy's advice, hired a new attorney and withdrew his guilty plea.
Following his trial, a jury convicted Titlow of second-degree murder and sentenced him to 20-to-40 years in prison. This led Titlow to accuse his second attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel for allowing him to withdraw the original guilty plea. Both the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Titlow's claim. Titlow petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court to hear his case, but they refused to do so.
Titlow then petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, but the district court denied his claim as well. The district court held that Titlow failed to meet the standard for overturning a state-court conviction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and ordered the state to reoffer Titlow's original plea agreement. The appellate court held that Titlow's second attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate his claims further, failing to obtain documents from the first attorney, and failing to convince Titlow to take the plea bargain.


[Burt v. Titlow (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No; no; unanswered. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that, when a state prisoner asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the AEDPA requires the Court of Appeals to apply a "doubly-deferential" standard in which both the state court and the defense attorney are given the benefit of the doubt. Because the state court's factual determination is assumed to be correct, the state prisoner has the burden to disprove that determination with clear and convincing evidence. In this case, the Court held that there was no convincing evidence that the new counsel's advice did not stem from the defendant's continued protestations of innocence. In the absence of such evidence, the new counsel's advice was reasonable and the defendant could not prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the defendant had the burden to prove that the new counsel acted ineffectively and that the state court decided the case incorrectly—both burdens that the defendant did not meet. Justice Sotomayor also emphasized the limited scope of the ruling in this case, which referred only to the facts at hand. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she argued that the plea deal became invalid when the defendant refused to testify against her aunt, so the prosecutor could not be directed to renew a plea deal that could no longer exist. Without the existence of a still-possible plea deal, there was no reversible error in the trial.