[United States v. S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Government liability under the FTCA is limited by the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides that the federal government may not be held liable for "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused." The FAA's decision to institute the "spot-check" program to monitor compliance with its minimum safety standards was clearly discretionary and protected by Section 2680(a). It was a calculated decision which took into account the objectives of the certification process in light of practical considerations such as funding and staffing. Judicial intervention in such a decision would be precisely what the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent.


[Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Dun and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, mistakenly reported to some of its subscribers that the construction contractor Greenmoss Builders had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. The president of Greenmoss quickly learned about the erroneous report, requested Bradstreet to correct its error, and asked for the list of subscribers who received the report. Bradstreet refused to release the names on the list, but issued a correction to its five subscribers who received the original report. The correction stated that actually a former employee of Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss Builders "continued in business as usual." Greenmoss was dissatisfied with the correction and again asked for the list. When Bradstreet refused a second time, Greenmoss filed suit against it for defamation in a Vermont state court. The court discovered that a 17-year-old high student interning for Bradstreet had caused the error and the jury awarded $350,000 to Greenmoss in compensatory and punitive damages. Bradstreet claimed that contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the trial judge told the jury that it could award punitive damages even if Bradford did not make mistakes intentionally or out of recklessness. The court granted Bradstreet's motion for retrial, but the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that Gertz only applied to cases involving defamation by the media.


[Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis Powell authored the opinion for a 5-4 court. Although the trial court correctly perceived that the trial judge's instructions did not satisfy the requirements of Gertz, the Court held that Gertz did not apply since the present case did not involve public speech. Instead the Court looked to apply the logic of Gertz to situations concerning private speech. The Court reasoned that laws regulating defamation suits aimed to "balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type [Bradstreet's] of expression." Because the First Amendment offers less protection to private speech than to public speech, and especially less to speech "being solely motived by a desire for profit," damages caused by it can result in heavier penalties and broader conditions for convictions. Therefore states can allow the recovery of punitive damages in defamation cases involving private speech even when the perpetrator does not demonstrate "actual malice."


[New York v. Quarles (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
After receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.


[New York v. Quarles (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that officers issue Miranda warnings to suspects. Since the police officer's request for the location of the gun was prompted by an immediate interest in assuring that it did not injure an innocent bystander or fall into the hands of a potential accomplice to Quarles, his failure to read the Miranda warning did not violate the Constitution.


[Heckler v. Matthews (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Congress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 amendments included a "pension offset" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision.


[Heckler v. Matthews (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The unanimous Court upheld the law. Justice Brennan granted that the 1977 amendments temporarily revived gender-based eligibility requirements, but maintained that they served a legitimate government interest, namely, they protected individuals who had planned for their retirements relying on the law as it stood before the Court's Califano decision. The resurrected eligibility criteria were narrowly drawn, applying to those individuals who were eligible for spousal benefits prior to 1977 who retired by 1982. Since many individuals who are planning for retirement rely on the law in making investment and spending decisions, changing the law (as Califano did) without giving some leeway to people who had already planned for the future would place an unreasonable burden on many who were close to retirement.


[Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Sure-Tan Inc. and Surak Leather Company were two small leather processing firms in Chicago who were considered a single employer for the purposes of this case. Of the 11 laborers both companies employed, several were illegal immigrants. In July 1976, eight workers from both companies authorized the Chicago Leather Workers Union to act as their collective bargaining representative. On December 10, 1976, the Union prevailed in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. The companies filed complaints with the NLRB and alleged that many of the voting members were illegal immigrants. When the NLRB certified the union anyway, the president of Surak Leather Company sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to request a check on the immigration status of the employees in question. INS agents discovered five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and deported them.
The NLRB’s Acting Regional Director filed complaints alleging that the companies engaged in unfair labor practices, and the charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to order the petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and substituted backpay for the recommendation of reinstatement.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first part of the Board’s order. However, the Court of Appeals held that, because backpay could only be given for periods of time when the employees were legally eligible but unable to work, the companies should be required to pay a minimum amount of six months worth of backpay.


[Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that that the NLRB can act to protect the labor rights of illegal immigrants because it serves the broader purpose of labor to have all workers represented, regardless of immigration status. Precedent establishes that the Board can protect the rights of any employee. The petitioners’ actions illegally discouraged union activity and caused the deportation of their employees. The Court also held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit impermissibly expanded its authority by modifying the order of the NLRB in regards to backpay.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that the majority erred in remanding the case to the Court of Appeals, as the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed in its entirety. Since the NLRB acquiesced to the remedy provided by the Court of Appeals, no purpose was served by reconsideration. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part where he argued that illegal aliens are not considered employees under the National Labor Rights Act. Since illegal aliens are actively violating United States criminal laws, the Act does not afford them protection. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii.


[Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court found that the Hawaii Liquor Tax violated the Constitution. Justice White reaffirmed what he called a "cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence" in arguing that states are prohibited from imposing taxes which discriminate in the traffic of interstate commerce. Since the law was originally enacted to support local industries in Hawaii, and the alcoholic products which the law exempted competed with different beverages produced outside the state, Justice White concluded that there were clear constitutional violations in this case.


[Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Bose Corporation, a loudspeaker manufacturer, brought a product disparagement action against Consumer Union for publishing a negative review of Bose products. Among other comments, Consumer Union's article mistakenly said that Bose loudspeakers caused sounds of individual musical instruments to wander "about the room" when they in fact merely wandered "along the wall[s]." Ruling in favor of Bose, the District Court found that the article's statements were factually wrong and made with "actual malice." On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed as it found the lower court's ruling to be clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court granted Bose certiorari.


[Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that while the record revealed that the article's author mistakenly described the sound path of Bose speakers, he did not do so with actual malice. A review of the author's testimony showed that he heard the Bose speaker sounds as tending to wander "along the wall" between speakers, rather than "about the room." Despite this disparity, the Court held that the description of Bose speaker sounds as wondering "about the room," though a misconception, was not written with actual malice since its author was not aware of his mischaracterization in time to remedy the error. Therefore, his speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.


[Nix v. Williams (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.


[Nix v. Williams (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.


[New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools.


[New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
After the original oral argument in March of 1984, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O's purse.
The Court heard reargument on October 02, 1984. The Court held that while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the circumstances.


[Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no "good-faith exception" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant.


[Massachusetts v. Sheppard (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court maintained that trial courts can use evidence seized by officers who have an "objectively reasonable basis" for mistakenly believing they have obtained valid warrants. Upon a factual inquiry, the Court found that "the officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them" to secure a valid warrant. Lawmakers did not enact rules for excluding evidence to invalidate evidence because of clerical errors by judges but to deter police from conducting unlawful searches.


[Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On March 31, 1980, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper C.J. Williams observed Richard McCarty’s vehicle weaving back and forth on Interstate Highway 270. He followed the car, pulled McCarty over, and asked him to exit the vehicle. Williams noticed that McCarty had trouble standing, and thus determined that he would charge McCarty with a traffic offense and that McCarty was no longer free to leave the scene. McCarty failed a balancing test.
Williams then asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants, and McCarty responded that he had consumed two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before. Williams placed McCarty under arrest. At the county jail, however, a breathalyzer test did not detect any alcohol in McCarty’s system. Williams resumed questioning McCarty, asking him if he was under the influence of alcohol and whether the marijuana had been treated with any chemicals. Williams responded, “I guess, barely,” to the first question, but denied that the marijuana he smoked had been treated. At no point did Williams or any other officer tell McCarty that he had a right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, or to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.
McCarty was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor under Ohio law punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to six months. McCarty moved to exclude the incriminating statements he made to Trooper Williams both on the scene of the arrest and in jail, on the grounds that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The trial court denied the motion; McCarty pled ‘no contest’ and was found guilty. On appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that the Miranda rule does not apply to misdemeanors, relying on a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s appeal for failing to present a substantial constitutional question. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s writ of habeas corpus, but the United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals accused of misdemeanor traffic offenses prior to custodial interrogation, but did not clearly apply this rule to McCarty’s statements made at the scene of his arrest.


[Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that arrestees in custody and under suspicion for a misdemeanor traffic offense must be informed of their constitutional rights or subsequent statements are inadmissible. Justice Marshall rejected Berkemer’s argument that the Court should carve out an exception to the Miranda rule for lesser offenses. He noted that the police are often unaware when they arrest a person whether that person has committed a felony or a misdemeanor, and that seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalate into more serious investigations. He reasoned that carving out an exception to the Miranda rule for misdemeanor traffic offenses would undermine Miranda’s simplicity and effectiveness given the rule’s widespread, customary use by police.
Justice Marshall then distinguished between the statements McCarty made at the scene of the arrest and at the jail. He held that McCarty was in custody as of the moment he was formally placed under arrest for driving under the influence, and that statements made after this point were inadmissible. He also held, however, that McCarty was not put in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule before this point. Justice Marshall reasoned that a routine traffic stop was more akin to a non-custodial ‘Terry stop’, and generally ended with a motorist’s release. He noted that McCarty was not told he could not leave prior to his arrest, and was only asked a few questions and told to perform a balancing test. Consequently, Justice Marshall held that the Ohio State Highway Patrol was not obligated to give Miranda warnings to persons detained pursuant to routine traffic stops.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He argued that the majority should have limited its decision to the question presented in Berkemer’s petition for certiorari: Whether law enforcement officers must give ‘Miranda warnings’ to individuals arrested for misdemeanor traffic offenses. He argued that the Court failed to follow the course of judicial restraint by answering a question not passed upon by the lower courts.


[United States v. Leon (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial.


[United States v. Leon (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, there is such an exception. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.


[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Fred and Mary Engle filed a joint federal income tax return in 1975. During that year, Fred Engle acquired two oil and gas leases covering a total of 240 acres in Wyoming. The Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction on advance royalties from the oil and gas leases, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected their claim because the deduction was not based on average daily production from the property’s oil and gas leases, as required by the Commissioner’s interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 613A of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, with one dissent. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed, holding that § 613A authorized depletion allowances on advance royalties so long as there was eventual production from the property.
Also in 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg, joint owners of 46,515 acres of land in Irion County, Texas, leased their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under these leases, the Farmars and Suggs received royalties and annual cash bonuses from the lessees. The bonuses were payable even when the property produced no oil or gas. The Farmars and Suggs claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the royalties and bonuses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the royalties because they were not based on average daily production from the property. In a consolidated suit, the Court of Claims held that Congress only allowed for depletion deductions from actual production during the taxable year.
In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress eliminated percentage depletion deductions for major oil producers. § 613A(d), however, authorized any qualified independent gas or oil producer or royalty owner to compute the allowance for percentage depletion in accordance with gross income from the property. The act stipulated that the allowance was tied to the taxpayer’s average daily production so as not to exceed the taxpayer’s depletable quantity. The Farmars and Suggs and the Commissioner filed petitions for writs of certiorari; the Supreme Court of the United States granted their petitions and consolidated their cases.


[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that the act allowed independent lessors to claim percentage depletion deductions on advance royalties from oil and gas leases. Justice O’Connor first described the history of percentage depletion deductions from oil and gas income, noting that prior to 1975, the Commissioner allowed such deductions on any advance royalty or bonus whether there was current production of the underlying minerals or not. These deductions only had to be attributed to actual production during the life of the lease.
While acknowledging that the Commissioner’s interpretation was plausible given the language of the act, Justice O’Connor argued that Congress eliminated the percentage deductions for large producers to subsidize the combined efforts of small producers and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the nation’s oil and gas resources. Under the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 613A, however, lessors and lessees would devote fewer resources to development of the nation’s energy resources. Justice O’Connor also looked to the legislative history of the act, noting that a complete repeal of the percentage deduction was never suggested during committee consideration of the act.
Finally, Justice O’Connor held that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the act was unreasonable. She wrote that holders of interests in oil and gas deposits had been consistently entitled to percentage deductions for the past fifty years. She noted that the Commissioner’s interpretation denied percentage deductions to all parties when congress clearly intended to grant them to at least some parties.
Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan, Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall. He emphasized that the Commissioner’s interpretation was consistent with the language of the statute, and that the act specifically tied the calculation of percentage deductions to average daily production during a given taxable year. Justice Blackmun disagreed that congressional silence on the availability of percentage deductions was dispositive.


[United States v. Karo (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants.


[United States v. Karo (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court found that although the cans of ether may have contained an unknown and unwanted object, no meaningful interference with the defendants' interest in their possessions occurred, as the tracking device was installed before the defendants obtained the ether. This case was an expansion of the holding announced in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). (Abstract by Blaine Schmidt.)


[Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request.


[Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message.


[Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Henri and Mary Tatro’s three-and-a-half year old daughter Amber had spina bifida. As a result, Amber suffered from a neurogenic bladder, which required the use of a catheter every three or four hours each day to avoid kidney injury. The preferred method of catheterization was called clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). Amber was unable to perform this method herself because of her age, but a layperson could easily learn to perform the procedure.
In 1979, Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber as required by the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This law required Texas to provide handicapped children with a free public education including ‘related services’. It only required ‘medical services’ for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. Amber’s individualized education program provided that she would attend early childhood development classes and receive physical and occupational therapy. Her program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Tatros unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services during school hours.
In October 1979, the Tatros filed an action against the district, the Texas State Board of Education, and others. They sought an injunction requiring the district to provide Amber with CIC. They also sought damages and attorneys’ fees through the Rehabilitation Act (RA), which forbade programs receiving federal aid from excluding handicapped people from participation and allowed prevailing parties to recover attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the Tatros' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that CIC was not a ‘related service’ under the EHA because it did not arise from an effort to educate. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that CIC was indeed a ‘related service’ under the EHA, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then ruled that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA because a doctor was not needed to administer the procedure. It found that CIC was a ‘related service’ and ordered the defendants to modify Amber’s individualized education program accordingly. It also held that the Tatros had proved a violation of the RA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both holdings.


[Irving Independent School District v. Tatro (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the provision of CIC was a ‘related service’ and not a ‘medical service’ under the Education of the Handicapped Act. He looked to the text of the EHA, which defined ‘related service’ as that which is required for a handicapped child to benefit from special education. Chief Justice Burger noted that Amber would not be able to attend school and benefit from special education without CIC. He cited the Court’s previous holdings on the act, where it determined that congress intended to give handicapped children meaningful access to public education.
Chief Justice Burger held that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA. He deferred to the regulations of the Department of Education, which defined ‘medical services’ as those provided by a licensed physician. As CIC could be performed by a layperson and was required for Amber to attend school, it fell within both Congress’ and the Department of Education’s definitions of ‘related services’.
Chief Justice Burger also held that the Tatros were not entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation Act because relief was available under the EHA. Hence, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the Tatros were entitled to attorneys’ fees.
Justice William Brennan concurred in part, but dissented from the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees under the Rehabilitation Act. He referred to his dissent in Smith v. Robinson, where he similarly objected to that majority’s interpretation of a conflict between the EHA and the RA as an implicit repeal of parties’ right to seek attorneys’ fees.
Justice Stevens concurred in part but also dissented to the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees. He noted that the district's petition for certiorari did not challenge the award of attorneys’ fees.


[Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1974, Marshall Murphy was questioned by Minneapolis police about the rape and murder of a teenage girl, but he was never charged. In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in an unrelated criminal sexual conduct case and was sentenced to a 16-month suspended prison sentence and three years probation. During probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders at Alpha House and to see a probation officer. While at Alpha House, Murphy admitted to the 1974 rape and murder. An Alpha House counselor contacted Murphy’s probation officer about the admission and the officer called Murphy in for a meeting. During the meeting Murphy became angry and said he “felt like calling a lawyer” but still admitted to the rape and murder. The probation officer relayed the information from the meeting to the police, and Murphy was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.
At trial, Murphy tried to suppress testimony about the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession, and the confession was not compelled or involuntary. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the confession violated the Fifth Amendment because Murphy’s parole officer knew that Murphy’s answers were likely to be incriminating.


[Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that admissions made to a probation officer about a crime unrelated to the probation are admissible in subsequent prosecution. A state may require a probationer to meet with his officer and discuss matters that may affect his probationary status, but this does not create an exception to the rule that one must assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Murphy could have asserted that privilege when his officer asked the questions that led to the incriminating answers, but he failed to do so.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that the state should have to prove that Murphy knew his rights and knowingly waived them. The facts of this case did not warrant application of the principle that one waive their privilege against self-incrimination unless they asserted it in a timely fashion. Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Grove City College v. Bell (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Grove City College, a private, coeducational liberal arts school, sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. The College did, however, enroll a large number of students who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) through a Department of Education-run program. The DOE concluded that this assistance to students qualified the College as a recipient of federal assistance and made it subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. When the College refused to comply with the requirements, the DOE attempted to terminate assistance to the student financial aid program. The College challenged the DOE's actions.


[Grove City College v. Bell (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that there was no "substantive difference" between institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students; Title IX coverage, the Court found, was triggered by the BEOG's. The Court noted that the assistance did not trigger institutionwide coverage under the Amendments, however. Only the College's financial aid program was subject to the federal requirements. The Court concluded that prohibiting discrimination as a condition for federal assistance did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the College and that the school was free to end its participation in the grant program.


[Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to "engage in editorializing."


[Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, "since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity," Congress must use the First Amendment to "inform and give shape" to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which "lies at the heart of First Amendment protection."


[Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Anthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child.


[Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while ethnic prejudices did exist in society, those private biases were not permissible considerations for the removal of an infant child from the custody of its mother. "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." The Court thus held that the decision of the lower courts was an unconstitutional denial of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.


[California v. Trombetta (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1980 and 1981, in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a “breathalyzer test”) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that the test results be excluded from all the trials.


[California v. Trombetta (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that due process rights do not extend to the point of compelling law enforcement to preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants. The state’s duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. Such evidence must possess an apparent exculpatory value before it is destroyed, and it must be of such a nature that the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. States are also prohibited of not taking breath samples did not violate the Due Process Clause because the breathalyzer tests were reliable and the exculpatory value of breath samples was very low. Additionally, defendants could have used alternate means to disprove the test results.


[Hudson v. Palmer (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State.


[Hudson v. Palmer (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches did not apply "within the confines of the prison cell." Noting that privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance, the Court found that "the paramount interest in institutional security" outweighed all privacy concerns. The Court further held that "random and unauthorized" deprivations of property did not violate the Due Process Clause, so long as postdeprivation remedies were available.


[Waller v. Georgia (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing.


[Waller v. Georgia (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to suppression hearings. The Court found that the "aims and interests" of public trials were "no less pressing in a hearing to suppress wrongfully seized evidence." The Court noted that the presumption of openness for trials could be overcome only by overriding interests based on findings that closure was absolutely necessary to preserve higher values and was narrowly tailored to serve those interests.


[United States v. Jacobsen (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On May 1, 1981, pursuant to company procedure, employees at the FedEx office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport opened a package that had been damaged by a forklift. The package was an ordinary-looking cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside, they found a tube that contained four plastic bags inside one another, and the innermost bag contained a white substance. They notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the contents of the box. When the DEA agents arrived, they removed a small amount of the white powder to conduct a field test that determined the powder was cocaine. The DEA agents obtained a warrant for the address on the package and searched the location, where they arrested Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen for possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute.
After they were indicted, the respondents filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal search. The motion was denied, and the defendants were tried and convicted in district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision and held that the warrant was the product of the test of the powder, for which a warrant was required.


[United States v. Jacobsen (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the decision of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the initial inspection by the DEA agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it remained within the scope of the previous search conducted by private agents. Once the agents gained enough information about the package to believe it contained contraband, the warrantless seizure of the package and its contents was not unreasonable. The Court also held that the test did not compromise any legitimate privacy interest. Either the test would be positive, which meant that the respondents had no legal right to posses the substance, or the test would be negative, which meant the agents knew nothing more about the powder than they knew after the visual examination.
Justice Byron R. White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Court unnecessarily dwelled on the fact that the DEA agent’s initial inspection of the contraband was allowed by the Fourth Amendment. Since the Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was in plain view when the agents arrived, there was no reason for the Court to consider the issue. He also disagreed with the Court’s analysis and argued that the government cannot duplicate a private search without a warrant.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the condition in which the DEA agents found the contents of the box was not clear enough to make a ruling. If the contents of the box were in plain view, the agents did not need a warrant, but if the contents were not, the agents required a warrant to replicate the private search. He also argued that the Court erred by not taking into account the context in which agents find an item as evidence of an expectation of privacy that the search violates. In this case, the packaging clearly indicated that the substance was illegal. Therefore the respondents had no expectation of privacy, and the search was legal.


[McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April 16, 1973, about two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.


[McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to self-representation completely free from the presence of standby counsel. Rather, the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right to “control the organization and content of his own defense.” The Court held that Wiggins was afforded all appropriate rights and that the presence of standby counsel did not interfere with the exercise of these rights.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Sixth Amendment protected a defendant’s right to present his case entirely without the mediation of a court-appointed attorney. Although Wiggins’ standby counsel was appointed in a purely advisory capacity, the attorneys regularly intervened and could have undermined Wiggins’ defense strategy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.


[Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."


[Schall v. Martin (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address. He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred.


[Schall v. Martin (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for a 6-3 majority, held that pretrial detention of juveniles does not violate the right of Due Process. The pretrial detention serves the legitimate purpose of protecting both the state and the juvenile from further crimes. Since the state has more responsibilities in the case of a juvenile than in the case of an adult, the pretrial detention not only protects society from potential crime, but it also protects the juvenile from the potential physical and psychological harm that can happen in the commission of a crime. The Court also found that the FCA put in place enough procedural safeguards that the juveniles are not denied Due Process. They are afforded notice, a hearing, and a statement of facts before any detention takes place, as well as an additional hearing to determine probable cause if the fact-finding hearing is not scheduled within three days.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and wrote that the standard of “serious risk” was too vague and easily satisfied given the limited information in the possession of the judge or the juvenile’s lawyer at the time of the initial hearing. Additionally, the conditions of juvenile detention centers are often such that the psychological harms of subjecting a juvenile who has not been found guilty to that environment far outweigh the abstract benefits to society. Given the near-impossibility of predicting whether or not a juvenile will commit a crime in the near future, Justice Marshall found that drastic measures such as pretrial detention could not be justified and represented a violation of Due Process. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Calder v. Jones (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Shirley Jones was a professional actress and California resident whose television career was also based in California. Marty Ingels, her husband, was also a professional entertainer. On October 9, 1979, the National Enquirer published an article about Jones. John South wrote the first draft of the article, and his byline appeared on it. Shortly before publication, South called Ingels to read him the article and elicit his comments on it. Ian Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, declined to print a retraction.
National Enquirer, Inc. was a corporation that published a national newspaper with a total circulation of over five million, 600,000 copies of which were sold in California. John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. He was a resident of Florida, but frequently travelled to California on business. Ian Calder was a Florida resident and he exerted close control over the functions of the Enquirer; he had traveled to California only twice and had no other relevant contacts with that state.
Jones filed an action in California state court against Calder and South, alleging that the article was untrue, libelous, and that it damaged their reputations and good names. The superior court ruled that although the injury occurred in California, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claim because of the potential chilling effect from requiring editors and reporters to appear in remote jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals reversed because the defendants intended to cause tortious injury to Jones and Ingels in California. A timely petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied, but the Supreme Court of the United States treated it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granting review.


[Calder v. Jones (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that Calder's and South’s contacts with California were sufficiently strong to give California state courts jurisdiction over Jones’ libel claim. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant has certain minimum contacts with a state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Looking to the facts of Jones’ claim, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident, and that Jones’ television career was based in California. In addition, the alleged injury to Jones’ career was suffered in California. Thus, jurisdiction was proper because of the effects of Calder and South’s Florida activities in California. Unlike a welder who helps create a boiler in one state that is sold in another state and that subsequently malfunctions, Calder and South allegedly intentionally directed their actions at California.
Justice Rehnquist noted that courts must evaluate each defendants’ contacts with a given state to determine if they’re sufficient, even if defendants work for the same organization. He rejected Calder and South’s argument that extending jurisdiction over writers and editors in remote states would have a chilling effect on speech; First Amendment concerns about that effect are already taken into account in the constitutional limits on the substantive law of libel.


[United States v. Cronic (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
During a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic’s counsel withdrew and the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government’s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the government. The jury found Cronic guilty and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Cronic’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction.


[United States v. Cronic (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by inferring that the less-than-ideal circumstances leading up to the trial negatively influenced the lawyer’s performance. The Sixth Amendment protects the right for an accused to receive effective assistance of counsel in order to protect the adversary process. Therefore, the test to determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred must rely on evidence that the adversary process itself suffered. In this case, there was no evidence of specific instances of failure of counsel during trial. Also, the circumstances prior to the trial were not such that effective assistance would have been impossible.
Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment.


[Oliver v. United States (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
These are two consolidated cases involving the discovery of open marijuana fields as the result of unwarranted searches of privately owned land.
In the first case, Kentucky State police searched Ray E. Oliver's farm, acting on reports that marijuana was grown there. A gate marked with a "No Trespassing" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the field about a mile from Oliver's home. Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open fields.
In the second case, police searched the woods behind Richard Thornton's property after an anonymous tip. Police found two marijuana patches on Thornton's land. The Maine Superior Court granted Thornton's motion to suppress evidence found in the search for the same reasons as the Oliver case. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Main affirmed.


[Oliver v. United States (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 vote, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority, stating that the open field doctrine applies to both cases. Individuals cannot legitimately expect privacy for activities conducted out in the open except in the area immediately surrounding their house. Also, the act of police officers entering a privately owned field is not automatically a search for Fourth Amendment purposes even if it is a common law trespass. Oliver's case was affirmed, and Thornton's was reversed and remanded.
Justice Byron White wrote a special concurrence, saying that there was no need for the majority to deal with the expectation of privacy issue because a field is clearly not a "house" or an "effect" under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, contending that the law should protect private land that is marked as such against unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice John P. Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent.


[Pulliam v. Allen (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In January 1980, Richmond Allen was arrested for allegedly using abusive and insulting language, which is a Class 3 misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of $500. Gladys Pulliam, the state magistrate for Culpeper County, Virginia set bail at $250 and, when Allen was unable to make bail, Pulliam committed him to the Culpeper County Jail for 14 days. Allen was tried, found guilty, fined, and released. The trial judge reopened his case and reversed the judgment. Allen sued Pulliam in district court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief for incarcerating him while waiting for trial on non-jailable offenses.
Jesse Nicholson was arrested four times in a two-month period for public intoxication, a Class 4 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $100 fine. Like Allen, Nicholson was incarcerated for failure to make bail, and he intervened in Allen’s suit as a party plaintiff.
This district court held that Pulliam’s practice of incarcerating persons for not making bail on non-jailable offenses violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court enjoined the practice and found Allen and Nicholson entitled to costs, including attorneys’ fees. Pulliam appealed the finding regarding costs and argued that, as a judicial officer, she was granted judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the judicial immunity argument and affirmed the district court’s decision.


[Pulliam v. Allen (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the precedent set by British common law relied on the issuance of writs, rather than the imposition of judicial immunity, to protect judicial independence. The United States never had a doctrine of judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there was no evidence that the lack of that protection created a chilling effect on judicial independence. The Court held that there was no reason to assume such immunity was necessary. There was no legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to insulate judges from injunctive relief. The Civil Rights Acts and their interpretations illustrate that Congress intended all state actors to be subject to such remedies to ensure the protection of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that judicial immunity from all types of relief and damages in civil suits is essential to protect judicial independence. He wrote that the majority’s opinion misinterprets British common law, which does rely on judicial immunity to protect judges from suit arising from a judge acting in her official capacity. He argued that the potential for the awarding of attorneys’ fees greatly increases the risk of harassing litigation because attorneys will recommend such action to clients. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


[Block v. Rutherford (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to embrace his family is "a matter of great importance" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.


[Block v. Rutherford (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Central Jail's policies worked to further the government's reasonable and legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of jail officials and visitors. The Court cited the extensive precedent that gave discretion to prison officials in enacting policies and procedures that they deem necessary to preserve internal order and security.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed with the approval of Central Jail's policies but disagreed with the majority's willingness to grant judicial deference to jail officials rather than to perform a careful analysis of the inmates' constitutional claims.
Justice Thurgood Marshall authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the jail officials could not show that allowing low-risk inmates to see their family would "frustrate the achievement of any substantial state interest." Furthermore, Justice Marshall cautioned against the Court's quick deference to the "expertise" of prison administrators and their blanket acceptance of "established state procedure[s]," at the cost of the depriving inmates of their private property. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.


[Heckler v. Day (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) establishes a four-step review process of disputed disability benefit claims. First, a state agency determines if a claimant has a disability and when the condition began or ended. Second, state agencies' disability determinations can be reviewed upon the claimant's request. Third, if upon review the claimant suffers an adverse finding he or she may demand an evidentiary hearing by an administrative law judge. Fourth, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, they may appeal to the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Claiming delays in excess of 90 days, during steps two and three, Leon Day sued on behalf of several similarly aggrieved Vermont claimants alleging a violation of the "reasonable time" hearing limitation. On appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling upholding a district court's imposition of disability hearing deadlines, the Supreme Court granted HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler certiorari.


[Heckler v. Day (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Congress already considered and expressly rejected the imposition of mandatory disability dispute-resolution deadlines. Such deadlines, according to congressional reports, would subordinate quality of service to timeliness. The Court cautioned that pervasively regulated areas, such as the Social Security Act in general and its dispute resolution mechanisms in particular, should be left free of judicial intervention that is far less attuned to the needs of the constituencies served by such legislation.


[Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Kathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the longest in the United States had not run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The Court of Appeals also found the application of the "single publication rule," which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire.


[Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Hustler's regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire is sufficient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. In analyzing whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to permit personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court should focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Hustler has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market and therefore it must reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there. Keeton did not need to have minimum contacts with the forum state in order for that state to have asserted personal jurisdiction over Hustler. New Hampshire had a sufficient interest in adjudicating the dispute. Moreover, even though most of the harm done to Keeton occurred outside New Hampshire, the same would be true in most libel cases brought anywhere other than plaintiff's state of domicile.


[United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a private firm planned to inspect a plant owned by Stauffer Chemical Co. (Stauffer) in Tennessee. Before granting entry, Stauffer requested that the employees of the private firm sign an agreement promising not to disclose any trade secrets they might learn during the inspection. The employees refused, and Stauffer denied them entry. The EPA and private firm returned with a warrant to enter the premises, but Stauffer again denied them entry.
The EPA began a civil contempt proceeding against Stauffer to gain entry. The district court ruled in favor of the EPA and Stauffer appealed. On appeal, Stauffer argued that the employees of the private firm did not qualify as “authorized representatives” under the Clean Air Act, and therefore Stauffer was not required to grant them entry. Stauffer had used this argument before in a similar case from Wyoming, which involved the same parties. Stauffer argued that this previous case precluded the government from re-litigating this issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with Stauffer and reversed.


[United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion in which the Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied in this case. This doctrine prevents re-litigation of issues that were “conclusively determined in a prior action involving the same parties.” While, the government conceded that the facts and question in this case were the same as those already ruled upon in the Wyoming case, it argued that this case could proceed because it involved unrelated subject matter. Additionally, the government argued that it had a duty to re-litigate issues of public importance. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive and concluded that this case involved the same parties, issues of law, and virtually identical fact scenarios.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he warned of taking the doctrine of collateral estoppel too far.


[Allen v. Wright (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.


[Allen v. Wright (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court found that the circumstances involved in this case did not warrant federal-court adjudication. Justice O'Connor's opinion argued that the Court could not act since the injuries that the suit identified were not "judicially cognizable" and because they were not "fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS." Citing past precedents, O'Connor found that, by itself, an assertion that the government is not acting in the bounds of the law is not enough to bring a suit to a federal court. To allow so would open the door to a myriad of legal challenges in which the courts would become buried by the minutiae of governing, acting as "continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action."


[Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.


[Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.


[City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. submitted a permit application to operate a home for the mentally retarded. The city council of Cleburne voted to deny the special use permit, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance.


[City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous judgment, the Court held that the denial of the special use permit to Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, and hence unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court declined to grant the mentally retarded the status of a "quasi-suspect class," it nevertheless found that the "rational relation" test for legislative action provided sufficient protection against invidious discrimination.


[United States v. Miller (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
An indictment issued by a grand jury charged James Miller with fraud. The indictment alleged he conspired with a burglar and overstated the value of the stolen items so his insurer would pay him more in damages recovery. The prosecution presented evidence proving that Miller had overstated the value of the items but did not try to establish that he had conspired with the burglar. The jury found his overstatement of value sufficient to convict him of fraud. Miller argued that by convicting him despite the fact that the prosecutors only addressed part of the indictment, the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on a grand jury indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction.


[United States v. Miller (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the decision for an 8-0 court. The Court maintained that an indictment is valid so long as it "clearly set[s] out the offense for which [the accused] was ultimately convicted." In this case, the defense clearly understood that Miller could be convicted for fraud solely because he overstated the value of the stolen items. Failing to convict him on other grounds did not annul his proven criminal conduct. The allegation of conspiring with a burglar constituted another "means of committing the same crime" and could be "treated as a useless averment that may be ignored" once the prosecution dropped it.


[California v. Carney (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney’s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell.
Carney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Carney pleaded no contest, was convicted, and placed on probation. He appealed, and the California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds that the motor home fell under the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed.


[California v. Carney (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied a lesser degree of protection to motor vehicles based on the ability to easily and quickly move them before a warrant can be obtained. Also, the regulation surrounding automobiles affords them a lesser expectation of privacy and therefore less protection under the Fourth Amendment. Since Carney’s motor home was not in an area traditionally used for residence and was licensed to operate as a vehicle on public streets, the Court held that it should receive the level of constitutional protection of a motor vehicle rather than a residence. The Court also held that the officers had probable cause and that the search itself was reasonable.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he argued that the Court should have relied on the ruling of the California Supreme Court to establish precedent for that state. He also argued that the majority’s decision overemphasized the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. Since the motor home was neither in motion nor was there any indication that Carney would quickly move it, there were no circumstances to prevent the officers from obtaining a warrant. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.


[Wilson v. Garcia (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Gary Garcia alleged that in 1979 he was unlawfully arrested, beaten, and tear-gassed by the petitioner, Richard Wilson, who was a New Mexico State Police officer. Garcia also alleged that Martin Vigil, the Chief of the State Police, knew Wilson had attacked citizens on several occasions but had failed to take action. Garcia sued for a violation of Section 1983 of the United State Code, a civil rights statute that creates a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights. The petitioners argued that this Section 1983 claim should be subject to the two-year statute of limitations that applied to a similar cause of action found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act). If that statute of limitations were applied, this case could not proceed because the complaint was not filed until two years and nine months after the alleged beating. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations recommended by petitioners did not apply because it was not sufficiently related to the nature of the right being enforced by Garcia's claim. Instead, the district court held that a different cause of action in the Act was more closely related to this Section 1983 claim and applied that cause of action's four-year statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling but held that actions brought under Section 1983 are essentially an injury to personal rights; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations that applies to all personal injury actions in New Mexico should apply to Section 1983 claims.


[Wilson v. Garcia (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes, yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that, in situations where a federal action does not have a statute of limitations, the practice has been to adopt a local limitation as long as that limitation is not inconsistent with a federal law or policy. Looking at the language of Section 1983, the Court determined that Congress intended to create a federal cause of action; therefore, it is up to the federal courts to determine the proper statute of limitation. The Court also determined that the importance of consistency and the diversity of Section 1983 causes of action required a uniform limitation for all causes of action to prevent uncertainty and quarrels over which limitation to apply. Finally, the Court agreed with the appellate court that the three-year personal injury limitation was the best available because of the nature of the remedy afforded by Section 1983.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that there need not be a uniform application of limitations to all Section 1983 claims. Rather, each claim should be evaluated individually and assigned a limitation that is most analogous to the specific claim that is brought before the court.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


[Heckler v. Chaney (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.


[Heckler v. Chaney (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, they are presumptively unreviewable. Refusals of administrative agencies to exercise enforcement authority involve a complicated balancing of factors, including agency allocation of scarce resources, which are not suitable for judicial review. Thus, they are presumptively "committed to agency discretion by law" under Section 701(a)(2). This presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. In the instant case, the presumption of unreviewability was not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The FDCA's prohibition on "misbranding" of drugs and introduction of "new drugs," absent agency approval, does not supply relevant guidelines. Neither does the FDA's "policy statement" indicating that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative actions nor the FDCA's provision that the Secretary need not report for prosecution minor violations of the Act supply relevant guidelines.


[United States v. Bagley (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In October 1977, Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. The government’s two principal witnesses were James F. O’Connor and Donald E. Mitchell, private security guards. Between April and June 1977, they assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) in conducting an undercover investigation of Bagley. In response to a discovery request for information about any deals, promises or inducements made to O’Connor or Mitchell, the government produced only affidavits from each man stating that each spoke without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward. Bagley waived his right to a jury trial. At trial, O’Connor and Mitchell testified about the firearms and narcotics charges. On December 23, 1977, the court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not the firearms charges.
In mid-1980, Bagley filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Privacy Act of 1974. He received copies of ATF form contracts, each entitled, “Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.” These contracts indicated that O’Connor and Mitchell provided information to the ATF and promised a future payment of $300 to each informer. Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that the government’s failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The motion came before the same district judge who presided at Bagley’s trial. At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate found that neither informant expected payment for his testimony. In contrast, the district judge found that O’Connor and Mitchell probably expected to receive compensation for their assistance, and that the government suppressed evidence favorable to Bagley. He also concluded, however, that the disclosure would not have had an effect on the court’s verdict. He emphasized that Bagley’s counsel did not seek to discredit O’Connor or Mitchell on cross-examination. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed, reasoning that the government’s failure to disclose required automatic reversal because it impaired Bagley’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through effective cross-examination.


[United States v. Bagley (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the government’s failure to disclose the contacts in discovery did not violate the Due Process Clause. Justice Blackmun wrote that the state was required by due process to disclose evidence that was both favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment, and that impeachment evidence fell within this requirement. He rejected, however, the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence required automatic reversal. The Court was concerned with undisclosed impeachment evidence that directly restricted the scope of cross-examination; here, Bagley’s counsel was free to cross-examine the informants on any relevant subject.
Relying on United States v. Agurs, Justice Blackmun held that undisclosed evidence was material if there was a reasonable possibility that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. He acknowledged that the government’s failure likely lead the defense counsel to believe that the informants could not be impeached on the basis of bias or inducements offered by the government. Nonetheless, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same if the government had disclosed the evidence in question. Justice Blackmun reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration.
Justice Byron White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist. He would have simply held that the proper standard was one of reasonable probability and that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the standard necessities reversal.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that a failure to disclose cannot be considered harmless when the government withholds evidence that might impeach the prosecution’s only witnesses. He wrote that the majority’s standard encouraged prosecutors to withhold potentially dispositive evidence.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He noted that the analysis in Agurs was restricted to the context where the defense made either a general request for evidence or no request at all, not a specific request for impeachment evidence. He rejected the majority’s results-based test for materiality.
Justice Louis Powell took no part in the decision of the case.


[Wayte v. United States (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Mr. Wayte was required by a 1980 Presidential Proclamation to register with the Selective Service system. Instead, he wrote letters to various government officials stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Wayte's letters were added to a file kept by the Selective Service of men who had informed the government that they were not complying with the proclamation.
The Selective Service later adopted a policy of passive enforcement, in which it would prosecute only men who had either reported to the government that they were not registering or whom other people had reported to the government for not registering. After a long series of requests by the government that Wayte register (all of which he failed to respond to), the government eventually indicted Wayte in federal district court for violating the Military Selective Service Act.
The district court, however, dismissed the indictment, holding that the government's passive enforcement policy was unconstitutional because it amounted to selective prosecution of only those men who took an outspoken stance against the Selective Service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wayte had failed to show that the government focused its attention on him because of his protest activities.


[Wayte v. United States (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held, 7-to-2, that the government's passive enforcement policy was constitutional. In the majority opinion, Justice Lewis Powell found that the government's policy was not unconstitutional selective enforcement (in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection clause) because men who had not taken an outspoken stance against the Selective Service, but who were merely reported by others for failing to register, were treated the same as those men who had notified the government of their own refusal to register. Justice Powell wrote, "In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities. Absent such a showing, his claim of selective prosecution fails."
To decide the First Amendment challenge, Justice Powell cited four requirements for incidental government regulation of speech laid out in United States v. O'Brien: the regulation must be within the government's constitutional power, must further an important or substantial government interest, must have an interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and must restrict only as much speech as is necessary to meet the government interest. Powell found that the passive enforcement policy satisfied all these requirements, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment.


[Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.


[Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut Sabbath observance statute was void, saying its "unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law "provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath." Burger said the state law "thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath."


[McDonald v. Smith (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In July 1981, David Smith sued Robert McDonald in state court. Smith alleged that, while he was being considered for the position of U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina, McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan that contained libelous falsehoods about him. Smith claimed that McDonald knew the accusations in the letters were false and that he mailed the letters with malicious intent to undermine the prospect of Smith’s appointment as U.S. Attorney. Smith’s complaint alleged that the letters had their intended effect—he was not appointed to the position, and he suffered damage to his career and reputation—so he sought compensatory damages.
McDonald removed the case to the district court on the basis of diverse citizenship and moved for judgment on the pleadings by arguing that the Petition Clause granted him absolute immunity. The district court held that the Petition Clause granted general immunity but not absolute immunity from liability for libel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[McDonald v. Smith (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that, while the Petition Clause was an important foundation for the ideas of self-government, there is no evidence that the Framers intended it to allow the unchecked expression of false information. Previous cases have also shown that the right to petition is not without limits; baseless litigation is not protected under the Petition Clause. The Court also held that damages may not be recovered without proof that the defendant acted with actual malice.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the Framers intended the Petition Clause to be a part of the overlapping First Amendment protections of free expression. Since the other parts of the First Amendment do not grant absolute immunity, he argued that there was no reason to assume that the Petition Clause should. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took not part in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Aguilar v. Felton (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Part of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorized local institutions to receive funds to assist educationally deprived children from low-income families. Since 1966, New York City had used portions of its Title I funding to pay salaries of employees who teach in parochial schools.


[Aguilar v. Felton (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Even though the Court acknowledged that the efforts of the City of New York were well-intentioned, it found that the funding practices violated the Constitution. As part of New York's program, teachers were directed to avoid involvement in religious materials and activities in their classrooms. This, as well as the actions of school administrators and field supervisors who monitored classroom activities for religious content, posed constitutional problems for the majority. Involving agents of the city in extensive monitoring increased the potential for "divisiveness along religious lines" and violated the intent of the Establishment Clause which is to prevent the intrusion of church and state on each other's respective domain.