[Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
addressedthroughbothpartsoftheFourteenthAmendment,andthesameinterrelatedprinciplesoflibertyandequalityapplywithequalforcetothesecases;therefore,theConstitutionprotectsthefundamentalrightofsame-sexcouplestomarry.TheCourtalsoheldthattheFirstAmendmentprotectstherightsofreligiousorganizationstoadheretotheirprinciples,butitdoesnotallowstatestodenysame-sexcouplestherighttomarryonthesametermsasthoseforopposite-sexcouples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Kingsley v. Hendrickson (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In May 2010, Michael Kingsley, who was being held as a pretrial detainee in Monroe County Jail, was ordered to take down a piece of paper covering the light above his cell bed but refused to do so. After Sergeant Stan Hendrickson ordered Kingsley to take down the paper several times and each time was met with refusal, Lieutenant Robert Conroy, the jail administrator, ordered the jail staff to take down the paper and transfer Kingsley to another cell. During the transfer, Kingsley refused to act as ordered, so the officers pulled him to his feet in such a manner that his feet hit the bedframe, which caused pain and made him unable to walk or stand. In the new cell, when Kingsley resisted the officers' attempts to remove the handcuffs, Hendrickson put his knee in Kingsley's back and Kingsley yelled at him. Kingsley also claimed that Hendrickson smashed his head into the concrete bunk. After further verbal exchange, another officer applied a taser to Kingsley's back.
Kingsley sued Hendrickson and other jail staff members and claimed that their actions violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury found the defendants not guilty. Kingsley appealed and argued that the jury was wrongly instructed on the standards for judging excessive force and intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.


[Kingsley v. Hendrickson (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, in a claim regarding whether an officer used excessive force against a pretrial detainee, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant thought the force was excessive but that the force was excessive based on an objective standard. Therefore, the court must determine whether, from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene at the time, the use of force in question was excessive. The Court held that the objective standard is in line with existing precedent that holds that the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from excessive force that amounts to punishment, which can be shown through evidence that proves that the force in question was not reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of holding detainees for trial. The objective standard also protects an officer who acts in good faith by taking into account the situation as the officer was aware of it at the time. The Court also noted that the use of force in question must be deliberate in order to give rise to an excessive force claim.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, while the Due Process Clause protects pretrial detainees from conditions that amount to punishment, objectively unreasonable force does not rise to the level of intentional punishment that the Due Process Clause prohibits. Because punitive intent cannot be inferred simply from the fact that an officer used more force than was objectively necessary, simply showing that the force in question was objectively unreasonable does not violate a pretrial detainees rights under the Due Process Clause. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Court should have dismissed this case as improvidently granted because such a case should be examined under Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis before the Court addresses the due process claims brought here.


[Glossip v. Gross (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On April 29, 2014, Oklahoma executed Clayton Lockett using a three-drug lethal injection procedure. The procedure went poorly; Lockett awoke after the injection of the drugs that were supposed to render him unconscious and did not die until about 40 minutes later. Oklahoma suspended all subsequent executions until the incident could be investigated and subsequently adopted a new protocol that placed a higher emphasis on making sure the injection was done properly. The new protocol also allowed for four alternative drug combinations, one of which used midazolam as the initial drug, as did the protocol used in the Lockett execution.
Charles Warner and 20 other death row inmates sued various state officials and argued that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Warner and three other plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Oklahoma from moving forward with their executions. A federal district court denied the injunction and held that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence that they would prevail on the merits of their claims and that they had failed to identify a "known and available" alternative to the drug in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
On January 15, 2015, the Supreme Court declined to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, and Charles Warner was subsequently executed. Richard E. Glossip and the other two death row inmates petitioned the Court again.


[Glossip v. Gross (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that there was insufficient evidence that the use of midazolam as the initial drug in the execution protocol entailed a substantial risk of severe pain, compared to known and available alternatives, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because capital punishment has been held to be constitutional and some risk of pain is inherent in execution, the Eighth Amendment does not require that a constitutional method of execution be free of any risk of pain. Instead, a successful Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim must identify a reasonable alternative that presents a significantly lower risk of pain, which the petitioners in this case were unable to do. Because the district court is entitled to a high degree of deference in its determination, the petitioners would have to prove that the district court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous in order for the Court to overturn the ruling. In this case, the medical testimony supports the district court’s determination that the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of severe pain, particularly in light of the safeguards the state imposed on the process.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Constitution expressly contemplates the death penalty when it considers the possibility that someone may be “deprived of life,” and therefore capital punishment cannot be unconstitutional. The arguments that it is arbitrary and unreliable, and therefore cruel, deal with the concerns about conviction, not the punishment itself, and are dangers inherent in the jury trial process. The decision of whether to impose the death penalty encompasses the type of moral calculus that should remain in the hands of the jury, as the Constitution provides. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the studies cited in support of the arbitrariness of the imposition of the death penalty are themselves unreliable because they require that the moral reasons to execute someone be reduced to a metric by academics who were not present at trial. Justice Scalia joined in the concurring opinion.


[Glossip v. Gross (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
shouldremaininthehandsofthejury,astheConstitutionprovides.JusticeClarenceThomasjoinedintheconcurrence.JusticeThomasalsowroteaseparateconcurrenceinwhichhearguedthatthestudiescitedinsupportofthearbitrarinessoftheimpositionofthedeathpenaltyarethemselvesunreliablebecausetheyrequirethatthemoralreasonstoexecutesomeonebereducedtoametricbyacademicswhowerenotpresentattrial.JusticeScaliajoinedintheconcurringopinion.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the constitutionality of a punishment must be evaluated based on currently prevailing social and legal standards; therefore, the death penalty is no longer constitutional. Justice Breyer pointed to studies that show that the exoneration rate is disproportionately high with capital crimes, which reflects both cases in which the defendant was actually innocent and cases in which there was procedural error; therefore, the death penalty is not reliably applied to cases in which the defendant has been properly convicted of crimes that society harshly condemns. Additionally, studies have shown that factors other than the egregiousness of the crime—such as the races and genders of the defendant and the victim, the location of the crime, and political pressures—influence the imposition of the death penalty, and such arbitrariness results in the punishment being unconstitutionally cruel. Because the imposition of the death penalty requires additional procedural safeguards, there are often long delays between sentencing and execution, if the execution happens at all, which is cruel in and of itself and also divorces the punishment from its punitive purposes of deterrence and retribution. Justice Breyer also argued that the nation has consistently been moving away from the use of the death penalty, to the point that it is used so rarely as to be considered “unusual” for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the district court erred in holding that the use of midazolam did not create a substantial risk of severe pain. Instead, the scientific evidence supports the view that, while midazolam can induce unconsciousness, it is not sufficient to maintain unconsciousness through the effects of the rest of the execution cocktail. Because the petitioners sufficiently demonstrated that the risk of severe pain was substantial and that the state’s safeguards do not appropriately mitigate that risk, the use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Sotomayor also argued that there is no requirement that petitioners for relief under the Eighth Amendment provide a reasonable alternative, because a cruel method of execution does not become constitutional simply due to a lack of alternatives. Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie) is a national chain of clothing stores that requires its employees to comply with a "Look Policy" that reflects the store's style and forbids black clothing and caps, though the meaning of the term cap is not defined in the policy. If a question arises about the Look Policy during the interview or an applicant requests a deviation, the interviewer is instructed to contact the corporate Human Resources department, which will determine whether or not an accommodation will be granted.
In 2008, Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, applied for a position at an Abercrombie store. She wore a headscarf, or hijab, every day, and did so in her interview. Elauf did not mention her headscarf during her interview and did not indicate that she would need an accommodation from the Look Policy. Her interviewer likewise did not mention the headscarf, though she contacted her district manager, who told her to lower Elauf's rating on the appearance section of the application, which lowered her overall score and prevented her from being hired.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf and claimed that the company had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to hire Elauf because of her headscarf. Abercrombie argued that Elauf had a duty to inform the interviewer that she required an accommodation from the Look Policy and that the headscarf was not the expression of a sincerely held religious belief. The district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Abercrombie because there is no genuine issue of fact that Elauf did not notify her interviewer that she had a conflict with the Look Policy.


[Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, to hold an employer liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an applicant for a position must only show that her need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision not to hire her. The disparate-treatment provision of Title VII does not contain a knowledge requirement but rather forbids certain motives, regardless of the employer’s knowledge about the applicant. If the applicant can show that the employer’s decision not to hire an applicant was based on a desire to avoid having to accommodate a religious practice, then the employer has violated Title VII. The Court also held that Title VII does not demand mere neutrality; instead it creates an affirmative duty to accommodate religious practices.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while the applicant has to show that the employer had knowledge of the applicant’s religious practice, the applicant does not have a duty to notify the employer. Justice Alito argued that the statutory language would not make sense without any knowledge requirement because such a reading would allow an employer to be held liable without fault.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the application of a neutral policy cannot constitute intentional discrimination that violates Title VII. Although the strict application of the employer’s policy may have disproportionately affected those who wear headscarves for religious reasons, the policy still treated all potential applicants in the same manner, and therefore an applicant who was denied a position because of her religious headscarf did not suffer from disparate treatment. Additionally, Title VII disparate-treatment precedent does not hold that a failure to accommodate is intentional discrimination. Justice Thomas also argued that the statutory language should be construed narrowly so as to only punish employers who act with a discriminatory motive.


[McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during-- political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill sometimes referred to as BCRA). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or wealthy individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures").
The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals.


[McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
With a few exceptions, the Court answered "no" to both questions in a 5-to-4 decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions.
In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits.
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections.
[In total, the Court addressed 21 sections of federal law. We have distilled these disparate components into 12 separate votes which we detail at the end of this document.]


[Hurst v. Florida (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Timothy Lee Hurst was charged and convicted of first-degree murder for killing his co-worker, Cynthia Harrison, during a robbery of the Popeye’s restaurant where they both worked. He was sentenced to death and appealed. On appeal, Hurst was granted a new sentencing trial because the Supreme Court of Florida found that his counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of Hurst’s borderline intelligence and possible organic brain damage. At his new sentencing trial, Hurst was prevented from presenting mental retardation evidence as an absolute bar to the imposition of the death penalty, though he was allowed to present it as mitigating evidence. The jury again sentenced Hurst to the death penalty by a vote of seven to five, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Ring v. Arizona, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment required that the presence of aggravating factors, which Arizona’s death penalty sentencing scheme viewed as essentially elements of a larger offense, be determined by the jury. The Supreme Court of Florida had previously held that the decision in Ring v. Arizona did not apply to Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme generally and specifically did not require that a jury’s recommendation of the death penalty be unanimous or that a jury determine the factual issue of a defendant’s potential mental retardation.


[Hurst v. Florida (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Florida’s death sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each element necessary to impose the death sentence. Although the Florida sentencing scheme required that the jury recommend a death sentence in order to impose the death penalty, the judge was only required to take the jury recommendation under consideration. Because the Supreme Court held in Ring v. Arizona that the Sixth Amendment required that a jury make all the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty, the Florida sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment in the same way the Arizona one did in Ring. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Eighth Amendment required jury sentencing in capital cases.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that that the Sixth Amendment did not require that a jury make the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the death penalty. The Florida sentencing scheme is different from the one the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona because in the Arizona scheme the jury did not make any recommendation about the death penalty at all. Although the judge could choose not to follow the jury’s recommendation, no Florida court has done so for more than 15 years. Justice Alito also argues that, if there was error, the error was harmless in this case because the jury recommended that Hurst be sentenced to death.


[Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1963, Henry Montgomery was found guilty and received the death penalty for the murder of Charles Hunt, which Montgomery committed less than two weeks after he turned 17. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and his conviction was overturned because of community prejudice. At his new trial, Montgomery was again convicted, but he was sentenced to life without parole.
In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, in which the Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes requiring children convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. In light of that decision, Montgomery filed a motion in state district court to correct what he argued was now an illegal sentence. The trial court denied Montgomery’s motion, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Montgomery’s application by holding that the decision in Miller does not apply retroactively.


[Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits sentencing schemes that impose a punishment of mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide, applied retroactively. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, when the Court establishes a substantive constitutional rule, that rule must apply retroactively because such a rule provides for constitutional rights that go beyond procedural guarantees. When a state court fails to give effect to a substantive rule, that decision is reviewable because failure to apply a substantive rule always results in the violation of a constitutional right, while failure to apply a procedural rule might or might not result in an illegitimate verdict. The Court held that Miller established a substantive rule because it prohibited the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders. The Court’s analysis in that case was based on precedent that established that the Constitution treats children as different from adults for the purposes of sentencing. Therefore, the rule the Court announced in Miller made life without parole an unconstitutional punishment for a class of defendants based on their status as juveniles, and such a rule is substantive rather than procedural.
In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide this case. Because Supreme Court precedent treated cases on collateral review from state court decisions differently from those on direct review from federal courts, the principle of finality of decisions dictates that whether new constitutional rule will be applied to a final state court conviction is entirely a matter of state choice. Therefore, a state court need only apply the constitutional rule that existed at the time of the conviction, and the Court does not have the jurisdiction to review that decision. Justice Scalia argued that the precedent the majority relied on for its conclusion was not binding and did not directly apply to the case at hand. Additionally, the language of Miller itself stated that it did not create a substantive rule but instead established a process that required courts to consider a juvenile offender’s age before imposing a particular penalty. Crucially, Miller still allowed for the imposition of life without parole on a juvenile offender if the crime(s) in question reflect “permanent incorrigibility.” Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide this case. The question of whether a constitutional right is retroactive asks whether there is an appropriate remedy, not whether the right was violated in the first place. Because the Supreme Court cannot force state courts to apply constitutional rules that did not exist at the time of the conviction, there is no constitutional mechanism to provide a remedy that would make the constitutional right in question apply retroactively.


[DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On September 7, 2008, Amy Imburgia filed a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV, Inc. (DIRECTV), and argued that DIRECTV had improperly charged early termination fees to its customers. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California precedent that had previously held that, in certain circumstances, arbitration clauses in customer agreements were unenforceable. Less than one month after that decision, DIRECTV moved to stay or dismiss the plaintiffs’ case and compel arbitration, which DIRECTV argued it had not done previously because it thought the arbitration clause in its customer agreement was void under California precedent. The trial court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal for the Second District affirmed by holding that the language of the customer agreement subjected the arbitration clause to state law.


[DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law, so the court has to enforce the arbitration agreement. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that requiring contract enforcement under California state law that the Supreme Court had held was invalid under AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act. Absent any indication that the language of the contract is meant to refer to invalid state law, it should be construed as only referring to valid state law, which is consistent with California state law. The Court also noted that there was no indication that a California court would apply state law that has been held to be invalid because it conflicts with federal law to any other context. Even in the canon of cases that determine that ambiguous language in a contract should be construed against the party that drafted the language, there is no case that goes so far as to apply invalid state law.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to state courts and therefore did not require the court to order arbitration in this case. In her separate dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the provision should be construed against the drafting party so as to give the consumer the ability to pursue class-based litigation. Because the relevant question should be whether both parties agreed to be bound by relevant state law as framed by the state legislature without considering the preemptive effect of federal law, the California state court’s decision should control this case. Although the Federal Arbitration Act contains a presumption in favor of arbitration, the presumption only applies when the express agreement to arbitrate was validly formed, which is not the case when consumers lack bargaining power in the creation of such contracts. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In late 2008, Robert Montanile was involved in a car accident that resulted in significant injuries. Montanile was covered by an employee welfare benefit plan administered by the Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan (Plan). After Montanile’s accident, the Plan dispersed over $120,000 to cover Montanile’s medical expenses. Montanile later sued the driver of the other car involved in the accident, eventually obtaining a $500,000 settlement. Per its terms, the Plan then requested that Montanile reimburse the initial $120,000 disbursement. When Montanile and the Plan were unable to reach an agreement, the Plan sued Montanile.
The Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which allows plan administrators to recover overpayment from a beneficiary when the recovery would constitute “appropriate equitable relief”. The trial court held that the terms of the Plan required Montanile to repay the initial $120,000, and that this repayment was appropriate equitable relief in part because the Plan was able to identify a source of funds within Montanile’s possession—the $500,000 settlement. Montanile appealed and claimed that the repayment would not be equitable relief because the settlement had been spent or disbursed to other parties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that, because the Plan had a right to reimbursement, the Plan’s lien against Montanile’s $500,000 settlement attached before Montanile spent or disbursed the funds. Therefore, Montanile could not evade the repayment by claiming the settlement funds had been spent or disbursed.


[Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industrial Health Benefit Plan (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
If a third party asset has been wholly disbursed on non-traceable items (such as services), ERISA does not allow for a suit to recover reimbursement of that asset. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that, while the Plan had a claim under ERISA to the settlement fund when it was in Montanile’s possession, the claim does not extend beyond the dissipation of the fund in question. When the fund is completely dissipated on non-traceable items, such as services, there is no fund to which the Plan would have a claim, and the Board may not then seek to attach the claim to the plan-beneficiary’s general assets. The Court also held that its precedent on “appropriate equitable relief” does not dictate a different result.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that allowing a plan-beneficiary to escape his reimbursement obligation by disbursing his settlement fund on non-traceable items would undo nearly forty years of Supreme Court precedent regarding “appropriate equitable relief.”


[Kansas v. Carr (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In December 2000, brothers Jonathan and Reginald Carr committed a series of crimes in Wichita, Kansas, known as “The Wichita Massacre,” which included assault, robbery, rape, and the murder of five people. The Carrs were prosecuted jointly. They moved to sever their cases and argued that being tried jointly would be prejudicial because they intended to mount antagonistic defenses and introduce evidence that would be admissible or non-prejudicial only in separate trials. The trial judge denied the motion, and the Carrs were later jointly convicted on numerous counts and sentenced to death. The jury instructions at the sentencing trial did not state that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the Carrs argued that their Eighth Amendment rights to individualized sentencing were violated both by the trial judge’s refusal to sever their cases and the failure to affirmatively instruct the jury that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed the death sentences by holding that the trial judge failed to do the necessary analysis and carefully consider the severance issue. The court also held that the jurors may have been prevented from giving meaningful effect to mitigating evidence because they were not instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the consolidated case, Kansas v. Gleason, Gleason was convicted of capital murder for the killings of several people in connection with a robbery. He was also convicted of pre-meditated murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The jury sentenced Gleason to death for the capital murder charge and a consecutive sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years for the other charges. Gleason appealed his convictions, and the Kansas Supreme Court vacated his conviction of life imprisonment because it was multiplicitous with his death sentence and vacated his death sentence because the jury was not properly instructed on how to consider mitigating circumstances.


[Kansas v. Carr (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Eighth Amendment does not require that a jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances do not need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, nor does the Eighth Amendment require that the sentencing phase of a joint trial be severed. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that death penalty case law does not require a court to give the jury express instructions on how to consider mitigating evidence, and no reasonable juror would have understood the instructions as requiring that defense counsel prove the existence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the Eighth Amendment does not govern procedural issues, such as the claim that each defendant was prejudiced by evidence relating to the other during the joint sentencing phase at issue. Instead, such claims are governed by the Due Process Clause. Moreover, in this case, there is no evidence that the jury was impermissibly prejudiced by the presentation of evidence during a joint sentencing phase for both defendants.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Kansas state courts had not violated any federal constitutional right, and therefore there was no reason for the Supreme Court to intervene. Because this case turns on a question about a state sentencing scheme, it is unlikely to apply to other states. By granting certiorari in such a case and determining that no constitutional right was violated, as the majority did in this case, the Court creates a risk that such decisions will discourage states from adopting additional procedural protections via state law.


[Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co. () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
William Thompson suffered a head injury aboard the SS. Rosina Marron after an attack by a fellow crewmember. After several months of recuperation, Thompson signed an agreement releasing Costal Oil Company from liability in exchange for $4000. Later, Thompson discovered the damage from his injury was much more extensive than originally thought. Thomson sued to recover damages from his injury. The district court upheld the release, noting that Thompson adamantly refused to consult an attorney, although he had many opportunities to do so, and freely entered into the agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.


[Thompson v. Coastal Oil Co. () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit opinion. Justice John M. Harlan concurred, but would have remanded the case to determine whether the vessel was unseaworthy. Justice Stanley Reed, Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Harold Burton, and Justice Sherman Minton dissented.


[Pennsylvania v. Nelson () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
Nelson, a member of the Communist Party, was convicted of violating the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. This Act was implemented prior to Congress's adoption of the Smith Act of 1940 (amended in 1948) which prohibited the same conduct as Pennsylvania's law.


[Pennsylvania v. Nelson () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that Pennsylvania's law was unenforceable and was superseded by the federal act. Chief Justice Warren argued that the scheme of federal regulation of seditious activities was "pervasive" and "left no room for the states to supplement it." Furthermore, the federal act dealt with an issue of primary importance to the national government which made any enforcement of similar state laws potentially harmful to the smooth execution of national statutes.


[Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
New York City municipal charter provision §903 required discharge of any municipal employee who invokes the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in a legally authorized inquiry into that employee’s official conduct. Harry Slochower, a tenured professor at Brooklyn College, invoked this privilege in a congressional committee investigation into his past Communist Party membership. Despite his tenured status, which required notice and a hearing before termination, the city terminated him immediately. The state trial court dismissed a motion to review the discharge and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed.


[Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Tom C. Clark, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that dismissal of the review motion was improper. §903 is unconstitutional as applied in this case because it denies due process of law. The Court emphasized that invoking the Fifth Amendment does not amount to an admission of guilt. Justices Hugo L. Black and William O. Douglas concurred, writing that they also adhered to the views in their dissents in Garner v. Board of Public Works, Adler v. Board of Education, and their concurrence in Weiman v. Updegraff
Justice Stanley Reed dissented, expressing that New York City had a reasonable ground to require employees to give information about their official conduct or give up their positions. Justices Sherman Minton and Harold Burton joined in the dissent. Justice John M. Harlan wrote a separate dissent, stating that no Due Process violation occurred in this case.


[Cole v. Young () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") fired Kendrick Cole when it determined that his employment was not "clearly consistent with the interests of national security." Mr. Cole was a food and drug inspector and a "preference-eligible veteran," but was charged with having "a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists." Mr. Cole appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which denied his appeal, finding that the Veterans' Preference Act did not afford Mr. Cole a right of appeal under the circumstances. Mr. Cole brought an action seeking declaratory judgment in the District of Columbia federal district court alleging that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission improperly denied his appeal. The district court dismissed the case and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.


[Cole v. Young () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that the discharge of an employee without determination that his position was one in which he could adversely affect national security was unauthorized by the Veterans' Preference Act. With Justice John Marshall Harlan II writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Act's use of "national security" only relates to the nation's safety, and not the general welfare. Moreover, there was no determination that Mr. Cole's position within the FDA affected national security as the term is used in the Act. Therefore, the Court concluded, Mr. Cole's discharge was invalid.


[Reid v. Covert () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England. Pursuant to a “status-of-forces” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury.


[Reid v. Covert () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
U.S. citizen civilians outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States cannot be tried by U.S. military tribunal, but instead retain the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
In a decision authored by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that U.S. citizen civilians abroad have the right to Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment constitutional protections. The Court agreed with the petitioners, concluding that as United States citizens they were entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights, notwithstanding that they committed crimes on foreign soil. Justice Black declared: "The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government."
While a majority of the Court agreed with the ultimate result, they did so for different reasons. Concurring in the decision, Justice Felix Frankfurter rejected the idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause could prevent Congress from mandating the court martial of civilians in all cases. He opposed what he termed a "recourse to the literal words" of the Constitution. Merely to hold that Mrs. Covert could not stand trial before a military tribunal since she was not a member of the armed forces signified too narrow a review. In his opinion, that determination required the Court to assess the Constitution in its entirety and not simply the single provision granting Congress the power to regulate the nation's land and naval forces. He advocated a balancing test that would require a court to weigh "all the factors involved...in order to decide whether [military dependents] are so closely related to what Congress may allowably deem essential for the effective...regulation of the land and naval forces that they may be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction in...capital cases, when the consequence is loss of [their constitutional] protections."
Also concurring in the judgment, Justice John Marshall Harlan II essentially agreed with Frankfurter. Accordingly, he saw the determination as "analogous to issues of due process." Having first determined that military dependents overseas bear a rational connection to the armed forces such that they could be validly subjected to court martial, he then asserted that the analysis turned on a question of what process was due a military dependent under the "particular circumstances of a particular case." While capital cases such as this one certainly necessitated a full Article III trial, most petty offenses committed by military dependents almost certainly would not. He thus advocated a case-by-case approach, rejecting the sweeping conclusion set forth by the plurality. Since Harlan had originally voted with the majority in the initial decision of this case, his concurrence on rehearing was narrow but significant. Perhaps as a consequence of his earlier vote in the previous term, his opinion on rehearing was considerably less at odds with the arguments set forth in the dissent written by Justice Tom C. Clark and joined by Justice Harold Burton.


[Reid v. Covert () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
advocatedacase-by-caseapproach,rejectingthesweepingconclusionsetforthbytheplurality.SinceHarlanhadoriginallyvotedwiththemajorityintheinitialdecisionofthiscase,hisconcurrenceonrehearingwasnarrowbutsignificant.Perhapsasaconsequenceofhisearliervoteinthepreviousterm,hisopiniononrehearingwasconsiderablylessatoddswiththeargumentssetforthinthedissentwrittenbyJusticeTomC.ClarkandjoinedbyJusticeHaroldBurton.
In that staunch dissent, Clark gave substantial weight to historical practice. He asserted that the "military has always exercised jurisdiction by court-martial over civilians accompanying armies in time of war," and that for explicit reasons of policy concerning military morale and discipline, none of the Court's relevant precedents had ever questioned that authority. He pointed out several troublesome and practical consequences of the Court's holding. Not least among these were the vast distances between the United States and its various military instillations around the world. By setting forth an overly broad standard, the plurality, argued Clark, had opened the door to a myriad of petty offenses to be tried in the federal court system, thus incurring needless cost, delay, and disruption.
Justice Charles Whitaker took no part in the decision.
Historical Note
Reid v. Covert has the distinction of being the only case in the history of the Supreme Court in which the Court reversed itself on rehearing. In successfully persuading the Court to do so, Mrs. Covert's lawyer, Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, secured for himself a seat among the giants of the legal profession. A seasoned veteran of Supreme Court litigation, Colonel Wiener considered his triumph in Reid v. Covert to be among his greatest professional accomplishments. His oral argument in the case has attained legendary status and remains a preeminent exemplar in the art of persuasion and appellate advocacy.
Matthew Lognion contributed this abstract.


[Griffin v. Illinois () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw were indicted for armed robbery in Cook County, Illinois. Following their conviction, in preparation for filling for an appeal, Griffin and Crenshaw requested a transcript of their trial proceedings without cost, on the basis that they could not afford the standard fee for the transcript. The lower court dismissed the petition without hearing evidence.


[Griffin v. Illinois () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court reasoned that there is "no meaningful distinction" between denying indigent defendants the right to appeal and denying them a trial. Because Illinois conceded that Griffin and Crenshaw could not file for appeal without a transcript, the Court found that their rights to due process and equal protection had been denied.


[Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. () — Warren Court (1954-1955) — Facts]
An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law.


[Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. () — Warren Court (1954-1955) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision authored by William Orville Douglas, the Court held that while the law may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, "to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." That is, Courts should not be able to invalidate state economic regulations on the grounds that they disagree with the theories supporting them. Even if the state law imposes burdens or waste, the legislature has the sole authority over weighing its benefits against its costs. In sum, the opticians could not prove that the law had no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives.


[Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (2) () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems.


[Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (2) () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
The Brown I decision shall be implemented "with all deliberate speed."
The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."


[Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
New York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure, and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the obscene material.


[Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the civil procedure complied with the requirements of due process. Justice Frankfurter noted that the procedural safeguards were not significantly different from many state criminal misdemeanor procedures, nor were the penalties any more severe. The opinion also reaffirmed the existing notion that the constitutional protection of speech does not extend to obscene material.


[Butler v. Michigan () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
John H. Griffin’s book The Devil Rides Outside traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to a police officer, he was arrested and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler’s application for leave to appeal.


[Butler v. Michigan () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Michigan statute unduly restricted the freedom of speech because it took only a single trial judge’s determination that the material could potentially corrupt minors to prohibit its dissemination. The Court noted that, although the State may attempt to protect juvenile innocence as part of its power to promote general welfare, the restrictions should be reasonably related to the evils of obscene material.
Justice Hugo L. Black concurred without writing a separate opinion.


[Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Not Available.


[Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Not Available.


[Jencks v. United States () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
Clinton Jencks, a union leader, was charged with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer with the National Labor Relations Board. Two undercover informants for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified against Jencks, and reported that he had been seen at Communist Party events and working with Communist Party members. The evidence provided against Jencks was entirely circumstantial, and the prosecution's evidence rested largely on the testimonies and reports of the undercover informants. Jencks requested the testimony of the informants to review their credibility and admissibility in court. The trial court denied his request without stating the reasons, and Jencks was found guilty on two counts of communist activity and sentenced to five years imprisonment for each offense. Jencks appealed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the informants' reports should have been provided for review to determine their use in the trial and on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the definitions of political party membership. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.


[Jencks v. United States () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the government's reports should have been produced for review for their admission in court. A concern for national security must be weighed against prosecuting criminal action if the criminal action prosecution relies on documents that, if released, would threaten national security. Based on this weighing test, the documents should have been provided for review of admissibility in a new trial. Criminal action must be dismissed if the government refuses to release information as a matter of national security.
Justice Harold Burton wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed that the accused had the right to review the documents as evidence against him but argued that the disclosure of the documents should not guarantee a new trial. Rather, the documents should be reviewed and, if found to contain information that discredited the FBI informants’ testimony, then there should be a new trial. However, in this case Justice Burton agreed there should be a new trial on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the requirements of membership to a political party. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the concurrence.
Justice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that, if information containing national secrets and issues of national security were available for the accused in criminal prosecutions, then national security would be greatly compromised. Justice Clark also wrote that the jury was properly instructed on the definition of membership to a political party.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
In December 1938, Thomas Leiter conveyed approximately 8,711 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana to the United States. The deed contained a mineral reservation under which Leiter retained the right to mine and remove all valuable minerals until April 1, 1945. The deed allowed for the extension of this reservation for an additional five years so long as operations were conducted profitably during the previous five years for an average of fifty days a year. If at the end of the original term or an additional extended term the operation had not carried on for fifty days a year, Leiter’s right to mine would terminate, and complete title would become vested in the United States. No mineral operations were conducted on the land in question during the original term.
On March 1, 1949, the United States conveyed the operating rights under lease to Frank J. and Albert Lobrano, who then conveyed those rights to The California Company. The California Company drilled and completed eighty wells, producing $3,500,000 in royalties for the United States. Leiter Minerals, Inc. then filed an action in state court against Allen L. Lobrano and The California Company based on a Louisiana law allegedly making a reservation of mineral rights to the United States “imprescriptible”. The United States was not a party to the suit. Leiter Minerals claimed that it was the fee simple owner of all the oil, gas and mineral rights in or on the land acquired by the United States from Thomas Leiter.
The United States then brought an action in district court; it sought to quiet Leiter Minerals’ title and rights and to enjoin Leiter Minerals from further asserting any claims in state court. The United States argued in part that irreparable injury in the form of lost royalties would result from any dispossession to its lessees. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the action could only be tried in federal court because the United States was not a party to the state court action.


[Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court held that the district court properly granted the injunction. Justice Frankfurter first looked to federal law, which specified that a court of the United States may not enjoin state court proceedings except 1) as expressly authorized by congress, 2) to aid its jurisdiction, or 3) to protect or effectuate its judgments. He also looked to the Court’s past interpretations of the Norris-La Guardia Act, where it determined that statutes generally divesting persons of pre-existing rights and privileges only divest the United States of those rights and privileges when there are expressed words to that effect.
Justice Frankfurter then turned to the purpose behind the restriction of the federal courts’ injunction power, arguing that the interest in restricting this power was strongest when the state court litigation was between private parties. Here, in contrast, the United States was arguably attempting to prevent injury to the national interest. Justice Frankfurter also emphasized that the United States was not a party to the state court action, and that the United States’ position in its claim was essentially defensive. The Court remanded the case to the state court, directing it to interpret and apply the Louisiana statute in question.
Justice William Douglas dissented in part, questioning the majority’s decision to remand the case to Louisiana state court. He argued that Congress tasked the federal courts with deciding mixed questions of state and federal law.


[Watkins v. United States () — Warren Court (1957) — Facts]
In 1954, John Watkins, a labor organizer, was called upon to testify in hearings conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Watkins agreed to describe his alleged connections with the Communist Party and to identify current members of the Party. Watkins refused to give information concerning individuals who had left the Communist Party. Watkins argued that such questions were beyond the authority of the Committee.


[Watkins v. United States () — Warren Court (1957) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the activities of the House Committee were beyond the scope of congressional power. The Court held that both the authorizing resolution of the Committee and the specific statements made by the Committee to Watkins failed to limit the Committee's power. The Court found that because Watkins had not been given sufficient information describing the pertinency of the questions to the subjects under inquiry, he had not been accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment thus invalidated Watkins' conviction.


[Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
On February 1, 1951, Virgil Herdman, a train conductor, was in charge of a freight train traveling from Indiana to Ohio. While passing through Dayton, Ohio, the train braked abruptly to avoid hitting a car stopped on a railroad crossing. Herdman fell and was injured as the train came to a stop.
Herdman sued the railroad company for negligence and claimed that the company was responsible for his fall under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Courts typically apply this doctrine when negligence can be inferred, without actual direct evidence, from the very nature of the accident. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the railroad on the basis that Herdman did not provide enough facts to support his negligence claim, even under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Herdman appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.


[Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 decision by Justice William J. Brennan, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. To effectively present a negligence claim under res ipsa loquitur Herdman should have shown that sudden stops, like the one that caused his injury, are unusual or extraordinary. Herdman failed to present any such evidence. Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, stating that the Court should not grant certiorari just to reevaluate the facts of certain cases.


[Lambert v. California () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, no convicted felon could stay in the city for more than five days without registering. Lambert, a convicted felon, stayed in Los Angeles for seven years without registering and was convicted of violating the ordinance. On appeal, she argued that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required the ordinance to include some mental state element, and she was not aware of it.


[Lambert v. California () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice William Douglas, the Court held that the prosecution would need to provide circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant should have been aware of the possibility that registration was required. The Court reasoned that due process requires notice unless the defendant has actual knowledge of the ordinance that has been violated. As there was no circumstantial evidence showing Lambert should have been aware of the ordinance, the Court concluded her due process rights were violated. The Court further held that because the ordinance that forced convicted felons to register was not accompanied by any action, nor were there circumstances that would lead a felon to be aware of his or her duty to register, the ordinance was unconstitutional.
Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker, arguing that mistake of law is usually not a defense to a crime. For example, a person may be convicted of drug possession even if he or she did not know that the particular substance was illegal.
Justice Harold Burton also dissented in a separate opinion.


[National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Company () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
Beginning on October 23, 1950, Lion Oil Company and Oil Workers International Union CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions for employees of the company. The agreement provided the means to amend its terms: Either party must notify the other in writing of its desire to amend the agreement, after which the company and the union should attempt to agree on the desired amendments. If no agreement was reached within sixty days, either party may terminate the agreement.
On August 24, 1951, the union transmitted a letter to the company notifying the company of its desire to modify the agreement. Representatives of the company and the union first met on August 29, 1951 to discuss the proposed amendments. The two groups held 37 more meetings between that date and April 30, 1952, but no agreement was reached. On April 30, employees of the company went on strike, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Neither the company nor the union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, the union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally, but the company refused this offer.
The company distributed a letter to the union explaining that there would be no reinstatement of workers unless the employees agreed to work for a period of at least one year without work stoppage. After June 21, the company interviewed individual employees and rehired only those who assured the company that they would continue to work daily throughout the strike. On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was executed between the company and the union; employees were reinstated the next day.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided that where there is a collective bargaining contract, employees may not go on strike until sixty days after either party provides written notice of its intent to terminate or modify the contract or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Employees who go on strike before this point lose the protection of the NLRA.
During the negotiations for the new agreement, the union filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the company with the National Labor Relations Board, based on the company’s response to the employees’ offer to return to work. The five member Board held in a split decision that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under the NLRA, rejecting the company’s defense that the strikers lost the protection of the act because the contract was still in effect. The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Board’s ruling. The Eighth Circuit held that a strike would violate the terms of the contract until the contract expired or was cancelled in the manner provided for in the NLRA. As the contract had not expired when the employees went on strike, those employees violated the terms of the NLRA and lost its protection.
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Lion Oil Company was merged into Monsanto Chemical Company. By order of the Court, Monsanto was made a party in the case.


[National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Company () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
No and no. In a decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the union did not violate the terms of the National Labor Relations Act by going on strike. Chief Justice Warren rejected the Eighth Circuit’s narrower, more literal interpretation of the Act. He looked to the legislative history of the NLRA and concluded that while Congress recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining, it would make little sense to deprive unions’ of the threat of strike, a force depended upon to facilitate settlements with companies.
Chief Justice Warren investigated the relevant language of the NLRA, determining that Congress intended “expiration date” to encompass both notice of a party’s desire to terminate or modify the contract and the date when the contract would normally expire. Hence, the union was not obligated to wait to strike until the contract’s actual expiration date. This conclusion was based in part on the Court’s ruling in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board. There, the Court recognized a dual purpose in the Act: to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities -- like strikes -- for their own benefit. Otherwise, the Chief Justice argued, unions would be wary of entering into long-term contracts at all. Chief Justice Warren thus concluded that the notice and waiting requirements of the Act were fully satisfied, as the strike did not occur until long after the union delivered notice of proposed amendments to the company.
Chief Justice Warren also rejected the company’s contention that the strike was a breach of contract, holding that where a contract does not contain an express waiver of the right to strike, that waiver cannot be inferred.
Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part, taking issue only with the majority’s breach of contract ruling. He noted that the Eighth Circuit did not reach that issue because of its decision to set aside the Board’s ruling, and that the Board did not raise the issue on appeal.
Justice John Harlan also concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s construction of the Act, but took issue with the majority’s ruling on the unfair labor practice charge. He also noted that the issue was not taken up by the Eighth Circuit, and strongly objected to the Court ruling on issues not decided by lower courts.
Justice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Rowoldt v. Perfetto () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
Charles Rowoldt, a German citizen living in the United States, received an order of deportation under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because of his membership in the Communist Party. Rowoldt admitted to joining the Party for about a year and working at a Communist bookstore. However, he contended that he should not be deported because he joined the Party to "fight for his daily needs" and get "something to eat and something to crawl into." The Internal Security Act contained an exception for those who joined the Party to obtain food, employment, or other necessities of living. Rowolt also indicated that he was not aware that anyone in the Party supported violent overthrow of the government. Rowoldt sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of Minnesota, but his writ was denied because there was enough evidence to support his membership in the Party. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.


[Rowoldt v. Perfetto () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the court, holding that Rowoldt did not have a "meaningful relationship" with the Communist Party as required by the Internal Security Act. The record was insufficient to support the order of deportation and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision. Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented stating that he believed the record indicated that Rowoldt joined the Party knowing of its active political nature, regardless of whether he believed in violent overthrow of the government.


[United States v. Howard () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
Federal criminal information was filed in district court against Ludenia Howard, representing Stokes Fish Company, for violating the Federal Black Bass Act. The Act forbids any person to transport black bass or other fish across state lines if doing so is prohibited by the laws of the state. In Florida, such issues are governed by the regulations of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The district court held that the regulations were not “laws” of Florida under the meaning of the Black Bass Act and quashed the information. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.


[United States v. Howard () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Stanley Reed delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that precedent has established that rulings of state administrative agencies should be considered laws of the state. In the case of fish and game legislation, the majority of state legislatures vest regulatory authority in commissions. The Court held that the congressional intent behind the Black Bass Act was to enforce the fishing regulations of individual states regardless of whether those regulations came from commissions or state legislatures.


[Mallory v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Andrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers on charges of rape. Upon arresting Mallory, the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, the police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory.


[Mallory v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the arraignment of Mallory was not accomplished "without unnecessary delay," violating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that Mallory was not told of his rights to counsel or to a preliminary examination before a magistrate, nor of his right to remain silent. "Not until he had confessed, when any judicial caution had lost its purpose, did the police arraign him." The Court held that it was not the function of the police to arrest people at large and interrogate them at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before approaching a commissioner.


[Fikes v. Alabama () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
On April 24, 1953 in Selma, Alabama, an intruder broke into the apartment of the daughter of the city mayor. The daughter and the intruder struggled through several rooms until she was able to seize his knife, and he fled. The assailant had a towel over his head, so the victim could not identify the defendant during the trial. The police apprehended William Earl Fikes on the basis of a call from a private citizen and held him “on an open charge of investigation.” The police questioned Fikes for hours, placed him in jail, and limited his access to anyone familiar. After nearly a week of this treatment, Fikes confessed in the form of answers to the interrogator’s leading questions. Five days later, Fikes confessed under questioning a second time. When these confessions were admitted into the trial as evidence, Fikes did not testify regarding the events surrounding his interrogation because the judge had ruled he would be subjected to unlimited cross-examination. The jury convicted Fikes and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.


[Fikes v. Alabama () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the circumstances surrounding Fikes’ confession were coercive and unduly influenced him. Because the confessions were gained through coercion, their use in trial constituted a denial of due process.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that mental and emotional coercion achieve the same result as physical coercion and should be considered equally detrimental to the interests of justice. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the questioning that led to the confessions was not definitively coercive. He also argued that, without evidence that shows the questioning was unconstitutional, the majority opinion overstepped the Court’s bounds by reversing the decision. Justice Stanley Reed and Justice Harold Burton joined in the dissent.


[Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required union officers to file non-communist affidavits to gain the protections of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRA also made filing a false affidavit a crime. The NLRB found that an officer of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelt workers had filed a false affidavit. The NLRB issued a decompliance order ceasing all protections. The union sued to enjoin the order. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.


[Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the criminal penalty imposed by NLRA is the only valid remedy for filing false affidavits.


[Carroll v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of evidence was appealable.


[Carroll v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion, reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the United States had no right to appeal the suppression order. The order was sufficiently separate from the criminal trial to be final and not appealable under statutes relating to criminal cases.


[Roviaro v. United States () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Facts]
On August 12, 1954, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics ("FBN") and the Chicago Police Department met twice with Albert Roviaro near the intersection of 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago. According to Agent Norris Durham of the FBN, after the second meeting, Detective Byson of the Chicago police climbed into the trunk of a Cadillac sedan owned and driven by "John Doe," an informant for the government. The trunk was propped open slightly to preserve Byson's line of sight. John Doe drove the car to 74th Street and St. Lawrence Avenue, where Alberto Roviaro got out of a Pontiac sedan. Roviaro entered the Cadillac sedan and took a seat next to the driver, John Doe.
Durham followed the Cadillac, which took a circuitous rote to Champlain Avenue and 74th Street. He observed Roviaro leave the Cadillac and walk to a nearby tree, where he picked up a small package. Byson confirmed this from his vantage point in the Cadillac's trunk. Roviaro then walked to the car's open right front door and motioned as if he was leaving the package inside. A chemist working for the United States later identified the package's contents as heroin.
The government charged Roviaro with trafficking heroin, in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. He was convicted, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the ruling. Judge Walter Lindley, writing for a unanimous court, held that because John Doe was not a participant in Roviaro's actual possession of heroin, Roviaro is not entitled to full disclosure of his identity.


[Roviaro v. United States () — Warren Court (1956-1957) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Harold Burton, writing for a majority in a 6-1 decision, held that Roviaro's interest in preparing his defense outweighed the public interest in protecting John Doe's identity. The Court focused on the fundamental requirements of fairness, reasoning that where the identity of an informant or the contents of an informant's communications are relevant and helpful to a defense, the government's privilege must give way. Justice Burton also noted that the charge in question required more than mere possession of heroin; Roviaro had the burden of justifying this possession, which underlined his need for access to material witnesses. John Doe was his only material witness.
Justice Thomas Clark dissented. He wrote that the majority's decision jeopardizes the government's privilege in cases involving informants, especially in drug cases where informants are often necessary to the proper administration and prosecution of narcotic laws. He also suggested that Roviaro was attempting to win on a technicality --as he likely already knew the informant's identity-- rather than on the merits of the case.
Justices Hugo Black and Charles Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Roth v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products.


[Roth v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).


[Yates v. United States () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Facts]
Fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully and knowingly conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This case was decided in conjunction with Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States.


[Yates v. United States () — Warren Court (1955-1956) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases to a District Court for retrial. The Court interpreted the Smith Act in the following manner: First, the term "organize" was construed to mean the creation of a new organization, making the Act inapplicable to subsequent organizational acts. Second, the Court drew a distinction between the "advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle" and the "advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the Government." The Court recognized that instances of speech that amounted to "advocacy of action" were "few and far between."


[Trop v. Dulles () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
In 1944, United States Army private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca, Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to Casablanca. Despite testifying that he "decided to return to the stockade" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a US citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.


[Trop v. Dulles () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes. After finding that Section 401(g) of the amended Act was penal in nature, since it punished convicted deserters with denationalization, the Court held that expatriation was barred by the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual penal remedy. Citizenship, the Court stated, is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. Rather, it can only be voluntarily renounced by express language and, or, conduct. Since Trop did not involve himself in any way with a foreign state, so as to demonstrate disloyalty to the United States, his court martial conviction of desertion did not justify his expatriation.


[United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Company () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Shotwell Manufacturing, along with several employees, was convicted of evading income taxes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction because the district court had denied Shotwell’s motion to suppress evidence of certain disclosures. Shotwell allegedly made these disclosures in good faith, thinking they would shield them from liability. After the government petitioned for certiorari, they moved to remand the case to the district court in light of new evidence. If true, this new evidence could prove Shotwell lied while testifying about making the disclosures in good faith.


[United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Company () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority, vacating the court of appeals' decision and remanding the case to the district court. The Supreme Court would not review the case with a record challenged as being “tainted with perjury and fraud”. Because Shotwell, et al. were found guilty, there was no double jeopardy issue. The district court was the proper venue for the remand because there were questions about the integrity of the record.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the Court should have denied certiorari and let the case take its regular course back to the district court for a new trial based on the decision by the court of appeals. Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


[Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) passed an order making intrastate passenger fares for the Milwaukee Road’s Chicago suburban commuter line higher than the fares the state commission had authorized. The state of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association sued the ICC in district court and sought to enjoin the enforcement of the order. The district court held that the ICC had failed to show that the fares authorized by the state commission caused undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, and therefore the order was not justified. The ICC appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.


[Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that there must be clear justification for an agency of the federal government to interfere in states’ interests. In this case, the ICC interfered based on a single line of a commuter train system running at a deficit, which does not provide justification to require alteration of the rates throughout the state.


[Cicenia v. Lagay () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
During police interrogation for a murder, Cicenia and his counsel repeatedly requested to see one another but they were refused their requests. By the time Cicenia saw his attorney, he had made and signed a written confession to the murder. Cicenia moved the state trial court for an order requiring the state to produce his written confession. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court affirmed the decision. Cicenia commenced a federal habeas corpus proceeding and the lower court discharged the writ, holding that Cicenia had failed to establish the involuntariness of his confession and that the state's refusal to permit petitioner to communicate with counsel during the inquiry did not deprive him of due process. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Cicenia v. Lagay () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court reasoned that Cicenia had failed to substantiate the charge that his confession was coerced. The Court also found that Cicenia did not have a constitutional right to confer with counsel during police questioning and, therefore, there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court also found that in the absence of a showing of prejudice to Cicenia, it was not a due process violation for the state to deny counsel the opportunity to inspect the confession before trial.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Warren and Black, dissented, arguing that the majority ruling was out of line with the constitutional requirement of fair criminal proceedings against a citizen.


[Crooker v. California () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
On July 5, 1955, John Russell Crooker was arrested for the murder of his boss with whom he had been having an illicit relationship. For the next fourteen hours, Crooker was sporadically questioned and interrogated in his home and in the West Los Angeles Police Station; he repeatedly asked to meet with an attorney and was told that he could call only after the investigation was over. After fourteen hours of detainment and periodic interrogation, Crooker wrote a full confession to the murder. The next morning, Crooker was asked to orally repeat his confession, but he refused and again asked to speak with an attorney. Crooker was permitted to call his attorney at that point, and from then forward, he was represented by his counsel.
At trial, Crooker argued that his confession was obtained in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because his confession was coerced by state authorities, and even if it was given voluntarily, he was denied the right to counsel. The issue of whether Crooker’s confession was voluntary was presented to the jury, which resolved the question against Crooker and convicted him. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.


[Crooker v. California () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the coercion that might occur from a denial of a specific request for counsel can be negated by factors such as the defendant’s age, intelligence, and education. In this case, Crooker had knowledge of his rights based on the fact that he was a law student and that he refused to answer some questions during interrogation. Additionally, Crooker was informed by the police officer that he didn’t have to answer anything he didn’t want to. Therefore, Crooker’s confession was not coerced. The Court also held that, although Crooker’s confession was made without counsel being present, his awareness of his rights meant that the absence of counsel did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the repeated denial of counsel to Crooker was a violation of his Due Process right. Justice Black also argued that the preservation of Due Process should also be applied to pre-trial investigation and therefore that the accused who wants counsel should have one at any time after the arrest. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Black Hugo L. Black, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
On July 18, 1951 the International Automobile Union called a strike against Wolverine Tube, Inc., a subsidiary of the Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company, located in Decatur, AL. As a result of this strike, Mr. Paul Russell, a non-union employee at the plant, was prevented from working when members of the picket line made violent threats against him and physically blocked the only entrance into the plant. The strike lasted until August 22, 1951.
Russell sued the union in Alabama state court, claiming that the union unlawfully invaded his right to engage in a lawful occupation free from unlawful interference. The Union argued that the Labor Management Act of 1947 removed jurisdiction from the state court to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). When the trial court decided for the union, Russell appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for trial.
At trial, a jury returned a $10,000.00 verdict for Russell. The union appealed, arguing that the jury verdict was excessive and reiterating its argument that the state court had no jurisdiction to hear this case. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s decision.


[International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. Justice Harold Burton, writing for a 6-2 majority, reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., which held that Congress did not give the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over a common-law tort for damages. Justice Burton noted that, although the National Labor Relations Board had the authority to award back pay to Russell, that authority did not remove Russell’s right to sue the union for damages in state court. The Court held that cutting off an employee’s right to sue a union would, in effect, grant unions substantial immunity from any consequences resulting from mass picketing or coercion. Finally, the Court held that the $10,000.00 verdict was not excessive in this case.
Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, stating that, when Congress passed the Labor Management Act, it was attempting to balance the competing interests of employees, unions, and management. By allowing additional remedies, Justice Warren argued that the Supreme Court upset that balance. Justice William O. Douglas joined in this dissent. Justice Hugo Black did not participate in this decision.


[Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
While the Spanish ship S.S. Guadalupe was docked in Hoboken, NJ, a cable struck Francisco Romero and seriously him. He sued for negligence under the Jones act and maritime law. The Jones Act provides jurisdiction for claims under the Constitution and treaties of the U.S. for persons of diverse citizenship. Both Romero and his employer were aliens, so there was no diversity of citizenship. Also, the maritime laws did not arise from the Constitution or treaties of the U.S.. The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction. The district court also held that Romero could receive adequate remedies under Spanish law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.