[Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.


[Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court overturned the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. The majority held that the challengers to the tax credit in Arizona lack standing under Article III. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "State sponsorship of religion sometimes harms individuals only (but this 'only' is no small matter) in their capacity as contributing members of our national community," Kagan wrote for the dissenters.


[Walker v. Martin (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.


[Walker v. Martin (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The Court held that the California rule requiring state habeas petitions to be filed "as promptly as the circumstances allow" constitutes an independent state ground that is adequate to bar habeas relief in federal court.


[Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction.


[Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "A connection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction," Ginsburg wrote. "Such a connection does not establish the 'continuous and systematic' affiliation necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims unrelated to the foreign corporation's contacts with the State."


[Los Angeles County, CA v. Humphries (2010) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in Monell v. Department of Social Services do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.


[Los Angeles County, CA v. Humphries (2010) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision, holding that Los Angeles County does not have to pay attorneys' fees in the case. Justice Stephen Breyer, who wrote the 8-0 opinion for the court, reasoned that the court's ruling in Monell applies to claims against municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration and decision of the case because she worked on it while in the Solicitor General's office.


[Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists.
The lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.


[Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Efficient and even-handed application of the law demands that we look to whether the arrest is objectively justified, rather than to the motive of the arresting officer," Scalia wrote.
Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined as to Part I. Kennedy expressed concern that the court's "holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves unresolved whether the government's use of the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful."
Ginsburg filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. Ginsburg also addressed the Material Witness Statute and wrote that Al-Kidd's "ordeal is a grim reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, constraints that will control officialdom even in perilous times."
Meanwhile, Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. "Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the pretextual use of a material witness warrant for preventive detention of an individual whom the Government has no intention of using at trial is, in my view, a closer question than the majority's opinion suggests," Sotomayor declared.
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action "to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt." On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.


[Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The court held that the state tort lawsuit in this case is not preempted by federal auto safety standards. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, while Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Abbott v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the defendants' arguments.


[Abbott v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. In its first opinion of the term, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' opinions. "A defendant is subject to the highest mandatory minimum specified for his conduct in §924(c), unless another provision of law directed to conduct proscribed by §924(c) imposes an even greater mandatory minimum," Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in an 8-0 opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision because of her involvement in the case as the solicitor general.


[Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Various business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ("LAWA") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute.
On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – like LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation.


[Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's licensing law falls well within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and therefore is not expressly preempted." All five members of the majority did not join the chief justice's opinion in full. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Congress did not intend its 'licensing' language to create so broad an exemption, for doing so would permit States to eviscerate the federal Act's preemption provision," Breyer wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a separate dissent in which she contended that she "would also hold that federal law pre-empts the provision of the Arizona Act making mandatory the use of E-Verify, the federal electronic verification system." The Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[FCC v. AT&T Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of "personal privacy."
The FCC rejected AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase "personal privacy" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined "person" as a corporation.


[FCC v. AT&T Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.. The court held that corporations do not have a right of personal privacy that would protect them from the disclosure of public records that have been handed over to federal agencies. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("RRRR"). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev., the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's suit.


[CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority held that a railroad could invoke the RRRR statute to challenge sales and use taxes that apply to rail carriers but exempt their competitors in the transportation industry. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.


[United States  v. Tinklenberg (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.
Before trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following Tinklenberg's conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.


[United States  v. Tinklenberg (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer. The Speedy Trial Act "contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial," Breyer wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Antonin Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case. " I agree with the judgment of the Court in Part II that a pretrial motion need not actually postpone a trial, or create an expectation of postponement, in order for its pendency to be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act.... But I think that conclusion is entirely clear from the text of the Speedy Trial Act, and see no need to look beyond the text," Scalia argued.


[Wall v. Kholi (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment that a petition for leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.


[Wall v. Kholi (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito. "Because the parties agree that a motion to reduce sentence under Rhode Island law is not part of the direct review process, we hold that respondent's motion tolled the AEDPA limitation period and that his federal habeas petition was therefore timely," Alito wrote for the court.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with "Footnote 3 of the Court's opinion, which declines to decide whether a Rule 35 motion seeks direct review."


[Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.


[Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Securities fraud plaintiffs need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification," the Chief Justice wrote.


[Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in Ex parte Young, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency.


[Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. " Ex parte Young allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same state," Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the 6-2 majority. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Roberts wrote that he disagreed with the majority's "substantial and novel expansion of what we have also called a 'narrow exception' to a State's sovereign immunity." Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug.
Three companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it restricts the speech rights of data miners without directly advancing legitimate state interests.


[Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Vermont's statute, which imposes content-and speaker-based burdens on protected expression, is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny," Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan. "The First Amendment does not require courts to apply a special 'heightened' standard of review when reviewing such an effort," Breyer wrote. "And, in any event, the statute meets the First Amendment standard this Court has previously applied when the government seeks to regulate commercial speech."


[Freeman v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
William Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly.
But in December 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Freeman v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a plurality opinion. "The Justices who join this plurality opinion conclude that the categorical bar enacted by the Court of Appeals finds no support in §3582(c)(2), Rule11(c)(1)(C), or the relevant Guidelines policy statements," Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote. In the controlling opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted: "In my view, the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court pursuant to an agreement authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) ((C) agreement) is 'based on' the agreement itself, not on the judge's calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines." Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. "I agree with the concurrence that the sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines," Roberts wrote. "I would, however, adhere to that logic regardless whether the agreement could be said to 'use' or 'employ' a Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the agreement."


[General Dynamics Corp. v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies weren't able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology.
The government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.


[General Dynamics Corp. v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Antonin Scalia. The court held that neither the government nor the defense contractors could pursue the long-running dispute because of the possibility that state secrets might be revealed. "Suit on the contract, or for performance rendered or funds paid under the contract, will not lie, and the parties will be left where they are," Scalia wrote. "Both parties—the government no less than petitioners—must have assumed the risk that state secrets would prevent the adjudication of claims of inadequate performance."


[Harrington v. Richter (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
However, upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington the defendant must show that "counsel's performance was deficient." And, the defendant must show that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Here, the requirements of Strickland were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.


[Harrington v. Richter (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Reversing the lower court order, the court held that the defense lawyer was not deficient in failing to consult blood evidence when planning strategy for trial. Justice Anthony Kennedy authored the opinion, which was joined by eight of the justices with Justice Elena Kagan taking no part in the consideration of the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.


[CIGNA v. Amara (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a "summary plan description" (SPD), as well as a "summary of material modifications" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class-action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The U.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself.


[CIGNA v. Amara (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order, finding that while the district court did not have authority under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA to reform CIGNA's pension plan, it did have authority to do so under another provision, Section 502(a)(3). In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court noted that "although §502(a)(1)(B) did not give the District Court authority to reform CIGNA's plan, relief is authorized by §502(a)(3), which allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary 'to obtain other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations of ERISA 'or the [plan's] terms.'" Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.


[J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.


[J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. A divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the state court to determine whether the youth was in custody when he was interrogated. (1966). "It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis," Sotomayor wrote for the majority. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. "The Court's decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in truth it is neither, Alito writes. "It is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miranda rule: the perceived need for a clear rule that can be easily applied in all cases. And today's holding is not needed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police."


[Ortiz v. Jordan (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told "that the man was leaving," "this was his nature," and he "is just an old dirty man." The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not "deliberately indifferent" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.


[Ortiz v. Jordan (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which held that a party may not appeal a denial of summary judgment after a district court has conducted a full trial on the merits. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a special concurrence, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy.


[Astra USA v. Santa Clara County (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.


[Astra USA v. Santa Clara County (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that health care providers cannot sue drug makers for overcharging public hospitals for prescription drugs. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Henderson v. Shinseki (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.


[Henderson v. Shinseki (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. The majority held that the deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court does not have jurisdictional consequences. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Smith v. Bayer Corp. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class.
Counsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.


[Smith v. Bayer Corp. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's opinion in a unanimous decision by Justice Elena Kagan. "In enjoining the state court from considering Smith's class certification request, the federal court exceeded its authority under the 'relitigation exception' to the Act," Kagan wrote.


[Chase Bank USA v. McCoy (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A class of Chase Bank ("Chase") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.


[Chase Bank USA v. McCoy (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor who held that at the time of the transactions at issue, Regulation Z did not require Chase to provide McCoy with a change-in-terms notice before implementing the agreement term allowing it to raise his interest rate.


[Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Jason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Nevada in 2006 and proposed a plan to make $500 monthly payments over a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and two creditors objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that $500 per month was not Ransom's projected disposable income as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. They argued that Ransom improperly included a deduction against income for "vehicle ownership expense" of $471. The trustee and creditors claimed that the deduction should be disallowed and that the monthly payment should be increased. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the trustee and refused to confirm the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, agreeing to hear the appeal on this interlocutory issue, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.


[Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, Justice Elena Kagan, in her first opinion for the Court, ruled that a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments could not take the car-ownership deduction. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.


[Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer "clear and convincing evidence" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are valid.


[Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. "Section 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence," Sotomayor wrote. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, in which he "join[s] the Court's opinion in full" but added that "I write separately because, given the technical but important nature of the invalidity question, I believe it worth emphasizing that in this area of law as in others the evidentiary standard of proof applies to questions of fact and not to questions of law."


[Sykes v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes' sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had previously been found guilty of three violent felonies.
In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that "fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar to ACCA's enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent felony under ACCA."


[Sykes v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Felony vehicle flight, as proscribed by Indiana law, is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA," Kennedy wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he wrote: "the majority errs by implying that the 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' test may still apply to offenses 'akin to strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes.'" Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which he chastises the majority for an "ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion." Justice Elena Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "Vehicular flight comes in different varieties, and so too the statutes that criminalize the conduct," Kagan wrote. "Because petitioner Marcus Sykes was convicted only of simple vehicular flight, and not of any flight offense involving aggressive or dangerous activity, I would find that he did not commit a 'violent felony' under ACCA."


[Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company's HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims against Roche.


[Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "The Bayh-Dole Act does not automatically vest title to federally funded inventions in federal contractors or authorize contractors to unilaterally take title to such inventions," Roberts wrote for the majority. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, noting that while she agrees with them majority that "the appropriate disposition is to affirm. Like the dissent, however, I understand the majority opinion to permit consideration of these arguments in a future case." Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He argued that the case should have been remanded to the Federal Circuit for further argument.


[Flores-Villar v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. INS which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.


[Flores-Villar v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Without answering the question, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.


[United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the majority decision "rests on false factual and legal premises and deprives the Nation and other Indian tribes of highly relevant evidence in scores of pending cases seeking relief for the Government's alleged mismanagement of their trust funds." Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Tolentino v. New York (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Jose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too loudly. The officer ran a check on Tolentino's DMV files and discovered that not only was his license suspended, but it had also been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years' probation. He later appealed, claiming his driving record should have been suppressed, because the police stop and subsequent DMV record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court, disagreed and upheld his sentence.


[Tolentino v. New York (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the case was dismissed as improvidently granted.


[Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
French-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a "right-to-use study" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of the copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and further held that "deliberate indifference" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.


[Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court holding in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Induced infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented, contending that the majority is "incorrect in the definition it now adopts; but even on its own terms the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals to consider in the first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge to support the jury's finding of inducement."


[National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review.


[National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The court reversed the lower court decision and upheld the background checks that NASA uses for employees of companies working under contract in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas also filed his own concurring opinion. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Milner v. Department of the Navy (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Glen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are "predominantly" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation.


[Milner v. Department of the Navy (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in an 8-1 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. The majority opinion held that "because Exemption 2 encompasses only records relating to employee relations and human resources issues, the explosives maps and data requested here do not qualify for withholding under that exemption."
Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which he agreed with the judgment but noted: "I write separately to underscore the alternative argument that the Navy raised below, which rested on Exemption 7(F) and which will remain open on remand. " Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, backing the decision of the appeals court and writing that in this case, "I would let sleeping legal dogs lie."


[Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A. (2010) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Watchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made watches from another importer and sold them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or "first sale" rule, under which certain rights are "exhausted" after a sale of the copyrighted good.
A judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.


[Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A. (2010) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Court deadlocked 4-4, which means that the appeals court ruling against Costco stays in place, though the case sets no new high court precedent because it ended in a tie. The tie was possible because Justice Elena Kagan recused herself in the case.


[Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the Melendez-Diaz ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.


[Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Confrontation Clause does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the certification," Ginsburg wrote, adding: "The accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification." Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined all but Part 4 of the opinion; Justice Clarence Thomas joined all but Part 4 and Footnote 6. Sotomayor concurred in part, writing: "I agree with the Court that the trial court erred by admitting the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) report. I write separately first to highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial—specifically because its 'primary purpose' is evidentiary—and second to emphasize the limited reach of the Court's opinion." Meanwhile, Anthony Kennedy dissented, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and Samuel Alito. "Far from replacing live testimony with 'systematic' and 'extrajudicial' examinations, these procedures are fully consistent with the Confrontation Clause and with well-established principles for ensuring that criminal trials are conducted in full accord with requirements of fairness and reliability and with the confrontation guarantee."


[Camreta v. Greene (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she "doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap." After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.


[Camreta v. Greene (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court declined to address the Fourth Amendment question in the case. "We conclude that this Court generally may review a lower court's constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case has become moot because the child has grown up and moved across the country, and so will never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality is at issue," Justice Elena Kagan wrote for the majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion and Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. "I agree with the Court's conclusion that this case is moot and that vacatur is the appropriate disposition; unlike the majority, however, I would go no further," Sotomayor wrote. "The majority suggests that we must decide whether Camreta has a 'right to appeal' in order to vacate the judgment below. But that view does not accord with our past practice." Meanwhile, Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. "The correct solution is not to override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions," Kennedy argued.


[DePierre v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits also interpret the statute the same way.


[DePierre v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous decision by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Cocaine base "means not just 'crack cocaine,' but cocaine in its chemically basic form," Sotomayor wrote for the court. Justice Antonin Scalia declines to join Section III-A, which is the portion of the opinion that discusses legislative history.


[Kentucky v. King (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police.


[Kentucky v. King (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Samuel Alito. "The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment," Alito wrote for the majority. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, contending that "the Court today arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in drug cases. "


[J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state.


[J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court in a plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Although the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion with careful attention to this Court's cases and to its own precedent, the 'stream of commerce' metaphor carried the decision far afield," Kennedy wrote. "Due process protects the defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in the judgment, writing: "I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences." Meanwhile, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today 'turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.'"


[McNeill v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Clifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the district court order.


[McNeill v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas. "A federal sentencing court must determine whether 'an offense under State law' is a 'serious drug offense' by consulting the 'maximum term of imprisonment' applicable to a defendant's prior state drug offense at the time of the defendant's conviction for that offense," Thomas wrote.


[Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged "materiality" in their claim because their evidence was not "statistically significant."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.


[Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court ruled that the materiality of a pharmaceutical company's non-disclosure of adverse event reports in a securities fraud action does not depend upon whether there is a statistically significant health risk.


[Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
1950, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota signed the Yellowstone River Compact, which spelled out how the states would share water. In 2007, Montana sued Wyoming, alleging farmers and other water users along the Powder and Tongue rivers were being harmed by Wyoming's excessive water use. Attorneys for Wyoming argued that much of the water used by the state's residents and businesses was not covered by the 1950 agreement.
Special Master Barton Thompson issued an interim report, finding that Montana had grounds to sue over Wyoming's expanded use of water since 1950. However, Thompson rejected Montana's claim that Wyoming should be held liable for increased water use due to irrigation improvements. Meanwhile, North Dakota, also a member of the Yellowstone compact, was named as a second defendant in the original lawsuit. But Montana officials have said its inclusion was a formality and that they have no disagreement with their eastern neighbor.


[Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master who found that "Montana's allegation fails to state a claim because more efficient irrigation systems are permissible under the compact so long as the conserved water is used to irrigate the same acreage watered in 1950." Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the "court's analysis substitutes its none-too-confident reading of the common law and the compact's definition of 'beneficial use.'" Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Fox v. Vice (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an "anonymous" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.


[Fox v. Vice (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Elena Kagan. "When a plaintiff's suit involves both frivolous and non-frivolous claims, a court may grant reasonable fees to the defendant, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims," Kagan wrote.


[Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Eric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to "discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title." The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII "does not permit third party retaliation claims." A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.


[Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, which held that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct, including Thompson's cause of action. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.


[Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. The majority held that the Fair Labor Standards Act applies to a complaint, whether oral or written. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. "The retaliation provision contemplates an official grievance filed with a court or an agency, not oral complaints—or even formal, written complaints — from an employee to an employer," Scalia argued. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the consideration of the case.


[United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and "has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged "gross mismanagement" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, "the Nation's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action."


[United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "The Court of Appeals was wrong to allow its precedent to suppress the statute's aims," Kennedy wrote for the majority. "The conclusion that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based on substantially the same operative facts allows the statute to achieve its aim." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued: "To avoid both duplication and the running of the statute of limitations, the CFC suit could be stayed while the companion District Court action proceeds." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case.


[American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue.
The states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota.


[American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Clean Air Act and the EPA action the Act authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants."
Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, writing: "I agree with the Court's displacement analysis on the assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act adopted by the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA is correct." Meanwhile, Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not take part in consideration of the case.


[Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart "greeter" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.


[Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Here, proof of commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents' merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The crux of a Title VII inquiry is 'the reason for a particular employment decision,' and respondents wish to sue for millions of employment decisions at once," Scalia wrote. "Without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Whether the class the plaintiffs describe meets the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) is not before the Court, and I would reserve that matter for consideration and decision on remand," Ginsburg wrote.


[Turner v. Rogers (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.


[Turner v. Rogers (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a decision by Justice Stephen Breyer. "We conclude that where as here the custodial parent (entitled to receive the support) is unrepresented by counsel, the State need not provide counsel to the noncustodial parent (required to provide the support), " Breyer wrote for the 5-4 majority. "But we attach an important caveat, namely, that the State must nonetheless have in place alternative procedures that assure a fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the supporting parent is able to comply with the support order." Meanwhile, Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, joined in full by Justice Antonin Scalia and in part by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito. "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants facing incarceration in civil contempt proceedings."


[Staub v. Proctor Hospital (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
As a member of the U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias.


[Staub v. Proctor Hospital (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision in a unanimous decision announced by Justice Antonin Scalia. "If a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable," wrote Scalia. Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in the judgment but wrote that he would hold employers liable if the person making the firing decision "merely rubberstamps" a biased supervisor's recommendation or when the decision-maker is "put on notice that adverse information about an employee may be based on antimilitary animus but does not undertake an independent investigation of the matter."
Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so.
Competitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co. (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the lower court in a decision by Justice Clarence Thomas. "The FCC has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations — i.e., that to satisfy its duty under §251(c)(2), an incumbent LEC must make its existing entrance facilities available to competitors at cost-based rates if the facilities are to be used for interconnection — and this Court defers to the FCC's views," Thomas wrote. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, noting: "I would reach the same result even without benefit of the rule that we will defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations." Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan took no part in consideration of the case.


[Stern v. Marshall (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith.
The Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.


[Stern v. Marshall (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Although the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority to enter judgment on Vickie's counterclaim, it lacked the constitutional authority to do so," the chief justice wrote. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. The majority "fails to follow the analysis that this Court more recently has held applicable to the evaluation of claims of a kind before us here, namely, claims that a congressional delegation of adjudicatory authority violates separation-of-powers principles derived from Article III," Breyer wrote.


[Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech.
The U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found "minimal" impact on freedom of speech.


[Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in a decision by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Arizona's matching funds scheme substantially burdens political speech and is not sufficiently justified by a compelling interest to survive First Amendment scrutiny," the chief justice writing for the majority, noted that the holding does not contend that the First Amendment forbids all public financing. Meanwhile, Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. "The First Amendment's core purpose is to foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate," Kagan argued, adding: "Nothing in Arizona's anti-corruption statute, the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, violates this constitutional protection. To the contrary, the Act promotes the values underlying both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the 'opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.'"


[Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.


[Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "A government employer's allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee do not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee's petition relates to a matter of public concern," Kennedy wrote. "The Third Circuit's conclusion that the public concern test does not limit public employees' Petition Clause claims is incorrect." Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment, writing: "Even where a public employee petitions the government in its capacity as sovereign, I would balance the employee's right to petition the sovereign against the government's interest as an employer in the effective and efficient management of its internal affairs." Meanwhile, Justice Antonin Scalia dissented in part: "I find the proposition that a lawsuit is a constitutionally protected 'Petition' quite doubtful."


[Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.


[Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards.


[Brown v. Plata (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Prison Law Office in Berkeley, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Marciano Plata and several other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans "cruel and unusual punishment." Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the "primary cause" for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so the inmate population would come within 137.5 percent of the prisons' total design capacity. That amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released.


[Brown v. Plata (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of special panel in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "The court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of prisoners' constitutional rights and is authorized by the PLRA," Kenney wrote for the 5-4 majority. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he admonished the majority for affirming "what is perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation's history: an order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted criminals." Justice Samuel Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which he wrote that the "Constitution does not give federal judges the authority to run state penal systems."


[Davis v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Police arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible.


[Davis v. United States (2011) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito. "Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule," Alito wrote. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the judgment only. Meanwhile, Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. "The Court finds a new 'good faith' exception which prevents application of the normal remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, namely, suppression of the illegally seized evidence," Breyer notes, adding: "At this point I can no longer agree with the Court. A new 'good faith' exception and this Court's retroactivity decisions are incompatible."