[Castro v. United States (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Hernan O'Ryan Castro was sentenced to 20 years in prison for drug related offenses. After the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, Castro alleged that he had discovered evidence that a government witness had testified falsely. Based on this evidence, he requested a new trial without legal representation. The district court, because Castro had no legal representation, attempted to help him by re-characterizing his request for a new trial as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The judge's re-characterization of Castro's appeal was intended to help him, but two years later, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress limited the number of petitions for writ of habeas corpus that a prisoner could file to one. When Castro attempted to petition for what he thought was his first write of habeas corpus in 1998, he was denied because of the earlier reclassification of his request for a new trial. When he appealed, the 11th Circuit Court of appeals initially sided with Castro, ruling that the reclassification should not count against him. Four months later, however, the 11th Circuit reconsidered, siding with the government.


[Castro v. United States (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that a federal court can recharacterize a motion as a first habeas corpus petition only if the court: (1) informs the litigant of the court's intent to recharacterize; (2) warns the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent habeas corpus petition will be treated as a second petition; (3) gives the litigant an opportunity to withdraw or amend the motion. The Court held that because the district court failed to give these prescribed warnings, Castro's 1994 motion could not be considered a first habeas corpus petition and his 1997 motion therefore could not be considered a second petition.


[Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Beef Promotion and Research Act (1985) required cattle producers to pay a fee for generic beef advertisements done on behalf of the cattle industry. Some cattle producers disagreed with the advertisements. The Livestock Marketing Association sued the Department of Agriculture (USDA) in federal district court and alleged a government-required fee for advertising with which some cattle producers disagreed violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The USDA argued the advertising was government speech immune from First Amendment challenge. Another group of cattle producers, the Nebraska Cattlemen, sided with the USDA and sued the Livestock Marketing Association. The two cases were consolidated. The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the program violated the First Amendment and that the advertising was compelled and not government speech.


[Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the fund was for government speech and that therefore the government could not be sued under the First Amendment. The Court pointed to the rule that while compelled funding of private speech raises First Amendment concerns, compelled funding of government speech generally does not.


[Tory v. Cochran (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Johnnie Cochran sued his former client Ulysses Tory in a California court for making defaming statements. Tory had tried to force Cochran to pay him money in exchange for desisting, Cochran argued. A judge agreed and ordered Tory to never talk about Cochran again. Tory appealed unsuccessfully in state court, arguing the order violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Cochran died one week after oral argument.


[Tory v. Cochran (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Cochran's death diminished the grounds for the judge's order and that the order therefore amounted to an overly broad prior restraint on speech. Tory could no longer try to force Cochran to pay him in exchange for desisting, the Court reasoned, ending the order's underlying justification.


[Van Orden v. Perry (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.


[Van Orden v. Perry (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."


[Johnson v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1998 a Georgia court reversed all of Johnson's seven prior convictions. One of these had been the basis for the enhanced federal sentence Johnson had received in 1994. In light of the reversals, Johnson filed a motion to vacate his enhanced federal sentence. Federal law, however, set out a one-year statute of limitations on motions by prisoners seeking to modify their sentences. That one-year period ran from the latest of four dates, the last of which was "the date on which the facts supporting the claim...could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." Johnson argued his motion was timely because the reversals constituted previously undiscoverable "facts supporting the claim" and thus triggered a renewed limitation period. The district court and the 11th Circuit denied Johnson's motion as untimely.


[Johnson v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court that the vacating of a state sentence that underlay a federal sentence enhancement was a "fact" within the meaning of the law, but that fact had to have been discovered with due diligence: that is, the prisoner must have promptly sought to have the state judgment vacated. The Court held that by waiting until more than three years after his federal sentence, Johnson failed to show due diligence in seeking to have his original state convictions vacated.


[Leocal v. Ashcroft (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A Florida court convicted Vietnam citizen Duan Le for driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged in federal immigration court that Le should be deported. The INS argued Le committed a crime of violence that was an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws - a deportable crime. The immigration court and an appellate immigration court ruled Le could be deported. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.


[Leocal v. Ashcroft (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice William Rhenquist, the Court held that state DUI offenses, except when involving purposeful intent, are accidental and not crimes of violence under federal law. Le therefore did not commit an aggravated felony for which he could be deported.


[Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs.


[Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that a private party, who, like Aviall, had not been sued under CERCLA could not obtain cleanup contributions from other liable parties. The Court reasoned that CERCLA's language made clear that parties could seek cleanup contribution only during or following a civil action.


[Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Willard Stewart was injured while working on a dredge (a machine for underwater digging) for Dutra, a dredging company. Stewart alleged Dutra was negligent and sued the company in federal district court under the Jones Act. The district court ruled a dredge is not a "vessel in navigation" as defined by the Jones Act and therefore Stewart could not sue under the act. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Stewart v. Dutra Construction Company (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Revised Statutes of 1873 specified that in any act passed after 1871, "vessel" included any watercraft capable of transportation. The requirement that a worker be on a vessel "in navigation," required by the LHWCA, simply meant that the vessel be capable of transportation. This included dredges which, both then and now, transported equipment and a crew over water.


[Pace v. DiGuglielmo (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1986 John Pace was convicted for murder in a Pennsylvania court. His post-conviction appeal was rejected by the state courts as untimely. In 1999 he filed a federal habeas corpus petition. While federal law provides a one-year statute of limitations on filing habeas petitions, that period is tolled while "a properly filed" state appeal is pending. The district court found Pace entitled to both statutory and equitable tolling, effectively discounting the period of time when Pace pursued appeals in state courts. Pennsylvania appealed and argued the court had no basis for the extension. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and ruled Pace could not file a federal habeas petition.


[Pace v. DiGuglielmo (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the federal statute of limitations barred Pace's petition, as it was filed beyond the deadline. Pace was not entitled to statutory tolling because a petition filed after a time limit, which does meet any exceptions to that limit, was no more "properly filed" than a petition filed after a time limit permitting no exception. Moreover, because Pace did not pursue claims in a "diligent" and timely fashion, he was not entitled equitable tolling for any of the time period during which he pursued his state appeals.


[Smith v. Massachusetts (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Melvin T. Smith was tried in for illegal possession of a firearm, among other offenses. During the trial the judge ruled Smith was not guilty because the state failed to introduce direct evidence of the gun's length - therefore not proving the gun Smith possessed met the statutory definition of a firearm. The state later pointed to the state supreme court's ruling that testimony that a gun was a pistol or revolver was sufficient evidence to allow a firearm charge to go to the jury. Because a witness had testified that Smith's gun was a pistol, the judge reversed and sent the possession charge to the jury.
Smith appealed and argued the judge's reversal of the not guilty ruling on the possession charge violated the Fifth Amendment's doubly jeopardy clause, which prohibited successive prosecutions. The state court of appeals rejected Smith's argument and ruled no Fifth Amendment violation occurred because the judge's reversal did not require a second proceeding.


[Smith v. Massachusetts (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred the judge from reconsidering the acquittal on the firearm charge later in the trial. Smith was subjected to successive prosecutions because, according to Court precedent, the midtrial ruling was an acquittal and the submission of the count to the jury was a further proceeding dealing with guilt or innocence. While the double jeopardy clause did allow states to create a procedure for reconsidering a midtrial determination of insufficiency of proof, Massachusetts had no such procedure at the time of Smith's trial.


[Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Azel Smith and group of other police department employees over the age of 40 sued Jackson, Mississippi, and the city police department in federal district court. The group alleged the department salary plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which banned employers from engaging in age discrimination. The department plan gave officers with five or fewer years of tenure with the department larger raises than those with more than five years of tenure. The group made a "disparate impact" claim under the ADEA, arguing the department and city unintentionally engaged in age discrimination. The federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled disparate impact claims could not be made under the ADEA. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary.


[Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that ADEA authorized recovery in disparate-impact cases, but that in this case petitioners failed to set forth a valid claim. The Court relied on its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke Power, where the Court first authorized disparate-impact claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court reasoned that the ADEA authorized disparate-impact claims in cases similar to Griggs, because the language of Title VII and ADEA was virtually identical. However, ADEA was narrower than Title VII and allowed an otherwise prohibited action where the discrimination was based on reasonable factors other than age. The employees in this case failed to identify any specific practice within the pay plan that had an adverse impact on older workers. Further, the city's plan was based on reasonable factors other than age.


[Mayle v. Felix (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A California state court sentenced Felix to life in prison for murder. Felix's conviction became final on August 12, 1997. Federal habeas law gave Felix one year to file a habeas petition in federal court. On May 8, 1998, Felix filed a habeas petition and asserted a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission into his trial of videotaped prosecution witness testimony. On January 28, 1999, more than five months after the one-year habeas time limit, Felix filed an amended petition arguing that the admission into his trial of pretrial statements had violated the Fifth Amendment. Felix argued that the one-year limit did not bar this amended petition, citing the rule under federal habeas law that amended petitions relate back to the filing date of the original petition if both arise out of the original's "conduct, transaction or occurrence." Because his Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims challenged the same criminal conviction, Felix argued, they arose out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence." The district court disagreed and ruled the amended petition time barred; the court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim on its merits. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Sixth Amendment ruling, but agreed with Felix that his amended petition was not time barred because they both arose out of the same trial and conviction.


[Mayle v. Felix (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court rejected the argument that the trial itself was the "transaction" or "occurrence" under federal habeas law. The Court said that such a definition would have allowed virtually any new claim introduced in an amended petition to relate back, gutting the one-year time limit on petitions. Felix's amended habeas petition thus did not relate back because the issue of his pretrial statements differed in time and type from the videotaped witness testimony.


[Halbert v. Michigan (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Halbert pleaded no contest in a Michigan court to two counts of criminal sexual conduct. The day after Halbert's sentence was imposed, Halbert moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied the motion and told Halbert the property remedy for his complaint was the state appellate court. Michigan required a defendant convicted on a guilty or no contest plea to apply for leave of appeal to the state appellate court. Halbert asked the trial court twice to appoint counsel to help him with his application. The trial court refused. Without counsel, Halbert still applied for leave to appeal, which the court of appeals denied. The state supreme court also denied Halbert's application for leave to appeal to that court.


[Halbert v. Michigan (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the due process and equal protection clauses required Michigan to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to the state appellate court. The Court reasoned that if indigent defendants convicted on their pleas did not have counsel to guide them through Michigan's complex appellate process, their right to appeal would not be meaningful.


[Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Two subsidiaries of ExxonMobil formed joint ventures with Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. When a dispute arose over the royalties SABIC had charged, SABIC sued the two subsidiaries in a Delaware state court, seeking a ruling that the royalties were proper. ExxonMobil countersued in federal district court, alleging SABIC had overcharged. Before the state-court trial, the district court denied SABIC's motion to dismiss the federal suit. As SABIC appealed, the Delaware court ruled for ExxonMobil. The Third Circuit held that as a result of of the state court judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the suit. That doctrine was an offshoot of the federal law giving the U.S. Supreme Court sole authority to modify and prohibiting a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction.


[Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the the Third Circuit "misperceived the narrow ground occupied by Rooker-Feldman." That doctrine was confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of state-court judgments made before the federal district court proceedings began and inviting district court rejection of those judgments. In this case, ExxonMobil's federal suit was filed before any state-court judgment and had not sought the review of any such judgment. Rather, the company had sought to protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds that might not have precluded relief in federal court. Moreover, in cases of parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman was not triggered simply by the entry of a state court judgment. Properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction did not vanish if a state court reached judgment on the same or a related question while the case remained before a federal district court. Rooker-Feldman did not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or add to the circumscribed doctrines allowing federal courts to dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.


[Johnson v. California (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
California prisoner Garrison Johnson alleged in federal district court that the California Department of Corrections used race to assign temporary cell mates for new prisoners. Johnson alleged this violated the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. The district court and a federal appellate court ruled against Johnson. The appellate court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Turner v. Safley, which said a relaxed standard - as opposed to a "strict scrutiny" standard - should be used to determine whether prison regulations are constitutional. The prison's policies were "reasonably related to the administrators' concern for racial violence and thus must be upheld," the appellate court wrote.


[Johnson v. California (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that prison racial-segregation policies are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court rejected the claim that because the policy was "neutral" - because all prisoners were "equally" segregated - the policy was not subject to strict scrutiny. Racial classifications must receive strict scrutiny even when they may be said to affect the races equally. The Court remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could use strict scrutiny to review the policy. Justices John Paul Stevens, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin Scalia dissented.


[Illinois v. Caballes (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."


[Illinois v. Caballes (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.


[San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, California (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The owners and operators of a hotel in San Francisco sued the city in state court, arguing a $567,000 conversion fee they had to pay in 1996 was an unconstitutional taking of private property. After California courts rejected this argument, the hoteliers argued in federal district court that the fee violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. This claim depended on issues identical to those that had been resolved in their state-court suit. The federal full faith and credit statute, however, barred litigants from suing in federal court when that suit was based on issues that had been resolved in state court (the rule of "issue preclusion"). The hoteliers asked the district court to exempt from the statute claims brought under the takings clause.


[San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, California (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court refused to create an exception to the full faith and credit statute in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance federal takings claims. The Court rejected the argument that whenever plaintiffs reserved their federal takings claims in state court, federal courts should review the reserved federal claims, regardless of the issues decided by the state court. Moreover, federal courts were not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can sue in federal court.


[KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Cosmetics company Lasting Impression trademarked the term "micro colors." Lasting Impression sued K.P. Permanent Make-Up in federal district court for using the term. K.P. used the "classic fair use defense" and argued it used the term only to describe K.P. products. The district court sided with K.P. Lasting appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Unlike other federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit required companies that used the fair use defense to prove there was no likelihood of confusion in use of the term. The Ninth Circuit ruled there was likelihood of confusion and reversed the district court's ruling.


[KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a party raising the classic defense of fair use did not need to negate any likelihood that the practice under question would confuse consumers about the origin of the goods. The Court interpreted federal trademark law as placing the burden of showing likelihood of confusion on the party charging infringement. Moreover, Congress "said nothing about likelihood of confusion in setting out the elements of the fair use defense."


[Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The IRS seized property owned by Grable and gave Grable notice by certified mail before selling the property to Darue. Grable sued in state court, claiming Darue's title was invalid because federal law required the IRS to give Grable notice of the sale by personal service, not certified mail. Darue removed the case to federal disctrict court, arguing that the case presented a federal question because Grable's claim depended on an interpretation of federal tax law. The district court agreed and ruled for Darue. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.


[Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that the case involved a federal question and could thus be removed to federal court. Federal-questions jurisdiction, the Court reasoned, lay over some state-law claims that implicated significant federal issues. In this case, the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation warranted moving the case to federal court.


[Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Bradley Nigh bought a car from Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Nigh later sued the dealership for intentionally charging him for a car feature for which he did not agree to pay. Nigh sued under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). A federal district court awarded Nigh about $24,000. Koons Buick appealed and argued the district court ignored TILA's cap on damages to $1,000. A Fourth Circuit held that a 1995 amendment to the act removed the $1,000 cap on recoveries involving loans secured by personal property.


[Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 judgment delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a 1995 TILA amendment did not change the original limit on violations involving personal-property loans. Congress intended the amendment to raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans secured by real property. Congress had not sought to remove the $1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property.


[United States v. Booker (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In Blakely v. Washington (2004) the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury required judges to use only facts proved to a jury to increase a sentence beyond the standard range.
Following U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a federal district court judge enhanced Freddie Booker's sentence based on facts the judge determined. Booker appealed and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment where they required sentences to be based on facts found by a judge.
In another case, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed a judge to sentence Ducan Fanfan to 188-235 months in prison based on facts the judge determined. The judge decided Blakely v. Washington prevented him from enhancing the sentence and sentenced Fanfan to 78 months. The federal government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court consolidated the Booker and Fanfan cases.


[United States v. Booker (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines, where they allow judges to enhance sentences using facts not reviewed by juries, violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. The sentences of Booker and Fanfan, based partly on facts determined only by judges, were therefore unconstitutional. In a separate 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court said the guidelines would now be advisory and invalidated the provisions that made them mandatory.


[Orff v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Westlands Water District received water from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation under a 1963 contract. In 1993 Westlands sued the district for reducing their water supply. California farmers who had bought water from Westlands also sued the bureau, intervening as plaintiffs. After negotiations Westlands agreed to dismiss their suit. But the farmers refused to drop theirs, accusing the bureau of breach of contract. The farmers claimed that as third-party beneficiaries they could enforce the contract and that the United States had waived its sovereing immunity from such suits in the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. That act allowed parties "to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit" over rights under a federal reclamation contract. The district court held that the farmers were not contracting parties or third-party beneficiaries and thus could not invoke the waiver. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision.


[Orff v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In this case, no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the act merely permitted parties to join the United States in an action between other parties when the action required interpretation of a contract and joining the U.S. was necessary. The farmers suit was not an attempt to join the U.S. as a necessary party defendant.


[Tenet v. Doe (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Jane and John Doe said they performed espionage activities abroad for the United States. The Does sued the CIA in federal district court for not paying financial support allegedly promised to the Does and for allegedly violating the Does' due process rights. The CIA argued the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Totten v. U.S. (1875) prohibited the district court from hearing the case. In Totten the Court dismissed a spy's claim against the government for damages for breach of contract. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Totten did not prevent the district court from hearing the Does' case. The courts reasoned that the Does' case, unlike Totten's, was mainly about the denial of due process rights. The Ninth Circuit said the CIA could prohibit the district court from hearing the Does' case only if the CIA could show that state secrets would be in jeopardy were the case to proceed. The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court for that court to determine the CIA's potential state secrets claim.


[Tenet v. Doe (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 9-0 decision delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Totten barred the Does' suit. Totten, the Court ruled, prohibited judicial review in any case where success depended on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the government. To risk revealing that relationship would endanger the essence of a spy's contract with the government - secrecy.


[Gonzales v. Raich (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in federal district court.
The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce - exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use. Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.


[Gonzales v. Raich (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.


[Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
When Ohio's highest security prison first opened, no official policy governed placement there, resulting in haphazard and erroneous placements. Ohio ultimately issued the "New Policy," which required formal procedures for evaluating whether prisoners classified for placement into the facility. The New Policy also required a three-tier review process after a recommendation for Supermax placement was made. For instance, the state had to explain a placement recommendation to an inmate and that inmate had to have an opportunity for rebuttal at a hearing. Prisoners in the facility sued in federal district court, alleging the prison placement policy violated the 14th Amendment's due process clause. The court agreed that the New Policy violated due process and ordered elaborate and far-reaching modifications to the policy. The Sixth Circuit affirmed but set aside the substantive modifications on the ground they exceeded the court's authority.


[Wilkinson v. Austin (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the procedures by which the New Policy classified prisoners for placement at the facility provided sufficient protection to comply with the due process clause. The Court reasoned that procedural protections afforded to prisoners were necessarily limited, and that the New Policy sufficiently minimized risk of erroneous placement. The Court also cited Ohio's interests in prison security against gangs and in preserving scarce resources.


[Bell v. Thompson (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A Tennessee trial court sentenced Thompson to death for murder. Thompson made unsuccesful appeals in state court based on the claim that his counsel had failed to adequately investigate his mental health. A federal district court also rejected Thompson's petition based on that claim. However, Thompson's habeas counsel had failed to include in the record the deposition and report of a psychologist who argued Thompson had suffered from serious mental illness. The counsel included the documents when Thompson appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which nevertheless dismissed Thompson's claim. Thompson then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate until the Court decided whether to hear the case. The Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit stayed its mandate again, pending the Supreme Court's decision on Thompson's petition for rehearing, which the Court denied. The Sixth Circuit still did not issue its mandate. Five months later, Tennessee had set Thompson's execution date. The Sixth Circuit suddenly issued an amended opinion on Thompson's habeas petition, overturning the district court's dismissal of his ineffective counsel claim and ordering hearings based on that claim. The Sixth Circuit included in the appeal record the initially ommitted psychologist deposition. The circuit court argued its authority to issue an amended opinion five months after the Supreme Court denied Thompson's petition was based on its inherent power to reconsider an opinion before issuance of the the mandate.


[Bell v. Thompson (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by withholding its mandate and not releasing its amended opinion for more than five months after the Supreme Court's final say in the case. The Sixth Circuit cost the state and the parties significant time and resources by not providing notification that it was reconsidering its decision. Further, the Sixth Circuit had the opportunity at the rehearing stage to consider the same mental health arguments it later adopted. Moreover, the evidence and its ommission did not warrant the court's "extraordinary departure from standard procedures." By withholding its mandate for months, the Court said, the Sixth Circuit failed to give the "appropriate level of respect" to Tennessee's judgment that Thompson deserved death. Notably, the Court declined to consider the scope of the appellate courts' Federal Appellate Procedure 41 authority to stay a mandate following a denial of certioarari.


[City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Rancho Palos Verdes, a city in California, gave Mark Abrams a permit to construct an antenna on his property for amateur use. But when the city learned Abrams used the antenna for commercial purposes, the city forced Abrams to stop until he got a commercial use permit. Abrams applied and the city refused to give him the permit. Abrams then sued in federal district court, alleging the city violated his rights under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Abrams sought damages under a federal liability law that allowed people to sue for damages for federal rights violations.
The district court agreed with Abrams and ordered the city to give Abrams the permit. But the court refused Abrams' request for damages under the separate federal liability law. The court said Congress intended for violations of rights under the Telecommunications Act to include only remedies specifically found in that act. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled that because the act did not contain a "comprehensive remedial scheme," Abrams could seek damages under other federal laws.


[City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Abrams could not enforce the limitations of the Telecommunications Act on local authorities through federal liability law, because the act provides its own judicial remedy. Congress could not have meant the judicial remedy expressly authorized by the Telecommunications Act to co-exist with an alternative remedy.


[Clingman v. Beaver (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Oklahoma's election laws created a primary system in which a party could invite only its own members and Independents to vote in its primary. The Libertarian Party and voters registered in other parties argued the laws violated the First Amendment freedoms of expression and association by preventing the Libertarian Party from inviting members of other parties to vote in its primary elections. The district court ruled for Oklahoma. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled Oklahoma's election laws violated the First Amendment.


[Clingman v. Beaver (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Oklahoma's semiclosed primary system did not violate the right to freedom of association and that any burden it imposed was minor and justified by legitimate state interests. The Court noted that not every electoral law burdening associational rights was subject to strict scrutiny. Requiring voters to register with a party before participating in its primary minimally burdened voters' associational rights. Moreover, Oklahoma's primary advanced a number of state interests, including the preservation of parties as viable and identifiable interest groups.


[Deck v. Missouri (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
After the Missouri Supreme Court set aside Carman Deck's death sentence, Deck was presented at his new sentence hearing shackled with leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Deck was again sentenced to death. The state supreme court rejected Deck's claim that his shackling violated the U.S. Constitution.


[Deck v. Missouri (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the Court's 7-2 holding that the Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles during both a capital trial's guilt and penalty phases, unless such shackling is justified by an essential state interest specific to the defendant on trial (such as courtroom security). The majority argued that the law has long forbidden use of visible shackles during a capital trial's guilt phase, and that the reasons underlying this prohibition (like the possibility shackles will bias the jury) extend this rule to the penalty phase.


[MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Grokster and other companies distributed free software that allowed computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks. In such networks, users can share digital files directly between their computers, without the use of a central server. Users employed the software primarily to download copyrighted files, file-sharing which the software companies knew about and encouraged. The companies profited from advertising revenue, since they streamed ads to the software users. A group of movie studios and other copyright holders sued and alleged that Grokster and the other companies violated the Copyright Act by intentionally distributing software to enable users to infringe copyrighted works. The district court ruled for Grokster, reasoning that the software distribution companies were not liable for copyright violations stemming from their software, which could have been used lawfully. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the Court held that companies that distributed software, and promoted that software to infringe copyrights, were liable for the resulting acts of infringement. The Court argued that although the Copyright Act did not expressly make anyone liable for another's infringement, secondary liability doctrines applied here. The software in this case was used so widely to infringe copyrights that it would have been immensely difficult to deal with each individual infringer. The "only practical alternative" was to go against the software distributor for secondary liability. Here the software companies were liable for encouraging and profiting from direct infringement.


[Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Hawaii enacted a limit on the rent oil companies could charge dealers leasing company-owned service stations. The rent cap was a response to concerns about the effects of market concentration on gasoline prices. Chevron, one of the state's largest oil companies, argued in federal district court that the the cap was an unconstitutional taking of its property. The district court held that the cap amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it did not substantially advance Hawaii's asserted interest in controlling gas prices. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980), where the Court declared that government regulation of private property is "a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." The Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Lingle v. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous opinion that the Court needed to "correct course" and make clear that the "substantially advances" formula put forth in Agins was inappropriate for determining whether a regulation amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking. Takings clause challenges to regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed upon property rights, not the effectivness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest. The Court insisted that its ruling did not "disturb any of its prior holdings."


[Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex Rel. Wilson (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The False Claims Act (FCA) allows the government or an individual on the government's behalf to sue any person for "making false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States." A 1986 amendment to the FCA allows individuas to sue their employer if the employer retaliates against them in any way for assisting in an investigation of such false claims. In 2001, Karen Wilson, a secretary for Graham County Water District, sued her employer for various false claims it allegedly made concerning a federal disaster relief program. She also brought a retaliation suit against her employer, alleging that after she had provided information on the false claims to federal officials in December 1995, she had been repeatedly harassed by Graham County District officials until she resigned in March 1997. The District Court dismissed Wilson's suit as untimely. The court accepted Graham County District's argument that the six-year statute of limitations in the 1986 amendment to the FCA was not intended to apply to retaliation suits. Therefore, the court held, the most closely analogous state limitation applies instead. The north Carolina limit for retaliation suits was three years, so Wilson's suit was brought too late. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court and applied the six-year limitation to all retaliation suits under the FCA.


[Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex Rel. Wilson (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that the six-year statute of limitations did not apply to suits for retaliation. The majority opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas found the statute of limitations "ambiguous." The ambiguity arose from the fact that the six-year limitation in the FCA starts from the time the false claim was made. Yet in a retaliation suit, no actual false claim needs to be alleged. The plaintiff only has to allege that her employer retaliated against her in connection with a federal investigation. The Court found that the ambiguity could be resolved by interpreting the statute of limitations to apply only to suits for false claims, not to retaliation suits. The Court left to the lower courts the question of which state statute of limitations should apply in place of the six-year limitation. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. The dissent characterized the statute of limitations as "unusual" but "reasonably clear," and argued that it should be read to apply to retaliation actions.


[Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In Artuz v. Bennett (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court held that state petitions for postconviction relief could toll the federal statute of limitations even if those petitions were ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Gonzalez, whose federal habeas petition had been dismissed as time barred, filed a new petition (a Rule 60[b] petition) in light of the Artuz ruling. The district court denied Gonzalez's new motion. The 11th Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that Gonzalez's latest motion amounted to a second or succcessive habeas petition which could not be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.


[Gonzalez v. Crosby (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the district court's previous ruling on the federal statute of limitations. That motion was therefore not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and could be ruled on by the district court without the 11th Circuit's precertification.


[Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A group of peanut farmers in Texas threatened to sue Dow Agrosciences in state court for damages caused by one of Dow's herbicides. The farmers alleged Dow violated Texas labeling requirements. Dow asked a federal district court to rule the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempted and therefore prohibited the farmers' state law claims. The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled FIFRA expressly prohibited additional state labeling requirements such as Texas'.


[Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the peanut farmers could sue Dow in state court. The Court reasoned that FIFRA preempts only state-law "requirements for labeling or packaging." The peanut farmers' defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of warranty claims were based on common-law and did not necessarily require that Dow label or package products in a particular way. The farmers' fraud and negligent-failure to warn claims, by contrast, were based on common-law rules that qualified as "requirements for labeling or packaging." However, FIFRA preempted only state-law labeling requirements" that were "in addition to or different from" FIFRA's labeling standards. The Court sent back to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals the question whether Texas law governing fraud and failure-to-warn claims was parallel to FIFRA.


[Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Under federal law, the Tax Court could appoint special trial judges to hear certain cases and to make recommendations to the Tax Court. The Tax Court judge, under Tax Rule 183(b), had to presume the special judge's fact findings to be correct, but could make the ultimate decision in the case. The special trail judge reports were made public and included in the record on appeal. Only after a rule revision in 1983 did the Tax Court stop making such reports public and exclude them from the appellate record. Whether the final Tax Court's decision deviated from the special judge's recommendations was kept secret. Tax Court Judge Howard Dawson ruled that Kanter was guilty of tax fraud and of illegally diverting money to Claude Ballard, a business associate. In his opinion, Dawson claimed to have adopted the opinion of the special trial judge. Ballard and Kanter separately appealed, objecting to the absence of the special trial judge's report from the appellate record. Two federal appellate courts ruled against Kanter and Ballard.


[Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that no statute authorized, and Rule 183's text did not warrant, the concealment of the special report. Rule 183 did not allow the "novel practice" of treating the trial judge's opinion as an "in-house draft to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court judge and the special trial judge." The rules allowed only one trial judge opinion to be issued and before a separate Tax Court ruling, Ginsburg wrote. It would be impossible for a Tax Court judge to give deference to an opinion he himself collaborated in producing. Moreover, the Tax Court's refusal to disclose the trial judge's original report did not allow fully informed appellate review of the court's decision.


[Dodd v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1997, Dodd was convicted under federal law for knowingly and intentionally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. On April 4, 2001 he filed a motion that the conviction should be set aside because it was contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 1999 in Richardson v. U.S. In that case, the Court held that a jury must agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of each of the specific violations that constitute the continuing criminal enterprise. The district court rejected Dodd's motion, because it was filed more than a year after the Court decided Richardson. Under federal law, the one-year limitation period in which a prisoner may file a motion to change his sentence, begins "on the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." The 11th Circuit affirmed.


[Dodd v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the text of the federal law "unequivocally" stated that the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the Court "initially recongized" the right, not the date on which that right was made retroactive. O'Connor wrote that Dodd's reliance on the statute's second clause was misplaced, because that clause merely limited the subsection's applicability to cases where applicants assert rights both "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made applicable to cases on collateral reviiew." Thus, the date the right was asserted does not apply at all unless the second clause's conditions are met. The Court noted that this would make it difficult for applicants filing second or successive motions to obtain relief, since the Court rarely announces a new rule and makes it retroactive within a year.


[Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
As Enron's financial difficulties became public in 2001, Arthur Andersen instructed its employees to destroy Enron-related documents. This was consistent with Andersen's document retention policy. The government later charged Andersen for violating federal law, which made it a crime to "knowingly...corruptly persuade another person" to "withold" or "alter" documents in an "offical proceeding." The federal jury found Andersen guilty. The company appealed, arguing the jury instructions failed to convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction - specifically, that a "consciousness of wrongdoing" was required. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the jury instructions failed to convey that the federal document law required a "consciousness of wrongdoing" for conviction. There was nothing inherently corrupt in ordering employees to destroy documents, even if the aim was to keep the documents from the government. Thus, contrary to what the jurors had been told, Andersen could be convicted only if the persuaders were shown to be conscious that they were behaving corruptly.


[City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In the late 18th century, Congress set aside most of the tribal land of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York as a reservation. The tribe later sold off much of the reservation. In the 1990s members of the tribe began to buy back pieces of the land. The tribe said the reacquired land was part of a reservation and therefore exempt from state and municipal taxes. The City of Sherrill - which encompassed some of the tribe's property - argued the land was not tax-exempt. The Oneidas sued Sherrill in federal district court and alleged the land was recognized by the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua as part of their historic reservation. The Oneidas also pointed to the 1790 Non- Intercourse Act that required federal consent for Indian land to lose its reservation status. Sherrill argued the land lost its reservation status after leaving the Oneidas' ownership originally. The district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for the Oneidas.


[City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity precluded the Tribe from unilaterally reviving its ancient sovereignty over the land at issue. The Court pointed to the "longstanding, distinctly non-Indian character of central New York and its inhabitants"and the fact that regulatory authority over the land had been exercised by state and local government for 200 years. By giving up the land in the early 19th century, the Oneidas had "relinquished governmental reins and could not regain them through open-market purchases from current titleholders."


[Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Roderick Jackson, a high school basketball coach, claimed he was fired for complaining that the girls' basketball team he coached was denied equal treatment by the school. Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education in federal court, claiming his firing violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Title IX bans sex discrimination in federally-funded schools. Jackson claimed Title IX gave him the right to sue - a "private right of action" - because he suffered for reporting sex discrimination against others, despite the fact the he did not suffer from sex discrimination. The federal district court and appellate court ruled against Jackson.


[Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Title IX allowed suits alleging retaliation for reporting sex discrimination. Such retaliation, the majority reasoned, constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Jackson therefore had the right under Title IX to pursue his claim in court.


[Kelo v. New London (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
New London, a city in Connecticut, used its eminent domain authority to seize private property to sell to private developers. The city said developing the land would create jobs and increase tax revenues. Susette Kelo and others whose property was seized sued New London in state court. The property owners argued the city violated the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which guaranteed the government will not take private property for public use without just compensation. Specifically, the property owners argued taking private property to sell to private developers was not public use. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled for New London.


[Kelo v. New London (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the majority held that the city's taking of private property to sell for private development qualified as a "public use" within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as "public use" despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not require "literal" public use, the majority said, but the "broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose.'"


[Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James N. Kirby, Proprietary Limited (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
James Kirby hired International Cargo Control (ICC) as a shipping intermediary to arrange a shipment of goods from Australia to Alabama. ICC issued Kirby a bill of lading (a contract that set shipping terms). The bill invoked liability limitations provided by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). The bill also included a Himalaya Clause, which extended ICC's limitations of liability to companies ICC hired. ICC hired Hamburg Sud to transport the goods. Hamburg Sud issued ICC a bill of lading that also invoked COGSA protections and included a Himalaya Clause. Hamburg Sud carried the goods on a ship to Georgia and subcontracted Norfolk Southern Railroad to transport the goods inland to Alabama.
The train derailed and Kirby sued Norfolk Southern to recover the $1.5 million in damages he claimed the derailment caused his goods. The district court ruled Norfolk Southern could limit its liability to Kirby on the basis of the Himalaya clause in the Hamburg Sud contract. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Hamburg Sud bill did not limit Norfolk Southern's liability to Kirby because Kirby was not bound by its terms.


[Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. James N. Kirby, Proprietary Limited (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that federal law controlled the interpretation of both bills, because they were maritime contracts and the dispute was not inherently local. The Court also held that the 11th Circuit misinterpreted the bills as not protecting Norfolk.


[Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Jessica Gonzales requested a restraining order against her estranged husband. A state trial court issued the order, which prohibited the husband from seeing Gonzales or their three daughters except during pre-arranged visits. A month later, Gonzales's husband abducted the three children. Gonzales repeatedly urged the police to search for and arrest her husband, but the police told her to wait until later that evening and see if her husband brought the children back. During the night Gonzales's husband murdered all three children and then opened fire inside a police station, where police returned fire and killed him. Gonzales brought a complaint in federal District Court, alleging that the Castle Rock police had violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution by willfully or negligently refusing to enforce her restraining order. The Due Process Clause states: "No state shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law..." The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that no principle of substantive or procedural due process allowed Gonzales to sue a local government for its failure to enforce a restraining order. On appeal, however, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Gonzales had a legitimate procedural due process claim. A rehearing by the full appeals court agreed, ruling that Gonzales had a "protected property interest in the enforcement of the terms of her restraining order," which the police had violated.


[Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that Gonzales had no constitutionally-protected property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, and therefore could not claim that the police had violated her right to due process. In order to have a "property interest" in a benefit as abstract as enforcement of a restraining order, the Court ruled, Gonzales would have needed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the benefit. The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia found that state law did not entitle the holder of a restraining order to any specific mandatory action by the police. Instead, restraining orders only provide grounds for arresting the subject of the order. The specific action to be taken is up to the discretion of the police. The Court stated that "This is not the sort of 'entitlement' out of which a property interest is created." The Court concluded that since "Colorado has not created such an entitlement," Gonzales had no property interest and the Due Process Clause was therefore inapplicable. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented.


[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Sigitas Banaitis and John Banks separately argued to the U.S. Tax Court that contingency fees paid to lawyers could be deducted from taxable gross income. The court disagreed and ruled for the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS said Banaitis and Banks owed taxes on contingency fees. Banaitis appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that under Oregon law contingency fees could not be taxed as income. Banks appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled contingency fees were never taxable income. Other federal appeals courts ruled to the contrary. The U.S. Supreme Court consolidated Banaitis' and Banks' cases.


[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banks (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous, 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that if a litigant's recovery constituted income, the litigant's income included the contingency fee paid to his or her lawyer. The Court held that an economic gain assigned in advance to another party - as in a contingency-fee agreement - could not be excluded from gross income.


[Granholm v. Heald (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Michigan and New York laws allowed in-state wineries to directly ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so. In separate cases groups sued the states and argued the laws violated the U.S. Constitution's "dormant" commerce clause. The dormant commerce clause prohibited states from passing laws affecting interstate commerce, particularly laws favoring in-state business over out-of-state business. The states argued the laws were valid exercises of state power under the 21st Amendment, which ended federal Prohibition and allowed states to regulate alcohol importation. A federal district court ruled for Michigan. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the Michigan law violated the dormant commerce clause and did not advance the core concerns of the 21st Amendment (such as temperance). A separate federal district court ruled against New York. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the 21st Amendment allowed New York's law.


[Granholm v. Heald (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that both states' laws violated the commerce clause by favoring in-state wineries at the expense of out-of-state wineries and did so without the authorization of the 21st Amendment. State authority to engage in such economic discrimination was not the purpose the 21st Amendment. Moreover, in modern cases, that amendment did not save state laws violating other provisions of the Constitution.


[Johnson v. California (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
NonJay Shawn Johnson, on trial in California for murder, objected to the district attorney's use of peremptory challenges to eliminate all three black prospective jurors. Johnson argued the eliminations were based on race. The judge denied Johnson's motions and held that Johnson had failed to show a "strong likelihood" that the dismissals were race-based. The judge relied on People v. Wheeler, the 1978 case in which the California Supreme Court ruled that to establish a prima facie case of racial bias in peremptory challenges, the objector had to show "strong likelihood" that the challenges were race-based. The jury found Johnson guilty of second-degree murder.
Johnson appealed and argued that the "strong likelihood" standard in Wheeler was at odds with the 'reasonable inference" standard the U.S. Supreme Court set in Batson v. Kentucky (1986). The appeals court agreed and reversed Johnson's conviction. The California Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the two standards were the same. The U.S. Supreme Court at first dismissed Johnson's appeal because the case was not finalized (see Johnson v. California 2004, No. 03-6539). After another round of appeals, however, the Court agreed to decide the case.


[Johnson v. California (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 decision, the Court reversed the California Supreme Court and ruled that California's standard for objections to peremptory challenges was incompatible with the standard set forth in Batson. The opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Court had not intended that the objector would have to prove that a peremptory challenge was "more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination." The Court ruled that in the first step of the Batson procedure, the objector only needs to "produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." The objector ultimately has to prove that the peremptory challenge was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination, but not until the third step of the Batson procedure, after the State has offered "permissible race-neutral justifications" for the challenges. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that California's standard was within the procedural leeway provided to States by Batson.


[Rhines v. Weber (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A South Dakota court convicted Charles Rhines of murder. Rhines filed a habeas corpus petition with a federal district court, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights in the trial and conviction. The district court ruled Rhines failed to exhaust all of his claims in state court. The court stayed Rhines' habeas petition so that Rhines could finish his claims in state court. The stay prevented the one-year statute of limitations in the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act from barring Rhines from appealing to a federal court once he exhausted state remedies. The state penitentiary warden appealed. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Lundy (1982) required the dismissal of a habeas petition that included unexhausted claims.


[Rhines v. Weber (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that a district court could stay a mixed petition to allow a petitioner to present unexhausted claims in state court and then return to federal court. The Court recognized that its decision in Rose, combined with the one-year statute of limitations required by the AEDPA (enacted 14 years after Rose) could have permanently deprived petitioners like Rhines of the opportunity to seek federal review for unexhausted claims. As a result, federal district courts could grant a stay on a mixed petition if (1) there was good cause for the petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims in state court, (2) the unexhausted claims had merit, and (3) the petitioner was not engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.


[Muehler v. Mena (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Police detained Mena and others in handcuffs while they searched the house they occupied. During the detention they asked Mena about her immigration status. The police had a search warrant to search the premises for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership. Mena sued the officers in federal district court for violating her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for Mena. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that using handcuffs to detain Mena during the search violated the Fourth Amendment and that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status also violated the Fourth Amendment.


[Muehler v. Mena (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No and no. In a 9-0 judgment delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that Mena's detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Officers with a search warrant for contraband had authority to detain occupants of the premisses during the search, in order to minimize any risk to officers. Handcuffing Mena while police searched for weapons and a wanted gang member was also justified by officer safety concerns and because officers had to deal with detaining multiple occupants. The Court further held that the officers' questioning of Mena about her immigration status during her detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officers did not need to have reasonable suspicion to question Mena. Moreover, the Court had held repeatedly that mere police questioning did not constitute a seizure.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Michigan law required every truck engaged in intrastate commercial hauling to pay a flat $100 annual fee. Interstate trucking companies asked Michigan courts to invalidate the fee, claiming the flat fee discriminated against interstate carriers and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate trade (in violation of the "dormant" commerce clause). They pointed to the fact that trucks carrying both interstate and intrastate loads engaged in intrastate business less than trucks that only haul within Michigan. State courts refused to invalidate the fee.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Commission (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that Michigan's fee did not violate the dormant commerce clause because the fee was imposed only on intrastate transactions and did not facially discriminate against interstate or out-of-state activities or enterprises. The dormant commerce clause did not, Breyer wrote, ban such a "neutral" and "locally focused fee."


[Rousey v. Jacoway (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Richard and Betty Rousey filed bankruptcy and claimed their two Individual Retirement Accounts were exempt from the bankruptcy. Federal law exempted the following from bankruptcy: "a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract." The exemption had to be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reasonable necessary for the support of the debtor...." The Rouseys said an IRA was a "similar plan or contract." The bankruptcy court and a bankruptcy appellate panel ruled an IRA not a "similar plan or contract." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that even if IRAs are "similar plans or contracts," the Rouseys' account withdrawals would not be "on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service." The Eighth Circuit's ruling conflicted with those of other circuits.


[Rousey v. Jacoway (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the Rouseys could exempt IRA assets from their bankruptcy estate. IRAs met both federal requirements dealing with exemptions from bankruptcy: They were "similar plans or contracts" to the exemptions enumerated and they "conferred a right to receive payment on account of age."


[Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A group of disabled people who travelled on Norwegian Cruise Line ships sued the company in federal district court and alleged two of its ships did not conform with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The company argued the ADA did not apply to the two ships because, though the ships sailed out of Texas, they sailed under the Bahamian flag. The district court dismissed the group's claims and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled foreign-flagged cruise ships are not subject to Title III of the ADA.


[Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held 6-3 that Title III applied to foreign-flag cruise ships in U.S. waters. Justice Kennedy delivered the Court's controlling opinion, which held that Title III did not apply to foreign ships' internal affairs, because there was no "clear congressional statement" showing an intent to do so. A clear statement was necessary before a general law could interfere with a foreign-vessel's internal affairs. Title III's own limitations, however, prevented the statute from imposing requirements that would have threatened safety on the ship or conflicted with international obligations. If Title III were to impose certain requirements, such as major structural modifications, the clear statement rule could bar such an interference.


[Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Michael Broudo and a group of shareholders sued Dura Pharmaceuticals under the Securities and Exchange Act after the price of the company's stock dropped sharply. The shareholders alleged the company's misleading statements about its antibiotic sales and about the possibility of FDA approval of an asthma device caused the price drop. The district court ruled the investors failed to prove "loss causation" because they could not prove a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the drop in price. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the investors proved loss causation because they proved the stock price on the date of purchase was inflated because of misrepresentation.


[Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that an inflated purchase price did not by itself prove "loss causation." At most, an inflated purchase price suggested that misrepresentation "touched upon" a later economic loss, but did not necessarily cause it. The Court reasoned that at the moment the transaction took place, the plaintiff had not suffered a loss because the inflated purchase price was offset by ownership of a share that possessed equivalent value at that instant. Further, the logical link between the inflated purchase price and any later economic loss was not invariably strong, because other factors may have affected the price.


[Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1991 about 10,000 Exxon dealers sued Exxon Corporation in federal court, alleging that the corporation had engaged in an extensive scheme to overcharge them for fuel. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, but the District Court judge certified the case for review on the question of supplemental jurisdiction. Some of the multiple plaintiffs in the case had claims that did not meet the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy necessary to qualify for federal diversity jurisdiction. In 1990 Congress had enacted 28 U.S.C. Section 1367, overturning Finley v. United States, which had narrowly interpreted federal courts' power to confer supplementary jurisdiction on related claims. The question for the District Court was whether Section 1367 also overturned Zahn v. International Paper Co., which ruled that each plaintiff had to separately meet the minimum amount-in-controversy requirement. The District Court accepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 1367 gave federal courts power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs with related claims, even if some plaintiffs' claims did not meet the required amount. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's ruling on supplemental jurisdiction. However, this ruling conflicted with the ruling of another Circuit, which had taken the opposite view of Section 1367's scope (see Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, No. 04-79). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases for argument.


[Exxon Corp v. Allapattah Services (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that as long one plaintiff meets the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction, Section 1367 authorizes federal courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related claims even if they do not meet the requirement. The majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that courts only need to determine whether they have original jurisdiction over one of the claims in a case. If they do, courts can then decide to extend supplemental jurisdiction to the other related claims. The Justices ruled that to require each claim in a civil action to meet the requirement would be "inconsistent with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction." The Court based its ruling on the "unambiguous[]" text of the statute, saying "the authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material." Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should have consulted the legislative history of Section 1367. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing for a narrower interpretation of Section 1367 that would not overturn Zahn.


[Shepard v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Reginald Shepard pled guilty to violating the federal statute prohibiting a felon from possessing a gun. The government argued Shepard's sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The act added at least a 15-year sentence for any felon with three or more "violent felony" convictions who then possessed a gun. The government argued at least five of the 11 breaking and entering convictions on Shepard's record were violent felonies. The ACCA listed "burglary" as a violent felony and in Taylor v. U.S.(1990) the U.S. Supreme Court said the act meant "generic burglary" of a "building or other structure." However the Massachusetts burglary law Shepard pled guilty to breaking gave burglary a nongeneric definition - including entry into non-structures like cars. Shepard argued he had not pled guilty to generic robbery. The federal district court refused to sentence Shepard under the ACCA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and said the district court must consider evidence that showed it was obvious to Shepard that he pled guilty to generic robbery. The district court refused. The First Circuit reversed and sentenced Shepard under the ACCA.


[Shepard v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that while a guilty plea could qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA, courts may only look to the following when determining if that plea admitted to generic burglary: the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement, or a judicial record in which the defendant confirmed the factual basis for the plea (such as conversation between defendant and judge).


[Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pled guilty in to aggravated murder committed in an armed robbery. That robbery had left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. While Stumpf admitted to shooting Mr. Stout, he insisted his accomplice Wesley had shot Mrs. Stout. A three-judge panel ruled Stumpf the principal offender in Mrs. Stout's murder and sentenced him to death. Following this, in Wesley's trial, the state presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to shooting Mrs. Stout. After Wesley's trial, Stumpf moved to withdraw his plea or reverse his death sentence, arguing that the evidence presented by the prosecution in Wesley's trial was inconsistent with what it had presented in his own. This, Stumpf argued, cast doubt on his conviction and sentence. Stumpf's motion was unscucessful in Ohio courts. A federal district court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.


[Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and possibly not. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Stumpf's plea was knowing and therefore valid, because his attorneys at the plea hearing had represented that they had explained the elements to Stumpf, who then confirmed this. The Court articulated the broad rule that constitutional requirements were satisfied when a defendant's competent counsel explained to him the charge's nature and the crime's elements. As for the prosecution's use of inconsistent theories in Stumpf's and Wesley's trials, the Court held that Stumpf's sentence may have been invalid, depending on the relationship between the prosecutor's conduct and Stumpf's death sentence.. The Court sent the question of that relationship back to the Sixth Circuit.


[Whitfield v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Federal district courts convicted David Whitfield and Haywood Hall of conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed and argued the federal money laundering law required the jury to have found proof of an "overt act" furthering the conspiracy. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reasoning that the law lacked any language requiring proof of an overt act. Other federal appeals courts had ruled the law did require an overt act.


[Whitfield v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the Court's unanimous ruling that because the federal money laundering law's text did not expressly make committing an overt act an element of the conspiracy offense, the government did not need to prove such an act.


[Roper v. Simmons (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Christopher Simmons was sentenced to death in 1993, when he was only 17. A series of appeals to state and federal courts lasted until 2002, but each appeal was rejected. Then, in 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court stayed Simmon's execution while the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, a case that dealt with the execution of the mentally disabled. After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing the mentally disabled (or "mentally retarded" in the vernacular of the day) violated the Eighth and 14th Amendment prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment because a majority of Americans found it cruel and unusual, the Missouri Supreme Court decided to reconsider Simmons' case.
Using the reasoning from the Atkins case, the Missouri court decided, 6-to-3, that the U.S. Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, which held that executing minors was not unconstitutional, was no longer valid. The opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky had relied on a finding that a majority of Americans did not consider the execution of minors to be cruel and unusual. The Missouri court, citing numerous laws passed since 1989 that limited the scope of the death penalty, held that national opinion had changed. Finding that a majority of Americans were now opposed to the execution of minors, the court held that such executions were now unconstitutional.
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the government argued that allowing a state court to overturn a Supreme Court decision by looking at "evolving standards" would be dangerous, because state courts could just as easily decide that executions prohibited by the Supreme Court (such as the execution of the mentally ill in Atkins v. Virginia) were now permissible due to a change in the beliefs of the American people.


[Roper v. Simmons (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that standards of decency have evolved so that executing minors is "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The majority cited a consensus against the juvenile death penalty among state legislatures, and its own determination that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for minors. Finally the Court pointed to "overwhelming" international opinion against the juvenile death penalty. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Clarence Thomas all dissented.


[Small v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Federal law made gun possession illegal for any person "convicted in any court" for crimes punishable by more than a year in prison. A Japanese court convicted Gary Sherwood Small for crimes punishable by a prison term longer than one year. Years later a U.S. District Court convicted Small, because of his prior conviction, of illegally possessing a gun. Small appealed and argued the term "convicted in any court" did not include convictions in foreign courts. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Small.


[Small v. United States (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the federal law's phrase, "convicted in any court," encompassed only domestic, not foreign, convictions. The majority reasoned that in determining the scope of the phrase, it was appropriate to assume Congress had domestic concerns in mind. Moreover, the statute's overall language suggested no intent to reach beyond domestic convictions.


[Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Tony Alford was driving when Washington state police, concerned Alford was impersonating a police officer, pulled him over. During a search of Alford's car, police found a tape recorder recording the traffic stop. The police arrested Alford and said he had made an illegal recording of a private conversation - a violation, they said, of the state's Privacy Act. A state court judge dismissed charges against Alford, ruling - as another state court already had - that the Privacy Act did not apply to public police work.
Alford then sued the officers in federal district court, alleging his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. The district court ruled for the officers.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the officers violated Alford's Fourth Amendment rights. The facts and law were so clearly established that no reasonable officer could believe Alford violated the Privacy Act. Therefore the officers lacked probable cause for the arrest and were not protected by qualified immunity. The court rejected the officers' argument that the arrest was constitutional because there was probable cause Alford committed the crime of impersonating a police officer. That was not the reason police gave during the arrest. The Ninth Circuit said there was only one instance when an arrest for a reason the police did not articulate was constitutional: if that reason was closely related to the stated reason for the arrest. Impersonating a police officer was not closely related to violating the state Privacy Act. Other circuit courts disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "closely related offense doctrine."


[Devenpeck v. Alford (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that police had probable cause to arrest Alford for impersonating a police officer, despite the fact that this was not closely related to the offense police identified during the arrest. A warrantless arrest by a police officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. The offense establishing probable cause need not be closely related to the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest. An arresting officer's state of mind, except for facts he knows, is irrelevant to probable cause.


[Florida v. Nixon (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A Florida court convicted Joe Elton Nixon of murder and sentenced him to death. During the trial Nixon's lawyer told the jury Nixon was guilty. Nixon appealed and argued he received ineffective counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Nixon said he did not agree to the lawyer's strategy. After several appeals the Florida Supreme Court granted Nixon a new trial. The court said Nixon's lawyer's comments were essentially a guilty plea and that because Nixon did not explicitly agree to the strategy, the lawyer was "per se ineffective."


[Florida v. Nixon (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court ruled that Nixon's lawyer's strategy - pursued without Nixon's express approval - did not automatically qualify the lawyer as ineffective. The Court reversed the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court, faulting that court for inappropriately applying presumptions of prejudice and deficient performance. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "When counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent." Nixon's lawyer would have needed Nixon's consent for a formal guilty plea, but the Court ruled that the tactic of effectively conceding guilt in order to concentrate on the sentencing phase of the trial was legitimate as long as the defendant was informed of the strategy. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the decision of the case.


[McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky. (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.


[McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky. (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."


[Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.


[Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.