[Saenz v. Roe (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to travel in three ways by: allowing citizens to move freely between states, securing the right to be treated equally in all states when visiting, and securing the rights of new citizens to be treated like long-time citizens of a state. The Court explained that by paying first-year residents the same TNF benefits they received in their state of origin, states treated new residents differently than others who have lived in their borders for over one year. As such, enforcement of the PRWORA power unconstitutionally discriminated among residents.


[West v. Gibson (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit victims of intentional employment discrimination, whether within the private sector or the federal government, to recover compensatory damages. Thereafter, Michael Gibson filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that the Department had discriminated against him by denying him a promotion on the basis of his gender. The Department found against Gibson. Afterwards, however, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) awarded Gibson the promotion plus backpay. Later Gibson filed suit, in the District Court, seeking compensatory damages and a court order for the Department to comply with the EEOC's order. Subsequently, the Department voluntarily complied with the EEOC's order, but it opposed Gibson's claim for compensatory damages. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed Gibson's complaint. On appeal, the Department supported the District Court's dismissal with the argument that Gibson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in respect to his compensatory damages claim; therefore, he could not bring that claim in court. In reversing, the Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argument. The court viewed the EEOC as lacking the legal power necessary to award compensatory damages. Consequently, there was no administrative remedy to exhaust.


[West v. Gibson (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission possess the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensatory damages when they discriminate in violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the dissenting minority, expressed the view that that the EEOC could not have awarded compensatory damages against the United States under Title VII because the statute did not authorize such awards in explicit terms. Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, it did not provide the required waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity.


[Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Under the Census Clause (Art. I, Sect. 2, Cl. 3), Congress is authorized to conduct a census of the American public every 10 years. Among other purposes, the census provides a basis for apportionment of congressional districts. Under the Census Act, Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary). When the Census Bureau (Bureau) announced plans to use two new forms of discretionary statistical sampling in the 2000 census, various United States residents, counties, and the House of Representatives challenged the constitutionality of the new sampling methods in two separate suits. On direct appeals from three-judge district courts enjoining the use of the new sampling methods, the Supreme Court consolidated the cases and granted certiorari.


[Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes with regard to the Census Act. The Court began by noting that the plaintiffs in the joined cases had good standing to bring their challenges because they stood to suffer a decrease in the number of their congressional representatives and a corresponding dilution of voting strength. The Court then added that the disputed Amendment to the Census Act, authorizing the discretionary use of statistical sampling, did not alter the Act's older statutory prohibition against the use of sampling. Consequently, the Court struck down the sampling provision on statutory grounds and avoided the constitutional question.


[Jones v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Louis Jones, Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas. After sexually assaulting McBride, Jones killed her with repeated blows to the head from a tire iron. The Federal Government charged Jones with kidnapping resulting in the victim's death, in violation of 18 USC section 1201(a)(2), an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death. Pursuant to the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, the government sought the death sentence. A jury found Jones guilty. The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty at Jones's sentencing hearing. The District Court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The court refused Jones' request to include in the jury instructions an instruction that in the event of a jury deadlock concerning what sentence to impose -- either death or life imprisonment without possibility of release -- the District Court would impose no less of a sentence than of life imprisonment without possibility of release. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Jones v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that Jones was not entitled to an instruction as to the effect of jury deadlock. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not require such an instruction and the Court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to require such an instruction in every capital case. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that, "in a capital sentencing proceeding, the Government has 'a strong interest in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.' [A] charge to the jury of the sort proposed by petitioner might well have the effect of undermining this strong governmental interest." Furthermore, the Court concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury had been led to believe that Jones would receive a court-imposed sentence less than life imprisonment in the event that the jury could not reach a unanimous sentence recommendation. Writing for the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed the view that, "'[a]ccurate sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury's] determination of whether a defendant shall live or die.' That 'indispensable prerequisite' was not satisfied in this case."


[Knowles v. Iowa (1998) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
After stopping him for speeding, an Iowa police officer issued Patrick Knowles a citation and conducted a full search of his car without probable cause or Knowles' consent. When his search turned up a "pot pipe" and some marijuana, the officer arrested Knowles on state drug charges. Knowles challenged these on grounds that because he was not arrested at any time prior to the search, the search was unconstitutional. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Knowles certiorari.


[Knowles v. Iowa (1998) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that full-stopped car searches can only be conducted when the safety of the officers is at risk. One significant indication of such danger is when an officer arrests the subject as a reaction to possible or actual threat. In the present case, no serious danger accompanied the stop of Knowles car as evidenced by the officer's initial decision not to arrest Knowles or even issue him a ticket. As such, regardless of its uncovered contents, the subsequent search violated the "search incident to arrest" power and the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful search and seizures.


[Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
At the time of his hiring by United Parcel Service (UPS) to a mechanics position that required him to drive commercial trucks, Vaughn Murphy was misdiagnosed as meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) health guidelines. When UPS discovered that Murphy's blood pressure exceeded DOT requirements, they fired him. Murphy challenged his dismissal as a form of discrimination prohibited under Title I of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Following defeat in trial and appellate courts, Murphy appealed and the Supreme Court granted him certiorari.


[Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the determination of whether one is "disabled" under the ADA must be made in light of available mitigating circumstances. In the present case, the Court did not find Murphy "disabled" since he could function normally with the help of blood pressure medication. Moreover, although no longer able to serve as a commercial truck driver for UPS, Murphy could still work as a mechanic - the position for which he was officially hired. The Court concluded that in order to be designated as "disabled" an employee must be unable to perform more than just one task.


[Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Verdan Technology, Inc.,, a prime contractor, failed to pay Blue Fox Inc., a subcontractor, for work completed on a construction project for the Department of the Army. Under the Miller Act, a contractor working on any public building or public work of the US must post a bond for possible defaults. However, the Army treated the work agreement as a "services contract," and removed Verdan's bond requirements. When Verdan failed to pay Blue Fox, it directly sued the Army. Blue Fox sought an "equitable lien" on any funds from the Verdan contract not paid to Verdan, or any funds available or appropriated for the completion of the project, and an order directing payment of those funds to it. The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and thus ruled in favor of the Army because the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) did not apply to Blue Fox's claim. The Court of Appeals held that the APA waives immunity for equitable actions, thus allowing Blue Fox's equitable lien.


[Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court ruled that "unless waived by Congress, sovereign immunity bars subcontractors and other creditors from enforcing liens on government property or funds to recoup their losses." The APA prohibits people and companies with grievances from suing the government for monetary damages. Blue Fox's lien was ruled "merely a means to the end of satisfying a claim for the recovery of money."


[Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides asylum to aliens who can demonstrate that they will be persecuted if deported, it does not protect aliens who commit "serious nonpolitical crimes" before their arrival in the United States. After burning busses, assaulting passengers, and vandalizing private property in his native Guatemala, Juan Aguiree fled to and, sought asylum in, the United States. Despite Aguirre's claims that his acts constituted political protest, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) overturned an administrative court's finding in favor of asylum. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as it found the BIA's analysis deficient in three parts: it failed to balance the severity of Aguirre's offenses against the threat of political persecution; it failed to qualify the atrocities of Aguiree's acts in comparison with others it faced in the past; and it did not consider whether Aguree's acts were politically necessary or successful. When the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) appealed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Aguirre-Aguirre (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that withholding of deportation is mandatory if an alien establishes that it is more likely than not that he or she will suffer political persecution if deported. The Court added that the BIA was not required to balance the severity of the acts in question against threats of political persecution, compare the actions with others, or pronounce on their political success or necessity. Likelihood of political persecution is the overarching issue when considering an alien's deportability, followed by a determination of whether the crimes at issue were serious and nonpolitical.


[Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Garret F., a minor and student in Cedar Rapids Community School District, requires a wheelchair and is dependent upon a ventilator. He requires assistance in attending to his physical needs during the school day. The school district declined to accept financial responsibility for Garret's services in order for him to be able to attend school. The school district believed it was not legally obligated to provide one-on-one care. An Administrative Law judge concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) required the school district to provide "school health services," which are provided by a "qualified school nurse or other qualified person," but not medical services, which are limited to services provided by a physician. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed despite arguments from the school district that such one-on-one care is too costly and too involved to be considered anything but medical in nature.


[Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that if the services in question are "related" to keeping the child with disabilities in school and able to access educational opportunities available to others IDEA funded school districts must provide such services. The Court added that although the nature and cost of providing certain IDEA "related services" is not determinative of whether their financial burdens must be met, potential financial burdens shall inform any decision governing their provision. In the present case, the benefits of providing Garret with his needed care outweighed the burdens.


[City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Del Monte Dunes sought to develop property it owned within the jurisdiction of the city of Monterey. Monterey continuously denied Del Monte Dunes' proposals to develop the property. Each rejection was followed by stricter and more rigorous demands for a smaller, less intrusive development. After years of rejection, Del Monte Dunes decided Monterey would not allow development under any circumstances. Del Monte Dunes sued the city in federal court under 42 USC Section 1983, alleging that the denial of their final proposal was a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, Del Monte Dunes claimed, the continuous demands constituted regulatory abuse. The District Court submitted Del Monte Dunes case to the jury. The judge instructed the jury to find for Del Monte Dunes if the jurors found Del Monte Dunes had been denied every economically viable use for its property or if the city's decision to reject the development did not directly advance a legitimate public purpose. The jury found for Del Monte Dunes on the equal protection and abuse claims, and it awarded monetary damages. The city prevailed on the due process claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings despite the city of Monterey's objection to the use of a jury in government land-use regulation cases. It found no errors in the use of the jury or the jury's decision.


[City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that property owners who file a Section 1983 civil rights suit seeking compensation for an alleged taking of their property can have a jury trial in some circumstances. "[T]he disputed questions were whether the government had denied a constitutional right outside the bounds of its authority, and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages." Justice Kennedy then added: "These were questions for the jury."


[Richardson v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A federal criminal statute, 21 U.S.C. section 848(a), proscribes any person from engaging in "continuing criminal enterprise (CCE)," which is defined as involving a violation of federal drug statutes where such a violation was part of a "continuing series of violations." Eddie Richardson, who had organized and managed the Chicago street gang called the Undertaker Vice Lords in order to sell drugs, was charge with a CCE violation. At trial, Richardson proposed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree not only that he committed some "continuing series of violations" but also that the he committed each of the individual "violations" necessary to make up that "continuing series." In other words, the proposed instruction would have required the jury to unanimously agree on which three acts constituted the alleged series of violations. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal and, instead, instructed the jurors that they must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses, but did not have to agree as to the particular offenses. Subsequently, the jury convicted Richardson. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's jury instruction.


[Richardson v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that a jury in a "continuing criminal enterprise" case is required to agree unanimously not only that accused committed continuing series of violations, but also which specific violations made up the continuing series. Looking to the language of the statute, Justice Breyer concluded that in the law "each 'violation' amounts to a separate element" and that combined with a "tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is whether a defendant has engaged in conduct that violates the law," calls for juror unanimity. In dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy expressed the view that the Court's decision "rewards those drug kingpins whose operations are so vast that the individual violations cannot be recalled or charged with specificity."


[Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
On January 26, 1996, Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (Michetti), filed a complaint in Alabama state court seeking damages for an alleged breach of contract and fraud by Murphy Bros., Inc. (Murphy). Michetti did not serve Murphy then, but three days later it faxed a "courtesy copy" of the complaint to a Murphy vice president. Michetti officially served Murphy under local law by certified mail on February 12, 1996. On March 13, 1996, 30 days after service but 44 days after receiving the faxed copy of the complaint, Murphy removed the case under 28 U. S. C. ?1441 to the Federal District Court. Michetti moved to remand the case to the state court on the ground that Murphy filed the removal notice 14 days too late under 28 U. S. C. ?1446(b), which specifies that the notice "shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the [complaint]." Michetti asserted that the removal was untimely because the notice had not been filed within 30 days of the date on which Murphy's vice president received the facsimile transmission. The District Court denied the remand motion on the ground that the 30-day removal period did not commence until Murphy was officially served with a summons. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, instructing the District Court to remand the action to state court. The court held that the defendant's receipt of a faxed copy of the filed initial pleading sufficed to commence the 30-day removal period, emphasizing the statutory words "receipt...or otherwise."


[Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that a named defendant's time to remove a state-court action to a federal court is triggered by the simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, "through service or otherwise," after and apart from service of the summons, but not by the mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service. Justice Ginsburg wrote for that Court that, "[i]t would take a clearer statement than Congress has made to read its endeavor to extend removal time...to effect so strange a change_to set removal apart from all other responsive acts, to render removal the sole instance in which one's procedural rights slip away before service of a summons."


[El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In a New York State court, Tsui Yuan Tseng alleged El Al Israel Airlines subjected her to an intrusive security search resulting in assault and false imprisonment before a flight from New York to Tel Aviv. Tseng alleged that psychic or psychosomatic personal injuries followed the incident, but no bodily injury occurred. El Al moved the case to federal court. The District Court dismissed the case due to the Warsaw Convention treaty. Convention provisions describe air carrier liability for international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods. Bodily injury, baggage or goods destruction, loss, or damage, and damage caused by delay are compensable under the Convention. Psychic or psychosomatic injury is not covered. Thus, Tseng's claim was not justicible. Moreover, New York tort law prevents El Al from liability suits covered under the Convention. The Court of Appeals held, in reversing, that the Convention drafters did not intend to remove all liability from an airline carrier, that the Convention does not shield routine operating procedures from the laws of signatory nations, and that the Convention precludes recourse to local law only when an incident is not exclusively covered. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the Convention would create uniformity because doing so would supplant applicable laws.


[El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, announced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention. In her opinion, Justice Bader wrote, "[w]e would be hard put to conclude that the delegates at Warsaw meant to subject air carriers to the distinct, non-uniform liability rules of the individual signatory nations."


[Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ceded land in present-day Minnesota to the U.S. in an 1837 treaty. In return, the U.S. granted the Mille Lacs Band certain hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded land. An 1850 Executive Order by President Taylor ordered the removal of the Mille Lacs Band and revoked their usufructuary rights. An 1855 treaty set aside reservation lands for the Mille Lacs Band, but did not mention their rights. The Mille Lacs Band sued, seeking a declaratory judgment stated that they retained their usufructuary rights and an injunction to prevent the state's interference with those rights. The District Court ultimately ruled that the Mille Lacs Band retained their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The courts rejected arguments that the 1850 Executive Order abrogated the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty and that Minnesota's entrance into the Union in 1858 extinguished any Indian treaty rights under the "equal footing doctrine."


[Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians does have usufructuary rights that were guaranteed to them by the 1837 treaty. After an examination of the historical record, the Court held that the 1850 Executive Order was ineffective to terminate Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights, that the Mille Lacs Band did not relinquish its 1837 treaty rights in the 1855 treaty, and that the Mille Lacs Band's usufructuary rights were not extinguished when Minnesota was admitted to the Union.


[Holloway Aka Ali v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Franois Holloway, a.k.a. Abdu Ali, was charged with several federal offenses, including carjacking. Federal law defines carjacking as "tak[ing] a motor vehicle ... from ... another by force and violence or by intimidation" "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Holloway's accomplice testified that there was no intent to harm the drivers of the cars, just steal their vehicles. However, he said he would have used his gun if he had been given a "hard time." The District Court judge instructed the jury that the requisite intend under law may be conditional. Moreover, the government would satisfy this condition if it had proved to them that the defendant intended to cause death or bodily harm if the drivers refused to turn over their cars. Subsequently, the jury found Holloway guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that a conditional intent to harm was within a reasonable interpretation of the legislative purpose of the carjacking law.


[Holloway Aka Ali v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 decision, announced by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that the federal carjacking law applies to carjacking crimes committed with "conditional intent" of harming drivers who refuse a carjacker's demands. "The intent requirement...is satisfied when the government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car," wrote Justice Stevens.


[Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
While working for Policy Management Systems (PMS), Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke. Ultimately, she lost her job but was awarded Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits because she claimed she was unable to work due to her stroke-induced disability. A week before her SSDI award, Cleveland challenged her termination by PMS as a violation of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). PMS defended itself by stating that Cleveland's SSDI award negated her ADA suit, because her receipt of SSDI funds proved she was not terminated in spite of an ability to perform her duties. On appeal from adverse rulings in both the lower courts, the Supreme Court granted Cleveland certiorari.


[Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that SSDI and ADA claims do not conflict in such a way as to automatically bar anyone from raising them jointly. The Court explained that when determining SSDI eligibility, the significant ADA question of whether someone would have been capable of performing their job if "reasonable accommodations" had been made by their employer, is not considered. As such, the "reasonable accommodation" issue is left open for resolution during an ADA claim. The Court added that any inconsistencies between ADA and SSDI claims are even more trivial if the ADA claim is brought prior to an actual SSDI award - as Cleveland did. Even in clear cases, where a contradiction would seem to lie between the two claims, alleged victims must still have the opportunity to present their cases.


[Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association (Association) wanted to run advertisements for lawful private casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi. The Association challenged the government's prohibition against such radio-and television-based advertising. After suffering defeat in both trial and appellate courts, the Association appealed and the Supreme Court granted them certiorari.


[Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found the advertising restrictions unconstitutional insofar as they applied to Louisiana-based advertisers - where the gambling activities being promoted are legal. The government failed to demonstrate that its restriction would alleviate harmful gambling practices to any material degree. Instead, the Court noted, the regulations in question provided only ineffective and remote support for the government's concerns, since all sorts of other gambling activities would continue unaffected. Thus, the government restrictions unfairly singled out a specific form of speech for regulation while leaving others untouched.


[Chicago v. Morales (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibits "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places. If a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a gang member loitering in a public place with one or more persons, he shall order them to disperse. A violation of the ordinance arises when anyone does not promptly obey a dispersal order. An officer's discretion was purportedly limited by confining arrest authority to designated officers, establishing detailed criteria for defining street gangs and membership therein, and providing for designated, but publicly undisclosed, enforcement areas. In 1993, Jesus Morales was arrested and found guilty under the ordinance for loitering in a Chicago neighborhood after he ignored police orders to disperse. Ultimately, after Morales challenged his arrest, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated due process of law in that it is impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties.


[Chicago v. Morales (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a plurality ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an opinion for a majority on several key points. The Court held that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and provided law enforcement officials too much discretion to decide what activities constitute loitering. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority that the ordinance's definition of loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose" does not give people adequate notice of what is prohibited and what is permitted, even if a person does not violate the law until he refuses to disperse. "'[A] law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits,'" noted Justice Stevens, "[i]f the loitering is in fact harmless and innocent, the dispersal order itself is an unjustified impairment of liberty."


[NCAA v. Smith (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Postbaccalaureate Bylaw of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private organization, only allows a postgraduate student-athlete to participate in intercollegiate athletics at the institution that awarded her undergraduate degree. Under this rule, Renee M. Smith, who played undergraduate volleyball at St. Bonaventure University, was denied permission from the NCAA to play at two other institutions she attended as a graduate student. Subsequently, Smith filed suit alleging that the NCAA's refusal to waive the bylaw denied her from playing intercollegiate volleyball on the basis of her sex in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which proscribes sexual discrimination in "any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The NCAA responded by moving to dismiss the case on the ground that Smith failed to allege that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Smith, in turn, argued that "the NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletics programs of its members, that these programs are educational, and that the NCAA benefited economically from its members' receipt of federal funds." The District Court concluded that the alleged connections between the NCAA and federal financial assistance to member institutions were too attenuated to sustain a Title IX claim and dismissed the suit. Smith then moved for leave to amend her complaint. The court denied the motion as moot. Reversing that denial, the Court of Appeals, in addressing Smith's proposed amended complaint, held that the NCAA's receipt of dues from federally funded member institutions would suffice, if proven, to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a recipient of federal funds.


[NCAA v. Smith (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that dues payments from recipients of federal funds do not suffice to subject the NCAA to suit under Title IX. Justice Ginsburg distinguished the coverage of Title IX in that "[e]ntities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not." Justice Ginsburg then concluded that "the Association's receipt of dues demonstrates that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members," which without more, "is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage."


[National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
After enacting the Inspector General Act (IGA), which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and other federal agencies, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor- Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FSLMRS permits union participation at an employee examination conducted "by a representative of the agency" if the employee believes that the examination will result in disciplinary action and requests such representation. In January 1993, NASA's OIG (NASA-OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of a NASA employee. A NASA-OIG investigator interviewed the employee and permitted the employee's union representative to attend. Subsequently, the employee's union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice when the investigator limited the union representative's participation in the interview. In ruling for the union, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that the OIG investigator was a "representative" of NASA within FSLMRS' meaning, and that the investigator's behavior had violated the employee's right to union representation. On review, the Authority agreed and granted relief against both NASA and NASA-OIG. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's rulings and granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order.


[National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that an investigator from NASA's Office of Inspector General is a "representative" of NASA when conducting an employee examination covered by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, declared: "[E]mploying ordinary tools of statutory construction...we have no difficulty concluding that [the law] is not limited to agency investigators representing an entity that collectively bargains with the employee's union." Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia, dissented, citing the independence guaranteed Inspectors General by the Inspector General Act as reason for investigators not representing management with the meaning of the FSLMRS.


[Cunningham v. Hamilton County (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Teresa L. Cunningham, an attorney representing a plaintiff, was served with a request for interrogatories and documents with responses due within 30 days after service. Cunningham failed to comply with those discovery orders, and a Magistrate Judge granted Hamilton County's motion for sanctions against her under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4). The District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge's order for sanctions. The court also disqualified Cunningham as counsel. Although the District Court proceedings were ongoing, Cunningham immediately appealed the order affirming the sanctions award. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because federal appellate court jurisdiction is ordinarily limited to appeals from "final decisions of the district courts." The court also held that the sanctions order was not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, which provides that certain orders may be appealed, notwithstanding the absence of final judgment, because Cunningham's appeal was not completely separate from the merits of the case.


[Cunningham v. Hamilton County (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that an order imposing sanctions on an attorney pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) is not a "final decision," even where the attorney no longer represents a party in the case. "To permit an immediate appeal from such a sanctions order would undermine the very purposes of Rule 37(a), which was designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process," Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. The Court concluded that piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays would preclude final judgement if such immediate appeals were possible. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.


[Neder v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In the mid-1980's, Ellis E. Neder, Jr., engaged in a number of real estate transactions financed by fraudulently obtained bank loans and schemes involving land development fraud. He was indicted on numerous counts of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud and of filing false federal income tax returns. At trial, the District Court instructed the jury that, to convict on the bank and tax offenses, it did not need to consider the materiality of any false statements, or whether Neder's actions, in fact, caused others to be defrauded. In instructing the jury on mail and wire fraud, the court did not include materiality as an element of either offense. Neder objected. Thereafter, Neder was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the court erred in failing to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury. However, under harmless-error analysis, the appeals court concluded the error was harmless because the error "'did not contribute to the verdict obtained." The appeals court also determined that materiality is not an element of mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. Thus, the District Court did not err in failing to submit materiality to the jury.


[Neder v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and Yes. In an opinion delivered by Chef Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held 6-3 that under the harmless-error rule, which applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense, the trial court's error did not render Neder's trial "fundamentally unfair." Thus, the error was harmless. In dissent, Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that depriving a criminal defendant of the right to have a jury determine his commission of every element of the crime charged could not constitute a harmless error. Additionally, the Court unanimously held that materiality is an element of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.


[Nynex Corporation v. Discon, Inc. (1998) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Discon Incorporated sold services to remove obsolete telephone equipment to Material Enterprises Company, a subsidiary of NYNEX Corporation. When Material Enterprises started to buy removal services from AT&T Technologies instead, Discon filed suit alleging NYNEX had engaged in unfair and anticompetitive practices. Discon claimed that Material Enterprises paid AT&T more than Discon would have received. Material Enterprises passed on the extra cost to the customers of NYNEX. Material Enterprises then received a rebate from AT&T and shared it with NYNEX. Discon alleged these practices were intended to them and to benefit their competitor, AT&T, because Discon refused to participate in the scheme. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, but held Discon's claims were founded under the Sherman Act. Discon had a valid claim in antitrust rules that prohibit group boycotts because the practices were anticompetitive. Moreover, the complaint stated a valid conspiracy to monopolize. NYNEX argued that this case did not constitute a group boycott and therefore it could not proceed.


[Nynex Corporation v. Discon, Inc. (1998) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision, announced by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court ruled the group boycott rule does not apply to claims with a single buyer and a single supplier. In the competitive environment antitrust laws seek to encourage, NYNEX had the freedom to switch its vendor. As for the conspiracy to monopolize claim, the Court remanded the case to provide Discon a chance to show that NYNEX agreements possibly harmed the competitive process.


[Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton (the Suttons) are identical twins who suffer from acute visual myopia. They brought suit against United Airlines (United) under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section12101 et seq., after United failed to hire them as commercial airline pilots because their uncorrected vision was worse than 20/100. Although each sister suffered from severe myopia, their vision was correctable with glasses and both sisters were able to function normally in their daily lives. The Suttons claimed that they were disabled within the meaning of the ADA either because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(A), they suffered from a physical impairment that "substantially limits . . . major life activities," or because, under 42 U.S.C. Section12102(2)(C), they were regarded as having such an impairment. The district court granted United's 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed the Suttons' complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.


[Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No and no. Determination of disability under the ADA should be made in reference to an individual's ability to mitigate his or her impairment through corrective measures. This reading is in harmony with the statutory language and history of the ADA because (1) the phrase "substantially limits" requires consideration of present, not future or hypothetical, impairment; (2) the ADA calls for individualized assessments of impairment; and (3) Congress found that approximately 43 million Americans were disabled, a number that would be far too low if Congress had meant to include all those with correctable impairments. Also, assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA, poor vision cannot be regarded as a substantially limiting impairment because it has only foreclosed the Suttons from pursuing work as "global airline pilots," not from numerous other positions in the aviation industry.


[Carter v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1997, Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank unarmed. In the process, Carter pushed an exiting customer back into the bank and startled customers already inside. Carter removed almost $16,000 from the bank and fled. After his apprehension, Carter was charged with federal bank robbery, 18 USC Section 2113(a), which punishes "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... any... thing of value [from a] bank." Carter pleaded not guilty, claiming that he had not taken the bank's money by force, violence, or intimidation as required of robbery. Carter moved that the District Court instruct the jury that they could consider whether he committed federal bank larceny, USC Section 2113(b), as a lesser included offense in the broader crime of robbery, in which case, Carter could be guilty of larceny without being guilty of robbery. The larceny law punishes "[w]hoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 [from a]... bank," with a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison, as opposed to robbery's 20-year maximum. The District Court denied the motion. The jury, instructed on robbery alone, returned a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Carter v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that federal bank larceny is not a "lesser included offense" of federal bank robbery. The "[p]etitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction," wrote Justice Thomas for the Court. Justice Thomas concluded that the larceny law requires proof of three elements not included in robbery: the intent to steal, property worth more than $ 1,000, and proof that the defendant "takes and carries away" the property. Dissenting, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G. Breyer, expressed the view that the Court's decision gave "short shrift to the common-law origin and statutory evolution of [18 USC Section 2113]."


[Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corporation (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the "JAILMAIL" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the Federal District Court granted United summary judgment, on the ground that the amended statute was an impermissible restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First Amendment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that the amended statute restricted commercial speech, which was entitled to a limited measure of First Amendment protection; and that although an asserted governmental interest in protecting an arrestees' privacy was substantial, the amended statute's numerous exceptions precluded the statute from directly and materially advancing such an interest.


[Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corporation (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was "'no possibility that protected speech would be muted.'" Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment." Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens expressed the view that the amended statute was invalid as applied to the service, because California was denying access to information based on their intended use of the information for a constitutionally protected purpose, and that such discrimination was not justified by state interests.


[Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by a Norfolk Southern train at a railroad intersection. At the time of the accident, the intersection was equipped with advanced warning signs and reflectorized crossbucks, which were installed with federal funds under the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program and were fully compliant with the federal standards for such devices. Afterwards, Dedra Shanklin, Mr. Shanklin's widow, brought a diversity wrongful death action against Norfolk Southern. Shanklin alleged, based on Tennessee statutory and common law, that Norfolk Southern had been negligent by failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) pre-empted Shanklin's suit. The FRSA contains an express pre-emption provision, which allows States to enforce their railroad safety measures until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. The District Court held that Shanklin's allegation that the signs installed at the crossing were inadequate was not pre-empted and, ultimately, entered judgement for her. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reasoned that federal funding alone was insufficient to trigger pre-emption of state tort actions under the FRSA. The court concluded that because the Tennessee Department of Transportation had installed the signs for the purpose of providing "minimum protection," no individualized determination of adequacy had be made by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) under the Crossings Program.


[Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that railroads cannot b sued under state tort law over allegedly inadequate warning devices at rail crossings if the equipment installed was federally funded. Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court that "[o]nce the FHWA approved the project and the signs were installed using federal funds, the federal standard for adequacy displaced Tennessee statutory and common law addressing the same subject, thereby pre-empting [Shanklin's] claim." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote that the consequence of the Court's decision "is that state negligence law is displaced with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the void."


[Drye v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1994, Irma Drye died, leaving a $233,000 estate. The sole heir to the estate under Arkansas law was Rohn Drye, Jr., her son. Drye owed the Federal Government approximately $325,000 in unpaid tax assessments. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had valid tax liens against all of Drye's "property and rights to property" under federal law, 26 USC section 6321. Several months after Drye was appointed the administrator of his mother's estate, he disclaimed his interest in the estate, which then passed under state law to his daughter. Arkansas law provides that the disavowing heir's creditors may not reach property thus disclaimed. Drye's daughter then proceeded to use the estate's proceeds to establish a family trust (Trust), of which she and her parents are the beneficiaries. Under state law the Trust was shielded from creditors seeking to satisfy the debts of the Trust's beneficiaries. After Drye revealed his beneficial interest in the Trust to the IRS, the IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien against the Trust. Ultimately, the District Court ruled in favor of the Government and its lien. In affirming, the Court of Appeals interpreted precedent to mean that state law determines whether a given set of circumstances creates a right or interest, but federal law determines whether that right or interest constitutes "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321, thus subjecting it to federal tax liens.


[Drye v. United States (1999) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Drye's disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax liens. The Court read the Internal Revenue Code to look to state law for a delineation of a taxpayer's rights or interests, but to leave to federal law the determine whether those rights or interests constitute "property" or "rights to property" under section 6321. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "Drye had the unqualified right to receive the entire value of his mother's estate...or to channel that value to his daughter. The control rein he held under state law, we hold, rendered the inheritance 'property' or 'rights to property' belonging to him within the meaning of [section] 6321, and hence subject to the federal tax liens that sparked this controversy."


[Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) grants the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate, among other items, "drugs" and "devices." In 1996, the FDA asserted jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, concluding that, under the FDCA, nicotine is a "drug" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are "devices" that deliver nicotine to the body. Accordingly, the FDA promulgated regulations governing tobacco products' promotion, labeling, and accessibility to children and adolescents. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, and a group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers, filed suit challenging the FDA's regulations. Brown moved for summary judgement on the ground that the FDA lacked the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed, or without manufacturer claims of therapeutic benefit. The District Court ruled that the FDA had jurisdiction over tobacco as a device, but that the agency had overstepped its authority in attempting to restrict tobacco advertising. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Congress had not granted the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. The court found that the FDA's definition of tobacco as a device was flawed because the agency could not prove that the impact of tobacco products on the body was "intended" under the act.


[Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that "Congress has not given the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco products as customarily marketed." The ruling was based on the FDCA as a whole and in conjunction with Congress' subsequent tobacco-specific legislation. "By no means do we question the seriousness of the problem that the FDA has sought to address," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. Nonetheless, Justice O' Connor wrote, "Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in the area."


[Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Harbert Construction Company (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1995, Cortez Byrd Chips hired Bill Harbert Construction to install a chip mill in Mississippi. Byrd and Harbert agreed that any ensuing disputes would be decided by arbitration. After the installation, Harbert demanded an upward adjustment on the bill. Byrd refused, claiming that Harbert had not submitted a written statement requesting additional compensation as required under their contract. Harbert called in the American Arbitration Association. Arbitration was conducted in Alabama and Harbert received an award. In response, Byrd sought to vacate or modify the award in a Federal District Court of Mississippi, where the contract was performed. Harbert then sought to confirm the award in Alabama. The latter court refused to dismiss, transfer, or stay its action, concluding that venue was proper only there because "[t]he place of arbitration determines the jurisdiction of the court," and it entered judgment for Harbert. Byrd appealed, claiming that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provided that the case should be deferred to Mississippi because the suit had been filed there first. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that, under the FAA, venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify awards was exclusively in the district where the arbitration award was made, and thus venue was limited to the Alabama court.


[Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Harbert Construction Company (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the "FAA's venue provisions are permissive, allowing a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify to be brought either in the district where the award was made or in any district proper under the general venue statute." Writing for the Court, Justice Souter reasoned that because both the history and function of the FAA's venue provisions dictate that they were meant to expand, not limit, venue choice, it was appropriate for Cortez Byrd to seek to vacate the arbitrator's award in federal court in Mississippi.


[Fischer v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Jeffrey Fischer, while president and part owner of Quality Medical Consultants, Inc. (QMC), arranged for QMC to receive a $1.2 million loan from West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA), a municipal agency that operates two hospitals, which participate in and receive funding from the federal Medicare program. To get the loan, Fischer pledged QMC's accounts receivables and offered a $1 million letter of credit. After a 1994 audit of WHVA raised questions about the QMC loan, Fischer was indicted for federal bribery, including defrauding an organization which "receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program." A jury convicted him and the District Court sentenced him to imprisonment, imposed a term of supervised release, and ordered the payment of restitution. On appeal, Fischer argued that the Government failed to prove WHVA, as the organization affected by his wrongdoing, received "benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program," as required by the federal bribery statute. In rejecting that argument and affirming the convictions, the Court of Appeals held that funds received by an organization constitute "benefits" within the statute's meaning if the source of the funds is a federal program, like Medicare, which provides aid or assistance to participating organizations.


[Fischer v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Health care providers such as the one defrauded by [Fischer] receive 'benefits' within the meaning of [the federal bribery statute]." Thus, the Medicare funds hospitals receive for treating Medicare patients subject people who bribe hospital officials to federal prosecution. "The government has a legitimate and significant interest in prohibiting financial fraud or acts of bribery being perpetrated upon Medicare providers," Justice Kennedy wrote for the court. "Fraudulent acts threaten the program's integrity. They raise the risk participating organizations will lack the resources...to provide the level and quality of care envisioned by the program." Justice Clarence Thomas, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that "[t]he only persons who receive 'benefits' under Medicare are the individual elderly and disabled Medicare patients, not the medical providers who serve them."


[Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court enjoined the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the District Court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The Court of Appeals held that, even as modified by the District Court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned for a writ of certiorari, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.


[Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."


[Carmell v. Texas (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Scott Carmell was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against his stepdaughter from 1991 to 1995, when she was 12 to 16 years old. Before September 1, 1993, the relevant Texas statute specified that a victim's testimony alone about a sexual offense could not support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence or if the victim had informed another person of the offense within six months of its occurrence (outcry). However, the statute provided that if a victim was under 14 at the time of the offense, the victim's testimony alone could support a conviction. A 1993 amendment allowed the victim's testimony alone to support a conviction if the victim was under 18. Carmell argued, before the Texas Court of Appeals, that four of his convictions could not stand under the pre-1993 version of the law, which was in effect at the time of his alleged conduct, because they were based solely on the testimony of the victim, who was not under 14 at the time of four of the offenses and had not made a timely outcry. The court held that applying the 1993 amendment retrospectively did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the amended statute did not alter the punishment or the elements of the offense that the State must prove. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied review.


[Carmell v. Texas (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the retrospective application of Texas's amended statutory provision allowing alleged sexual offense victim's uncorroborated testimony to support a conviction violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that, "[a] law reducing the quantum of evidence required to convict an offender is as grossly unfair as, say, retrospectively eliminating an element of the offense, increasing the punishment for an existing offense or lowering the burden of proof." For the dissenting minority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the amended statute accords victims of a sexual offense "full testimonial stature," and that "such a witness competency rule validly may be applied to offenses committed before its enactment."


[Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Lucio Flores-Ortega, who does not speak English fluently, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. At his sentencing, the trial judge advised him that he had 60 days to file an appeal. His counsel, a public defender, did not file a notice of appeal in the period set by the court even though her file contained the words "bring appeal papers." Flores-Ortega's subsequent attempt to file such notice was rejected as untimely. Flores-Ortega's efforts to secure state habeas corpus relief were unsuccessful. Represented by a federal defender, Flores-Ortega then filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel based his counsel's failure to file the notice after promising to do so. The District Court denied relief. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that Flores-Ortega was entitled to relief because, under its precedent, a habeas petitioner need only show that his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent.


[Roe v. Flores-Ortega (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that counsel is not always required to file a notice of appeal after their clients plead guilty unless the clients specifically ask them to so. "We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable and therefore deficient," Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority. "We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal," concluded Justice O'Connor. In dissent, Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, wrote that attorneys should be required to consult with their clients about possible appeals in virtually all cases, even those in which the defendants plead guilty.


[Baral v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
David H. Baral made two remittances to the Internal Revenue Service towards his 1988 income tax, which was due on April 15, 1989. The first was a standard withholding from Baral's wages throughout 1988 by his employer. The second was an estimated income tax remitted in January 1989 by Baral himself. Baral received an extension until August 15, but did not file the return until June 1, 1993. On the return, Baral claimed a $1,175 overpayment and asked the IRS to apply this excess as a credit toward his outstanding tax obligations for the 1989 tax year. The IRS denied the requested credit citing 26 U. S. C. Section 6511, which states that "the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid within the period immediately preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the return." According to the IRS, Baral had paid no portion of the overpaid tax between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, and therefore he faced a ceiling of zero on any allowable refund or credit. Baral commenced suit for a refund in the Federal District Court, which granted the IRS summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that both remittances were paid on April 15, 1989.


[Baral v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that remittances of withholding tax and estimated income tax are paid on the due date of a calendar year taxpayer's income tax return. The Court concluded that the ceiling on Baral's requested credit was zero, because, rather than being paid within the look-back period, between February 1, 1990 and June 1, 1993, both the withholding and the estimated taxes had been paid on April 15, 1989. The decision means that the three-year time limit for seeking a refund begins running when someone's withholding and estimated tax payments are made to the government. The deadline does not depend on when the person's income tax return is filed, the court said.


[Pegram v. Herdrich (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, after feeling an unusual pain in her stomach, was examined by Lori Pegram, a physician affiliated with Carle Clinic Association, P. C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (hereafter Carle). Carle functions as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for profit. Pegram then required Herdrich to wait eight days for an ultrasound of her inflamed abdomen, which was to be performed at a facility staffed by Carle more than 50 miles away from Herdrich. During that period, Herdrich's appendix ruptured. Herdrich sued Carle, including Pegram, in State court for medical malpractice and two counts of fraud. Carle and Pegram, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), removed the case to federal court. Ultimately, Herdrich was only able to pursue one fraud count, which was amended to allege that Carle's HMO organization provisions rewarding its physician owners for limiting medical care, entailed an inherent or anticipatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, because the terms create an incentive to make decisions in the physicians' self-interest, rather than the plan participants' exclusive interests. The District Court granted Carle's motion to dismiss on the ground that Carle was not acting as an ERISA fiduciary. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal.


[Pegram v. Herdrich (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that mixed treatment and eligibility decisions to delay medical treatment by sending a patient to a HMO owned facility, with adverse consequences, made by a health maintenance organization through its physician, are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Thus, Herdrich did not state an ERISA claim. "Herdrich's remedy -- return of profit to the plan for the participants' benefit -- would be nothing less than elimination of the for-profit HMO," wrote Justice Souter for the Court, "no HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing." Justice Souter noted that "the Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure."


[Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1998, William Stoecker formed Chandler Enterprises, Inc., which purchased a plane out of state and moved it to Illinois. By the time the Illinois Department of Revenue, having discovered that the corporation had failed to file a use tax return or pay the tax on the plane, issued a notice of tax liability against the corporation and a notice of penalty liability against the debtor in the District Court, the corporation was defunct and Stoecker was in bankruptcy. Under Illinois law, any corporate officer who is responsible for filing tax returns and making payments, and who "willfully" fails to do so, is personally liable for a penalty "equal to the total amount of tax unpaid by the corporation." There was no proof that Stoecker was responsible for payment of the tax and the court ruled that while Chandler owed taxes on the plane, Stoecker should not be penalized. However, Illinois law shifted the burden of proof, both on production and persuasion, to the purportedly responsible officer, the trustee in bankruptcy, Thomas Raleigh, once a notice of penalty liability was issued. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Department, holding that the burden of proof remained with Raleigh, just as it would have been on Stoecker had the proceedings taken place outside of bankruptcy, and finding that Raleigh had not satisfied the burden of persuasion.


[Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that "[w]hen the substantive law creating a tax obligation puts the burden of proof on a taxpayer, the burden of proof on the tax claim in bankruptcy court remains where the substantive law put it (in this case, on the trustee in bankruptcy)." The Court concluded that the bankruptcy estate's obligation to the Department was established by the state's tax code and that the Bankruptcy Code made no provision for altering the burden on a tax claim, and its silence said that no change was intended.


[Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult membership when the organization discovered that Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In 1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the values it was attempting to instill in young people. The New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First Amendment freedom of expressive association prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad-based membership solicitation and its connections with various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated it by revoking Dale's membership based on his homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that application of New Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association because Dale's inclusion would not significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to express any message.


[Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."


[Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1981, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. and Marathon Oil Co. both paid the Federal Government over $150 million in return for the rights to explore for and develop oil off the coast of North Carolina, provided that the companies received exploration and development permissions in accordance with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA), and the regulations promulgated pursuant to OCSLA and CZMA. In 1990, the companies submitted an exploration plan, as required by OCSLA and CZMA, to the Department of the Interior for approval. Thereafter, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became effective. The OBPA prevented the Secretary of the Interior from approving the exploration plan for at least 13 months. The state of North Carolina then objected to certification of the companies' plans under the CZMA. Before the Secretary of Commerce rejected Mobil's request to override North Carolina's objection, the companies filed a breach-of-contract lawsuit. In granting summary judgement for the companies, the Court of Federal Claims found that the Federal Government had broken its contractual promise to follow OCSLA's requirement to approve an exploration plan that satisfied OCSLA's requirements within 30 days of the plan's submission, which constituted the repudiation of the contract and entitled the companies to restitution of the payments. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Federal Government's refusal to consider the companies' final exploration plan was not the operative cause of any failure to carry out the contracts' terms, because North Carolina's objection would have prevented the companies from exploring.


[Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the Federal Government broke its promise, repudiated the contracts, and must give the companies their money back. "We find that the oil companies gave the United States $158 million in return for a contractual promise to follow the terms of pre-existing statutes and regulations. The new statute prevented the Government from keeping that promise," wrote Justice Breyer for the Court, "therefore the Government must give the companies their money back."


[Smith v. Robbins (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A California state-court jury convicted Lee Robbins of second degree murder and grand theft auto. After the trial, in which Robbins defended himself, his appointed counsel on appeal concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. Under a new California procedure, established in People v. Wende, Robbins' counsel then filed with the California Court of Appeal to allow him to withdraw or to let the court dispose of the case by filing a brief that was silent on the merits of the case and offered to brief issues at the court's direction. The court affirmed and, after Robbins appealed his own case, the California Supreme Court denied review. After exhausting his state post-conviction remedies, Robbins sought federal habeas corpus relief, arguing that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. The Federal District Court granted Robbins' petition and concluded that his counsel failed to meet even the minimum duty to further a client's case after determining that his appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded the case for the District Court to consider other trial errors raised by Robbins.


[Smith v. Robbins (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "States are free to adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel," as does California's procedure. Justice Thomas wrote for the Court that California's procedure "reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. Whatever its strengths or weaknesses as a matter of policy, we cannot say that it fails to afford indigents the adequate and effective appellate review that the Fourteenth Amendment requires." The dissenting minority collectively noted that California's procedures allowed attorneys to remain too passive.


[California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In California, candidates for public office can gain access to the general ballot by winning a qualified political party's primary. In 1996, voter approved Proposition 198 changed California's partisan primary from a closed primary, in which only a political party's members can vote on its nominees, to a blanket primary, in which each voter's ballot lists every candidate regardless of party affiliation and allows the voter to choose freely among them. The candidate of each party who wins the most votes is that party's nominee for the general election. The California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party have historically prohibited nonmembers from voting in their party's primary. Each political party filed suit against Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State, alleging that the blanket primary violated their First Amendment right of association. Jones countered that a blanket primary will intensify the election and allow for better representation in elected office. Siding with Jones, the District Court held that the primary's burden on the parties' associational rights was not severe and was justified by substantial state interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment right of association. "Proposition 198 forces political parties to associate with -- to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by -- those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival," wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the majority. "A single election in which the party nominee is selected by nonparty members could be enough to destroy the party." Justice Scalia went on to state for the Court that Proposition 198 takes away a party's "basic function" to choose its own leaders and is functionally "both severe and unnecessary." Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens wrote, "an extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States."


[Hill v. Colorado (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with [that] person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment.


[Hill v. Colorado (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities," Justice Stevens wrote for the Court. "The unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases." Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony M. Kennedy dissented.


[Free v. Abbott Laboratories Inc. (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Robin Free and Renee Free, consumers of infant formula, sued Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, and Mead Johnson & Company (collectively Abbott), under Louisiana's antitrust laws alleging a price-fixing conspiracy. After Abbott successfully removed the case to federal court, the District Court granted the Frees' motion to remand, holding that it lacked federal question jurisdiction and that it had diversity jurisdiction only over the named plaintiffs' claims, not over the other class members. Ultimately concluding that federal jurisdiction extended to the case, the Court of Appeals held that the district court had supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs because it had diversity jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs' claims.


[Free v. Abbott Laboratories Inc. (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion announced by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals by an equally divided 4-4 ruling. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Rice v. Cayetano (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Hawaiian Constitution limits the right to vote for the nine trustees of the state agency known as the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA). The agency administers programs designed for the benefit of two subclasses of Hawaiian citizenry, "native Hawaiians," defined as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Islands before 1778, and "Hawaiians," defined as descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778. Only "Hawaiians" may vote in the statewide election for the trustees. Harold Rice, born in Hawaii and a Hawaiian citizen, does not have the requisite ancestry to be a "Hawaiian" under state law. However, Rice applied to vote in OHA trustee elections. After Rice's application was denied, he sued Hawaiian Governor Benjamin J. Cayetano, claiming that the voting exclusion was invalid under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Federal District Court granted the state summary judgment. The court examined the voting qualifications with the latitude applied to legislation passed pursuant to Congress' power over Indian affairs, and found that the electoral scheme was rationally related to the state's responsibility to utilize a part of the proceeds from certain public lands for the native Hawaiians' benefit. In affirming, the Court of Appeals found that Hawaii "may rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being the group to whom trust obligations run and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of loyalty, should be the group to decide who the trustees ought to be."


[Rice v. Cayetano (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that "Hawaii's denial of Rice's right to vote in OHA trustee elections violates the Fifteenth Amendment," in creating a race-based voting qualification. "A state may not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, and this law does so," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court. The court rejected the state's argument that the voting limitation was one based on ancestry, not race. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for himself and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that the majority's decision "rests largely on the repetition of glittering generalities that have little, if any, application to the compelling history of the state of Hawaii."


[Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Jonathan Stevens, a former attorney for the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, filed suit against his former employer, the agency, alleging that it had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in order to induce the EPA to disburse more grant money than it was entitled to receive. Stevens filed suit under the False Calms Act (FCA), which provides for a private person to bring a qui tam civil action "in the name of the [Federal] Government," against "any person" who "knowingly presents...to...the...Government...a false or fraudulent claim for payment." The State of Vermont moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that a State or state agency is not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. Vermont then filed an interlocutory appeal. Thereupon, the court stayed its proceedings and the United States intervened in the appeal in support of Stevens. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act, but that the False Claims Act does not subject a state or state agency to liability in such actions. The Court concluded that the False Claims Act does not include states as "persons" who can be sued under the law. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.


[Garner v. Jones (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
While serving a life sentence for murder in Georgia, Robert Jones escaped and committed a second murder in 1982. Jones was sentenced to a second life term. At the time of Jones' second offense, Georgia law required the State's Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board) to consider inmates serving life sentences for parole after seven years and if it was not granted at that time, that it be reconsidered every three years thereafter. Jones was initially considered for parole in 1989, seven years after his 1982 conviction, and parole was denied. After Jones was incarcerated but before his first parole hearing, the Board amended its rule to require that parole reconsideration take place only once every eight years. Subsequently, the Board scheduled Jones for reconsideration eight years later, in 1997. However, a Federal Court of Appeals ruling, that such board actions could not be applied retroactively, allowed Jones to be reconsidered for parole in 1992 and again in 1995. Then a U.S. Supreme Court decision was read to allow for retroactive adjustments in parole and Jones was scheduled for reconsideration in 2003 (eight years later), rather then in 1998. Jones sued the Board members, claiming that retroactive application of the amended rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the Board. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the amended Rule's retroactive application was necessarily an ex post facto violation.


[Garner v. Jones (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the retroactive application of the Georgia provision permitting extension of intervals between parole considerations does not to necessarily violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court concluded that the key element in deciding whether an increase in the interval between a state's parole hearings for prison inmates violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to the covered crimes. "States must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedure and addressing problems associated with confinement and release," wrote Justice Kennedy.


[Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Salvador Martinez, a self-described self-taught paralegal with 25 years of experience at 12 different law firms, was working for a Santa Ana, California law firm when a client gave him $6,000.00 to bail her boyfriend out of jail. The bail was never posted and Martinez was subsequently charged with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another. Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, which acquitted him of theft, but convicted him of embezzlement. Martinez then filed a timely notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself, and a waiver of counsel. The motion to represent himself was denied by the California Court of Appeal. The court explained: "There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. The right to counsel on appeal stems from the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth Amendment....The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees."


[Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist. (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that here is no constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction. "We are not aware of any historical consensus establishing a right of self-representation on appeal," wrote Justice Stevens for the Court. Noting that the rights established by the Sixth Amendment "are presented strictly as rights that are available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself" and that the Amendment "does not include any right to appeal," Justice Stevens concluded, "[i]t necessarily follows that the Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal." Justice Stevens added "[o]ur experience has taught us that "a pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly when compared to a defense provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney." Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Stephen G. Breyer, and Antonin Scalia wrote concurring opinions.


[Jones v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1998, Dewey Jones, of Detroit, tossed a Molotov cocktail into the home of his cousin, James Walker, Jr., in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Walker's home was severely damaged. Subsequently, Jones was convicted in U.S. District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. section 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to "maliciously damage or destroy, ...by means of fire or an explosive, any building... used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce." The Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction. Before both courts, Jones unsuccessfully argued that section 844(i), when applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.


[Jones v. United States (2000) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property "used in" commerce or commerce-affecting activity, such that arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under section 844(i). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the Court that "[w]ere we to adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of section 844(i), hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."