[City of Arlington v. FCC (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing himself and four other justices, held that courts must apply the Chevron doctrine and defer to an agency's interpretation of its jurisdiction when that jurisdiction is called into question. The Chevron doctrine is supported Congressional intent that an agency should determine its jurisdiction when there is ambiguity in a statute. The Court held that there was no significant difference between "run-of-the-mill" ambiguity and important, "jurisdictional" ambiguity. Instead, every new application of an ambiguous statutory term could be reframed as a jurisdictional issue concerning the who, what, where, or when questions of an agency's regulatory power. The test should look at whether the statute's language prevents the agency's assertion of authority. If the agency's assertion is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute, then the courts must defer to the agency.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Although he agreed that courts should not get involved where Congress has deferred to an agency's judgment, he argued that the mere existence of ambiguity should not be considered conclusive evidence of Congress' intent to defer to that agency. Where Congressional intent is not clear, the courts should be permitted to interpret the statute accordingly.
Chief Justice John Roberts dissented and argued that a court should not defer to an agency until that court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to deference. However, once a court has made such a determination, Chevron deference may be warranted. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2003, Congress enacted the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act ("the Act"). Through the Act, Congress apportioned billions of dollars towards the funding of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS. NGOs qualify to receive this funding only if they satisfy certain conditions. One of these conditions requires that all federally funded NGOs implement a policy explicitly opposing prostitution.
The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, and InterAction are NGOs that receive funding under the Act. The NGOs brought suit against the Agency for International Development and the other agencies responsible for enforcing the Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act's funding provisions. The NGOs argued that the funding provisions violate the First Amendment by restricting the organizations' speech and forcing them to promote the government's viewpoint on prostitution. The district court agreed with the NGOs and held that the provisions were too broad of a restriction on free speech. The agencies appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the majority opinion. The Court held 6-2 that the government may not use funding and the threat of the loss of funding as a method for the regulation of speech and policies of non-governmental organizations. Because the Act's funding provisions represent an ongoing condition on the actions of the group receiving funding, the provisions essentially act as government coercion. The Court held that the funding provisions require the groups to accept the beliefs of the government, which infringes on their First Amendment rights.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the government has the right to choose to give financial support only to groups which share its views on how to address a particular issue. The fact that the government must often choose among many policy options does not mean that the government is coercing groups to adopt its views. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.
Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the discussion or decision in this case.


[Already LLC v. Nike (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Since 1982, Nike Inc. sold a shoe called the Air Force 1. The shoe has a distinctive appearance and Nike owns multiple federal trademark registrations for the shoe's design. In July 2009, Nike filed suit against Already, LLC for selling shoes that were confusingly similar to the Air Force 1 shoe. In November 2009, Already counterclaimed and requested cancellation of Nike's trademark on the basis that it interfered with Already's ability to continue selling its shoes.
To avoid further litigation, Nike provided Already with a covenant not to sue. The agreement promised that Nike would not pursue any legal action against Already with regard to trademark infringement. The District Court held a hearing to determine whether the covenant caused the court to lose subject matter jurisdiction over Already's counterclaims. Following the hearing, the District Court determined that it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the counterclaim alone did not create a case or controversy before the court; therefore the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.


[Already LLC v. Nike (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that Nike's covenant not to sue made the case moot. Nike met its burden to show that it "could not reasonably be expected" to resume trademark enforcement action against Already. The language of the covenant was broad enough that the Court could not conceive of a shoe that would fall outside of its scope. The Court also rejected Already's assertion that dismissing the case would allow Nike to enforce invalid trademarks against any competitor by continually issuing covenants not to sue. Nike has an incentive not to do this because allowing many competitors to use Nike's marks, or confusingly similar ones, could lessen the strength of Nike's mark.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred, emphasizing that covenants not to sue should not be a first reaction to trademark litigation. Courts should be wary of large companies intentionally burdening smaller competitors with infringement actions only to turn around and promise not to sue after learning valuable future business information. A covenant not to sue should only terminate litigation when it meets the high burden required by in this case. Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.


[Maryland v. King (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Maryland DNA Collection Act (MDCA) allows state and local law enforcement officers to collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested for a crime of violence, an attempted crime of violence, burglary, or attempted burglary. Alonzo Jay King, Jr. was arrested on first and second degree assault charges. While under arrest, but prior to conviction, King's DNA was collected and logged in Maryland's DNA database. That database matched King's DNA to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case. This sample was the only evidence linking King to the rape. The trial judge denied King's motion to suppress the DNA evidence and he was convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison.
King appealed the conviction, arguing that the MDCA was an unconstitutional infringement of his Fourth Amendment privilege against warrantless searches. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the MDCA was unconstitutional. The court held that King's expectation of privacy was greater than Maryland's interest in using the DNA for identification purposes.


[Maryland v. King (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that conducting a DNA swab test as a part of the arrest procedure does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test serves a legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a warrant. The routine administrative procedures that occur during a booking for an arrest do not require the same justification and the search of a location. The Court held that ascertaining an arrestee's identity and criminal history is a crucial part of the arrest procedure and that a DNA test is just as valid and informative as fingerprinting. Determining an arrestee's criminal history also serves the legitimate state interest of determining what level of risk the individual poses to the public and what conditions should be set on his/her release from custody.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment categorically prevents searching a person for evidence of a crime without cause. Because the majority's opinion allows for DNA tests to be conducted in the absence of evidence linking the arrestee to a specific DNA-related crime, these tests fall within the boundaries of the British "general warrants" the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. He also argued that the procedural safeguards on the DNA evidence make it an ineffective and redundant identification tool. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


[Levin v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On March 12, 2003, Steven Levin was scheduled to undergo cataract surgery performed by Lieutenant Commander Frank Bishop, M.D., a United States Navy surgeon in Guam. Levin previously gave his written consent to the procedure but claims that he attempted to orally withdraw it prior to the surgery. He suffered complications from the surgery and faces continuing treatment with unclear likelihood of success. Levin sued Dr. Bishop for battery and negligent medical malpractice. The United States substituted itself for Dr. Bishop and filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the negligent medical malpractice claim, not the battery claim. The United States then filed for dismissal of the battery claim and alleged that the Federal Tort Claims Act preserved sovereign immunity against battery claims. The district court dismissed the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Levin v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered a unanimous opinion reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanding for further proceedings. In general, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") allows a plaintiff to bring a tort claim against the United States, unless that claim alleges an intentional tort, such as battery. However, the Medical Malpractice Immunity Act, also known as the Gonzalez Act, carved out a specific exception to this rule. The Gonzalez Act states that the intentional tort exception to the FTCA "shall not apply" to certain tort claims alleging wrongful or negligent medical care. The Court applied the plain meaning of the statute and held that the Gonzalez Act nullifies the FTCA's intentional tort exception when a plaintiff alleges medical battery by an armed forces physician. Since the intentional tort exception does not apply, Levin should be allowed to proceed with his suit against the United States.


[United States v. Davila (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In early 2010, Anthony Davila was tried for defrauding the federal government by filing false tax returns. During a hearing before the magistrate judge, Davila requested to discharge his court-appointed attorney. Davila was concerned that the attorney had not discussed any possible trial strategies with him; the attorney merely insisted that Davila plead guilty. The magistrate judge explained to Davila that there might not be another viable option and that pleading guilty may be the best advice his attorney could have given him. Following the judge's advice, Davila plead guilty and was subsequently sentenced to 115 months imprisonment.
Davila appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Davila argued that the magistrate judge's advice to plead guilty warranted a new trial. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court must not be involved in any plea discussions. Since the judge commented on the weight of the evidence against Davila and suggested that a guilty plea would result in a more lenient sentence, he participated in such a plea discussion. As a result of this violation, Davila claimed that the court should vacate the judgment. The appellate court agreed with Davila, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.


[United States v. Davila (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a judge's improper participation in plea discussions does not belong in the "highly exceptional" category of errors that trigger an automatic reversal of a defendant's guilty plea. Instead, such misconduct falls within the category of "harmless error." Because Davila failed to raise the issue of the magistrate judge's comments at his hearing, he had the burden to show that, but for the misconduct, he would not have pled guilty. In this case, the three-month window between Davila's conversation with the magistrate and his guilty plea de-emphasized the role of the judge's comments in affecting the plea.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the case could be decided based simply on the text of the harmless error rule, which states that a harmless error is one that "does not affect substantial rights." According to Scalia, the majority's analysis of legislative history to discern the scope of the harmless error rule was unnecessary. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the partial concurrence and concurrence in judgment.


[Wos v. E.M.A. et al. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Emily M. Armstrong, daughter of Sandra and William Earl Armstrong, was born on February 25, 2000. She was seriously injured during her delivery resulting in mental retardation, cerebral palsy and several other medical conditions. Emily's mother applied for Medicaid two months after her daughter's birth. Since then the North Carolina state Medicaid program had paid over $1.9 million in medical expenses on Emily's behalf. Emily's parents and guardian sued the physicians for negligently delivering their child and won a settlement of $2.8 million. As a result, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") placed a lien on Emily's settlement, looking to recover some of the money it paid for Emily's health care services. Under the North Carolina third-party liability statutes, when a patient wins an award of medical expenses, the DHHS has the right to recover either the total amount spent on the patient's health care, or one third of the patient's recovery payment, which ever is less.
Emily's parents and guardian brought suit against the DHHS, claiming that federal Medicaid law prevents the DHHS from taking her proceeds. Federal law prohibits recovery from any payments not made for past medical expenses. Since under North Carolina law a minor child is not allowed to recover for past medical expenses, Emily's settlement could not include such expenses. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina disagreed with this argument and granted summary judgment to the state.
The Armstrongs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision. While the appellate court agreed with the lower court that the DHHS has the right to recover from Emily's settlement, it remanded the case because the state failed to provide a mechanism for determining what part of a settlement covers past medical expenses. Since the North Carolina statutes do not attempt to recover payment for past medical expenses, they violate federal Medicaid law.


[Wos v. E.M.A. et al. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the lower court. The North Carolina law is preempted by federal law to the extent that it would allow the state to recover part of a Medicaid beneficiary's tort judgment or settlement not designated for medical expenses. Arbitrarily designating one-third of a judgment as recoverable medical expenses lacks any limiting principle. If upheld, nothing could stop a state from arbitrarily designating one-half or all of a judgment as medical expenses. Calculating the actual amount of medical expenses in each case may be more difficult than the one-third rule, but similar allocation procedures are already used other circumstances, such as worker's compensation and separating compensatory and non-compensatory damages for tax purposes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, stating that he agreed with the majority because the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had already reached the same conclusion.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. dissented, arguing that no regulation or prior case law requires a specific allocation of damages recovered for medical expenses. States should be allowed more leeway to come up with a workable regulation to recoup Medicaid payments. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Shelby County v. Holder (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time.
Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination.


[Shelby County v. Holder (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining whether changes to a state's voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the voting turnout gap in the states in question.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional in addition to Section 4. He wrote that the blatant discrimination against certain voters that Section 5 was intended to prohibit is no longer evident. Without such extraordinary circumstances, Congress cannot constitutionally justify placing the burden of Section 5 on the states in question.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments encompasses legislative action such as the Voting Rights Act. The legislative history and text of the Amendments as well as previous judicial precedent support Congress' authority to enact legislation that specifically targets potential state abuses. However, Congress does not have unlimited authority but must show that the means taken rationally advance a legitimate objective, as is the case with the Voting Rights Act. The evidence Congress gathered to determine whether to renew the Voting Rights Act sufficiently proved that there was still a current need to justify the burdens placed on the states in question. She also argued that, by holding Section 4 unconstitutional, the majority's opinion makes it impossible to effectively enforce Section 5. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Two logging roads in Oregon, Trask River Road and Sam Downs Road, are owned by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Board of Forestry. The roads are used primarily by various logging companies. These roads run parallel to rivers and use a series of ditches, culverts, and channels to direct storm water runoff into the nearby rivers. This runoff deposits large amounts of sediment in the rivers, which adversely affects the fish and other wildlife that relies on the water.
The Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) sued the Oregon State Forester, the Oregon Board of Forestry and several timber companies. The NEDC alleged that, since the runoff ditches and channels can be defined as "point sources," the petitioners violated the Clean Water Act by failing to obtain permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. In district court, the petitioners moved for dismissal by arguing that the runoff was exempt from the permits. The district court granted the motion. The NEDC appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the decision based on precedent that supported the NEDC interpretation of both the "point source" and the permit requirement.


[Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No and yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 7-1 majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the Clean Water Act exempts the storm water runoff from the permitting scheme because the runoff is not associated with industrial activity. Even though the roads are used for the transport of raw materials, they are not used for the manufacturing, processing, or storage of those materials. The Court deferred to the Environmental Protection Agency's own reasonable interpretation that the permit requirement extends only to traditional industrial sites, such as factories. Therefore, the runoff ditches and channels did not constitute point sources that require permits under the Act.


[Chaidez v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Roselva Chaidez came to the United States from Mexico in 1971; she became a lawful permanent resident in 1977. In 2003, she was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on three counts of mail fraud in connection with an insurance scheme. On the advice of her attorney, Chaidez pleaded guilty and received a sentence of four years of probation. The U.S. government initiated removal proceedings in 2009 under a federal law that allows deportation of any alien who commits an aggravated felony. Chaidez's attorney never told her that pleading guilty could lead to her deportation.
Chaidez filed for a writ of coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. While this motion was pending before the district court, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, holding that it is ineffective assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to advise a client that he or she may face deportation as a result of pleading guilty. The district court concluded that Padilla did not announce a new rule, so its holding applied to Chaidez's case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that Padilla does announce a new rule and is not retroactively applicable in this case.


[Chaidez v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Padilla ruling created an entirely new rule relating to whether advice about deportation fell under the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because the Court considered this rule separately from previous cases, it was considered a new rule and therefore could not retroactively apply to already decided cases.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment only arguing that the Sixth Amendment provides for adequate assistance of counsel in the charged offense and does not extend to advice regarding possible consequences, such as deportation. He dissented in the Padilla case and therefore concurred only in the judgment in this case.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the decision in Padilla did not create a new rule but only extended previous analysis of Sixth Amendment rights to a new set of facts. Because the Padilla decision only clarified an attorney's responsibility to a client and did not create any new distinctions, the ruling should apply retroactively to previously decided cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


[Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Defendant Mark Gabelli was the portfolio manager for the Gabelli Global Growth Fund (GGGF), as well as several affiliated funds, from 1997 until 2004. Defendant Bruce Alpert had been the Chief Operating Officer of Gabelli Funds, a company that advises GGGF, since 1988. Beginning in 1999, Gabelli permitted another company, Headstart, to engage in "market-time" trading with GGGF. "Market-time" trading is premised on the fact that price movements during the New York trading day can cause corresponding movements in the international markets that will not be incorporated into new stock prices until the following day. Traders can then buy and sell at artificially low and high prices, respectively. By early 2002, Alpert became concerned about the effects of market-timing and instructed Headstart to reduce the number of those transactions. On August 7, 2002, Gabelli announced that all market-timing must stop, and Headstart pulled its money from GGGF.
On September 3, 2003, the New York Attorney General announced an inquiry into market-timing. On April 24, 2008, the SEC sued the defendants and alleged that Gabelli and Alpert knew of Headstart's market-timing but deliberately mislead GGGF's Board and shareholders in violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The district court dismissed the SEC's claims for failure to bring the suit within the five-year statute of limitations, and the SEC appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.


[Gabelli v. Securities and Exchange Commission (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
When the alleged violation is committed. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Second Circuit and remanded. Starting the limitations period at the time of the violation is the most natural reading of the statute. This reading is supported by past precedent and dictionary definitions. In the past, the "discovery rule", which pauses the statute of limitations until fraud is discovered, has been applied when the victims of the fraud would be denied relief. The protection that the rule provides for the injured is not relevant to a Government enforcement action such as this one. It would also be nearly impossible to determine when the Government "knows" of a violation and Congress did not require that determination.


[University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Dr. Naiel Nassar, who is of Middle Eastern descent, was hired by the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW) in 1995 to work at the Amelia Court Clinic (Clinic), which specializes in HIV/AIDS treatment. After three years there, he left to pursue additional training and returned in 2001 as an Assistant Professor of Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases and Associate Medical Director of the Clinic. His immediate supervisor at the Clinic was Dr. Philip Keiser, whose supervisor at UTSW was Dr. Beth Levine. After being hired in 2004, Levine immediately began inquiring into Nassar's productivity and billing practices. In 2005, after interviewing a candidate who was of Middle Eastern descent, Levine stated in Nassar's presence, "Middle Easterners are lazy." In 2006, after hiring the candidate, Levine made a similar statement in Keiser's presence. Keiser informed Nassar of these comments as well as the fact that Levine scrutinized Nassar's productivity more than any other doctor. Around this time, Nassar applied for a promotion that Levine actively undermined. In 2006, Nassar resigned from the UTSW faculty and cited Levine's harassment and the creation of an unhealthy work environment in his resignation letter. Nassar resigned with the understanding that he would be offered a position at the Amelia Court Clinic unaffiliated with the UTSW, but the Clinic was forced to withdraw its offer after heavy opposition from the UTSW faculty, who have an agreement with the Clinic regarding positions to be filled by faculty doctors.
In 2008, Nassar sued UTSW under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that UTSW had constructively discharged and retaliated against him. The jury found in favor of Nassar and awarded him back pay and compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the retaliation claim but insufficient evidence to support the claim of constructive discharge.


[University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The retaliation provision of Title VII requires the plaintiff to prove than an employer would not have taken an action but for the existence of improper motives. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that there must be a demonstrable causal link between the injury sustained and the wrong alleged. A standard understanding of causation supports the view that an action cannot be the cause of an event unless it can be shown that the event would not have occurred without the action in question. Because there is no language in the retaliation provision that states otherwise, it must be assumed that Congress intended to support the standard understanding of causation. The Court also held that lessening the causation standard would increase the number of frivolous claims and decrease the ability of employers and the courts to deal with the pressing issues of real workplace harassment.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the majority's decision creates an unnecessary dichotomy between discrimination cases and retaliation cases by restricting retaliation cases to a stricter standard of proof. In doing so, the majority's opinion ignores extensive judicial precedent that supports the close connection between anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions. Additionally, there is no evidence that Congress intended to provide less protection from discrimination than from retaliation, as the majority's reading of the provision suggests. She also argued that the "but-for" causation test is particularly difficult to implement in employment discrimination cases as it requires trial courts to reach conclusions as to what would have happened had the employer's thoughts been different. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Koontz v. St. John's River Water Management (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1994, Coy A. Koontz requested a permit from St. John's River Water Management to develop more of his land than the original permit allowed. St. John's had jurisdiction over Koontz's land. St. John's agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Koontz deed the rest of his property into a conservation area and do some mitigation work on the surrounding areas. Koontz agreed to the deed but not to the mitigation work. St. John's denied the permit application.
Koontz sued St. John's River Water Management, and the trial court found in favor of Koontz. A Florida trial court held that St. John's actions effected a taking of Koontz land and that imposing requirements for the issuance of a permit is only constitutional if the required action serves the same governmental purpose as the ban on development. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed.


[Koontz v. St. John's River Water Management (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government may not conditionally approve land-use permits unless the conditions are connected to the land use and approximately proportional to the effects of the proposed land use. This standard even applies when the government does not approve the permit but instead demands that the condition be met before granting the permit. Such demands, which amount to asking for property or money from an applicant, place a burden the applicant’s ownership of the land. This burden diminishes the value of the land, which violates the Constitutional protections against having property taken without just compensation.
Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the limitations on the government’s ability to conditionally approve land-use permits do not apply to monetary exactions. She also wrote that applying those limits would likely inhibit local governments’ ability to charge reasonable permitting fees. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Henderson v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Armarcion D. Henderson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of federal law. The sentencing guideline range was 33-41 months, but the judge sentenced Henderson to 60 months to ensure that he had the opportunity to enroll in the Bureau of Prisons drug program. Henderson did not object to the sentence. Eight days after sentencing, Henderson filed a motion to correct the sentence. The district court denied the motion.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Henderson did not preserve the error for correction under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so the court reviewed the decision for plain error. Henderson did not show plain error because the error was not clear under current law at the time of trial. The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.


[Henderson v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for a 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that that an error is deemed to be a "plain error" based on the law at the time of the appellate review of the case, not at the time of the trial. It is unreasonable to expect either the defendant or the trial court to predict the outcome of unsettled issues of law, therefore it is the role of the appellate court to review what is considered "plain error" at the time of the appellate review.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that an issue of law that is unsettled at the time of the trial cannot be considered "plain error" for the purposes of appellate review. An error can only be plain if it should have been obvious to the court and the prosecution at the time of the trial. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Missouri v. McNeely (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit.
The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision.


[Missouri v. McNeely (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches applies to blood alcohol tests unless specific exigent circumstances exist. Because each case must be considered based on its individual facts, there are cases in which the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood would be considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to create a categorical rule. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against bodily intrusions outweighs the state’s interest in gaining evidence quickly.
In his partial concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the case in question does not provide the basis for any categorical rule on the issue of conducting a blood alcohol test without a warrant. He also wrote that the Fourth Amendment does not allow the warrant requirement to be entirely ignored in drunk driving arrests. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that there must be a categorical rule on this issue to provide appropriate guidance to law enforcement officials. He argued that exigent circumstances exist and justify a warrantless blood test if the officer believes there is not sufficient time to obtain a warrant before critical evidence is lost through natural metabolic processes. If there is time to secure a warrant, the officer must do so. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the body’s natural metabolization of alcohol constitutes the destruction of evidence and represents an exigent circumstance. The importance of obtaining evidence allows the police to conduct a warrantless blood alcohol test without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


[Millbrook v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Kim Millbrook was an inmate at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Millbrook alleges that a correctional officer took him to the basement of the Special Management Unit and sexually assaulted him while other officers stood by. Millbrook filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging sexual assault. Under 28 U.S.C. §2680(h), the United States is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees, except for certain torts committed by law enforcement officials. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d. 868 (1986) limited claims that arise under §2680(h) to intentional torts by a law enforcement officer while executing a search, seizing evidence, or making arrests for violations of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that Millbrook's claim was precluded by Pooler. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the definition of seizure is limited to seizure of evidence.


[Millbrook v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Supreme Court. The Court held that nothing in the text of the proviso itself implies a more specific reading than that a tort law claim may be filed when a law enforcement officer’s actions fall within the scope of his employment. The text indicates that Congress intended the proviso to focus on the status of the individual rather than the type of action.


[Alleyne v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On October 1, 2009, Allen Ryan Alleyne and two accomplices robbed the store manager of a Mapco/East Coast convenience store in Petersburg, Virginia as he was dropping off the nightly deposit at the bank. In April 2010, after an extensive investigation, the authorities arrested Alleyne and a grand jury indicted him for robbery and possessing a firearm. On September 7, 2010, after a week-long trial, the jury convicted Alleyne on both counts and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced him to 130 months imprisonment.
Alleyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming the district court made three specific errors: 1) the evidence against him wasn't strong enough to support his convictions; 2) he was convicted of aiding and abetting the robbery and not carrying it out, which changed his original indictment; and 3) he should not have received a mandatory 7 year sentence for possession of a firearm. The Fourth Circuit rejected all three of his claims. First, the appellate court refused to overrule the jury's decision on the strength of the evidence because a jury is best equipped to determine whether evidence is credible. Second, since aiding and abetting a crime is not itself a separate offense, it does not need to be included in the indictment and does not change the original charge. Finally, there was no indication that the district court should not have imposed the minimum sentence for possessing a firearm.


[Alleyne v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, yes, no. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury, which can only be accomplished if all of the facts that are elements of the crime are presented to the jury. If an element of the crime increases the mandatory minimum punishment, it must be submitted to the jury and found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also held that, because an indictment must contain every allegation legally essential to punishment, a defendant cannot be found guilty of a crime not included in the indictment.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, although the Court generally follows precedent, when the analysis supporting a previous decision has been sufficiently undermined, it is appropriate to overturn it. She argues that the majority's opinion is not the result of judicial sentiment but rather a recognition of shifting Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that jury factfinding would serve as a check on judicial power to impose maximum or minimum sentences.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Sixth Amendment was intended to protect defendants from the government but does not limit a judge's discretion within the limits set by the jury. Once a jury finds a defendant guilty, it is the judge's duty to set a punishment within the appropriate limits, and there is no risk of judicial overreach within those limits. He also argued that the majority's decision does not have a basis in judicial history. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority's opinion alters judicial precedent simply because a majority disagrees with it, without the proper justification.


[Lozman v. Riviera Beach (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2002, Fane Lozman purchased a floating residential structure. The structure was rectangular and made of plywood. It contained no bilge pumps, no raked bow, no navigation aids, no lifeboats, no propulsion mechanism, no steering, and cleats, which were inappropriate for towing.
Lozman kept his floating home in a marina in the City of Riviera Beach. Lozman signed a lease with the city, moored the floating home to the dock, and affixed the home to land based utilities. Later, the city council passed a revised dockage agreement and accompanying Marina Rules. Pursuant to these rules, the city informed Lozman it would revoke his permission to remain on the Marina unless he executed a new agreement and complied with the new regulations. Lozman did not execute a new agreement and continued to remain at the marina.
In response, the city filed an in rem suit in federal court for trespass under federal maritime law. The city filed for partial summary judgment on its trespass claim. Lozman argued that his floating home was not a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, and therefore not subject to maritime law. The district court granted the city's motion and held that Lozman's floating home was a "vessel" for purposes admiralty jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower court, and Lozman appealed the appellate court's determination that his floating home was a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3.


[Lozman v. Riviera Beach (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the 11th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the 11th Circuit's definition of "vessel" is too broad. The Court focused on the language of the statute, which states that a vessel is "capable of being used...as a means of transportation." While the floating home can move, it is not used for transportation in a practical way. The Court employed a "reasonable observer" test, holding that something's ability to float, does not automatically make it a vessel.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the reasonable observer test introduces a subjective element that upsets long established maritime precedent. The dissent would also remand the case to develop the record further. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.


[Bowman v. Monsanto (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1994, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted a patent to the Monsanto Company for genetic material from a virus that can be used to incorporate new genetic material into a plant. In 2006, Monsanto patented a gene that makes plants resistant to the glyphosate-based herbicides that farmers can use on weeds. Both patents are included in the Monsanto Technology agreement which states that growers who purchase Monsanto's products may only use the seed for a single season and may not sell the seeds to any other grower. Growers may sell the second-generation seed to a grain elevator.
Vernon Hugh Bowman, a farmer in Knox County, Indiana, began purchasing Monsanto's Pioneer Hi-Bred seed in 1999 and followed the terms of the agreement by not saving any of his seed. Also beginning in 1999, Bowman purchased second-generation seed from a grain elevator for his second planting and saved seeds from that purchase for reuse later. In 2006, Monsanto contacted Bowman to examine his planting activities and found that his second-round crops contained the patented genetic material. Monsanto sued Bowman for patent infringement. The district court granted summary judgment for Monsanto. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.


[Bowman v. Monsanto (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered a unanimous opinion holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not allow the purchaser to make copies of a patented item. Because the product in question is a seed, using the seed to grow a crop and then harvesting those seeds for future use constitutes creating copies of a patented item. In this case, Bowman's one-time purchase of Monsanto's product allowed him to take advantage of their patented product over the course of many seasons without respecting the rights of the patent holder. The Court also held that this reading of the doctrine allowed patents for plants to retain their value.


[Gunn v. Minton (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In the early 1990s, Vernon Minton, a former securities broker, developed the Texas Computer Exchange Network (TEXCEN) software that allowed financial traders to execute trades on their own. R.M. Stark & Co. (Stark) agreed to lease TEXCEN. More than one year later, Minton filed for a patent that was granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office on January 11, 2000.
Minton later sued the NASDAQ and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and alleged that their services infringed on his patent. NASD and NASDAQ argued that a patent is invalid when the invention claimed is sold more than a year before the patent application is filed. The district court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ. Minton retained new counsel to argue his case under the experimental use exception, which states that the patent remains valid if the invention was sold primarily for experimental, rather than commercial, use. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
Minton sued his original attorneys (collectively referred to as Gunn) for legal malpractice and argued that their failure to argue the experimental use exception in the original suit cost him the case. Gunn filed for summary judgment arguing no-evidence due to the fact that the attorneys did not know of the earlier sale in order for the experimental use exception to be relevant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Gunn. Minton appealed to the Second Court of Appeals for Texas. Shortly after he filed his appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided a case that gave jurisdiction to the federal courts in malpractice suits arising from patent litigation. Minton filed a motion to dismiss his case from the Second Court of Appeals for Texas, but the court denied his motion and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed and dismissed the case.


[Gunn v. Minton (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court applied Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., which provided that a case only arises under federal patent law when it "necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." The Court held that Minton failed to show that the federal issue in the case carried the necessary significance. The need to decide a hypothetical patent case is not substantial enough to deprive the state court of jurisdiction. A state court decision in a state law malpractice case relating to patent law will not substantially affect federal patent law.


[Descamps v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.


[Descamps v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that Descamps' ACCA enhancement was improper because a felony burglary conviction under the California Penal Code is not a generic burglary conviction. To count for sentence enhancement under the ACCA, a prior burglary conviction must at least match a conviction using the traditional elements of the offense: "breaking and entering a building." The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit's examination of Descamps' burglary plea hearing transcript exceeded the purview of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reiterated that sentencing courts may only consult outside documents to ascertain the basis of the defendant's conviction ("modified categorical approach") when the statute defines elements in the alternative—for example, "breaking and entering a building [generic] or automobile [non-generic]." California's burglary statute does not require "unlawful entry" as an element, or an alternative element, of the offense, so courts may not use the modified categorical approach. Allowing a sentencing court to determine, from the record, whether a defendant's prior conviction could have satisfied the traditional elements of the offense "raises serious Sixth Amendment concerns," Such as encouraging ill-advised guilty pleas.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the majority opinion's concern that defendants would enter guilty pleas or let certain facts go uncontested without considering the potential consequences under the ACCA. He also expressed concern over the burden the majority's opinion places on state legislatures to revise their statutes. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the ACCA framework amounts to a judicial factfinding expedition that runs counter to what is allowed by previous precedent. However, because the majority opinion limited the circumstances under which courts may consult documents relating to the defendant's prior conviction, Thomas concurred in the judgment.
Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in which he contended that the majority opinion artificially limits the reach of the ACCA and treats similar convictions differently based solely on the arbitrary wording of state statutes. To remedy this problem, he argued that sentencing courts should always be permitted to consult the record to determine whether the defendant's conviction matched the generic offense.


[Hillman v. Maretta (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In December 1996, Warren Hillman made his wife, Judy Maretta, the beneficiary of his Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance ("FEGLI") policy. In 1998, the two divorced and Mr. Hillman remarried. Despite the divorce, Mr. Hillman never changed the beneficiary designation on his policy to his new wife, Jacqueline Hillman. In 2008, Warren died and Jacqueline Hillman attempted to claim the death benefits under his policy. Her claim was denied because she was not the named beneficiary on her husband's policy; Ms Maretta received the death benefits instead. Mrs Hillman sued Ms Maretta for the full amount of death benefits under the policy.
When a divorce is finalized in Virginia, state law revokes any beneficiary designations between former spouses. State law also creates a cause of action against anyone who wrongfully receives FEGLI policy proceeds. However, federal law under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act dictates that death benefits from FEGLI policies shall go to the designated beneficiary, regardless of state regulation to the contrary. The trial court applied state law and granted summary judgment to Mrs. Hillman, but Ms Maretta appealed. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the lower court's decision and held that federal law preempted the state law; therefore Mr. Hillman's beneficiary designation was not revoked. Mrs. Hillman appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.


[Hillman v. Maretta (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA) preempts the Virginia law. By passing FEGLIA, Congress clearly intended that the insurance proceeds go to the named beneficiary. The state law, which allows a deceased employee's family to sue a designated beneficiary for the proceeds of a FEGLI life insurance policy, conflicts with Congress' intent.
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. He stated that he cannot join with the majority's conclusion because the consideration is unnecessary. The Supremacy Clause effectively repeals state laws that directly conflict with federal law as the Virginia law does with FEGLIA. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. stated that one of the purposes of FEGLIA is to implement the expressed wishes of the insured. Since the Virginia law has the effect of overriding an insured's choice of beneficiary, FEGLIA preempts it.


[FTC v. Actavis Inc. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2000, Solvay Pharmaceuticals successfully patented AndroGel, a topical gel medication. Shortly after the FDA approved the medication, generic drug manufacturers Watson Pharmaceuticals and Paddock Laboratories began developing generic versions of the gel. Solvay filed a patent infringement suit against Watson and Paddock, but the manufacturers counter-claimed that Solvay's patent was invalid to begin with. As the infringement suit progressed, Solvay feared that it would lose its monopoly on AndroGel. To prevent this, Solvay entered into a reverse payment agreement with the two manufacturers. In return for dropping the suit and maintaining exclusivity, Solvay agreed to pay the manufacturers a sizeable fee. The agreement allowed Solvay to maintain its monopoly, despite the possible invalidity of the patent, in exchange for sharing some of the profits with its potential competitors.
Shortly after entering the agreement, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") filed a complaint against the pharmaceutical companies. The FTC claimed that Solvay was unlikely to win the patent infringement suit; therefore the settlement unfairly protected an invalid patent monopoly. By limiting competition in the AndroGel market, the manufacturers were restraining trade in violation of antitrust laws. The manufacturers argued that the FTC failed to state a valid claim because the agreement merely protected Solvay's already existing patent rights. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with the manufacturers and dismissed the case. The FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court explained that the manufacturers' reverse payment settlement is lawful as long as it restrains competition in the same way that patent protection typically restrains competition.


[FTC v. Actavis Inc. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that reverse payment settlements are not presumptively unlawful and that the FTC's lawsuit should have been allowed to proceed. Although patent-based settlement agreements can sometimes violate anti-trust laws, the Court declined to apply an all-or-nothing rule regarding these agreements. Instead, the Court stated that there are five considerations that should have allowed the consideration of FTC's case. These considerations are: 1) that specific restraints in the settlement agreement had the potential to adversely effect competition; 2) that certain anti-trust consequences will sometimes prove unjustified; 3) that if a reverse payment settlement can cause anticompetitive harm, the patent-holder likely has the power to bring about that harm as well; 4) an anti-trust claim may be more administratively feasible than the lower court believed; and 5) the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment settlement risks anti-trust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuits. The Court held that these considerations outweighed the lower court's decision to provide anti-trust immunity to reverse payment settlements.
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority's decision discourages generic pharmaceutical companies from challenging patents because it eliminates the possibility of meaningful settlements. He argued that this decision instead forces generic companies into costly litigation that could be more efficiently handled through settlement negotiations. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States of America (2012) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
From 1993 through 2000, the United States Army Corps of Engineers imposed a temporary flood regime around the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area. The flood regime caused flooding across the region encompassed by the wildlife management area, which restricted access to and destroyed or degraded thousands of timber trees.
The petitioners brought a case in federal court in an attempt to recover under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment for the loss of their property resulting from the United State's flood regime. The federal court held that the flood regime constituted a Fifth Amendment taking and that the United States owed petitioners approximately $5.6 million as just compensation.
The government appealed, and the appellate court reversed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court reasoned that the flood regime was a temporary government action, and that only a permanent flooding condition would constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. The petitioners appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States of America (2012) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, in some cases. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for an 8-0 majority, reversed the Federal Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that there is no temporary flooding exception to the Takings Clause. Prior precedent clearly establishes that a temporary interference with property can constitute a compensable taking. The length and severity of the interference is just one factor among many a court must consider when determining whether a specific action was a taking. Other factors include the intent behind the action and the degree to which the interference was a foreseeable result of an authorized government action. On remand, the Federal Circuit must decide whether the circumstances in this case constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.


[Genesis Healthcare v. Symczyk (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Genesis Healthcare Corporation ("Genesis") employed Laura Symczyk as a registered nurse between April 2007 and December 2007. During her employment, Genesis implemented a policy that automatically deducted pay for employees' meal breaks whether or not they worked during those breaks. This prompted Symczyk to file a collective action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). In February 2010, Genesis offered to pay all of Symczyk's unpaid wages and attorney's fees. Symczyk did not respond to the offer. Genesis filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that Symczyk no longer had a real interest in the outcome of the action since they offered her full relief.
Since Genesis made an offer of judgment and no one had yet joined Symczyk's collective action, the District Court dismissed the case. Symczyk appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The Third Circuit held that a full offer of relief does not cause an FLSA collective action suit to be dismissed.


[Genesis Healthcare v. Symczyk (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that established mootness principles determined that, in cases that lack other claimants, the suit on behalf of other "similarly situated" employees becomes moot when the individual claim does. Since Symczyk no longer had a personal interest and was not representing the interests of a broader class, the case was properly dismissed.
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Elena Kagan argued that the premise on which the majority's decision is based—that Symczyk's individual claim is moot—is incorrect. She wrote that, because Symczyk rejected the settlement offer, she retained her personal interest in the case, and there was no reason to consider her claim moot. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Sekhar v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2008 the General Counsel for the Office of the State Comptroller of New York advised against investing in a fund managed by FA Technology Ventures. The investment would have given FA Technology millions in service fees. The General Counsel received an anonymous email of "blackballing a recommendation on a fund" and threatened to disclose the General Counsel's extramarital affair to his wife, to the Comptroller, and to others if he did not change his recommendation within 36 hours. On the advice of law enforcement, the General Counsel asked for more time, which the individual granted. The FBI traced the emails to Giridahr Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology. Sekhar later admitted to sending the emails.
Sekhar was charged with one account of extortion and six counts of interstate transmission of extortionate threats under the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act prohibits obtaining property by threats. Sekhar moved to dismiss, arguing that the General Counsel's recommendation was not property. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the General Counsel's right to make professional decisions without outside influence was intangible personal property. Sekhar was convicted on six of the seven counts and sentenced to 15 months in jail. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Sekhar v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that attempting to compel a person to issue a favorable recommendation does not amount to extortion under the Hobbs Act. The Court determined that the right of the General Counsel to issue a professional recommendation is not transferrable, and therefore lacks an essential characteristic of extorted property.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the key question was whether the General Counsel’s recommendation constituted property. As internal recommendations are not property, the issue of transferability became irrelevant. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the concurrence in the judgment.


[US Airways v. McCutchen (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
After James E. McCutchen suffered a serious injury in a car accident, a benefit plan administered by US Airways paid $66,866 to cover his medical expenses. The plan requires the beneficiary to pay back the medical expenses out of any amount recovered from third parties. Once McCutchen recovered over $100,000 from third parties in a separate suit, the plan demanded that McCutchen reimburse them for the full amount they paid out. McCutchen argued that US Airways did not take into account his legal fees, which reduced his recovery amount from third parties to less than the amount demanded. US Airways then filed suit for "appropriate equitable relief" under the Employment Retirement Security Income Act (ERISA). The district court ordered McCutchen to pay the full $66,866.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, holding that ERISA is subject to equitable limitations. To determine appropriate equitable relief, the district court must take into account the distribution of the amount recovered from third parties between McCutchen and his attorneys.


[US Airways v. McCutchen (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Maybe. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a 5-4 majority, vacated the Third Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that equitable limitations did not apply to the benefit plan as a whole because the plan is a valid contract and the parties are only demanding what they bargained for under that contract. The common fund doctrine, however, may provide relief because the benefit plan is silent on the allocation of attorney fees. The common fund doctrine allows a litigant to recover attorney fees from a fund that is created, increased, or protected by that litigant. Because the parties did not contract otherwise, the common fund doctrine provides the best indication of the parties' intent. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, arguing that the majority should not have discussed the plan's lack of a provision for attorney fees because it was not included in the question presented. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The level of pollution detected in the Santa Clara River, the Los Angeles River, the San Gabriel River, and Malibu Creek—collectively known as the Watershed Rivers—far exceeds what is allowed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit held by Los Angeles County. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental organizations brought legal action against the county and the district, alleging that the county violated the Clean Water Act. The allegations stem from the fact that the county and district allowed untreated storm water that had collected myriad pollutants to run unchecked through storm sewers and into the rivers. The county and district did not contest the fact that the amount of pollutants was high but rather contested the allegations that they were solely responsible.
The federal district court found for county and the district and held that there was no evidence that they were directly responsible. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision with respect to the Santa Clara River and the Malibu Creek but reversed the decision with respect to the San Gabriel River and the Los Angeles River.


[Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the pumping of polluted water from one portion of a waterway to another section of the same waterway did not constitute pollution under the Clean Water Act. Based on the text of the CWA, the "discharge of a pollutant" refers to the addition of a pollutant to a waterway. Because the pollutant is coming from farther up the same waterway, it cannot be considered an addition. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in the judgment.


[Boyer v. Louisiana (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2002, Jonathan Edward Boyer and his brother Anthony walked along a roadway in Sulphur, Louisiana. When Bradlee Marsh gave the brothers a ride, Boyer demanded money from Marsh. Marsh refused, and Boyer shot him in the head three times and took his money and a silver chain. Marsh died from his injuries.
Boyer was indicted in Louisiana state court on second-degree murder and armed robbery with a firearm charges. The jury found Boyer guilty on both counts. Boyer filed a motion for a new trial, but was denied. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the second-degree murder charge, and 104 years without parole for the armed robbery charge. On appeal, Boyer argued that that the trial court erred in determining his mental competency, by sustaining the State's objection to Boyer's attempt to present testimony showing his brother - Anthony - had violent tendencies, and by giving Jonathan Boyer an excessively long sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and did not prejudice Boyer.


[Boyer v. Louisiana (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred, writing that the majority of the delay in the trial was due to the defendant himself. The defendant even moved to delay a hearing to solve the funding issue multiple times. The record did not support a finding that lack of funding was a significant cause of the delay. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to the lower court's finding that the majority of the delay was caused by a lack of funding. If the Court had addressed the question presented, Justice Sotomayor would hold that a delay due to lack of funding weighs against the State when determining whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Bullock v. BankChampaign (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1978, Randy Curtis Bullock became the trustee of his father's trust. The trust's only asset was his father's life insurance policy, and Bullock and his four siblings were the trust's only beneficiaries. As trustee, Bullock was only allowed to borrow from the trust to pay the life insurance premiums and to satisfy a withdrawal request from another trustee. Despite these restrictions, Bullock borrowed from the trust three times: to satisfy a debt on his father's business, to allow him and his mother to purchase certificates of deposit, and to allow him and his mother to purchase real estate. All of the loans were fully repaid.
When Bullock's two brothers learned of the existence of the trust and their brother's actions, they sued him in Illinois state court. They claimed that Bullock had breached his fiduciary duty by taking loans that violated the guidelines of the trust. The brothers moved for summary judgment and the court granted it. The court ordered Bullock to pay $250,000 in damages for the benefits he received from his dealings with the trust, $35,000 in attorneys' fees, and placed the property Bullock purchased—a mill in Ohio—in a constructive trust. The constructive trust was awarded to BankChampaign, which replaced Bullock as the trustee of his father's trust. Bullock was unable to sell the mill to satisfy the Illinois judgment.
In 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 to discharge his debt from the Illinois judgment. The bank started an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court where it argued that debts arising out of "fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity" are not dischargeable by bankruptcy. The bank moved for summary judgment and the bankruptcy court granted the motion. Bullock appealed the bankruptcy court's judgment to district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court recognized that the only way for Bullock to satisfy the judgment debt was to sell the mill, and the bank could not hold it in perpetuity, so the district court concluded that the bank was abusing its power; however, it still affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court and held that Bullock's conduct met the standard for defalcation because it was objectively reckless and constituted a known breach of a fiduciary duty.


[Bullock v. BankChampaign (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen J. Breyer delivered a unanimous opinion holding that a bankruptcy proceeding resulting from "fraud or defalcation" is not dischargeable and that the term "defalcation" encompasses knowledge of or grossly reckless behavior in a fiduciary capacity. The Court held that the term should include a knowledge or intent requirement because such a reading follows statutory and judicial precedent. Additionally, this interpretation differentiates the term from others in the statute and provides a clear definition on which courts may rely. The Court then vacated the lower court's judgment and remanded the case to determine if further proceedings were necessary under this heightened standard.


[American Express Co., et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
American Express Company provides charge card services to supermarkets and other merchants throughout the United States. When a store decides to accept American Express cards, it must enter into a Card Acceptance Agreement. This standard form contract outlines the basic relationship between American Express and the merchant. A clause within the agreement requires arbitration of all claims brought against American Express and prohibits merchants from bringing any class action claims.
Several merchants, including Italian Colors Restaurant, brought individual lawsuits against American Express, claiming that the Card Acceptance Agreement violates U.S. antitrust laws. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York consolidated the cases and American Express moved to dismiss in order to force the merchants to arbitrate. The district court enforced the arbitration clause and dismissed the case. The merchants appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the arbitration clause, in particular the class action waiver, is unenforceable because it would essentially protect American Express from antitrust suits. American Express further appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court vacated the ruling and remanded for further proceedings in light of its decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International. The appellate court reevaluated its decision and still found the class action waiver to be unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari again to resolve this issue.


[American Express Co., et al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the prohibitively high cost of arbitration is not a sufficient reason for a court to overrule an arbitration clause that forbids class action suits. Federal law does not guarantee that a claim will be resolved affordably. The fact that it can be more expensive to litigate individual arbitrations than they are worth does not negate the right to pursue a statutory remedy. Therefore, no exception to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) can be applied.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that the purpose of the FAA is to resolve disputes and facilitate compensation of injuries. By barring any means of sharing or shrinking arbitration costs, the arbitration clause in the American Express form contract functions to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims, which runs counter to the purpose of the FAA. The contract also violates the Sherman Act by depriving parties of a chance to challenge allegedly monopolistic conduct. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


[PPL Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
PPL Corporation held a 25 percent stake in South Western Electricity Board, a utility in England subject to a onetime windfall tax. After PPL paid the tax, it claimed a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. §901 on its U.S. tax return. §901 allows a credit for foreign taxes on "income, war, profits, [or] excess profits." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the tax credit and issued a notice of deficiency. PPL then filed a petition in Tax Court to challenge the IRS's determination. The Tax Court agreed with PPL and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, arguing that §901 does not cover the windfall tax because it is a tax on the company's value, not its profits. PPL argued that, looking beyond the face of the statute, the windfall tax was intended to act as a tax on excess profits. The Third Circuit ruled in favor of the CIR, holding that the windfall tax is not eligible for credit.


[PPL Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that courts should apply a common-sense, substance-based approach when considering the effect of a foreign tax. Using this approach, the Court held that the U.K. tax is creditable under §901. The predominant character of the windfall tax was, for all intents and purposes, an income tax under U.S. definitions. The Court also held that the windfall tax should not fall under the same approach as a general tax on value. Value taxes, such as gift and estate taxes in the U.S., use past profits to estimate the tax value of future income. Conversely, the windfall tax is solely based on past, realized net income.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, but noted that an argument could have been made that the windfall tax was a tax on values as opposed to an excess profits or income-based tax. However, because that argument was not raised in oral arguments, she declined to rule on that issue.


[Comcast v. Behrend (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2003, Caroline Behrend, along with Stanford Glaberson, Joan Evanchuk-Kind, and Eric Brislawn, brought an antitrust class action suit against Comcast Corporation. The petitioners were all Comcast cable customers, alleging that the company obtained a monopoly on the cable market in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. By contracting with competitors to swap customers and subsume the regional cable markets, the company excluded and prevented competition amongst cable providers in the Philadelphia area. The proposed class of plaintiffs included all cable television customers in the Philadelphia area who subscribe or subscribed to Comcast's video programming services since December 1999.
In May 2007, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania certified the class, allowing the case to move forward. In light of a new antitrust decision in 2008 on class certification from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the District Court reconsidered its certification decision. The court held evidentiary hearings in October 2009, which consisted of dozens of expert testimonies and depositions. Following the hearings, the District Court recertified the class, finding sufficient evidence of a common impact amongst class members and a common methodology available to measure damages on a class-wide basis. Comcast subsequently appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision.


[Comcast v. Behrend (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Kennedy, held that the plaintiff’s class action was improperly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because the lower courts failed to entertain competing arguments against the plaintiff’s claim for damages. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that the lower courts only required that the plaintiffs provide a method to measure and quantify damages for the class without deciding whether such a method was a just and reasonable inference or if it was based on speculation. Because the lower courts failed to adequately establish the economic impact Comcast’s actions had on the plaintiffs, the lower courts were reversed.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a joint dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. They argued that the Supreme Court did not actually decide the issue granted in the writ of certiorari. Instead, they argued that the court addressed the “merits arguments” present in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Because the question was reformed, it was inadequately addressed and the Court should not have issued a ruling.


[Smith v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.


[Smith v. United States (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that the defendant has the burden of proving withdrawal from a conspiracy regardless of when the withdrawal took place. Placing the burden on the defense does not violate the Due Process Clause because a defense of withdrawal does not negate an element of the crime of conspiracy. Instead, it assumes that the crime has occurred and starts the clock on the statute of limitations period for the prosecution. The Court held that a defense of withdrawal is considered an affirmative defense that places the burden of proof on the defendant. The Court also held that placing the burden on the prosecution to prove the withdrawal never happened would be a nearly impossible task, as witnesses would invoke the Fifth Amendment rather than discuss their criminal associations with the defendant.


[Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Adrian Moncrieffe, a native of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1984. In 2008, police arrested Moncrieffe while he was in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty in a Georgia court to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
In 2010, the department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings against Moncrieffe for being an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and as an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense. Moncrieffe did not dispute his conviction but argued that that the conviction was not an "aggravated felony" and did not make him removable.
An immigration judge ruled that Moncrieffe was removable, holding that the petitioner's conviction was an aggravated felony because Moncrieffe was convicted under a state law which was similar to a federal law which made possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony. Moncrieffe appealed and argued that possession of such a small amount of marijuana would not be a felony under federal law, but rather a misdemeanor. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Moncrieffe's argument and dismissed the appeal. The United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the deportation order.


[Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a categorical approach must be used to determine whether a state offense is comparable to one listed in a federal statute. Because the Controlled Substances Act contains provisions for the conviction of the possession of marijuana as both a felony and a misdemeanor, it is unclear which one aligns with a conviction for the possession of marijuana under the Georgia state statute. Under the categorical approach, it is not possible to tell whether Moncrieffe's conviction under the Georgia state statute would constitute an aggravated felony. The Court held that if a noncitizen's conviction for possession of a controlled substance fails to establish whether remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it cannot be considered an aggravated felony.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because the Georgia state statute punishes Moncrieffe's offense as a felony, and it is punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act, the conviction should be considered an aggravated felony. He also argued that the majority's opinion allows state felonies to be treated as federal misdemeanors, which runs counter to existing precedent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority's decision allows the leeway for convicted drug traffickers to remain in the country, which runs counter to the government's interest and existing precedent. Rather than following a purely categorical approach, the majority's decision creates a great deal of variation in the consequences for the conviction of the possession of a controlled substance based on the different state laws. He also argued that, because Moncrieffe did not prove that his offense falls under the definition of a misdemeanor, the deportation decision should be upheld.


[Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In December 2004, Karen Bartlett's doctor prescribed Sulindac, a generic anti-inflammatory medication, to help treat her shoulder pain. Within months she began suffering from a severe reaction called Stevens-Johnson syndrome, which caused the skin condition toxic epidermal necrolysis. This condition deteriorated over 60 percent of her skin to the point of causing open wounds. As a result, she has suffered permanent and serious injuries, including near-blindness.
Bartlett filed a lawsuit against the Sulindac medication manufacturer, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company. Bartlett initially presented several negligence and product liability claims, but only her design defect product liability claim made it to trial. Beginning in August 2009, a jury at the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire heard evidence that Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous to consumers and therefore was defectively designed. Mutual countered, among several other defenses, that federal law governs generic drug manufacturers' conduct; therefore Karen could not pursue a state design defect claim.
After 14 days of trial, the jury deliberated and sided with Bartlett, awarding over $20 million in compensatory damages. Mutual appealed the decision for several reasons, including the following: the district court misunderstood New Hampshire product liability law; and, the court improperly admitted several pieces of evidence and the jury award of damages was excessive. Mutual also reasserted its claim that federal law should prevail over a state defective design claim. Despite Mutual's arguments, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. Mutual appealed further to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari.


[Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that state law design-defect claims regarding the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by federal law which prohibits generic drug manufacturers from independently changing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved drug labels. New Hampshire state law obligates Mutual Pharmaceutical to place a stronger warning on the generic drug labels, a requirement that is irreconcilable with federal requirements. Therefore, the state law is pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause, which states that federal law supersedes that of the states.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that state law should not be pre-empted without evidence that Congress acted with the intent to supersede state law, especially in fields historically dominated by states. The objective of Congress in creating the law prohibiting the alteration of labels was to prevent misbranding as a protection for the consumer; state law requiring adequate warnings on labels complements this purpose. The New Hampshire design-defect laws are an incentive to avoid strict-liability not a mandate that product labels must be altered, so they are not irreconcilable with the federal law. She also argues that design-defect claims are distinct from failure-to-warn claims. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent arguing that Mutual Pharmaceutical could comply with both state and federal law by not doing business in the state. However, if Mutual Pharmaceutical options are limited by the conflicting laws to paying a substantial damages remedy or leaving New Hampshire and these options are an obstacle to the goals of the federal law, then the relevant state law is pre-empted. Without any direction from the relevant federal agency, the FDA, or a general pre-emption clause in the federal statute, he concludes that the New Hampshire law is not a substantial obstacle and should not be pre-empted. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
John Ivan Sutter and Oxford Health Plans entered into a Primary Care Physician Agreement (PCPA). Under this agreement, Sutter provided primary care health services to patients in Oxford's care network in exchange for reimbursement by Oxford. The contract also included a general arbitration clause, which stated, in part, "No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court." In 2002, Sutter initiated a class action, on behalf of himself and other health care providers under the PCPA, against Oxford, alleging breach of contract and violations of New Jersey law. Oxford moved to compel arbitration. The arbitrator found that the arbitration clause was so general that it encompassed any conceivable court action, including class actions. The arbitrator certified the class, and Oxford moved to vacate that decision in district court arguing the arbitration clause did not encompass class actions and the arbitrator exceeded his authority. The district court denied the motion and class wide arbitration proceeded.
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., which held that an arbitrator exceeded his authority by allowing class arbitration when the parties had no agreement on the issue. Oxford moved for reconsideration from the arbitrator in light of Stolt-Neilson, and then moved in district court to vacate the arbitrator's most recent award. Both motions were unsuccessful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.