[Freytag v. Commissioner (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
Under 26 U.S.C. 7443A(b), the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court (an Article I Court established by Congress) may appoint special trial judges to certain specified proceedings explicitly laid out in the statute, in which the special trial judges may issue decisions. He may also appoint them to "any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate," but in those unspecified cases the special trial judge may not issue a final decision, only draft an opinion which must be reviewed by a regular judge of the Tax Court.
Freytag and several other defendants were charged with using a tax shelter to avoid paying roughly $1.5 billion in taxes. They consented to have their case heard by a special trial judge. The trial judge eventually drafted an opinion unfavorable to their position, which was reviewed and adopted by the Chief Judge. They then appealed the case, arguing that their case was too complex to assign to a special trial judge under section 7443A. Congress's decision to allow the Chief Judge to make such an assignment, they argued, violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II Section 2), which provides that Congress may "vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Freytag asserted that the "Courts of Law" referred to there were only Article III courts (Federal District Courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, all of which have judges with lifetime tenure), and that the Chief Judge was part of an Article I court, meaning that Congress could not assign him the power of appointment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, affirming the Tax Court's decisions.


[Freytag v. Commissioner (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. On the question of whether 7443A permitted the assignment of complex cases to special trial judges, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the statute unambiguously did allow such appointments. Justice Harry Blackmun, in the majority opinion, wrote, "The plain language of 7443A(b)(4) surely authorizes the Chief Judge's assignment of petitioners' cases to a special trial judge. When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry should be complete except in rare and exceptional circumstances."
On the Appointments Clause question, however, the Court was divided 5-to-4. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority that Article I Courts, like Article III Courts, exercised the judicial power of the United States and were therefore "Courts of Law" for purposes of Article II Section 2. While they may have been more dependent on Congress than the other branches, they were nevertheless independent, and it therefore did not violate the separation of powers to allow them to make appointments.


[Schad v. Arizona (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first-and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.


[Schad v. Arizona (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
No. In a complex decision, Souter's plurality opinion acknowledged that jury instructions offering all-or-nothing alternatives in capital cases may overstep the Due Process Clause. But Schad's jury was not faced with such a choice. His jury had been instructed on the non-capital offense of second-degree murder.


[Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc. (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.


[Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc. (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
No. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.


[Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.


[Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. Justice Byron R. White and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered parts of the opinion, both majorities by a 5-4 vote. The Court held that Fulminante was coerced to confess in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found that "it was fear of physical violence, absent protection from his friend Sarivola, which motivated Fulminante to confess." This motivation invalidated his confession. Since Fulminante's confession to Donna Sarivola was closely tied to his first coerced confession, the Court dismissed both. The Court also found that the confessions played a determinative role in the trial. It maintained that a "successful prosecution depended on the jury's believing the two confessions." Because the confessions were critical to the outcome of the trial, the fact that they were obtained coercively could not be dismissed as a harmless error. Four justices dissented to using harmless error analysis for coerced confessions on the ground that confessions always significantly affect a trial's outcome.


[Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as "substantially identical" (because they had the same fair market value).
When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the "sale or disposition of [the] property." An exchange of property only constitutes a "disposition" if there is a "material difference" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as "substantially identical," the IRS ruled, a "disposition" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.


[Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the definition of "substantially identical" under the FHLBB regulations was intentionally flexible and broad enough to include even properties that were "materially different" for IRS purposes. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in the majority opinion, wrote that exchanged properties are "materially different" if they "embody legally distinct entitlements." The properties involved in this exchange clearly satisfied that test. "Because the participation interests exchanged by Cottage Savings and the other S & L's derived from loans that were made to different obligors and secured by different homes, the exchanged interests did embody legally distinct entitlements. Consequently, we conclude that Cottage Savings realized its losses at the point of exchange."


[Riverside County v. McLaughlin (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.


[Riverside County v. McLaughlin (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
The Court held that Riverside's actions did not comply with the Gerstein precedent. Justice O'Connor argued that it was the state's burden to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances when delaying probable cause determinations beyond 48 hours. The lower court in this case had placed that responsibility on the accused. Intervening weekends or complicated pretrial proceedings were not legitimate reasons for delay.


[Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.


[Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 vote, the Court ruled that the First Amendment s free expression clause could not protect the distortions in Malcolm s article. Justice Anthony Kennedy's majority opinion also explained when a direct quotation can be considered false, and therefore potentially libelous. The First Amendment limits libel suits by public figures. A report about a public figure cannot be considered "false" unless it is a gross distortion of the truth. Justice Kennedy's opinion explained that a direct quotation will qualify as such a distortion if the quoted words differ in their factual meaning from anything the public figure really said. Malcolm_s fabrication qualified as a "gross distortion," and the Court granted Masson standing to sue.


[Powers v. Ohio (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Facts]
Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black individual from the jury without explanation. The court denied the request for explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution’s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.


[Powers v. Ohio (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1990-1991) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the prosecution is prohibited from excluding an unbiased and qualified juror based on the person’s race regardless of the race of the defendant. Although an individual does not have the right to sit on a jury, every citizen has the right not to be deprived of the opportunity to participate in this aspect of civil life. The Court also held that a criminal defendant has the right to raise objections on racial discrimination when excluding certain potential jurors because it could cause potential injury to the defendant. The defendant must feel that he is receiving a fair trial and that the integrity of the judicial system is upheld. Therefore the defendant, as well as the juror, has the right to eliminate racial discrimination in the courtroom and the color of his skin is irrelevant to these objections of racial discrimination.


[Lee v. Weisman (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.


[Lee v. Weisman (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that government involvement in this case creates "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school." Such conduct conflicts with settled rules proscribing prayer for students. The school's rule creates subtle and indirect coercion (students must stand respectfully and silently), forcing students to act in ways which establish a state religion. The cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause is that government may not compose official prayers to recite as part of a religious program carried on by government.


[Franklin v. Massachusetts (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their "homes of record." Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their "homes of record" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people "in each State."


[Franklin v. Massachusetts (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
The Secretary's decision was not reviewable under the APA because it was not a "final agency action." Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in the majority opinion, wrote that only agency decisions that complete the decision-making process and directly affect the party bring suit may be challenged under the APA. In this case the Secretary's decision resulted merely in a set of findings reported to the President that he could ask to have revised using a different formula. Also, the recommendation (and therefore the procedure used to arrive at it) did not directly affect Massachusetts; the President had to take action before the findings would affect the number of Representatives apportioned to the State. The procedure and the findings that resulted from it, therefore, was not a "final agency action" challengeable under the APA, and the actions of the President are also not challengeable under the APA.
Evaluating the Secretary's chosen procedure under Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, however, Justice O'Connor ruled that the decision to include overseas personnel of the Department of Defense was a reasonable interpretation of the Constitution's intent. "The Secretary's judgment does not hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home states, actually promotes equality," wrote Justice O'Connor.


[Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
In a statewide ballot, California residents approved the addition of Article XIIIA to their State Constitution. Article XIIIA's "acquisition value" provision limited property assessment value increases to two percent, if caused by changes in ownership or new construction improvements. Article XIIIA exempted two types of transfers from this reassessment limit: first, if the principal seller is 55 or older and moved to a home of equal or lower value, and second, when a transfer occurred between parents and children. One of Article XIIIA's effects is that over time the taxes of new property owners, adjusted to reflect recent values, would be substantially higher than long-term property owner's taxes. A new property owner filed suit to challenge the state constitutional amendment.


[Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
The Court, through Justice Blackmun, held that California's new property tax system rationally and plausibly furthered legitimate state interests in restraining increasing property taxes and preserving local neighborhood stability. The discrepancy which Article XIIIA created between new and long time property owners is warranted, because the latter had a far greater reliance interest in their property than the former. Thus, long-time property owners deserved more protection from higher property taxes than new property owners. This demonstrated a significant difference between the two property owner types. In addition, both of Article XIIIA's exemptions rationally promoted a legitimate state interest. The first exemption did not discourage older people from moving to a smaller home that is likely to better suit their smaller family and income. The second exemption aimed at preserving family unity and neighborhood stability. Accordingly, the Court held that Article XIIIA did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.


[Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
After the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail’s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
No, Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the grievous wrong standard does not apply to requests to modify consent decrees and that changes of conduct or conditions may be revised if necessary for future events based on a flexible standard. Under a flexible standard, the party seeking modification of an institutional reform consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants a revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is tailored to that change of circumstances. This requirement will be satisfied if the change was unforeseen or would be detrimental to public interests without the modification.
Justice John Paul Stevens, with whom Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined, wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that after the institution was found by the district court to be deficient, it is the district court’s duty to command an effective remedy. In this case, the remedy was to have single-occupancy cells for pretrial detainees and it is important that the court apply a strict standard when considering modification request that undermines the central purpose of a consent decree. The modification of the consent decree should be denied.
Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision.


[Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enforcing any law relating to airline rates, route, or service. The ADA was enacted to ensure that states would not undo the anticipated benefits of federal deregulation of the airline industry. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines, which govern the content and format of airline advertising and award frequent flyers and payment to passengers who voluntarily gave up their seats on overbooked flights. The Attorney General of Texas sent letters to airlines, including Trans World Airlines, notifying them of the intent to sue if they did not follow the guidelines. Trans World Airlines sued and claimed that state regulation of fare advertisements is prohibited by the ADA. The district court found in favor of Trans World Airlines and held that states cannot take any enforcement action, which would restrict any aspect of the fare advertising or operations relating to rate, routes, or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the ADA prevents the enforcement of the NAAG fare-advertising guidelines through a state’s general consumer protection. When the ADA was enacted, Congress intended to prevent the state enforcement action if it has a connection with, or references airline rates, routes, or services, including advertisements. The NAAG guidelines explicitly refer to the rates within the meaning of the ADA and would have a significant impact on the airline’s ability to market their product and upon the fares they charge.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued the words “relate to” in the ADA should not be given a broad meaning because it gives the ADA pre-emption provision a meaning beyond the words and the legislative history behind the enactment. Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined the dissent
Justice David H. Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.


[Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
In a bitter 5-to-4 decision, the Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. For the first time, the justices imposed a new standard to determine the validity of laws restricting abortions. The new standard asks whether a state abortion regulation has the purpose or effect of imposing an "undue burden," which is defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Under this standard, the only provision to fail the undue-burden test was the husband notification requirement. In a rare step, the opinion for the Court was crafted and authored by three justices: O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
Learn more about the Supreme Court and abortion law in Body Politic, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


[United States v. Fordice (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
After 17 years of litigation, Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral policies to dismantle its de jure segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. Fordice.


[United States v. Fordice (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. A state's duty is not discharged "until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continues to foster segregation." Race-neutral admissions are not a sufficient corrective to constitutional violations of a dual system. Different admissions criteria, and different missions for university system components, may have racially discriminatory effects perpetuating the old system. The Court did not declare the present system unconstitutional, only that Mississippi had not done enough to eliminate segregation. The Justices turned the matter back to state officials -- and to the courts -- to determine what must be done to fulfill its duty under the Constitution.


[Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Lechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.


[Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No, reasoned Justice Clarence Thomas, except in situations where inaccessibility makes communication through normal channels ineffective. There were alternatives short of trespass, such as signs, mailings, and newspaper ads. (Thomas's defense of private property rights may offer a clue to his budding jurisprudence.)


[Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
Rose Cipollone died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
In a complicated 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that federally mandated warnings do not bar smokers from suing manufacturers under state personal-injury laws. The justices ruled that such suits cannot be based on claims that cigarette advertising failed to warn smokers of smoking dangers. But the justices also ruled that individuals may press claims alleging that the tobacco companies made fraudulent or inaccurate statements in their advertising or that the companies conspired to mislead people about the health hazards of smoking.


[Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.


[Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. Even if the Court were to assume that the agency-funded projects at issue threatened listed species, there was no proof that these actions would produce "actual or imminent" injuries to particular respondents who might some day wish to visit the foreign countries in question. The Court disregarded the proposed theory of "ecosystem nexus" which claimed that any person who used any part of of a "contiguous ecosystem" adversed affected by a funded activity had standing to sue.


[Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Respondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. The suits challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted §318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. §318 included the names of the lawsuits and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that §318 violated Article III of the Constitution because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation.


[Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that §318 did not violate Article III because it made changes to the law by replacing the legal standards of the five challenged statutes. It did not make any findings of law or fact, or compel any results in the pending cases. The explicit reference to the cases only served to identify the statutes underlying those cases.


[Riggins v. Nevada (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
On November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. Dr. Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.


[Riggins v. Nevada (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that an individual has the right to freedom from an unwanted antipsychotic drug. In order for the state to administer an antipsychotic drug against the patient’s wishes, the state must establish the pressing need for the administration of the drug. Because the district court did not reach a finding on the necessity of the Mellaril, the Court held that its administration was an error that infringed on Riggins’ constitutional rights.
In Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he wrote that the Due Process Clause prohibits the state from administering unwanted psychotic drugs to a defendant in order to make the defendant competent to stand trial. He argued that, since the administration of the antipsychotic drug can significantly alter the demeanor of the defendant during the trial and on the stand, it can amount to a manipulation of evidence by the state.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent where he argued that the issue of whether or not the state should have issued the antipsychotic medication without Riggins’ consent is a separate legal issue from his trial. He argued that there was no evidence that the Mellaril rendered Riggins’ trial anything less than “full and fair,” and therefore Riggins was not entitled to have his conviction reversed. Because he was found to be competent to stand trial under the influence of Mellaril, the Mellaril could not have significantly interfered with his ability to take part in his own defense. Justice Thomas also argued that, since Riggins approached the jail psychiatrist for medication because he was hearing voices, the district court did not order Riggins to take the Mellaril. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


[Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Taco Cabana, a fast food Mexican restaurant chain in San Antonio, Texas, had a specifically-designed look or “trade dress”. Two Pesos, another similar restaurant chain based in Houston, Texas, opened a few years later with a remarkably similar look. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Two Pesos allegedly copied Taco Cabana’s distinctive trade dress. The judge instructed the jury that trade dress must be inherently distinctive of have acquired a secondary meaning. The jury found that Taco Cabana’s trade dress was inherently distinctive, but had not acquired a secondary meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Two Pesos argument that a finding of no secondary meaning necessarily means the trade dress is not inherently distinctive and is not protected under the Lanham Act.


[Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court held that trade dress can be protected under the Lanham Act based on inherent distinctiveness even if there is no proof of a secondary meaning. Recovery is usually available for trademark infringement without a secondary meaning, and there is no persuasive reason for treating trade dress differently from other types of trademark. Requiring a secondary meaning would go against the purposes of the Lanham Act.
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, stating that the Lanham Act and its common law counterpart were broad enough to cover trade dress. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, expressing that the majority’s decision was supported by stare decisis. Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred in the judgment, arguing that the common law roots of the Lanham Act justify this decision better than the majority’s reasoning.


[Quill Corporation v. North Dakota (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of Bellas Hess in light of the "tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations" since it had been decided.


[Quill Corporation v. North Dakota (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No and No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court admitted that, over time, subsequent cases have allowed for more flexibility than Bellas Hess. Nevertheless, the Court maintained that this evolution does not suggest a rejection of Bellas Hess. The Court also determined that North Dakota's imposition of the use tax did not constitute a breach of the Due Process Clause because the Quill Corporation had sufficient contact with the state's residents and benefited from the state's tax revenue. However, it found the use tax to be unconstitutional because it interfered with interstate commerce, rendering it a violation of the Commerce Clause. Consequently, the Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision by ruling in favor of the Quill Corporation.


[New York v. United States (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.


[New York v. United States (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld two of the three provisions of the Act under review, reasoning that Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to use financial rewards and access to disposal sites as incentives for state waste management. The third provision, the "take-title" qualification, stipulated that states must take legal ownership and liability for low-level waste or by the regulatory act. "Either type of federal action," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "would 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments." This last provision violated the Tenth Amendment.


[International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.


[International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.


[Presley v. Etowah County Commission (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The principal focus of Alabama County Commission members is the construction and maintenance of roads. In 1987, Etowah County Commission passed the "Common Fund Resolution", combining all of the commission's funds into one county-wide budget and eliminating each commissioner's power over the distribution of funds allocated for his or her own road district. Newly elected black member, Commissioner Lawrence C. Presley, claimed that the changes in the distribution of authority were a form of racial discrimination and a violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which permits a state government to alter practices related to voting only after receiving judicial preclearance. The Etowah County Commission had not received this preclearance, and neither had the Russell County Commission when, in 1979, its members instituted the "Unit System." This system transferred full authority over Russell County roads, highways, bridges, and ferries from the commissioners to the appointed county engineer. When the first 2 black commissioners were elected in Russell County, they joined Presley in filing a suit against Etowah and Russell Counties in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The District Court determined that preclearance was unnecessary in both 2 instances, but Presley appealed.


[Presley v. Etowah County Commission (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court determined that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act covers only changes that directly relate to voting. More specifically, the Court found that case law outlines 4 areas in which alterations require preclearance under section 5: the method of voting, the requirements for candidacy, the composition of the electorate, and the formation or elimination of an elected office. In the Court's opinion, neither the "Common Fund Resolution" nor the "Unit System" fell in any of the 4 categories. Instead, those 2 changes merely concern the "internal operation of an elected body". Thus, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed.


[Burson v. Freeman (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.


[Burson v. Freeman (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
No. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages.


[National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corporation (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter into "trackage rights" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are "required for intercity rail passenger service." Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property.
Amtrak had a "trackage rights" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B & M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue this agreement because B & M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B & M track and sell it to CV, which would take over maintenance of the track but grant "trackage rights" to Amtrak and usage rights to B & M. When B & M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not "required for intercity rail passenger service."


[National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corporation (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the ICC was entitled to deference and that its decision had been reasonable. In the majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that by interpreting the statute's use of "required" to mean that the track must be useful but not absolutely indispensable to Amtrak's operation, the ICC had better accommodated the underlying intention of the RPSA than the appeals court. That finding was reinforced by Congress's amendment to the act, which would only be effective under the ICC's interpretation.


[Georgia v. McCollum (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
In 1990, white respondents, Thomas McCollum, William Joseph McCollum, and Ella Hampton McCollum, were charged with assaulting two black individuals. Before the criminal trial, the prosecution moved to bar the defense from using its peremptory challenges to eliminate black people from the juror pool. The term "preemptory challenge" refers to the right to reject a potential juror during jury selection without giving a reason. The trial judge denied the prosecution's motion, and, when the prosecution appealed, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decision.


[Georgia v. McCollum (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court found that the exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner not only violates the rights of potential jurors, but also undermines the integrity of the judicial system. Since the Court also determined that a peremptory challenge did constitute state action, it found the use of peremptory challenge for the purpose of racial discrimination to be a breach of the Equal Protection Clause. Consequently, the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court was reversed.


[Suter v. Artist M. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be "in effect in all" a state's political subdivisions and "be mandatory upon them," and must state that "reasonable efforts will be made" to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals a right to sue for "deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws." They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Suter v. Artist M. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 only required that a state have a plan for the administration of adoption and foster care programs in order to receive federal reimbursement, not that the plan be correctly carried out. The language of the statute requiring that the plan be "in effect in all" political subdivisions of the state meant only that the plan had to apply to all of them, not that they were actually required to carry it out. The Secretary of Health and Human Services could reasonably withhold approval of a plan if it was clear that the plan would not be applied, but nothing in the Act suggested that Congress had intended to create a private right to sue for the enforcement of the plan.


[Morgan v. Illinois (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
In the Illinois judicial system, the jury chosen to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence also sentenced the defendant. And, the trial court, not the attorneys, performed voir dire, which involves questioning potential jurors during jury selection to determine their ability to be impartial. Before Derrick Morgan's capital murder trial, he requested that the court ask the potential jurors whether they would automatically sentence him to the death penalty upon conviction. The trial court denied Morgan's request, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. When he appealed, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, Morgan's conviction, and his sentence.


[Morgan v. Illinois (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court noted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the impartial jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment, in combination, indicate that the criminally accused have a right to an impartial jury. It found that a juror who would automatically vote for the death penalty in criminal sentencing would be prejudiced. The Court also concluded that, in order to detect this prejudice, an adequate voir dire is necessary. Therefore, an adequate voir dire would include a question to determine whether a juror would automatically vote for the death penalty, upon request. Thus, the decision of the Illinois State Supreme Court was reversed.


[Hudson v. McMillian (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Keith Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed that he was beaten by Marvin Woods and Jack McMillian, two prison guards, while their supervisor, Arthur Mezo, watched. Hudson sued the guards in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." Hudson argued that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court ruled that the guards had used force when there was no need to do so, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that Hudson was therefore entitled to damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that an inmate must demonstrate "significant injury" when he claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the use of excessive force.


[Hudson v. McMillian (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that the degree of injury suffered by an inmate is one of several important factors in an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment, but that the absence of "significant injury" alone does not mean his rights have not been violated. Instead, the Court should consider whether the punishment inflicted was malicious and sadistic. "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in the majority opinion. "This is true whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth Amendment as it is today."


[Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The protesters had sought to deny women their "right to abortion" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.


[Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the protesters had not violated section 1985(3) by obstructing access to the abortion clinics. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Court's decision in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, there must be a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators' action" for it to violate 1985(3). The clinics' claim that the protesters had demonstrated "animus" toward women as a class was unfounded because the demonstrations were not directed at women but rather were intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect gender-based intent, Justice Scalia wrote, because there are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than a derogatory view of women.
In addition to holding that the protesters did not exercise discriminatory animus, Scalia also addressed the specific rights on which the clinics based their arguments. The right to interstate travel, Scalia pointed out, was not affected here because the protests were carried out entirely within the District of Columbia and were not aimed specifically at interstate travelers. Nor was the "right to abortion" implicated, he wrote, because that right was merely one to be free of governmental interference in the decision. The protesters, acting as private individuals, could not possibly violate that right.


[Jacobson v. United States (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Before the Child Protection Act of 1984 rendered it illegal, Keith Jacobson, the petitioner, purchased a magazine including photographs of nude minors. In 1985, government agencies began investigating Jacobson's interest in child pornography. Over the course of about 2 1⁄2 years, they sent him mailings from 5 fictitious organizations and one non-existent pen pal all promoting sexual liberation and challenging government censorship. After Jacobson was somewhat responsive, a government agency attempted to sting him by selling him child pornography which he purchased, resulting in his arrest and conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Jacobson v. United States (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In a majority decision authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court determined that, the prosecution was unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jacobson was inclined to commit the criminal act of purchasing child pornography independent of government interference. Doubt stems from the fact that government agencies may have actually encouraged Jacobson to break the law in their effort to prosecute him. Since the Court found that the prosecution failed, the decision of the Court of Appeals and Jacobson's conviction were reversed.


[Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
In 1981, Argentina instituted a foreign exchange insurance contract program (FEIC), under which it effectively assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions. When Argentina could not cover the FEIC contracts, it issued "Bonods," which provided for repayment in U.S. dollars through transfer on the market in one of several locations. Subsequently, when Argentina concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange to retire the Bonods, it unilaterally extended the time for payment and offered bondholders substitute instruments as a means of rescheduling the debts. Ultimately, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank brought a breach-of-contract action in Federal District Court. The court denied Argentina's motion to dismiss. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which subjects foreign states to suit in American courts for acts taken "in connection with a commercial activity" that have "a direct effect in the United States."


[Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the District Court properly asserted jurisdiction under the FSIA. The Court reasoned that the issuance of the Bonods was a "commercial activity" and that the rescheduling of the maturity dates on those instruments was taken "in connection with" that activity because Argentina had acted as a private player within a market and not as a regulator of that market. Moreover, the Court concluded that the unilateral rescheduling of the Bonods had a "direct effect in the United States" because Argentina had designated their accounts in New York as the place of payment and had made some interest payments into those accounts before announcing that it was rescheduling the payments.


[White v. Illinois (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
During Randall D. White’s trial on charges related to a sexual assault of a 4-year-old girl, Illinois state prosecutors twice-attempted to call the child, who was by then five years old, as a witness, but each time she experienced emotional difficulty and left the stand without testifying. The trial court then allowed the admission of testimony by the girl’s babysitter, mother, emergency room nurse, doctor and an investigating officer that recounted statements she made describing the crime. This testimony was allowed into evidence under state-law hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of a medical examination. The jury subsequently convicted White. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected White’s claims that the introduction of the out-of-court statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the case.


[White v. Illinois (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not require that a declarant be produced at trial or found unavailable before his out-of-court statements may be admitted into evidence. Instead, when the statements fall within a “firmly-rooted” exception to the hearsay rule, they satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Statements made in certain contexts carry special guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness, such as when the prospect of misdiagnosis or mistreatment deters a declarant from making false statements while obtaining medical treatment. Consequently, the Court held that cross-examination does not aid the truth-finding process with respect to these types of statements as much as it might for out-of-court statements that do not come under an exception to the hearsay rule.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring the judgment in which he urged that the Confrontation Clause be applied more narrowly and only to extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, or confessions. According to Justice Thomas, the Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause as permitting out-of-court statements that fall within a “firmly-established” hearsay exception does not comport with the text of the Sixth Amendment or with the history of extending cross-examination rights to defendants. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.


[American National Red Cross v. S.G. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Plaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to "sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States," 36 U.S.C. Section 2, conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district court.


[American National Red Cross v. S.G. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. A congressional charter's "sue and be sued" provision confers federal-court jurisdiction if, but only if, it specifically mentions the federal courts. The Red Cross Charter provision does specifically mention the federal courts. This holding leaves the jurisdiction of the federal courts well within the Article III limits, because the Court has consistently held that Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction is broad enough to authorize Congress to confer federal-court jurisdiction over actions involving federally chartered corporations.


[Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.


[Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court relied on the trial court's finding that Lucas's lots had been rendered valueless by the state law. "[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good...he has suffered a taking."


[Freeman v. Pitts (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
In 1969, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) to eliminate its previously legal racial segregation and its inequitable byproducts under judicial control. However, in 1986, DCSS officials filed a motion, intending for the District Court to declare the DCSS officially desegregated and withdraw supervision. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, outlines 6 categories in which a school district should achieve desegregation, and the District Court found that the DCSS was successful in 4 of these categories. Consequently, the court decided to relinquish control over the DCSS in these 4 areas, while it maintained control and mandated further improvements in the areas in which segregation still existed. Both the respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, and the petitioners, the DCSS officials, appealed the District Court's decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed it. The Court of Appeals argued that the District Court should have authority over the DCSS until it is fully desegregated in all 6 categories for several years.


[Freeman v. Pitts (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
Yes and No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court found that a district court must only maintain control over a school system in the categories in which it has failed to abide by its court-ordered desegregation plan. The Court argued that this incremental approach provides district courts with a systematic and orderly means to their ultimate goal: to fully withdraw supervision. In addition, it allows the district court to focus more attention and resources where they are needed most. In compliance with the Court's determination, it reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.


[Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned the distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets and other printed material at its airport terminals. Members of a religious group wanted to perform a ritual involving the distibution of literature at these airports. The group challenged the regulation on free expression and and free exercise grounds of the First Amendment.


[Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
In a short per curiam opinion, the court held 5 to 4 that the ban on literature distribution violated the Free Speech Clause. (A related case, also Int. Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, addressed a ban on the solicitation of funds.)


[R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 9-to-0 vote, the justices held the ordinance invalid on its face because "it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." The First Amendment prevents government from punishing speech and expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. Under the ordinance, for example, one could hold up a sign declaring all anti-semites are bastards but not that all Jews are bastards. Government has no authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow the Marquis of Queensbury Rules."


[Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 "Son of Sam" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon & Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal.


[Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board (1991) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court concluded that "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income." This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" (Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)). The Board failed to explain why victims' compensation had to come from the criminals' storytelling rather than other assets.


[Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The Board of Commissioners for Forsyth County enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to charge a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to hold a parade, assembly, or demonstration on public property in the county. The law allowed the administrator to adjust the fee to correspond with the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the activity. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement (Movement) applied for a permit to hold a rally on the courthouse steps in Cumming, Georgia, to protest the federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. The county charged $100 for the permit, but that amount that did not include a calculation for expected law enforcement expenses during the rally. The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the rally; instead the Movement sued the county in federal district court and challenged its authority to interfere with the Movement’s free speech and assembly rights. The district court found that the county administrator did not unconstitutionally apply the ordinance to the Movement’s permit application because the fee was based solely on content-neutral criteria such as the costs of processing the application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the permit fee of up to $1,000 a day exceeded the constitutional requirement that governments charge only a nominal fee for using public forums.


[Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the ordinance violated the free speech guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it contained no reasonable or definite standards to guide the county administrator’s calculation of permit fees. Additionally, the ordinance required the administrator to examine the speech’s content to assess the likelihood of public hostility to the message and adjust the fee accordingly to account for security and law enforcement costs. In the Court’s view, a nominal fee lower than $1000 could not save the ordinance from the constitutional infirmities it found.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent in which he disagreed with the argument that the Constitution limits a parade license fee to a nominal amount and argued that the Court should have remanded the case to determine the scope of the ordinance and how it was administered. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissenting opinion.


[Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Andrew Hill, a teacher at North Gwinnett High School, sexually harassed Christine Franklin throughout her 10th grade year. Franklin reported the harassment to teachers and school district administrators, but the administration did nothing. They also encouraged Franklin to refrain from pressing charges. Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all matters pending against him were dropped. After Hill’s resignation the school closed its investigation.
Franklin brought this action against the school district under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failing to take action against Hill. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Title IX did not authorize an award for damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.


[Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White wrote the Court's unanimous decision, holding that monetary damages are available under Title IX because there is a presumption that any appropriate relief is available to remedy the violation of a federal right. In this case, back pay and prospective relief were not sufficient remedies. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a special concurrence, stating that when causes of action are judicially implied, it is proper to imply limitations on the remedies for those actions as well.


[Doggett v. United States (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Facts]
In 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges. When Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents went to his home to arrest him, they found he had left for Colombia four days earlier. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. The DEA agent in charge did not follow up on the case and Doggett reentered the United States without issue in 1982 where he lived openly under his own name and in accordance with the law. No one looked into Doggett’s whereabouts, but in 1988 a random credit check of individuals with outstanding warrants revealed his place of residence.
After being arrested, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A federal magistrate found that the length of time between indictment and arrest was presumptively prejudicial, but recommended dismissal of Doggett’s motion because he did not show actual prejudice. The district court followed the magistrate’s recommendation. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the subsequent conviction on the speedy trial claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.


[Doggett v. United States (1992) — Rehnquist Court (1991) — Conclusion]
No, No. Justice David H. Souter, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the government’s egregious failure to locate and prosecute Doggett warranted relief even without showing actual prejudice. Doggett was unaware of the indictment prior to be arrested 8 1⁄2 years later, so he could not be penalized for failing to raise the speedy trial defense earlier.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that the possibility of prejudice is not enough to prove that the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented, arguing that the right to a speedy trial was meant to prevent oppressive incarceration and the anxiety accompanying public accusation. Because Doggett was never incarcerated and had no knowledge of the charges against him until his arrest, neither of those purposes were served by this decision.


[Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Nineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants -- domestic primary insurers, trade associations, and a reinsurance broker, along with London-based as well as domestic reinsurers -- violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the conduct alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1012(b), and that none of the conduct amounted to a "boycott" within the meaning of the Section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 1013(b), exemption to that grant of immunity. The court of appeals reversed.


[Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes to the first; no to the second. The Court, speaking through Justice Antonin Scalia, held that a boycott exists when, in order to coerce a target into certain terms on one transaction, parties refuse to engage in other, unrelated transactions with the target. On most counts, the plaintiffs' allegations, construed favorably, described boycotts. Justice David H. Souter wrote for the Court on jurisdiction over foreign conduct, holding that it was appropriate in this case because there is no true conflict between domestic and foreign law. That is, because the London reinsurers can comply with both British law and the Sherman Act, international comity does not counsel against exercising subject matter jurisdiction in this case.


[Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.


[Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and "its incriminating character is immediately apparent". It held that instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded that the police officer frisking Dickerson stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact the officer was already aware that Dickerson's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further tactile investigation.


[Deal v. United States (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Between January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence "in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection." The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Deal v. United States (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Deal's second through sixth convictions in a single proceeding arose "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), finding that the statute was not ambiguous. The Court rejected that the rule of lenity applied because Deal's "105-year sentence 'is so glaringly unjust.'" Writing for the court, Justice Scalia said the 105 years sentence for the gun offenses was not unjust "simply because [Deal] managed to evade detection, prosecution and conviction for the first five offenses and was ultimately tried for all six in a single proceeding." Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Harry A. Blackmun joined.


[United States v. California (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
From 1975 to 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[United States v. California (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court determined that regardless of the fact that the Federal Government reimburses WBEC for its taxes, the private company is still the taxpayer. And, the taxpayer had its opportunity to go to court and challenge the state taxes imposed upon it, and accepted the result. The Court found that the Federal Government does not have a separate right to do so.


[Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Hazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years. Biggins’ pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service. Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and “willfully” violated the ADEA. The willful violation gave rise to liquidated damages. The district court judge granted Hazen’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing a “reckless disregard” for the matter.


[Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes, no. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that interfering with an employee’s pension does not automatically violate the ADEA, though it is a clear ERISA violation. While older employees may have more years of service, age and years of service are independent of each other. On remand, the court of appeals should reconsider whether there is sufficient evidence to support an ADEA violation independent of the pension interference. The Court also held that the court of appeals applied the proper definition of willfulness.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred, noting that nothing in the majority opinion should be read as supporting the “disparate impact” theory of Title VII. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.


[Heller  v. Doe (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures.


[Heller  v. Doe (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky's procedures for involuntarily committing mentally retarded persons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because retarded persons are not a suspect classification, Kentucky's statute warranted only rational basis scrutiny – the Court's lowest level of scrutiny. Consequently, the Court concluded that the state met its burden that its procedures were rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and were constitutional.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. She argued, in contrast to the majority, that Kentucky's commitment procedures were irrational. Justice Harold A. Blackmun also dissented. He argued that laws that discriminate against the mentally retarded warrant heightened scrutiny by the Court. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, and in part by Justice O'Connor, dissented. He argued that Kentucky's commitment procedures were not supported by any rational justification.


[Godinez v. Moran (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
Richard Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court. After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial. Two and a half months later, Moran told the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty. Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence. After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran’s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas. The court sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders.
After sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court. The court rejected Moran’s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal. Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a “reasoned choice” among the alternatives given. The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of making a reasoned choice.


[Godinez v. Moran (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that pleading guilty and waiving a right to counsel do not require a higher level of competency that standing trial. There is no reason to believe waiving these rights requires a higher mental capacity than waiving other constitutional rights. Whether a defendant is able to adequately defend himself without an attorney is irrelevant to this decision.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that using the same competency standard for pleading guilty without counsel and standing trial with counsel does not violate due process. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, arguing that courts should conduct a specific inquiry to determine whether a defendant can proceed without counsel when the accused’s competency to stand trial has already been questioned. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the school district from providing the requested interpreter. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, the presence of an interpreter is not linked to the state and is the result of the private decision of individual's parents. "The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.


[Graham v. Collins (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
On May 13, 1981, 17-year-old Gary Graham accosted Bobby Grant Lambert in the parking lot of a Safeway grocery store in Houston, Texas, and attempted to steal his wallet. When Lambert refused to hand it over, Graham shot and killed him. Graham was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
Graham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by arguing that the sentencing jury should have considered the mitigating circumstances of his youth and troubled family life. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, and a panel reversed the district court’s ruling. Upon an en banc review, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s decision


[Graham v. Collins (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a decision in favor of Graham would create a new constitutional rule by extending beyond the reasoning of the precedents that were in place at the time of the conviction. Unless a jurist at the time of Graham’s conviction could have found reasonable precedent to decide the case in his favor, to do so now would extend beyond the Court’s purview. Since the precedent at the time would not have provided a valid reason to overturn Graham’s sentence, the Court found that it must uphold it.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he fully supported the Court’s decision. He also wrote that the case Graham chiefly relied on, Penry v. Lynaugh, was wrongly decided. He argued that the specific questions a sentencing jury is asked to consider before sentencing a defendant to death make the consideration of mitigating factors redundant.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he argued that the consideration of mitigating factors by a sentencing jury is a crucial safeguard against discriminatory sentencing. He strongly disagreed with Justice Clarence’s view that Penry v. Lynaugh was wrongly decided.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice David H. Souter argued that a decision in favor of Graham would not create a new constitutional rule in this case because such a decision would not impose a new burden on the prosecution in sentencing hearings. He also found that the jury instructions did not allow the jury to fully consider the implications of mitigating factors. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Withrow v. Williams (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
During his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted.
Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went further, ruling that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument.


[Withrow v. Williams (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Conclusion]
No. In an opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the decision in Stone had been one of prudence rather than one of jurisdiction. In Stone, the Court had decided against using the "exclusionary rule" in federal habeas cases dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures (the exclusionary rule prevents evidence discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search from being introduced in Court). The Court's decision had been based on an expectation that, even in the unlikely case that a state court had erred in its consideration of the constitutionality of a given search, that procedural error was not likely to produce a wrongful conviction. In Fifth Amendment involuntary testimony cases, though, it was possible that a suspect would given false statements about his own guilt because of confusion or fear. The question was not merely a procedural one, therefore, and the prudential concerns of Stone did not apply.


[Shaw v. Reno (1993) — Rehnquist Court (1991-1993) — Facts]
The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.