[Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit inaccurately categorized the type of jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case as "structural error." It reasoned that one instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt does not necessarily spoil all the jury's findings, which would entitle the convicted individual to automatic relief. Rather, the Court found that the jury instructions in Mr. Pulido's case should be evaluated by whether they caused a "substantial and injurious effect" upon the jury reaching its verdict. The Court vacated Mr. Pulido's conviction and remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings consistent with the decision.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justices David H. Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. They found the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit merely misused the term "structural error" in its opinion, while it actually utilized the analytical model advocated by the majority opinion. They reasoned that in the interests of efficiency, the Supreme Court should have affirmed the court of appeals rather than have it repeat largely the same analysis.


[District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to potentially exculpatory evidence.
The district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show the disclosure of evidence would "affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent" in order to gain access. Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from pursuing post-conviction relief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr. Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing. The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that favorable DNA results would afford a "reasonable probability" that he could prevail in an action for post-conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his confession.


[District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Maybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his claims using § 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures, its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate.
Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that § 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second, he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing postconviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective postconviction relief procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had access to the DNA evidence he sought.


[Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In 1961, Florida enacted the Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("BSPA") to restore and maintain critically eroded beaches within the state. In 2003, under the BSPA, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection filed for an Application for a Joint Coastal Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands in order to dredge sand from a shoal to rebuild a beach. Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. ("SBR"), an association of homeowners, subsequently challenged the issuance of the permit and the constitutionality of the BSPA. The Florida court of appeals rescinded the permit, holding that issuance would have resulted in an unconstitutional taking.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida first rephrased the certified question to determine whether the BSPA was "on its face" constitutional. Then, the court held that the BSPA was not unconstitutional, reasoning that it did not deprive land owners of littoral rights without just compensation.


[Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held 8-0 that the Florida Supreme Court did not take property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Antonin Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, and authored an opinion in which he maintained that there could be no taking unless property owners could show that they had rights to future exposed land and to contact with the water superior to Florida's right to fill in its submerged land. Here, there could be no showing. Scalia drew from Florida-law principles that (1) the state, as owner of submerged land adjacent to beachfront property, has the right to fill that land and (2) the exposure of land previously submerged belongs to the state even if it interrupts the beachfront property owners' contact with the water. Justice Scalia, with a plurality of the Court including Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. Alito, also noted in Parts II and III of the decision that if a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property in violation of the Takings Clause.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but disagreed that a plurality should reach the issue of whether or when a judicial decision determining property owners' rights can violate the Takings Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the Court's holding, but, like Justice Kennedy, counseled that the Court should only address the issues before it.


[Holland v. Florida (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A Florida state court convicted Albert Holland of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, attempted sexual battery, and armed robbery, and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Holland petitioned for federal habeas relief in a Florida federal district court. The district court denied the petition as untimely.
On appeal, Mr. Holland argued that his attorney failed to communicate with him about the status of his case, then failed to file a timely federal habeas corpus petition, despite repeated instructions by Mr. Holland to do so. Therefore, Mr. Holland contended that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that absent an allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, or mental impairment on the attorney's part, no mere negligence of the attorney's rises to the level of egregious misconduct that would entitle a habeas corpus petitioner to equitable tolling.


[Holland v. Florida (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who has exhausted her state court appeals has one year within which to petition a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that under certain "extraordinary circumstances," a court may relax that deadline. Those circumstances may arise from an attorney's misconduct, even if the attorney did not act dishonestly or in bad faith.
Justice Samuel J. Alito concurred in part and in the judgment, and Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined in part by Justice Clarence Thomas. In his dissent, Scalia criticized the court's statutory interpretation, stating that if Congress had intended for there to be equitable tolling in AEDPA, they would have explicitly stated so. He went on to criticize the court's application of the new standard


[Astrue v. Ratliff (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Catherine Ratliff was the attorney for Ruby Kills Ree in her successful suit against the Social Security Administration for Social Security benefits. The district court also granted Kills Ree’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Before paying the fee award, the government discovered that Kills Ree owed the government a debt that predated the fee award and accordingly sought to offset the fee award against the debt. Ratliff then intervened in the case to challenge the offset and argued that the fee award belonged to her and therefore could not be used to offset Kills Ree’s debt. The district court held that the offset was proper because the fee award goes to the “prevailing party,” not directly to the attorney. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that precedent established that EAJA fee awards go to the attorney.


[Astrue v. Ratliff (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that “prevailing party” is a term of art referring to the prevailing litigant, and nothing in the text of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) supports a different reading of the term. The fact that the statute awards fees to the prevailing litigant in which her attorney has an interest or contractual right does not mean that the statute awards the fees directly to the attorney. The government’s practice of paying fees directly to the attorney occurred mostly in cases in which the litigant had already assigned her rights to the fees to the attorney and does not affect the reading of the statutory text. The Court held that the fees are awarded to the litigant, and therefore they can be offset if the litigant has outstanding debts to the government.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that, although the text of the EAJA indicates that the government pays the litigant rather than the attorney and the attorney’s right to the fees is controlled by contract, it is not clear whether Congress intended for the government to be able to offset the fees against outstanding debt. Because such offsets undercut the effectiveness of the EAJA in providing access to the courts, it is likely that Congress would have made a different choice had it considered this possibility. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the opinion.


[United States v. Comstock (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Convicted sex offenders moved to dismiss petitions requesting their indefinite civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. A North Carolina federal district court dismissed the petitions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that the Protection and Safety Act exceeded the scope of Congress' authority when it enacted a law that could confine a person solely because of "sexual dangerousness," and the government need not even allege that this "dangerousness" violated any federal law.


[United States v. Comstock (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority, the Court pointed to five considerations that compelled its holding. (1) the Necessary and Proper Clause grants broad authority. (2) The Court recognized that Congress has long delivered mental health care to federal prisoners. (3) Congress had good reason to pass the statute as it has the power to protect nearby communities from the danger prisoners may pose. (4) The Tenth Amendment does not reserve a zone of authority to the states in this context. (5) The Court recognized that the statute was narrow in scope and did not confer on Congress a general police power, which is reserved to the states.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He maintained that authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause is dependent upon the "strength of the chain" from Congressional action and its enumerated power, not on the number of "links in the chain." Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He cautioned that the majority opinion should not be construed as granting an unlimited ability by Congress to extend its power.
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined in part by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress only to enact laws that carry into execution one or more enumerated powers. Here, he argued that the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act did not carry into execution an enumerated power.


[Dillon v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A Pennsylvania federal district court convicted Percy Dillon for conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 50 grams of cocaine base, use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to retroactively reduce the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses. Mr. Dillon then moved to have his sentence reduced in accordance with the new guidelines. The district court reduced Mr. Dillon's sentence by two levels, but held that it lacked the authority to reduce his sentence further. On appeal, Mr. Dillon argued that in light of United States v. Booker the district court had the authority to further reduce his sentence. Moreover, he argued that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score when determining his sentencing.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that Booker did not allow a district court, when reducing a previously imposed sentence, to treat the amended guidelines' range as advisory. Moreover, the court rejected Mr. Dillon's argument that the district court erred in calculating his criminal history score, reasoning that the district court had no authority to reconsider its prior criminal history determination.


[Dillon v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit, holding that Booker is inapplicable to the present case and, thus, does not require that the amended guidelines' range be treated as advisory. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the sentencing guidelines implicated in this case are not governed by Booker because, unlike other sentencing guidelines, the implicated guidelines allow only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed with the majority for binding the hands of district courts and not allowing them the discretion to reduce sentences with respect to this one section of the sentencing guidelines. Justice Stevens thought such restrictions had been done away with by the Court's decision in Booker.


[Bloate v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Taylor James Bloate was convicted in a Missouri federal district court on counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. In a pretrial motion, Mr. Bloate moved to dismiss arguing that there had been a Speedy Trial Act violation. It was denied. The Act requires that a defendant's trial begin within "70 days after the indictment or the defendant's initial appearance, whichever is later." However, it excludes "any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant." Following his conviction, Mr. Bloate appealed, arguing that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied as the court excluded too many days in its calculation.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Bloate's conviction. It recognized that six circuits hold that "pretrial motion preparation may be excluded, if the court specifically grants time for that purpose" and that two do not. Here, the Eighth Circuit sided with the majority in holding that the district court properly excluded days from the time of Mr. Bloate's indictment to his trial and therefore there was no violation to the Speedy Trial Act.


[Bloate v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable from the 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1). Rather, with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court stated that such time may be excluded only when a district court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court reasoned that the period of time sought to be excluded by the government preceded the first day upon which Congress specified that such delay may be automatically excluded. Thus, in this case, the pretrial preparation time was not automatically excludable.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion. She highlighted that nothing in the majority decision prevents the Eight Circuit upon remand from considering the government's argument that Mr. Bloate's indictment and conviction remain valid. Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. He argued that the neither the text nor legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act support the majority decision. Instead, he criticized the majority for creating a rule that would entitle Mr. Bloate to dismissal of his charge because his attorney persuaded a Magistrate Judge to give him more time to prepare pretrial motions.


[Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Among the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party ("KWP") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"). The KWP and LTTE engage in a variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a "foreign terrorist organization." Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide "material support or resources" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ("IRTPA") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals "knowingly" provide "material support or resources" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the Act that further clarified what constituted "material support or resources." The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms "service," "training," or "other specialized knowledge" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague.


[Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Not as applied to the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the material support provision of the AEDPA is constitutional as applied to the particular forms of support that the plaintiffs seek to provide to terrorist organizations. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that, as applied, the provision in question is not vague. Here, the statutory terms at issue -- "training," "expert advice or assistance," "service," and "personnel" -- are not similar to terms like "annoying" and "indecent" that the Court has struck down as being too vague. The Court recognized that the statute may not be clear in every respect, but it is clear enough with respect to the plaintiffs in this case.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He agreed that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. However, Justice Breyer disagreed that the Constitution permits the government to prosecute the plaintiffs criminally for engaging in coordinated teaching and advocacy furthering the designated organizations' lawful political objectives. He reasoned that the government had not met its burden to show that the speech prohibited by the statute served a compelling governmental interest.


[Bilski v. Kappos (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Applicants were denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for claims pertaining to a process of managing risk in commodities trading. The PTO examiner deemed the invention not to be of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the decision.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that an invention is patentable if: "1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing." Reasoning from this, it held that the applicants' invention clearly failed this test (machine-or-transformation test) and therefore did not constitute patentable subject matter.


[Bilski v. Kappos (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit, holding that the applicants' claimed invention is not patent eligible. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Federal Circuit did not err when it used the "machine-or-transformation test" to determine patentability. However, the Court noted, in contrast to the Federal Circuit, that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test for determining patent eligibility.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority to the extent it suggested that any series of steps that is not itself an abstract idea or law of nature may constitute a "process" within Section 101. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, also concurred in the judgment. He noted his agreement with Justice Stevens' concurrence and also highlighted the extent to which the Court agreed on many fundamental issues of patent law raised by this case.


[Samantar v. Yousuf (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Natives of Somalia filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in a Virginia federal district court under the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA") and the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"). Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Samantar committed torture and other human rights violations while he commanded Somali government agents under the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Mr. Samantar was immune to suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the FSIA did not render Mr. Samantar immune to suit. The court reasoned that the FSIA does not apply to foreign government officials. The court further reasoned that even if the FSIA does apply to foreign government officials, it does not apply to former foreign government officials.


[Samantar v. Yousuf (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. No. The Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not govern Mr. Samantar's claim of immunity. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that there is nothing to suggest that "foreign state" within the FSIA should be read to include an official acting on behalf of that state. The Court further reasoned that the FSIA's legislative history did not indicate that Congress intended to codify official immunity within the FSIA.
Justices Samuel A. Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Antonin G. Scalia, writing in separate opinions, noted that the legislative history of the FSIA should not have been evaluated in reaching the Court's conclusion.


[Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers (2009) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively.


[Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers (2009) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes and No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for a unanimous bench, the Court held that the Seventh Circuit effectively resolved the Union's core complaint, but erred in doing so under a "constitutional, rather than statutory headline." The Court reasoned that there was no due process issue "alive" in the case. The Court further held that prearbitration settlement conferences are not a prerequisite for NRAB jurisdiction over a dispute. The Court reasoned that prearbitration conference requirements set out by the NRAB run independent of the collective bargaining process and do not bear on the merits of an actual grievance.


[Pottawattamie County v. McGhee (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee Jr. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Iowa state court. In 2002, Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trial improperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect. Subsequently, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Harrington filed civil claims in an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were absolutely immune to civil prosecution. The district court found some defendants immune to certain claims, but denied immunity to other defendants on the other claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.
The Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not immune from claims that they violated Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's due process rights. The court reasoned that allegations that prosecutors obtained, manufactured, coerced, and fabricated evidence did not fall within "a distinctly prosecutorial function" and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims.


[Pottawattamie County v. McGhee (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Dismissed pursuant to the Court's Rule 46.


[South Carolina v. North Carolina (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
This case originates in the Supreme Court. South Carolina seeks an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River, which starts in North Carolina and flows into South Carolina. The Special Master recommends that the Supreme Court (1) permit the City of Charlotte, N.C., the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC to intervene as defendants, and (2) deny South Carolina's motion for clarification of the Special Master's order.


[South Carolina v. North Carolina (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. The Supreme Court held that the Catawba River Water Supply Project and Duke Energy met the standards for intervention, but Charlotte did not. "Charlotte has not carried its burden of showing a sufficient interest for intervention in this action," Justice Samuel J. Alito wrote for the 5-4 majority. "Its interest is solely as a user of North Carolina's share of the Catawba River's water."
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor. The dissent agreed with the majority's denial of Charlotte's motion and its rejection of the more permissive intervention standard adopted by the special master, but would not have permitted the Catawba Project and Duke Energy to intervene either.


[Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Geertson Seed Farms ("Geertson") and Trask Family Seeds ("Trask") sought an injunction against Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") in a California federal district court. Geertson and Trask feared that the wide-scale sale of a new Monsanto alfalfa variety, resistant to one of the company's herbicides, would lead to cross-pollination with Geertson's and Trask's conventional alfalfa variety and thereby lead to its disappearance. The district court granted the injunction pending an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") about the effect of Monsanto's new alfalfa variety.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the injunction was appropriate and that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the issuance of the injunction.


[Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. Yes. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief. However, the Court further held that the district court abused its discretion when it entered an injunction absent the completed EIS. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that no factor favoring the imposition of an injunction yet existed.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that the district court's findings of fact all supported the imposition of an injunction: (1) the new alfalfa variety could contaminate other plants, (2) contamination could take place even in a controlled setting, (3) the relevant regulator has limited ability to control or limit limitations on planting, and (4) genetic contamination could decimate farmers' livelihoods all supported.


[Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation.


[Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas held that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a precondition to filing a copyright infringement claim. The Court further held that a copyright holder's failure to comply with the registration requirement does not restrict a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction over infringement claims involving unregistered works. The Court declined to address whether Section 411(a)'s registration requirement is a mandatory precondition to suit that district courts may or should enforce on their own initiative by dismissing copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Ginsburg agreed that Section 411(a)'s registration requirement does not restrict a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. However, she noted that tension remained between the Court's prior holdings in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. and Bowles v. Russell. In an attempt to stave off confusion, she attempted to reconcile the two decisions by distinguishing the cases.


[Graham v. Florida (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment.


[Graham v. Florida (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not permit a juvenile offender to be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a non-homicidal crime. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that because this case implicates a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders (juveniles), the categorical analysis under Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy governs. Under this approach, the Court must: (1) consider objective indicia of society's standards and (2) determine whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution guided by the standards elaborated by controlling precedents. Here, the Court concluded that both (1) and (2) indicated that the punishment in question for the class in question was unconstitutional. The Court made a point to note that life sentences for juveniles for non-homicidal crimes has been "rejected the world over."
Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the manner in which the majority reached its conclusion. Instead, he made his conclusion based on: (1) Supreme Court cases requiring "narrow proportionality" review of noncapital sentences and (2) the Supreme Court's conclusion in Roper that juvenile offenders are generally less culpable than adults who commit the same crimes. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, and in part by Justice Samuel A. Alito, dissented. Justice Thomas reprimanded the majority for replacing its own moral judgment for that of American citizens who up to this point had been charged with making the moral distinction as to whether this sentence could ever be imposed. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He departed from Justice Thomas's dissent to note that "[n]othing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole." He also would not have reached the issue as to whether Mr. Graham's sentence as-applied violated the Eighth Amendment. He would only have reached the question of whether such sentences categorically violate the Eighth Amendment.


[Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), "debt relief agency," and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that the BAPCPA did not apply to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of "debt relief agency" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide "bankruptcy assistance" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of "debt relief agency." However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional.


[Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. No. No. With Justice Sonia Sotamayor writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that attorneys who provide bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons are debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA. The Court further held that § 526(a)(4) of the BAPCPA is not an overly broad, content based restriction on attorney-client communications. Rather, the Court reasoned that it merely prohibits a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor is filing for bankruptcy. Lastly, the Court held that § 528's disclosure requirements are valid as applied to Mr. Milavetz. The Court reasoned that the disclosure requirements do not act as an affirmative limitation on speech and are reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He disagreed with the majority's use of the BAPCPA's legislative history arguing that "legislative history is irrelevant when the statutory text is clear." Justice Clarence Thomas also concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He noted his skepticism with Zauderer and its progeny, cases at the heart of the majority's reasoning. Justice Thomas wondered whether these precedents provide sufficient First Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosure requirements.


[Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Antonio Jackson filed a complaint in the Nevada federal district court alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The employer, Rent-A-Center West, Inc., moved to dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in part that the district court was required to determine in the first instance whether the coverage and discovery provisions of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable.


[Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), where an agreement to arbitrate includes a provision that the arbitrator will determine the enforceability of the agreement, if a party challenges specifically the enforceability of that particular provision, the district court considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the enforceability of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for the arbitrator. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Mr. Jackson challenged the enforceability of the agreement as a whole, and thus, the determination is left to the arbitrator not the district court.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, dissented. He criticized the majority for adopting a position not proposed by either party during briefing or oral arguments.


[New Process Steel v. NLRB (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
The union representing employees at a New Process Steel plant in Butler, Indiana failed to reach an agreement over a new contract with New Process Steel. The union subsequently filed unfair labor practices claims with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") arguing that New Process Steel failed to honor its collective bargaining agreement to deal with the union as the exclusive representative of employees of the plant. A two-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the union. On appeal, New Process Steel argued that the NLRB's decision was invalid because 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that three members of the five member National Labor Relations Board shall "at all times" constitute a quorum.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the board. The court held that the NLRB had power to delegate its authority to a group of three of its members. In which case, two sitting members constituted a quorum. Therefore, the NLRB appropriately rendered its decision.


[New Process Steel v. NLRB (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that the NLRBA requires that when the Board delegates its authority, the delegated group must maintain a membership of three in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain language of the statute – the Board may delegate its powers to a "group of three or more members" – required that the delegated group must have at least three members to exercise such authority.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. He criticized the majority for calling into question the more than 500 cases the NLRB address during the 26 months it carried out its responsibilities with only two members. He also disagreed with the manner in which the majority reached its conclusion.


[NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
The Maine Public Utilities Commission along with the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts filed for petitions of review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC approved a settlement and redesigned New England's "capacity" electricity market, which Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts were subject to, even though they were not parties to the settlement. FERC denied their request for rehearing.
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts argued that FERC erred in finding that "transition payments" under the settlement should be reviewed under the "public interest" standard as dictated by Mobile-Sierra rather than the "just and reasonable" standard. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed holding that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should not apply to non-parties to the settlement agreement. It reasoned that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is premised on the existence of a "voluntary contract" between the parties. Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts never entered a voluntary agreement with FERC and therefore the standard was inappropriate.


[NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to the extent that it rejected the application of Mobile-Sierra to non-contracting parties. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, Samuel A. Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, the Court held that Mobile-Sierra controls the FERC as well as challenges to contract rates brought by contracting and non-contracting parties. The Court reasoned that Mobile-Sierra is not an exception to the just-and-reasonable standard, but rather an application of that standard to the context of rates set by contract.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued in part that this case was clearly outside the context of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. He further argued that the majority's decision imposes "a special burden" on non-contracting parties attempting to exercise their rights to object to unreasonable rates. He reasoned that such a rule was a "quantum leap" from the origins of the Supreme Court's rate setting jurisprudence.


[Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers sued Ohio's Tax Commissioner in an Ohio federal district court alleging that Ohio's tax scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that because four local natural gas distribution companies benefited from certain tax exemptions that did not benefit the plaintiffs, despite their similar circumstances, the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.
The Sixth Circuit held that federal comity concerns do not bar an action that challenges the tax benefits provided to just four specific entities, but not others similarly situated. The court recognized a circuit split over whether federal comity concerns prevent federal court jurisdiction over a matter. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have interpreted Hibbs v. Winn to mean that comity prevents federal court jurisdiction only when state taxpayers seek federal court orders allowing them to avoid paying state taxes. This was not at issue in this case, and the plaintiffs' success would not significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio; thus, the federal court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in order for it to proceed.


[Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that under the comity doctrine, a taxpayer's complaint of allegedly discriminatory state taxation must proceed originally in state court. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that its decision in Hibbs did not narrow the comity doctrine. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Ohio courts are better positioned to determine whether Ohio's taxation scheme is unconstitutional.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring. He noted that he joined the majority position with the understanding it did not expand the holding in Hibbs. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, concurred in the judgment. He also noted his skepticism of Hibbs. Moreover, Justice Thomas argued that this case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.


[Briscoe v. Virginia (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
This appeal is the consolidation of three separate cases that involved defendants' conviction for possession of cocaine in a Virginia state court. On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission into evidence of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at trial from the person who performed the analysis and prepared the certificate, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 19.2-187, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the provisions of Section 19.2-187 did not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Moreover, the court held that the defendants in these cases knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the forensic analysts when they failed to call them as witnesses at trial.


[Briscoe v. Virginia (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
In a short per curiam opinion, the Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia, remanding the case for further proceedings in light of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decided the previous Term.


[Florida v. Powell (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his Miranda warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to "talk with an attorney" is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.


[Florida v. Powell (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that it retained jurisdiction over the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer as to Part II. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented joined in part by Justice Breyer. The majority recognized that the Florida Supreme Court relied in part on its own state Constitution in addition to Miranda in reaching its decision. However, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that when a state court decision fairly appears to rest on federal law, or is interwoven with federal law, and the adequacy and independence of the state-law ground is unclear from the opinion, as in this case, it is presumed that federal law controlled the state court's decision. Hence, the Supreme Court retained jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court also reversed the Florida Supreme Court, holding that while Miranda requires that a suspect "be warned prior to any questioning" and "that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, "it does not dictate the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. Rather, to determine whether police warnings are satisfactory, the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably conveyed to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda. Here, Mr. Powell received warnings that satisfied this standard.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Supreme Court's power to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision was at best doubtful and that the Florida court had a better view of the case on the merits. Justice Stevens counseled that the Supreme Court should limit applying the presumption that federal law controlled a state court's decision only in truly ambiguous cases. He reasoned that this was not such a case. Justice Stevens further argued that the warnings Mr. Powell received did not reasonably convey to him that he had the right to a lawyer during his interrogation.


[United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that provided for the repayment of student loans to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. ("Funds"). After Funds was notified, it filed a proof of claim roughly $4,500 greater than that was included in the plan. The bankruptcy court approved the original plan and Funds was notified it would be paid the lower figure. Mr. Espinosa subsequently completed the plan and his loans were discharged by the court. Three years later, Funds began intercepting Mr. Espinosa's income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion of his student loans (the $4,500 figure). Mr. Espinosa petitioned the bankruptcy court for an order holding Funds in contempt for violating the discharge injunction. In response, Funds argued that Mr. Espinosa's student loans were improperly discharged because student loans cannot be discharged unless the debtor can show "undue hardship." This can only be shown in an adversary proceeding, which did not take place. Moreover, it argued the lack of an adversary proceeding denied Funds its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. These arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, but, on appeal, were accepted by the Arizona federal district court.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that simply because Mr. Espinosa failed to comply with additional procedures required by the Bankruptcy Code to discharge student loan debt was not sufficient to set aside the discharge of his student loans, considering Funds had actually been notified of the Chapter 13 plan. It also held that Fund's due process rights were not violated because Fund's had received actual notice of Mr. Espinosa's Chapter 13 plan, even though he had not commenced the adversary proceedings.


[United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. No. The Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Court's confirmation order is not void. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that because the Bankruptcy Court's order was final, it could only be rendered void if the order was premised on either a jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process. Here, there was neither a jurisdictional error nor a violation of due process. The Court further reasoned that the Bankruptcy Court's failure to find undue hardship was mere legal error and did not rise to the level of a jurisdictional or due process error that would render the order void.


[Perdue v. Kenny A. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that "the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the fee" and thus justified the enhancement.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that the enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature of results.


[Perdue v. Kenny A. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the calculation of an attorney's fee based on the lodestar may be increased due to superior performance, but only in extraordinary circumstances. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court rejected the contention that a fee determined by the lodestar method may not be enhanced in any situation. The Court then explained that there were circumstances where superior attorney performance is not adequately taken into account by the lodestar. However, the Court counseled that such enhancements should not be awarded without specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been "adequate to attract competent counsel."
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote separately, concurring. He lauded the Court for rejecting that all enhancements under the lodestar method should be barred. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote separately, concurring. He was careful to note that the majority opinion placed precise limitations on the availability of lodestar enhancements. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that lodestar enhancements may sometimes be permissible. However, he would have affirmed the Eleventh Circuit because the Supreme Court was too far removed from the fact intensive inquiry as to whether a fee enhancement in this case was warranted.


[Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In 1998 National Australia Bank (NAB), an Australian company, acquired Homeside Lending Inc. (Homeside), an American company. In 2001, NAB announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for inaccurately calculating the fees Homeside would generate for servicing mortgages, which had been calculated as present assets. Its stock price then dropped 5 percent. Later that year, NAB announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion to amend for other inaccurate calculations that had been booked as present assets. NAB's stock price tumbled an additional 13 percent. Subsequently, four owners of NAB stock filed suit against NAB and Homeside in a New York federal district court alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Three of the plaintiffs purported to represent a class of non-American purchasers of NAB stock because they bought their shares abroad. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class of non-American purchasers.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that subject matter jurisdiction exists over claims only "if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act with the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad." Here, the court noted that (1) the issuance of fraudulent statements from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia were more central to the fraud than Homeside's manipulation of financial data on which NAB based its statements, (2) there was no effect on U.S. capital markets, and (3) the lengthy chain of causation from NAB receiving inaccurate information from Homeside before passing the information along to its investors suggested that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.


[Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. Not answered. The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit, but held that it erred when it raised the question of subject matter over the case. Instead, the Court held that the Securities and Exchange Act does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign stock exchanges. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that "longstanding principle" dictated that the legislation of Congress, unless expressly stated otherwise, only applies within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Here, the Court further reasoned that the section of the Securities and Exchange Act in question dealt with transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions which was not present in this case.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment. He agreed with Court's conclusion but disagreed that the Court employed a new test to determine the reach of the Securities and Exchange Act – only extending to "transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions." He stated that the federal courts have been construing the Act's scope under a different test which did not warrant abandonment.


[Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products Co. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Gas station franchisees won a verdict against franchisor Motiva in the Massachusetts federal district court for violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The franchisees argued that new leases that changed the way rent was calculated and which amounted to increased rents were made in bad faith and meant to drive them out of business. They claimed that the new lease terms amounted to "constructive nonrenewal," prohibited by the PMPA, even though they signed the agreements. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the PMPA did not support a claim for constructive nonrenewal under the circumstances in the case. It reasoned that the PMPA requires franchisees faced with objectionable contract terms to refrain from ratifying those terms by executing the contract, as the franchisees did in this case.


[Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products Co. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the court held that a franchisee cannot recover for constructive termination under the PMPA if the franchisor's allegedly wrongful conduct did not compel the franchisee to abandon its franchise. The Court further held that a franchisee who signs and operates a renewal agreement with a franchisor may not maintain a constructive nonrenewal claim under the PMPA. The Court reasoned when a franchisee signs a renewal agreement, there has been no "failure to renew," and, thus no violation.


[Alabama v. North Carolina (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Several states belonging to the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact ("Compact") and the commission created by the compact ("Commission") filed suit against North Carolina. The plaintiffs allege that North Carolina was designated as a host state for a waste management facility, accepted $80 million to build the facility, but then declined to fund, license, build, and operate it. The plaintiffs seek to recover the $80 million, a $10 million sanction, and attorneys' fees.
The Supreme Court assigned the case to a Special Master who conducted proceedings and filed two reports. The Preliminary Report recommended denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Count I which sought enforcement of sanctions against North Carolina; granting North Carolina's motion to dismiss Count I; and denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss Counts II-V. The Special Master's Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Count II; and denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Counts III-V. The parties then filed a total of nine exceptions to the Special Master's Reports.


[Alabama v. North Carolina (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' seven exceptions are overruled. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the Compact does not authorize the Commission to impose monetary sanctions against North Carolina. Moreover, the Court reasoned that North Carolina did not breach its contractual obligation. The Court further held that North Carolina's two exceptions are overruled. The Court reasoned that the Special Master acted reasonably in denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts III-V.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Sonia Sotamayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He stated that, despite some reservations, the majority was correct to reject the plaintiffs' final exception to the Special Master's Reports. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that Arizona v. California, relied on heavily by the majority, was a case "built on sand," and thus, not sufficient to support the majority's conclusions. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that North Carolina did breach the Compact when it suspended its efforts to build a waste disposal facility.


[Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International Corp. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
AnimalFeeds International Corp. on behalf of a class of plaintiffs filed suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against Stolt-Nielsen among others alleging defendants were engaged in a "global conspiracy to restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker transportation services." After the case was transferred to the Connecticut federal district court, Stolt-Nielsen filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. During arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a demand to proceed as a class. A panel was appointed to determine whether the language of the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class and answered in the affirmative. Stolt-Nielsen then petitioned the Connecticut federal district court to vacate the panel's determination, which was granted.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the panel's decision. The court held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when reaching its conclusion that the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class, even though the Award was silent on whether proceeding as a class was permitted. The court reasoned that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether an agreement permits class arbitration is generally left to the arbitrators, not the courts.


[Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International Corp. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that in this case the arbitration panel exceeded its powers by imposing its own policy choice instead of identifying and applying a rule derived from the FAA or from maritime or New York law. The Court emphasized that the FAA adopts the basic principle that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion. Here, there was no consent.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented. She argued first that the petition for certiorari in this case was improvidently granted because the Court overturned the ruling of "experienced arbitrators." Moreover, even by reaching the merits of the case, she would have affirmed the Second Circuit and adhered to the "strict limitations" the FAA places on judicial review.


[Salazar v. Buono (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered.
While the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock a national memorial and barred its dismantling with the use of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that the district court made an error in judgment.


[Salazar v. Buono (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the plurality, the Court held that Mr. Buono has standing to maintain this action. Justice Kennedy reasoned that when a party obtains a judgment in its favor, like Mr. Buono, it acquires a "judicially cognizable" interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment. The plurality also held that the district court erred in preventing the government from implementing the land-transfer statute in order to protect Mr. Buono's rights. A court may not order an injunction when it fails to consider all the circumstances bearing on the need for preventive relief. The district court failed to consider the context in which the land-transfer statute was enacted. Justice Kennedy concluded that upon remand the court should conduct a proper inquiry into the continued need for preventive relief in light of the statute.
Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The district court should not reach the issue whether the implementation of the land-transfer statute would violate the district court's injunction or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Mr. Buono lacked standing; and therefore, the Supreme Court should not have addressed the merits of his claim. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotamayor, dissented. The district court was correct in preventing the enforcement of Congress' land-transfer statute because the statute was designed to leave the cross in place thus violating the Establishment Clause.


[Smith v. Spisak (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Frank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas corpus relief by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Musladin and Landrigan.
On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that Musladin and Landrigan were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law.


[Smith v. Spisak (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. Yes. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Samuel A. Alito, and Sonia Sotamayor, and Justice John Paul Stevens in part, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that the jury instructions in Mr. Spisak's trial were not "contrary to" and did not "involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." The Court further held that even though Mr. Spisak's counsel's closing argument was inadequate, it reasoned that there was no "reasonable probability" that a better closing argument would have made a significant difference in Mr. Spisak's sentence.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that the Sixth Circuit correctly concluded that errors occurred during Mr. Spisak's trial that violated clearly established federal law. However, Justice Stevens agreed that those errors did not entitle Mr. Spisak to relief as his own conduct "alienated and ostracized the jury" and "his crimes were monstrous."


[Hamilton v. Lanning (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A Kansas federal bankruptcy court denied objections to a Chapter 13 debtor's repayment plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the starting point for calculating a Chapter 13 debtor's "projected disposable income" is presumed to be the debtor's current monthly income. However, the court stated that the calculation is subject to a showing that there is a substantial change in circumstances. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debtor had shown there was a substantial change in her circumstances.


[Hamilton v. Lanning (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, holding that a bankruptcy court may account for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are "known or virtually certain" at the time of confirmation when it calculates a debtor's projected disposable income. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the plain meaning of "projected disposable income" within the statute supports the Court's holding.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. He disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the term "projected." He maintained that the term did allow for a bankruptcy court to depart from the "inflexible formula" provided by the statute.


[Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. Fuartado, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness.


[Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that counsel's advice with respect to deportation is not categorically removed from the scope of the Sixth Amendment. Here, Mr. Padilla's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because counsel could have easily determined that a guilty plea would make Mr. Padilla eligible for deportation. The Court did not address whether Mr. Padilla was prejudiced by his counsel's deficiency and entitled to relief. The Court then remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Kentucky for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, wrote separately, concurring. He criticized the Court for adopting a halfway standard where defense counsel must advise a client on immigration law when it is "succinct and straightforward" but not necessarily in other situations. He predicted that this instruction would lead to confusion and needless litigation. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, also wrote separately, dissenting. He criticized the majority for expanding the text of the Sixth Amendment beyond merely providing the defendant counsel to providing him "sound advice about the collateral consequences of conviction." He mused that the Constitution is not an "all-purpose tool" to create a perfect world.


[Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Plaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees.


[Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred by not applying the Court's standard enunciated in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.. There, the Court held that in determining whether a claim is cognizable under Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act requires a determination that the adviser charge a fee that is "so disproportionately large it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered." With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for unanimous Court, it reasoned that the Gartenberg standard reflected the importance of determining whether a fee structure was the result of "arm's length bargaining" while also understanding that the Act provided other avenues to protect investors.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately, concurring. He disagreed that the Court was simply endorsing a Gartenberg standard. Rather, he noted that the Court did not endorse a "free-ranging judicial fairness review of fees" that Gartenberg, itself, might endorse.


[Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo was admitted to the United States in 1993 and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2004, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana. One year later, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of Xanax, but was not tried as a recidivist. In 2006, Mr. Carachuri was notified that he was removable from the United States. He applied for removal cancellation, which was denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Mr. Carachuri was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that because Mr. Carachuri's second drug conviction could have been punished as a felony under the Controlled Substances Abuse Act, had he been prosecuted in federal court, the conviction qualified as an "aggravated felony" making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.


[Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that a minor drug offense is not automatic grounds for deportation of a legal immigrant. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens reasoned that "although a federal immigration court may have the power to make a recidivist finding in the first instance, it cannot, ex post, enhance the state offense of record just because facts known to it would have authorized a greater penalty under either state or federal law." Justice Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only.


[Beard v. Kindler (2009) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Joseph Kindler was convicted of first degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to death. He subsequently filed motions for post-conviction relief, but while the motions were pending, he escaped from prison. Pennsylvania immediately moved to dismiss the motions arguing that Mr. Kindler had waived any right to have his post-conviction motions considered because he was a fugitive. The trial court agreed and dismissed them. After recapture, Mr. Kindler moved to reinstate his post-conviction motions, which was denied. Both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
In 2000, Mr. Kindler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in a Pennsylvania federal district court. The State of Pennsylvania argued that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Mr. Kindler because Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was an "independent and adequate" state ground that precluded federal habeas review. The district court disagreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in Doctor v. Walters, it held that Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was not an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review.


[Beard v. Kindler (2009) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Maybe. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Third Circuit holding that a discretionary state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would pose an unnecessary dilemma for the states: "States could preserve flexibility by granting courts discretion to excuse procedural rules, but only at the cost of undermining the finality of state court judgments. Or States could preserve the finality of their judgments by withholding such discretion, but only at the cost of precluding any flexibility in applying the rules."
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, wrote a separate concurring opinion. He noted that while the Court did not have the opportunity to address the matter, "[i]n a proper case," "[i]t seems most doubtful that this Court can or should require federal courts to disregard a state procedural ground that was not in all respects explicit before the case when it was first announced, absent a showing of a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guarantees."


[United States v. Marcus (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A New York federal district court convicted Glenn Marcus of violating sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"). The TVPA was enacted after Mr. Marcus engaged in some of the behavior for which he was charged. Yet, the jury was not instructed as to the date when the TVPA was enacted in relation to Mr. Marcus' allegedly illegal behavior. On appeal, he argued that the TVPA was applied retroactively, and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. Applying a "plain-error" standard of review, the court held that Mr. Marcus was entitled to a new trial on Ex Post Facto grounds. The court reasoned that if it was possible for the jury, who had not been given instructions regarding the date of the TVPA's enactment, to convict exclusively on the defendant's pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause.


[United States v. Marcus (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Second Circuit's plain-error standard stands in conflict with the Court's own interpretation of the plain-error rule. Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen G. Breyer stated that an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only when the appellant demonstrates that: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear and obvious; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Here, the Second Circuit's standard conflicted with the third and fourth of these criteria.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He noted that while the Second Circuit reached its decision in an unusual manner, he agreed with its conclusion. Justice Stevens thought the Second Circuit properly exercised its discretion to remedy an error by ordering a retrial.


[Black v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Four former executives of Hollinger International were convicted of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 by an Illinois federal district court. In part, they had paid themselves $5.5 million in fees without the knowledge of the company's audit committee or board of directors. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendants guilty if it deemed they had schemed to deprive Hollinger and its shareholders "of their intangible right to the honest services of the corporate officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of Hollinger," and if the objective of the scheme was "private gain." On appeal, the defendants explained that while their objective was "private gain," the compensation had been crafted in order to avoid paying taxes to the Canadian government. Therefore, they argued that because their "private gain" was intended to be purely at the expense of the Canadian government and not the company, their actions did not violate the intent of Section 1346.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. It held that the deprivation of honest services owed to an employer is not mitigated simply because the inducement was a tax benefit obtained from a third party. The court reasoned that had the defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit committee and board of directors that the compensation was meant to bring about tax benefits, the committee and board very well may have reduced the pay-out in light of the tax benefits.


[Black v. United States (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Not answered. No. With Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the majority, the Supreme Court held that based on its decision in Skilling v. United States, Section 1346 criminalizes only schemes to defraud that involve bribes or kickbacks. Therefore, the "honest services fraud" instruction given in this case was incorrect. The Court further held that Mr. Black and his co-defendants secured their right to challenge the "honest services fraud" jury instructions on appeal because they properly objected to the instructions at trial. The Court noted that it expressed no opinion as to whether the jury instruction prejudiced the defendants and left it for the district court to determine.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed that the Court used the Notes of the Advisory Committee in rendering its decision. He also viewed the "honest services fraud" jury instruction to be error because it was given at all. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He viewed Section 1346 as being unconstitutionally vague.


[Magwood v. Patterson (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
An Alabama state court convicted Billy Joe Magwood of murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, an Alabama federal district court partially granted Mr. Magwood's petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The court upheld his conviction but instructed the state court to look at mitigating evidence when resentencing Mr. Magwood. Upon resentencing, the state court sentenced Mr. Magwood to death once again. Mr. Magwood filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief with the federal district court arguing that a judicial rule was retroactively applied in his case and that he lacked effective counsel at sentencing. The district court granted the petition and vacated Mr. Magwood's death sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit reversed, holding that prisoners may not raise challenges to an original sentence that could have been raised in an earlier petition. The court also held that Mr. Magwood's counsel was not ineffective because he failed to raise an argument that had already been decided by the state's highest court adverse to his client's position.


[Magwood v. Patterson (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that because Mr. Magwood's habeas application challenges new judgments for the first time, it is not "second or successive" under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court determined that the text of the AEDPA counseled in favor of the Court's conclusion.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Sonia Sotomayor, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He noted that the Court was not expanding its holding from Panetti v. Quarterman. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Samuel A. Alito, dissented. He argued that a straightforward application of Panetti, consistent with all of the courts of appeals to rule on the issue, would have dictated an opposite result from the Court's.


[United States v. Stevens (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest.


[United States v. Stevens (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 48 is substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that depictions of animal cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court further reasoned that because a "substantial number" of § 48's applications are unconstitutional, the law is overbroad and, thus, invalid.
Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. He disagreed with the majority opinion arguing that § 48 was not intended to suppress speech, but rather to "prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty." He was concerned that the majority holding will practically legalize the sale of such videos and spur the resumption of their production.


[United States v. O'Brien (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt."


[United States v. O'Brien (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fact that a firearm was a machinegun is an element to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge at sentencing. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Congress determines whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor. But when Congress is not explicit, the courts look to a statute's provision and framework for guidance. Under this analysis, the Court determined that the fact a firearm was a machine gun is an element of the crime.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring. He argued that McMillan and Harris, two cases holding that "sentencing factors" need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, should be overruled. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. He agreed with the majority's conclusion, but argued that the better approach is to treat any sentencing facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence as an "element of a separate, aggravated offense that is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."


[Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Facts]
A Virginia federal district court remanded Bridget Hardt's claim for long-term disability benefits from Reliance Standard Life Insurance ("Reliance"). The court asked Reliance to reconsider its denial of Ms. Hardt's claim. Upon remand and after Ms. Hardt presented new evidence, Reliance changed its earlier stance and awarded Ms. Hardt full long-term disability benefits. Ms. Hardt then filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on her status as a prevailing party. The district court granted her motion and awarded her $39,149 in fees.
On appeal, Reliance argued that Ms. Hardt was not a "prevailing party" as understood by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and thus was not eligible for an award of attorneys' fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. The court held that the district court's decision to remand Ms. Hardt's claim to Reliance did not constitute an enforceable judgment that Ms. Hardt prevailed on her claim because Reliance could have decided to deny her coverage.


[Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. (2010) — Roberts Court (2009-2010) — Conclusion]
Yes. Yes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a fee claimant need not be a "prevailing party" to be eligible for an attorney's fees award. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because Congress failed to include an express "prevailing party" requirement, to say otherwise would more closely resemble "inventing a statute rather than interpreting one." The Supreme Court also held that a court may award fees and costs under the statute so long as the fee claimant has achieved "some degree of success on the merits." Here, Ms. Hardt met this standard even though she failed to win summary judgment on her benefits claim. The Court reasoned that the district court found compelling evidence that she was totally disabled and obtained the remand of her case after which Reliance awarded her benefits.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He cautioned that in the future the Court should examine the text, structure, and history of any other federal statute authorizing an award of fees before concluding that Congress intended the same approach as in this case.