[M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Retirees from the Point Pleasant Plant in Apple Grove, West Virginia⎯owned by M&G since 2000⎯sued after M&G announced that the retirees would be required to contribute to the cost of their medical benefits. The retirees, who had been employees of Apple Grove before the plant was bought by M&G, entered into a series of collective bargaining negotiations through their unions regarding healthcare benefits. Just as earlier versions had included, the 2005-2008 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) included a provision that "capped", or limited, the company's annual contribution towards employee healthcare benefits. In 2006, M&G announced it was requiring employees to cover their individual costs once that cap was exceeded in response to the shifting healthcare landscape. The retirees claimed that language in the effective CBA promised full coverage of healthcare benefits for life without any contribution requirement and sued the company because that "capping" provision was not included in the pension and insurance booklet or adopted by the union on behalf of employees in the latest agreement. The retirees sued under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
The district court dismissed the retirees' claim, and they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court found in favor of the retirees but ordered that their healthcare benefits be reinstated to the post-2007 version that included employee contributions. Both parties appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgement.


[M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Courts should apply ordinary principles of contract law. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that collective bargaining agreements, including those established under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) plans, should always be interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract law. In this case, the appellate court's holding relied on an understanding of contract law that leaned too heavily in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements and therefore distorted the efforts to ascertain the intentions of the parties, a principle on which ordinary contract law is based. Additionally, the Court held that the appellate court relied on inferences that did not have sufficient support in the factual record of this case and therefore failed to properly apply principles of contract law, such as not construing ambiguous writings to create lifetime promises.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that courts must apply ordinary principles of contract law, which require courts to consider whether the agreement as a whole adequately expresses the parties' intents. If not, then courts may turn to extrinsic evidence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence.


[Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received a complaint from a woman who claimed Mach Mining, LLC (Mach Mining) denied her a job because of her gender. The EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Mach Mining had discriminated against female applicants and began conciliation, but the parties ultimately could not agree and the EEOC sued on the female applicants' behalf. Mach Mining argued that the EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on whether failure to conciliate in good faith is a viable defense to its suit for unlawful discrimination. The district court denied the motion and held that courts may review the EEOC's informal settlement efforts to determine whether the EEOC made a sincere and reasonable effort to negotiate.
Nonetheless, the court certified the question to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that, so long as the EEOC has pleaded that it complied with Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient, judicial review is satisfied. The appellate court noted that Title VII gives the EEOC complete discretion to accept or reject settlement offers during informal conciliation and provides no standard to evaluate the failure-to-conciliate affirmative defense. Therefore, the appellate court determined that allowing an employer to use failure-to-conciliate as an affirmative defense would protract and complicate employment discrimination cases.


[Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, but the scope of the review is narrow. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that, while judicial review to ensure that the EEOC fulfilled its statutory obligation to attempt conciliation before suing was appropriate, the scope of such review must be narrow in recognition of the EEOC’s extensive discretion. Because there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review, the Court will only hold that judicial review is inappropriate when Congress has expressly stated in statute that an agency is permitted to police itself. Despite the fact that Congress granted the EEOC broad leeway on when to begin and end conciliation, there is no indication that Congress intended to make the EEOC immune to judicial review. The scope of such review must be limited to what Title VII requires of the EEOC: that the EEOC provide the employer with notice of the specific allegation and allow the employer the opportunity to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice.


[Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Colorado imposes a 2.9% tax on the sale of tangible goods in the state, which retailers with a physical presence in the state are required to collect from purchasers and remit to the state. If a Colorado purchaser has not paid the sales tax on tangible goods, as occurs in some online and mail-order transactions in which the businesses have no physical presence in Colorado, the purchaser must pay a 2.9% use tax and is responsible for reporting and paying the tax to the state. To increase the rate of collection of the use tax, in 2010, Colorado implemented regulations for non-collecting retailers whose gross sales in Colorado exceed $100,000. These retailers must provide transactional notices to Colorado purchasers, send annual purchase summaries to Colorado customers, and annually report Colorado purchaser information to the Colorado Department of Revenue. Retailers that do not comply with these regulations are subject to penalties.
In June 2010, Direct Marketing Association (DMA)—a group of businesses and organizations that market products via catalogs, advertisements, broadcast media, and the Internet—sued the Colorado Department of Revenue's executive director and argued that the regulations violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The district court granted DMA's request for an injunction and later granted summary judgment in favor of DMA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not reach a decision on the merits of the appeal and instead held that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction to enjoin Colorado's tax collection effort.


[Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that the requested relief would not "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax," and therefore the Tax Injunction Act (TIA) did not prevent a federal district court from exercising jurisdiction to hear the case. Because the requested relief was an injunction, which would constitute the type of action the TIA bars, the question was whether the notice and reporting requirements constitute the assessment, levying, or collection of a tax. The Court held that the notice and reporting requirements are a preliminary part of the tax administration process that occur before assessment, levying, or collection, and therefore do not fit into any of those categories. Because the requested relief would not affect any of the categories the TIA protects, the federal district court could hear the case.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that outdated precedents preventing states from collecting use taxes from businesses that do not have a physical presence within the state should be reexamined in light of modern economic realities. However, Justice Kennedy also noted that this case did not present that question to the Court. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she noted that this case did not implicate Congress' intent in enacting the TIA, which was to prevent taxpayers from avoiding their liability by pursuing an alternate legal challenge route, and was consistent with previous jurisprudence on the TIA. Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the concurrence and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the concurrence in part.


[Mellouli v. Lynch (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2010, Moones Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia residing in the United States, was arrested for driving under the influence. While Mellouli was detained, police discovered four tablets of Adderall in his sock. Although initially charged with trafficking a controlled substance in a jail, Mellouli ultimately pled guilty to the lesser charge of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a Kansas statute. In 2012, the government attempted to deport Mellouli pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which states that aliens convicted under any law "relating to a controlled substance" as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), are deportable.
In immigration court, Mellouli argued that, since his 2010 conviction did not specify a particular controlled substance and the Kansas statute includes some substances not included in the CSA, his conviction did not necessarily "relate to a controlled substance" for the purposes of the INA. The judge rejected the argument and held that Mellouli was deportable because the particular controlled substance involved in his conviction was irrelevant. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that possession of drug paraphernalia involves drug trade in general, which is "related to a controlled substance," and therefore Mellouli's conviction met the criteria required by the INA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review and his petition for rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the BIA's conclusion was reasonable in light of the INA's use of the general term "relating to" instead of a more specific term like "involving."


[Mellouli v. Lynch (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a drug conviction under state law triggers deportation only if the crime falls within a category of deportable offenses defined by federal law. It has long been established that, if a state criminalizes certain “narcotics” not listed as a “narcotic drug” under federal law, a state conviction cannot serve as the basis for deportation. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals’ approach in this case makes state paraphernalia convictions deportable because they generally “relate to” any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed, less grave paraphernalia possession misdemeanors can have harsher consequences than certain drug possession and distribution offenses. The text of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) limits the meaning of “controlled substance” for removal purposes to those listed under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Because the Kansas paraphernalia statute does not depend on whether the substance is listed under the CSA, nor did state prosecutors seek to prove that Mellouli possessed a substance listed under the CSA, Mellouli’s conviction does not warrant deportation.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the narcotics on Kansas’ controlled substances list are the same as those listed in the CSA, with nine additions. Therefore, the Kansas law under which Mellouli was convicted “relates to” a “controlled substance” as defined in the CSA, and Mellouli’s state paraphernalia conviction could trigger deportability under the INA. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., joined in the dissent.


[Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime wages to employees who work more than 40 hours per week. However, the FLSA also provides exemptions to this overtime rule for employees, including those "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity...or in the capacity of outside salesman."
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is a national trade organization that represents real estate financial companies and their employees across the country. Among these employees are mortgage loan officers, who assist prospective buyers in finding and applying for mortgage offers. In 2006, the Department of Labor issued an opinion letter that stated that mortgage loan officers' duties fell within the definition of "administrative" and that they qualify for the exception to the overtime rule in the FLSA. In 2010, however, the Deputy Administrator issued a second pronouncement that declared that a mortgage loan officer did not qualify for the administrative employee exception. MBA sued the Department of Labor in district court and argued that the agency could not change its interpretation without first going through a notice-and-comment period required by the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court denied MBA's motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the Department of Labor's 2010 interpretation.


[Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellate court improperly relied on the rule established in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P., which required an agency to use notice-and-comment procedures when making significant changes to a previously interpreted legislative rule. The Court held that this rule was invalid because it was contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) clear provision that agencies need only use notice-and-comment procedures when enacting a legislative rule that has the "force of law." Because notice-and-comment procedures are not required when agencies enact interpretive rules, they should not be required to make subsequent interpretations, as occurred in this case. The Court rejected Mortgage Banker Association's policy argument and noted that the APA contains other safeguards to prevent agencies from creating substantive changes to legislative rules under the guise of "interpretation."
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion correctly overruled the Paralyzed Veterans rule as incompatible with the APA. Justice Alito also noted his agreement with Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Antonin M. Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the majority opinion continued the dangerous trend of judicial deference to agencies' interpretation of their own rules. The APA allows reviewing courts to interpret disputed terms in agencies' legislative rules, but traditionally courts have deferred to the definitions that agencies have enacted through their interpretive rules. Justice Scalia pointed out the majority opinion failed to curb growing agency power and would continue to allow the use of interpretive rules to bind the public without notice-and-comment oversight. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas echoed Justice Scalia's concerns and took issue with judicial deference making way for agencies to enact "interpreting rules" that, in reality, have substantive outcomes.


[United States v. Kwai Fun Wong (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Kwai Fun Wong, a citizen of Hong Kong and leader of the Wu Wei Tien Tao religious organization, was arrested and deported by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for unlawful entry into the U.S. Prior to her deportation, Wong was briefly detained by the INS, during which she claimed to have been treated negligently by the INS. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no civil suit may be filed against the United States unless the claimant has first filed a claim with the relevant federal agency and that claim has been denied.
Following denial, a claimant has six months to file suit or the suit is permanently barred. Wong filed a claim with the INS and, following the denial of that claim, sought leave from the district court to add a civil claim against the U.S. to her already outstanding suit against a number of federal officials. For unexplained reasons, the district court did not allow Wong to amend her complaint until seven months later, after the six-month deadline had passed. The district court then dismissed Wong’s federal civil complaint and held that the six-month deadline was “jurisdictional” and thus not subject to equitable tolling, or delaying the time at which a statute of limitations begins to run. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that equitable tolling could be applied to the six-month deadline.
This case was consolidated with United States v. June, a case in which the conservator (financial manager) of an estate argued that the two-year statute of limitations for filing suit under the FTCA should not have begun to run until she had access to the depositions of federal employees without which she could not have been aware of her claim against the federal government. As in Wong, the federal government claimed that this statute of limitations was “jurisdictional,” and thus not subject to equitable tolling. The district court agreed with the federal government and dismissed the suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that equitable tolling was appropriate based on its earlier opinion inWong v. Beebe.


[United States v. Kwai Fun Wong (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, as in suits between private parties, there is presumption that equitable tolling is available for suits against the federal government. That presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, as the government attempted to show in these cases. Because such a determination would completely deprive a court of the authority to hear a case, the Court will only find that the time limitation is jurisdictional if Congress has clearly intended that result. The Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not provide any such clear statement that Congress intended the statute of limitations provisions to be jurisdictional.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the history of the FTCA and its statutory language indicate that the statute of limitation provisions are not subject to equitable tolling. Because the FTCA waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity, Congress placed strict limits on situations in which the federal government might be subject to liability. The statute of limitations provisions at issue in these cases are examples of such protections against extensive governmental liability and have been interpreted as such. Even if the statute of limitations provisions are not jurisdictional, Justice Alito argued that they should still be interpreted as inflexible based on the statutory language and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[U.S. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1970, Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) through the Rail Passenger Service Act and gave them the priority to use track systems owned by freight railroads for passenger travel. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue metrics and standards addressing scheduling, including on-time performance and train delays. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) sued the Department of Transportation, the FRA, and two officials alleging that the metrics and standards are unconstitutional. The AAR alleged that allowing a private entity, like Amtrak, to exercise joint authority in their issuance violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by vesting the coercive power of government in an interested private party, and also violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers by placing legislative authority in a private entity.
The district court rejected the AAR’s argument, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed holding that Amtrak is a private corporation and Congress violated the constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.


[U.S. Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the majority. The Court held that, for purposes of determining the validity of the metrics and standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The members of Amtrak’s Board of Directors are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and Amtrak is required by statute to pursue broad public objectives.  Because of Amtrak’s significant ties to the government, Amtrak is not a private enterprise, and therefore, treating Amtrak as a governmental entity is consistent with the constitutional separation of powers.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he addressed the issues of accountability and the constitutional questions that arise out of the recognition that Amtrak is functionally a governmental entity. First, unlike other governmental officers, Amtrak’s board members are not required to take an oath to uphold the Constitution. Next, the arbitration clause of the PRIIA is potentially unconstitutional if it is interpreted to allow for a private arbitrator because private parties are not vested with legislative powers. Finally, although all of the other board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, Amtrak’s president is not but is rather selected by the other board members.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Amtrak is a private entity and therefore should be subject to generally applicable rules of private conduct created through the proper exercise of legislative power. Because Congress has permitted Amtrak, a private corporation, to make legally binding rules, there are serious constitutional questions that the majority opinion failed to address.


[Gelboim v. Bank of America (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is a daily interest rate benchmark that is used to help set the interest rate of financial transactions across the globe. Between August 2007 and May 2010, it has been alleged that the LIBOR rate was artificially manipulated downward by a number of colluding financial institutions. Ellen Gelboim was one of many parties to file individual suits against these financial institutions. Given the large number of cases, Gelboim's case was consolidated with a number of other similar cases for pre-trial purposes. During this pre-trial phase, the district court dismissed a number of the cases, including Gelboim's, for failure to state a claim. Gelboim sought to appeal the dismissal, however the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed Gelboim's appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court had not entered a final order concerning all the claims in the consolidated action.


[Gelboim v. Bank of America (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, because cases that are consolidated for pretrial proceedings retain their separate identities, the question is not whether all claims within the consolidated cases have been subject to a final order, but whether the specific case which is being appealed has been subject to a final order. Because Gelboim's case had been dismissed without leave to amend, the dismissal acted as a final order and thus Gelboim could appeal the district court's dismissal of her case.


[City of Los Angeles v. Patel (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Naranjibhai and Ramilaben Patel are owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) requires motel operators to keep records with specified information about their guests. The LAMC also authorizes police officers to inspect hotel records at any time without a search warrant. The Patels filed suit and argued that the provision violated their Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches. The city of Los Angeles argued that motels are "closely regulated" businesses and are therefore subject to warrantless inspections.
The district court determined that motels were not subjected to the same kind of pervasive and regular regulations as other recognized "closely regulated" businesses. Nonetheless, the court held that motels do not have an ownership interest that gives rise to a privacy right in their records because the records were created to comply with the ordinance. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, but later reversed in rehearing en banc. The appellate court held that the hotel records were private "papers" protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the LAMC's warrantless search provision was unreasonable because it does not provide for pre-compliance judicial review of an officer's demand to inspect a motel's records.


[City of Los Angeles v. Patel (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that an individual may challenge a statute for violating the Constitution on its face without needing to allege unconstitutional enforcement, and that the municipal ordinance in question is unconstitutional on its face because it does not allow for hotel operators to engage in pre-compliance review by questioning the reasonableness of the subpoena in district court. The type of search the municipal ordinance authorizes is an administrative one, which means that its purpose is to ensure that the hotel operators are complying with the record requirement, and judicial precedent has held that there must be an opportunity for the subpoenaed party to contest the subpoena for an administrative search before penalties are imposed. Such pre-compliance review is necessary to ensure that the search is not a pretext to harass the business owner. The Court also held that hotels are not a “closely regulated” business and therefore do not fall under that exception to the warrant requirement.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the municipal ordinance in question is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment in most, if not all, of its applications because warrantless searches are not unreasonable under certain conditions. One of those conditions is when the premises to be searched is that of a closely regulated business, as long as the regulatory scheme of which the search is a part furthers a substantial government interest, the search is necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and the regulatory scheme provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. Because hotels have a long tradition of being closely regulated and the municipal ordinance in question satisfies the conditions of a regulatory scheme for closely regulated businesses, the unwarranted search of hotel records is not unreasonable. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, in order to hold a statute unconstitutional on its face, the Court must find that the statute is unconstitutional in every application. Because there are many circumstances in which the municipal ordinance in question could be applied constitutionally, relief should only be granted in cases when applying the ordinance would conflict with the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name "Hana Overseas Korean Club" in English as well as "Hana Bank" in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank's logo, known as the "dancing man." A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words "Hana Financial" for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI's use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other.
In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the "Hana Bank" trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the "Hana Financial" trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank's trademark could be "tacked" to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase "Hana Bank." HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be "tacked" to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury's decision.


[Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The issue of "tacking" is a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the jury. Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court noted that the test for "tacking" is whether the two marks create the same, continuing commercial impression so that consumers consider both as the same mark. The Court held that juries are better equipped to make a determination under a test that relies on consumer impressions. Juries can also apply legal standards to facts when given adequate jury instruction. However, a judge may decide a "tacking" question on a motion for summary judgment, a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and during a bench trial. The Court concluded that allowing juries to resolve "tacking" questions would not create any more unpredictability in the law of trademarks than other jury determinations across all legal fields.


[Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Until 2000, the Arizona State Constitution granted the State Legislature the ability to draw congressional districts, subject to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto. In 2000, the Arizona voters passed Proposition 106, which amended the state constitution to remove the congressional redistricting power from the legislature and vest it in the newly created Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (IRC).
In 2012, after the IRC approved a new congressional district map, the legislature sued the IRC and argued that Proposition 106 violated the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution by removing redistricting authority from the legislature and therefore that the new district map was unconstitutional and void. The legislature also requested that the district court permanently enjoin the IRC from adopting, implementing, or enforcing the new congressional district map. The district court held that Proposition 106 did not violate the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution.


[Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Elections Clause of the federal Constitution did not preclude an independent commission, created by initiative, from creating the map for congressional districts. Although the Elections Clause specifically mentions the state legislature, at the time the federal Constitution was ratified, direct lawmaking by the people did not occur. Since then, state Constitutions have been ratified that specifically place lawmaking power in the hands of the electorate in the form of an initiative, as the Arizona State Constitution did. Judicial precedent establishes that redistricting is a legislative function that must be performed in accordance with the state Constitution’s structure of lawmaking; because the Arizona state Constitution allows lawmaking to occur by a referendum of the electorate, Proposition 106 was an acceptable use of that power. Additionally, because the use of such an initiative would not be questioned if it were employed to redistrict for local and state elections, it should also be allowed for federal elections.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Elections Clause’s use of the word “legislature” should be read to mean “representative body,” which is consistent with other uses of the word in the federal Constitution as well as its meaning at the time of ratification. The debate surrounding the Seventeenth Amendment, which altered the Constitution to provide for the election of U.S. Senators by the people of the state rather than its legislature, strongly indicated that the state legislature and the electorate were not interchangeable lawmaking bodies. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that there was no precedent to support entirely supplanting the legislature’s redistricting role and no policy argument that such a drastic move is necessary. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the Constitution did not grant the judicial branch the power to decide separation-of-powers cases until an action by one of the governmental subunits had caused a private individual harm. Because no such action has occurred in this case, the Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide it. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion’s celebration of direct democracy conflicts with previous judicial precedent and in this case results in removing the redistricting power from the people’s elected representatives. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent.


[Coleman v. Tollefson (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis in federal court if the prisoner has, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Andre Lee Coleman, a Michigan state prisoner, filed several claims while incarcerated. His first claim was dismissed as frivolous, and his second claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Coleman's third claim was also dismissed for failure to state a claim, but he appealed the judgment. Coleman's appeal of his third claim was unresolved when he subsequently filed his fourth claim and moved to proceed in forma pauperis.
The district court denied Coleman's motion and held that Coleman's three previous dismissals prevented him from proceeding in forma pauperis on his fourth claim. The court then ordered Coleman to pay the $350 filing fee. After Coleman failed to pay the fee and his fourth claim was dismissed, Coleman appealed. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and held that the PLRA does not require that all dismissals be final to count as a "strike."


[Coleman v. Tollefson (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a plain reading of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) indicates that a dismissal is a “strike” for the purpose of the “three strikes” provision when the case is pending on appeal. The text of the statute refers to when an action is “dismissed,” which does not normally include subsequent activity on appeal. A reading of the statute that does not include appellate action within the meaning of “dismissed” is consistent with the rest of the statute, which treats trials and appeals separately, and with the statute’s purpose of filtering out bad claims. The Court also held that there was little risk that a prisoner would erroneously be denied in forma pauperis status.


[Ohio v. Clark (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On March 17, 2010, a preschool teacher at Cleveland's William Patrick Day Head Start Center noticed some facial injuries on one of her three-year-old students. When the teacher inquired about the injuries, the student indicated that his mother's boyfriend, Darius Clark, caused them. The teacher forwarded her concerns to a child-abuse hotline, which resulted in the arrest and subsequent charging of Clark for child abuse.
Prior to trial, a judge ruled the three-year-old child was incompetent to testify but refused to exclude the child's out-of-court identification of Clark as his abuser. Clark was found guilty. On appeal Clark claimed that the admission of the child's out-of-court statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower court's ruling and held that, because state law required the teacher to report suspected incidences of child abuse, the teacher was acting as an agent for law enforcement when inquiring about the child's injuries. Therefore, the child's out-of-court statements could only be admitted if the primary purpose of the teacher's questioning was to address an ongoing emergency, as opposed to attempting to establish past events. Because the child was not in immediate danger of further injury, the out-of-court statement could not be admitted.


[Ohio v. Clark (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No and no. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion of the Court in which five justices joined. The Court held that the three-year-old’s statements to his teachers were non-testimonial because the totality of the circumstances indicated that the primary purpose of the conversation was not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. In this case, there was an ongoing emergency because the child, who had visible injuries, could have been released into the hands of his abuser, and therefore the primary purpose of the teachers’ questions was most likely to protect the child. Moreover, a very young child who does not understand the details of the criminal justice system is unlikely to be speaking for the purpose of creating evidence. Finally, the Court held that a mandatory reporting statute does not convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and a student into a law enforcement mission aimed primarily at gathering evidence for a prosecution.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment and argued that a statement that satisfies the primary purpose test alone is sufficient to be testimonial. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined this opinion. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the primary purpose test was not the proper test to determine whether a statement is testimonial. Instead, Justice Thomas argued that only statements that bear “sufficient indicia of solemnity” are testimonial.


[Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Low Income Housing Tax Credits are federal tax credits distributed to low-income housing developers through an application process, and the distribution is administered by state housing authorities. In 2009, the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP), a non-profit organization dedicated to racial and economic integration of communities in the Dallas area, sued the Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA), which administers the Low Income Housing Tax Credits within Texas. ICP claimed that TDHCA disproportionately granted tax credits to developments within minority neighborhoods and denied the credits to developments within Caucasian neighborhoods. ICP claimed this practice led to a concentration of low-income housing in minority neighborhoods, which perpetuated segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act.
At trial, ICP attempted to show discrimination by disparate impact, and the district court found that the statistical allocation of tax credits constituted a prima facie case for disparate impact. Using a standard for disparate impact claims that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch , the court then shifted the burden to TDHCA to show the allocation of tax credits was based on a compelling governmental interest and no less discriminatory alternatives existed. TDHCA was unable to show no less discriminatory alternatives existed, so the district court found in favor of ICP. TDHCA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and claimed that the district court used the wrong standard to evaluate disparate impact claims. The appellate court affirmed and held that the district court's standard mirrored the standard promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing the Fair Housing Act.


[Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the statutory language of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) focuses on the consequences of the actions in question rather than the actor’s intent. This language is similar to that used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, both of which were enacted around the same time as the FHA and encompass disparate-impact liability. Additionally, the 1988 amendments retained language that several appellate courts had already interpreted as imposing disparate-impact liability, which strongly indicates Congressional acquiescence to that reading of the statute. Disparate-impact liability is also consistent with the FHA’s purpose of preventing discriminatory housing practices because it allows plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised discrimination that may be harder to uncover than disparate treatment. However, a prima facie case for disparate-impact liability must meet a robust causality requirement, as evidence of racial disparity on its own is not sufficient.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., on which the majority opinion based its Title VII analysis, wrongly interpreted Title VII as enabling disparate-impact liability, and therefore that opinion should not serve as the basis for the majority opinion’s interpretation of the FHA in this case. In holding that Title VII allows for disparate-impact liability and applying that analysis to the FHA, the majority relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the statute rather than the statutory language that Congress enacted. Justice Thomas also argued that racial imbalance alone is not sufficient to prove unlawful conduct and should not be punished as such. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the FHA did not encompass disparate-impact liability when it was enacted, and no further amendments or precedents have created such liability. The plain language of the statute clearly focuses on intentional discrimination rather than the racial disparity itself, and the 1988 amendments have not been interpreted as altering that understanding of the statute. Justice Alito also argued that precedent interpreting similar text has held that the use of “because of” language linking a cause to a particular reason criminalizes the intention behind discrimination rather than solely the result. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Kerry v. Din (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Fauzia Din, who is a United States citizen, filed a visa petition for her husband Kanishka Berashk, a citizen and resident of Afghanistan. Nine months later, the State Department denied the petition based on a broad provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that excludes aliens on terrorism-related grounds. Berashk asked for clarification of the visa denial and was told that it is not possible for the Embassy to provide him with a detailed explanation of the reasons for denial.
After several other unsuccessful attempts to receive explanation of the visa denial, Din sued and argued that denying notice for aliens who were not granted a visa based on terrorism grounds is unconstitutional. The district court held that Din did not have standing to challenge the visa denial notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the government is required to give notice of reasons for visa denial based on terrorism grounds.


[Kerry v. Din (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the three-judge plurality, which held that no Constitutional rights were violated by denying a full explanation of why an alien’s visa was denied. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no citizen may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property” without due process, but judicial precedent has held that no due process is owed when these interests are not at stake. Because none of these interests are implicated in the denial of a nonresident alien’s visa application, there is no denial of due process when the visa application is rejected without explanation. Although “liberty” has been construed to refer to fundamental rights, there is no precedent that supports the contention that the right to live with one’s spouse is such a fundamental right.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the notice of the denial of the visa application was sufficient to satisfy the due process requirement. Because the decision was made based on a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” the courts do not need to look further, especially when national security is involved. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence in the judgment.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Due Process Clause entitles a citizen to procedural due process when a liberty interest flows implicitly from the Due Process Clause or when a statute creates the expectation that the interest will not be denied without due process. The right at issue in this case—the right to live with one’s spouse—satisfies those requirements, and therefore entitles Din to procedural due process. Because a statement of the reasons for a decision is a fundamental element of due process, its denial in this case amounts a denial of due process. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Teresa Sheehan suffered from a mental illness and lived in a San Francisco group home. After Sheehan threatened her social worker when he attempted to perform a welfare check, he became concerned that she was a danger to herself or others and summoned the police for help transporting her to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary commitment. When the police officers arrived, they entered Sheehan's room without a warrant to take her into custody. Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill the officers. They were forced to withdraw outside her room and call for backup, but instead of waiting for the backup to arrive, they drew their weapons and forced their way back into her room. When Sheehan again threatened the officers with a knife, they shot her several times.
Sheehan sued the officers and the city for violations of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Sheehan appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the officers' second entry into Sheehan's room was reasonable under the circumstances and whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate Sheehan's disability as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act.


[City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, and unanswered (because the oral arguments did not address the Americans with Disabilities Act). Justice Samuel A. Alito delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that public officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless they have violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right. A right is not clearly established unless a reasonable official in that public official’s shoes would have understood his actions to be in violation of that right. In this case, the officers’ second entry into Sheehan’s room without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant in an emergency situation when there is potential for injury to the occupant. The Court also held that the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, even to the extent of firing multiple rounds.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted so as not to reward the petitioners for presenting a question that induced the Court to grant the writ and then failing to brief or argue that question. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Davis v. Ayala (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Hector Ayala, a Hispanic man, was charged with three counts of murder and one count of attempted murder stemming from a failed robbery. During jury selection for his trial in California state court, the prosecution used seven preemptory challenges to exclude each black or Hispanic prospective juror. Ayala challenged the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges as a violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In accordance with Batson, if a party can make a prima facie showing that preemptory challenges are being used in a racially motivated way, the other party must give a non-racially motivated reason for their use of the preemptory challenges. The state court allowed the prosecution to give their non-racially motivated reasons in a closed hearing, from which Ayala and his attorneys were excluded, and subsequently found the prosecution's use of preemptory challenges was not racially motivated. Ayala was not given the prosecution's reasoning or a transcript of the meeting until after the conclusion of his trial. Additionally, after the trial it was discovered that the vast majority of the questionnaires all the potential jurors had to fill out had been lost. Ayala was found guilty of the majority of the charges against him and sentenced to death.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court found that the state court erred in excluding Ayala from the Batson hearing, but that error as well as the loss of the questionnaires were harmless, and therefore upheld Ayala's conviction. Ayala appealed to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and argued that the Batson hearing procedure and loss of the questionnaires violated his constitutional rights. In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the appellate court found that the California Supreme Court had not adjudicated Ayala's claims of federal constitutional violations on the merits largely on the basis that the California Court had determined the procedure used for the Batson hearing violated California state law; therefore the appellate court reviewed Ayala's claims de novo and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing, as well as the loss of the questionnaires, violated Ayala's constitutional rights. To determine whether the errors were harmless, the Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson , which asked whether the errors had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury's verdict, and found that the exclusion of Ayala from the Batson hearing deprived him of the ability to prevail on a compelling Batson challenge.


[Davis v. Ayala (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, no. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that habeas petitioners are not entitled to relief unless they can establish that the alleged error resulted from “actual prejudice,” which is the standard established in Brecht v. Abrahamson. The standard requires that the reviewing court find that there was more than a “reasonable possibility” that the error was harmful; there must be “grave doubt” as to whether the error had a substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s determination. The Court also held that the California Supreme Court had adjudicated the case on the merits based on the statutory language of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which means that the highly deferential AEDPA standard applies to a federal habeas petition to review the state court’s decision. Therefore, a federal court cannot overturn a state court’s determination unless the decision was contrary to clearly established law or based on an unreasonable view of the facts. Because the record supports the state court’s interpretation of the facts, the federal appellate court erred in holding that the prosecutions use of peremptory strikes was not harmless.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that there is a great deal of focus on the adjudication of guilt or innocence but not enough on the conditions prisoners face in prison, particularly solitary confinement and its long-term effects on their mental health. Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote a separate concurrence in which he addressed the concerns Justice Kennedy raised by noting that any prison accommodations are more comfortable than those afforded to the victims of Ayala’s crimes.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority opinion’s analysis is based on a consideration of whether Ayala’s attorney’s could have raised successful arguments had they been present at the Batson hearing rather than whether they were erroneously excluded. Had Ayala’s attorney’s been present, they likely could have raised potentially significant arguments and at the very least could have added to the record in a manner that would have been helpful on appeal. Because the procedural error of excluding Ayala’s attorneys from the Batson hearing likely prevented Ayala from raising significant arguments, the appellate court could properly review the state court’s determination and find that the errors were not harmless. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Brumfield v. Cain (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1995, Kevan Brumfield was convicted of the murder of a Louisiana police officer and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia in 2002, which held the execution of mentally retarded criminals violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, Brumfield filed for post-conviction relief on the basis that he was mentally retarded. Brumfield also requested funds to help develop his Atkins claim. The Louisiana state court found that Brumfield was not entitled to an Atkins hearing because Brumfield did not present enough evidence to establish he was mentally impaired. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied his appeal without explanation.
Brumfield next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and argued that the state courts had erred in failing to give him a full Atkins hearing. He also requested funding to enable him to fully present his claims, which was granted. A federal magistrate found that, while the state court had correctly ruled that Brumfield's initial evidence regarding his mental retardation was not adequate for the court to have granted Atkins relief, the additional funds enabled Brumfield to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation. The federal magistrate subsequently recommended that the district court admit Brumfield's new evidence when determining his habeas claim; the district court did so and ruled in favor of Brumfield by forbidding Louisiana from executing him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the state court's ruling on Brumfield's Atkins claim constituted a decision on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act prevented the district court from reviewing the decision unless the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Because the state denied Brumfield additional funds to develop his case due to his failure to establish a prima facie case of mental retardation, the decision was not a violation of Brumfield's constitutional due process rights nor based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.


[Brumfield v. Cain (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the state trial court’s decision that Brumfield did not present sufficient evidence of mental impairment was an unreasonable determination of the facts, and therefore the federal district court could review the state court’s decision. The state court’s decision rested on its determination that Brumfield’s IQ score was not low enough to prove that he had subaverage intelligence and that Brumfield did not show that his adaptive skills were impaired. However, an IQ test has a margin of error that, if applied to the score in this case, would place Brumfield in the category of subaverage intelligence; therefore, the state court could not definitively preclude the possibility that Brumfield satisfied this criterion, and to hold otherwise was unreasonable. Additionally, the factual record presented to the state court provided sufficient evidence to question Brumfield’s adaptive skills. Because Brumfield only needed to raise reasonable doubt regarding his intellectual capacity to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the state court’s decision that Brumfield did not meet that low threshold was unreasonable.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that judicial precedent establishes that, as long as the factual record supports the state court’s decision, a federal court cannot rule that decision unreasonable simply because it would have concluded differently. In this case, the record showed that Brumfield’s IQ score was not low enough for him to be declared of subaverage intelligence and that he did not have impaired adaptive skills because he had a normal capacity to learn when given time for repetition. Because the factual record supported the state court’s determination that Brumfield was not intellectually disabled based on the relevant state standards to prove intellectual disability, the determination was reasonable. Justice Thomas also wrote that Brumfield’s claim could not succeed based on the argument that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, which is a high standard that requires the habeas petitioner to show that the state court confronted a set of facts “materially indistinguishable” from a Supreme Court case and nonetheless reached a different conclusion. In this case, Brumfield could not show that the Supreme Court had ever decided a case with facts materially indistinguishable from this one, and the state court’s decision was in line with existing precedent; therefore the state court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also joined Justice Thomas’ dissent in part and wrote separately to note that Justice Thomas’ inclusion of the life story of the victim’s son in his dissent should not be considered a part of the legal analysis.


[Henderson v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Tony Henderson was a former United States Border Patrol Agent who was charged with, among other crimes, distribution of marijuana. On June 9, 2006, two days after he was arrested, Henderson voluntarily turned 19 firearms over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which he argued was for "safekeeping as a condition of the bond." He later pled guilty to his narcotics charges.
In 2008 and 2009, Henderson requested that the FBI return his firearms so that he could transfer them to a purported buyer, but the FBI refused to do so. Henderson then moved the district court to allow him to transfer the firearms to the 2009 buyer or his wife. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion because Henderson was a convicted felon, and the district court adopted the recommendation. Henderson appealed and argued that, because he had not been given notice that his guilty plea would disqualify him from firearm ownership, he is entitled to relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.


[Henderson v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a court may order the transfer of a felon’s lawfully owned firearms to a third party as long as the court is satisfied that the defendant will neither use them nor direct their use. While a felony conviction does not prevent the felon from owning firearms, it prohibits both actual and constructive possession of firearms, so a court may not order a transfer to a third party if the felon will continue to exert authority over the firearms in a manner that amounts to constructive possession. However, if the transfer to a third party represents merely a sale or disposition of the firearms, the prohibition on possession is not implicated, and the court may order the transfer.


[Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
During her candidacy for County Court Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida, Lanell Williams-Yulee personally solicited campaign contributions. She stated that she served as the "community Public Defender" – although her title was "assistant public defender" – and inaccurately stated in the media that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running.
The Florida Bar filed a complaint against Williams-Yulee and alleged that her actions during the campaign violated the rules regulating The Florida Bar. A referee was appointed who suggested that Williams-Yulee receive a public reprimand. Williams-Yulee appealed the referee's finding, and the Supreme Court of Florida held that Williams-Yulee violated bar rules for directly soliciting funds for her judicial campaign. Williams-Yulee appealed and claimed that The Florida Bar rule prohibiting a candidate from personal solicitation of funds violated the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech.


[Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that rules limiting speech in charitable solicitation contexts have typically been subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny because such speech often deals with issues of public concern in precisely the manner the First Amendment was meant to protect. Therefore, the government may only restrict the speech of a judicial candidate when the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The Court held that the restriction in this case serves the compelling state interest of preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and is sufficiently narrowly tailored to that interest. Although Williams-Yulee claimed that the rule’s underinclusivity was evidence that it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, First Amendment jurisprudence does not require that a state take an all-or-nothing approach to regulating problematic speech.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the Court’s doctrine of tiers of scrutiny, such as the strict scrutiny applied in this case, should be viewed as a guideline rather than a mechanical test.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that there was no need to apply an exacting standard of scrutiny to a state’s endeavor to distinguish between political and judicial elections. Therefore, states should be granted broad latitude to regulate judicial elections, particularly with respect to campaign finance issues, as vast amounts of spending in judicial elections threatens the appearance and reality of an independent judiciary. Justice Breyer joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment protects all speech unless widespread and longstanding tradition permits its regulation, which is not the case here. Because the rule in question presumptively violates the First Amendment, the Court can only uphold it if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. In this case, there is no evidence that banning personal requests for contributions in a judicial election increases public faith in judicial integrity, and the rule bans much more speech than would be narrowly tailored to serve such an interest. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the First Amendment protections of speech should especially apply in an electoral context and that the majority opinion erred in its application of strict scrutiny analysis because the rule in question was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent to emphasize that the rule in question fails the test of strict scrutiny.


[Oneok, Inc. et al. v. Learjet, Inc. et al. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Learjet, Inc. and other retail buyers of natural gas (Learjet) sued Oneok, Inc. and other energy trading companies (Oneok) for artificially increasing energy prices during the 2000–2002 energy crisis in violation of several states' antitrust laws. Learjet claimed that Oneok reported false data and engaged in "wash sales," which are prearranged sales in which traders execute a trade on an electronic trading platform, and then immediately offset that trade by executing an equal and opposite trade. Oneok moved to dismiss Learjet's claims and argued that the claims were pre-empted by the federal Natural Gas Act (NGA). The Natural Gas Act regulates interstate, wholesale natural gas trade, but it does not apply to retail sales of natural gas. The district court granted Oneok's motion to dismiss and held that Learjet's claims were pre-empted by the NGA because Oneok's actions affected wholesale prices as well as retail prices. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, because Learjet suffered harm in retail transactions, which the NGA does not regulate, Learjet's claims were not pre-empted.


[Oneok, Inc. et al. v. Learjet, Inc. et al. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, because the Natural Gas Act (NGA) was carefully drawn so as not to dilute state power, the courts can only find that the NGA pre-empts a claim when that claim falls within a pre-empted field as enumerated by judicial precedent. In this case, because the state laws at issue are directed at practices affecting the retail rates of natural gas prices, and those are the claims the respondents raised, the state laws control and the NGA did not pre-empt the claims. Because the petitioners in this case did not argue that the state laws conflict with the NGA, the Court did not address the question of conflict pre-emption.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution only allows federal laws to pre-empt state ones when the federal law falls within one of Congress’ enumerated powers. Therefore, the potential pre-emptive scope of the NGA may be impermissibly broad, though the majority opinion in this case stayed within the limits prescribed by precedent.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion unnecessarily introduced uncertainty into precedent that has interpreted the NGA as pre-empting state law claims on issues that the federal government already exclusively regulates. Additionally, the majority opinion lacked any precedential support for its view that there are situations in which state regulation of federally regulated activity is acceptable and could not justify the sort of case-by-case analysis that it espouses. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[B&B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Industries Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
B&B Hardware (B&B) sells a fastener product in the aerospace industry under the trademark "Sealtight," which it registered in 1993. Hargis Industries (Hargis) sells self-drilling screws under the mark "Sealtite" in the construction industry. After Hargis applied to register its mark in 1996, B&B opposed the application and sued Hargis for infringement. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) eventually determined that there was a likelihood of confusion between the two marks and denied Hargis' application. On appeal, the district court held that, because the TTAB is not an Article III court, it need not give deference to the TTAB decision and refused to admit the decision into evidence. A jury then found in favor of Hargis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that, since the Eighth Circuit uses a slightly different likelihood of confusion test from the TTAB, the TTAB did not decide the same likelihood of confusion issues presented to the district court.


[B&B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Industries Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, when a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion often applies. When parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate an issue of fact and an administrative agency acting in a judicial capacity properly resolves the issue, re-litigation is precluded unless Congress has indicated otherwise. The Court determined that nothing in federal trademark law prohibited issue preclusion, although a party could seek judicial review of an agency’s decision. The Court also held that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s (TTAB) decision met the ordinary elements for claim preclusion: the likelihood-of-confusion standards for registration and infringement are the same; there was no reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of the agency’s procedures, and parties are likely to treat both contested registration and infringement seriously.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that, when contested registrations are decided upon a comparison of trademarks in the abstract and separate from their marketplace usage, the issue of likelihood of confusion would not be precluded.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that decisions by administrative agencies should not qualify for issue preclusion. Historically, federal courts had been hesitant to preclude issues determined by administrative tribunals. Justice Thomas noted that Congress authorized the TTAB to determine the respective rights of trademark registration only, not to decide questions of infringement, and that Congress included a provision allowing judicial review. Therefore, Congress likely did not intend preclusion to apply. Finally, Justice Thomas argued that allowing an administrative agency, part of the Executive Branch, to decide central issues in private claims may effect an unconstitutional transfer of judicial power. Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent.


[Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Jesse Busk and Laurie Castro were former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Integrity), a company that provides warehouse space and staffing to clients such as Amazon.com. Busk and Laurie both worked in warehouses in Nevada filling orders placed by Amazon.com customers. At the end of each day, all the workers were required to pass through a security clearance checkpoint where they had to remove their keys, wallets, and belts, pass through a metal detector, and submit to being searched. The whole process could take up to 25 minutes. Similarly, up to ten minutes of the workers' 30-minute lunch period was consumed by security clearance and transition time. In 2010, Busk and Castro sued Integrity and argued that these practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) as well as Nevada state labor laws.
The district court granted Integrity's motion to dismiss and held that time spent clearing security was non-compensable under the FLSA and that the shortened meal periods were not relevant to the FLSA because the plaintiffs did not argue that they performed work-related duties during their lunch periods. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While the Court of Appeals agreed that the shortened lunch periods were not relevant to the FLSA, the Court of Appeals held that the district court should have assessed the plaintiffs claims that the security clearances were "integral and indispensable" to their work in order to determine if that time was compensable.


[Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that the time spent by warehouse workers undergoing security screenings is not compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Portal-to Portal Act exempted employers from liability for claims dealing with activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the principle activities that an employee is employed to perform. The screenings in this case are not a principle activity and were not integral to the employees' duties; therefore the screenings are not compensable.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she stated that the screenings are not integral or indispensable activities because the employee could dispense with them without impairing his ability to perform the principle activity safely and effectively. Justice Elena Kagan joined the concurring opinion.


[Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Plaintiffs were investors who bought Omnicare securities in a December 15, 2005 public offering. At the same time, Omnicare offered 12.8 million shares of common stock and made related filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. These filings were incorporated into a Registration Statement. The plaintiffs sold all the securities by January 31, 2006. Plaintiffs brought suit under §11 of the Securities Act of 1993 claiming Omnicare materially misled or omitted material information on the registration statement because they were engaged in illegal activities that included kickback arrangements with pharmaceutical manufacturers and submitting false claims to Medicare and Medicaid. Plaintiffs further allege that Omnicare failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), which resulted in a substantial overstatement of the company's revenue affecting the 2005 public offering.
The original suit filed in the district court had multiple claims from which this case arose, but all were dismissed in favor of Omnicare. The claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to plead that the defendants had knowledge of wrongdoing when they materially falsified information on the registration statement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissals except one filed under §11 for materially misleading or omitting material information because that claim was filed under a strict liability statute which did not require pleading to knowledge of wrongdoing. The Court held that plaintiffs had met their burden for making a prima facie case under §11 and remanded the case to district court.


[Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held a statement of opinion, even if shown to be objectively false, cannot constitute an untrue statement of fact because of the different nature between opinions and facts. Facts are intended to express certainty; opinions are not. Therefore, an opinion can only constitute an untrue statement of fact if a plaintiff can show that the entity which put forth the opinion does not actually hold the stated opinion. Because the determination of whether a statement is misleading depends on a reasonable investor’s perspective, the Court remanded the case in order for the lower court to determine whether Omnicare omitted facts that a reasonable investor would find misleading.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he emphasized that a statement of opinion, which does not convey additional facts, only implies two facts: (1) that the speaker genuinely believes the opinion; and (2) that the speaker believes his/her basis for the opinion is sufficient. Only if a plaintiff can show that one of these two implications is false may a statement of opinion, which does not convey additional facts, constitute an untrue statement of fact.


[Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Brian Wynne and his wife are Howard County, Maryland residents who own stock in Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (Maxim), a company that provides health care services nationally. Maxim's income is "passed through" to its owners, and the owners are then taxed individually. In 2006, Maxim filed income tax returns in 39 states and allocated a share of taxes paid to each shareholder. The Wynnes claimed the share of Maxim's income taxes that they paid as a credit against their Maryland individual income tax, which includes Maryland state taxes and Howard County taxes. The Comptroller of Maryland determined that the Wynnes had incorrectly calculated their county tax credit by including the taxes they had paid to other states and issued an assessment for the remaining tax owed. The Wynnes appealed to the Hearings and Appeals Section of the Comptroller's Office, which noted that the wrong county tax rate had been applied initially and revised the assessment, but nonetheless affirmed that the tax credit was limited to Maryland state taxes and not applicable to Howard County taxes.
The Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Tax Court and argued that the limitation violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The Tax Court rejected the Wynnes' argument and affirmed the revised assessment. The Wynnes then appealed to the Maryland Circuit Court for Howard County. The Circuit Court reversed the Tax Court's decision and held that the county tax without a credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Comptroller appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals and argued that the Commerce Clause was not implicated by the county tax. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court by finding that the county tax implicates the dormant Commerce Clause because it affects the interstate market for capital and business investment and the overlapping power to tax income from such sources. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the county tax without a credit violated the Commerce Clause because the county tax is not fairly apportioned, since taxpayers who earn income from interstate activities would be taxed at higher rates than taxpayers who earn income exclusively in Maryland while the tax covers income earned wholly outside of Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals also held that the county tax is discriminatory against interstate commerce since it favors businesses that do business primarily in Maryland.


[Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibited a tax scheme like Maryland’s, which discriminates against interstate commerce without Congressional approval. This decision is directly in line with previous dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court held that, to be permissible under the dormant Commerce Clause, a tax scheme must satisfy the “internal consistency test,” which asks whether the tax scheme in question would disadvantage interstate commerce if it were applied identically in every state. If so, then the tax is unconstitutional. Because Maryland’s tax scheme fails the internal consistency test, it is therefore unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not exist in the Constitution. The Constitution explicitly gives the federal government the power to regulate interstate commerce, but it does not say anything about prohibiting state laws that burden interstate commerce. The supposed doctrine also lacks a governing principle as well as internal consistency. Justice Scalia also noted that following precedent would require the tax in this case to be held unconstitutional only if it discriminated against interstate commerce on its face and was indistinguishable from a tax the Court had previously held unconstitutional. Because those factors are not met in this case, the tax should be upheld. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that laws passed by the same legislators that ratified the Constitution would have violated the dormant Commerce Clause under the majority’s analysis. Therefore, that reading of the dormant Commerce Clause, assuming it exists at all, cannot be correct. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissent in which she argued that the dormant Commerce Clause does not prevent the operation of a tax scheme when the discriminatory effect is the result of the combination of two otherwise-lawful tax schemes, as is the case here. Although Maryland chooses not to offer tax credits for taxes paid out of state, it is still entitled to tax that income. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the Court has not rigidly enforced the “internal consistency test” and need not do so here. Justice Scalia and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Reed et al. v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona et al. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Clyde Reed, pastor of Good News Community Church (Good News), rented space at an elementary school in Gilbert, Arizona, and placed about 17 signs in the area announcing the time and location of Good News' services. Gilbert has an ordinance (Sign Code) that restricts the size, number, duration, and location of certain types of signs, including temporary directional ones, to prevent improper signage. After Good News received an advisory notice from Gilbert that it violated the Sign Code, Good News sued Gilbert and claimed that the Sign Code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court found that the Sign Code was constitutional since it was content-neutral and was reasonable in light of the government interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that, even though an official would have to read a sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied, the restrictions were not based on the content of the signs, and the Sign Code left open other channels of communication.


[Reed et al. v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona et al. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the restrictions were subject to strict scrutiny because they were content-based restrictions, or restrictions that were applied differently depending on the message of the sign. Because these restrictions were content-based on their face, the Court need not examine justifications or the government’s motives in determining whether the restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Despite the Town of Gilbert’s argument that the restrictions do not single out a specific nonprofit or church but restrict all, the Court stated that the First Amendment prohibits censorship of all speech on a whole topic. The Court also held that the restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny because they had no compelling interest in adding restrictions to only a certain type of sign.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that this decision does not preclude towns from continuing to regulate signs, but it does stop them from restricting them in an unconstitutional manner. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that content discrimination should have been the consideration and legal analysis, and that this case did not trigger strict scrutiny. The presumption against constitutionality is too strong to use automatically and was unnecessary in this case as there was another, more appropriate method of analysis available. In her separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that constantly using strict scrutiny to judge government-regulated communication is too restrictive and would water down the meaning of strict scrutiny. The risk that the government will limit the public’s ability to debate ideas with these regulations is very low and does not warrant strict scrutiny. In this case, the restrictions were not brought on by any reason or need, and so they did not pass any level of scrutiny. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Breyer joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


[Warger v. Shauers (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2006, Gregory Warger was involved in an automobile collision with another car driven by Randy Shauers. Warger filed suit against Shauers for damages resulting from the crash, and Shauers filed a counter-suit. After an initial mistrial, a jury found for Shauers. Warger appealed on the basis that, following the verdict, Warger's attorney had been contacted by a jury member who expressed concern that the jury foreperson had improperly gained the sympathy of the other jurors by informing them all that her daughter had been in a similar type of automobile accident and that the verdict would have had a negative impact on her life had she been found responsible. Warger claimed that the foreperson's alleged misconduct should result in a new trial because it was improper outside influence, which tainted the jury's verdict, and because it was evidence that the foreperson had lied during jury selection.
The district court ruled that the concerned jury member's statement was inadmissible based on Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars the testimony of a juror concerning any statements made during the jury's deliberations for purposes determining the validity of a verdict, with an exception for testimony regarding whether an improper outside influence was used to persuade any juror. Specifically, the court ruled that the past life experiences of the foreperson did not constitute improper outside influence. While 606(b) does not explicitly bar juror testimony for the purposes of proving dishonesty by a potential juror during jury selection, in this case the evidence was barred by 606(b) because it was based on statements the foreperson made during the jury's deliberations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Warger v. Shauers (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a plain reading of Rule 606(b) precludes the use of juror testimony when a party is seeking a new trial on the basis of juror dishonesty during voir dire. Prior to Congress' enactment of the rule, judicial precedent had established the inadmissibility of testimony of jury misconduct for the purpose of impeaching a verdict, and the legislative history of Rule 606(b) indicates that Congress intended the rule to apply broadly. The Court also held that the rule did not raise any issue of constitutionality because juror impartiality continued to be assured by either party's ability to bring forward evidence of juror bias at any time before the verdict is rendered.


[North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is a statutorily created agency that regulates the practice of dentistry. It is composed of six dentists⎯who are elected by other dentists in North Carolina⎯one dental hygienist, and one consumer member. The Board may bring an action in the North Carolina Superior Court to enjoin the conduct of any individual the Board suspects of engaging in the unlawful practice of dentistry.
In 2003, non-dentists began offering teeth-whitening services to consumers in mall kiosks and salons across the state. After dentists complained, the Board sent 47 cease and desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whiteners. The non-dentists ceased offering the service, and manufacturers and distributors of over-the-counter teeth-whitening products exited the North Carolina market.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently charged the Board with violating the Federal Trade Act by excluding the non-dentists. An Administrative Law Judge found that the Board had engaged in unfair competition and enjoined the Board from issuing any more cease and desist letters; the FTC upheld that ruling on appeal. The Board petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the FTC decision and argued that, as a state agency, it was exempt from federal antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals declined to review the case and held that, when a state agency is operated by market participants who are elected by other market participants, the agency is a private actor and subject to federal antitrust laws.


[North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, because the Board was made up of market participants, the Board could only claim immunity from federal anti-trust actions if the Board were subject to active supervision by the State. Under the Court's decision in Parker v. Brown, when a state acts to regulate activity within its boundaries, that regulation is immune from federal anti-trust actions. However, when the regulatory action is undertaken by an entity made up of non-state actors, courts must ensure the regulatory action is attributable to state policy. Courts must determine whether the state has clearly authorized to the entity to regulate and whether the entity is subject to active supervision from the state. While an entity may be excused from the active supervision requirement in some situations, such as when the entity is electorally accountable, none of these considerations applied to the Board. Because the Board was not subject to active supervision from the state, the Board could not claim immunity from federal anti-trust actions.
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. authored a dissent in which he argued that the case should be controlled by Parker v. Brown, and thus the Court should limit its inquiry to whether or not the Board constituted a state agency. Because the Board is a state-created agency, empowered by the state to regulate dentistry within the state, the Court should have found the Board was immune from federal anti-trust actions. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Tibble v. Edison International (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Edison International is a holding company for electric utilities and energy interests. Since 1999, Edison International and its related benefits and investment committees (collectively, Edison) have offered retail-class mutual funds as part of its 401(k) employee benefits plan, even though otherwise identical institutional-class funds that charged lower fees were available. Those mutual funds also give a portion of the fees collected back to plan service providers, including Edison's, which thereby reduces Edison's administrative costs.
In 2007, Glenn Tibble and other Edison employees (Employees) sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which requires fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan to administer the plan prudently for the exclusive benefit of the participants. The Employees argued that the continued inclusion of the higher-cost funds in the benefit plan was a "continuing violation" of ERISA. Edison argued that ERISA's statute of repose, which bars claims filed more than six years after the date of the last action which constituted a part of the violation, prevented Employees' claim. The district court granted summary judgment for Edison and held that there was no "continuing violation" theory under ERISA. The court stated that the act of designating an investment for inclusion started the six-year period, and since Edison had not made any misstatements or actively concealed any breach following the initial inclusion, the six-year period had passed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Tibble v. Edison International (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the nature of the fiduciary duty under trust law creates a continuing obligation to monitor trust investments and remove imprudent ones. Because this continuing duty is separate from the initial duty to choose investments carefully, violation of the continuing duty counts as a breach of the fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). As long as the breach of the continuing duty occurred within six years of the filing of the lawsuit, ERISA’s statute of repose does not bar the claim.


[Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Alabama imposes a 4% sales tax on the gross receipts of retail businesses and a 4% use tax on storage, use, or consumption of tangible personal property. Accordingly, rail carriers that purchase diesel fuel within the state are subject to a 4% sales tax. However, motor and water carriers that purchase fuel in Alabama pay an excise tax of $0.19 per gallon.
In 2008, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) sued the Alabama Department of Revenue for violating the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 (4-R Act), which targeted local and state taxation schemes that discriminated against rail carriers. CSX argued that the sales tax was discriminatory because it required the rail carriers to pay more than their competitors for purchasing diesel fuel in the state. The district court dismissed the case and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal by citing precedent that held that a railroad could not challenge its competitors' exemptions from a sales tax as discriminatory under the 4-R Act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, overturned the ruling, and remanded the case. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and issued an order holding that the state's sales tax does not discriminate against rail carriers for the purposes of the 4-R Act, because the amount that motor carriers paid was roughly equal to that paid by rail carriers. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that the tax is discriminatory because the state had not offered sufficient justification for exempting CSX's competitors from the sales tax.