[Tison v. Arizona (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Ricky and Raymond Tison, brothers, conspired with several other family members to help their father, Gary, escape from prison. Gary was serving life in prison for murdering a guard during a previous escape attempt. Smuggling in a cooler full of guns, the Tisons helped Gary and his cellmate Randy escape. The group made a safe exit, but a few days later their car got a flat tire. They decided to flag down and steal a passing car. The group ordered the family of four out of the car while they transferred their belongings. When Ricky and Raymond went to get the family some water, Gary and Randy shot the family multiple times, killing them all. Ricky and Raymond did nothing to help the family. They continued to run with Randy and Gary until the chase ended in a shootout with police. Gary died in the desert of exposure before the police found him, and another brother died in the shootout. Ricky, Raymond, and Randy faced four counts of felony murder through accomplice liability. All three received the death penalty.
The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, holding that while the Tisons had not specifically intended to kill the family, they conspired with known killers and did nothing to aid the family when they had the chance. The Court held that the son’s anticipation that lethal force might be used in their endeavor satisfied the “intent” requirement for the death penalty.


[Tison v. Arizona (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, vacating the lower judgments. The Supreme Court remanded to determine whether the Tisons acted with a reckless indifference to human life. The Court held that anticipating lethal force is not enough to satisfy the “intent to kill” requirement, but the Tisons major participation in the felony along with a reckless indifference to human life may be.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing that this case illustrates how arbitrary capital sentencing is. The death penalty is always cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens joined the dissent in part.


[Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Ronald Calder was a native of Iowa working in Puerto Rico, He was charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. After posting bail, he fled to his home state. Puerto Rico submitted a petition to Branstad, Iowa's governor at the time, to extradite Calder for court proceedings. Branstad refused.


[Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court overturned its decision in Kentucky v. Dennison (1861) which had rendered federal courts powerless to enforce the Extradition Clause. The unanimous Court concluded that the precedent in Kentucky was "the product of another age" and "fundamentally incompatible with more than a century of constitutional development."


[Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
This case concerned the retrospective application of judge-made rules. Specifically, the Court had to decide whether a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors, combined with his call to the jury clerk, violated the black petitioner's right to an impartial jury. The Court was called upon to decide whether the previous decision in Batson v. Kentucky was applicable to pending litigation but not final when Batson was decided. This case was decided together with Brown v. United States.


[Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
The Court held that after a new rule had been decided in a particular case, "the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review." The Court reasoned that selective application of new rules violated the principle of treating similarly situated defendants on an equal basis. The Court also refused to make an exception to the rule of retroactivity in cases where there was a "clean break" with past precedent.


[Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
The Transportation Agency, Santa Clara, California promoted Diane Joyce to road dispatcher over Paul Johnson. Both candidates were qualified for the job. As an affirmative action employer, the Agency took into account the sex of the applicants in making the promotion decision.


[Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara Cty. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
The Court affirmed the promotion procedures of the Agency. Justice Brennan argued that it was not unreasonable to consider sex as one factor among many in making promotion decisions, and that the Agency's actions did not create an absolute barrier to the advancement of men (a quota system did not exist).


[Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Pennzoil Co. obtained a jury verdict of $10.53 billion in a Texas state court suit. The suit alleged that Texaco Inc. tortiously induced a third party to breach its contract to sell stock to Pennzoil. Before the court entered a final judgment, Texaco sued in federal district court alleging that the Texas court proceedings violated its rights under the Constitution and several Texas statutes. Pennzoil argued that the district court should abstain from hearing the case under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris. Younger held that a federal court must abstain from hearing challenges to a state court proceeding while that proceeding is still underway. The district court did not abstain and granted a preliminary injunction. The court found that it had jurisdiction over the matter and that Texaco was likely to succeed in its suit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the district court had jurisdiction, but should not have evaluated the claims that were discussed in the state trial. Meanwhile, the state court proceedings continued, and reduced the judgment to $8.53 billion


[Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have followed Younger and abstained from issuing an injunction until the state court proceedings concluded. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that a federal court need not abstain when it does not have to decide any issue litigated in the state court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court did not have to abstain, but Texaco’s constitutional claims were without merit. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence. Justice Marshall separately concurred in the judgment, writing that venue was improper because the issues before the district court were inextricably linked to the Texas court proceedings. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment, arguing that the district court should have abstained because unsettled questions of state law existed. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, arguing that Younger did not apply. Justice Marshall joined in the concurrence.


[Bourjaily v. United States (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
William Bourjaily was arrested after receiving a quantity of cocaine in a parking lot from Angelo Lonardo. At Bourjaily's trial, the government introduced statements Lonardo made in a telephone conversation with an informant regarding a "friend" who had questions about the cocaine. The district court, considering the events in the parking lot and Lonardo's statements over the telephone, found that the government had established that a conspiracy existed between Bourjaily and Lonardo, and that Lonardo's statements over the telephone had been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, the court held that Lonardo's out-of-court statements satisfied Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and were not hearsay.


[Bourjaily v. United States (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No; preponderance of the evidence; and no. When the existence and membership of a conspiracy are disputed, the traditional standard applies: the party offering the statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must prove these preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 104(a) provides that, in determining preliminary questions concerning admissibility, the court "is not bound by the rules of evidence" (except those with respect to privileges). Therefore, hearsay, including the statements sought to be admitted, can be considered. Finally, since the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is rooted firmly in precedent, no independent inquiry into reliability is required by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.


[California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Two federally recognized Indian Tribes had reservation land within Riverside County, California where they conducted bingo and card games open to non- Indians. The gambling industry provided employment to many Indians on the reservation, and most clients were non-Indians. The State of California wanted to apply state gambling laws to reservation gaming and Riverside County wanted to apply local ordinances. Together, these laws would ban the card games and put charitable organizations in charge of bingo games. The Tribes claimed that the imposition of gambling laws by the state government violated their sovereignty. They brought suit against the state of California and Riverside County in federal district court. The district court ruled that neither the state nor the county had the authority to regulate gambling on reservation land. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. State laws require the consent of Congress in order to apply to Indian reservations. While the federal government consented to states enforcing criminal laws on reservation land, gambling regulations are types of civil law and therefore not enforceable. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 did not grant states the authority to regulate gambling either. Although the Act incorporated certain state gambling laws into federal laws regulating gambling on reservations, this did not grant states authority to enforce the new federal laws on reservations. Absent explicit permission for regulation, states can only enforce laws on reservations if their interests in regulation outweigh the interests of the federal government and tribal authorities. In this case, gambling provided revenue critical to the economic self-sufficiency of the reservation. Accordingly, the federal government's interest to ensure Indian self-government outweighed state concerns about organized crime developing because of unregulated reservation gaming.


[South Dakota v. Dole (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In 1984, Congress enacted legislation ordering the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a 21-year-old minimum drinking age. South Dakota, a state that permitted persons 19 years of age to purchase alcohol, challenged the law.


[South Dakota v. Dole (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Congress, acting indirectly to encourage uniformity in states' drinking ages, was within constitutional bounds. The Court found that the legislation was in pursuit of "the general welfare," and that the means chosen to do so were reasonable. The Court also held that the Twenty-first Amendment's limitations on spending power were not prohibitions on congressional attempts to achieve federal objectives indirectly. The five percent loss of highway funds was not unduly coercive.


[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Robert P. Groetzinger spent sixty to eighty hours a week placing bets on dog races. He had no other form of employment, and the winnings from these wagers were his only form of income. His net gambling loss for 1978 was $2,032. Groetzinger reported his loss in his tax return but did not compute it in his adjusted gross income. The Internal Revenue Service determined Groetzinger was subjected to the minimum tax since his gambling loss was an item of tax preference according to the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. The Internal Revenue Service sued Groetzinger and the tax court held that he was in the “trade of business” of gambling, which meant that no part of his gambling losses subjected him to a minimum tax. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment.


[Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Groetzinger (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a taxpayer’s gambling activity does constitute a “trade or business” under the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. Since Groetzinger was in the “trade or business” of gambling, no part of his gambling losses was an item of tax preference subjecting him to a minimum tax. The Court held that the term “trade or business” has a broad definition within the statute. While a mere hobby does not constitute as a trade or business, activity with continuity and regularity with the purpose of making a profit or income is, so Groetzinger’s gambling activity qualifies.
Justice Byron R. White delivered a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the 1982 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code made it clear that gambling was not a trade or business. Although the relevant year for this case is 1978, the later provisions indicate that the legislature did not intend to include gambling activity in constituting as a trade or business. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


[Booth v. Maryland (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
John Booth was convicted of the murders of an elderly couple and chose to have the jury determine his sentence instead of the judge. A Maryland statute required that a victim impact statement "describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his family" be included in the pre-sentence report in felony cases. In this case, the victim impact statement described the victims, the impact of the crime on their family, and the family members' opinions of the defendant and the crime.


[Booth v. Maryland (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court found that the victim impact statement created "a constitutionally unacceptable risk" and violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Powell argued that in a capital case, the jury's sentencing task is based on the defendant as a unique individual and not on the character or impact of the crime on the victim's family. Allowing the content of a victim impact statement to influence the jury could lead it to choose the death penalty for reasons which "were irrelevant to the [defendant's] decision to kill," thus diverting attention from the facts of the crime. Furthermore, concluded Powell, introducing the "emotionally-charged opinions" of family members into the process would erode the "reasoned decisionmaking" which is crucial in capital cases.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
One of the types of fees that Pennsylvania used to finance the cost of its highway maintenance was lump-sum annual fees, also known as flat taxes. In 1980, Pennsylvania increased the fee for an identification marker required of every truck over a certain weight from $2 to $25, but exempted trucks registered in Pennsylvania from the fee _ the marker fee was "deemed" to be included in the registration fee that local truckers had to pay. In 1982, the marker tax was reduced to $5, but a new tax was introduced, taxing trucks by the axle. The axle tax applied to all trucks weighing more than 26,000 pounds, but the registration fee for Pennsylvania trucks was reduced in an amount calculated to offset that new tax for most trucks. These flat taxes were contested in two state court cases on the ground, inter alia, that they violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Since Pennsylvania-based trucks travel, on average, about five times as many miles in Pennsylvania as out-of-state trucks, the cost of the flat taxes was approximately five times as high per mile of road use for out-of-state vehicles as for local vehicles. For that reason, the lower courts in Pennsylvania found that both the marker tax and the axle tax violated the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered both cases together and reversed.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the flat taxes violated the basic principle that the Commerce Clause created an area of trade free from interference by the states. One problem with the flat taxes is that they do not pass the "internal consistency" test, which is to say that they could not be applied by every state without interfering with free trade. If many states adopted them, truckers would pay more to go through those states than to drive the same distance in only one state. This would disrupt the market for interstate transportation services. In addition, because the cost to out-of-state truckers is approximately five times as heavy per mile, the taxes have a discriminatory effect. It is no defense that Pennsylvania's registration fee is fairly high, conferring a competitive advantage to trucks based in other states; the solution to that problem is to lower the level of the registration fee. It is also no defense to describe the flat taxes as user fees because such fees are acceptable only insofar as they are neither discriminatory nor excessive. Finally, Pennsylvania cannot appeal to administrative convenience because it has shown itself capable of administering taxes that reflect the quantity of highway use.


[Maryland v. Garrison (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Baltimore police officers obtained a warrant for the apartment of Lawrence McWebb and “the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment.” When they obtained and executed the warrant, the police mistakenly believed that there was only one apartment on the third floor. By the time they discovered there were two apartments, the police were already in the process of searching the apartment of Harold Garrison. During that search, police discovered heroin. Garrison was tried and convicted of violating Maryland’s Controlled Substances Act. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin discovered during the search, but the trial court denied the motion. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed.


[Maryland v. Garrison (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the description of the place to be searched and the items to be seized in the original warrant was not unduly general given the information available to officers at the time. The fact that the officers found more information later did not invalidate the original warrant. The Court also held that the execution of the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers proceeded only based on the knowledge they had and stopped their search immediately when they discovered their error.
In Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s dissent, he wrote that the Fourth Amendment values protection of the home above all else, and the actions of the police in this case violated the expectation of privacy. He argued that Court precedent required warrants to be specific when dealing with multi-tenant residences. He also found that the police officers’ mistake was not a reasonable one when there were several indicators that each floor of the building had multiple occupants. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Rock v. Arkansas (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Vickie Rock was charged with manslaughter for the death of her husband, Frank Rock. Vickie and Frank had argued after Frank refused to let Vickie eat pizza and prevented her from leaving the apartment to get something else to eat. As the fight escalated, Vickie picked up a handgun and at some point Frank received a fatal gunshot wound to the chest. The police arrived and arrested Vickie. Because Vickie was unable to recall the shooting in any detail, on the advice of her attorney, she submitted to hypnosis in an attempt to refresh her memory. During one session, Vickie recalled that her finger had not been on the trigger and the gun had discharged accidentally when Frank had grabbed her arm. A gun expert examined the gun and found that it was defective and prone to fire when dropped or hit, even without the trigger being pulled, supported this revelation.
Because an Arkansas rule of evidence prohibited the admittance of any evidence obtained through hypnosis, the trial court barred Vickie from testifying to her memory of the shooting because it had been “hypnotically refreshed.” She was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. Vickie appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed her conviction. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that, in the absence of a general consensus on the accuracy of evidence obtained through hypnosis, case-by-case inquiry into the accuracy of the evidence would be too burdensome on courts. In this case, the exclusion of Vickie Rock’s hypnotically refreshed memory did not infringe on her constitutional rights because her right to testify in her own defense was only limited by generally applicable rules of evidence intended to exclude confusing or misleading evidence.


[Rock v. Arkansas (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment protect the right of the individual to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial. Because the Arkansas rule was a blanket ban, it did not allow a trial court to consider the particular circumstances of individual cases. Although Arkansas has a state interest in preventing unreliable testimony from being admitted into evidence at trial, that interest does not justify a blanket ban on testimony that may be reliable in an individual case. Therefore the exclusion of the hypnotically refreshed testimony, without exploring the reliability of the testimony, infringed on the petitioner’s Constitutional right to testify in her own defense.
In his dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that an individual’s right to present evidence has always been subject to reasonable restrictions. Because Arkansas’s rule excluding evidence obtained by hypnosis is a reasonable attempt to ensure the reliability of evidence, he argued that it was appropriate to defer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


[Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Two affiliate organizations of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints operated Deseret Gymnasium, a non-profit facility in Salt Lake City, Utah. These affiliates were the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB) and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). Arthur Frank Mayson worked for the Gymnasium for sixteen years as an engineer, but CPB and COP fired him when he failed to obtain a certificate authorizing him to attend the Church's religious temples. He filed a class-action lawsuit in District Court alleging that CPB and COP violated Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by dismissing him from nonreligious employment because he did not satisfy certain religious conditions. In response, CPB and COP claimed that Section 702 of the Act, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the Act's ban in Section 703 on religious discrimination. Mayson then claimed that Section 702 violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by allowing religious organizations to practice discriminatory hiring for nonreligious jobs. The District Court agreed that Mayson's job was nonreligious. It also held that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause because it allowed religious adherents exclusive participation in nonreligious activities.


[Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from using state mechanisms to advance a religion. Section 702 passed a three-part test the Court established in Lemon v. Kurtzman for determining whether a state action violates the Establishment Clause. To be valid, the state action must first promote a "secular legislative purpose." The Court found that Section 702 satisfied this criterion, since it ensured that the government would not determine for religious organizations what they could count as religious activities. Second, the state action can neither "advance nor inhibit religion." The Court held that for a violation of this standard to occur, the "Government itself must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence." In this case, the government allowed for a church to advance its religion but did not directly intervene. Third, the state action must not "entangle" church and state. By allowing religious organizations to employ whom they pleased, they state became less entangled in religion.


[Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Joseph Griffin, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and obstruction of an officer. He was put on probation. According to Wisconsin law, probationers are in the legal custody of the State Department of Health and Social services and must abide by that department’s rules and regulations of the department. One of the regulations permits the probation officer to search the probationer’s home without a warrant as long as there are “reasonable grounds” to believe illegal substances are in the premises. These grounds include: information provided by an informant, the reliability of that information and the informant, and the officer’s own experience with the probationer.
Griffin’s probation officer received information from a detective that there might be guns in Griffin’s apartment. When the police searched Griffin’s apartment, they found a handgun and Griffin was charged with the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Griffin moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court denied the motion and Griffin was convicted. Griffin appealed on the grounds that the evidence from the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.


[Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted in accordance with a regulation that is a reasonable response to the “special needs” of a probation system. Supervision of probation is necessary to ensure the restrictions are followed and that the probation serves as a period of rehabilitation; therefore the state may depart from the usual warrant requirements. The “reasonable grounds” standard to search a probationer’s residence is an appropriate substitute for warrant requirements in this special situation, and in this case, the information received from the detective provided those reasonable grounds.


[First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In 1979, the County of Los Angeles passed an ordinance which prohibited construction or reconstruction on land which had been devastated by a flood one year earlier. The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church owned a campground which was affected by this ordinance and it was not allowed to reconstruct buildings on this land which the flood had destroyed.


[First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Noting that the fate of the Church's property had been in limbo for over six years (the suit which it had filed in 1979 had been denied a hearing as late as October of 1985), Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that, because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a "taking" of the property had occurred. Thus, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the government to exercise one of a number of "options" such as amending the regulation or fair payment for the use of the property in order to protect the Church's constitutional rights.


[O'Connor v. Ortega (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In 1981, officials at a hospital, including Executive Director Dr. Dennis O'Connor, suspected improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of a residency program. The officials conducted an investigation of Ortega, which included multiple searches of his office and seizure of a number of items. The items were later used in proceedings before the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of witnesses that testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf.


[O'Connor v. Ortega (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that "the realities of the workplace" made some expectations of privacy among public employees unreasonable when the intrusion was by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Work-related searches, the Court found, were "merely incident to the primary business of the agency," and a warrant requirement would "seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business." The Court thus held that a standard of "reasonableness" was sufficient for work-related intrusions by public employers.


[Gray v. Mississippi (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
On June 3, 1982, Attina Cannaday, David Gray, and Dawn Bushart woke up Ronald Wojcik and Sandra Sowash in their Biloxi apartment and forced them to leave at knifepoint. They brought Wojcik and Sowash in Wojcik’s van to a remote wooded area. Grey raped Sowash at knifepoint in the van, but she later escaped. At sunrise, Ronald Wojcik’s body was found with nineteen stab wounds to the head, hands, upper body, and back. Later that month, David Randolph Gray was indicted in Harrison County, Mississippi on a capital charge for the stabbing death of Ronald Wojcik while committing the felony of kidnapping.
During the jury selection process, the potential jurors were questioned individually. After the judge denied the prosecutor’s for-cause motions, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove eight panel members who expressed any degree of uncertainty in their ability to cast a vote in a case potentially involving the death penalty. The voir dire oath of panelist H.C. Bounds was confused, but she ultimately stated that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty. The judge eventually excused Bounds for cause, however, implying that he had improperly denied the prosecutor the use of for-cause motions for the other panelists.
The jury convicted Gray of capital murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi divided on whether Gray’s death sentence was invalid because the exclusion of Bounds violated Gray’s right to a fair and impartial jury. It ultimately affirmed Gray’s sentence despite the violation of Mississippi state procedure created by the trial court’s failure to follow voir dire guidelines in its dismissal of Bounds.


[Gray v. Mississippi (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the exclusion of Bounds was a reversible constitutional error not subject to harmless-error review. He wrote that the state could only exclude jurors who would frustrate the administration of capital sentencing schemes by not following their oaths. Justice Blackmun noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court unanimously agreed that Bounds was qualified to sit as a juror.
Justice Blackmun rejected Mississippi’s argument that the trial judge restored a peremptory challenge to the prosecutor to use against Bounds, pointing out that the trial judge explicitly stated that Bounds was removed for cause. He also rejected the state’s argument that the trial judge remedied an erroneous denial of a for-cause motion by granting an erroneous motion. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the court’s error was no less a constitutional violation because the trial judge may have improperly deprived the prosecution of peremptory challenges. He wrote that the relevant question was not whether the court excluded a prospective juror erroneously, but rather whether the composition of the jury panel could have been affected by the court’s error.
Finally, Justice Blackmun rejected Mississippi’s argument that the exclusion of Bounds was a harmless technical error because it did not have prejudicial effect. He argued that courts could not say with confidence that an erroneous exclusion for cause of a scrupled, eligible, venire member was an isolated incident.
Justice Louis Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with the plurality’s reliance on real-world factors such as the prosecutor’s use of the peremptory challenges, arguing that the reasons for the prosecutor’s use of those challenged was irrelevant.
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. He argued that Bounds would have been excluded if the trial court properly granted the prosecutor’s for-cause motion, and thus the composition of the jury was ultimately unaffected.


[School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Gene Arline could no longer teach elementary school because she had tuberculosis, a contagious disease. The superintendent of schools in Nassau County, Florida dismissed her after it became clear that her illness was recurrent. The school system did not grant her financial relief. Arline claimed in a federal district court that this violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits state-funded programs from denying relief to applicants solely because they are handicapped. The school conceded it dismissed her solely because of her illness, but contended that a contagious disease like tuberculosis did not qualify her as handicapped. The court ruled that the Act did not define contagious illnesses as handicaps, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It found that Arline was "otherwise qualified" to teach except for her illness, and ruled that this qualified her for handicapped benefits.


[School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court relied on the qualification criteria for "handicapped status" provided by the Department of Health of Human Services (HHS), which Congress authorized to implement the Act. HHS made it clear that the Act covers illnesses that cause a "record of impairment" upon a patient's "major life activities." The Court found that both the "contagious effects of a disease" and "the disease's physical effects" can impair the patient's ability to work. The Act intended to cover "those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired," since both conditions can prevent a patient from finding work.


[Pennell v. City of San Jose (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
The City of San Jose enacted a rent-control ordinance in 1979 in an attempt to alleviate the problem of skyrocketing rent prices due to the growing shortage of and the increasing demand for housing. Part of the ordinance allowed a Mediating Hearing Officer to consider as one factor "hardship to a tenant" when evaluating rent increases imposed by landlords.


[Pennell v. City of San Jose (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the ordinance was rationally crafted to protect the financial investments of landlords while simultaneously preventing tenants from becoming victims of burdensome rent increases. The City argued the ordinance satisfied a need. This view was uncontested and, according to Justice Rehnquist, represented a "legitimate and rational" means to protect "consumer welfare."


[Murray v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
On April 6, 1983, federal law enforcement agents tailing Michael F. Murray and James D. Carter for suspicion of illegal drug activities saw the two drive large vehicles into a warehouse in South Boston. When Murray and Carter left, the agents saw a tractor-trailer rig and a large container. The agents arrested Murray and Carter and lawfully seized their vehicles, which contained marijuana. Several agents then returned to the warehouse, forced entry without a search warrant, and found numerous wrapped bales of what was later confirmed to be marijuana. The agents did not disturb the bales and kept the warehouse under surveillance until they obtained a search warrant. In applying for the search warrant, the agents did not mention the unwarranted entry or the information they had obtained. Approximately eight hours later, the agents obtained the warrant, entered the warehouse, and seized the bales along with the notebooks indicating the destinations of the marijuana.
Before the trial, Murray and Carter moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warehouse and argued that the warrant was invalid because it was based on information obtained in the previous unwarranted entry. The district court denied the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Murray v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 4-3 plurality. The Court held that evidence that would be excluded under the Fourth Amendment is admissible if it comes from an independent source. If the police obtained information unlawfully but the evidence in question comes from an untainted source, it is still admissible. Because the officers in this case obtained a lawful warrant without relying on the information they obtained illegally, the evidence seized in the warranted entry can be considered to have come from an independent source and therefore not subject to exclusion.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the independent source exception is limited to cases in which the evidence in question stemmed from a wholly independent source. He argued that courts must keep in mind the incentives that police officers have to hide the use of illegal methods in obtaining evidence, and they must use a high standard of proof when determining whether evidence came from a truly independent source. Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that court decisions that incentivize police officers to obtain evidence through illegal means moves further away from the true meaning of and protections offered by the Fourth Amendment.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did not participate in the decision or discussion of this case.


[Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
The Spectrum, the school-sponsored newspaper of Hazelwood East High School, was written and edited by students. In May 1983, Robert E. Reynolds, the school principal, received the pages proofs for the May 13 issue. Reynolds found two of the articles in the issue to be inappropriate, and ordered that the pages on which the articles appeared be withheld from publication. Cathy Kuhlmeier and two other former Hazelwood East students brought the case to court.


[Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require schools to affirmatively promote particular types of student speech. The Court held that schools must be able to set high standards for student speech disseminated under their auspices, and that schools retained the right to refuse to sponsor speech that was "inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Educators did not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The actions of principal Reynolds, the Court held, met this test.


[Karcher v. May (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
In 1982, the New Jersey Legislature overrode the Governor's veto and enacted a statute requiring the state's public school teachers to permit students to observe a minute of silence before the start of each school day. A group of New Jersey public school teachers, students, and parents sued the New Jersey Department of Education, its Commissioner, and two township boards of education. The suit alleged that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. After the named defendants and the New Jersey Attorney General refused to defend the statute, Alan J. Karcher, the Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly, and Carmen A. Orechio, the President of the New Jersey Senate, intervened as defendants on behalf of the Legislature. The district court ruled against them and declared the "minute-of-silence" statute unconstitutional. Karcher and Orechio appealed the ruling in their official capacities as presiding officers of the Legislature. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and shortly thereafter, Karcher and Orechio lost their respective officer positions. They subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, but the successors to their offices indicated to the Court that they were withdrawing the appeal on behalf of the Legislature. The plaintiffs argued that the withdrawal of the appeal ended the controversy and that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to review the case, according to Article III of the Constitution. Karcher and Orechio countered that they should be permitted to continue the appeal in their capacities as legislators and representatives of the legislative body that enacted the statute. Alternatively, they argued that the Court should vacate the judgment of the lower court upon their dismissal as appellants. They contended that New Jersey law does not authorize presiding legislative officers to represent the Legislature in litigation, and they argued that their loss of presiding officer status rendered the judgment unappealable.


[Karcher v. May (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
No and No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that once the individuals left their offices, the authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of the Legislature passed to their successors. Because Karcher and Orechio’s successors withdrew the appeal, there was no longer an active case or controversy, so the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case under Article III. The Court further held that the appellants' intervention and participation in the lawsuit as president and speaker did not entitle them to appeal as individual legislators. The Court rejected both theories that Karcher and Orechio offered in support of vacating the lower court's judgment and noted that the first argument appeared to be wrong as a matter of New Jersey State law and directly contrary to Karch and Orechio's representations to the district court. The Court also held that the loss of Karcher and Orechio's right to appeal from the appellate court's ruling did not render the case unreviewable, instead it was their successors' refusal to pursue the appeal that caused the judgment to become final.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed with the Court that Karcher and Orechio lost their authority to appeal on behalf of the New Jersey Legislature when they were no longer presiding officers of the General Assembly and Senate. Rather than hear this matter, Justice White argued that the Court should have reversed its prior order denying a motion by parents and school teachers to intervene as appellants before the Court. In his opinion, the parents and school teachers likely had standing to defend the law while the right of individual legislators to intervene in a non-representative capacity to defend legislation remained an open question, even after the Court's ruling in this case.


[United States v. Kozminski (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1983, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris — who have IQs of 67 and 60, respectively — were discovered working on the Kozminski dairy farm in Chelsea, Michigan. Ike Kozminski, his wife Margarethe, and his son John used the labor of Fulmer and Molitoris seven days a week, for approximately 17 hours a day since they brought the men to the farm. Margarethe picked up Fulmer from the side of road in 1967, and by doing so took him away from a farm where he previously worked. Ike Kozminski found Molitoris living on the streets in Ann Arbor in the early 1970s and brought him to the farm to work. At first, the men received $15 per day, and later they received no pay at all. Although both men were in their sixties, they had the mental capacity of children between 8 and 10 years old. The Kozminskis told Fulmer and Molitoris that they could not leave the farm, and on one occasion John Kozminski threatened Molitoris with institutionalization. They also failed to provide the men with adequate nutrition, housing, and medical care, and told them not to contact their families or any other outsiders.
Eventually, a herdsman who worked for the Kozminskis became concerned for the welfare of Fulmer and Molitoris and alerted the authorities. County officials removed the men, and the Kozminskis were tried in federal district court for holding Fulmer and Molitoris in involuntary servitude. Based on jury instructions that included forms of coercion other than purely physical, the jury found the Kozminskis guilty. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the convictions on the grounds that the District Court’s definition of involuntary servitude was too broad.


[United States v. Kozminski (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that precedent had established that the type of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment is limited to that “enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.” Involuntary servitude had never before been extended to cover labor compelled by the use of psychological coercion. The government’s use of a broader interpretation makes the criminal nature of the action dependent on the victim’s state of mind, which cannot always be foreseen. The mental state of the victim is only relevant in determining whether or not the physical or legal coercion was effective.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the Court unnecessarily narrowed the definition of the involuntary servitude. He argued that there are many different methods of coercion that can all be equally effective in reducing the victim to a state of involuntary servitude. The proper understanding of the term is defined by the conditions of servitude that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to eradicate: conditions similar to those of slaves before the Civil War. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this concurring opinion.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment. He argued that the attempt to define “involuntary servitude” based on hypothetical situations is irrelevant to the legal issues at hand. Rather, he found that the statute was written to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the defendants were rightfully convicted on the basis of jury instructions, but Justice Stevens agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that expert testimony was erroneously admitted. Therefore, he agreed with judgment of the Court that the case should be remanded. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


[Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
Following the death of US Marine helicopter pilot David A. Boyle, Delbert Boyle sued the helicopter's manufacturer ("Sikorsky") for defectively designing its copilot emergency escape hatch. On appeal from a state-law based jury verdict favoring Boyle, the Court of Appeals found that Sikorsky could not be held liable under Virginia tort law for any design flaws since it met the requirements of the "military contractor defense." Boyle appealed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to4 decision, the Court held that despite the absence of specific legislation immunizing government contractors from liability for design flaws, questions of their liability are of unique federal concern. As such, to the extent that it holds military contractors liable for design flaws, state law may significantly conflict with federal interests thereby requiring its displacement. The Court added that in the instant case, such displacement is appropriate since the United States approved the helicopter's specifications, the equipment met those specifications, and Sikorsky warned the government of possible dangers in the helicopter's use. Finally, since the Court of Appeals' use of the "military contractor defense" failed to specify if a reasonable jury could have found for Boyle, the Court vacated its judgment and remanded.


[Braswell v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
A federal grand jury subpoenaed Randy Braswell, president of Worldwide Machinery Sales Inc. and Worldwide Purchasing Inc., to produce the corporations’ books and records. Braswell refused to produce the documents, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The district court ruled against Braswell, holding that the “collective entity doctrine”, which treats corporations differently from individuals for Fifth Amendment purposes, applied. The court rejected Braswell’s argument that the doctrine does not apply where the corporation is so small that it is merely the individual’s alter ego. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Braswell v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion affirming. The Supreme Court held that corporations are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. An agent of the corporation holds the official records of the corporation in their representative, and not individual, capacity so the personal privilege is not applicable. Allowing corporations a privilege against self-incrimination would be detrimental to enforcement of government regulations and prosecution of white-collar crime.


[Honig v. Doe (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
The Education of the Handicapped Act contains a provision, known as the "stay-put" provision, which provides that a handicapped child shall remain with his or her current educational placement pending completion of any review proceedings, unless the parents and state or local educational agencies agree to removal.
John Doe was a student at the Louise Lombard School, a developmental center for disabled children. Doe had a disability which caused him considerable difficulty in controlling his impulses. On November 6, 1980, Doe was teased by a fellow student and responded by attacking the student and kicking out a school window. Doe was subsequently suspended pending expulsion proceedings. After unsuccessfully protesting the suspension by letter, Doe brought an action against school authorities under the Education of the Handicapped Act. Jack Smith was another handicapped student whose disability caused behavioral problems. Smith engaged in disruptive behavior and was eventually suspended indefinitely pending a hearing. Smith brought an action in district court essentially identical to the one brought by Doe. After learning of Doe's action Smith joined Doe's suit.
The handicapped students asked the district court to enter an order requiring the school to allow the students to return to their own schools. The district court granted the handicapped students' request and issued a permanent injunction, an order which prevented the school district from indefinitely suspending a student for disability-related misconduct. The school authorities appealed, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. The school authorities appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Honig v. Doe (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
Yes and Yes. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, held that since the Act covered individuals from ages 3 to 21, the claim of a 24-year-old who was no longer in school was moot, but that the claim of a 20-year-old was not moot. The Supreme Court further held that the "stay-put" provision of the Education of the Handicapped Act prohibited state or local school authorities from excluding disabled children from the classroom even for dangerous or disruptive conduct resulting from their disabilities. The Supreme Court thereby affirmed the lower court's opinion.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred and wrote separately on the mootness issue. He agreed with the court's determination but emphasized that he would go further in relaxing the test of mootness, particularly when events giving rise to mootness occurred after certiorari was granted.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissent which Justice O'Connor joined. He stated that the controversy was moot because it was unlikely that the 20-year-old plaintiff would return to public school.


[Wheat v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
For many years, Mark Erick Wheat allegedly participated in a far-flung marijuana distribution operation, acting mainly as an intermediary by receiving and storing shipments of marijuana in his home then distributing them around the region. Juvenal Gomez-Barajas and Javier Bravo were also allegedly involved in the operation. Attorney Eugene Iredale represented Gomez-Barajas and Bravo at trial. The trial court acquitted Gomez-Barajas on drug charges that overlapped with charges against Wheat, but Gomez-Barajas pleaded guilty to tax evasion and illegal importation of merchandise to avoid a second trial. At the beginning of Wheat’s trial, however, the court had not yet accepted Gomez-Barajas’ plea and he was free to withdraw it.
On August 22, 1985, Bravo pleaded guilty to one count of transporting 2,400 pounds of marijuana. Immediately after the proceedings, Iredale informed the court that Wheat contacted him to hire him as additional counsel; Gomez-Barajas and Bravo waived any objection. The United States expressed concern about the possibility of conflict arising from Iredale’s representation of both Iredale and Gomez-Barajas. The government pointed out that if Gomez-Barajas withdrew his plea, it was likely Wheat would be required to appear at his trial as a witness. In that event, Iredale would not be allowed to cross-examine Wheat. Further, it was possible that Bravo would be required to appear at Wheat’s trial as a witness as well.
Although Wheat emphasized his right to his choice of counsel under the sixth amendment, the district court denied his motion for a substitution of counsel. Wheat was convicted of conspiracy to possess 1,000 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute and five counts of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. It held that the district court correctly balanced the sixth amendment’s rights to choice of counsel and to a defense by an attorney free of conflicts of interest.


[Wheat v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the possible conflict of interest was sufficient to justify denying Wheat’s motion to take on Iredale as his attorney. Justice Rehnquist noted that the Sixth Amendment right to choice of counsel was limited in several ways; for example, a party could not hire a lawyer who had a previous or ongoing legal relationship with the opposing party. He also noted that the Court previously recognized that the representation of multiple defendants by the same lawyer created special dangers of conflict of interest, although it was not a per se constitutional violation.
Although Wheat insisted that the waivers by all defendants cured any problems from multiple representations, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the federal courts had an independent interest in fair and ethical criminal trials. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that courts had the latitude to decline defendants’ waivers where the potential for a conflict of interest existed. Here, the persons Iredale wished to represent were allegedly three conspirators at various levels in a complex drug distribution operation, and there remained a possibility that either Bravo or Gomez-Barajas could be a witness at Wheat’s trial. Thus, Justice Rehnquist held that rejecting Wheat’s motion was within the district court’s discretion.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that the majority granted unwarranted deference to the district court’s discretion, and that the potential for a conflict of interest in the case did not outweigh Wheat’s Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun. He emphasized that Wheat’s prior counsel planned to remain available to assist with his defense. Hence, the question was actually whether Wheat had the right to the additional counsel of his choice.


[Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.


[Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate "if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires," and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion.


[Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related "misconduct." The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.


[Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
Undecided. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court instructed the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether peyote usage for religious purposes is prohibited under Oregon law, or only by the employer. The Court required this information to consider the constitutionality of the denial of benefits.


[Coy v. Iowa (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
John Coy was tried in an Iowa court for sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. When the girls were testifying against Coy, the court placed a large screen in front of him so that the girls would not have to see him. The jury proceeded to convict him. Coy argued that Iowa Code 910A, which provides for the use of a screen in child sexual abuse cases, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers face-to-face. He also claimed that the code violated his right to due process, since having a screen placed between him and the girls made him appear guilty before he was properly tried. The trial court dismissed these claims and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.


[Coy v. Iowa (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of a 6-2 court. The Sixth Amendment explicitly states that the accused has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Court maintained this "confrontation is essential to fairness." The screen clearly disrupted this confrontation in a way that could have biased the trial. While acknowledging that "face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child," the Court insisted that "by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." A trial court cannot abridge the right to confrontation using a generalized law, and in Coy's case no specific reason was given for using a screen.


[Doe v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury’s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents.
The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe’s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe’s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe’s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information.
The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “fishing expedition” for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed.


[Doe v. United States (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for an 8-1 majority, held that such a court order does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. First, he noted that it is undisputed that the contents of foreign bank accounts are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment only protects individuals from being incriminated by their “own compelled testimonial communications.” The foreign bank statements, and the requisite authorization document, do not fit into this definition.
The Court made further analogies to situations where a defendant may be required to give “incriminating” information without invoking the Fifth Amendment. These include: blood samples, lineups, handwriting samples, voice samples, or wearing particular clothing. Finally, the authorization in this case did not list specific information that the government needed for the case. Rather, this authorization simply gave the government the ability to search for the evidence without providing any information on any accounts, documents, banks, or other incriminating evidence.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, made an argument distinguishing this situation from the other situations discussed by the Court. Unlike lineups, fingerprints, or blood samples, this case forced the defendant to use his mind in assisting the government’s case. Therefore, Justice Stevens felt that this action violated the Fifth Amendment.


[Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
At the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.


[Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
Yes. After noting that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. In noting the uniform ban among all relevant state statutes against the execution of one under the age of 16, the Court explained that such an act would violate the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The case was reversed and remanded.


[Morrison v. Olson (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.


[Morrison v. Olson (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.


[United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. and a collection of tax-paying and tax-exempt abortion rights supporters (ARM) sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferences). ARM alleged that the Conferences participated in political activities in violation of U.S. laws governing tax-exempt organizations and that this participation created an unfair advantage over other, rule-abiding tax-exempt groups and infringed upon the plaintiffs’ ability to participate in the political process as voters. After the court granted the Conferences motion to be dismissed as parties to the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ARM sought financial documents and other information from the Conferences to support their claims against the remaining defendants. When the Conferences refused to comply, the district court held them in civil contempt. On appeal, the Conferences contended that ARM lacked standing to bring its case against the government officials and, therefore, the court did not have the power to issue the contempt citation under Article III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and held that witnesses may challenge a contempt citation only on the grounds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute.


[United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority in which the Court reversed and remanded the appellate court’s ruling. The Court held that a nonparty witness may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit in defense of a civil contempt citation. The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction standard impermissibly expanded the reach of judicial power because it permitted a court to act in issues without an actual case or controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution. The Court also held that, because the judiciary may impose sanctions for the abuse of court processes, restricting a nonparty’s right to appeal a civil contempt citation is unnecessary.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that he agreed with the Second Circuit’s concern that allowing a witness to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges while appealing a contempt citation invited collusion with defendants who, unlike witnesses, lack a right to appeal interlocutory orders prior to a final judgment in the action. allowing a witness to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges while appealing a contempt citation invited collusion with defendants who, unlike witnesses, lack a right to appeal interlocutory orders prior to a final judgment in the case.


[Schweiker v. Chilicky (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to pursuing remedies through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act’s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages.


[Schweiker v. Chilicky (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the respondents were not entitled to monetary damages because they were not mentioned in the extensive remedial options provided in the Social Security Disability Act (Act). The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that this case was analogous to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, a case in which the Court ruled that, when a government actor violates a citizen’s legal right, federal courts may use any available remedy to make the wronged party whole. In Bivens there were no special circumstances preventing monetary damages, and Congress provided no legal redress in the statute. In this case, the Act provides an extensive remedial program in which Congress carefully considered the possibilities for remedy and specifically left out monetary damages.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he disagreed with the majority opinion’s decision to ignore the Solicitor General’s argument that Congress had enacted a statute expressly requiring dismissal of this complaint.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congressional silence on the monetary damages issue does not mean that the explicitly stated remedial process was intended to be the only source of remedy. He argued that legislators of “normal sensibilities” would have wanted some form of remedy for citizens wronged to the extent that respondents were. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


[California v. Greenwood (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Facts]
Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.


[California v. Greenwood (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1987-1988) — Conclusion]
Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public."


[Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.


[Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "advancement of religion" was not AFLA's primary effect. Although it funded religious and other institutions without expressly prohibiting the use of such funds for religious purposes, AFLA required potential recipients to reveal what services they intended to provide and how they would provide them. Thus, the government could protect against the misuse of its funds. At the same time, however, such oversight did not create an "excessive entanglement" between church and state because AFLA merely authorized funding of religiously affiliated, rather than pervasively sectarian, organizations. Finally, the Court remanded the matter to the district court for further determination of whether AFLA violated the establishment clause "as applied."


[New York State Club Association Inc. v. City of New York (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not "distinctly private." Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and institutions that hosted dining regularly, retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights.


[New York State Club Association Inc. v. City of New York (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court examined the clubs subjected to anti-discrimination laws closely and found "no evidence of any club, let alone a substantial number of clubs, for whom the Law impairs the ability to associate or to advocate public or private viewpoints." In addition, many of the clubs showed characteristics of a public nature. Often strangers attended club functions, partook in meals, and made financial contributions. So long as the clubs were sufficiently open to this type of exposure to outsiders, the clubs could not be closed to certain types of people on account of their race, sex, or religion. Prohibiting this type of discrimination did not impair a club's ability to advance a viewpoint because clubs could still select people for membership based on whether they shared similar beliefs.


[Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.


[Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the judgment for 6-3 court a wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall. In the Brennan's view, the Texas government "directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations" by providing the exemption. The Court referred to its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which required legislation affecting religion to have a secular purpose. In this case, the exemption did not have a secular purpose since it could not "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." Since taxing religious publications did not inhibit the exercise of religion, a state could not singularly remove taxes for religious publications while still taxing nonreligious publications. This would use state mechanisms to give religious publishers an advantage over nonreligious publishers in violation of the Establishment Clause.


[Mansell v. Mansell (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Major Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed.


[Mansell v. Mansell (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. The Court reversed the judgement and held that the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act exempted that portion of the retirement pay that a service member waived in order to receive disability benefits from the amount divisible upon divorce. While recognizing potential inequities to former spouses, the Court reasoned that the clear language of the statute could not be ignored.


[Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Penry, a man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's intellectual disability in imposing its sentence.


[Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the lower court's decision. Justice O'Connor argued that the jury was improperly instructed and should have been told that it could have considered Penry's mental deficiencies when imposing its sentence. However, she rejected Penry's blanket claim that generally the Eighth Amendment does not allow death sentences for defendants who are intellectually disabled ("retarded" in the Court's words).


[National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information.


[National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the "substantial interests" of the government in stifling the drug trade justified "departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements" associated with searches. The fact that customs personnel are the country's "first line of defense" against drug smugglers and they are exposed to a sometimes aggressive criminal element, places them in a unique and important position in which they have a "diminished expectation of privacy."


[Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1976, Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a design for a fiberglass recreational boat and made a model to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. No patent application was ever filed for protection. In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful to use a direct modeling process to duplicate and sell a vessel or part of a vessel. In 1984, Bonito sued Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft), a Tennessee corporation, in the Florida district court for violating the statute. Thunder Craft successfully argued that the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent laws and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment. The Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Florida law interfered with federal patent laws.


[Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that, under the Federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal patent system prevents the Florida statute. The Florida statute offered patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the federal patent system. This protection restricted the public’s ability to use unpatented designs, which conflicted with the free competition in ideas without patent protection that the federal patent system supported. Therefore, this Florida statute entered into a field of regulation that the patent laws have reserved for Congress, and Congress had declined to exercise.


[Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
CBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of "public record" and "interest." On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the U.S. Department of Justice certiorari.


[Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an individual's interest in nondisclosure of any criminal records that the FBI might have on him or her is precisely the sort of "personal privacy" that Congress intended to protect when it enacted FOIA exemptions. Balancing public knowledge interests against privacy considerations, the Court explained that RCFP's request was overly broad. The request sought access to all FBI records on Medico, rather than specific information concerning his file. Moreover, the Court stated that public interest in criminal record information is not increased simply because the requesting party is a news agency.


[Brower v. Inyo County (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached.
After Caldwell’s death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Brower v. Inyo County (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the police intentionally acquire physical control of a person or possessions. In this case, the violation occurred because Caldwell clearly intended to continue driving, and the police actions intended to forcibly stop his car.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in judgment. He argued that the majority’s opinion established a test for Fourth Amendment violations based on police intent. However, since not every Fourth Amendment violation is intentional, this test could not be used to decide all Fourth Amendment cases. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.


[Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.


[Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.


[Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.


[Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the government's interest in assuring safety on the nation's railroads constituted a "special need" which justified a departure from standard warrant and probable-cause requirements in searches. Preventing accidents, the goal of most railroad regulations including the one in this case, argued Justice Kennedy, was such a significant concern that it warranted reduced "expectations of privacy" for railroad employees.


[Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
When first questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer "if and when you go to court." The following day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible.


[Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a closely divided decision, the Court held that informing Eagan that an attorney would be appointed for him "if and when you go to court" did not render the Miranda warnings inadequate. The Court reasoned that officers did not have to use the specific language of the Miranda decision so long as they reasonably conveyed to suspects their constitutional rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the instructions given to Eagan accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana.


[Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.


[Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
The Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Thus, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.


[Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) made an oral agreement with James Reid, a sculptor, to produce a statue depicting the plight of the homeless for display at a 1985 Washington D.C. Christmas pageant. Upon completion, delivery, and joining of the work to a base that it prepared separately, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the agreed-upon price. Shortly thereafter, the parties filed competing copyright claims over the sculpture. Holding, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"), that the statue was a "work made for hire," a district court ruled in favor of CCNV. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted CCNV certiorari.


[Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the statue's preparation was not a "work for hire" as defined by the Act because Reid was not a CCNV employee. Instead, CCNV hired Reid as an independent contractor. Reid's independent status was evident because he supplied his own tools, worked in his own studio in another city, was retained for less than two months, decided his own work schedule, received salary that was contingent on the sculpture's completion, and had sole discretion over hiring and paying assistants. Moreover, CCNV did not pay social security taxes for Reid nor did it provide him any employee benefits.


[Martin v. Wilks (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
As a result of a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.


[Martin v. Wilks (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because "a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party," the white firefighters were not precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decrees. The Court argued that "[t]he parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action" and that they were better suited to intervene when their rights were immediately threatened. Conversely, the Court noted that "[n]o one can seriously contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier suit."


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1983, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) challenged the flat tax portion of Arkansas' Highway Use Equalization (HUE) tax, alleging that it violated the Commerce Clause. The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim. Subsequently, on June 23, 1987, the Supreme Court decided American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which held that state application of flat highway use taxes was unconstitutional. Pending re-hearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun ordered, in August 1987, that all new taxes collected be kept in escrow. Subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that HUE was unconstitutional, but that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. The court went on to decide that taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, could remain in the state treasury, but that those funds placed in the escrow account ordered by Justice Blackmun should be refunded, as they had not been spent or budgeted for future spending.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No and no. A plurality of the Court held that Scheiner did not apply retroactively, and that state collection of taxes for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, before the establishment of the escrow account, was unconstitutional. Applying the test of non-retroactivity articulated in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court found that Scheiner clearly established a new principle of law; that the purpose of the Commerce Clause did not support retroactive application; and that equitable considerations weighed heavily against retroactivity. The Court went on to reverse the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision not to refund taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, reasoning that the conduct to which Scheiner applied prospectively was the use of the highway, not the payment of money therefor. Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but disagreed with the plurality's retroactivity analysis. He found that the only reason to follow Scheiner, which he believed to be wrongly decided, was the doctrine of stare decisis, which only applies prospectively.