[Mishkin v. New York () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No, yes, and yes. The Court upheld Mishkin’s conviction, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Justice Brennan rejected Mishkin’s argument that the New York statute’s use of the terms “sadistic” and “masochistic” was impermissibly vague, because the state’s definition was narrower than used by the Court in Roth v. United States. The Court also rejected Mishkin’s argument that the material did not meet the Roth test’s prurient-appeal requirement in that it did not appeal to the prurient interests of the average person. The Court held that the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of material appeals to the prurient interests of members of a sexual subgroup. It pointed to evidence that Mishkin instructed the books to be specifically conceived and marketed to appeal to “sexually deviant groups”.
The Court also rejected Mishkin’s argument that there was insufficient proof that he knew the material was obscene. The Court noted Mishkin’s instructions to his artists and writers, his efforts to disguise his role in the enterprise by publishing the books anonymously, and the sheer volume of material. According to the Court, this evidence showed Mishkin was aware of the character of the material.
Justice Hugo Black dissented, arguing that the Court and lower federal courts are without power to censor obscene material regardless of its subject matter.
Justice Potter Stewart dissented, arguing that the material in question was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, in a combined response to the majorities of Mishkin and Ginzburg v. United States. He referenced testimony at trial indicating that several of the books in question have redeeming social value. He also questioned New York's right to limit publishers' ability to cater to nonconformist groups.


[Sheppard v. Maxwell () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Sheppard v. Maxwell () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.


[Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
On April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry’s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry’s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation.
Byars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry’s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, “You mean to say we can’t stand here on the sidewalk?” Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry’s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence.
On April 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder’s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars’ initially testified that the group’s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution’s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth’s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth’s applications for certiorari and rehearing.


[Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Potter Stewart held that while both portions of the statute were facially constitutional, the trial court unconstitutionally applied the “obstructing free passage” portion of the ordinance. Justice Stewart noted that in Phifer v. City of Birmingham, the Alabama Court of Appeals later interpreted the statute to apply only when a person who obstructs free passage on a sidewalk also refuses to obey a request by an officer to move on. The trial court did not have this interpretation available to it, and it made no findings of fact and rendered no opinion. Justice Stewart inferred from this that the trial court may have applied an unconstitutionally literal interpretation of the statute, where either obstructing free passage on the sidewalk or disobeying a police order to move on would be sufficient for a finding of guilt.
Justice Stewart also held that the trial court unconstitutionally applied the "move on" portion of the ordinance to Shuttlesworth. Justice Stewart again referred to Phifer, where the Court held that the police order in question must be related to directing vehicular traffic because that section of the Birmingham General City Code was related to regulating vehicular traffic. In contrast, the record for Shuttlesworth’s case did not contain any evidence that Patrolman Byars was directing vehicular traffic.
Justice William Douglas concurred. He reasoned that Shuttlesworth could not have been blocking traffic when he was arrested because all other members of his group had left by that point.
Justice Abraham Fortas also concurred, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Justice Fortas would have finally reversed the conviction. While agreeing that the statute is constitutional on its face, he argued that there was no way the facts could be construed to show that Shuttlesworth and his group were actually obstructing the sidewalk. He accused Birmingham of using the statute as a pretext to lock up a notorious civil rights activist.


[Dennis v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board.


[Dennis v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes, not addressed, and yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the indictment properly charged a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government under 18 U.S.C. 371. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Abe Fortas, argued that the conspiracy of filing the false affidavits was intentional and that the events of filing the affidavits and using the NLRB facilities together were a "concert of action" with the purpose of defrauding the Government. The Court refused to hear the question of the constitutionality of 9(h) as the union officers' attempt was to circumvent the law. The relevant standard, according to Fortas, is that the Court will not hear a constitutionality claim to supplant a "voluntary, deliberate, and calculated course of fraud and deceit," as conspiracy to defraud is not an appropriate way to challenge acts of government. The Court also held that the defense should have been allowed access to the grand jury minutes containing the prosecution witnesses' testimonies with an opportunity to question the witnesses regarding their statements. The majority opinion maintained that the union officers exceeded the particularized need standard that is used to evaluate access to grand jury testimony, and thus access should have been granted to the defense, especially as an evaluation is best made by a defense advocate and not a trial judge during in-camera inspection. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo L. Black joined this part of the majority opinion but dissented from the remainder. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.


[United States v. Price () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
On June 21, 1964 Cecil Ray Price, a sheriff’s deputy, detained three civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, in the Neshoba County Jail, in Philadelphia, Mississippi. That night, Price released all three men from custody, and then drove his police cruiser to intercept them on Mississippi Highway 19. Price accosted the three men, placed them in his police car, and then drove them down an unpaved road. There Price and seventeen other men, including both local citizens and members of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department, executed the three men and dumped their bodies in a construction site. All eighteen defendants were subsequently arrested and were indicted by a Grand Jury on January 15, 1965 for violating federal statutes. The first statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 241, dealt with criminal conspiracies. The second statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 242, criminalized anyone acting under the color of law from depriving any of the rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the charges for violating 18 U.S.C.S. 242 against the non-police officer defendants, claiming that the indictment did not state an actual offense against the United States. This appeal followed.


[United States v. Price () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, Justice Abe Fortas reinstated the indictment against all defendants. First, Justice Fortas addressed 18 U.S. C.S. 242 as applied to the non-police officers. Here, he noted that private citizens can act under the color of law where they are joining state officials in engaging in prohibited actions, as they did in this case. Therefore, the “color of law” indictments should be reinstated against all of the defendants, not merely the police officers. Next, Justice Fortas addressed the alleged violation of 18 U.S.C.S. 241, the criminal conspiracy statute. Here, Justice Fortas stated that a criminal conspiracy, perpetrated in part by state officials, constitutes a state action and therefore falls under the United States’ authority granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Fortas then addressed the history of this statute, and the Fourteenth Amendment. To him, this history, including the civil war, racial violence, Klu Klux Klan, and voter intimidation, solidified his conclusion that the conspiracy statute was designed to be read against the backdrop of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in this decision, noting some disagreement with the majority’s use of the case of United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58; United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70; and Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70. This case also inspired the 1988 film, Mississippi Burning.


[Harris v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Al Harris refused to answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the District Court for the Southern District of New York where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Harris v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority and held that Harris' conduct did not rise to the level of contempt covered under 42(a). The rule is reserved for acts such as threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing. The Court also felt the "real contempt" occurred before the grand jury, not the district court. Because Harris' conduct was not covered, he should be given notice of and a separate hearing for criminal contempt as provided by Rule 42(b). With this decision the court overruled Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959). Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent stating that the issue was resolved in Brown and there is no reason to overrule that decision.


[Evans v. Newton () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
In his will, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon left a piece of real estate to the city of Macon in Georgia. He intended the land to be used as a park that only whites could access. The city, as the named trustee, created a board of managers to operate the park, and it eventually allowed African Americans to use it. Trying to effectuate the Senator's will, individual managers of the park sued to remove the city as trustee because it was constitutionally unable to enforce the racially restrictive component of the will. After the city complied and resigned as trustee, private trustees appointed by a state court resumed excluding African Americans. A group of African Americans then brought an action on the grounds that the racial exclusion still violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state courts upheld the appointment of the private trustees.


[Evans v. Newton () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
A private park operator is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment if the park is municipal in character.
Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice William O. Douglas held that racial discrimination is prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment in any state-sponsored situation. In this situation, the city maintained and managed the park, which had become an integral part of the city. This makes the operation of the park a public function, despite the fact that it was managed by private trustees. A park provides municipal services, such as mass recreation, so equal protection should apply.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the city’s resignation was based on the false understanding that the city cannot enforce the dictates of the trust but that the private trustees can. Since racial discrimination regarding the use of public property is unconstitutional, the private trustees could not enforce the will any more than the city could.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court unnecessarily overstepped its bounds by hearing a case that should be decided solely according to interpretation of state law by the state courts. Since there is no constitutional reason to prevent a municipality from resigning a trusteeship, the issue is one for the states to decide individually.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari because the case had no federal implications.


[United States v. Guest () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
On July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. The U.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or more individuals conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a specific denial of rights under U.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[United States v. Guest () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
If a state participates at all in a conspiracy it has violated the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to any individuals whose rights are infringed, based on the constitutional right to travel.
In an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that a criminal conspiracy affecting an individual's right of free interstate passage violated the law. The Court reasoned that the indictment contained an express allegation of state involvement sufficient at least to require denial of a motion to dismiss. If the predominate purpose of the conspiracy is to prevent the exercise of the right of travel, or to oppress a person of that right, as was the case here, then whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of federal law under which the indictment was brought. Therefore, the federal indictment was based on an offense under the laws of the United States.
Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurred.
Justice Harlan dissented in part and concurred in part.
Justice Brannan, joined by Justices Warrant and Douglas, dissented in part and concurred in part.


[Schmerber v. California () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted.


[Schmerber v. California () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Brennan argued for a 5-4 majority that the protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."


[Hanna Mining Company v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Hanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were "supervisors" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be "employees." The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing.
Hanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.


[Hanna Mining Company v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 decision Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority. While a state may not regulate conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the Supreme Court found that Hanna's engineers were supervisors, not employees, and were not covered under the Act. The NLRA did not preempt Wisconsin's authority in this situation. The Court reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.


[Miranda v. Arizona () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation.
On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.


[Miranda v. Arizona () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody.
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant’s interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.
Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.


[United States v. Huck Manufacturing Co. () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Huck Manufacturing Company owned the patent for a certain type of lock bolt. Huck granted a license to Townsend Company to manufacture the lock bolt on the condition that Townsend sell those bolts at a price set by Huck. Huck granted no other licenses to manufacture its lock bolt patents. The United States filed a complaint against Huck and Townsend, alleging Sherman Act violations of conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade and monopolize interstate commerce in lock bolts. The district court ruled in favor of Huck and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[United States v. Huck Manufacturing Co. () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision by an equally divided court. Justice Abe Fortas did not participate.


[Katzenbach v. Morgan () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
New York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.


[Katzenbach v. Morgan () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that Section 4(e) is a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Congress exercised its powers consistent with those afforded it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court then concluded that the Supremacy Clause prevented the enforcement of the New York English literacy requirement.


[Klopfer v. North Carolina () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
The State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a nolle prosequi with leave. This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state’s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute.


[Klopfer v. North Carolina () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that indefinitely suspending a trial violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The Court also held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Sixth Amendment to the states. The Court noted that almost every state has rejected the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reasoning. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, but argued that incorporating the Sixth Amendment is not necessary. He based his decision solely on the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart also concurred in the result.


[Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Harry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent the appointment and continued employment of “subversive persons.” Because the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program.


[Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y. () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the provisions of the New York plan were defined in such uncertain terms that they infringed upon the constitutional rights of public servants. Because the country had an interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of teachers in order for the educational system to be as free and open as possible, such overly broad and vague requirements both violated the teachers’ rights and were detrimental to the profession. The Court held that the government could only regulate First Amendment rights with “narrow specificity.” The Court also held that specific provisions of the Civil Service Law and Educational Service Law were too overly broad because they prohibit membership in the Communist Party without determining whether or not there was any specific intent to overthrow the United States government.
Justice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that the duties of a public servant allow the government to inquire into the employee’s fitness to serve in a particular position. He also argued that the provisions in question are specific to actions that “advocate, advise, or teach” the overthrow of the United States government and are not unconstitutionally vague. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


[Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Several American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers’ plants in Canada. Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment. Later, Canada Packers’ sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for the unreasonably low original payment. The railroads refused to pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the U.S.A. The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed.


[Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) authorizes the ICC to determine reasonable rates where a carrier has entered into a joint through international rate covering transportation in the United States and abroad. Consequently, the ICC had the authority to order reparations. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent citing the ICA, which states the ICC can only regulate “insofar as such transportation...takes place within the United States.


[In re Gault () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.


[In re Gault () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. The proceedings of the Juvenile Court failed to comply with the Constitution. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in Gault's case met none of these requirements.


[Garrity v. New Jersey () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the Attorney General to investigate alleged irregularities in the handling of cases in the municipal courts of certain boroughs. As part of that investigation, police officers were brought in for questioning. They were told that anything they said might be used against them in a state criminal proceeding and that they could refuse to answer, but such refusal might be grounds for dismissal. The appellants represent a group of police officers who answered the questions and were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants were convicted and they appealed by arguing that their statements were coerced by the threat of the loss of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions.


[Garrity v. New Jersey () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the threat of the loss of employment placed the interviewee in the bind of being forced to choose between self-incrimination and the loss of livelihood. In such a situation, there is no chance for the interviewee to reach a free and rational decision. The Court also held that policemen and other public servants are entitled to the same constitutional rights as other citizens, and that there was precedent to establish threat of a loss of employment as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there should not be an inflexible rule regarding coercion, but rather that each case should be decided based on its individual facts. He argued that the government had a valid interest in ensuring the integrity of its police officers and other public servants, and that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the state from discharging an employee who refuses to answer questions regarding his job performance and conditions for future employment.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that there was no evidence that the admissions were involuntary, given the fact that all the officers were informed of their rights and had counsel present at their interviews. There is no reason to suspect that they were subject to mental coercion based on any of the techniques that were present in previous coercion cases. He also argued that the statements were admissible as a matter of law because it is constitutionally permissible for a state to establish reasonable qualifications and standards of conduct for its employees. There was no constitutional reason for an employer to be unable to expect an employee to provide information pertinent to his employment. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.


[Adderley v. Florida () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.


[Adderley v. Florida () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he "objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest," there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.


[Gilbert v. California () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Jesse James Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and the murder of a police officer in Alhambra, California. Gilbert refused to answer questions about the robbery charge without the advice of counsel, but later answered questions about a robbery in which the robber, allegedly Gilbert, used a handwritten note demanding the money. He gave the police handwriting exemplars, which were later admitted into evidence. The police also had eyewitnesses identify Gilbert in a line-up that was conducted without notice to his counsel. During the trial, several witnesses identified Gilbert in the courtroom as being a part of multiple robberies, including the Alhambra robbery. No distinction was made as to whether the in-court identifications were independent of the illegal line-ups that occurred before the trial. The jury rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed.


[Gilbert v. California () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No, yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that taking the handwriting exemplars was constitutional. While the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, a handwriting exemplar simply identifies a physical characteristic and is therefore outside of its protection. Also, taking exemplars without counsel present would not affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court held that the admission of the in-court identifications without determining them to be impartial violates the Constitution. Since the identification line-up was the result of an illegal procedure, the state must establish that the in-court identifications are independent of those conducted illegally.
Justice Hugo L. Black delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the admission of the writing exemplars violated Gilbert’s constitutional rights because his counsel was not present at the time this evidence was obtained. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the general search for evidence did not violate the Constitution.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there was no need to establish that the in-court identifications were independent from the illegal identification line-up. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.


[Walker v. City of Birmingham () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Civil rights activists who planned to march on Good Friday and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated their intention to march anyway, Birmingham obtained an injunction from a state court which ordered them to refrain from demonstrating. Marchers who defied the order, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, were arrested.


[Walker v. City of Birmingham () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
The Court upheld the arrests since Walker failed to use proper judicial procedures to test the injunction's validity. Even though, Justice Stewart admitted, the injunction seemed broad and vague, and the marchers may not have enjoyed due process when applying for the permit originally, simply disobeying the injunction was illegitimate as "no man can be judge in his own case . . . however righteous his motives."


[United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
The United States brought an antitrust action against Arnold, Schwinn & Co. and its distributor Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association. Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers. The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade. The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal


[United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Sometimes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that it is unreasonable for a manufacturer to restrict where its products are sold after it has transferred title and responsibility for loss. In situations where Arnold retains title, and the dealer acts as an agent or salesperson, those restrictions are not a restraint on trade. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a partial dissent, expressing disagreement with the majority’s argument that Arnold’s practices become illegal when carried out through a distributor. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the partial dissent. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Byron R. White did not participate.


[Stovall v. Denno () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
On August 23, 1961, Dr. Paul Berheldt was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home. His wife was also injured in the attack. The next day, Theodore Stovall was arrested for the murder and promptly arraigned, but he did not yet have counsel. On August 25, although Stovall had still not retained counsel, police brought him to the hospital room where Mrs. Berheldt’s was recovering from surgery to see if she could identify him. Stovall was the only African-American man in the room and was handcuffed to a police officer. Mrs. Berheldt positively identified him after he was directed to say a few words for voice identification purposes. The prosecution used this identification as evidence in the trial, and Mrs. Berheldt again identified Stovall in court.
Stovall was convicted, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Stovall sought habeas corpus relief in district court on the grounds that Mrs. Berheldt’s identification was inadmissible. The district court dismissed after hearing argument on an unrelated issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
In 1967, the Court issued rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California that excluded identification evidence from trial when identification came from a tainted lineup — one at which the defendants did not have counsel present.


[Stovall v. Denno () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No, No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the decision to retroactively apply rulings of criminal procedure depended on the potential impact of that ruling on the fact-finding at trial. In this case, the identification, while a crucial stage of the investigation and trial, could be conducted well or poorly regardless of the presence of counsel. The Court held that the circumstances of this case were such that, given the uncertainty of Mrs. Berheldt’s medical status, the identification could not have been conducted any other way. Also, the retroactive application of the rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California would greatly disrupt the justice system.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the identification in the hospital room was not constitutionally improper. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the concurrence.
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the right to have counsel present at an identification should be granted retroactively.
Justice Abe Fortas wrote a dissent and argued that the State’s use of the hospital identification in the trial was prejudicial and violated Stovall’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
In his dissent, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that people put in prison by evidence that is later found unconstitutional should not be denied the benefit of those rulings. He also argued that the Court’s case-by-case determination of due process granted the Court too much power and failed to give the government a solid constitutional standard.


[Osborn v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
At attorney Z.T. Osborn’s trial for attempting to bribe a juror in a federal criminal trial, the judge admitted a tape recording of an incriminating conversation between Osborn and a local police officer. The officer recorded the conversation secretly under authorization of the court. Osborn argued that the recording violated his right to privacy and he was entrapped. A jury convicted Osborn and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirmed.


[Osborn v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes, No, No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 7-1 majority, affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that using the secret recording did not violate Osborn’s rights. The recording was also properly admitted as evidence. The trial court properly left the question of entrapment to the jury. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that recording the conversation violated Osborn’s constitutional right to privacy. Justice Byron R. White did not participate.


[Redrup v. New York () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Robert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal.
William Austin owned a retail bookstore and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name –High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial.
Gent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling."


[Redrup v. New York () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a per curiam decision, the court reversed the judgments of the respective lower courts, holding that while members of the majority advocated a variety of legal approaches to obscenity cases, the judgments at hand did not withstand scrutiny under any of the available approaches. The court specified that two of its members argue that the court has no authority to control publications on obscenity grounds, a third member limits the state's authority to a specific and readily identifiable class of material, and other members limit the state's authority to prurient material that is offensive to the specific community and has no redeeming social value. Yet another justice did not view social value as an independent factor. The court held that the judgments failed all of these tests.
Justice John Harlan, joined by Justice Thomas Clark, dissented, noting that Redrup v. New York and Austin v. Kentucky originally raised questions regarding the scienter requirement in obscenity prosecutions; Gent v. Arkansas was granted review to answer questions of vagueness and prior restraint under an Arkansas anti-obscenity statute. He argued that the majority decided a question that was not before it and in doing so avoided the questions of scienter, vagueness and prior restraint actually raised by the cases.


[Hoffa v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
These are several consolidated cases involving similar circumstances. In the lead case, a district court in Tennessee tried and convicted James Hoffa, the president of a labor union, for attempting to bribe members of a jury in an earlier trial. A paid government informer provided substantial evidence in the bribery trial. The informer was another local union officer who met with Hoffa on several occasions during the first trial. At that time, the government had not hired the officer as an informant. Hoffa alleged that the evidence gathered from this informer violated his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Hoffa v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a plurality opinion for four members of the court affirming the court of appeals. The plurality held that the government did not procure the evidence deceptively. Use of the evidence did not violate Hoffa’s Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure or his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the writs should be dismissed as improvidently granted. Justice William O. Douglas joined in this dissent. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent, expressing that this holding strayed from the standards of justice in the federal system.


[United States v. Wade () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Billy Joe Wade was arrested and indicted for robbing a federally-insured bank. Without giving notice to Wade’s counsel, an FBI officer set up a lineup for two bank employees including Wade and several other prisoners. The officer had each prisoner put strips of tape on their face and say, “Put the money in the bag,” like the robbers did. The employees identified Wade as the robber. At trial, the employees identified him again. Wade’s counsel moved to strike the identifications because the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.


[United States v. Wade () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Maybe. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan vacated the lower judgment and remanded to determine whether the employees based their trial identifications solely on the lineup. The Supreme Court affirmed that the lineup did not violate Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination. To decide the Sixth Amendment issue, courts must decide whether counsel’s presence at a pre-trial confrontation of the accused will preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial. In this case, Wade was entitled to counsel at the lineup. The Court held that the identifications should not be excluded if they were based on observations other than the lineup.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented in part and concurred in part, expressing that the lineup violated Wade's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Black would affirm the conviction, though, because the prosecution did not use evidence of the lineup at trial. Justice Byron R. White dissented in part and concurred in part, stating that Wade was not entitled to counsel at the lineup. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the opinion. Justice Abe Fortas concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that the lineup violated Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the opinion.


[Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case.


[Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court noted significant differences between the circumstances of these cases and those of New York Times. In particular, criticism of Butts or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. The situation in Butts contrasted with Walker, where the AP relied on a correspondent on the scene of an event that was immediately newsworthy. The Court thus denied Walker's claims to damages.


[Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the "established name" of the drug "prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug," on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices.
The act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name every time its corresponding proprietary name is used.
Abbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Abbott Laboratories argued that the "every time" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress.
Chief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's "every time" interpretation. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 other drug manufacturers appealed the decision.


[Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. Writing for the majority in a 5-3 decision, Justice John Harlan wrote that where the legal issue is fit for judicial resolution and a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in plaintiffs' conduct with potentially serious penalties, the law permits access to the courts under the APA and the DJA. The Court found that congress did not intend to forbid pre-enforcement review of regulations like the "every time" rule. The legislature designed the statute's specific review provisions to provide additional remedies for parties in Abbott Laboratories' position, not to cut down traditional channels of review. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals.
Justice Abraham Fortas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Thomas Clark. He wrote that courts have jurisdiction over challenges to administrative action only when there is a specific statutory provision, when the agency acts unconstitutionally, or when it acts without jurisdiction. Justice Fortas feared that the majority's ruling would give federal district judges a "roving commission to halt the regulatory process." He reviewed the legislative history of the FFDCA and found that congress had consistently reserved judicial review for specific situations not including the present case.
Justice Clark wrote a separate dissent arguing that the commissioner was right to prevent drug manufacturers from misleading the public about the content of their proprietary drugs.
Justice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Loving v. Virginia () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).


[Loving v. Virginia () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."


[Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
In an antitrust suit, the U.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock. Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the district court denied the motions. The district court approved El Paso’s divestiture plan, under which El Paso would create a new company to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets. The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-2 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the gas companies had the right to intervene. The Court also gave guidelines for the district court to follow in its new order for divestiture. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that private parties do not have the right to intervene in government antitrust suits. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Abe Fortas did not participate.


[Afroyim v. Rusk () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall "lose" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.


[Afroyim v. Rusk () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, overruling Perez v. Brownell (356 US 44), the Court held that Congress has no general power to revoke American citizenship without consent. Noting the special bond between Americans and their government, a bond that protects every citizen against all manner of destruction of their rights, the Court held that only citizens themselves may voluntarily relinquish their citizenship. This sacred principle applies equally to natural and naturalized citizens. As such, Section 401(e) violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.


[Warden v. Hayden () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Around 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden’s room.
Hayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had “evidential value only” and was improperly admitted into evidence at trial.


[Warden v. Hayden () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the language and purpose of the Fourth Amendment does not support such a distinction. Because the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect the privacy of citizens from being violated by the government, the type of property that is the subject of the search is irrelevant to the protection provided. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment.
Justice Abe Fortas wrote a partial concurrence in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of searches to those items which can be directly tied to the commission of a crime. He also argued that the protection against general searches is a fundamental aspect of the Fourth Amendment, and the majority’s opinion damages that protection. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the partial concurrence.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment provides protection of both privacy and property. He argued that not all evidence discovered in a lawful search is admissible, particularly if it serves a testimonial purpose that would violate the Fifth Amendment rights of the defendant.


[Spevack v. Klein () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
The New York Bar charged Samuel Spevack, an attorney from New York, with professional misconduct because he refused to produce financial records and testify at a judicial inquiry. In his defense, Spevack claimed his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and stated that the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The New York appellate court rejected Spevack's defense and ordered Spevack disbarred, holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not available to attorneys against states.


[Spevack v. Klein () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the plurality opinion of the Court reversing the lower court's decision. Writing for himself and three other justices, Douglas maintained that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable against states because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from interfering with the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, including the right to remain silent without suffering a penalty. This protection extends to lawyers, and Spevack should have been able to assert his right against self-incrimination without being penalized by the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of his livelihood.
Justice Abe Fortas voted with the majority but wrote a special concurrence distinguishing between a lawyer's right to remain silent, which he acknowledged, and that of a public employee, who could be questioned about his official duties without the self-incrimination protection.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, joined by Justices Tom Clark and Potter Stewart. Harlan wrote that the State of New York had the authority to impose valid conditions on the authority to practice law and to assess qualifications for continued practice. He concluded that the plurality improperly invalidated New York's rules by reversing Spevack's disbarment and determined that protection from disbarment for failure to provide information to a judicial inquiry went beyond the scope of the right against self-incrimination.


[Washington v. Texas () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, actually shot the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.


[Washington v. Texas () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes, Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for eight members of the court, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington was denied that right in this case. Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, writing that Washington’s right to due process was violated, but the compulsory process clause played no role in his decision.


[Berenyi v. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Kalman Berenyi applied for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After a hearing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the application, finding that Berenyi gave false testimony to facilitate his naturalization, so he was not a person of “good moral character.” In Berenyi’s application, he denied membership in the Communist Party, but two witnesses testified that Berenyi often spoke of his Party membership and lead a study group on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Berenyi appealed, arguing that the government failed to show that he had a “meaningful association” with the Communist Party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Berenyi v. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the First Circuit. The Supreme Court held that it could not review a factual finding by two lower courts without an obvious and exceptional showing of error. The record gave no indication that the district court or the court of appeals made such an error. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous based on other evidence presented at the naturalization hearing. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Travis v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
This is a companion case to United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis’ passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, the U.S. government did not allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Travis v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Abe Fortas, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that area restrictions on an otherwise valid passport are not criminally enforceable under the Immigration and Nationality Act.


[United States v. Robel () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “defense facility”. The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[United States v. Robel () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-2 decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority holding that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association even if it applied only to active Party members. The Supreme Court held that the provision was overbroad and the war power does not give Congress a blank slate to do whatever it wants. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the judgment, writing that Congress’ delegation of authority in designating defense facilities to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because they provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the Communist Party’s goal of government overthrow justified the ban on employment in defense facilities. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


[Parker v. Gladden () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
On May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During the trial, the bailiff stated to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, “Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.” Misses Inwards and Drake, both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court.
After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs’ statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror who was sure of the bailiffs’ statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff’s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman’s.
Parker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff’s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff’s statements did not violate Parker’s state or federal constitutional rights.


[Parker v. Gladden () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Court held that the bailiff's statements violated Parker’s right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to trial by an impartial jury. The Court noted that there was no dispute over what the bailiff said, nor any dispute over whether he was subjected to confrontation, cross-examination or other constitutional safeguards. The Court held that the bailiff’s speech was private talk tending to reach the jury by outside influence. The Court rejected the government’s argument that no prejudice was shown because ten members of the jury testified that they did not hear the bailiff’s statement, pointing to one juror’s testimony that she was prejudiced by the bailiff’s statements. The Court also noted the official character of the bailiff's role with the court.
Justice John Harlan dissented, disagreeing that the Sixth Amendment was directly applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He rejected the Court’s assumption that jurors must be absolutely insulated from all expressions of opinion on the merits of cases, citing cases where the Court refused to overthrow a verdict despite jury contact with outside information. He also questioned the evidence of Mrs. Inwards’ prejudice, ascribing her claims of prejudicial influence to post-conviction guilt.


[United States v. Sealy, Inc. () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
Until about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers.
In 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940’s, Sealy’s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories.
The Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.’s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.’s price fixing violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.’s licensing structure.


[United States v. Sealy, Inc. () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-1 decision written by Justice Abraham Fortas, the Court held that Sealy’s licensing structure was a horizontal restraint of trade, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. He noted that the licensees controlled the day-to-day business of Sealy through the board of directors and the executive committee, including the grant, assignment, reassignment, and termination of exclusive territorial licenses. Justice Fortas held that Sealy’s behavior was an aggregation of trade restraints, reasoning that Sealy’s territorial restraints were a part of its admittedly unlawful price fixing scheme. While acknowledging that the territorial limitations served other purposes, he reasoned that their connection to price fixing was enough to require they be condemned as an unlawful restraint of trade.
Justice John Harlan dissented. He argued that Sealy’s territorial licensing structure was a vertical arrangement not prohibited by the Sherman Act. He described the main purpose of Sealy’s licensing structure as the proper exploitation of the Sealy name and trademarks by licensed bedding manufacturers. Justice Harlan argued that the territorial restrictions were secondary or ancillary to that purpose. He rejected the majority’s theory that Sealy’s actions were an aggregation of trade restraints, noting that the district court did not address the reasonableness of Sealy’s territorial arrangements.
Justices Tom Clark and Byron White took no part in the decision of the case.


[Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.


[Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspector obtain a warrant before searching his home. He also cannot be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. This decision overruled Frank v. Maryland
Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that Frank v. Maryland settled the question and must be followed. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent


[Chapman v. California () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
On October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club’s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman’s general description and Adcock stood in front of the club’s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door.
The next day, the Spot Club’s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body’s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found.
Officers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman’s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting.
Chapman and Teale were charged with the first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman’s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants’ failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. State of California that California’s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants’ silence against them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.


[Chapman v. California () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No and no. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court affirmed that there may be some constitutional errors so unimportant and insignificant that they are harmless. Justice Black noted that all fifty states have harmless error statutes or rules, and that Congress established a longstanding rule for federal courts that judgments should not be reversed for errors that do not affect parties’ substantial rights.
Justice Black determined that federal law must govern the application of a state harmless error rule; the Court cannot leave the formulation of rules protecting individuals from invasion by the states to those very same states. Justice Black then cited the holding from Fahy v. State of Connecticut, where the Court determined that an error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Here, the prosecution repeatedly told the jury that by their silence Chapman and Teale had served as irrefutable witnesses against themselves; absent these comments, reasonable jurors might well have returned a not-guilty verdict. Thus, the state had not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutions’ comments did not contribute to Chapman and Teale’s conviction, and the error was harmful.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred, noting that the Court previously reversed all convictions of guilt when defendants had given involuntary confessions at trial. Justice Stewart rejected the notion that such constitutional violations could ever be harmless.
Justice John Harlan dissented, arguing that the state appellate court reasonably applied California’s harmless error rule to sustain Chapman and Teale’s conviction, and that California’s harmless error rule was consistent with the guarantee of fundamental fairness in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Harlan rejected the majority’s assumption of a general supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues, finding no source for that power in the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Witherspoon v. Illinois () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Facts]
Witherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with "conscientious scruples" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment.
Witherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no constitutional violation took place.


[Witherspoon v. Illinois () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held 6-3 that Witherspoon's death sentence was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that a jury composed after the dismissal of all who oppose the death sentence was biased in favor the death sentence; such a jury was not impartial and thus violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that while jurors who say they will not impose the death sentence can be dismissed, jurors who simply oppose the death sentence as a personal belief may not. Justice William Douglas, concurring, argued that it also unconstitutional to dismiss prospective jurors who say they will never impose the death sentence.
Justice Hugo Black, with whom Justices John Harlan and Byron White joined, dissented. Douglas argued that the Constitution allows the dismissal of all jurors who oppose the death penalty personally, because they will be necessarily biased against the death penalty. In a separate dissent, White argued that the Illinois legislature was allowed to exclude "those with doubts" about "one of the punishments among which the legislature sought to have them choose...."


[Bumper v. North Carolina () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Facts]
Wayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper’s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper’s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to the search. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.


[Bumper v. North Carolina () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, for a search to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the consent must have been freely and voluntarily given. A search that relies on a warrant cannot be justified on the basis of consent if the warrant turns out to be faulty, regardless of the police officer’s knowledge of the faultiness of the warrant. Therefore, the evidence obtained during the search in this case should not have been admitted into evidence.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that, because the introduction of the rifle into evidence was not harmless error in the sense that Bumper’s guilt was not adjudicated based solely on constitutionally admissible evidence, not in the sense that he was improperly convicted.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he highlighted the fact that Leath testified that her consent “was all [her] own free will.” The fact that the police did not have a warrant does not negate the fact that Mrs. Leath wanted the police to search her premises to show her innocence; therefore, her consent was freely and voluntarily given. Justice Black also argued that, while all evidence found in the illegal search must be thrown out, Bumper should still have been found guilty without a mandatory retrial. In his separate dissent, Justice White dissented and argued that not every search conditionally consented to must be deemed invalid. The fact that the evidence was discovered illegally and without a warrant does not mean that the evidence should not be deemed legal if a valid warrant is eventually presented.


[Wainwright v. City of New Orleans () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Facts]
On October 12, 1964, Wainwright, a student at Tulane University Law School, was out walking around midnight. Two New Orleans Police Department officers stopped him because, in their opinion, he fitted the description of a man suspected of murder. Wainwright told the officers he had identification at home, but not on his person. The officers then asked Wainwright to remove this jacket so that they could search him for a tattoo that the suspected murdered had on his left arm. Wainwright ultimately refused to do so after trying to walk away and some mild verbal sparing. The officers then arrested him on a charge of vagrancy by loitering and frisked him. After Wainwright continued to refuse to remove his jacket at the police station, officers used force to remove it and discovered that he had no tattoo.


[Wainwright v. City of New Orleans () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.


[Alderman v. United States () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Facts]
The petitioners were convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the government had relied on illegally obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing.
The United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed in camera by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term.


[Alderman v. United States () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Conclusion]
Yes and Yes. In a majority opinion speaking for himself and four other members of the Court, Justice Byron R. White held that "conversations as well as property are excludable from the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home." Moreover, continued White, "surveillance records as to which any petitioner has standing to object should be turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge.


[Mempa v. Rhay () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Facts]
Jerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa’s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa’s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition.


[Mempa v. Rhay () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the legal right to counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, extends to the post-trial proceeding for revocation of probation and deferred sentencing. The right of counsel at this stage ensures that the conviction and sentence are read correctly without misinterpretation of record. Counsel also assists the defendant in asserting his rights, such as the right to appeal, at the deferred sentencing stage.


[Marchetti v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Facts]
A Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an occupational tax for accepting wagers. Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment. He argued that the requirements to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Marchetti v. United States () — Warren Court (1965-1967) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-1 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority reversing the lower court opinion. The Supreme Court held that the registration and occupational tax provisions were constitutional, but using the related information to prosecute someone did violate privilege. Marchetti’s claim of privilege was a proper defense and should have been sufficient to avoid conviction. Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent stating that this decision frustrates the purpose of the tax and opens the door to many other similar challenges.


[First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company () — Warren Court (1967-1969) — Facts]
Gerald Waldron filed an anti-trust action against Cities Service Co. and six other large oil companies. Waldron sought treble damages alleging a conspiracy by the oil companies to boycott Iranian oil. The trial judge limited Waldron’s discovery to depositions of certain Cities employees. After an extended period of depositions, the trial judge granted Cities summary judgment because there was no material evidence that Cities took any part in the conspiracy. The court denied Waldron’s motion of additional discovery because the court felt it would be a fishing expedition and constitute harassment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.