[Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Between 1969 and 1980, Dr. Morton Mower worked with Dr. Mieczyslaw Mirowski to develop the implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) and the cardiac resynchronization therapy device (CRT), both devices that are meant to treat different kinds of heart failure. Mirowski Family Ventures (MFV) held both patents and licensed them to Guidant Corp. In 1991, Medtronic, a manufacturer of medical devices and equipment, entered into a sublicense agreement with Eli Lilly & Co., Guidant Corp's predecessor-in-interest regarding these patents. The agreement obligated MFV to inform Medtronic which items were covered by which patents, and if Medtronic disagreed, Medtronic could retain patent rights and file for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement on the patents. In October and November of 2007, MFV identified several Medtronic products that it believed infringed on its patents, and Medtronic subsequently sued for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.
In the bench trial in district court, the court, relying on precedent, stated that the patent holder bears the burden of proving that infringement occurred and found in favor of Medtronic. MFV appealed and argued that the burden falls on the alleged patent infringer to prove that infringement did not occur. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that, because Medtronic is the party seeking relief from the court, it bears the burden to prove that it did not infringe on MFV's patents.


[Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that judicial precedent supports the view that the burden of proof in patent cases always rests with the owner of the patent, regardless of the type of legal action in question. To shift the burden based on the type of legal action could create ambiguity regarding the rights of each party. Because the public interest favors a well-functioning patent system, it is in the best interest of the public not to shift the ordinary rule regarding burden of proof in patent cases.


[Atlantic Marine Construction Company v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2009 the U.S. Corps of Engineers contracted with Atlantic Marine Construction Company (Atlantic) to build a child development center at Fort Hood, a military base located in the western district of Texas. Atlantic then subcontracted with J-Crew Management, Inc. (J-Crew) to provide labor and materials. The subcontract agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that any dispute would be litigated in Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia, or the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Despite this clause, J-Crew brought suit against Atlantic in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for failure to pay for work J-Crew performed.
Atlantic moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. §1406, arguing that the forum selection clause required the suit to be brought in Virginia. Atlantic also moved, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). The district court denied Atlantic's motions, holding that Atlantic did not show why the interest of justice or the convenience of the parties weighed in favor of Virginia. Atlantic petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to dismiss the case or transfer it to Virginia. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and venue was proper in the Texas court because the parties entered into and performed the agreement in that district.


[Atlantic Marine Construction Company v. U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes; the party acting in violation of the forum-selection clause. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Section 1404 codified a doctrine of transfer that allowed cases to be transferred to a more convenient forum rather than being dismissed. Because both Section 1404 and the forum non conveniens doctrine from which it derives depend on a balancing-of-interests standard, courts should use that standard when evaluating claims under Section 1404. The Court also held that, when parties have agreed to a forum-selection clause, a court should transfer the case to that forum unless there are exceptional factors at work. Therefore, the party requesting the change of forum should bear the burden of proving that such a change is necessary.


[Madigan v. Levin (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Harvey N. Levin was hired as an Illinois Assistant District Attorney on September 5, 2000. On May 12, 2006 when he was fired, Levin was over the age of sixty, and he believed that he was fired due to his age and gender. He was replaced by a female attorney in her thirties. Levin sued the state of Illinois, the Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan in both her individual and official capacities, and four other Attorney General employees under the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit by arguing that either the claim under the ADEA precluded the Civil Rights Act claim or that they were entitled to qualified immunity under the ADEA. The district court originally ruled that the ADEA did not prevent the claim from proceeding under the Civil Rights Act and granted the qualified immunity. After the case was reassigned to a different district court judge, the district court held that Levin was not an employee for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and the ADEA, so he could not pursue those claims, and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.


[Madigan v. Levin (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Unanswered. In an unsigned, per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.


[White v. Woodall (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On January 25, 1997, a sixteen-year-old girl was kidnapped, murdered, and raped. After an investigation, the police arrested Robert Woodall, who subsequently pled guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. At trial, Woodall invoked his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination and declined to testify, and so he asked the judge to instruct the jury not to make any adverse inferences from that decision. The judge refused to issue the "no adverse inference" instruction and stated that, by entering a guilty plea, Woodall waived his right to be free from self-incrimination. The jury found Woodall guilty on all charges and the judge sentenced him to the death penalty and two subsequent life sentences.
Woodall appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which affirmed both Woodall's conviction and sentence. In 2006, Woodall filed a habeus corpus petition in federal court, and that court held that the trial court violated Woodall's Fifth Amendment right when it refused to offer the requested jury instruction. In addition, that court also held that Woodall's Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court allowed the state to dismiss an African-American juror without a mandatory hearing for cause. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the issue of self-incrimination but did not address the other issues.


[White v. Woodall (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, unanswered. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the trial court did not violate Woodall's Fifth Amendment rights by not providing a "no adverse influence" jury instruction because Woodall's guilty plea negated the possibility of any adverse influence. Because Woodall admitted to the elements of the case that the prosecution would otherwise have had to prove, there was no inference left for the jury to make. The Court therefore held that the state courts' rejection of Woodall's Fifth Amendment claim was not objectively unreasonable and should not have proceeded to federal courts.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a criminal defendant is entitled to a "no adverse influence" jury instruction at the penalty phase of a capital trial just as he is during the guilt phase if he requests one. Justice Breyer wrote that there was no reason to deviate from established Fifth Amendment jurisprudence on this issue and that, in doing so, the majority opinion construes the precedent too narrowly. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Chadbourne and Parke LLP v. Troice (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which was meant to combat issues such as nuisance filings, targeting of specific clients, and client manipulation in class action suits. To prevent plaintiffs from filing class action suits in state courts in order to get around the restrictions of PSLRA, Congress enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which provided for the dismissal or removal of a class action suit brought by more than 50 plaintiffs in connection with a "covered security." The term "covered security" was limited to a subset of securities that were traded on a national exchange or issued by a federally registered investment company.
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued the Stanford Group Company and other holdings of R. Allen Stanford for allegedly perpetrating a massive Ponzi scheme. Two groups of Louisiana investors also sued Stanford holdings for their roles in the Ponzi scheme and for violations of the Louisiana Securities Act. These cases were consolidated with two others against Stanford holdings and moved to the district court for the Northern District of Texas. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints under SLUSA and argued that the court should adopt an expansive interpretation of "covered securities." The district court held that the funds were not covered securities, but it granted the dismissal because the funds were represented as covered securities and because it was likely that at least one of the plaintiffs liquidated a retirement account, which a covered security, in order to purchase the funds in question. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that there was not a sufficient connection between the misrepresentation and the stock sale to consider them connected and for the securities to function as "covered" for the purposes of a SLUSA dismissal.


[Chadbourne and Parke LLP v. Troice (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the scope of SLUSA does not extend beyond misrepresentations that are material to the purchase or sale of a covered security. Because the focus of SLUSA deals with covered securities, the purchase or sale of uncovered securities is beyond SLUSA's purview. The Court also held that nothing in the language of SLUSA itself or the underlying regulatory statutes suggests that the relevant language should be interpreted more broadly. To do so would prohibit more lawsuits and interfere with state efforts to provide remedies to victims of frauds.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, while SLUSA precludes class action cases dealing with fraud "in connection with" covered securities, the connection does not extend to all securities.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority's opinion unnecessarily narrows and constricts protection from fraud in national securities markets. Justice Kennedy argued that the relevant language must be interpreted broadly in order for SLUSA to accomplish its purpose of protecting the integrity of the markets. If misrepresentations were made relating to covered securities to perpetrate fraud, federal regulation is necessary, and it is this interest that Congress intended SLUSA to protect. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) established the National Labor Relations Board (Board) to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and employees. Parties first file unfair labor practice allegations to a Regional Office, which then conducts an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presides over the hearing on the complaint and issues a recommendation to the Board. Unless a party to the dispute files a timely appeal, the ALJ's recommendation becomes the final order of the Board. To hear a case and issue a ruling, the Board must have at least three of its five members present. The NLRA allows parties to appeal a Board ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the area where the alleged unfair labor practice occurred or to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Board members are appointed by the president and serve five-year terms.
In 2010, Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of Pepsi-Cola products, was engaged in negotiations with its employee union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 760 (Union). During the final bargaining session that December, Noel Canning agreed to submit two wage and pension plans to a vote by the Union membership. The membership approved the union's preferred proposal. However, Noel Canning argued that the discussions did not amount to a binding agreement and refused to incorporate the changes into a new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Noel Canning's actions constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA. An ALJ determined that the agreement was binding and ordered Noel Canning to sign the collective bargaining agreement. The Board affirmed the ruling against Noel Canning.
Noel Canning appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that the Board's ruling was invalid because not enough members of the Board were present. The panel that heard the Noel Canning case consisted of one member who was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the Senate in 2010 and two members whom President Obama appointed without Senate confirmation in January 2012. Although the Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to fill vacancies that occur while Congress is in recess, between December 2011 and the end of January 2012, the Senate met in pro forma meetings every three business days. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the Senate was not in recess on the days the Senate did not meet because, for the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, recess is defined as the time in between sessions of Congress.


[National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a pro forma session does not create a recess long enough to trigger the Recess Appointments Clause. While the term "recess" in the Clause refers both to inter-and intra-session recesses, its legislative history and historical context indicate that the term should be presumed to mean a recess of substantial length. The Court held that the three-day break that occurs during pro forma sessions does not represent a significant interruption of legislative business and therefore cannot justify the exercise of the Clause. Additionally, a pro forma session cannot be viewed as a single, long recess because the Senate retains its capacity to conduct business during such sessions. Because recess appointments made during a recess that was shorter than ten days have been so historically rare, the Court held that ten days was the appropriate presumptive lower limit to place on the exercise of the Clause. The Court also held that the Clause applies to vacancies that occur during a recess as well as those that originally occur before a recess but continue to exist at the time of the recess. Although a plain reading of the Clause does not require such an interpretation, the historical context of the wording favors the more broad reading because a vacancy can be considered a continuing state.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence in judgment in which he argued that the Recess Appointments Clause was only meant to cover breaks between congressional sessions rather than breaks within them. Therefore, the appointments in question are invalid because they were made during the session. Justice Scalia argued that a plain reading of the text as well as the historical meaning of the term "recess" clearly places it in opposition to the term "session," and it is therefore illogical to interpret the Clause as allowing appointments while Congress is in session. In offering a broader reading of the Clause, the majority opinion disregards the Clause's purpose: to preserve the balance of power between the President and the Senate regarding appointments. Justice Scalia also argued that the majority's ten-day rule cannot stand because it is based purely on judicial interpretation of historical practices without any textual basis. For these same reasons, the Clause should be read as only granting the President the power to fill vacancies that originally occurred during a recess. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence in judgment.


[Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA) was a company owned by Nicholas Paleveda and his wife, Marjorie Ewing. Shortly before BIA filed for voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2006, the company assigned the insurance commission from one of its largest clients to Peter Pearce, a long-time employee. Additionally, Paleveda used BIA funds to incorporate the Executive Benefits Insurance Agency, Inc. (EBIA). Pearce then deposited over $100,000 into an account held jointly by EBIA and another company owned by Paleveda and Ewing. The Trustee, Peter Arkison, filed a claim against EBIA in the BIA bankruptcy proceeding. Arkison alleged fraudulent conveyances and that EBIA, as a successor corporation, was liable for BIA's debts. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and the district court affirmed.
On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, EBIA argued, for the first time, that the bankruptcy judge's entry of a final judgment on the Trustee's claims was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that, while a bankruptcy court may not decide a fraudulent conveyance claim, it may hear the claim and make a recommendation for review by a district court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that EBIA, by failing to object to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, waived its Seventh Amendment right to a hearing before an Article III court.


[Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes and Undecided. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court began by noting that, under federal law, issues related to a bankruptcy proceeding fall into one of two categories: "core" and "non-core." Bankruptcy courts may render final decisions, subject to appeal, on "core" issues, but when an issue is "non-core," the bankruptcy court may only issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are to be reviewed de novo by district courts. However, bankruptcy courts may render final decisions on "non-core" issues if both parties consent. In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that some claims labeled as "core," specifically those considered "public rights," could not be adjudicated by bankruptcy courts because they do not comply with the constitutional requirements in Article III and thus Congress can only grant them limited subject matter jurisdiction. While a fraudulent conveyance claim may be the type of "core" claim on which Stern prohibits bankruptcy courts from ruling, here the claim was related to the bankruptcy proceedings and should thusly be treated as a "non-core" issue, which would allow the bankruptcy judge to submit proposed findings to a district court. The Court found it unnecessary to address the petitioner's issue regarding consent, because although the bankruptcy court had rendered a final decision on the claim instead of a proposed finding, the district court had reviewed the bankruptcy court's holding de novo, which meant that it had effectively treating the claim as if it had been a "non-core" claim.


[Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
At midnight on July 18, 2004, West Memphis Police Officer Forthman pulled over Donald Rickard's vehicle because of an inoperable headlight. After Officer Forthman noticed damage on the vehicle and asked Rickard to step out of the car, Rickard sped away. Officer Forthman called for backup and pursued Rickard from West Memphis, Arkansas to Memphis, Tennessee. The police officers were ordered to continue the pursuit across the border and ultimately surrounded Rickard in a parking lot in Memphis, Tennessee. When Rickard again attempted to flee, the police fired shots into the vehicle, ultimately killing both Rickard and Kelley Allen, a woman who had been a passenger in the vehicle. The entire exchange was captured on police video.
Rickard and Allen's families sued the police officers, the chief of police, and the mayor of West Memphis under federal and state law claims. The families argued that the police used excessive force when pursuing and ultimately killing Rickard and Allen and that using that force violated the Fourth Amendment. They also brought claims of assault, battery, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. The government argued that, because the police acted in their official capacity, they were entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity from any lawsuit. The district court refused to dismiss the case against the government, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that qualified immunity only applies when officers are acting reasonably, and after reviewing subsequent cases, held that the police did not act reasonably in this case. Additionally, because the video evidence showed that the police fired on unarmed, fleeing drivers, a jury could determine that the police were not acting reasonably.


[Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the requirement that a final decision be made by a district court prior to an appeal does not apply to motions for summary judgment when the motion is based on a claim of qualified immunity. Because the determination of qualified immunity is not merely a defense but actually immunity from the suit, it cannot be effectively reviewed after a final judgment at which point the protection from suit would have been “irretrievably” lost. The Court also held that the evidence showed that Rickard was still attempting to flee when the officers opened fire and that the officers reasonably could have believed that if the chase resumed Rickard would once again pose a deadly threat to others on the road. Furthermore, the total number of shots fired also did not qualify as excessive force. Therefore, if officers are justified in opening fire to end a threat to public safety, they are similarly justified in continuing to fire until the threat to public safety has ended.


[United States v. Woods (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1999, Gary Woods and Billy McCombs became investors in two partnerships. Those partnerships then transferred their assets to a corporation that was jointly owned by Woods and McCombs, which caused the partnerships to be considered liquidated for tax purposes. Because the value of a liquidated asset is equal to the partner's basis in the investment, the partnerships reported their losses on their tax reports as equal to the purchased options Woods' and McCombs' separate companies originally contributed to the partnerships. After conducting an audit, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the partnership transactions served no business purpose and were solely for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore they had no legal basis and the IRS did not consider the partnerships valid. The IRS imposed accuracy-related penalties for understatements of income and gross valuation misstatements.
In 2005, Woods (as the tax matters representative for the partnership) brought the matter before a district court and argued that penalties were inappropriate because the tax consequences of the transactions were accurately reported. The district court held that the transactions "lacked economic substance" and that their reported losses should be disregarded. The court also held that, because the transactions had no economic substance, the valuation misstatement penalties did not apply. The United States appealed the decision with regard to the valuation misstatement penalties, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling.


[United States v. Woods (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes; yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that, under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), a court in a partnership-level proceeding has the jurisdiction to consider the applicability of any penalty that relates to the partnership. Therefore, a district court must determine whether the partnership situation in question had the potential to trigger a penalty, as happened in this case. The Court also held that a transaction that was determined to lack economic substance can still trigger the penalty for overstatement because the overstatement and the action that led to it are inherently tied together.


[Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On August 23, 2004, Unite Here Local 355 (UHL) entered an agreement with Mardi Gras Gaming (Mardi Gras), the owner of a casino and dog track in Florida. Under the terms of the agreement, UHL would pay for advertisements to support a gambling ballot initiative that Mardi Gras wanted to pass, and Mardi Gras would facilitate the union organizing Mardi Gras' workers by providing the union with access to work premises, employee information, and neutrality toward the unionization of their employees. UHL also agreed not to strike, protest, picket or otherwise pressure the company's business.
Martin Mulhall, a Mardi Gras employee, sued both Mardi Gras, and UHL. He opposed the agreement and argued that it violates the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which prohibits an employer giving or a union receiving a "thing of value." The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, holding that Mulhall was not injured by UHL merely seeking to represent him. Mulhall appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Mulhall appealed again and the Court of Appeals again reversed and remanded.


[Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, rather than dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, the Court should have asked for briefs addressing issues antecedent to the one brought up by the case. The Court could then determine whether the case was moot because the contract expired in 2011 and whether Mulhall had Article III standing, as well as whether there is a private right of action in this case. Justice Breyer argued that it was important that the Court address the issues presented in this case because the outcome could negatively affect the collective bargaining process. Justice Sonia Sotomayor and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Kaley v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2005, a grand jury began investigating Kerri Kaley and her husband Brian Kaley for stealing prescription medical devices from hospitals. In February 2007, the grand jury indicted the Kaleys on seven criminal counts. One of these counts was a criminal forfeiture count, which would require the Kaleys to forfeit all property that could be traced to their offenses. This property included a certificate of deposit for $500,000, which the Kaleys intended to use to pay their defense attorneys.
Following the indictment, the district court issued a protective order preventing the Kaleys from transferring or disposing of any property in the forfeiture count. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order because it prevented them from hiring their attorneys in violation of their right to counsel protected by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied their motion without granting a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The Kaleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded.
On remand, the district court granted a pretrial hearing, but limited it to the question of whether the property in the forfeiture count was traceable to the Kaleys' offenses. When the Kaleys failed to present evidence regarding traceability, the district court refused to vacate the protective order. The Kaleys appealed again, arguing that they should have been allowed to challenge the validity of the indictment in the pretrial hearing. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the lower court's decision.


[Kaley v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not allow a defendant to use ill-gotten gains to pay an attorney. The Court also held that, since the government had the power to restrain persons given probable cause that they committed a crime, it follows that the government can constitutionally restrain property as well. Similarly, because the criminal justice system entrusts to the grand jury the determination of whether there is probable cause to restrain a defendant prior to trial, there is not reason to use another method to determine whether there is probable cause to restrain a defendant's property. The Court also held that the alternative ruling, which would allow a judge to overrule a grand jury's finding of probable cause, could have destructive impacts on the criminal justice system as a whole. Previous precedent has maintained that there is no need for an adversarial hearing to determine probable cause because it is such a relatively low standard of proof, and the Court found no reason to depart from that precedent in this case.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that, while the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not equate to an absolute right to choice of counsel, the right cannot be denied based on the discretion of the prosecutor. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the issue of the forfeiture of assets is entirely separate from the issue of indictment for a crime and requires different evidence. Therefore, a hearing to determine whether the Kaleys' assets were forfeitable would not be relitigating a decided issue but rather allowing a judge to determine whether the government met its burden. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority opinion essentially allows the government to deprive defendants of the counsel of their choice, which is fundamentally at odds with the ideals of the criminal justice system. While the government does have a legitimate interest in ensuring that ill-gotten assets are available to be returned if the defendant is convicted, there are other ways to protect the assets that do not require the defendant to forfeit his right to the counsel of his choice. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented.
In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers.


[Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that there is a long tradition of constitutionally permissible legislative prayer and that such prayer need not be non-sectarian, especially when such a requirement would place the government in the position of policing prayer. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Establishment Clause should be read as a federalist provision that protected states' rights rather than individual rights.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, as the Court of Appeals held, the Town of Greece must do more to make its legislative prayer inclusive of other faiths. Despite the fact that the town is not exclusively Christian, the town made no significant effort to inform non-Christian clergy about the possibility of delivering an invocation, and in doing so, marginalized religious minority populations. Justice Elena Kagan wrote in a separate dissent that the town's failure to represent a variety of religions in its meetings amounted to the unconstitutional preference of one religion over others. To do so in a public forum where people come to participate in the political process forces individuals who do not agree with the beliefs represented in the prayer to either acquiesce or visibly make their dissent known. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Breyer joined in the dissent.
"


[McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which established two sets of limits to campaign contributions. The base limit placed restrictions on how much money a contributor—defined broadly as individuals, partnerships, and other organizations—may give to specified categories of recipients. The aggregate limit restricted how much money an individual may donate in a two-year election cycle. The limits were periodically recalibrated to factor in inflation.
Shaun McCutcheon is an Alabama resident who is eligible to vote. In the 2011-2012 election cycle, he donated to the Republican National Committee, other Republican committees, as well as individual candidates. He wished to donate more in amounts that would be permissible under the base limit but would violate the aggregate limit. McCutcheon and the other plaintiffs sued the Federal Election Commission, arguing that the aggregate limit violated the First Amendment by failing to serve a "cognizable government interest" and being prohibitively low. The district court held that the aggregate limit served government interests by preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption and was set at a reasonable limit.


[McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the aggregate limit did little to address the concerns that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was meant to address and at the same time limited participation in the democratic process. Because the aggregate limit fails to meet the stated objective of preventing corruption, it does not survive the "rigorous" standard of review laid out by previous precedent dealing with campaign contributions from a First Amendment perspective and is therefore unconstitutional. The aggregate limit also prevents a donor from contributing beyond a specific amount to more than a certain number of candidates, which may force him to choose which interests he can seek to advance in a given election. The plurality held that the collective interest in combating corruption can only be pursued as long as it does not unnecessarily curtail an individual's freedom of speech, and in this case the aggregate limit is not sufficiently closely tailored to accomplish this goal. The plurality also noted that there are many other means by which the government may fight election corruption without setting an aggregate limit on campaign contributions.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, a previous case dealing with limits on campaign contributions, should be overruled because it denigrates the core values of the First Amendment. Because the reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo could not sufficiently justify using a standard lower than strict scrutiny to examine limits on campaign contributions, Justice Thomas wrote that Buckley should be overruled and the BCRA should be subject to strict scrutiny.
In his dissent, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the plurality's opinion misconstrues the nature of competing constitutional issues and destroys campaign finance laws, which causes great harm to the democratic process. Justice Breyer argued that the plurality's opinion was based on a definition of corruption that is too narrow to be effective. He went on to state the reasoning that the aggregate limit is faulty is because there is no substantial mismatch between Congress' goal of combating corruption and the means established to achieve it. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Highmark v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Patent Act allows a court to award reasonable attorneys fees in exceptional cases in which the lawsuit is objectively baseless and brought in bad faith. Allcare Management Systems, Inc. (Allcare) owns a patent that covers a computer-based method of generating treatment options based on symptom data entered by a physician. This process can help an insurance company determine whether to approve a particular treatment for a patient. In 2003, Highmark, Inc. (Highmark), a health insurance company, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of Allcare's patent. Allcare filed a counterclaim and alleged that Highmark infringed on two sections of its patent. The federal district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Highmark. The court also found that Allcare had willfully pursued frivolous infringement claims and ordered it to pay Highmark's attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit independently reviewed the district court's determination that Allcare's claims were objectively baseless. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding with respect to one of Allcare's claims and reversed the court regarding Allcare's second claim.


[Highmark v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that a district court is in the best position to determine whether a lawsuit is objectively baseless and, as such, is entitled to deference upon appeal. The Federal Circuit applied too strict of a standard in its independent review of the case, which should be reserved for questions of law. The Court remanded the proceedings and instructed the Federal Circuit to examine the district court’s findings for abuse of discretion.


[United States v. Castleman (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2001, James Alvin Castleman was charged and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault under the relevant Tennessee statute, which dealt with knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm to the mother of the defendant's child. Seven years later, federal agents discovered that Castleman and his wife were buying firearms from dealers and selling them on the black market. Because Castleman's domestic assault conviction prohibited him from purchasing firearms, Castleman's wife bought the weapons in her own name. Castleman was indicted in federal district court and charged with two counts of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. The district court dismissed the charges and held that Castleman's misdemeanor domestic assault conviction under Tennessee law did not constitute the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as required by the federal statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[United States v. Castleman (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, because the statute in question—that prevents people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence from possessing firearms—incorporates an element regarding the use of physical force, it includes those convicted of domestic assault under state law. This reading of the statute is consistent with the common-law meaning of violence, and to read it otherwise would have meant that the statute was ineffective in many states at the time of its enactment. Because the Tennessee statute under which Castleman was convicted necessarily involved the use of physical force, it should be considered a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction for the purpose of the federal statute.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the majority opinion could have settled the case on much narrower grounds than it did. Because the meaning of the Tennessee statute in question categorically includes the meaning of "physical force," a conviction under that statute qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the reasoning in the majority opinion purports to rely on the reasoning in Johnson v. United States, but because the majority opinion in this case holds that force does not need to be violent, it is an improper application of the precedent. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.


[Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1908, the United States granted land, known as a right-of-way (ROW) to the Hahn's Peak and Pacific Railway Company to build a 66-mile railway from Laramie, Wyoming to Colorado. In 1976, the United States granted Fox Park, Wyoming⎯land that surrounds the ROW⎯to Melvin and Lula Brandt. In 1986, a new company, the Wyoming and Colorado Railway Company, acquired the ROW. The company operated the ROW until it officially abandoned the land in 2003. Following the abandonment, the United States sued the Brandt Revocable Trust and other potential property owners under 42 USC 912, a statute governing the disposition of abandoned or forfeited railroad grants. The government argued that this statute reverts abandoned ROWs back to the federal government's exclusive possession. The United States sought a judicial order of abandonment and exclusive possession of the ROW. The Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners filed a countersuit seeking full possession of the ROW, insofar as it cut through their land. They argued that the statute only granted an easement to the United States, not full possession. The district court granted the interest in the ROW to the United States and the US. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.


[Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the language, legislative history, and subsequent administrative interpretation of the General Railroad Right-of-Way Act of 1875 (1875 Act) clearly grants an easement for the railroad's land and not a more enduring property interest. When the United States granted Fox Park to Melvin and Lula Brandt, it did not reserve for itself any additional interest in the railroad property. Therefore, pursuant to the 1875 Act, when the railroad company abandoned the land, it should have been settled as an easement. When an easement is abandoned, the easement disappears and the land reverts to its previous owner, so in this case, the land would revert to the Brandt Revocable Trust and property owners.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that there is judicial precedent to support the view that, in granting land to railroad companies, Congress did not intend to allow those land grants to be disposed at the will of the private companies. Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority opinion failed to take into account the fact that railroad rights have historically not been treated as property rights that can be decided simply on the basis of common law principles. Therefore, even if the 1875 Act only granted an easement, it should not be treated as an ordinary easement. Instead, such an easement should be settled according to the presumption in favor of the sovereign grantor, the United States, as has typically governed railroad ROW property.


[Rosemond v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In August 2007, Justus Rosemond and Ronald Joseph met Ricardo Gonzalez in a Tooele, Utah, park to sell him a pound of marijuana. When Gonzalez attempted to take the marijuana without paying, he was fired upon while fleeing. The government charged Justus Rosemond with several drug-and firearm-related offenses. At trial, the government alleged that Rosemond was either the shooter or that he aided and abetted the shooter. The jury convicted Rosemond on all charges.On appeal, Rosemond argued that the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the aiding and abetting theory were insufficient and that the jury must find that Rosemond "intentionally took some action to facilitate or encourage the use of a firearm" to convict. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Rosemond's conviction.


[Rosemond v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the government must prove that the defendant actively participated in a drug or violent crime intending to see it succeed and knew in advance that one of his coconspirators had a gun during the crime. Whether the defendant approved or disapproved of having or using the gun is irrelevant, as long as he participated in the underlying drug or violent crime with knowledge of a gun. Proof that the defendant knew that a gun was used sometime in the commission of the crime is insufficient; if, as in this case, a defendant learns of a gun upon seeing or hearing an accomplice fire shots after the criminal scheme has begun, he cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting under this statute. The State must prove as part of the knowledge element that the accomplice had the opportunity to walk away after learning of the gun but chose to proceed thereby incurring the liability of this statute.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreeing only with the majority's new rule that the State prove that the aider and abetter had an opportunity to refrain from the criminal conduct after learning of a gun. His dissent rests on the position that this requirement deviates from the traditional aiding and abetting doctrine, and it opens up the affirmative defense of necessity or duress for the accomplice that does not object to having a gun for fear violence might be directed at him. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


[Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
A collective bargaining agreement directed Ray Holuch Gravel, a landscape supply company, to remit contributions to several benefit funds affiliated with the Central Pension Fund, a labor union which represents landscape supply company employees. After conducting an audit of the company's books in 2009, the union sued for additional remittances of past unreported work. They also sued for attorney's fees. The district court ruled in favor of the labor union on both issues with respect to one employee, but ruled against them with respect to employees who could not be identified because the landscape supply company failed to keep the required records. The two decisions were announced separately and one week apart. The labor union appealed both rulings within thirty days of the second ruling, but more than thirty days after the first ruling. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the appeal was timely because the attorney's fees are a merits issue, so the first decision was not final until the lower court had decided both cases.


[Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the decision on the merits, even if the issue of attorney's fees remains unresolved, is the final decision for the purpose of appeal. Because attorney's fees do not remedy the injury giving rise to the action and are often available to the defendant(s) as well as the plaintiff(s), the issue is generally not considered part of a merits decision. Although this distinction could lead to piecemeal litigation, the Court held that the concern was counterbalanced by the clarity that such a uniform rule provided to the appeals process.


[Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Former shareholders of Halliburton Company (Halliburton) filed a class action lawsuit against the company and argued that Halliburton falsified its financial statements and misrepresented projected earnings between 1999 and 2001. In their petition for class certification, the shareholders invoked the "fraud on the market" presumption to demonstrate their class-wide reliance on Halliburton's statements. The "fraud on the market" theory assumes that, in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects any material, public representation affecting that security. Therefore, under this theory, the law presumes that investors have relied on a material misstatement when they purchase a security at an artificially high or low price. The federal district court certified the shareholders as a class and prevented Halliburton from introducing evidence that the statements did not impact its stock prices at all. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that Halliburton could not rebut the presumption that the plaintiffs relied on the statements until a trial on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.


[Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that there was no reason to prevent defendants in a securities fraud case from presenting evidence regarding the impact of alleged misinformation on stock prices during the class certification stage. The Court also held that Halliburton was unable to provide adequate justification to overrule the established precedent that plaintiffs in securities fraud cases only need to prove a presumption of reliance on fraudulent information. The presumption standard is based on the generally agreed-upon principle that public information affects stock prices. Without any evidence that this principle was misunderstood or no longer reflects current economic realities, the presumption standard should remain. Additionally, because Congress had the opportunity to pass a law that created a new standard and chose not to do so, Congress clearly intended the presumption to stand.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that, while allowing the defendants to present price-impact evidence at the class certification stage may broaden the scope of those proceedings, it should not present an undue burden to plaintiffs with legitimate claims. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the presumption of reliance standard should not be used because it is based on a flawed understanding of economics and effectively lowers the burden of proof for the plaintiffs. For these reasons, Justice Thomas argued that the decision in Basic v. Levinson—the decision that established the “fraud on the market” presumption standard—should be overruled. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.


[Lawson and Zang v. FMR, LLC (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathan Zang, brought a lawsuit against their former employer, FMR LLC, a subcontractor of Fidelity Investments (Fidelity), alleging that the company unlawfully fired them in retaliation for filing complaints. Both Lawson and Zang told the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) that they believed that Fidelity had violated certain rules and regulations set forth by both the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. Sometime after filing these complaints, Zang was terminated for unsatisfactory performance. Lawson filed several retaliation claims against her employer with OSHA, and resigned in 2007, claiming that she had been constructively discharged.
Zang and Lawson each filed separate actions against their former employers in district court. They alleged that the defendants violated "whistleblower" protection sections of the Sarbanes-Oakley Act by taking retaliatory actions against them. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the whistleblower provisions extended to employees of private agents, contractors, and subcontractors to public companies and that the plaintiffs had engaged in protected activity under the statute. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which reversed the decision. Looking at both Congressional intent and the plain meaning of the statute, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not protected employees under the act.


[Lawson and Zang v. FMR, LLC (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that whistleblower-protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protects employees of private contractors and subcontractors just as it does employees of the public company served by the private contractors and subcontractors. Because there was no language in the Act that specifically limited the covered employees to those working for the public company, the Court held that Congress must not have intended the Act to have such a limited scope. The legislative record supports the view that Congress was aware of the role that outside contractors can play in recognizing and reporting fraud, and that fear of retaliation can prevent them from fulfilling that role.
In his opinion concurring in principal part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that, while he agreed with the judgment of the majority opinion, the majority opinion's reliance on legislative history is an ineffective measure of proof because it cannot accurately reflect Congressional intent. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence in principal part and in the judgment.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority opinion was an over-broad interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. There are several key indicators that support a narrower reading of that Act, not the least of which is the fact that the relevant section is entitled "Protection for Employees of Publically Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of Fraud." Beyond the evidence of the Act's context that support a narrow reading, Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority opinion's interpretation would result in opportunities for litigation any time any employee claims to be harassed for providing information regarding any offense; it is not plausible that Congress would have intended to place such burdens on the courts. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Clean Air Act creates a federal-state partnership that aims to control air pollution in the United States. The Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to both establish air quality standards and gives the states significant freedom to implement plans in order to meet those standards. Among the problems the Act sought to prevent was the possible spread of air pollution from "upwind" states to "downwind" states.
In 2011, the EPA created the Transport Rule, a rule which sets emission reduction standards for 28 "upwind" states based on the air quality standards in "downwind" states. Various states, local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations brought suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and argued that the Transport Rule created federal standards with no deference to the states, which violated federal law. The court held that the Transport Rule violated federal law because the Clean Air Act allows states to implement their own plans to curb air pollution.


[Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, no, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Clean Air Act supports the EPA's contention that if a state implementation plan (SIP) is determined to be insufficient, then the EPA has an absolute mandate to create and enforce a federal implementation plan (FIP) at any point within the next two years unless the state revises the SIP in question. Nothing in the Act required the EPA to provide states with specific metrics regarding upwind states' contributions to the pollution of downwind states, especially since this schedule could prolong the process by instituting a delay that Congress did not order in the Act. The Court held that the Transport Rule was necessary for the EPA to fulfill its statutory requirement to balance the possibility of under-and over-control of emissions standards. The Court also held that there was no jurisdictional bar to the Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court hearing the case.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Clarence Thomas arguing that the majority opinion failed to rely on a textual justification for its holdings. Instead, the majority opinion reached the logically inconsistent conclusion that the EPA did not have to provide states with information regarding emission standards before states were required to implement plans that conformed to those standards.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.
[In the initially published opinion, Justice Scalia's dissent cited a Supreme Court case dealing with the EPA, Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., as an example of a case that had denied the EPA the ability to expand its mandate. However, the case actually had to do with the EPA defending its more limited mandate, and the majority sided with the EPA. Additionally, Justice Scalia was the author of the opinion he mischaracterized. The Supreme Court then issued a corrected version of Justice Scalia's dissent that removed the incorrect reference.]


[Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Diana Alvarez and Manuel Lozano, two native Columbians, met while living in London and had a daughter together. At trial Alvarez testified that, from 2005 until 2008, Lozano was abusing and threatening to rape her. Lozano denied these allegations and claimed that, although they had normal couple problems, they were generally "very happy together." In November 2008, Alvarez took the child and, after a stay at a women's shelter, moved to her sister's home in New York. A psychiatrist diagnosed the child with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by her experience living in the United Kingdom, moving to America, staying at a women's shelter, and knowing that her mother had been threatened. However, six months later, the child's condition drastically improved.
After Lozano exhausted all remedies within the UK to attempt to locate the child, on November 10, 2010, he filed a Petition for Return of Child under Article 2 of the Hague Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act in U.S. district court. The district court held that the child was now settled in New York and that removing the child would cause undue harm. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the policy of equitable tolling, which pauses the running of a statute of limitations when a litigant has diligently pursued his rights, does not apply to the Hague Convention's provision on international child abduction. Because equitable tolling extends an otherwise discrete time period, it must be proven to align with statutory intent. However, the Hague Convention is a treaty, not a statute, and a treaty by its nature must be interpreted based on principles shared by the nations involved. Equitable tolling is not an established part of the background law of all signatories of the Hague Convention and therefore has no role in the interpretation of the treaty. The Court also held that the one-year period is not actually a statute of limitations because its expiration opens the door for other considerations that could result in the return of the child to the home country.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Hague Convention allowed courts to consider all factors relevant to the child's wellbeing and order the child's return to the home country even after the one year has elapsed. Nothing in the Hague Convention specifies that the one-year period places limits on a court's discretionary power to order the child's return. The one-year period is the time when the court must order the return, but not the only time the court may do so. Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.


[Paroline v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Doyle R. Paroline pled guilty to possession of 150-300 images of child pornography. Included among those files on his computer were two photographs of Amy Unknown, a victim of child pornography. He was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration followed by release under supervision. Under a federal statute that mandates full restitution to victims of child pornography by those convicted of creating, distributing or possessing such material, the Government and Amy sought restitution in the amount of nearly $3.4 million. The district court denied restitution and held that the statute required the Government to prove that Paroline's possession of the images was the proximate cause of the injuries for which restitution was sought. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Paroline was responsible for restitution for all the victim's losses even if his criminal acts occurred after the victim's losses.


[Paroline v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government or victim must prove that the costs for which the victim seeks restitution stem from the offense in question. However, this causal link must be not simply factual but rather proximate, which means that there must be a sufficient connection between the offense and the victim's costs. The proximate cause requirement prevents a defendant from being held liable in situations where the link between the offense and the alleged harm could best be described as coincidental. In this case, although Paroline's individual possession of the pornographic images may not have directly caused the extent of the victim's losses that stem from the continuing traffic of her images, the Court held that it would be appropriate for a court to order restitution in an amount that represents the defendant's relative role in the larger process that caused harm to the victim.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, because there is no way to prove exactly what amount of the victim's harms were caused by this specific defendant's possession of her images, the court would only be able to pick an arbitrary restitution amount, which undermines a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. Since the statute requires the government or the victim to demonstrate the amount of the victim's loss that was caused by the offense in question, the restitution system fails in cases like this one, where the injury is not divisible. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that the restitution statute in question requires the defendant to pay restitution for the victim's costs in full, though a periodic payment schedule may be implemented. If the defendant were to avoid paying restitution simply because he was one of many people who contributed to the victim's harms, such logic would excuse all similar offenders and the victim would be unable to obtain any restitution. Because individual possessors of child pornography act in concert as part of a larger network, they act with the knowledge of their roles and the larger harms their actions cause to the victim, which means that they must be held liable.


[Burrage v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Marcus Burrage was arrested for distribution of heroin and distribution of heroin resulting in the death of Joshua Banka. A jury found him guilty, and Burrage was sentenced to nearly 40 years in prison. He appealed and argued that the judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence, denied his motion for acquittal, and denied his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous jury instructions.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on all counts. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Burrage of the crime. The court also noted that experts presented adequate testimony that Banka would not have died but for the heroin in his system. Additionally, the court held that in-court testimony of the police officer was not hearsay.


[Burrage v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Not decided, no. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the majority opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the law considers causation as a hybrid between two constituent parts: actual cause, or cause-in-fact, and legal cause, which is also known as proximate cause. Because the cause-in-fact requirement was not met in this case, the Court did not rule on whether the crime of distribution of drugs causing death required a foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. Instead, the Court focused on the specific text found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), the federal law requiring heightened sentences for drug sales causing death or serious bodily injury. The language in that statute requires that the death "results from" the sale of illegal drugs. Because the deceased in this case was found with multiple drugs in his system, the heroin sold by the defendant could not be considered an independently sufficient cause of death.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which she objected to an analogy made in the majority opinion that compared the "results from" language in drug statutes to similar language found in Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. Instead she cited to her dissent in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar . There, Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court's interpretation of similar language (in that case, "because of") lacked sensitivity to real-life concerns. Despite her reservations about the Court's statutory interpretation, she agreed with the ruling in this case. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined Ginsburg's special concurrence.


[Lane v. Franks (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2006, Edward Lane accepted a probationary position as Director of the Community Intensive Training for Youth ("CITY") program at Central Alabama Community College ("CACC"). He subsequently terminated the employment of Suzanne Schmitz, a state representative who had not performed any work for the program despite being listed on CITY's payroll. Lane also testified against Schmitz in two federal criminal trials between 2008 and 2009. In January 2009, Steve Franks, the president of CACC, sent termination letters to 29 CITY employees, including Lane, but rescinded the terminations of 27 of those employees within a few days. Lane sued Franks in federal district court and alleged that his termination from the CITY program was in retaliation for his testimony against Schmitz and therefore violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded Franks from liability and granted summary judgment in his favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed but declined to reach a decision on the qualified immunity question. Instead, the appellate court held that the First Amendment did not protect Lane's testimony because it was made pursuant to his official duties as a public employee.


[Lane v. Franks (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Lane’s testimony clearly constituted citizen speech on a public matter and that the testimony was elicited during a trial for misuse of state funds and corruption. Therefore, Lane did not testify as part of his employment responsibilities. Though Lane learned some of the subject matter of his testimony through the course of his employment, that alone does not make the testimony a part of Lane’s employment responsibilities. However, even though the Court found that Lane’s speech was protected under the First Amendment, ultimately Lane’s claim must be dismissed because Franks had qualified immunity. Previous precedent, specifically Morris v. Crow, had held that public employee testimony was unprotected speech, and thus when Franks fired Lane, he was not violating a clearly established constitutional right.
In his concurring opinion Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that, because Lane did not testify as a part of his employment duties and responsibilities, his testimony constituted citizen speech on a public matter and was entitled to First Amendment protection. Justice Thomas further applauded the Court for not addressing whether the First Amendment protects the testimony of public employee when that testimony is part of the employee’s employment duties. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the concurrence.


[Hall v. Florida (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Freddie Lee Hall was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1978 murder of Karol Hurst. Hall sought a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution in state court, which was denied. Hall then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court and was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Hall appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed in part and remanded the case for a hearing regarding the potential effect of his absence from the courtroom during the trial and ineffective counsel. On remand, the district court again denied habeas corpus and held that Hall's absences from the courtroom were harmless and that he deliberately bypassed ineffective counsel claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hall petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas corpus relief based on the Supreme Court decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, which held that all mitigating factors should be considered rather than just the mitigating factors listed in the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court of Florida denied the petition and held that no error occurred in sentencing. After the governor signed his second death warrant, Hall filed a motion to vacate the sentence, which the trial court denied by holding that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision barred further review of the case. The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed and held that the case involved additional non-record facts that had not been considered in the previous review. The case was vacated and remanded for new sentencing. At the new sentencing trial, the trial court held that Hall's mental retardation was a mitigating factor with "unquantifiable weight," and he was again sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.
In 2002, the Supreme Court decided the case Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court held that the execution of mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Hall filed a motion to declare certain sections of the Florida death penalty statute unconstitutional based on this decision and filed a claim to be exempt from the death penalty under that ruling. The trial court held a hearing to determine if Hall was eligible for such a claim and found that he was not because the first prong of the test—whether he had an IQ below 70—could not be met. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.


[Hall v. Florida (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that executing an intellectually disabled person violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment. If a person is unable to make the calculated judgments that are the premise for the rationale that the death penalty functions as a deterrent and as retribution, then the death penalty serves no legitimate purpose. While the Florida statute in question may be constitutional on its face, the Florida courts have interpreted the statute too narrowly by relying only on an IQ test score—which itself is not infallible—instead of allowing for the consideration of other evidence regarding the defendant’s intellectual disability. In this manner, the mandatory cutoff at an IQ of 70 allows for intellectually disabled people to be sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion represented an unprecedented departure from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence because it relied on professional standards rather than the evolving standards of society at large. Because the standards of professional organizations frequently change, tying Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to them will likely result in legal instability and protracted litigation. In fact, Justice Alito argued that there was no evidence that the new method the majority opinion favored was any more accurate than the IQ test, and that Florida’s statutory scheme already took the risk of testing error into account by allowing for the introduction of multiple test scores into evidence. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
S. Binyomin Ginsberg became a member of the Northwest Airlines frequent flyer program in 1999 and obtained Premium Elite Status in 2005. In 2008, his membership was terminated, as per the terms of the program that allow Northwest Airlines discretion over the removal of participants. In January 2009, Ginsberg sued Northwest Airlines and argued that, by terminating his membership in the frequent flyer program, the company breached both the contractual agreement and the implied doctrine of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law.
At trial in district court, the defense argued that Ginsberg's claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits states from enacting or enforcing regulation over the price, route, or service of an air carrier. The district court found in favor of Northwest Airlines. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the ADA did not preempt the claims because the claims were unrelated to the price, route, or services of the air carrier.


[Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, the Airline Deregulation Act pre-empts state law claims when such claims seek to enlarge the contractual obligations that the parties voluntarily adopted. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that exempting such claims from pre-emption would negate the ADA's goal of allowing market forces to establish aspects of air transportation without the interference of state laws. Additionally, since Minnesota state law does not allow parties to contract out of the covenant into which they voluntarily entered, a claim of a breach of covenant is pre-empted unless otherwise specified.


[Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Workers at the United Steel Corporation brought a class action suit against the company arguing that the Fair Labor Standards Act required the company to compensate them for time spent changing into and out of work clothes and the transit time from the locker room to their work stations. The Act states that an employer does not need to compensate employees for time spent "changing clothes." United States Steel Corporation moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion as it relates to compensation for changing clothes but not in relation to compensation for transit time.
The company appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Act did not require the company to compensate the employees for either the time spent changing or the time spent in transit between the locker room and the work stations.


[Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that safety gear falls within the parameters of "clothes" for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act and therefore is subject to the separate collective bargaining agreement that does not provide compensation for changing into and out of safety gear. Because the statutory context makes it clear that the concept of "clothes" refers to items that are necessary for job performance, there is no need to construe the term more strictly. Additionally, since "changing" clothes does not require the substitution of one outfit for another, the act of donning or doffing safety can be considered "changing clothes" for the purposes of the Act.


[Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Julie Heimeshoff worked for Wal-Mart as Senior Public Relations Manager from April 1986 through June 2005. In January 2005, she began suffering from pain from fibromyalgia as well as Irritable Bowel Syndrome and lupus. By June, her condition was so severe that she had to leave work. In August 2005, Heimsehoff filed a claim with Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) for Long Term Disability benefits. Heimsehoff's doctor failed to provide an analysis of her condition to Harford, so Hartford denied her claim in December 2005. In May 2006, Heimsehoff obtained counsel to assist her in obtaining benefits. After several evaluations by other doctors, Hartford denied Heimsehoff's claim again in November 2006, finding that she could perform the duties of her former position. Heimsehoff appealed the decision, but Hartford denied her claim for a final time in November 2007.
Heimsehoff sued in district court, alleging that Hartford violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in denying her claim. The district court dismissed the suit as time barred because the plan unambiguously prohibited legal action more than three years after proof of loss is required. Heimsehoff argued that the three-year statute of limitations should instead run from the date when Hartford denied her claim for the final time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (2013) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, because ERISA does not mandate a statute of limitations, parties may agree to one that begins before a final denial of coverage that allows a party to state a claim in district court. Since Hartford's agreed-upon limitations period is neither too short nor is there a statute that prevents it from taking effect, the courts are bound to enforce the limitations period and its start date as written in the coverage plan. The Court also held that there is no evidence that the limitations period would prevent a party from fully pursuing internal review followed by judicial review, and if that were to happen, the courts could apply well-established doctrines to allow the suit to proceed.


[Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The respondents are all immigrants to the United States and are considered lawful permanent residents. At various times each of the respondents applied for family-sponsored visas. However, because of the delays caused by visa quotas and serious backlogs in the U.S. immigration system meant that all of their children had turned twenty-one and, based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), had "aged out" of eligibility for any derivative child-visas. As a result, their visa applications converted from child-applications to adult-applications and were moved to the bottom of the adult-application list, which potentially added years to their wait to receive a visas.
In 2009, after the Board of Immigration Appeals converted several child visa petitions to adult petitions, the respondents filed two cases in federal district court in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California asking hat the court order the Board to retain use of their children's original visa filing dates. That court denied the request. The respondents then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. There, the petitioners argued that certain provisions in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) should allow the use of the children's original application dates for certain visa applications. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the language of both CSPA and the INA allow the child-status petition to convert to an adult petition while still retaining the original date when the visa petition was filed.


[Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the three-justice plurality. The plurality held that the relevant sections of the Child Status Protection Act are not ambiguous but rather allow children to retain their original application date only in certain situations and not in others. Therefore, the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals is reasonable and should receive deference in this case. However, the plurality also noted that the CSPA does not require the Board's interpretation in this case; it is simply one possible reading based on the differences in the text of the statute.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that Congress intended any ambiguity in the statute to be resolved by the Board. Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the plurality that the Board's interpretation of the statute was reasonable and should be allowed to stand. Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.
In his dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the CSPA has an appropriate category into which to convert the petitions of children who have "aged out" of their previous category. Because such a conversion is possible without any action on the part of the INA, the respondents' petitions should have been immediately converted and their original petition dates should be retained. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate dissent in which she argued that, because all five categories of aged out children meet the requirement in the initial clause of the statute, they are entitled to relief in the form of retaining their original petition dates. By holding that the Board's interpretation was a reasonable one, the plurality's opinion ignores the principle of statutory interpretation that requires courts to assume that Congress constructed the statute as a coherent whole. Because the Board's construction of the statute neglected this principle and treated the statute as entirely disparate parts, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Board's interpretation was impermissible. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Bond v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act).
In the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce.


[Bond v. United States (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that federal law typically does not intrude on the ability of states to regulate local matters, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is not an exception to that general rule. While Congress has the authority to create legislation to enforce treaties, it must do so while respecting the traditional division of sovereign responsibility between the federal government and the states. The Court also held that it is incumbent upon the courts to be sure of Congress' intent before ruling based on such a rationale; in this case, because there is no evidence that Congress intended the statute to have expansive powers, it must be read more narrowly. In fact, the language of the statute suggests that the facts of this case do not match the types of situations the statute was enacted to govern.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, in determining whether the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act covers Bond's actions, the majority opinion overstepped its bounds and performed Congress' duty. Justice Scalia also wrote that it was clear from the wording of the statute that Bond's actions were covered, and the majority opinion's interpretation of the statute made it so broad as to be unintelligible. However, the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the rights of the states. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas wrote that, while Congress has the power to create laws that enforce treaties, that power does not extend to the enforcement of laws that would infringe on states' rights. The historical context of this "Treaty Power" indicates that it was meant to be limited to international affairs and not interfere with the constitutional structure of federal and state power. Justice Scalia and Justice Alito joined in the concurrence in judgment. Justice Alito also wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the statute went beyond Congress' power to enforce treaties and is therefore unconstitutional.


[Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Peggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter.
Young sued UPS and claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed Young's claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, but courts must evaluate the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than non-pregnant workers with similar inabilities to work and determine whether there are any legitimate reasons for such differences. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an interpretation of the Act that requires employers to offer the same accommodations to pregnant workers as all others with comparable physical limitations regardless of other factors would be too broad. There is no evidence that Congress intended the Act to grant pregnancy such an unconditional “most-favored-nation status.” However, Congress clearly intended the Act to do more than defining sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. The Court held that a plaintiff may show that she faced disparate treatment from her employer according to the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which requires evidence that the employer’s actions were more likely than not based on discriminatory motivation, and that any reasons the employer offered were pretextual.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the language of the Act makes employers liable for discriminatory conduct regardless of intent. To determine whether the conduct was discriminatory, Justice Alito argued that the treatment of pregnant employees should be compared to the treatment of non-pregnant employees in similar jobs with similar abilities and inabilities to work.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Act only prohibited an employer from distinguishing between employees of similar abilities and inabilities because of pregnancy, while differing treatment for other reasons is permissible. To adopt a broader reading of the Act’s protections would entitle pregnant workers to every possible accommodation. Justice Scalia also argued that the Act’s main intent is to clarify that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority opinion interpreted the Act in a manner that conflates evidence of disparate impact with that of disparate treatment, which creates unnecessary confusion in litigating pregnancy discrimination cases.


[Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S. ex rel. Carter (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In early 2005, Benjamin Carter worked for Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a U.S. Government contractor providing logistical services to the U.S. military in Iraq. In 2006, Carter filed a whistleblower suit against KBR for fraudulent billing practices under the False Claims Act (FCA). Carter alleged that KBR had a standing policy of filling out fraudulent time sheets and thus overbilling the U.S. Government for services rendered in Iraq.
In 2010, just before trial, the U.S. Government informed the parties of a complaint that was filed earlier and alleging similar claims. The district court ruled that the earlier suit was related to Carter’s claims and dismissed the suit under the FCA’s “first-to-file” requirement, which bars a suit if a related one is pending. In 2011, Carter refiled his complaint, and KBR moved to dismiss by arguing that the latest complaint was filed after the FCA’s six-year statute of limitations had expired, and Carter’s complaint did not satisfy the first-to-file rule because there was yet another related matter pending. The district court dismissed Carter’s complaint, but the U.S Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), which suspends the applicable six-year statute of limitations, only applies to criminal charges and, because the remaining related cases had since been dismissed, there was no pending related matter to prevent Carter’s claim from proceeding.


[Kellogg Brown & Root v. U.S. ex rel. Carter (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No and yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court looked to the WSLA’s text, structure, and history to show that it applies only to criminal offenses, and not to civil claims like the ones in this case. However, the Court also held that the False Claims Act’s first-to-file bar keeps new claims out of court only while related claims are still alive, not in perpetuity. The Court deemed KBR’s interpretation of the word “pending” to be “peculiar” and turned to the dictionary definition of “pending,” which means “remaining undecided; awaiting decision.”