[Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Renegotiation is allowed only if the contract poses "serious harm to the public interest." In this case, the Court decided 5-2 (Justices John G. Roberts and Stephen Breyer took no part in the decision) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had failed to make sufficient factual findings in order to determine whether such serious harm could in fact occur. Therefore, the Court sent the case back down to the Ninth Circuit in order to provide an opportunity to revisit these factual findings. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion stating that she believed the Court should have waited to hear the case until all the facts had been uncovered. However, because the case was heard when it was, she felt obliged to agree with the majority's reasoning. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David Souter, dissented, arguing that Congress, not the courts, should set the standards regarding the reasonableness of public contracts.


[Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
The case arises from competing claims to more than $30 million, the rewards of an investment former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos made with Merrill Lynch and subsequently misappropriated. A Philippine agency charged with recovering the funds, several Marcos family creditors, and human rights victims who had already secured a judgment against Marcos' estate each laid claim to the money, prompting Merrill Lynch to file an interpleader action to settle all of the claims in one case. The Philippine government, acting in concert with the recovery agency, claimed that it had sovereign immunity from suit and, because it was an indispensable party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), justice required that the case be stayed and brought before a special Philippine court established to return such misappropriated funds to the public treasury. However, the district court continued to adjudicate the case, eventually awarding the assets to the creditors.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the award, noting that the government's claim was barred by the applicable Philippine statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit further held that the "equity and good conscience" requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) did not require the Philippine government's participation in the case. In its petition for certiorari, the Philippine government argued that the award of assets undermined the comity principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) by not including the government as an indispensable party.


[Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes it did. The Court's opinion was unanimous in finding that the Philippine government was a required party to the case under Rule 19(b). Such a required party must be joined to the suit if it is "feasible," and the Court ruled that the government's inclusion was feasible in this case. The Court sent the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss the interpleader action. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter concurred in part and dissented in part.


[Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Richlin Security Service contracted with the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide guards at Los Angeles International Airport. After discovering that the guards had been misclassified by the federal government and subsequently underpaid for a period of years, Richlin brought a successful suit to recover the lost wages. In seeking reimbursement for fees associated with the proceedings, Richlin sought to recover fees for paralegal services at market rates. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 504, Richlin was entitled to "fees and other expenses incurred in the proceedings." Based on this language, the Board of Review determined that paralegal fees should be billed as a calculable cost to the firm and, therefore, should not be recoverable at market rates.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this decision, noting that the lack of a cap for paralegal fees could entice legal professionals to shift much of the work to them in order to maximize profits. Petitioners note, in urging the Court to grant certiorari, that a previous Court decision, Missouri v. Jenkins 491 U.S. 274 (1989), as well as several Eleventh Circuit decisions have reached the opposite result and have awarded paralegal fees at market rates.


[Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court held that such paralegal fees are recoverable at market rates. Justice Samuel A. Alito stated that because Richlin incurred fees for paralegal services in connection with its case, a straightforward reading of the statute demonstrates that Richlin was entitled to recover fees for the paralegal services it purchased at the market rate. The Court found the government's argument that only "reasonable costs" should be recovered unpersuasive.


[14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
A group of employees brought this action following a job transfer they believed to be based on age discrimination. The employees filed a grievance with their union, including the age discrimination issues but also asserting that the transfer violated their collective bargaining agreement. The union pursued the employees' collective bargaining claim through Penn Plaza's arbitration system; however, the employees themselves pursued their age discrimination claim in federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Penn Plaza argued that the arbitration clause included in the employment contract, stating that all age discrimination claims must be pursued through arbitration, prevented the employees from bringing the claim in federal court. The district court ruled in favor of the employees, holding the arbitration clause unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the ruling, relying on its previous decisions holding that arbitration clauses with respect to statutory claims, such as the ADEA, are unenforceable.


[14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that ,here, the arbitration provision was a "bargained-for exchange" in the collective bargaining agreement and thus should not be interfered with by the courts. The Court went on to state that because the ADEA itself did not mandate such interference, the arbitration provision should be enforced.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He noted that the majority opinion was a departure from Supreme Court precedent with respect to arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements. He went on to state that it was it was Congress' responsibility to reassess the policy arguments favoring arbitration rather than for the Supreme Court to decide. Justice David H. Souter also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He reemphasized that Supreme Court precedent did not preclude the pursuit of an ADEA claim because of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement, as in this case.


[FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 2002 and 2003, Fox Television Stations broadcast the Billboard Music Awards, an annual program honoring top-selling musicians. During the broadcasts, one musician used an explicative in his acceptance speech, and a presenter used two expletives. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although it had previously taken the position that such fleeting and isolated expletives did not violate its indecency regime, issued notices of liability to Fox for broadcasting the profane language. The FCC argued that previous decisions referring to "fleeting" expletives were merely staff letters and dicta and did not accurately represent its position on the matter. Fox appealed the FCC sanctions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit held that the FCC's liability order was "arbitrary and capricious" under the governing Administrative Procedure Act because the FCC had completely reversed its position on fleeting expletives without giving a proper justification. The Second Circuit also failed to find any evidence that the expletives were harmful.


[FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's order was neither "arbitrary" nor "capricious." Justice Antonin G. Scalia announced the judgment of the court in which Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in part, reasoning that the FCC need not prove that its change in policy is "better" than its prior stance. Rather, the FCC need merely prove that its new policy is "permissible" and that there are good reasons for it, as in this case.
Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring. Justice Kennedy also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that when the FCC changes policy, such that it reverses its own precedent, it should explain why. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that the FCC need explain why it changed its policy and disagreed that the word "indecent" allowed the FCC to punish the broadcast of "any" expletive that has a "sexual or excretory origin." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also dissented. She noted, that while the First Amendment issues surrounding the case were not addressed, they "cast a shadow", and the Court should be mindful that words "unpalatable to some may be commonplace for others." Lastly, Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. He argued that the FCC failed to adequately explain why it changed its policy and thus its order with respect to the Fox Television Stations was "arbitrary" and "capricious."


[Pearson, et al. v. Callahan (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
This case stems from a search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search, however the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction.
Subsequently, Callahan filed this action in federal court against the Task Force and individual officers alleging that the search violated his civil rights under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah dismissed his claim, holding in part that the "consent once removed" doctrine applied to the search. Under the doctrine, an undercover officer may summon backup officers into a home after that officer has been invited with consent. However the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, holding that the doctrine does not apply when the officers are summoned by a police informant. Therefore, according to the Tenth Circuit, Callahan had established a violation of his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.


[Pearson, et al. v. Callahan (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Not addressed, no, and yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that it was not clearly established at the time of police entry that the consent once removed doctrine violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore that the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force was qualifiedly immune in its search of Mr. Callahan's home. The Court also overturned its prior decision in Saucier v. Katz, which prescribed a rigid two-part inquiry into government officials' qualified immunity claims: "1) whether the facts alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and 2) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Rather, the Court held that this inquiry should be utilized at the discretion of the lower courts. It reasoned that substantial judicial resources were often expended in determining difficult constitutional claims that ultimately had little to do with the outcome of the case.


[Republic of Iraq v. Beaty (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 2003, plaintiffs sued the Republic of Iraq in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleging they had been tortured and taken hostage during the 1990-1991 Gulf War. The plaintiffs relied on 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7), an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allowed for lawsuits against state sponsors of terrorism. Iraq moved to dismiss arguing that Section 1605(f) provides a limitations period of ten years for any action filed under Section 1605(a)(7). The district court agreed and dismissed the suit.
After the plaintiffs' appeal, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which revised Section 1605(a)(7) granting the President authority to waive the exception to the FSIA with respect to Iraq, which he did. Iraq subsequently contended that because of the revision, the case should be dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the district court. It held that the district court had jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed on time and not barred by the President's waiver.


[Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Natural Resources Defense Council along with other environmental groups object to the "SOCAL" exercises, scheduled to take place between February 2007 and January 2009. The groups felt the exercises would cause serious harm to various species of marine mammal present in the southern California waters. The groups sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from carrying out the exercises. The district court granted the injunction, finding that the NRDC had demonstrated probable success on its claim that the Navy had violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the exercises. The district court also denied the efforts of the Council on Environmental Quality to provide "alternative arrangements" for the Navy to proceed without an EIS. The district court stated that such arrangements require "emergency circumstances" not applicable to the case
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and upheld the decision granting the injunction. The court reviewed the findings under an "abuse of discretion" standard and determined that the district court had not abused its discretion in finding that the environmental groups raised substantial questions as to whether the exercises would have a significant impact on the environment and that these claims were likely to succeed on the merits. Furthermore, the district court had acted properly when it found that allowing long-planned, routine training exercises to meet the "emergency circumstances" exception would create an unacceptably broad definition of that phrase.


[Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No and not specifically determined. The Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice John G. Roberts that the standard for properly granting a preliminary injunction is not based on the "possibility" of irreparable harm to marine life, but rather that "irreparable injury is likely" in the absence of such an injunction. Regardless, the Court reasoned that in this case the public interest in conducting naval training exercises outweighed even certain irreparable harm to marine life. Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and removed the preliminary injunction against the Navy's training exercises. It further instructed that if a district court finds the Navy must complete an Environmental Impact Statement, it need find alternative ways to persuade the Navy to comply, other than through an injunction.
Justice Stepehen G. Breyer filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. While agreeing with much of the majority's reasoning, he advocated keeping in place the court of appeals' modified injunction against naval exercises, at least until Navy's publication of an acceptable Environmental Impact Statement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg joined by Justice David H. Souter dissented finding that the District Court appropriately used its discretion to order a preliminary injunction against the Navy.


[Forest Grove School District v. T.A. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 2003, T.A., a former student in the Forest Grove School District, sought to be evaluated for suspected learning disabilities. In 2004, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Oregon determined that T.A. was disabled and eligible for special education under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As T.A. was no longer enrolled in the Forest Grove School District, but attending private school, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse T.A. for the private school tuition ($5,200 per month), determining it had failed to offer him a free and appropriate public education.
The school district appealed the order in an Oregon federal district court arguing that reimbursement was not appropriate because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from school, never received special education services while enrolled, and withdrew for reasons unrelated to his learning disability. The district court invalidated the order. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the order. It reasoned that IDEA provided the courts broad discretion in order to achieve "equitable relief" for disabled students, including reimbursement for private school tuition.


[Forest Grove School District v. T.A. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special-education services when a public school fails to provide free appropriate public education (FAPE) and the private school placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously received special education services through the public school. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court relied on its decisions in Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass. and Florence County School Dist. 4 v. Carter to reach its conclusion. There, the Court had found that courts had the power to reimburse parents for private school tuition when a school district fails to provide FAPE and a private school placement is appropriate.
Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia and Clarence Thomas. He argued that the 1997 Congressional amendments to IDEA limited reimbursement for private school tuition when the public school had provided FAPE and the student's withdrawal was unilateral, and then criticized the majority for not recognizing such limitations.


[Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 1999, the city of Valdez, Alaska imposed a property tax on large vessels that used its port. Vessels subject to taxation elsewhere were held to an apportionment formula based on the number of days spent there. In response, Polar Tankers Inc. filed suit in an Alaska trial court arguing that the apportionment provision was unconstitutional. The trial court in part agreed, ruling that the apportionment method violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but did not violate the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed in part. The court held that the tax apportionment formula used by the city of Alaska was fair and non-duplicative. Therefore, it did not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses in the Constitution.


[Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Not answered, not answered, yes. The Supreme Court held that the Valdez, Alaska property tax that fell exclusively on large vessels and that used an apportionment method for out of state vessels violated the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined in part by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reiterated that the Tonnage Clause need be interpreted in light of its purpose of restraining states from enacting taxes that injure the interests of other states. Here, the Court reasoned that the Valdez tax that targeted ships not residing in Alaska did just this, and therefore was unconstitutional. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the Tonnage Clause would not have applied to the City of Valdez had it imposed similar taxes upon other businesses. However, the Court found little evidence that Valdez did so, and therefore the tax was not excluded from the scope of the Tonnage Clause.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the City of Valdez's tax was unconstitutional, but disagreed with the majority that an unconstitutional tax could become permissible when bundled with other similar taxes on other businesses and properties. Justice Alito also wrote separately, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice David H. Souter, dissented. He argued that the Tonnage Clause merely limits states from charging ships for "the privilege of arriving and departing from a port." He reasoned that the City of Valdez tax did not do so and therefore the tax was not unconstitutional.


[Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In October 1998, Hugh Caperton filed suit against A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (Massey) for tortious interference, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. A state trial court in West Virginia rendered judgment against Massey and found it liable for $50 million in damages. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia granted review. However, prior to hearing, Mr. Caperton motioned for Justice Brent Benjamin to recuse himself. He argued that since Massey's C.E.O. had donated $3 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign to win a seat on the Supreme Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin's participation would present a "constitutionally unacceptable appearance of impropriety." The motion was denied. In a 3-2 decision with Justice Benjamin voting in the majority, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered it to dismiss the case. After its decision, the court granted Mr. Caperton's motion for rehearing, but once again denied his motion for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. On rehearing, the court maintained in a 3-2 decision that the trial court should be reversed and the case dismissed. It reasoned that a forum selection clause in a contract between the parties made the trial court in West Virginia an improper venue. It also concluded that because the parties had previously adjudicated the dispute in a Virginia state trial court, the doctrine of res judicata did not allow this case to be retried.


[Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that due process required that Justice Brent Benjamin recuse himself from participation in the case in question. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court stated that it need not find that Justice Benjamin was actually biased in his decision making in order to find invalid the decision in which he took part. Rather, it need merely be shown that "under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness," Justice Benjamin's interest posed "a risk of actual bias" and thus he should have recused himself if his participation threatened the adequate implementation of due process. The Court stated that such a risk of bias exists where a judge has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest," as Justice Benjamin did. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he improperly failed to recuse himself.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts dissented and was joined by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. He argued that the majority imprudently expanded the standard for which a judge need recuse himself by merely showing a "probability of bias." He raised forty points of uncertainty that arise because of the majority's vague standard. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He argued that the majority performed its duties poorly as a clarifying body by making an area of the law vastly more uncertain.


[Kansas v. Colorado (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
This case represents another chapter in the longstanding dispute between the two states concerning water rights to the Arkansas River. The states had created the Arkansas River Compact in 1943 in order to allocate portions of the river between them. In 1985, Kansas brought suit before the Court alleging that Colorado had breached the agreement. The Court appointed a "Special Master" to investigate the allegations and to make recommendations to the Court. The Special Master submitted his report in 1994, finding that Colorado had indeed violated the Compact.
Since 1994, the Special Master has issued three more reports. These reports have been accompanied by several objections by both states. The Court has dismissed the majority of these objections. The question presently before the Court is whether or not to overrule two of Kansas' objections to the most recent report of the Special Master.


[Kansas v. Colorado (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court overruled Kansas' objection holding that witness attendance fees that are available in actions brought under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction should be the same as those brought under actions in the federal district courts. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for a unanimous Court, it reasoned that there was no good reason not to have a uniform rule for the recovery of expert witness fees among the different levels of federal courts.


[Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In the aftermath of September 11th, the FBI arrested thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into the attacks. One of these men, Javaid Iqbal, was classified as being a "high interest" detainee at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal claims that during his detention he was segregated from the rest of the prison population and mistreated in several ways, including confinement to a cell for 23 hours a day where he had blinding light shone on him constantly and air conditioning pumped into the cell even during the winter months. After being released, Iqbal brought a suit against representatives of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, and FBI alleging 21 violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on his treatment while confined. These defendants argued that they should be protected from the suit in their official governmental roles through qualified immunity. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and rejected the qualified immunity defense.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on all counts but one for violation of the right to due process. The Second Circuit noted that the actions taken by the government occurred in the immediate aftermath of September 11th and therefore created a unique context in which Iqbal's claims had to be reviewed. Even with these circumstances, however, the court felt that the qualified immunity defense could protect the government only from the due process claim. The "serious allegations of gross mistreatment" were enough to sustain the remaining counts.


[Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Not Answered and No. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit had jurisdiction to affirm the district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss Mr. Iqbal's claim. However, the Court also held that Mr. Iqbal failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that Mr. Iqbal needed to plead sufficient facts to show that the defendants implemented their policies for the purpose of discrimination. Mr. Iqbal did not do this and thus his complaint was deficient. The Court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Mr. Iqbal may amend his complaint.
Justice David H. Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He disagreed with the majority's opinion that Mr. Iqbal failed to state a claim. Rather, he argued that since the defendants admitted that they would be liable if they knew their subordinates' conduct was deliberately discriminatory, that Mr. Iqbal did plead sufficient facts to state a claim for unlawful discrimination.


[Nijhawan v. Holder (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Manoj Nijhawan was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. He was found responsible for having caused over $600 million in damages and sentenced to 41 months imprisonment. Subsequently, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Mr. Nijhawan had committed an "aggravated felony" and was subject to deportation because his offense involved fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victims exceeded $10,000. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Mr. Nijhawan argued that 1) his offense did not involve fraud or deceit as those terms are used in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and 2) that his conviction did not establish that loss to his victims exceeded $10,000. The court of appeals affirmed the BIA's findings and refuted Mr. Nijhawan's arguments. It held that Mr. Nijhawan's offenses constituted fraud or deceit as understood by the INA and that his conviction did establish that the loss to his victims exceeded $10,000, even though the jury did not determine that amount.


[Nijhawan v. Holder (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the $10,000 threshold stated by the Immigration and Nationality Act refers merely to the particular circumstances in which an offense is committed, and does not require that the statute used to convict the potential deportee contain $10,000 in damages as an element of the crime. Here, the Court reasoned that the statute used to convict Mr. Nijhawan for conspiracy did not require that he cause a minimum of $10,000 in damages; but regardless, the jury's computation of damages at his sentencing was sufficient to meet the requirements of the INA to trigger his deportation.


[Corley v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In September 2004, Johnnie Corley was convicted on counts of armed bank robbery and the use and carrying of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Before trial, he filed a motion to suppress his oral and written confessions. The federal district court dismissed the motion. After his conviction, Mr. Corley appealed arguing his motion was improperly dismissed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
The court recognized that federal statutes require federal officials to bring persons they arrest before judicial officers without unnecessary delay. Confessions received after such delays and before the arrested person is presented before a federal magistrate should be suppressed. Mr. Corley's confessions fell under these guidelines. However, the court reasoned that the voluntariness of a confession was an overriding factor in determining admissibility. Mr. Corley voluntarily confessed. Therefore, his confessions were admissible.


[Corley v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court held that its decisions in McNabb and Mallory were not supplanted by 18 U.S.C. Section 3501. Therefore, confessions made during periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure remain generally inadmissible -- even voluntary ones.
Justice Samuel A. Alito wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Antonin G. Scalia and Clarence Thomas. He argued that 18 U.S.C. Section 3501 is unambiguous in stating, "[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United States...a confession...shall be admissible in evidence if it is given voluntarily." Therefore, Mr. Corley's voluntary confession should not be suppressed.


[Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Ignacio Flores-Figueroa was convicted on two counts of aggravated identity theft in a federal district court and sentenced to 75 months imprisonment. On appeal, he argued that his conviction was in error because the government did not prove he knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's decision. It held the government need not prove Mr. Flores-Figueroa knew the identification he possessed belonged to another person.


[Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government needs to prove that the defendant "knew" that the identification he possessed belonged to another person. With Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that ordinary grammar indicates that "knowingly" should be read to apply to all subsequently listed elements of the crime in the relevant statute.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a separate concurring opinion and concurred in the judgment. He was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia argued that the Court should distinguish between those cases where it should infer a mens rea requirement when Congress has not addressed it within the statute, and those cases when Congress has intentionally limited the mens rea requirement to particular elements of the relevant crime. Justice Samuel A. Alito also wrote separately, concurring and concurring in the judgment. He noted his concern that the majority opinion may be read as a rigid rule of statutory construction where the mens rea requirement of a federal criminal statute will always apply to every element of the relevant crime.


[Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In February 2001 Jacqueline Fitzgerald, a kindergarten student, told her parents that an older student on the school bus, on several occasions, bullied her into lifting up her skirt. Jacqueline's mother reported these allegations to the school but its immediate investigation into the matter, including interviewing the supposed perpetrator, the school bus driver, and many students on the bus, did not provide any further proof of the sexual harassment. After Jacqueline told her parents about further instances of mistreatment, the local police department began its own investigation but was unable to find sufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings against the alleged harasser. Jacqueline reported other incidents throughout the year, and each was addressed by the school's principal as it occurred. In April of 2002 the Fitzgeralds brought suit against the school district in federal court alleging violations of both Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983). Title IX prohibits discrimination by any educational entity receiving federal funding, while Section 1983 protects against the deprivation of any rights guaranteed by the Constitution and federal laws. The district court granted the school district's motion to dismiss both counts and the Fitzgeralds appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. First, discussing the Title IX claim, the court stated that five conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed: the student must prove that (1) the institution is a recipient of federal funding, (2) severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive harassment occurred, (3) the harassment denied the student of educational opportunities or benefits, (4) the institution had actual knowledge of the harassment, and (5) the institution's deliberate indifference caused the student to be subjected to the harassment. The First Circuit held that even if the first four factors were met in this case, the school's "prompt" and "diligent" investigation was not clearly unreasonable and therefore did not amount to deliberate indifference. Rather, the school looked into each allegation quickly and thoroughly. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Fitzgeralds' Section 1983 claim, applying the so-called "remedial" exception prohibiting such claims when the allegedly violated federal law is itself specific enough to demonstrate Congress' intention to allow only those remedies referred to in the statute itself. According to the First Circuit, Title IX is one of these remedial statutes and therefore any alleged violations of the statute cannot be litigated under Section 1983.


[Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. It held that a claim filed under Title IX for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the use of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to further constitutional claims. The Court reasoned that Title IX was not meant to be the exclusive tool for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for actions filed under Section 1983 to enforce constitutional rights.


[Coeur Alaska v. S.E. Alaska Conservation Council (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) granted permits to allow Coeur Alaska, Inc. to discharge processed wastewater from its gold mine into a lake in Alaska. The South East Alaska Conservation council sued to prevent the discharge. It argued that granting the permits exceeded the authority of the USACE. The federal district court in Alaska held that the permits were valid.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to void the permits. The court held that the USACE improperly interpreted the Clean Water Act when granting the permits. It explained that the characteristics of the wastewater discharge did not come under the USACE's scope of authority, but were of a nature that was explicitly prohibited by the Clean Water Act.


[Coeur Alaska v. S.E. Alaska Conservation Council (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the United States Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) and not the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had authority to grant permits allowing Coeur Alaska Inc. to discharge processed wastewater into a lake in Alaska. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and joined in part by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the Court stated that both the USACE and EPA agreed on a common definition of "fill material," which described the discharge planned by Coeur at its mining site in Alaska. Further, since the USACE had exclusive rights to grant permits relating to the discharge of fill material, the Court reasoned that it was clear that USACE had authority to grant Coeur a permit to discharge its waste at its mining site.
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion, attempting to assuage concerns that the Court's decision will be seen as a loophole for polluters, so long as they dump enough pollutant into a lake for it to be considered "fill material." Justice Scalia also wrote separately concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David H. Souter. She argued that the relevant inquiry should have stopped at the determination that Coeur failed to meet EPA performance standards by discharging its wastewater in an Alaska lake.


[AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Four employees sued their employer, AT&T, alleging that the company's policy for calculating employee pension and retirement benefits discriminated against women who had taken leave time due to pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The AT&T policy considered temporary disability leave as service time for the purposes of calculating retirement benefits except when the leave was taken by pregnant women. The employees argued that the policy violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which clarified that Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." The main issue in the case was one of timing: although the employees' pregnancy leave was taken before the PDA came into effect, AT&T's calculation of benefits took place after. The employees argued that under the Court's decision in Pallas the time of calculation should govern the applicability of the PDA. AT&T countered that another decision, Landgraf directly opposed Pallas and had created a "sea change" in retroactivity principles such that the PDA should not apply to pregnancy leave taken before it was enacted. The district court sided with the employees and granted summary judgment in their favor.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the lower court, agreeing with AT&T that Pallas gave impermissible retroactive effect to the PDA. On rehearing, the full court reversed and ruled in favor of the employees, avoiding the retroactivity problem by holding that the PDA applies to the actual calculation of pension and retirement benefits regardless of when the leave itself was taken. Because AT&T performed this calculation after the PDA had gone into effect, the denial of benefits violated Title VII.


[AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that a company does not necessarily violate the PDA or Title VII when it denies retirement benefits to women who take a temporary disability leave while pregnant when the leave was taken before the PDA came into effect. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that since AT&T's seniority system was not discriminatory at its adoption, its limiting seniority credit for time taken during pregnancy did not constitute unlawful discrimination. Rather, the limitation of seniority credit for pregnant women could only violate the PDA or Title VII if AT&T's system had been unlawful at its adoption.
Justice Stevens also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer. She argued that AT&T violated the PDA and Title VII when it did not discontinue reliance upon a benefit calculation system which contained pregnancy-based seniority classifications.


[Locke v. Karass (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
After the Maine State Employees Association (a union representing state workers) negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement for certain employees, nonmembers voiced their disapproval with the agreement's requirement that they pay a "service fee" to the union as its exclusive bargaining agent. The service fee included an affiliation fee paid to the Service Employees International Union through a general pooling arrangement, meaning that the nonmembers were contributing funds to an affiliate for litigation not specifically for their own benefit. The nonmembers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine claiming that the service fee violated their First amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the union.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, applying the Court's decision in Lehnert to determine that the nonmember employees' First Amendment rights were not implicated by the service fee. Under the Lehnert test, chargeable activities must (1) "be substantively related to bargaining and ultimately inure to the benefit of local union members, (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace and avoiding free riders, and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of agency."


[Locke v. Karass (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment permits a local union to charge nonmembers for national litigation expenses so long as 1) the subject matter is of a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local and 2) the charge is reciprocal in nature (the contributing local union reasonably expects other local unions to contribute similarly). The Court reasoned that the fees paid by nonmembers of the Maine State Employees Association that funded national litigation expenses met this test and therefore did not violate nonmembers' First Amendment rights.
Justice Samuel A. Alito filed a separate concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts. Alito noted the Supreme Court did not reach the question of what "reciprocity" means, acknowledging it was not contested by either party.


[Carcieri v. Salazar (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 1991, the Narragansett Indian Tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in Charlestown, RI to build a housing complex for the elderly. The U.S. Department of the Interior, acting at the tribe's request, moved to take the land into federal trust, thereby placing it largely under federal and tribal control, in 1998. However, Rhode Island officials opposed the move, claiming that the Department of the Interior lacked the proper authority because the Narragansett tribe was not recognized until nearly 50 years after the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act took effect. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island upheld the action, stating that Rhode Island was taking an unnecessarily narrow view of the law.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision and approved of its reasoning. In seeking Supreme Court review to determine whether the time of tribal recognition should be dispositive on this issue, Rhode Island noted that "the future allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction between states and tribes over a potentially unlimited amount of land hangs in the balance."


[Carcieri v. Salazar (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit holding that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 did not apply to tribes not recognized at the time of the statute's creation. Therefore, the Indian Reorganization Act did not authorize the Secretary of the Interior to act on behalf of the Narrangansett Tribe as trustee. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the statute unambiguously referred only to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and therefore did not apply to the Narrangansett Tribe.
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opinion qualifying his assent to the majority opinion. In part, he argued that the statute was not "unambiguous", but through contextual analysis, the statute referred only to those tribes under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He departed from the majority opinion by arguing that the case should have been remanded for the Narrangansett Tribe to pursue an alternative legal theory. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented arguing that the Narrangansett Tribe was an Indian Tribe under the meaning of the statute, though not specified by name, and therefore the Secretary of the Interior should be allowed to act on its behalf.


[Bartlett v. Strickland (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Dwight Strickland, a commissioner in Pender County, NC, along with several other county commissioners, brought this suit against state officials alleging that their redistricting plan was in violation of the North Carolina Constitution. The state officials argued that the redistricting plan was required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), stating that the minority group in question, comprised of African-American North Carolina citizens, was sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority under the terms of the VRA. The North Carolina Superior Court agreed with the state officials and entered summary judgment in their favor.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on appeal, holding that the minority group did not comprise a numerical majority of citizens and, therefore, redistricting was not required by the VRA. Because the redistricting plan did not meet the conditions of the VRA, the court said, it had to comply with certain terms of North Carolina's Constitution setting a minimum county population for redistricting. The court found that the county did not meet this requirement, and declared the plan unlawful.


[Bartlett v. Strickland (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court holding that the VRA does not require state officials to redraw election district lines to allow a racial minority group to feasibly join with crossover voters to elect the minority's candidate choice when the racial minority group would make up less than 50 percent of the voting population in the redrawn district. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the plurality and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court, relying on its decision in Gingles, stated that the VRA allows redistricting only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could form a majority in the redrawn election district. The Court reasoned that this requirement was not satisfied here as the minority group in the redrawn district comprised a mere 39 percent of the voting population.
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin G. Scalia, concurred only in the judgment. He disagreed with the Gingles framework for analyzing vote dilution claims arguing it had no basis in the language of the VRA. Justice David H. Souter dissented and was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer. He disagreed with the majority's holding, arguing that a district may be redrawn so long as a cohesive minority population is large enough to elect its chosen candidate when combined with crossover voters. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, encouraging Congress to remedy what she viewed as the Court's misinterpretation of the VRA. Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, criticizing the plurality's reliance on a 50 percent threshold as too simplistic because it fails to account for the realities of how people actually vote.


[Horne v. Flores (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
The Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction and members of the Arizona state legislature moved for relief from judgments of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. In January 2000, the court had cited the state for civil contempt for failing to adequately fund English Language Learner programs, in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and subsequently rejected proposed legislation as inadequate to resolve the programs' deficiencies. The superintendent and representatives argued that increases in state funding, changes in the management of the school district involved, and passage of the No Child Left Behind Act sufficiently altered the foundations of the district court's original ruling and therefore relief was warranted. The federal district court of Arizona denied the motion.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that since Arizona never appealed or complied with the district court's original order that it was fair to require compliance.


[Horne v. Flores (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts erred in their analysis under Rule 60(b)(5). With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court criticized the lower courts for implementing a Rule 60(b)(5) standard that was too strict. It remanded the case for the federal district court to examine four factual and legal areas that may warrant relief for Arizona from its court orders: 1) the impact of a new ELL learning program, 2) the impact of No Child Left Behind, 3) the impact of structural and managerial changes in its school system, and 4) the impact of an increased state general education fund.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. He disagreed with the Court's reasoning, arguing that the lower courts fairly considered every change in the circumstances that Arizona called to the courts' attention.


[Kansas v. Ventris (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In January 2003, Donnie Ventris and his girlfriend entered the apartment of Ernest Hicks who was subsequently robbed and killed. Mr. Ventris was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated battery by the District Court of Montgomery County in Kansas. To rebut the testimony of Mr. Ventris at trial, the State relied on the testimony of his former cell mate, Johnnie Doser. The government recruited Mr. Doser to keep his "ear open" and listen for incriminating statements made by Mr. Ventris. Mr. Ventris appealed claiming this testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court's decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but reversed by the Supreme Court of Kansas.
The court held that "[w]ithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the admission of the defendant's uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State agent violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights." It reasoned that the fact finding responsibilities of the trial court do not outweigh individuals' constitutional rights.


[Kansas v. Ventris (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. Mr. Ventris' statements, elicited in violation of the Sixth Amendment, were admissible to impeach his inconsistent testimony at trial. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned that the interests protected by excluding "tainted evidence" are outweighed by the need to assure "integrity of the trial process."
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He sharply criticized the majority for allowing the State to cut corners in criminal proceedings at the expense of criminal defendants' constitutional guarantees.


[Chambers v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.


[Chambers v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice David H. Souter, and Justice Ruther Bader Ginsburg held that the "failure to report" crime does not satisfy the Armed Career Criminals Act's (ACCA) "crime of violence" definition. The Court reasoned that the "failure to report" crime does not "involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another" as it is a crime of inaction and therefore should not be categorized as a "crime of violence".
Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. While agreeing with the Court's analysis, Justice Alito highlighted the difficulty the courts have had in applying the ACCA. He encouraged Congress to amend the ACCA and include a specific list of crimes that appropriately enhance a sentence.


[Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In July 2005, Edgar Townsend was allegedly injured while working aboard the tug boat Thomas. His employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. sought declaratory judgment in a federal district court to determine its obligations toward him. Mr. Townsend counterclaimed. In part, he alleged arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries, and sought punitive damages. Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. motioned to dismiss the request for punitive damages. The district court denied the motion, but allowed for interlocutory appeal.
The United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed. The court held it was bound by its prior decision in Hines v. J.A. LaPorte, Inc. There, it concluded a seaman may recover punitive damages when an employer arbitrarily and willfully refuses to pay maintenance and cure for his injuries. It reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. did not apply. In that case, the Court held that recovery for "non-pecuniary loss in the wrongful death of a seaman was not available under general maritime law". The court of appeals reasoned that Miles was not "clearly on point" to the facts in Mr. Townsend's case.


[Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that punitive damages remain available for the willful and and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that since punitive damages have long been accepted under general maritime law and neither Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. or the Jones Act altered this understanding, punitive damages remain available.
Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, and Anthony M. Kennedy. He argued that under Miles courts should be reluctant to award relief under general maritime law that is not available under a statutory claim. Thus, punitive damages should not be available to Mr. Townshend.


[Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Luis Melendez-Diaz was arrested while making a cocaine sale in a parking lot in Massachusetts. At trial, bags of the cocaine alleged to have been distributed by Melendez-Diaz were introduced into evidence along with drug analysis certificates prepared by the lab technician who analyzed the drugs and identified them as cocaine. A jury convicted Melendez-Diaz of distributing and trafficking cocaine in violation of Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz appealed, arguing that the State's introduction of the drug analysis certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him under the Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington. Crawford had held that so-called "testimonial" evidence cannot be introduced at trial unless the defendant has a chance to cross-examine the witness providing the evidence. Melendez-Diaz characterized the lab analysis as testimonial and argued that Crawford required the lab technician to testify on the results. The State argued that Massachusetts had previously held, in Commonwealth v. Verde, that lab reports were not testimonial.
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals rejected Melendez-Diaz's claims in an unpublished opinion, referring to them in a short footnote as "without merit." The Massachusetts Supreme Court also denied his appeal.


[Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a state forensic analyst's lab report that is prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is subject to the demands of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. With Justice Antonin G. Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reasoned that the lab reports constitute affidavits which fall within the "core class of testimonial statements" covered by the Confrontation Clause. Therefore, when Mr. Melendez- Diaz was not allowed to confront the persons who created the lab reports used in testimony at his trial, his Sixth Amendment right was violated.
Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion, emphasizing that he thought the Confrontation Clause was only implicated by statements made outside the courtroom when they are part of "formalized testimonial materials." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy dissented and was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Samuel A. Alito. He criticized the majority for so cavalierly dispensing with the long held rule that scientific analysis could be introduced into evidence without testimony from the analyst who produced it.


[Ricci v. DeStefano (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
White and Hispanic candidates for promotion in the New Haven, CT fire department sued various city officials in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut when the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) failed to certify two exams needed for the plaintiffs' promotion to Lieutenant and Captain. The CSB did not certify because the results of the test would have promoted a disproportionate number of white candidates in comparison to minority candidates. The plaintiffs argued that their rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, and the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause were violated. The federal district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. It reasoned that the CSB, by refusing to certify the results of the promotional exam, was trying to fulfill its obligations under the rules utilized by the plaintiffs in their argument and therefore was protected in its actions.


[Ricci v. DeStefano (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Maybe; fact dependent. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that by discarding the exams, the City of New Haven violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote the majority joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito. Before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the purpose of avoiding a "disparate impact" on a protected trait (race, color, religion, national origin), the employer must have a "strong basis in evidence" that it will be subject to "disparate impact liability" if it fails to take the discriminatory action. Here, the Court reasoned that New Haven failed to prove it had a "strong basis in evidence" that failing to discard the results of the exam would have subjected it to liability, as the exams were job-related, consistent with business necessity, and there was no evidence that an equally-valid, less-discriminatory alternative was available.
Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring. He noted that the Court avoided answering whether the "disparate impact" provision of Title VII was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Alito also wrote a concurring opinion and was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. He criticized the dissent for omitting key information in reaching its alternate conclusion.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented and was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer. She argued that the City of New Haven had good cause to believe it would be vulnerable to a Title VII lawsuit if it certified the exams. Moreover, she criticized the majority for ignoring "substantial flaws" in the exam.


[Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In April 2004, Jack Gross sued FBL Financial Services, Inc. (FBL) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) alleging he was demoted because of his age. A federal district court in Iowa found in his favor and awarded him $46, 945.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. The court held that the jury instruction in Mr. Gross' case was improper. It reasoned that since Mr. Gross never submitted direct evidence that age was a motivating factor in his demotion, he was not entitled to a jury instruction that put the burden of persuasion upon FBL to show that it would have demoted him regardless of his age.


[Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. The Supreme Court held that in an ADEA discrimination claim the burden of persuasion does not shift to the defendant employer to prove that it would have taken the action regardless of the plaintiff's age, even when evidence is introduced showing that age was one motivating factor in its decision. Rather, the Court held that the plaintiff must prove by a "preponderance of the evidence" that age was the "but-for" cause of the defendant's action. With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court reasoned from the ADEA's plain text and Congressional intent that the Title VII burden shifting framework did not apply to the ADEA.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented and was joined by Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer. He argued that both the Court and Congress had previously rejected the "but for" standard of causation in ADEA claims and then criticized the majority for "unnecessary lawmaking." Justice Breyer also wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg. He criticized the majority for adopting a standard that was inappropriate for determining mental processes like motive, a necessary element in a ADEA discrimination claim.


[Puckett v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In September 2003, James Benjamin Puckett agreed to a plea bargain with the United States on counts of bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. In exchange for his guilty plea, the government agreed to recommend a reduced sentence. However at sentencing, the government reneged arguing that because Mr. Puckett admittedly aided a fellow inmate in another crime while awaiting sentencing, he was no longer eligible for the reduction. The district court agreed. On appeal, Mr. Puckett maintained that the government's breach of agreement disqualified his guilty plea.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Puckett's guilty plea was not disqualified. It recognized that the government breached its plea agreement at sentencing. However, it reasoned that Mr. Puckett failed to prove his substantial rights were affected when the district court was unlikely to have imposed a different sentence, even if the government had recommended a reduction.


[Puckett v. United States (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. With Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Supreme Court held that the "plain error standard" governs claims that are forfeited because they were not raised at trial in determining whether they may be raised at the appellate level. The Court then reaffirmed the four-pronged "plain-error" standard of review: "1) there must be an error or defect that the appellant has not affirmatively waived, 2) it must be clear and obvious, 3) it must have affected the appellant's substantial rights, 4) if the three other prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Here, the Court rejected Mr. Puckett's arguments that he should not be subject to the "plain-error" standard after he failed to raise his claims at the trial level. Moreover, it affirmed his conviction and sentencing, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that Mr. Puckett's "substantial rights" had not been affected.
Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, wrote a separate dissenting opinion. He agreed that the "plain-error" standard was appropriate in Mr. Puckett's case. However, he criticized the majority for interpreting the "plain-error" standard's third prong requirement of affecting the appellant's "substantial rights" to only include his "length of incarceration." Rather, Justice Souter argued that Mr. Puckett's substantial rights were affected when he was convicted without trial and by a plea agreement that was not honored by the government. Therefore, Mr. Puckett was entitled to relief.


[Harbison v. Bell (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Edward Jerome Harbison was convicted in a Tennessee state court of first-degree murder, second-degree burglary, and grand larceny, and was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully appealing his case through the Tennessee courts, a federal district court appointed Mr. Harbison a federal public defender to represent him in filing a federal habeas corpus petition. That petition was denied by the both the federal district court as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. As Tennessee law does not authorize the appointment of state public defenders as counsel in state clemency proceedings, Mr. Harbison's federal public defender requested to represent him in his state clemency proceedings. Both the district court and Sixth Circuit denied the request, holding that federal law does not authorize federal compensation for legal representation in state matters.


[Harbison v. Bell (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No and Yes. First, the Supreme Court held that a certificate of appealability (COA) is not required to appeal an order denying a request for federally appointed counsel. With Justice John Paul Stevens writing for the majority, and joined by Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer, the Court reasoned that a COA is only required to appeal final orders in habeas corpus petitions. Here, Mr. Harbison did not require a COA because he merely appealed an order denying his request to expand the authority of his federally appointed counsel. Second, the Supreme Court held that federally appointed counsel may represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and are entitled to compensation for such representation. The Court stated that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 authorized federally appointed counsel to represent their clients in those proceedings "as may become available to the defendant", reasoning that state clemency proceedings met this description.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas each wrote separately concurring in the judgment. Justice Antonin G. Scalia, joined by Justice Samuel A. Alito, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that a COA was not required to appeal an order denying the expansion of a federally appointed counsel's authority. However, he disagreed that 18 U.S.C. Section 3599 authorizes state prisoners' federally funded counsel to pursue state clemency on their clients' behalf.


[Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One ("Northwest") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits "covered jurisdictions" – states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting – from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The district court held that Northwest was not eligible for exemption from Section 5 reasoning that it did not qualify as a "political subdivision" as defined in the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, the court rejected Northwest's argument that Congress' 2006 extension of Section 5 for another 25 years made the provision unconstitutional. Rather, the court held that given the documentation of contemporary racial discrimination in "covered jurisdictions", Congress acted rationally in extending the provision, rendering Section 5 constitutional.


[Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the VRA permits all political subdivisions, including the district, to seek to bailout from the preclearance requirements of the VRA. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, and in part by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court reasoned that the language of the VRA did not constrict the availability of a bailout for political subunits like Northwest Municipal. Moreover, the Court reasoned that considering that only 17 of 12,000 jurisdictions covered by the VRA had bailed out suggested that Congress had never intended for it to be so difficult to bailout.
Justice Thomas wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He criticized the Court for not addressing the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA. He argued that he thought it did in fact exceed Congress' power to enforce the 15th Amendment, rendering it unconstitutional.


[Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 1986, a federal bankruptcy court granted Travelers Indemnity Co.'s (Travelers) motion to settle with three separate classes of plaintiffs in asbestos related litigation (on behalf of its insuree Johns-Manville Corp.) and enjoin non-settling parties from future litigation with Travelers for alleged misconduct unrelated to the settlement. The orders were subsequently affirmed by a New York federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Over ten years later, the Second Circuit vacated the orders, stating that state-law actions ("Direct Actions") against Travelers that alleged wrongdoing while it acted as Johns-Manville Corp.'s insurer were not barred by the 1986 order. The court held that the federal bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to prevent such lawsuits.


[Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit erred in holding that federal bankruptcy courts lack jurisdiction to enter orders beyond matters directly related to the execution of a debtor's estate. With Justice David H. Souter writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen G. Breyer, and Samuel A. Alito, the Court recognized that the unambiguous terms of the 1986 orders barred Direct Actions against Travelers and the orders' finality stood in the way of challenging their enforceability. It reasoned that the federal bankruptcy court's 1986 orders had become final on direct review 20 years previously, and thus the Second Circuit improperly ruled on an issue that was not reviewable.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissented. He criticized the majority for improperly interpreting the meaning of the 1986 orders.


[United States v. Eurodif S.A. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
This case examines the correct application of federal antidumping statutes to so-called "separate work unit" (SWU) contracts for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU). The case, brought by the federal government and the United States Enrichment Corporation, has been consolidated from two cases both alleging that Eurodif, a French corporation, imported LEU in violation of federal antidumping laws. Based on a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit holding that SWU contracts for the production of LEU are contracts for services rather than goods and are therefore immune from the antidumping laws, the U.S. Department of Commerce excluded all LEU entering the country from antidumping regulations if accompanied by a certificate that the uranium was imported under an SWU contract. The Court of International Trade sustained the Commerce Department decision.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dismissed the case, saying that it was "unripe" for judicial review. The court held that the issues raised by the government only concerned the application of the Department's decision regarding future importation of LEU; and, therefore, the court did not have a specific factual context in which to review the claim.


[United States v. Eurodif S.A. (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the Commerce Department's view of imported low enriched uranium, as the sale of goods rather than services, was permissible. It reasoned that, since 19 U.S.C. Section 1673 did not specify whether it applied to the production of low enriched uranium, it was left to the reasonable interpretation of the Commerce Department to determine. Accordingly, the Court found the Commerce Department interpreted the statute reasonably.


[Negusie v. Holder (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Daniel Negusie, an Eritrean citizen, worked as a prison guard in Eritrea before seeking asylum in the United States. When Negusie tried to come into the country, however, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The INS based its decision on evidence that Negusie assisted in the persecution of prison inmates on the basis of a protected ground, specifically, the prisoners' Protestant religious beliefs. Negusie appealed his case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that he did not voluntarily assist in the persecution but rather attempted to help the individuals who were being mistreated.
The BIA gave little weight to Negusie's argument that he was trying to help the prisoners, instead focusing on his more prominent involvement in the persecution as an armed guard who oversaw and was complicit in the acts. After the BIA upheld the INS' denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal, Negusie filed a petition to have his case reviewed before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Finding that the evidence from the BIA decision did not compel a conclusion that Negusie was uninvolved in the persecution of inmates, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition.


[Negusie v. Holder (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the BIA and Fifth Circuit erred when they evaluated Mr. Negusie's asylum petition because they presumed it mandatory that an alien's coercion to persecute was immaterial when determining whether the "persecutor bar" applies. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Antonin G. Scalia, Justice David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, the Court found that the BIA failed to exercise its discretion when interpreting ambiguous provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and therefore interpreted the INA from a mistaken legal premise. The Court ordered that the BIA interpret the ambiguous provisions of the INA and then review Mr. Negusie's case with respect to its interpretation.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, wrote a separate concurring opinion noting that he would not have agreed to remand Mr. Negusie's case had the majority prevented the BIA from reaching the same conclusion once again. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part. He criticized the majority for failing to establish a standard for when the "persecutor bar" applies to an alien's asylum petition. Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented, arguing that the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily or was coerced.


[Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
William Kennedy designated his wife, Liv, as the sole beneficiary of his Dupont pension and retirement savings plans. The couple subsequently divorced, and as part of the settlement Liv agreed to give up any interests she may have in the plans. However, William never submitted this portion of the settlement prior to his death in 2001, so the pension and retirement savings benefits were paid out to Liv. William's daughter, Keri, the executor of his estate, brought suit against Dupont to recover the benefits. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment for the estate, awarding it the value of the benefits.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that because William had never submitted the portion of the settlement agreement denying the benefits to Liv, they were correctly paid out to her by Dupont.


[Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Sav. and Investment Plan (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision with Justice David Souter writing for the Court, the Supreme Court held that Liv's waiver of her former husband's pension benefits upon their divorce was not rendered void by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's anti-alienation provision. However, the Court held that Liv was appropriately granted the benefits of her ex-husband's estate because the plan administrator properly disregarded her waiver. It reasoned that the pension plan was clearly laid out and recognized Liv as the beneficiary. The plan had a mechanism in which Liv could have disclaimed her interest, but she did not.


[United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Employees of the city of New York filed a lawsuit in a New York federal district court under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging that it was unlawful for the city, as a condition of employment, to require non-resident employees to pay a fee equivalent to the income taxes paid by resident-employees. The district court dismissed the case for failing to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. It reasoned that actions brought by private parties under the FCA must be appealed within 30 days of judgment and not 60 days as when the United States is a party to the lawsuit. Here, the employees of the city of New York appealed 54 days after judgment and thus their appeal was untimely.


[United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, it held that the 30-day limit applies for filing a claim under the False Claims Act when the United States is not a party to the lawsuit. Therefore, the Court found that the private parties who brought suit against New York filed in an untimely manner and their suit should be dismissed.


[Arizona v. Johnson (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Lemon Johnson was riding in the backseat of a car when it was pulled over by the state police in Sugar Hill, Arizona. The officers had scanned the license of the car and found that it had a "mandatory insurance suspension." Although the stop was solely predicated on the suspended license, the officers began to question the car's occupants, including Johnson, about gang activity in the area. Based on certain circumstantial evidence, such as Johnson's possession of a police scanner, the officers asked Johnson to exit the car so that they could question him further. Although Johnson was free to stay in the car, he voluntarily exited and a subsequent search of his person by the officers revealed a handgun and a small amount of marijuana. Based on evidence obtained during this search, Johnson was convicted in Arizona state court of (1) the unlawful possession of a weapon as a prohibited possessor and (2) possession of marijuana. Johnson appealed, arguing that the evidence recovered from the search should have been suppressed because the officers did not have probable cause to search him at the time of his arrest and therefore did so in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona agreed with Johnson and reversed his conviction and sentence. The court found that the officers had no reason to believe that Johnson was involved in any criminal activity when he was searched. The officers requested that Johnson step out of the car to discuss gang activity, not because the officers feared that their safety was threatened, thus it was part of a consensual encounter between the officers and Johnson. Therefore, the court said, the officers' subsequent search of Johnson was illegal and unconstitutional.


[Arizona v. Johnson (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Court of Appeals. It held that Mr. Johnson's encounter with police officers was not consensual and therefore did not violate his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The Court reasoned that lawful traffic stops entail the "temporary seizure of driver and passengers" that continues for the duration of the stop. Officer inquiries into matters unrelated to the stop do not transform the event into a "consensual" encounter whereby the driver or passenger is free to go as he or she pleases. Therefore, the police officers who frisked Mr. Johnson were not constitutionally required to depart the scene without first ensuring that he was not armed and dangerous, so long as they reasonably suspected he was armed and dangerous.


[Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), filed suit against the state of Hawaii to prevent the transfer of "ceded" lands for the purpose of private development. The OHA was established to manage the proceeds from lands ceded by the Kingdom of Hawaii following its overthrow by the United States. The lands were marked to provide for the benefit of native Hawaiians. The OHA argued that "any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third parties would amount to a breach of trust" and would be without consideration of the claims of native Hawaiians to those lands. However, the trial court held that the State did have the power to transfer the lands. The OHA appealed.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii overruled the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue an injunction to prevent the transfer of ceded lands from the public trust. In its reasoning, it cited Ahuna to illustrate that the State as trustee of these lands was under an obligation to administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary' (native Hawaiians). Further, it gave great weight to the Apology Resolution passed by the United States Congress in 1993 to mark the 100th Anniversary of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii. This resolution stated that "native Hawaiians (1) 'never directly relinquished their claims to... their national lands to the United States,' and (2) 'are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territory.'" Therefore, the court held, it was the responsibility of the State of Hawaii to preserve the ceded lands in the public trust, at least until such land claims were resolved.


[Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
No. A unanimous Supreme Court held that the Apology Resolution did not restrict Hawaii's sovereign authority to transfer publicly held land for private development. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the Court, it reasoned that the language of the resolution did not indicate the creation of new substantive rights that could limit the actions of Hawaii.


[Jimenez v. Quarterman (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 1995, Carlos Jimenez pled guilty in Texas state court to burglary and violating his probation. Because Jimenez had a prior felony conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he was sentenced to 43 years in prison. Jimenez appealed and, in 1996, a state appeals court dismissed Jimenez's petition when a court-appointed lawyer stated that Jimenez had no grounds for appeal. Six years later the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals allowed leave for Jimenez to renew his appeal based on his lawyer's incompetence, however the court affirmed his conviction and sentence.
In 2005, Jimenez filed a habeas corpus petition in a Texas federal court arguing that he had not received adequate legal assistance during his proceedings in the state courts. The district judge dismissed the claim, holding that the one-year statute of limitations, which began running on the date of conviction, had expired. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also denied Jimenez's appeal. Jimenez, in his petition for certiorari, argued that the one-year statute of limitations should actually have begun in 2005, after his final appeal was denied in state court, rather than in 1995 when he was convicted.


[Jimenez v. Quarterman (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion with Justice Clarence Thomas writing for the Court, the Supreme Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. It held that when a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal and he does so, the conviction is not final. Therefore, the statute of limitations begins to run only after the out-of-time direct appeal is final. The Court remanded Mr. Jimenez's case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.


[Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
Mayola Williams sued the tobacco giant, Philip Morris, in Oregon state court following her husband's death from lung cancer in 1997. Ms. Williams claimed that her husband had been convinced by Philip Morris' advertisements and representations that smoking did not pose any significant health risks and had refused to quit smoking despite his family's pleas. She alleged that Philip Morris' fraud and negligence in this regard had caused her husband's death.
At trial, a jury found in favor of Ms. Williams and awarded her $79.5 million in punitive damages, which the trial court reduced to $32 million. On appeal, Philip Morris argued that the trial court had committed an error when it failed to give a proposed jury instruction stating, in part, that the jury should not "punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on other persons." The case eventually wound up before the Oregon Supreme Court ("OSC"), which ruled that the proposed jury instruction incorrectly stated the federal requirements of due process of law, and the trial court was therefore correct to exclude it. The OSC found it unnecessary to rule, at that time, on whether the jury instruction was flawed for its description of state-law requirements. Philip Morris sought and was granted certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court reversed the OSC, stating that due process did not necessarily require exclusion of the instruction, and remanded the case so that the OSC could apply the correct standard.
On remand, the OSC stated that the U.S. Supreme Court's new constitutional standard was only triggered "upon request," which obligated it to determine whether Philip Morris's request was valid under state law. The OSC held that the proposed instruction misstated Oregon's statutory punitive damages criteria and therefore was not "clear and correct in all respects," as it must be to be considered error. The U.S. Supreme Court, which will now hear the case for the second time after granting Philip Morris' certiorari petition, must determine whether the OSC is permitted to insert these state law issues at such a late stage in the game.


[Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.


[Ministry of Defense and Support for Armed Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi (2009) — Roberts Court (2006-2009) — Facts]
In 1977, the Iranian Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with an American defense contractor for the purchase of military equipment to be used by the Iranian Air Force. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the American company breached its contract with Iran and sold the equipment elsewhere. Iran requested arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and received $2.8 million in damages for breach of contract. Iran then reduced the award to a judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.
Dariush Elahi, brought a wrongful death claim against the Iranian government alleging that Iranian agents had assassinated his brother in Paris in 1990. Elahi was awarded over $300 million in damages by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He attempted to satisfy this judgment in part by attaching the damages Iran had recovered from the previous contract dispute. Iran argued that the previous recovery was immune from attachment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California held that Iran had waived its immunity from attachment by submitting to the jurisdiction of the ICC and the district court in its prior contract dispute.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's ruling but on different grounds. The court held that Elahi could attach the Iranian judgment under Section 201(a) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which allows creditors such as Elahi to attach "the blocked assets of [a] terrorist party." Eschewing the jurisdiction argument relied on by the district court, the Ninth Circuit characterized Iran as a "terrorist party" and held that the contract judgment was a "blocked asset" subject to attachment.