[Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Larry Witters attended the Inland Empire School of the Bible, seeking to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Inland Empire was a non-denominational Christian school supported by donations and tuition payments. Witters suffered from a progressive eye condition, which rendered him legally blind under Washington law.
Witters applied to Washington’s Commission for the Blind to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, funded by approximately eighty percent federal funds and twenty percent state funds. The commission, however, had previously adopted a policy statement forbidding the use of public funds to assist an individual in pursuing a career or degree in theology or related areas, based on Washington’s constitution. The commission denied Witters’ application because his vocational objective was to become a pastor, viewing this as falling within the areas related to theology. A state hearings examiner upheld the commission’s ruling, also citing Washington’s constitution. A Washington district court upheld the decision for the reasons given by the hearings examiner.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the decision, but declined to base its ruling on the Washington Constitution. Instead, it reserved judgment on the state constitutional issue and determined that the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause required the commission to deny Witters’ application. Using the three-part test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, it held that approving his application would have the primary effect of advancing religion.


[Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that extending aid to Witters through Washington’s vocational rehabilitation program would be consistent with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Justice Marshall also looked to the Lemon test, agreeing with the Supreme Court of Washington that the statute had a facially secular purpose, to promote the well-being of the visually handicapped.
Justice Marshall held, however, that extending aid to Witters would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. He noted that the program did not provide greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious education, and that nothing in the record indicated that a significant portion of aid extended through the program would flow to religious education. He also argued that although the aid would ultimately flow to Inland Empire, this was not because of the state's actions but rather Witters’.
Justice Louis Powell, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist, concurred. He argued that the statute could not have the primary effect of advancing religion because the funds were available to applicants regardless of whether their school was secular or religious; hence, any aid to religion would result from the private choices of individual beneficiaries.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also concurred. She emphasized that any potential aid to religion would be the result of Witters’ choice, and that no reasonable observer would likely draw an inference that Washington was endorsing a religious belief or practice.


[Moran v. Burbine (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Brian Burbine was arrested for burglary in Cranston, Rhode Island. Police then received information connecting Burbine to a murder that happened in town a few months earlier. Burbine was read his Miranda rights and held for questioning. At first, Burbine refused to waive his rights, but later he signed three forms acknowledging that he understood his right to an attorney and waived that right. After questioning, he also signed three written statements admitting to the murder. That same night Burbine’s sister called the local Public Defender’s Office to get a lawyer for her brother. The sister did not know about the potential murder charge. When the Public Defender called the Cranston Police Station, police told her that Burbine was unavailable and would not be questioned until the next day. Police never told Burbine that an attorney attempted to contact him.
At trial, the judged denied a motion to suppress the statements made at the police station, holding that Burbine knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island denied Burbine’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that the police officer’s deliberate or reckless failure to inform Burbine that his counsel attempted to contact him invalidated his waiver of rights.


[Moran v. Burbine (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that failure to inform Burbine about the attorney’s phone call did not affect the validity of his waiver of rights. The waiver was not coerced, and Burbine was aware of his rights at all times. The right to counsel does not attach until an accused is formally charged, so that right was not violated in this case. Also, the misleading conduct by the police was not so offensive that it deprived Burbine of his due process rights.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that Burbine’s waiver of rights was invalidated by the police’s deceptive acts. Those acts also constituted an interference with the administration of justice that the due process clause was meant to prohibit. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Bowen v. Roy (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller, along with their daughter Little Bird of Snow, were residents of Pennsylvania receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps programs. Roy and Miller refused to comply with the federal requirement that participants in these programs provide the social security numbers of all family members receiving benefits. They argued that obtaining a social security number for Little Bird would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare terminated AFDC benefits paid for Little Bird and the parents sued, arguing that the free association clause of the First Amendment provided an exemption to the social security number requirement. At trial, Roy disclosed the Little Bird already had a social security number, and the court suggested the case was moot. Roy then argued that widespread use of the social security number would “rob the spirit” of Little Bird, violating their religious beliefs. The court restrained the government from denying benefits for Little Bird until she was 16 years old, but denied Roy’s request for damages.


[Bowen v. Roy (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the social security requirement did not violate the First Amendment and the injunction against the government was vacated. The requirement was entirely neutral in religious terms, and was a reasonable means of preventing welfare fraud. The First Amendment does not require the government to aid individuals in carrying out their religious beliefs. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in part, expressing that the entire lower judgment should be vacated because the record was unclear as to whether a justiciable controversy remained. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the result, expressing that the Roy’s claim for benefits was either moot or not ripe for decision.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the government failed to show that allowing an exception to the social security requirement for those with legitimate religious objections would harm the state’s interest in preventing welfare fraud. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that prior precedent clearly showed that requiring a social security number to receive benefits in spite of legitimate religious objections clearly violated the First Amendment.


[Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A Puerto Rican law restricted advertising by the island's casino gambling establishments. Even though gambling was a legal activity in Puerto Rico, the law only allowed advertising that was targeted at tourists.


[Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the Act passed the constitutional test for restrictions on commercial speech. Justice Rehnquist argued that Puerto Rico's desire to protect the "health, safety, and welfare of its citizens" by attempting to isolate them from casino advertising served a "substantial government interest." The law was clearly drawn and directly related to the government's goal of minimizing the ill effects, such as prostitution and crime, that gambling cultivates in local communities.


[Ford v. Wainwright (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1974, a Florida court sentenced Alvin Bernard Ford to death for first-degree murder. At the time of the murder, trial, and sentencing phase, there was no indication that Ford was suffering from any mental deficiencies. While awaiting execution, Ford's mental condition worsened. His competency was assessed in accordance with Florida procedures. Following this assessment, Florida's Governor signed Ford's death warrant. A state court declined to hear arguments raised about Ford's competency. Without the benefit of a hearing, Ford's habeas corpus petition was then denied by the a federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.


[Ford v. Wainwright (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In a 7-2 decision reversing and remanding the lower court's judgment, Justice Thurgood Marshall writing for the five-justice majority noted that English common law found executing the insane "savage and inhumane." In addition, no State permitted such executions. Opponents of such executions maintained that it "offends humanity" and that such executions had neither a deterrent nor a retributive effect. On the second question, Marshall observed that no state court had heard arguments that Ford was insane. In addition, Florida's competency procedures were inadequate.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed that executing an insane inmate violated the Eighth Amendment. For Powell, "the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Powell argued that Florida's procedure for determining the competency of the inmate violated due process.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined by Justice Byron R. White, dissented in part. They agreed that Florida's procedures did not protect Ford's due process rights but that "the Eighth Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while insane." Justice William H. Rehnquist further, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, also maintained that no substantive right was created. In addition, Rehnquist argued that the State's procedures drew sustenance from the common law and were not out of step with contemporary practice.
This abstract was prepared by Adam J. Ruggles, Gloria R. Thornburg, and Peter Watkins.


[Malley v. Briggs (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police force was conducting an authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll. On December 20, the police intercepted two phone calls from an unknown source that made reference to marijuana use that had occurred at a party the previous night at the Briggs’ residence. Edward Malley was the police officer in charge of the Driscoll investigation, and on the basis of these two calls, he drew up felony charges for the Briggs. The charges were presented to a state district court judge in February 1981, and the judge signed warrants for the Briggs’ arrest. The Briggs were arrested in their home on March 19, 1981, and taken to a police station where they were booked and held for several hours before being released. When presented to a grand jury, the charges were dropped.
The Briggs sued Malley in district court and alleged that his application for the warrants for their arrest violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. After the evidence was presented to the jury, Malley moved for a direct verdict, which the district court granted. The district court held that it was judge’s signing of the arrest warrants that was improper and that an officer who believes that he is acting on correct information is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that an officer is not entitled to immunity unless the officer had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that the alleged facts are sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.


[Malley v. Briggs (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that immunity can be judged on a standard of objective reasonableness. If a reasonable officer could not believe that a warrant has sufficient probable cause, the officer cannot be immune from prosecution. The Supreme Court also held that the officer applying for the warrant bears the burden of liability rather than the magistrate who signs it because, under the constraints of a docket, the magistrate may tend to defer to the officer’s judgment.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that, based on the record for this case, a reasonable officer could have assumed that there was probable cause for an arrest warrant. He argued that the majority’s opinion did not grant enough weight to the fact that a judge signed off on the arrest warrant. Because a judge also agreed that there was enough evidence for an arrest, there is substantial evidence that the police officer acted reasonably and should have been granted immunity from damages. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


[Davis v. Bandemer (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A group of Democrats challenged Indiana's 1981 state apportionment scheme on the ground of political gerrymandering. The Democrats argued that the apportionment unconstitutionally diluted their votes in important districts, violating their rights. A three-judge District Court sustained the Democrats' challenge.


[Davis v. Bandemer (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that while the apportionment law may have had a discriminatory effect on the Democrats, that effect was not "sufficiently adverse" to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The mere lack of proportional representation did not unconstitutionally diminish the Democrats' electoral power. The Court also ruled that political gerrymandering claims were properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that judicially manageable standards could be discerned and applied in such cases.


[Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The North Carolina General Assembly passed a redistricting plan for the state's Senate and House of Representatives. Black citizens of North Carolina alleged that the plan created seven new districts where blacks would not be able to elect representatives of their choosing. They filed suit in a District Court claiming that this violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Before the District Court could hear the case, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in order to clarify that voting violations needed only to have a "discriminatory effect" and required no "discriminatory purpose." Considering the "totality of circumstances" of the redistricting plan, the District Court ruled that six of the new districts violated the newly amended Voting Rights Act by diluting the power of the black vote. The North Carolina Attorney General appealed the decision directly to the Supreme Court.


[Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court found that five of the six contested districts discriminated against blacks by diluting the power of their collective vote. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The District Court properly performed its function "to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." The District Court correctly analyzed data from three election cycles in North Carolina to determine that the black voters strongly supported black candidates, whereas whites usually voted against black candidates. The redistricting plan apportioned "politically cohesive groups of black voters" into districts where blocs of white voters would consistently defeat the black candidates. In violation of the Voting Rights Act, this damaged the ability of black citizens "to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice."


[New York v. P. J. Video, Inc. (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Investigator David Groblewski from the Erie County District Attorney's Office viewed videos rented from P.J. Video and determined their content violated New York obscenity statutes. He drafted an affidavit describing the content on the videos and filed a warrant authorizing their seizure. A village justice in Depew NY issued the warrant and the police seized ten movies suspected to contain obscene content. A local court determined five of the movies violated obscenity standards. P.J. Video argued that the justice issued the warrant without probable cause since he did not personally view the movies. The court agreed and suppressed the videos as evidence. The County Court of Erie County affirmed the decision, and the New York Court of Appeals also affirmed. It asserted that warrants authorizing the seizure of items that were both non-dangerous and mediums of speech needed to satisfy a higher level of proof of "probable-cause" than other types of warrants because of First Amendment concerns.


[New York v. P. J. Video, Inc. (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for a 6-3 court. The Court determined that the police department did not discriminate based on content. It seized the videos in order to preserve evidence rather than to suppress speech. In nondiscriminatory cases, the Court held that the same test for preventing Fourth Amendment wrongful search violations also secured against First Amendment free speech violations. Particularly, "the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same probable-cause standard used to review warrant applications." The officers met this standard by describing content in the videos that clearly violated the obscenity statutes.


[Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored Hepps and held that the newspaper was obligated to prove its accusations true.


[Philadelphia Newspapers Inc. v. Hepps (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Relying on its reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (1974), the Court reversed the state court's decision. The Gertz standard for evaluating potentially libelous speech required that "the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages."


[Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Public Schools, Inc. (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Dayton Christian Schools, Inc. (Dayton) is a private, non-profit corporation formed by two churches for the purposes of providing private education at the primary and secondary levels. The corporate charter includes a section that requires employees to subscribe to a particular set of religious beliefs, including a resolution of disputes through the “Biblical chain of command,” which means that all disputes must be handled internally, without redress in civil court. p>
Linda Hoskinson was a teacher at Dayton during the 1978-1979 school year. She agreed to the requirement of the corporate charter, including the Biblical chain of command. In January 1979, Hoskinson informed her principal that she was pregnant and was told that her employment contract would not be renewed because of the organization’s belief that mothers should stay home with their young children. Rather than appealing the decision internally, Hoskinson contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue based on state and federal sex discrimination laws if her employment contract was not renewed. Hoskinson was suspended and then fired for going outside of the internal dispute resolution system.
Hoskinson filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, which filed an order that required Dayton to reinstate Hoskinson with backpay. When Dayton did not respond, the Commission filed suit. Dayton responded by arguing that that the First Amendment prevented the Commission from having jurisdiction over the exercise of religious beliefs. While the administrative proceedings were pending, Dayton sued the commission in district court and sought an injunction against the state proceedings because they violated the First Amendment. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss and argued that federal abstention doctrines meant that the district court should let the administrative proceedings run their course. The district court refused the issue the injunction without addressing the abstention argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that allowing the Commission jurisdiction over Dayton would violate the First Amendment.


[Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Public Schools, Inc. (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts should abstain from adjudicating civil state proceedings in which important state interests are involved. As long as the plaintiff has a full and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim, there is no reason for the district court to become involved. Because the Ohio court has the authority to consider whether the Commission’s actions violated the First Amendment, the issue can be fully addressed in state court.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the district court’s decision on the merits of the case was correct. The Commission merely investigated a complaint based on Dayton’s conduct and filed suit; there was no evidence that the Commission intended to impose a sanction. Without the threat of a sanction, there is no potential constitutional violation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.


[Firefighters v. City of Cleveland (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Section 706(g)of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a court from ordering the promotion of an individual who was denied advancement for any reason other than racial discrimination. In 1980, the Vanguards of Cleveland, an organization of black and Hispanic firefighters employed by the City of Cleveland, filed a lawsuit alleging that the City’s system for hiring and promoting firefighters discriminated against racial minorities, which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly after the City entered into settlement negotiations with the Vanguards, Local Number 93 of the International Association of Firefighters (a union representing a majority of Cleveland firefighters) moved to intervene as a party-plaintiff according to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a nonparty to join an ongoing lawsuit in order to protect its rights from being affected by the litigation. The union argued that it had an interest in the suit because of its concern that promotions based upon a “racial quota system” (rather than competence exams or seniority rights) would detract from the quality of the Cleveland firefighting force. The Court approved the motion and ordered the Vanguards and the City to engage the union in settlement negotiations.
During the negotiations, the union membership overwhelmingly rejected a consent decree between the parties that increased the total number of supervisory positions within the Fire Department without specifying to whom those positions would be given. The Vanguards and the City moved for the approval of an amended consent decree that adopted the agreed-upon promotional system but was not subject to the union members’ approval. The district court approved the consent decree over the union’s objections. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Local Number 93 petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari based on its argument that the consent decree was an impermissible remedy under Section 706(g) of Title VII. According to the union, the court was precluded from approving the new promotional system because it may benefit individuals who were not actual victims of racial discrimination.


[Firefighters v. City of Cleveland (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Section 706(g) does not apply to relief awarded in a consent decree. Although a consent decree has several characteristics of a judicial order, the Court found that it was not an “order” for purposes of Section 706(g) because of its voluntary, contractual nature. Additionally, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Title VII suggests that Congress intended to encourage private, voluntary remedies for past discrimination. Because the consent decree did not “bind Local 93 to do or not to do anything,” it did not preclude the union from raising claims it may have under other laws, such as the unlawful employment provisions of Title VII.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor emphasized the narrow nature of the majority’s opinion. Even though the union had not raised the claims before the Court in its petition for certiorari, the non-minority employees retained the ability to challenge the consent decree under Section 703 of Title VII or the 14th Amendment.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent in which he argued that the consent decree fell under the purview of Section 706(g) and therefore was not a permissible remedy for past discrimination because it benefited minorities who may not have been the actual victims of the City’s racially discriminatory promotional system for firefighters. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that a consent decree is a judicial order and subject to the limitations of Section 706(g). He wrote that the district court’s failure to make a finding about past discrimination toward each minority firefighter who would receive preferential treatment under the new promotional system rendered the consent decree an impermissible judicial order. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined the dissent.


[Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1974, Zenith Radio Corporation, an American manufacturer of consumer electronic products, and National Union Electronic Company (collectively referred to as Zenith) sued 21 Japanese-owned or -controlled manufacturers of consumer electronics and claimed that these companies conspired to drive the American companies out of the market. According to Zenith, the Japanese companies conspired to set artificially high prices for their products in Japan to offset the artificially low prices of their products in America, which was harmful to the American companies. Zenith claimed this conspiracy was a violation of several anti-trust laws intended to prevent price-fixing. The Japanese companies filed a motion for summary judgment. After finding the bulk of Zenith’s evidence inadmissible, the district court held that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that most of Zenith’s evidence was admissible. On the merits of the case, and in light of the greater amount of admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals held that a reasonable factfinder could find evidence of a conspiracy and that the district court improperly granted the summary judgment in favor of the Japanese companies.


[Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence of alleged conspiracies is not sufficient to prove allegations of violating antitrust legislation unless there is evidence that the conspiracies in question injured American companies. To effectively oppose the motion for summary judgment, the evidence must show that the respondents suffered harm as a result of the petitioners’ illegal activity and that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court also held that all inferences drawn in a motion for summary judgment must be construed in the light most favorable to the side opposing the motion, but in antitrust cases those inferences are constrained by economic factors. In this case, the alleged conspiracy would be economically irrational and therefore cannot be inferred to exist.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily confuses the standard by which a motion for summary judgment should be adjudicated. In an antitrust summary judgment hearing, it is not the job of the judge to determine whether an inference of a conspiracy is more probable than not. In doing so, the Court invades the role of the finder of fact. He also argued that the Third Circuit was correct in holding that the evidence demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Bowsher v. Synar (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Due to rising government budget deficits during the first term of the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Control Act of 1985. The act was designed to eliminate the federal budget deficit by restricting spending during fiscal years 1986 through 1991. Under the law, if maximum allowable deficit amounts were exceeded, automatic cuts, as requested by the Comptroller General, would go into effect. This case was decided together with O'Neill v. Synar and United States Senate v. Synar.


[Bowsher v. Synar (1986) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court found that the duties which the Congress delegated to the Comptroller General did violate the doctrine of separation of powers and were unconstitutional. A two step process led Chief Justice Burger to arrive at this conclusion. First, in exploring the statute defining the provisions of the Comptroller General's office relating to the Congress's power of removal, it was clear to Burger that this officer was subservient to the legislative branch. Second, in examining the functions that this officer would carry out under the Deficit Control Act, Burger concluded that the Comptroller General was being asked to execute the laws and, thus, was intruding on the prerogatives of the executive branch.


[McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
McCleskey, a black man, was convicted of murdering a police officer in Georgia and sentenced to death. In a writ of habeas corpus, McCleskey argued that a statistical study proved that the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some extent on the race of the victim and the accused. The study found that black defendants who kill white victims are the most likely to receive death sentences in the state.


[McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
The Court held that since McCleskey could not prove that purposeful discrimination which had a discriminatory effect on him existed in this particular trial, there was no constitutional violation. Justice Powell refused to apply the statistical study in this case given the unique circumstances and nature of decisions that face all juries in capital cases. He argued that the data McCleskey produced is best presented to legislative bodies and not to the courts.


[Anderson v. Creighton (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
On November 11, 1983, FBI Agent Russell Anderson, along with other state and federal officers, conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home based on the belief that Vadaain Dixon, a man suspected of robbing a bank earlier that day, was hiding in the house. The Creightons sued Anderson in Minnesota state court and filed a claim for monetary damages under the Fourth Amendment. The suit was removed to federal district court, where Anderson moved for dismissal or summary judgment based on his alleged qualified immunity from civil damages liability. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for certain violations of an individual’s constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for Anderson after finding that the search was lawful because Anderson had probable cause.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the case could not be decided on summary judgment because there were unresolved factual disputes regarding the legality of the search. The Court of Appeals also held that that Anderson did not have qualified immunity because the right he allegedly violated was the well-established Fourth Amendment right to protection from warrantless searches of a home.


[Anderson v. Creighton (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an officer of the law has qualified immunity from civil liability if the actions that officer took “could reasonably have been thought consistent” with the allegedly violated rights. Because Anderson could reasonably believe that his actions were legal, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court also held that the determination of whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity should be determined based on the reasonable belief of the legality of the search, rather than the actual legality of the search.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily expands the idea of qualified immunity beyond high political officials to police officers, whom it is in the public’s best interests to hold accountable for their actions. He also argued that the lower court was correct in holding that summary judgment cannot be granted without resolving the factual disputes regarding the constitutionality of the search. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Turner v. Safley (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In the late 1970s, Renz Correctional Institution converted to a “complex prison”. Generally, female prisoners at Renz were medium and maximum security level offenders, while most male inmates were minimum security offenders. Leonard Safley was a male inmate at Renz, and P.J. Watson was a female inmate. They met at Renz, where they became romantically involved; Watson was then transferred to Ozark Correctional Center because of this relationship. Prison authorities rebuffed all of Safley’s attempts to directly contact Watson.
A Missouri Division of Corrections regulation permitted correspondence between inmates who were immediate family members, but correspondence between inmates who were not family members was only allowed if 1) it related to legal matters or 2) at the discretion of the classification/treatment team of both inmates. Another regulation only permitted inmates to marry with the permission of the prison superintendent, and specified that permission should only be given when there was a compelling reason to do so.
The district court certified plaintiffs as a class including inmates at Renz who desired to correspond with inmates at other prison facilities. This class also included persons who wished to marry inmates at Missouri correctional facilities and whose right to marry had been allegedly violated by the DoC. Plaintiffs filed an action against Renz's Superintendent William Turner and others for injunctive relief and damages. The district court applied strict scrutiny to both DoC restrictions. It held that the restriction on correspondence was overly broad and capriciously applied, and that the marriage restriction violated inmates’ constitutional right to marry. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, affirmed, further holding that neither restriction was the narrowest means of addressing the DoC’s security concerns.


[Turner v. Safley (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No and yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Byron White, Justice Louis Powell and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court upheld the Missouri Department of Correction’s restriction on correspondence between inmates. Justice O’Connor looked to the Court’s test for determining the reasonableness of restrictions on prison inmates’ expressive freedom. She argued that this particular content-neutral restriction on correspondence between inmates was logically connected to the DoC’s legitimate security concerns, noting the danger of coordinated gang activity in Missouri prisons. Justice O’Connor further reasoned that the restrictions did not deprive inmates of all means of expression, only limiting correspondence with a particular class of people. She argued that the Eighth Circuit failed to consider the impact easing the restriction might have on the liberty and safety of prison guards and other inmates. Finally, Justice O’Connor argued that there were no obvious, easy alternatives to the DoC’s restrictions.
Turning to the DoC’s marriage restriction, Justice O’Connor held that it was an unconstitutional violation of inmates’ fundamental right to marry. While acknowledging that prisoners’ right to marry is subject to restriction, she argued that many important aspects of marriage should not be altered by a person’s incarceration, including the potential emotional and religious impact of marriage to another. Hence, Missouri prisoners retained a constitutionally-protected right to marry. Justice O’Connor further held that the DoC’s marriage restriction was not reasonably related to its stated interest in preventing violence in prisons and in the rehabilitation of female prisoners.
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun, concurred in part and dissented in part. While agreeing with the majority’s holding that the marriage restriction was unconstitutional, he rejected the majority’s application of a reasonableness standard to the facts on record. Justice Stevens argued that the majority improperly accepted the DoC’s mostly speculative arguments with respect to the DoC’s security concerns about inmate correspondence, while rejecting the DoC’s similarly speculative concerns about marriage between inmates.


[Colorado v. Spring (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In February 1979, John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly after, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received information from an informant that Spring was involved in the transportation of stolen firearms across state lines. The informant also told the agents the Spring had been talking about killing Walker. The agents set up an undercover operation and arrested Spring on March 30. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest and again at the police station. He then signed a document stating that he understood and waived his rights and was willing to make a statement. After asking Spring about the firearms transactions, the agents asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone, and if he had shot Walker in Colorado. Spring admitted to shooting someone but denied shooting Walker, and the interview ended. On May 26, Colorado police officers visited Spring in jail intending to question him about the Walker murder. They read Spring his Miranda rights, and he signed a document stating that he waived them. During the course of the interview, Spring confessed to the murder.
Spring was charged with first-degree murder in Colorado state court. He moved to suppress both the March 30 and May 26 statements by arguing that he invalidly waived his Miranda rights. The trial court held that the police’s failure to inform Spring of the topics that would be covered in questioning did not affect the the waiver, but the content of the March 30 interview was not relevant. The trial court suppressed the March 30 statement and admitted the May 26 statement into evidence. Spring was convicted. On appeal, Spring renewed his argument about the waiver of his Miranda rights for the March 30 statement and argued that the May 26 statement was the “illegal fruit” of the March 30 statement. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed and held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible because the ATF agents had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker murder before questioning him about it. The Court of Appeals also held that the state failed to meet its burden to prove that the May 26 statement was not the product of the earlier illegal statement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.


[Colorado v. Spring (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence that Spring was in any way coerced into signing the waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights or that he was prevented from understanding his rights and the consequences of waiving them. The Constitution does not require that the suspect understand every possible nuance of the consequences of waiving his rights, but rather that he understand that whatever he says may be used against him. The Court also held that police silence regarding the topics of an interrogation is not an attempt to trick the suspect and does not affect the validity of the waiver. Because the interrogation on March 30 was not illegal, the May 26 statements cannot be considered “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
In his dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the state failed to meet the heavy burden to prove that Spring’s waiver was valid and that the scope of the questioning was highly relevant to Spring’s decision. He also argued that the agents’ silence on the extent of their questions was an interrogation technique designed to draw Spring into confessing more than he would have otherwise. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[United States v. Paradise (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In response to a series of NAACP-initiated lawsuits in the 1970s, the Alabama Department of Public Safety was required to implement a promotion scheme in which half of the department's promotions to certain ranks would go to black officers if enough qualified blacks were available.


[United States v. Paradise (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the promotion plan. The scheme did not impose an "absolute bar" to white advancement, was narrowly drawn to include only specific ranks in the department, and, according to the four justices who voted to affirm it, was "required in light of the Department's long and shameful record of delay and resistance" in complying with past judicial decisions. It is important to remember that courts had first found the Department's practices unconstitutional in 1972.


[Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
The Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which prohibited all "First Amendment activities" in the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). Alan Snyder, a minister with Jews for Jesus, was instructed by an airport officer to refrain from distributing free religious literature on a walkway in the central terminal of LAX.


[Board of Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Using the "First Amendment overbreadth doctrine," which allows an individual to challenge a statute on its face which is potentially threatening to others, the Court found that the ordinance violated the Constitution. Justice O'Connor argued that the rule was vague, overly broad, and would have effectively prohibited activities such as reading, talking, or wearing expressive shirts or political buttons in the LAX terminal. Allowing such an ordinance, which touched "the universe of expressive activity" in its totality, would have caused LAX to become a "First Amendment Free Zone," according to O'Connor.


[Colorado v. Connelly (1986) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In 1983, Francis Connelly approached a police officer and, without any prompting, confessed to murder. The police officer immediately informed Connelly that he had the right to remain silent, but Connelly indicated that he still wished to discuss the murder. It was later discovered that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia at the time of the confession. A Colorado trial court suppressed the statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily.


[Colorado v. Connelly (1986) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
The Court held that because the taking of Connelly's statements as evidence did not involve any element of governmental coercion, no violation of the Due Process Clause occurred. The Court argued that suppressing statements in cases where suspects were not coerced would have no deterrent effect on future violations of the Constitution by the police. The Court noted that "Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that."


[Tanner v. United States (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Anthony Tanner and William Conover were indicted on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and of mail fraud. After the jury ruled, Tanner and Conover filed a motion for a new trial based on an affidavit stating that several jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, holding that juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict under Rule 606(b). There was insufficient evidence other than that testimony of juror misconduct. Tanner and Conover filed another motion, this time alleging juror use of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the trial. The district court declined to hold another evidentiary hearing. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a second evidentiary hearing.


[Tanner v. United States (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion affirming in part and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the district court was right to refuse to admit juror testimony in the evidentiary hearing. There was insufficient non-juror testimony to substantiate the claims of juror misconduct. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further consideration of the conspiracy claims.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a partial dissent, stating that juror testimony was admissible under Rule 606(b), and allowing the district court to ignore sworn affidavits from jurors violated the Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury. Justices William J. Brennan, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent


[Pope v. Illinois (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. California and established a three-prong test for determining whether material is obscene. The test asks whether the material in question appeals to a prurient interest, describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner, and whether the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
On July 21, 1983, police detectives in Rockford, Illinois, purchased magazines from Richard Pope and Charles Morrison, both of whom were attendants in an adult bookstore. Pope and Morrison were subsquently charged under Illinois’ obscenity statute for the sale of those magazines. They each moved to dismiss the charges and argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it did not require that the value of the work in question be judged on an objective basis but instead allowed for judgment based on contemporary community standards. The trial courts denied the motions and instructed the juries to determine whether the material would be viewed as obscene by adults in Illinois. Pope and Morrison appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review.


[Pope v. Illinois (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while the first two prongs of the Miller test may be determined based on contemporary community standards, the third prong must be determined based on whether a reasonable person would find value in the material. In this manner, the work in question is protected from needing to obtain majority approval to be deemed of value. Because the statute under which Pope and Morrison were convicted had already been repealed, the Court held that the case should be remanded for consideration of whether the error in this case was harmless.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the Miller test was meant to be adjudicated based on what a reasonable person would find valuable, but he also argued that art could not be judged objectively.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a partial concurrence and partial dissent in which he argued that the “harmless error” analysis proposed in the majority opinion was inappropriate in this case, but the majority opinion correctly protected a work from being judged solely by the value, or lack thereof, that a majority of community members might ascribe to it.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that the error in this case was harmful to Pope and Morrison because the jury evaluated their guilt based on unconstitutional instructions. Justice Stevens also wrote that the majority opinion’s attempt to clarify the definition of obscenity subjected the First Amendment’s protection of free speech to the whims of jurors who might believe that a majority view on the value of a work is more reasonable than a minority view. The difficulty in attempting to define obscenity reflects what Justice Stevens found to be the constitutional impossibility of criminalizing the creation or sale of obscene literature to consenting adults. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that the concept of obscenity cannot be sufficiently defined to provide fair notice to the creators and purveyors of sexually oriented materials without also seriously undermining the First Amendment protection of free speech.


[Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
On January 26, 1973, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a non-stock, non-membership corporation. Beginning in January 1973, MCFL distributed a newsletter to its contributors focused on MCFL’s political concerns. Prior to the September 19, 1978, primary elections, MCFL distributed a flyer to contributors, due-payers and to approximately 50,000 people MCFL considered sympathetic to its goals. This flyer encouraged readers to vote ‘pro-life’, listed candidates for state and federal office in every voting district in the state, and identified each candidate as either supporting or opposing MCFL’s views.
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) prohibited corporations from spending general corporate treasury funds on any federal election; MCFL spent a total of $9,812.76 from its general treasury on the flyers in question. When conciliation proved unsuccessful, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a complaint against MCFL seeking a civil penalty and other relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found for MCFL, holding that the flyers did not fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and that the flyers fell under the act’s press exemption for news stories, commentaries, or editorials. The court also held that the act would violate the First Amendment if applied.
After examining the legislative history of the FECA, the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It held that the flyers fit within the act’s definition of ‘expenditure’ and did not fall under its press exemption. It did, however, affirm the lower court’s ruling that FECA would be unconstitutional if applied, holding that the government offered no substantial government interest.


[Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (1986) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In an opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, the Court held unanimously that Massachusetts Citizens for Life’s flyers violated FECA’s prohibition on expenditures. He pointed to the general definitions section of FECA, where ‘expenditures’ included the provision of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing a federal election. Justice Brennan also looked to the legislative history and determined that Congress did not intend to abandon its restrictions on expenditures to support candidates. Justice Brennan rejected MCFL’s argument that it did not expressly advocate for a candidate, noting that the flyers exhorted readers to vote for specific ‘pro-life’ candidates.
In a 5-4 majority, Justice Brennan also held that FECA was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL’s flyers. While acknowledging that FECA’s requirements were not an absolute restriction on MCFL’s First Amendment rights, he argued that they were a substantial restriction. He noted that MCFL was forced to comply with several burdensome requirements only because it was a corporation; these requirements potentially created a disincentive for engaging in political speech. Justice Brennan held that the state’s compelling interest in restricting corporate spending on elections did not extend to MCFL because 1) MCFL was formed for an exclusively political purpose, 2) it had no shareholders, and 3) it was not formed by a business corporation or labor union. He noted that even if FECA’s disclosure requirements no longer applied, MCFL was still required to identify anyone contributing over $200.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred with both of the majority’s holdings. She emphasized that the significant burden on MCFL arose from FECA’s additional organizational restrictions, and not from its higher disclosure requirements.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, dissented on the constitutionality of FECA. While acknowledging that the threat from corporate political activity varied depending on the characteristics of a particular corporation, he argued that these were distinctions in degree and not differences in kind. He described the majority’s three-part test as legislative in character.


[Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) is a union that represents railroad workers across the country, specifically the employees of Maine Central Railroad, a subsidiary of Guilford Transportation Industries (Guilford). After Guilford acquired Maine Central in 1981, Maine Central had to lay off 300 of the 400 employees that BMWE represented. The collective bargaining agreement between the two expired in 1984, before the parties were able to reach a satisfactory new agreement. For the following year, the parties attempted to reach a settlement using the procedures set out by the Railroad Labor Act (RLA), but they exhausted those options. On March 3, 1986, BMWE began a strike against Maine Central that expanded to encompass the other Guilford subsidiaries. Upon receiving information that other railroad companies were assisting Guilford, BMWE began picketing other railroads’ lines. On April 9, Burlington Northern Railroad Company sought and received a temporary restraining order from the district court to stop the picketing. Six other railroad companies filed petitions in the same court and received temporary restraining orders on April 11. On April 23, the district court consolidated the cases entered a preliminary injunction against BMWE.
The Court of Appeals reversed based on the understanding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents the use of injunctions to halt labor dispute protests. The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the injunction and ordered it to dismiss the petitioners’ claims.
While these judicial procedures were pending, on May 16, 1986, the President issued Executive Order No. 12557, which convened an emergency board to investigate the dispute and report back to the President after 30 days. During that period the parties had to maintain the status quo that existed before the dispute. Congress also convened an advisory board that recommended that Congress enact legislation that would bind the parties to the recommendation of the President’s emergency board. Congress did so, and the President signed it into law.


[Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly to prevent courts from distinguishing between primary and secondary actors for the purposes of labor immunity in labor disputes. Additionally, since Congress did not provide any clear way to distinguish between primary and secondary actors in such cases, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to make decisions based on a distinction that lacks a legislative basis. The Court also held that Congress meant the term “labor dispute” to be broad, so the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not only refer to employers who are substantially aligned with the primary employer.


[Illinois v. Krull (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
The state of Illinois required all who sell or scrap motor vehicles or parts to obtain licenses. That law also required anyone with a license to allow police to inspect their records at any time without a warrant. Albert Krull, George Lucas, and Salvatore Mucerino operated a wrecking yard. During a routine records inspection, police found four stolen cars on the lot. The men were arrested and charged with several criminal violations of Illinois motor vehicle laws. The next day, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down the law that allowed police officers to inspect records without a warrant.
Krull moved to suppress evidence found during the search because the law that police officers relied on was now unconstitutional. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search is excluded at trial. Illinois argued that because the police officer acted in good faith, the evidence was admissible. The trial court granted Krull’s motion. The state appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded. On remand, the trial court maintained its original position and granted the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.


[Illinois v. Krull (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in good faith. The officer’s reliance on the unconstitutional law was objectively reasonable when he conducted the search. Excluding the evidence in this case would not support the policy behind the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct. The Court followed United States v. Leon 468 U.S. 897 (1984) where police conducted a search with a warrant that they later found out was defective.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a dissent, stating that United States v. Leon qs distinguishable from this case. She also asserted that the rule the majority adopted was inconsistent and difficult to apply. Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, joining in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, but expressing that her discussion of prior precedent was unnecessary.


[United States v. Salerno (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
The 1984 Bail Reform Act allowed the federal courts to detain an arrestee prior to trial if the government could prove that the individual was potentially dangerous to other people in the community. Prosecutors alleged that Salerno and another person in this case were prominent figures in the La Cosa Nostra crime family.


[United States v. Salerno (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the Act was constitutional because when the government's interest in protecting the community outweighs individual liberty, pre-trial detention can be "a potential solution to a pressing societal problem." The Act only applied to a specific list of serious offenses, placed heavy burdens on the government to prove that the arrestee posed significant threats to others, and did not prevent the accused from enjoying a speedy trial. The Court also dismissed Salerno's argument that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.


[Bowen v. Gilliard (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Until 1984, the statutes governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) allowed a family to exclude one member if that person had an income or is receiving benefits that would reduce the amount of government aid. In 1984, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which removed the option of excluding a family member. The new law required that the filing unit include all income from all members of the family. This might reduce the family’s total income by reducing the benefits the family is eligible to receive.
In 1970, Beaty Mae Gilliard, who had been receiving benefits from North Carolina through the AFDC since 1962, gave birth to her seventh child. Because Gilliard was receiving child support from the child’s father, the state deducted the child support from the benefits she was eligible for as the parent of an eight-person family. Gilliard sued, and the district court agreed with her reading of the statute that she was allowed to exclude the child who was receiving child support from her filing unit because the seven-person family benefits were greater than what she would receive from the eight-person family benefits minus the child support. The district court awarded class relief to anyone in Gilliard’s position. When North Carolina adopted regulations to comply with the 1984 Act, Gilliard and other members of the class filed a motion to reopen the case and obtain relief. The district court concluded that the new statutory scheme adopted by the 1984 Act violated the Due Process and Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.


[Bowen v. Gilliard (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the 1984 Act supported the federal government’s dual interests of reducing the deficit and distributing aid to needy families in the fairest way possible. Because some families receive income from sources other than the government, the Court held that it was reasonable for the government to be able to provide more aid to those families that have no other means of support. Based on the rational basis for this decision, the 1984 Act did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that the 1984 Act did not violate the Takings Clause because the amount of money the child receives does not change, regardless of the amount of money the family as a whole receives from the government. The government is not taking anything away from the child without compensation, the type of government action the Takings Clause was meant to prevent.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the government’s actions unduly harm the parent-child relationship. Because an increasing number of children live in a single-parent household headed by the mother, forcing the children to forego the financial support of the father in order to live with the mother and receive her government benefits can cut children off from a relationship with their fathers. He argued that the 1984 Act places an undue burden on the child and the familial relationship, which requires a higher level of scrutiny than merely proving the decision was a rational one. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun also wrote a dissent stating that he agreed with Justice Brennan’s arguments.


[Board of Directors, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International violated club policy by admitting three women into its active membership its charter was revoked and it was expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary International's action violated a California civil rights act prohibiting sexual discrimination.


[Board of Directors, Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found that the relationship among the club's members was not of the intimate or private variety which warrants First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are conducted in the presence of strangers, and because women members would not prevent the club from carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to associate, that minimal infringement would be justified since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in ending sexual discrimination.


[Hodel v. Irving (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In 1983, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act. Prior to this act, tribal land was allotted to individual tribal members in trust. Individual owners would hold the land in trust and could convey the land to their heirs. If a tribal member who held land in trust died without a will, the land would be divided among all of the heirs of that tribal member. This eventually lead to heirs inheriting very small fractional interests in land. The Indian Land Consolidation Act contained a provision which would transfer certain minimal fractional interests in land away from the individual heirs and back to the tribal governments.
Mary Irving, Patrick Pumpkin Seed, and Eileen Bissonette were enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe and were heirs or devisees of Tribe members who died in 1983. Each had inherited a fractional interest in land which they would lose to the tribal government under the Indian Land Consolidation Act.
Irving, Seed, and Bissonette filed suit in the district court claiming that the provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act resulted in taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was constitutional and that the complainants had no vested interest in the property of the decedents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It held that the complainants had standing and that the statute did violate the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary of the Interior appealed the appellate court's decision.


[Hodel v. Irving (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the appellate court's decision. The Court held that the section of the Indian Land Consolidation Act which transferred ownership of fractional land interests to the respective tribe constituted an unconstitutional seizure of property without just compensation. The Court also held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the provision.
Justice William J. Brennan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun joined. Justice Brennan emphasized that the ruling would not limit the Court's opinion in Andrus v. Allard, and that the property rights and expectations specific to this case made this case unusual.
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined. He stated that the Court's decision effectively limited Andrus v. Allard to its facts.
Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Byron White joined. He stated that Congress had failed to afford the affected Native Americans due process by failing to provide any opportunity to order their affairs in light of the new law.


[Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
After its Maryland synagogue was painted with anti-Semitic slogans and symbols, the Shaare Tefila Congregation brought a suit charging the white defendants with racially discriminatory interference with property rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1982. The Maryland District Court dismissed the claims, maintaining that white-on-white violence was not racially discriminatory.


[Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court unanimously ruled that Jews can state a claim of racial discrimination since they were among the peoples considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of U.S.C. Section 1982. The statute "was intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." The Jewish people most certainly suffered such discrimination and so were not barred from their claim simply because both they, like the defendants, were Caucasian.


[Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
The California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property wishing to obtain a building permit to maintain a pathway on their property open to the public.


[Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Justice Scalia held, in a 5-4 opinion, that the Coastal Commission could only place conditions on the Nollans’ development permit to rebuild their home where those conditions substantially furthered government interests that would justify denial of the permit entirely. Because the Nollans’ request to rebuild their home did not further the government’s interest in overcoming a perceived psychological barrier to using the beach, the condition was a regulatory taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.


[Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Paula Hobbie worked for Lawton and Company, a Florida jewelry shop. She joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church and informed her employer that she could not work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday since it was her new church's Sabbath day. Lawton soon dismissed her for refusing to work Friday evening and Saturday shifts. Hobbie filed for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Lawton objected to paying benefits, claiming that she did qualify since she had been dismissed "for misconduct connected with her work." The Bureau of Unemployment Compensation agreed and denied her benefits. Hobbie claimed that this violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. She unsuccessfully appealed the decision in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal.


[Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. Referring to its similar decisions in Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., the Court maintained that a state cannot deny unemployment benefits to an employee dismissed for having religious conflicts with the employer. This violates the Free Exercise Clause by pressuring religious adherents to modify their religious views in order to retain work or benefits. The state cannot do this without a compelling interest. The Court did not find it relevant that Hobbie converted after she began working, and did not consider the fact that she still qualified for partial benefits a satisfactory remedy.


[Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
On September 23, 1978, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda motorcycle while riding down Highway 80 in Solano County, California. His motorcycle collided with a trailer and killed his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno. A year later, Zurcher filed a liability suit alleging that the sudden loss of air and subsequent explosion of his rear tire caused the accident. His complaint named Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Company, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube, as a defendant. Cheng Shin sued its co-defendant, Asahi Metal Industry Company, the Japanese manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Zurcher's claim was eventually settled, which left the suit against Asahi still outstanding.
Asahi filed a motion with the superior court to quash the summons by arguing that the court had no jurisdiction over the company. The Court denied the motion because Asahi does business internationally and therefore should be subject to international laws. The Court of Appeal of the State of California ordered the Superior Court to grant the motion because it was not reasonably foreseeable for Asahi products to end up in California. The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and held that Asahi placed its components in a "stream of commerce" with the awareness that some of those components ended up in California.


[Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty. (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the state must show that the defendant company purposefully established "minimum contacts" by directing products toward a particular state. Although Asahi placed its products in a stream of commerce that eventually led to California, there was no evidence that the company marketed or in any way anticipated sales in California. The Court also held that the jurisdiction of the California court would be unreasonable for Asahi, given the distance and the fact that this dispute is purely between Asahi and Cheng Shin. The state of California had only a slight interest in this case that did not outweigh the burden on Asahi.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the decision of the Court that the California jurisdiction would place an unfair and unreasonable burden on Asahi, but he disagreed with the holding that Asahi did not purposefully interact with the California market. He argued that the ""stream of commerce"" is both predictable and profitable for companies, and the benefits of sales balance the potential burden of litigation. Justices Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence in part and in the judgment.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the examination of whether or not Asahi had established ""minimum contacts"" was unnecessary. The test of minimum contacts only becomes relevant once a reasonable burden has been established. He also argued that the Court misapplied the test by not recognizing that such a high volume of Asahi parts reaching California can only be the result of purposeful business. Justices Byron R. White and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the partial concurrence and concurrence in judgment.


[Rankin v. McPherson (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Ardith McPherson was a clerical employee in the Harris County, Texas constable's office. After hearing on the office radio that there had been an attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, McPherson, who thought she was alone with one other office worker, stated "if they go for him again, I hope they get him." Another co-worker overheard the comment and reported it to the Constable, Walter H. Rankin. Rankin subsequently fired McPherson.


[Rankin v. McPherson (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson was outweighed by her rights under the First Amendment. The Court held that McPherson's statement, when considered in context, "plainly dealt with a matter of public concern." The Court found that there was no evidence that McPherson's speech interfered with "the efficient functioning of the office" and that her private comment had not discredited the office. The Court also noted that McPherson did not serve a "confidential, policymaking, or public contact" role, diminishing the impact of her speech on the agency's proper functioning.


[Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Al-Khazraji, a professor and U.S. citizen born in Iraq, filed suit against his former employer and its tenure committee for denying him tenure on the basis of his Arabian race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The District Court held that while Al-Kharzraji had properly alleged racial discrimination, the record was insufficient to determine whether he had been subjected to prejudice.


[Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that persons of Arabian ancestry were protected from racial discrimination under Section 1981. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Byron R. White maintained that section 1981 encompassed discrimination even among Caucasians. Justice White noted that history did not support the claim that Arabs and other present-day "Caucasians" were considered to be a single race for the purposes of section 1981. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., in a separate concurrence, added that "Pernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this nation is founded."


[San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Currently unavailable.


[San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Currently unavailable.


[Arizona v. Hicks (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
A bullet was fired through the floor of Hicks's apartment which injured a man in the apartment below. To investigate the shooting, police officers entered Hicks's apartment and found three weapons along with a stocking mask. During the search, which was done without a warrant, an officer noticed some expensive stereo equipment which he suspected had been stolen. The officer moved some of the components, recorded their serial numbers, and seized them upon learning from police headquarters that his suspicions were correct.


[Arizona v. Hicks (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. The Court found that the search and seizure of the stereo equipment violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing the Court's holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), Justice Scalia upheld the "plain view" doctrine which allows police officers under some circumstances to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. However, critical to this doctrine, argued Scalia, is the requirement that warrantless seizures which rely on no "special operational necessities" be done with probable cause. Since the officer who seized the stereo equipment had only a "reasonable suspicion" and not a "probable cause" to believe that the equipment was stolen, the officer's actions were not reconcilable with the Constitution.


[Richardson v. Marsh (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were charged with the assault of Cynthia Knighton and the murder of her four-year-old son, Koran, and her aunt, Ollie Scott. Despite Marsh’s objections, she and Williams were tried jointly. The prosecution entered Williams’ confession into evidence, although the confession was redacted to prevent any mention of anyone other than Williams and Martin being involved in the crime. In his closing argument, the prosecution admonished the jury not to use Williams’ confession against Marsh but linked her testimony to events in the confession. The judge also instructed the jury not to use the confession against Marsh. Marsh was convicted, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the appeal.
Marsh filed a writ of habeas corpus and argued that the introduction of the confession violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause. The district court denied the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.


[Richardson v. Marsh (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that not only did the jury receive instructions not to consider the confession in assessing Marsh’s guilt, but also the confession was redacted so that there was no incriminating evidence regarding Marsh’s actions. Without the implication that the evidence in the confession was incriminating, Marsh’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated. The Court also held that joint trials, while not necessarily in either defendant’s best interests from the perspective of the Confrontation Clause, are a necessary part of the justice system.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent and argued that the Confrontation Clause regulates the introduction of any evidence from which the jury could infer the defendant’s guilt. Given the presentation of the confession in this case, the jury could only infer that Williams’ confession also enumerated Marsh’s guilt. He also argued that the legal system’s interest in joint trials from an efficiency standpoint should not outweigh the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[United States v. Stanley (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
In February 1958, Master Sergeant James Stanley volunteered to participate in a military program ostensibly testing the effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical warfare. He spent a month at the Army’s Chemical Warfare Laboratories and during that time was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). As a result of his exposure to LSD, Stanley began experiencing hallucinations, memory loss, impaired performance of his job, and he engaged in domestic violence without remembering it later. He was discharged from the Army in 1969. In 1975, Stanley received a letter from the military asking for his cooperation in a study to determine the long-term effects of LSD and referring to his previous “voluntary” involvement in the 1958 tests. This letter was the first notification that Stanley received regarding the true purpose of the 1958 tests. He sued the government under the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) and argued that there had been negligence in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the drug testing program.
The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and held that the government was not liable for negligence that occurred while Stanley was on active duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but also held that the district court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, Stanley amended his complaint to include claims that unknown officers violated his constitutional rights and argued that the constitutional claim did not fall under the service exception to the FTCA. The district court again dismissed the claim under the FTCA and rejected the government’s argument that the same exception barred Stanley’s constitutional claims. The government moved for partial final judgment because Stanley had not named individual defendants. Stanley filed a second amended complaint that named individual defendants, but before the court ruled on it, the Supreme Court decided Chappell v. Wallace, which held that enlisted military personnel may not file constitutional claims. The district court held that the Chappell decision did not bar Stanley’s constitutional claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that recent precedent did not require Stanley’s FTCA claim to be barred.


[United States v. Stanley (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not have the jurisdiction to consider Stanley’s FTCA claims because they were not a part of the order that was originally appealed. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals took an unnecessarily narrow view of the Chappell decision by limiting it to an even greater extent than the FTCA waiver of governmental liability. Because the government is protected from suits arising from activities that occurred during the course of service under the FTCA, there is no reason to assume that the precedent set by the Chappell decision would provide less protection.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that members of the armed forces deserve the same constitutional protections from the government as those enjoyed by ordinary citizens. Previous federal immunity jurisprudence was based on the specific circumstances surrounding events and that the individuals named in the suit should be required to demonstrate absolute immunity. He also argued that the Chappell decision only barred constitutional claims when military discipline would suffer. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In her separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued that both the Chappell decision and the FTCA exception prohibit civilian courts from considering suits that arise as the result of military service. However, because Stanley’s FTCA claims arise as the result of his involuntary conclusion in a military test, his claims should be allowed to proceed.


[O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Ahmad Uthman Shabazz and Sadr-Ud-Din Nafis Mateen were inmates in New Jersey’s Leesburg State Prison. The prison classified inmates depending on the security risk each posed. Due to their classification, Shabazz and Mateen were assigned to a prison job outside of the main prison building and were not allowed to return to the main prison building during the workday. Because of these restrictions neither men, both of whom were practicing Muslims, were able to attend Juamu’ah, a weekly religious service held on Fridays.
The two men sued the prison and argued that the work policies infringed on their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. The federal district court found in favor of the prison and held that the prison policies plausibly advanced the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the prison was required to show that there was no other reasonable method by which the inmate’s religious rights could be accommodated without creating actual security problems.


[O'lone v. Estate Of Shabazz (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, while prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional rights after being convicted of a crime, being incarcerated does place necessary limitations on those rights. Because of the particular interests and dangers involved in prisons and the prison administration’s everyday experience with the operation of a prison, courts should largely defer to prison administrators on questions of policy or regulation. Therefore, even when an inmate alleges that a prison policy infringes on his or her constitutional rights, the policy is valid as long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, as the policy in this case was. The Court also held that a prison is not required to adopt any alternative policy that may have “undesirable results,” as determined by the prison.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a prison must demonstrate that the restrictions imposed on inmates were necessary to further an important governmental interest. He also argued that there should be a varying level of scrutiny depending on the nature of the right being asserted, rather than the general standard of deference in the majority opinion. Because the prison policy in the case in question acts as a complete ban that prevents some Muslim prisoners from attending Juamu’ah, an obligatory and important religious ceremony, the prison should be required to show the policy was necessary and no less extreme measures could serve the same purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent,


[Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v. DeBenedictis (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
By passing the the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Act), the Pennsylvania Legislature empowered the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) to regulate underground coal mining that damaged structures on the surface. When implementing the Act, DER prevented coal miners from removing more than 50% of coal from mines located beneath buildings. Historically, coal miners acquired rights to "mining estates" separate from the property owned on the above "surface estates." The Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, a group of miners, complained that the Act created a "support estate" that effectively took away its property without compensation. Keystone relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to allege that this state action violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected both allegations and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision.


[Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. v. DeBenedictis (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No and No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. Like in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court's decision depended upon the "particular facts" of the mining regulation in question. Unlike in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court found a valid public purpose behind the present Act and determined the Act would not make it impossible for the miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore the decision in Pennsylvania Coal did not apply. To refute alleged Takings Clause violations, the Court established that "the support estate has value only insofar as it is used to exploit another estate." Then the Court conducted a factual review of the effects of the new regulation. It concluded that "[b]ecause petitioners retain the right to mine virtually all the coal in their mineral estates, the burden the Act places on the support estate does not constitute a taking." The Court also dismissed alleged Contract Clause violations because the state acquired no property for itself, but rather used its police power to implement regulation which served valid public interests.


[Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
A Louisiana law entitled the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act" prohibited the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools unless that instruction was accompanied by the teaching of creation science, a Biblical belief that advanced forms of life appeared abruptly on Earth. Schools were not forced to teach creation science. However, if either topic was to be addressed, evolution or creation, teachers were obligated to discuss the other as well.


[Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that the law violated the Constitution. Using the three-pronged test that the Court had developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to evaluate potential violations of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan argued that Louisiana's law failed on all three prongs of the test. First, it was not enacted to further a clear secular purpose. Second, the primary effect of the law was to advance the viewpoint that a "supernatural being created humankind," a doctrine central to the dogmas of certain religious denominations. Third, the law significantly entangled the interests of church and state by seeking "the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose."


[United States v. Dunn (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Facts]
Using electronic beepers and aerial photography, police tracked certain drug making supplies to Ronald Dale Dunn’s ranch. The ranch had a fence surrounding the perimeter as well as several interior fences. Law enforcement officers entered the property without a warrant and crossed several fences to get near Dunn’s barn. The barn was about 60 yards away from Dunn’s house and a fence separated the two buildings. Police smelled phenylacetic acid and heard a motor running in the barn. Police approached the barn but did not enter. The officers did shine a flashlight through netting above the door and observed what looked like a drug laboratory. The officers made several similar visits, not entering, but looking into the barn, before obtaining a warrant to search the barn and Dunn’s house. During this search, police seized chemicals and equipment use for making drugs.
At trial, Dunn unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. A jury convicted him on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the barn was “within the curtilage” of Dunn’s house, so the police officers’ warrantless visits to the barn violated the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals judgment and remanded in light of Oliver v. United States. This time, the court of appeals found that the warrantless searches of the barn violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy.


[United States v. Dunn (1987) — Rehnquist Court (1986-1987) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the barn and the area around it lay outside the protected area of curtilage around Dunn’s house. The barn was separated from the house by a fence and was a substantial distance away from the house, the officers had other data that lead them to suspect Dunn, and Dunn did little to protect the barn from observation. Even if Dunn did have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search still did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers never entered the barn. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the officers perception of the way Dunn used the barn was not as important as the way the barn actually was used.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that the barn was within the area of protected curtilage, and the officers violated Dunn’s reasonable expectation of privacy because the barn was an essential part of Dunn’s business. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.