[Price  v. Vincent (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
During Duyonn Vincent's trial, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of acquittal as to first-degree murder. Subsequently, when the prosecution made a statement on first-degree murder, defense counsel objected, arguing that the court had granted its directed verdict motion and that further prosecution on first-degree murder would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judge responded that he had granted the motion but had not directed a verdict. The judge then submitted the first-degree murder charge to the jury, which convicted Vincent on that charge. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. In reversing, the State Supreme Court determined that the trial judge's comments were not sufficiently final to terminate jeopardy. Subsequently, the Federal District Court granted Vincent's federal habeas corpus petition after concluding that continued prosecution for first-degree murder had violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Price  v. Vincent (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the defendant did not meet the requirements for habeas relief. The Court stated that Vincent was entitled to relief only if he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claim was "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of" the Court's clearly established precedents. Finding that the state court's adjudication of his claim was not, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals because "Even if we agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Double Jeopardy Clause should be read to prevent continued prosecution of a defendant under these circumstances, it was at least reasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise."


[Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW) filed a class action alleging that certain individuals and organizations that oppose legal abortion violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through "a pattern of racketeering activity" that included acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. Ultimately, the District Court entered a permanent nationwide injunction against the abortion opponents. Upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals held, in part, that the things abortion supporters claimed were extorted from them, such as women's right to seek medical services from the clinics and the clinic doctors' rights to perform their jobs, constituted "property" that was "obtained" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. (Together with No. 01-1119, Operation Rescue v. National Organization for Women.)


[Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc. (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In an 8-1 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that abortion opponents did not commit extortion because they did not "obtain" property from the abortion supporters as required by the Hobbs Act. The Court further held that is first holding renders insufficient the other bases or predicate acts of racketeering supporting the jury's conclusion that the abortion opponents violated RICO. While the opponents' conduct constituted the separate offense of coercion, reasoned Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opponents neither pursued nor received something of value from the supporters that the opponents could exercise, transfer, or sell, and thus did not commit extortion. Without an underlying RICO violation, the Court vacated the District Court's injunction and did not reach the second question. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented.


[United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Under Public Law 86-392, the former Fort Apache Military Reservation is held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The Tribe sued the federal government to rehabilitate the property, alleging that the United States had breached a fiduciary duty to maintain, protect, repair, and preserve it. In its motion to dismiss, the federal government argued that jurisdiction was lacking here because no statute or regulation could be read to impose a legal obligation on it to maintain or restore the trust property, let alone authorize compensation for breach. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the complaint. In reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the federal government's property use triggered a common-law trustee's duty to act reasonably to preserve any property the Secretary of the Interior chose to utilize, which also supported a money damages claim.


[United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that Public Law 86-392 gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the Tribe's suit. The Court reasoned that, although the statute providing for the land to be held in trust imposed no duties on the United States to maintain the land, the occupation of such land by the United States raised a duty to preserve trust assets and that it naturally followed that the United States was liable in damages for the breach of such duties. Justice Clarence Thomas, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy joined, dissented. Justice Thomas argued that the majority's opinion "radically alters the relevant inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual control."


[Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
If a federal court with jurisdiction over a civil action declines to exercise supplement jurisdiction over other related claims, the claims will be dismissed and must be refiled in state court. To prevent the limitations period on those claims from expiring, 28 USC section 1367(d) requires state courts to toll the period while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court. In 1994, Susan Jinks filed a federal-court action against Richland County, South Carolina. The District Court granted the county summary judgment and declined to exercise jurisdiction over Jinks's state-law claims. Jinks then filed the supplemental claims in state court and won. In reversing, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found the state-law claims time-barred. Although they would not have been barred under section 1367(d)'s tolling rule, the court held section 1367(d) unconstitutional as applied to claims brought in state court against a State's political subdivisions.


[Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that section 1367(d)'s application to claims brought against a State's political subdivisions is constitutional. The Court reasoned that section 1367(d) is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power "to constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, as it provides a straightforward tolling rule, which promotes fair and efficient operation of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to the administration of justice. The Court also reiterated that, while Congress lacks Article I authority to override a State's immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise of its enumerated powers. Justice David H. Souter filed a concurring opinion, noting that he did not shift from his dissent in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706.


[Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Article 1, section 8, "Congress shall have Power...to promote the Progress of Science...by securing [to Authors] for limited Times...the exclusive Right to their...Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years, making copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have entered the public domain, argued that the CTEA violates both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. They claimed Congress cannot extend the copyright term for published works with existing copyrights. The District Court and the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed.


[Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No and no. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations in placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA. Disagreeing with the argument that a copyright once set is fixed, the majority found that the CTEA "continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes," and is a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. Moreover, the Court held that the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment. Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the CTEA amounted to a grant of perpetual copyright that undermined public interests.


[American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1999 the California legislature enacted the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) in an attempt to facilitate Holocaust-era insurance claims by California residents. The Act required all insurance companies doing business in California that sold policies to people in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make public all of those policies, including the names of policy owners and the status of the policies. A group of insurance companies and a trade organization sued, saying that only the federal government, with its jurisdiction over commerce and foreign affairs, had the right to enact such legislation. They also said the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution because the companies, if they failed to comply, could lose their insurance licenses. The District Court ruled for the insurance companies; the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.


[American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that California's HVIRA interferes with the president's ability to conduct the nation's foreign policy and is therefore preempted. The Court reasoned that an exercise of state power that concerns foreign relations must yield to the Federal Government's policy or that generally there is executive authority to decide what policy should be implemented. Based on an account of related international negotiations, the Court found sufficiently clear conflict between HVIRA and the President's foreign policy. "The basic fact is that California seeks to use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves," wrote Justice Souter. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, dissented, arguing that no executive agreement or other formal expression of foreign policy expressly disapproved of state disclosure laws like California's HVIRA.


[Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Leandro Andrade was found guilty of two felony counts of petty theft with a prior conviction after he stole approximately $150 worth of videotapes. Under California's three strikes regime, a judge sentenced him to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life. In affirming, the California Court of Appeal rejected his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. After the Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review, Andrade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The District Court denied his petition. In reversing, the Court of Appeals granted Andrade a certificate of appealability as to his claim that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.


[Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the California Court of Appeal's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the Court's clearly established law within the meaning of 28 USC section 2254(d)(1). The Court reasoned that, because the "precise contours" of the proportionality principle were unclear, it was not objectively unreasonable for the state appellate court to conclude that the "contours" permitted an affirmance of the sentence. The gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case, wrote Justice O'Connor. "This is the rare sentence of demonstrable gross disproportionality," argued Justice David H. Souter in his dissent, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined.


[PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
A group of physicians filed suit against a number of managed-health-care organizations, alleging they violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by failing to reimburse them for health-care services that they had provided to patients covered by the organizations' plans. The District Court refused to compel arbitration of the RICO claims on the ground that the arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements prohibited awards of punitive damages. Subsequently, the court found the arbitration agreements unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the proper course in this case was to compel arbitration. The Court reasoned that since it did not know how the arbitrator would construe the remedial limitations, given the Court's prior decisions, the questions whether they render the parties' agreement unenforceable was unusually abstract and thus it would be premature for the Court to address them. Justice Clarence Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


[Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Gilbert Hyatt filed a part-year resident income-tax return in California for 1991, which represented that he had become a Nevada resident in October 1991, shortly before he received substantial licensing fees. The California Franchise Tax Board (CFTB) determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 1992 and issued notices of proposed assessments and imposed substantial civil fraud penalties. Hyatt filed suit against CFTB in a Nevada state court, alleging that CFTB had committed negligence and intentional torts during the course of its audit. CFTB argued that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because full faith and credit required that the court apply California law immunizing CFTB from suit. Ultimately, the Nevada Supreme Court allowed the intentional tort claims to proceed to trial. The court held that affording CFTB statutory immunity with respect to intentional torts would contravene Nevada's interest in protecting its citizens from injurious intentional torts and bad faith acts committed by sister States' government employees.


[Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to give full faith and credit to California's statutes providing its tax agency with immunity from suit. Noting that Nevada did not grant immunity to its agencies for intentional torts, the Court reasoned that Nevada's interest in redressing intentional tortious conduct was sufficient to decline to accord full faith and credit to California's immunity of its tax agency to bar intentional tort claims. Accordingly, the Court refused to adopt a new rule mandating that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would interfere with the State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.


[Wiggins v. Smith (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Kevin Wiggins was convicted and sentenced to death for a 1988 murder. He appealed, claiming that his attorney's decision not to tell jurors about Wiggins' troubled childhood amounted to ineffective counsel because it resulted in a harsher sentence. Prosecutors countered that the attorney's decision had been carefully considered, and that a different decision would not necessarily have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, they said, it was not ineffective counsel. A Maryland district court sided with Wiggins; the Maryland Supreme Court reversed, siding with the state. On appeal to federal court, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling for Maryland.


[Wiggins v. Smith (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the performance of Wiggins's attorneys at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court reasoned that Wiggins's counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation because, among other things, standard practice in Maryland in 1989 included the preparation of a social history report, which his attorneys did not commission even though the necessary funds were available. The Court concluded that Wiggins's counsels' failures prejudiced his defense. "Had the jury been able to place [Wiggins's] excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance," wrote Justice O'Connor. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented.


[United States v. Navajo Nation (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) allows Indian tribes, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to lease the mining rights on their tribal lands to private companies. In 1964, Navajo Nation (tribe) entered into a lease with the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing Peabody to mine on the tribe's land in return for a royalty of 37.5 cents for every ton of coal mined. The agreement was subject to renegotiation after 20 years. By 1984, the tribe's royalty was only worth 2% of Peabody's gross proceeds. In 1977 Congress had required a minimum of 12.5%. The tribe requested that the Secretary set a new rate, and the Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs for the Navajo Area, as the Secretary's representative, made a preliminary decision to set the rate at 20%. Peabody's representatives urged the Secretary to reverse or delay the decision. The Secretary agreed, and urged the parties to resume negotiations. The tribe and Peabody agreed on a rate of 12.5%. In 1993, however, the tribe sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging a breach of trust and claiming $600 million in damages. The court ruled for the government, explaining that though the government may have betrayed the tribe's trust by acting in Peabody's interest rather than the tribe's, it had not violated any specific statutory or regulatory obligation. The tribe was therefore not entitled to monetary relief. On appeal, the tribe argued that the entirety of the IMLA imposes on the government a broad obligation to look after the wellbeing of the tribe. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court, finding that "the Secretary must act in the best interests of the Indian tribes."


[United States v. Navajo Nation (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled that an Indian Tribe must "identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the IMLA could not be interpreted to require the Secretary to exercise broad authority to manage the tribe's resources for the tribe's benefit. Instead, the tribe itself controls negotiations and the Secretary has a more limited role in approving the agreements. The Court concluded that no provision of the IMLA entitled the tribe to monetary damages as a result of the government's role in the negotiations. Justice Souter, joined by justices Stevens and O'Connor, wrote a dissent arguing that the Secretary's approval power must be exercised for the tribe's benefit, and monetary damages may be awarded if the power is misused.


[Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
With the recommendation of his doctor, Kenneth Nord filed for disability benefits with his employer of 25 years, Kwikset Corp., a company owned by Black & Decker Corp. After the company denied his claim, Nord asked for a review of the denial. A doctor hired by the company determined that Nord could in fact perform the duties required by his job and was therefore ineligible for benefits, despite determinations to the contrary by Nord's physician, his orthopedic surgeon and a Black & Decker human resource representative. Nord sued to have the decision reversed, claiming that the company's preference of its doctor's opinion over the opinions of the other physicians violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The district court ruled in favor of Black & Decker Corp. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.


[Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that plan administrators are not obliged to accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. The Court reasoned that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied a "treating physician rule" because nothing in ERISA gave rise to such a rule. Justice Ginsburg wrote, "courts have no warrant to require administrators automatically to accord special weight to the opinions of a claimant's physician; nor may courts impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation."


[Massaro v. United States (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering. Though prosecutors found a bullet before the trial began and did not inform the defense until the trial was underway, defense counsel declined more than once the trial court's offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined. Subsequently, Massaro was convicted. On direct appeal, Massaro but did not raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Massaro later moved to vacate his conviction, under 28 USC section 2255, based on an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The District Court found his claim procedurally defaulted because he could have raised it on direct appeal. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the trial record, the claim must be raised on direct appeal.


[Massaro v. United States (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in a collateral proceeding under section 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal would create a risk that defendants would feel compelled to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity fully to develop it. Moreover, the Court noted its new rule would provide for ineffective-assistance claims to be litigated in the District Court, the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.


[Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Rex Sprietsma's wife was killed in a boating accident when she was struck by the propeller of a motor made by Mercury Marine. Sprietsma sued Mercury Marine under Illinois common law, alleging that his wife's injuries were caused by an unreasonably dangerous motor. The trial court, the intermediate court, and the Illinois Supreme Court all dismissed the complaint, finding the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA) preempted such state common-law claims.


[Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held 8-0 that neither the text nor the intent of the FBSA preempts Sprietsma's common law claims, either explicitly or implicitly. Justice Stevens wrote, "Absent a contrary decision by the Coast Guard" - the agency in charge of propeller-safety regulations - "the concern with uniformity does not justify the displacement of state common-law remedies that compensate accident victims..."


[Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
VietNow National Headquarters, a charitable nonprofit corporation, retained for-profit fundraising telemarketing corporations to solicit donations to aid Vietnam veterans. The contracts provided that the telemarketers would retain 85 percent of the gross receipts from Illinois donors. The Illinois Attorney General filed a complaint in state court, alleging that the telemarketers represented to donors that a significant amount of each dollar donated would be paid over to VietNow for charitable endeavors and that such representations were knowingly deceptive and materially false and constituted a fraud. The trial court granted the telemarketers' motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. In affirming, the Illinois Supreme Courts relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent that held that certain regulations of charitable solicitation barring fees in excess of a prescribed level effectively imposed prior restraints on fundraising and were therefore incompatible with the First Amendment.


[Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, consistent with the Court's precedent and the First Amendment, States may maintain fraud actions when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be used. The Court reasoned that, while bare failure to disclose that information directly to potential donors does not suffice to establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, the First Amendment does not preclude a fraud claim. Because the state's action was on misrepresentations that were not protected by freedom of speech, rather than the high percentage of donations retained, the Court concluded that the allegations against the telemarketers therefore state a claim for relief that can survive a motion to dismiss.


[Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
When David Sattazahn's penalty-phase jury reported to the trial judge that it was hopelessly deadlocked 9-to-3 for life imprisonment, the court discharged the jury and entered a life sentence, as required under Pennsylvania law. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed Sattazahn's first-degree murder conviction and remanded for a new trial. At the second trial, Pennsylvania again sought the death penalty and the jury again convicted Sattazahn, but this time the jury imposed a death sentence. In affirming, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that neither the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty at the retrial.


[Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that there was neither a Double Jeopardy Clause nor a Due Process Clause bar to Pennsylvania's seeking the death penalty on retrial. The Court reasoned that the death sentence on retrial did not implicate a double jeopardy bar because the life sentence at issue did not amount to an acquittal based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence or that the government failed to prove one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also refused to hold that the Due Process Clause provides greater double-jeopardy protection than does the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, and Stephen G. Breyer, joined.


[Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayers (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Six employees of the Norfolk and Western Railroad Company contracted asbestosis, a disease caused by exposure to asbestos. The employees brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), including a damages request for pain and suffering caused by a fear of cancer (which they had not yet contracted). The district court ruled for the plaintiffs. The court of appeals denied discretionary review.


[Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Ayers (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. The court ruled that an employee who has developed asbestosis as a result of the actions or negligence of his employer has a reasonable fear of cancer and may collect damages for the emotional distress caused by this fear. Furthermore, under FELA the railroad is liable for damage caused "in whole or in part" by its negligence. It is the responsibility of the railroad to seek contribution from other parties involved in causing the damage.


[Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a redistricting plan that was backed by many black leaders because it would have spread black voters and influence across several districts rather than concentrating them in a select few. Georgia's Republican governor objected to the plan because he said it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which discourages the dilution of minority voting strength. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the legislature's plan.


[Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that the District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined whether Georgia's Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court reasoned that Georgia likely met its burden of showing nonretrogression under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the District Court focused too narrowly on certain districts without examining the increases in the black voting age population that occurred in many of the other districts and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the benchmark majority-minority districts support the plan. In his dissent, Justice David H. Souter argued that Georgia had failed to carry its burden.


[Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Connecticut's "Megan's Law" requires persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety and requires the Department to post a sex offender registry containing registrants' names, addresses, photographs, and descriptions on the Internet. John Doe, a convicted sex offender who is subject to the law, filed suit, claiming that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court enjoined the law's public disclosure provisions. In affirming, the Court of Appeals concluded that such disclosure violated the Due Process Clause because officials did not afford registrants a predeprivation hearing.


[Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. The Court reasoned that, because the law was not based on an offender's dangerousness, but rather only on convictions, disclosing an offender on the registry without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court did not answer whether the law violated the substantive component of due process. Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.


[Woodford v. Garceau (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, the U.S. Supreme Court held that amendments to the criminal code made by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) do not apply to cases pending in federal court on the AEDPA's effective date, April 24, 1996. Robert Garceau was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After his petition for state postconviction relief was denied, Garceau moved for the appointment of federal habeas counsel and a stay of execution in Federal District Court on May 12, 1995. He filed a federal habeas application on July 2, 1996. The District Court concluded that Garceau's habeas application was not subject to AEDPA because his motions for counsel and a stay were filed prior to that date. The Court of Appeals agreed.


[Woodford v. Garceau (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held, for purposes of Lindh, that a case does not become "pending" until an actual application for habeas corpus relief is filed in federal court. The Court reasoned that, because Garceau's federal habeas application was not filed until after AEDPA's effective date, it was subject to AEDPA's amendments. "If, on [the effective date of the AEDPA], the state prisoner had before a federal court an application for habeas relief seeking an adjudication on the merits of the petitioner's claims, then [the AEDPA] does not apply. Otherwise, an application filed after AEDPA's effective date should be reviewed under AEDPA, even if other filings by that same applicant...were presented to a federal court prior to AEDPA's effective date." Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, dissented.


[Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
William Hibbs, an employee of the Nevada Department of Human Resources, sought leave to care for his wife under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to take up to 12 workweeks of unpaid leave annually for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse. The Department granted Hibbs's request for the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave and, after he had exhausted that leave, informed him that he must report to work by a certain date. When Hibbs failed to do so, he was fired. Pursuant to FMLA provisions creating a private right of action "against any employer" that "interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of" FMLA rights, Hibbs sued in Federal District Court, seeking money damages for FMLA violations. The District Court concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred the FMLA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed.


[Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.


[Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Catharina Costa was fired from her job as a heavy equipment operator at Desert Palace Casino. She filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit, charging that the firing was the culmination of discrimination that had occurred during her employment. Jurors during the trial were instructed by the judge to rule for Costa if they determined that sex was a motivating factor in the firing, even if other (legal) factors were present as well. The jury ruled for Costa. Desert Palace appealed, saying that the instructions incorrectly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in the case. A three judge panel from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling for the casino, but a subsequent review of the case by all 11 judges of the 11th Circuit reversed the panel's decision.


[Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that direct evidence is not required. Given that Title VII, on its face, does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence, the Court reasoned that in order to obtain an instruction a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." "Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury," wrote Justice Thomas. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurring opinion.


[Washington State Department of Health and Human Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The State of Washington, through its Department of Social and Health Services, provides foster care to certain children. It also receives and manages Social Security benefits, which it uses to cover its costs, for many of those children. Such beneficiary children filed suit, alleging that the Department's use of their benefits to reimburse itself for the foster care costs violated the "anti-attachment" provision of Title II of the Social Security Act, which protects certain benefits from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process." The trial court enjoined the Department from continuing to charge its foster care costs against Social Security benefits and ordered restitution of previous reimbursement transfers. The Washington Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding that the Department's practices violated the anti-attachment provision.


[Washington State Department of Health and Human Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that the state's use of the Social Security benefits to reimburse itself does not violate the Social Security Act's anti-attachment provision. The Court reasoned that the Department's effort to become a representative payee and its use of Social Security benefits did not amount to employing an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process" within the meaning of the provision. The Court also noted that a ruing adverse to the state could disadvantage children in foster care.


[Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In order to achieve savings on Medicaid purchases above federal cost-saving measures, the "Maine Rx" Program reduces prescription drug prices for state residents. Under the program, Maine attempts negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers. If a company does not enter into a rebate agreement, its Medicaid sales are subjected to a prior authorization procedure that requires state agency approval to qualify a doctor's prescription for reimbursement. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, an association of nonresident drug manufacturers, challenged the program, claiming that it is pre-empted by the Medicaid Act and violates the Commerce Clause. Without resolving any factual issues, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the statute's implementation, concluding that any obstacle to the federal program's administration is sufficient to establish pre-emption. The Court of Appeals reversed.


[Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held, 9-0, that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America had not carried its burden of showing a probability of success on the merits of its Commerce Clause claims and, 6-3, that their showing was insufficient to support a finding that the Medicaid Act pre-empts Maine's Rx Program insofar as it threatens to coerce manufacturers into reducing their prices on non- Medicaid sales. The Court's decision upheld the Court of Appeal's reversal of the District Court's injunction. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented from the plurality's opinion. "By imposing prior authorization on Maine's Medicaid population to achieve wholly non-Medicaid related goals, Maine Rx 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of the federal Medicaid Act," argued Justice O'Connor.


[Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
During an investigation of welfare fraud, the Inyo County Sheriff's office requested personnel files from a casino owned by the Paiute-Shoshone Indian tribe. When the request was denied, the Sheriff's office obtained a warrant to search for the records at the casino. After the search, the tribe sued, claiming that it was a violation of their sovereign immunity. The district court ruled for Inyo County; a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, ruling for the Paiute-Shoshone tribe.


[Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No; the Court did not answer the second question. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, in the situation presented, the Tribe does not qualify as a "person" who may sue under section 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims. The Court reasoned that section 1983 was designed to secure private rights against government encroachment, not to advance a sovereign's prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. Regarding the second question, the Court concluded that whether the Tribe's suit qualifies for federal-court jurisdiction because it arises under some federal law other than section 1983 was an issue that required additional addressing and remanded the question. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.


[Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In an attempt to solve a contract dispute, Lynn and Burt Bazzle filed suit against Green Tree Financial Corporation. After they filed the suit, the Bazzles learned that other Green Tree customers were dealing with the same sort of dispute. As a result, they asked for and received permission to file a class action suit. However, Green Tree contracts had a clause requiring that any contract disputes be settled by an arbitrator. Green Tree asked the court to revoke the class certification because the Federal Arbitration Act, it argued, did not permit class-wide arbitration. Instead, the arbitration would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that, unless specifically banned in the contract, class-wide arbitration could be permitted by the courts.


[Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, delivered an opinion concluding that an arbitrator must determine whether the contracts forbid class arbitration. Justice Breyer reasoned that, because the question of what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to did not concern a state statute or judicial procedure, was well suited to be answered by an arbitrators, and was situated in sweeping language, the matter of contract interpretation should be for an arbitrator, not the courts, to decide. Justice John Paul Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part in order to establish a controlling judgment. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony M. Kennedy, dissented.


[Lawrence v. Texas (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.


[Lawrence v. Texas (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.


[Dole Food Company v. Patrickson (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1997, a group of farm workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who alleged injury from chemical exposure, filed a state-court action against Dole Food Company and others. Subsequently, Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd., or the Dead Sea Companies. Dole successfully removed the action to federal court, arguing that the federal common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction. The District Court rejected the argument that the Dead Sea Companies were instrumentalities of a foreign state, Israel, as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and thus entitled to removal. In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that Dole could not base removal on the federal common law of foreign relations and that the Dead Sea Companies were not instrumentalities of Israel because they did not meet the FSIA's instrumentality definition.


[Dole Food Company v. Patrickson (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held, 7-2, that a foreign state must itself own a majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an instrumentality of the state under the provisions of the FSIA and, 9-0, that instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. The Court reasoned that, as indirect subsidiaries of Israel, the Dead Sea Companies cannot come within the statutory language granting instrumentality status and that only direct ownership satisfies the statutory requirement. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, argued that the language "other ownership interest...owned by a foreign state," covers a foreign state's legal interest in a corporate subsidiary, where that interest consists of the foreign state's ownership of a corporate parent that owns the shares of the subsidiary. As Dole did not seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision, the writ of certiorari in 01-593 was dismissed.


[Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Hurley Henson filed suit in Louisiana state court against Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., asserting various tort claims related to the manufacture and sale of a chlordimeform-based insecticide. When Henson successfully intervened in a similar action, Price v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., in federal district court, the Louisiana court stayed his state court claim. Although the ensuing settlement in Price stipulated that his state-court action be dismissed with prejudice, the Louisiana state court allowed Henson to proceed. Syngenta then removed the action to the federal District Court under the All Writs Act. The District Court dismissed the former state-court action as barred by the Price settlement. Vacating the dismissal, the Court of Appeals wrote that the All Writs Act could not properly support removal of the state-court action.


[Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the All Writs Act does not provide removal jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that, because the general removal statute requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be removed from a state court, the All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred.


[Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
According to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'s standard client agreement, Karen Howsam chose to arbitrate her dispute with the company before the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure section 10304 states that no dispute "shall be eligible for submission...where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute." Dean Witter filed suit, asking the Federal District Court to declare the dispute ineligible for arbitration because it was more than six years old. The court dismissed the action, stating that the NASD arbitrator should interpret and apply the NASD rule. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the rule's application presented a question of the underlying dispute's arbitrability and the presumption is that a court will ordinarily decide an arbitrability question.


[Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-0 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the applicability of the NASD time-limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator. Justice Breyer reasoned that the issue did not raise a substantive question of arbitrability requiring judicial resolution. The NASD's time-limit rule "falls within the class of gateway procedural disputes that do not present what our cases have called 'questions of arbitrability.' And the strong pro-court presumption as to the parties' likely intent does not apply," concluded Justice Breyer. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


[Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
When Ford Motor Company and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. canceled a credit card rebate program that enabled cardholders to accrue and redeem rebates towards the purchase of a new Ford, cardholders filed multiple state-based class actions. Ford and Citibank removed the cases to federal court. The cardholder plaintiffs consolidated their actions, seeking reinstitution of the program. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that each class member was asserting a separate and distinct claim and that the individual claims did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. The appellate court also concluded that premising jurisdiction on the cost of complying with an injunction in favor of a single plaintiff would conflict with the principle of the amount-in-controversy requirement.


[Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley (2002) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.


[Smith v. Doe (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, any sex offender or child kidnaper incarcerated in Alaska must register with the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex offenders. While some of the data is kept confidential, some, such as the offender's name, photograph, and physical description, is published on the Internet. The Act's requirements are retroactive. John Doe I and John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before the Act's passage are thus covered by it. Both brought suit, seeking to declare the Act void as applied to them under the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The District Court ruled against them and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.


[Smith v. Doe (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the act is nonpunitive. The Court reasoned that the act was clearly intended as a civil, non-punitive means of identifying previous offenders for the protection of the public. The Court also found that the stigma, which could result from registration, did not render the act effectively punitive, since the dissemination of the registration information did not constitute the imposition of any significant affirmative disability or restraint. Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the act could only cover those convicted of offenses committed after the effective date of the act without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the act was "ambiguous in intent and punitive in effect" and that its retroactive application was incompatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause.


[Overton v. Bazzetta (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1995, after the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) banned visits to inmates by little brothers and sisters, nieces, nephews and other minors, a group of prisoners sued. They claimed that the ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and that it restricted their First Amendment right to association. The district court agreed, ruling against the ban. On appeal, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling.


[Overton v. Bazzetta (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the MDOC's regulations were valid. The Court reasoned that the fact that the regulations bear a rational relation to legitimate penological interests suffices to sustain them regardless of whether the prisoners have a constitutional right of association that has survived incarceration. The Court also concluded that the visitation restriction for inmates with two substance-abuse violations is not a cruel and unusual confinement condition violating the Eighth Amendment. The Court reasoned that withdrawing visitation privileges for a limited period is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for confinement conditions. Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.


[City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
After the City Council of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio passed an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing complex by the Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, a group of citizens filed a formal petition requesting that the ordinance be repealed or submitted to a popular vote. The voters passed the referendum repealing the ordinance. The Foundation filed suit, claiming that by submitting the site plan to voters, the City violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. After the Ohio Supreme Court declared the referendum invalid under Ohio's Constitution, the District Court granted the City summary judgment. In reversing, the Court of Appeals found that the Foundation had stated a valid Fair Housing Act claim and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City had engaged in arbitrary and irrational government conduct in violation of substantive due process.


[City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals with regard to the Foundation's equal protection and substantive due process claims and vacated the appellate court's Fair Housing Act holding. Noting that the Foundation claimed injury from the referendum petitioning process and not from the referendum itself, the Court reasoned that statements made by private individuals during a citizen-driven petition drive do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.


[Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Larry Hiibel was arrested and convicted in Nevada state court for failing to identify himself to a police officer who was investigating an assault. Nevada, and many other states, has a law that requires a person to tell an officer his name if asked. Hiibel challenged the conviction, claiming it violated his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The state intermediate court and Supreme Court rejected his argument in affirming the conviction.


[Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was based on reasonable suspicion (the police officer was investigating the assault, and Hiibel was nearby) and involved only a minimally intrusive question (his name). It also did not violate the Fifth Amendment because Hiibel never argued that telling the officer his name would actually incriminate him of any crime. Justice Kennedy wrote, "While we recognize petitioner's strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him."


[Illinois v. Lidster (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Police stopped Robert Lidster at a checkpoint set up to find information about a recent hit-and-run accident. Lidster was arrested, and later convicted, for drunk driving. Lidster successfully appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. It relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000) holding that a checkpoint is unconstitutional if its only purpose is to uncover "ordinary criminal wrongdoing." The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.


[Illinois v. Lidster (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held 6-3 that the Illinois checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and was constitutional. It ruled that the checkpoint was reasonable because it advanced a "grave" public interest - "investigating a crime that had resulted in a human death" - and interfered minimally with Fourth Amendment liberty. The Court distinguished Illinois's "information-seeking" checkpoint from the "crime control" checkpoint struck down in Edmond. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg - while agreeing that Edmond does not invalidate the Illinois checkpoint - dissented from the majority's decision granting constitutional approval to the checkpoint. They argued that the case should have been remanded to the Illinois courts.


[Banks v. Dretke (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Delma Banks, Jr. was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas state court in 1980. Sixteen years later Banks learned that one of the witnesses against him, Robert Farr, was a paid informant (a fact not stated during the trial). Charles Cook, another witness against Banks, claimed that he had made up much of his testimony in order to get other criminal charges against him dropped as part of a plea agreement.
In Brady v. Maryland the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process is violated if prosecutors suppress evidence favorable to a defendant that relates to guilt or punishment. Pointing to Brady and evidence the prosecution suppressed information on its ties to the two witnesses, Banks sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to overturn his conviction and get a new trial. The district court granted habeas relief with respect to Banks' death sentence based on the state's failure to disclose Farr's informant status. However the district court refused to reverse the guilt verdict, rejecting Banks' Brady claim relating to Cook's testimony and Banks' argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) allowed the claim to be treated as if it were raised earlier.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision to grant Banks relief as to his death sentence based on his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony. The Court held that Banks first had to press his claims in state court. The Court upheld the district court's rejection of Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings.


[Banks v. Dretke (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to dismiss Banks' claim under Brady relating to Farr's testimony and 9-0 that the Fifth Circuit was wrong to deny Banks' appeal based on Cook's testimony. Banks could make his Brady claim relating to Farr's testimony in federal court without have made the claim in state court because he demonstrated both cause for failing to present evidence in state court and evidence that that failure prejudiced the proceedings against him. The Court held that both the district court and the Fifth Circuit wrongly denied Banks' appeal with regard to his Brady claim on Cook's testimony. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) does apply in this case and requires courts to treat Banks' claim relating to Cook's testimony as if it were raised in earlier proceedings.


[United States v. Lara (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Bureau of Indian Affairs officials arrested Billy Jo Lara on the Spirit Lake Nation Reservation for public intoxication (though Lara is not a member of the reservation). During the arrest Lara attacked an officer.
A tribal court convicted Lara of assault. The federal government then indicted Lara for assaulting a federal officer. Lara moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the federal charges violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeapordy (being charged twice for the same crime). The district court denied Lara's motion. Lara then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his Fifth Amendment motion.
A panel of the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling. However, the Eight Circuit reversed when it reviewed the case en banc (with the full court), ruling that Lara's federal charges violated the double jeapordy clause. The court reasoned that the only source of authority for Spirit Lake Nation to prosecute a nonmember (like Lara) came from the federal Indian Civil Rights Act (1968). Because the federal government delegated this prosecutorial authority to Indian Tribes, charging Lara for the same crime in tribal and federal courts was essentially trying Lara twice under federal authority.


[United States v. Lara (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an opinion written by Justice Stephen G. Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and three other Justices, the Court found that the right to prosecute nonmember Indians is inherent in the sovereignty of Native American tribes. Congress may constitutionally choose to restrict this right, but its choice not to (or its choice to relax earlier-imposed restrictions) is different from a delegation of federal prosecutorial power. Prosecuting a crime under both federal and tribal law, therefore, does not violate the Constitution.


[Republic of Austria v. Altmann (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Maria Altmann learned that the valuable artwork owned by her uncle had been either seized by the Nazi's or taken by Austria after World War II. She sued in American federal court to recover six paintings from the Austrian Gallery. She filed the suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which allows suits against foreign nations in cases involving "rights to property taken in violation of international law." Austria, however, claimed that the FSIA did not apply in this case because the paintings were taken in the 1940s, when the United States embraced a different - and more extensive - idea of immunity that would have barred the suit. Because the Act did not explicitly state that it applied retroactively (that is, to actions taken before it was passed) Austria claimed that it was entitled to this broader definition of immunity.
The district court sided with Altmann, holding that the FSIA applied retroactively. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed.


[Republic of Austria v. Altmann (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that, while the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 does not explicitly state that it should be applied to actions that took place before its passage, there are strong indications in the text of the statute that Congress intended it to apply retroactively. Justice Stevens wrote that, under the Act, immunity "claims are 'henceforth' to be decided by the courts. ... [T]his language suggests Congress intended courts to resolve all such claims 'in conformity with the principles set forth' in the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred."


[Barnhart v. Thomas (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
After a heart attack left her unable to continue working as a housekeeper in the late 1980s, Pauline Thomas took a job as an elevator operator. By the mid- 1990s, however, Thomas's job and others like it were eliminated as elevators became automated. Thomas applied for Social Security disability benefits because she could not do other work. The Social Security Administration (SSA), however, rejected her claim because, it said, she was still able to perform the duties of her former position. The fact that it was nearly impossible to find such a position, the SSA held, did not entitle her to benefits under disability law. An administrative judge and a federal district court both upheld the SSA's position, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "a claimant's previous work must be substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."


[Barnhart v. Thomas (2003) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SSA's decision had been a reasonable interpretation of the statute and was therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. Justice Scalia wrote, "The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether an agency construction can give rise to undesirable results... but whether... the agency construction is reasonable. Here, the SSA's authoritative decision satisfies that test."


[Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 2001, President Bush announced that he planned to lift a temporary ban on Mexican trucking companies in the United States once new regulations were prepared by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to regulate safety inspections and applications to transport materials. Congress specified certain standards that those regulations would have to meet before it would appropriate money to register the new carriers.
When the FMCSA formulated its regulations, it performed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to examine their effects on the environment. Under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), federal agencies must perform an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of policies that are likely to have significant environmental effects. If an agency feels that its policies will not have significant effects, however, it may perform a more limited Environmental Assessment (EA) - which is what FMCSA chose to do. Public Citizen, a watchdog group that monitors government actions, challenged this decision in federal court. It argued that, because FMCSA knew that a large number of Mexican trucks would be admitted into the United States once it issued its regulations, it should have considered the environmental impact of the increased number of trucks in addition to the more limited impact of the safety inspections. The impact of the trucks would have been significant enough to warrant an EIS, so Public Citizen argued that FMCSA had violated NEPA by not conducting the more stringent study. The district court side with the FMCSA, holding that, while the passage of the regulations was necessary before the trucks could be admitted, the FMCSA nevertheless did not have control of those trucks and therefore did not have to account for them in its Environmental Assessment; a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.


[Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that the FMCSA had no control of the trucks once the regulations were passed, and would therefore be unable to act on the findings of an EIS even if it did conduct one. Further, the Court found that the passage of the regulations was not sufficiently responsible for the increased pollution caused by the trucks to warrant an EIS.


[Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In January 2001, President Bush created an advisory committee on energy policy headed by Vice President Dick Cheney. After the group issued its recommendations five months later, Judicial Watch, a non-profit government watchdog group, filed suit in federal district court. The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, later filed a nearly identical suit that was joined with the Judicial Watch suit. The two organizations alleged that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that it had generated. While FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal officials, Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in the energy committee's meetings.
Cheney and the advisory group asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that it violated the Constitutional separation of powers by requiring judicial oversight of internal executive branch deliberations. The district court refused.
The government then sought summary judgment of the case (without the discovery process) based on a few administrative documents that it claimed showed that only federal officials had worked on the group. The district court denied this request as well, and the government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The appeals court refused to grant summary judgment, arguing that it could not yet rule on the separation of powers argument. The government then appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court sent the case back to the D.C. Court of Appeals, arguing that the appellate court should have considered separation-of-powers claims and was wrong to conclude it lacked authority to order District Court discovery to stop. Such an order (mandamus) to stop discovery proceedings should be considered because those proceedings, "by virtue of their overbreadth," could interfere with presidential activity. Further, the appellate court misinterpreted U.S. v. Nixon to mean that the government needed to assert executive privilege for separation-of-powers objections to be considered.


[Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) filed a complaint against Intel with the European Commission, alleging that Intel was using its size to unfairly dominate the computer microprocessor market. Complaints filed with the European Commission are first reviewed by the commission's directorate general, which does fact-finding to decide whether or not to pursue the complaint. AMD asked the directorate to review documents containing some of Intel's trade secrets from a separate American court case involving Intel. The directorate declined.
Because European law did not provide a way for AMD to gain access to the documents, AMD filed suit against Intel in United States federal district court seeking access to the documents so that it could use them to support its complaint. The suit was filed under Title 28, Section 1782 of U.S. Code, which allows (but does not require) federal district courts to give "interested persons" access to material for proceedings before "foreign or international tribunal(s)." AMD argued that, though the directorate was only a fact-finding body, the case could eventually be appealed to a trial court and was therefore covered under section 1782. Further, it argued that the directorate's unwillingness to demand the documents was irrelevant. Intel, on the other hand, argued that the directorate was not a "foreign or international tribunal" and that the federal district court therefore did not have the authority to compel Intel to release the documents. It also argued that the directorate's unwillingness to compel production of the documents should preclude U.S. action.
The district court sided with Intel, ruling that the directorate's investigation was not a foreign tribunal and that the court therefore could not give AMD access to the documents. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed the decision. After the case was accepted for review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Commission filed a brief in the case supporting Intel's position that the directorate was not a foreign tribunal.


[Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and Yes. In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court ruled that just because a foreign tribunal was unwilling to demand certain documents did not mean that it would be unwilling to accept them if provided to them by other means. By permitting, but not forcing, American judges to allow discovery of certain documents, Congress allowed judges to exercise their discretion to decide whether a foreign tribunal would be receptive to the the documents at question. The Court also ruled that it would be impractical to limit the fact-finding to only the actual trial before a foreign tribunal because, in cases like this one, the foreign tribunal does not gather evidence itself but instead relies on the evidence presented to the investigatory commission (in this case the directorate general). In order to make the evidence available for the tribunal, therefore, it would be necessary to present it first to the commission.


[Tennard v. Dretke (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Robert Tennard was convicted of murder. During the sentencing phase, he presented evidence that he had an IQ of 67. The instructions given to the jury by the judge when it was considering whether to apply the death penalty, however, did not account for this - they instructed they jury to determine whether the crime was committed deliberately and whether Tennard posed a future risk. Under Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, those instructions are not enough to allow the jury to weigh a defendant's mental retardation in his favor. After he was sentenced to death, Tennard filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, claiming that the sentence, given the shortcomings of the jury instructions, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The district court rejected the petition. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Tennard had no shown that his mental retardation was constitutionally relevant. To be constitutionally relevant, Tennard's retardation would have had to be responsible for his crime, and Tennard had not shown that this was the case.
After the Supreme Court decided, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, that executing the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered its holding. It affirmed the decision on the grounds that execution was only unconstitutional if the defendant could show that his mental retardation had actually caused the crime; being mentally retarded in and of itself did not exempt someone from the death penalty.


[Tennard v. Dretke (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In a fairly narrow ruling 6-to-3 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that Tennard's mental retardation could reasonably be understood as relevant to his crime. Especially given the fact that the prosecutor emphasized Tennard's retardation when discussing the likelihood that he would be dangerous in the future, the Court found that the jury instructions did not sufficiently permit the jury to weigh Tennard's mental retardation in his favor.


[Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Michael Newdow's daughter attended public school in the Elk Grove Unified School District in California. Elk Grove teachers began school days by leading students in a voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, including the words "under God" added by a 1954 Congressional act. Newdow sued in federal district court in California, arguing that making students listen - even if they choose not to participate - to the words "under God" violates the establishment clause of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment.
The district court dismissed Newdow's complaint for lack of standing, because he and the mother of his daughter are divorced and he does not have custody. The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Newdow did have standing "to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious education of his daughter." The Ninth Circuit ruled that Congress's 1954 act adding the words "under God" to the Pledge and the school district policy requiring it be recited both violated the First Amendment's establishment clause.


[Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Supreme Court found that Newdow did not have standing to bring suit because he did not have sufficient custody over his daughter. "When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law," Justice Stevens wrote. Because it found that Newdow did not have standing, the Court failed to reach the constitutional question. Chief Justice Renquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence Thomas all wrote seperate concurrences, saying that requiring teachers to lead the Pledge is constitutional.


[Frew v. Hawkins (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In 1996, Linda Frew and other citizens settled a class-action lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. Settlement was reached through a consent decree, in which the parties make an agreement that is subject to court supervision. As part of this consent decree, Texas was supposed to improve health care for poor children to comply with a federally mandated program called Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment. Two years later, Frew and others remained unsatisfied that Texas was complying with the federal requirements, and asked the court to force Texas to create a plan for how it would improve health care. Texas refused, however, claiming that it was immune from the court order under the 11th Amendment, which provides for state sovereignty. Texas argued that because no federal rights had been violated, suit could not be brought in federal court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Texas.


[Frew v. Hawkins (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that enforcement of the consent decree does not violate the 11th Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that a federal court cannot enforce a consent decree unless it finds a violation of federal law. "The decree here is a federal court order that springs from a federal dispute and furthers the objectives of federal law," Justice Kennedy wrote.


[Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Thomas Heinz worked as a construction worker for 20 years, then retired. Upon retirement, he began to receive pension payments from the Central Laborers' Pension Plan. He continued to receive the pension after he took another job as a supervisor in the construction industry. The pension plan had a list of occupations that a recipient could not work in while receiving pension payments, but construction supervisors were not included. After two years, however, Central Laborers' Pension amended the list of prohibited professions to include construction supervisors. As a result, Heinz stopped receiving his pension payment. He and Richard Schmitt, a friend who was in the same situation, filed suit in federal district court. They claimed that the amendment, because it was passed after they had already started receiving the benefits, violated the "anti-cutback" provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. ERISA states that amendments to a pension plan may not decrease the "accrued benefit of a participant." Because the amendment barred them from receiving payments that they were otherwise eligible for, Heinz and Schmitt claimed that it had reduced their "accrued benefit." Central Laborers' Pension, however, argued that the men were still eligible to receive the same pension, they just could not receive it while working as construction supervisors. Because the value of the plan itself had not been changed, only the stipulations for receiving it, the pension plan managers argued that the amendment did not violate ERISA.
The federal district court sided with the pension plan. A divided Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel, however, reversed the decision, writing that "an amendment placing materially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit 'reduces' the benefit just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit payment."


[Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court unanimously held that the amendment to the plan had narrowed Heinz's rights to the benefits promised him at the time he retired, and that such a narrowing violated ERISA. Justice David H. Souter, in the Opinion of the Court, wrote, "'[A] participant's benefits cannot be understood without reference to the conditions imposed on receiving those benefits.' ... We simply do not see how, in any practical sense, this change of terms could not be viewed as shrinking the value of Heinz's pension rights and reducing his promised benefits."


[Lamie v. United States Trustee (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Congress created a list of people that corporations could pay while going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy attorney for the corporation was not included in that list. John Lamie, a bankruptcy attorney, challenged the law, arguing that the omission of bankruptcy attorneys from the list was accidental. The bankruptcy court that heard the case ruled that the omission was not inadvertent. Nevertheless, it awarded Lamie the fees in question because money intended to pay them had been set aside in a retainer before the corporation entered Chapter 7 proceedings. A Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision to pay Lamie, holding that the retainer was not separate from the corporation's other funds. On the issue of whether the omission of the bankruptcy attorney from the list of acceptable payees, the panel affirmed the lower court's decision.


[Lamie v. United States Trustee (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the Fourth Circuit, ruling that the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 did not authorize the payment of bankruptcy attorneys by corporations going through Chapter 7 bankruptcy. According to Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion for the Court: "The statute is awkward, and even ungrammatical; but that does not make it ambiguous on the point at issue." The Court ruled that though the Act's deletion of the words "or to the debtor's attorney" from the Bankruptcy Code had rendered a sentence grammatically incorrect, the Act should still be interpreted according to the plain meaning of its text, however awkward. The Court found the legislative history of the Act inconclusive, and concluded that "we must determine intent from the statute before us." The text of the statute, erroneously or not, omitted bankruptcy attorneys from the list of people bankrupt corporations could pay. r


[City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Littleton required adult businesses to apply for a permit to operate from the city. If the city denied the license, the business could appeal to a state district court under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Z.J. Gifts, an adult bookstore, wanted to operate in a place not zoned for adult businesses. Rather than apply for a license, they challenged the licensing law itself as unconstitutional, claiming that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provide merely for prompt judicial review of city denial, not for a prompt judicial decision. Because stores denied a license cannot operate until the court has made its decision, they could potentially be forced to wait indefinitely for a license based solely on the content of the material they intend to sell. This, Z.J. argued, violated the Supreme Court's holding in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, that censorship laws must provide for "prompt judicial determination."
The federal district court sided with Littleton. A Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed.


[City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In an opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that Colorado did not have to explicitly provide for a "prompt judicial determination" to make the law constitutional. As long as Colorado courts did not unnecessarily delay such claims, the normal judicial review process could be expected to provide a decision quickly enough to satisfy the constitutional demands. If the courts failed to make a prompt decision in a specific case, the business in that particular case could sue, but the absence of explicit "prompt judicial determination" language in the statute did not make it unconstitutional.


[Locke v. Davey (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
The Washington State Promise Scholarship, created by the state legislature in 1999, gives college scholarship money to talented students. However, this money cannot be used to obtain a degree in theology if the program is taught to cause belief. Washington's constitution prohibits funding religious instruction. The 1969 state code applied this ban to college financial aid.
Joshua Davey forfeited his Promise Scholarship money in order to major in pastoral ministries at a private Christian college. Davey filed suit in U.S. district court, claiming the state constitution's ban on funding religious instruction violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion (in the U.S. Constitution). The district court rejected Davey's claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding Davey's free exercise rights were violated.


[Locke v. Davey (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court ruled that a state does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause when it funds secular college majors but excludes devotional theology majors. The Court rejected Davey's argument that the state scholarship program is unconstitutional because it is not neutral toward religion. "The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction," the Court wrote. Similarly the Washington Constitution - which explicitly prohibits state money from going to religious instruction - does not violate the free exercise clause. Unlike laws and programs the Court has struck down under the free exercise clause, nothing in either the scholarship program or the state constitution "suggests animus towards religion." States have a "historic and substantial interest" in excluding religious activity from public funding.


[Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Nancy Drew Suders quit her job as a dispatcher for the Pennsylvania State Police in August 1998. She claimed that she had been sexually harassed by her supervisors since she got the job in March of that year, and that she had finally decided to quit after she was accused of theft, handcuffed, photographed and questioned. Two days before quitting, she had contacted the state police equal opportunity officer about the harassment, but did not file a report because, Suders claimed, the woman was unhelpful and unsympathetic.
Suders then filed suit in federal district court, charging that the harassment had forced her to quit. The district court judge, however, granted summary judgment to the state police before the case went to trial. He found that Suders had failed to use the internal procedures set up by the state police to deal with sexual harassment, and that she therefore could not bring suit unless the police had taken a "tangible employment action" that substantially changed her employment status. On appeal, a Third Circuit Court of Appeals panel overturned the district judge's decision, ruling that the harassment had been so bad that Suders had no choice but to quit. While the police had not fired Suders, they had been directly responsible for her resignation and therefore could not use her failure to file a report as a defense.


[Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court ruled that an employee faced with a situation in which a "reasonable person ... would have felt compelled to resign" could bring suit even if she had not filed a report with the employer before resigning. Her employer, however, could use her failure to file a report, along with evidence of the safeguards it had in place to prevent harassment, in its defense. If it could prove that she had not attempted to prevent the harassment, and that the safeguards in place would have prevented it if she had, the employer would not be liable.


[Tennessee v. Lane (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
George Lane and Beverly Jones were disabled and could not access upper floors in Tennessee state courthouses. Lane, Jones, and several others sued Tennessee in federal district court, alleging that by denying them public services based on their disabilities, Tennessee was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). According to Title II, no person may be denied access to "services, programs, or activities" on the basis of his disability. The act allows alleged victims of discrimination to sue states for damages.
Tennessee asked that the case be dismissed, claiming that it was barred by the 11th Amendment's prohibition of suits against states in federal courts (the sovereign immunity doctrine). The state cited Alabama v. Garrett (2001), in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Congress had acted unconstitutionally in granting citizens the right to sue states for disability discrimination (such as the denial of employment) under the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause. In that case the Supreme Court reasoned that Congress did not have enough evidence of disability discrimination by states to justify the waiver of sovereign immunity.
The district court rejected the state's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The courts reasoned that because Title II of the ADA dealt with the Due process Clause of the 14th Amendment, not the equal protection clause, the ruling in Garrett did not apply. The court found that while Congress may not have had enough evidence of disability discrimination to waive sovereign immunity for equal protection claims, it did have enough evidence of Due Process violations (such as non-handicap-accessible courthouses) to waive the sovereign immunity doctrine for Due Process claims.


[Tennessee v. Lane (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that Congress had sufficiently demonstrated the problems faced by disabled persons who sought to exercise fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (such as access to a court). The Court also emphasized that the remedies required from the states were not unreasonable - they just had to make reasonable accommodations to allow disabled persons to exercise their fundamental rights. Because Title II was a "reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end," and because Congress had the authority under the 14th Amendment to regulate the actions of the states to accomplish that end, the law was constitutional.


[Pliler v. Ford (2004) — Rehnquist Court (1994-2005) — Facts]
Richard Ford filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court five days before the one-year statute of limitations for his appeal ended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). He represented himself, and his petition contained some claims that had been decided on by state courts and others that had not. The judge informed him that he could not hear the claims that had not been heard by state courts, and that Ford had several options: the judge could dismiss all the claims, allowing Ford to re-file them after he had presented the unheard claims to a state court, or he could dismiss the unheard claims, but delay proceedings on the other ones so that Ford could re-add the unheard ones after they had been heard. Ford chose the first option, but when he tried to re-file the claims after they were rejected by a state court, the judge refused to let him file them because the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations had ended. Ford appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision, finding that the judge could have heard the claims if Ford had chosen the second option and that he should have warned Ford that the statute of limitations would likely end before he could re-file the claims under the first option.