[Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson () — Taft Court (1925-1930) — Facts]
In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court.


[Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson () — Taft Court (1925-1930) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint and hence was invalid under the First Amendment. (The majority used the incorporation doctrine to apply the rights granted under the Bill of Rights to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.) The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government might be able to justify a prior restraint.
Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented in an opinion written by Justice Butler.


[Powell v. Alabama () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Facts]
Nine black youths -- described as, "young, ignorant, and illiterate" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.


[Powell v. Alabama () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that the trials denied due process because the defendants were not given reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel in their defense. Though Justice George Sutherland did not rest the Court holding on the right-to-counsel guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, he repeatedly implicated that guarantee. This case was an early example of national constitutional protection in the field of criminal justice.


[A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Facts]
Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine.


[A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Hughes, the unanimous Court held that the Act was "without precedent" and was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The President cannot be allowed to have unbridled control to make whatever laws he believes to be necessary to achieve a certain goal. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity, meaning Congress failed to provide the necessary guidelines for the implementation of this functionally legislative process.
Justice Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Stone.


[United States v. Butler () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Facts]
In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor.


[United States v. Butler () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Conclusion]
In an opinion written by Justice Roberts, the majority declared the Act unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate and control agricultural production, an arena reserved to the states. Congress’ Spending Power (Article I, Section 8) is restricted to situations in which it is being used for the general welfare of the people. Agricultural production historically lies beyond the authority of the federal government to regulate. Although Congress does have the power to tax and appropriate funds, in this case those activities were "but means to an unconstitutional end.” That is, Congress was using the spending power as an enforcement mechanism to control activity that was completely within the authority of the states. Thus, the Act violated the Constitution.
Justice Stone wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo.


[United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Facts]
The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a weapons manufacturer, sold fighter planes and bombers to Bolivia during the Chaco War, during which Paraguay and Bolivia contested control of a semi-arid region. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which banned U.S. weapons manufacturers from aiding either side of the war. Challenging its indictment, Curtiss-Wright argued that Congress had violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the executive branch to make decisions that were properly left to the legislature.


[United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Conclusion]
In an opinion written by Justice Sutherland, the majority upheld the Joint Resolution. The Court reasoned that the federal government could not exceed its enumerated powers regarding internal issues but had a much broader scope of discretion in foreign affairs. Because "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation," Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external matters which would not be afforded domestically. Roosevelt thus had the discretion to determine what impact a certain policy might have on foreign affairs and make decisions accordingly, even had Congress not authorized him.
Justice McReynolds authored a dissenting opinion.


[West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Facts]
Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1923), in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women.


[West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision written by Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the Court held that the establishment of minimum wages for women was constitutional. Echoing Muller v. Oregon (1908), the majority ruled that the state may use its police power to restrict the individual freedom to contract. The decision overruled Adkins and marked the Court's departure from the expansive view of the freedom to contract. The decision is generally regarded as having ended the Lochner era, a period in American legal history in which the Supreme Court tended to invalidate legislation aimed at regulating business.
While Justice Hughes wrote the opinion, the stark doctrinal shift resulted from Justice Owen Josephus Roberts changing his perspective on this issue. According to Hughes, President Franklin Roosevelt's reelection in 1936 and the impressive achievements of the New Deal caused Roberts to abandon his affiliation with the Court's conservative justices.
In dissent, Justice George Sutherland implicitly criticized Roberts for changing sides and argued that politics and public opinion should not impact the Court’s understanding of the Constitution.


[National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Facts]
With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country’s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members.


[National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation () — Hughes Court (1932-1937) — Conclusion]
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, the majority found that companies cannot discriminate against employees for exercising their fundamental right to unionize. The Court upheld the Act, reasoning that it was narrowly constructed so as to regulate industrial activities which had the potential to restrict interstate commerce. The majority stated that any significant effect (direct or indirect) on interstate commerce allows Congress to regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause. While the manufacturing process or relationships between labor and management may not have a direct impact on the flow of goods, they have an aggregate impact on commerce. In this case, the potential secession of manufacturing activity due to conflicts between management and labor could potentially impede interstate commerce. However, Hughes carefully limited the opinion to exclude situations in which an activity had such an inconsequential or remote impact on interstate commerce that it exclusively impacted local matters.
In dissent, Justice McReynolds questioned Congress's enhanced power under the Commerce Clause.


[Palko v. Connecticut () — Hughes Court (1937-1938) — Facts]
Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.


[Palko v. Connecticut () — Hughes Court (1937-1938) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court upheld Palko's second conviction. In his majority opinion, Cardozo formulated principles that were to direct the Court's actions for the next three decades. He noted that some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right. Palko died in Connecticut's electric chair on April 12, 1938.
In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Court expressly overruled its decision in Palko.


[United States v. Miller () — Hughes Court (1939) — Facts]
An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.


[United States v. Miller () — Hughes Court (1939) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual the right to keep and bear a sawed-off double-barrel shotgun. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds reasoned that because possessing a sawed-off double barrel shotgun does not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of such an instrument.


[Cantwell v. Connecticut () — Hughes Court (1940-1941) — Facts]
Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace.


[Cantwell v. Connecticut () — Hughes Court (1940-1941) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells’ actions were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.


[Minersville School District v. Gobitis () — Hughes Court (1940-1941) — Facts]
In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights.


[Minersville School District v. Gobitis () — Hughes Court (1940-1941) — Conclusion]
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court upheld the mandatory flag salute. Writing for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter he relied primarily on the "secular regulation" rule, which weighs the secular purpose of a nonreligious government regulation against the religious practice it makes illegal or otherwise burdens the exercise of religion. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values," and that national unity was "the basis of national security." Frankfurter wrote that the school district's interest in creating national unity was enough to allow them to require students to salute the flag.
The Court declined to make itself “the school board for the country.”
Justice Harlan Stone dissented, writing that the “very essence of the liberty” guaranteed by the Constitution “is the freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall think and what he shall say.” Stone’s position soon became the majority; the decision was reversed in 1943 in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette


[United States v. Darby () — Hughes Court (1940-1941) — Facts]
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause.


[United States v. Darby () — Hughes Court (1940-1941) — Conclusion]
The unanimous Court upheld the FLSA. Relying heavily on the Court's decision in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), Justice Stone affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, which "can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power." The Court held that the purpose of the FLSA was to prevent states from using substandard labor practices to their own economic advantage by interstate commerce. Congress acted with proper authority in outlawing substandard labor conditions since they have a significant impact on interstate commerce.


[Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire () — Stone Court (1941-1942) — Facts]
On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague.


[Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire () — Stone Court (1941-1942) — Conclusion]
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction. The Court identified certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and "fighting words." He found that Chaplinsky's insults were “fighting words” since they caused a direct harm to their target and could be construed to advocate an immediate breach of the peace. Thus, they lacked the social value of disseminating ideas to the public that lay behind the rights granted by the First Amendment. A state can use its police power, the Court reasoned, to curb their expression in the interests of maintaining order and morality.


[Betts v. Brady () — Stone Court (1941-1942) — Facts]
Betts was indicted for robbery in Maryland. He was unable to afford counsel and requested one be appointed for him. The judge in the case denied the request, and Betts subsequently pled not guilty. He was convicted of robbery, which he eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued he was wrongfully denied his right to counsel.


[Betts v. Brady () — Stone Court (1941-1942) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice Owen Roberts, the majority ruled Betts did not have a constitutional right to counsel. The Court reasoned that while the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits an unfair trial, the amendment does not embody “an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” The majority opinion concluded that indigent defendants need only be provided with a lawyer under special circumstances.
Justice Black dissented, arguing that denial of counsel based on financial stability makes it so that those in poverty have an increased chance of conviction, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
This decision was overruled in 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright.


[Wickard v. Filburn () — Stone Court (1941-1942) — Facts]
Filburn was a small farmer in Ohio who harvested nearly 12 acres of wheat above his allotment under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Filburn was penalized under the Act. He argued that the extra wheat that he had produced in violation of the law had been used for his own use and thus had no effect on interstate commerce, since it never had been on the market. In his view, this meant that he had not violated the law because the additional wheat was not subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.


[Wickard v. Filburn () — Stone Court (1941-1942) — Conclusion]
A unanimous Court upheld the law. In an opinion authored by Justice Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate prices in the industry, and this law was rationally related to that legitimate goal. The Court reasoned that Congress could regulate activity within a single state under the Commerce Clause, even if each individual activity had a trivial effect on interstate commerce, as long as the intrastate activity viewed in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. To this extent, the opinion went against prior decisions that had analyzed whether an activity was local, or whether its effects were direct or indirect.


[West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette () — Stone Court (1943-1945) — Facts]
In 1942, the West Virginia Board of Education required public schools to include salutes to the flag by teachers and students as a mandatory part of school activities. The children in a family of Jehovah's Witnesses refused to perform the salute and were sent home from school for non-compliance. They were also threatened with reform schools used for criminally active children, and their parents faced prosecutions for causing juvenile delinquency.


[West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette () — Stone Court (1943-1945) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. In an opinion written by Robert Houghwout Jackson, the Court found that the First Amendment cannot enforce a unanimity of opinion on any topic, and national symbols like the flag should not receive a level of deference that trumps constitutional protections. He argued that curtailing or eliminating dissent was an improper and ineffective way of generating unity.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred to repudiate their earlier opinions in First Amendment decisions.
Justice Frankfurter dissented. He believed the Court was exceeding the scope of the judicial role and was taking on a legislative function in striking down the law.


[Yakus v. United States () — Stone Court (1943-1945) — Facts]
In 1942, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act to control commodity prices and prevent inflation during wartime. This case is the consolidation of two cases in which the defendants were tried and convicted in district court on several counts of selling wholesale cuts of beef at prices above the maximum prices set by the Revised Maximum Price Regulation under the Act. During the trial, the district court overruled all motions regarding the validity of the Regulation and the Act, including questions of whether the Act deprived the defendants of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions.


[Yakus v. United States () — Stone Court (1943-1945) — Conclusion]
No, yes. Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that Congress sufficiently regulated the powers of the Administrator of the Act in such a way as to be a constitutional delegation of legislative power to obtain a particular objective. The Constitution grants Congress the necessary flexibility to perform its legislative function in a variety of ways. Because the regulations and standards are specific enough to ensure that the enforcement of the Act is conforming to the congressional intent behind it, it is constitutional. The Court also held that, because the Act establishes a procedure for redress for those who feel they have been wronged by the Act, it does not violate due process.
Justice Owen J. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Administrator of the Act. Because the standards set by the Act leave many decisions up to the judgment of the Administrator, they cannot be sufficiently overseen by Congress. He also argued that the standard for review of the regulations relies too heavily on the Administrator to be impartial, as it is the Administrator who sets the regulations in the first place. In his dissent, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge argued that the way in which Congress conferred jurisdiction over the Act onto state and federal courts while creating a separate system for the redress of wrongs was unconstitutional. He wrote that Congress cannot require a court to enforce regulations without allowing the court to consider their constitutional validity. Such a piecemeal approach to due process denies the defendants their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Justice Frank Murphy joined in the dissenting opinion.


[Korematsu v. United States () — Stone Court (1943-1945) — Facts]
In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, the U.S. government decided to require Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps as a matter of national security. President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 in February 1942, two months after Pearl Harbor. A Japanese-American man living in San Leandro, Fred Korematsu, chose to stay at his residence rather than obey the order to relocate. Korematsu was arrested and convicted of violating the order. He responded by arguing that Executive Order 9066 violated the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed Korematsu's conviction.


[Korematsu v. United States () — Stone Court (1943-1945) — Conclusion]
In an opinion written by Justice Black, the Court ruled that the evacuation order violated by Korematsu was valid. The majority found that the Executive Order did not show racial prejudice but rather responded to the strategic imperative of keeping the U.S. and particularly the West Coast (the region nearest Japan) secure from invasion. The Court relied heavily on a 1943 decision, Hirabayashi v. U.S., which addressed similar issues. Black argued that the validation of the military's decision by Congress merited even more deference.
Justice Frankfurter concurred, writing that the “martial necessity arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage” warranted the military’s evacuation order.
Justice Jackson dissented, arguing that the exclusion order legitimized racism that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Facts]
A New Jersey law authorized reimbursement by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools. 96% of the private schools who benefitted from this law were parochial Catholic schools. Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit alleging that this indirect aid to religion violated both the New Jersey state constitution and the First Amendment. After losing in state courts, Everson appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on purely federal constitutional grounds.


[Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Conclusion]
A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. Justice Black reasoned that the law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in anyway. It was rather enacted to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton dissented.


[Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Facts]
The case tested the principle of "released time", where public schools set aside class time for religious instruction. The Champaign County Board of Education authorized a program in which outside religious teachers hired by private third parties provided weekly religious instruction in public schools. The classes were not mandatory. McCollum, an atheist, complained that her son was ostracized for not attending the classes. McCollum eventually sued the school board in 1945, arguing that the religious instruction in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Conclusion]
In an opinion written by Justice Black, the majority held that program violated the Establishment Clause. The Court reasoned that the use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between the school authorities and the religious council violated the constitutionally-required separation of church and state. Because pupils were required to attend school and were released in part from this legal duty if they attended the religious classes, the Court found that the Champaign system was "beyond question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups and to spread the faith."
In his lone dissent, Justice Stanley Forman Reed objected to the majority’s broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause.


[Shelley v. Kraemer () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Facts]
In 1911, a St. Louis, Missouri neighborhood enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans from living in the area. In 1945, an African-American family (the Shelleys) moved into the neighborhood. Louis Kraemer brought suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house. A similar lawsuit arose in Detroit, Michigan. Both state supreme courts enforced the covenants because they were private rather than state action. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal.


[Shelley v. Kraemer () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Fred Vinson, the Court held that standing alone, racially restrictive covenants do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Private parties may abide by the terms of such a covenant, but they may not seek judicial enforcement of such a covenant, as that would be a state action. Thus, the enforcements of the racially restrictive covenants in state court violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Wolf v. Colorado () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Facts]
Julius A. Wolf, Charles H. Fulton, and Betty Fulton were charged with conspiracy to perform an abortion. At trial, Wolf objected to evidence material and admissible as to his co-defendants would be inadmissible if he were tried separately. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld all three convictions in which evidence was admitted that would have been inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a federal court.


[Wolf v. Colorado () — Vinson Court (1946-1949) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the states to specific limitations and that illegally obtained evidence did not have to be excluded from trials in all cases. The Court reasoned that while the exclusion of evidence may have been an effective way to deter unreasonable searches, other methods could be equally effective and would not fall below the minimal standards assured by the Due Process Clause. Civil remedies, such as "the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes of an alert public opinion," were sufficient.


[Sweatt v. Painter () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Facts]
In 1946, Heman Marion Sweatt, a black man, applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. State law restricted access to the university to blacks, and Sweatt's application was automatically rejected because of his race. When Sweatt asked the state courts to order his admission, the university attempted to provide separate but equal facilities for black law students.


[Sweatt v. Painter () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required that Sweatt be admitted to the university. The Court found that the "law school for Negroes," which was to have opened in 1947, would have been grossly unequal to the University of Texas Law School. The Court argued that the separate school would be inferior in a number of areas, including faculty, course variety, library facilities, legal writing opportunities, and overall prestige. The Court also found that the mere separation from the majority of law students harmed students' abilities to compete in the legal arena.


[Dennis v. United States () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Facts]
In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or destruction of the United States government. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights. Party leaders were found guilty and lower courts upheld the conviction.


[Dennis v. United States () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently" violate the First Amendment. In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech.
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in separate opinions.
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in separate opinions. Justice Black stressed that the petitioners were not charged with an attempt to overthrow the Government or any overt acts designed to overthrow the Government. They were not even charged with saying anything or writing anything designed to overthrow the Government. The charge was that they agreed to assemble and to talk and publish certain ideas at a later date. “No matter how it is worded, this is a virulent form of prior censorship of speech and press, which I believe the First Amendment forbids.”


[Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Facts]
In April of 1952, during the Korean War, President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike by the United Steelworkers of America.


[Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the President to take possession of private property. The Court also held that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."


[Hernandez v. Texas () — Warren Court (1953-1954) — Facts]
Pete Hernandez, an agricultural worker, was indicted for the murder of Joe Espinoza by an all-Anglo (white) grand jury in Jackson County, Texas. Claiming that Mexican-Americans were barred from the jury commission that selected juries, and from petit juries, Hernandez' attorneys tried to quash the indictment. Moreover, Hernandez tried to quash the petit jury panel called for service, because persons of Mexican descent were excluded from jury service in this case. A Mexican-American had not served on a jury in Jackson County in over 25 years and thus, Hernandez claimed that Mexican ancestry citizens were discriminated against as a special class in Jackson County. The trial court denied the motions. Hernandez was found guilty of murder and sentenced by the all-Anglo jury to life in prison. In affirming, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that "Mexicans are...members of and within the classification of the white race as distinguished from members of the Negro Race" and rejected the petitioners' argument that they were a "special class" under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the court pointed out that "so far as we are advised, no member of the Mexican nationality" challenged this classification as white or Caucasian.


[Hernandez v. Texas () — Warren Court (1953-1954) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects those beyond the two classes of white or Negro, and extends to other racial groups in communities depending upon whether it can be factually established that such a group exists within a community. In reversing, the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment "is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'" but in this case covers those of Mexican ancestry. This was established by the fact that the distinction between whites and Mexican ancestry individuals was made clear at the Jackson County Courthouse itself where "there were two men's toilets, one unmarked, and the other marked 'Colored Men and 'Hombres Aqui' ('Men Here')," and by the fact that no Mexican ancestry person had served on a jury in 25 years. Mexican Americans were a "special class" entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Abstract submitted by Professor Marc S. Rodriguez


[Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1) () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Facts]
This case was the consolidation of cases arising in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington D.C. relating to the segregation of public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American students had been denied admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race. They argued that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were denied relief in the lower courts based on Plessy v. Ferguson, which held that racially segregated public facilities were legal so long as the facilities for blacks and whites were equal. (This was known as the “separate but equal” doctrine.)


[Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1) () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Conclusion]
Separate but equal educational facilities for racial minorities is inherently unequal, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that the segregation of public education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the education and personal growth of African American children. Warren based much of his opinion on information from social science studies rather than court precedent. The decision also used language that was relatively accessible to non-lawyers because Warren felt it was necessary for all Americans to understand its logic.


[Bolling v. Sharpe () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Facts]
The D.C. Board of Education denied a petition by a group of parents in Anacostia to racially integrate John Phillip Sousa Junior High School. The following year, in 1950, the parents sought admission to the all-white school for 11 African-American children. When the request was again denied by the Board, a Howard University law professor brought a lawsuit. The claim was dismissed by the trial court.


[Bolling v. Sharpe () — Vinson Court (1949-1953) — Conclusion]
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" protected by due process also guaranteed racial equality in public education in the District of Columbia.
In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court found that racial discrimination in the public schools of Washington, DC, denied blacks due process of law as protected by the Fifth Amendment. Noting the legal peculiarities of DC, Justice Warren recognized that the Fifth Amendment (which applied to the District) did not contain an Equal Protection Clause, while the Fourteenth Amendment. Lacking an equal protection standard to invalidate the District's segregation, Warren creatively relied on the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of "liberty" to find the segregation of the Washington, DC, schools unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court decided this case on the same day as Brown v. Board of Education, which overshadowed it. Its most important legacy is the concept of reverse incorporation and the application of the same anti-discrimination principles to state and federal governments.


[Thornburgh v. Abbott (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Jack Abbott and other prisoners were denied access to publications that Richard Thornburgh, the U.S. Attorney General at the time, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP) deemed to be detrimental to penological interests. FBP regulations allow publications that may pose a threat to the security and discipline of prisons or that promote criminal activity to be rejected. Material cannot be rejected based on its political, philosophical, or distasteful nature, and prison officials have the burden of showing why the restriction was necessary and how the denied material was detrimental to penological interests. Abbott and others sued and argued that the restriction on certain publications violated their First Amendment rights. The district court held that prisons had a right to deny access to certain publications and that prison wardens must be given broad discretion in their duties to maintain the security of the prison, but their discretion must not limit the prisoners’ First Amendment right more than what is necessary to protect the government’s penological interests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the prison officials had the burden of showing how the denied material is detrimental to penological interests.


[Thornburgh v. Abbott (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that there is a substantial penological interest in denying access to certain publications because it is necessary to maintain the security and order of the prison. However, the limitation on the prisoners’ First Amendment rights must be no greater than what is necessary to the preserve the penological interest. Therefore, the Federal Bureau of Prisons may deny access to publications that include threats to security of the prison or may incite violence among prisoners.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, while “penological interests” may be highly ambiguous, prison officials often require broad discretion to “prevent internal disorder.” Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[Wittman v. Personhuballah (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
In 2012, the Virginia State Legislature adopted a redistricting plan that altered the composition of the Third Congressional District, which was already majority African-American, and increased the percentage of African-American voters in the district. Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the plan was submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance, which was granted. On October 2, 2013, plaintiffs sued the defendants in their official capacities and argued that Virginia’s Third Congressional District was racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court ruled that the districting plan was unconstitutional because its use of race as a factor was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
The defendant Commonwealth of Virginia did not appeal; instead, ten members of Congress, who had intervened in the case at the trial level, appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama. In that case, the Court held that the Voting Rights Act does not require a legislature to maintain a particular minority number percentage in creating a districting plan, but rather it requires that the legislature maintain a minority’s ability to elect a candidate of choice. In considering whether a districting plan is unconstitutional, courts must examine whether racial considerations predominated over nonracial ones in determining which voters to place in which district. On remand, the district court again determined that the Third Congressional District was unconstitutional because racial considerations predominated in creating the plan.


[Wittman v. Personhuballah (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
The appellants did not have standing to appeal this case to the Supreme Court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the appellants in this case, ten members of Congress who had intervened in the case at the trial level, did not have standing to appeal because they do not meet the requirements for standing under Article III -- an injury in fact that is directly traceable to the conduct at issue and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Although ten members of Congress initially intervened, by the time the case reached oral argument at the Supreme Court, only three claimed to have standing. Of those, one determined that he would run for office regardless of the new plan, and therefore did not suffer an injury in fact. The other two appellants were unable to produce evidence that their chances of reelection would be significantly impaired by the new districting plan and therefore did not meet their burden to establish that they suffered an injury sufficient to have standing under Article III.


[Taylor v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
David Anthony Taylor was a member of the “Southwest Goonz,” a group of robbers based in Roanoke, Virginia, that focused on robbing drug dealers, who typically have drug proceeds in their home and are reluctant to report crime. Taylor was indicted on two counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, which prohibits actual or attempted robbery or extortion affecting interstate or foreign commerce. At Taylor’s second trial, after his first resulted in a hung jury, the government moved to prevent Taylor from offering evidence that robbing a drug dealer who grows marijuana outside of state lines does not affect interstate commerce and therefore cannot violate the Hobbs Act. The district court granted the government’s motion, and Taylor was subsequently convicted of both counts under the Hobbs Act. Taylor moved to set aside the verdict on the grounds that the government did not present sufficient evidence that his actions affected interstate commerce. The district court denied Taylor’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Taylor v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
In a prosecution for robbery under the Hobbs Act, the commerce element is satisfied when the government shows that the defendant robbed a drug dealer of drugs or drug proceeds. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that “commerce” under the Hobbs Act is defined broadly as all interstate commerce over which the federal government has jurisdiction. Precedent has established that the federal government can regulate intrastate economic activity that has substantial effects on interstate commerce, and although the sale of drugs is illegal under federal law, it is still an economic activity; therefore Congress can regulate purely intrastate drug theft. The government does not need to prove that the defendant’s specific action affected interstate commerce as long as the affected activity does so in the aggregate.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s opinion went too far in expanding Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Because Congress does not have the power to regulate robbery by itself, it can only do so when such regulation is “necessary and proper” to carrying out one of Congress’ enumerated powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce. Commerce Clause jurisprudence has established that Congress may also regulate activities that bear an “obvious, simple, and direct” relationship to regulating interstate commerce. While a robbery might fit this criteria, not every robbery would. Therefore, in order to regulate robbery under the Hobbs Act, the government must prove that the robbery in question affected interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would rid the government of its burden in a criminal case to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.


[Molina-Martinez v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Saul Molina-Martinez pleaded guilty to being in the United States illegally following deportation proceedings that stemmed from his felony convictions. The district court accordingly sentenced Molina-Martinez to 77 months in prison, pursuant to the sentencing range established in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for his criminal history category. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, prior sentences are counted as a single sentence if they were imposed on the same day unless the offenses in question were separated by an intervening arrest. Molina-Martinez’s prior offenses were not separated by an intervening arrest, so when his probation officer calculated his criminal history points and concluded that they placed him in category VI, he erred; Molina-Martinez should properly have been placed in category V, which carries a lower sentencing range of 70-87 months. Molina-Martinez appealed his sentence on the grounds that the district court erred in sentencing him based on the incorrect criminal history category. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, despite the error in calculation, Molina-Martinez failed to show that the error affected his substantial rights and therefore affirmed his conviction and sentence.


[Molina-Martinez v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
If a defendant shows that the court mistakenly applied a higher sentencing range to his sentence, his substantial rights are affected. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that, when appellate courts review errors in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant is not required to identify “additional evidence” to show that he received an incorrect sentence. Nothing in the Guidelines themselves, the relevant precedent, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governing appellate review of such an error requires that a defendant make a showing of prejudice beyond showing that the error occurred. By requiring more from the defendant, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit failed to properly account for the crucial rule the Guidelines play in the sentencing process and the dynamics of sentencing, which often leaves the defendant without any of the evidence the Fifth Circuit would require.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while a court’s use of an incorrect Sentencing Guideline range is sufficient evidence that the defendant’s substantial rights were affected, Guideline error issues should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Justice Alito argued that the majority opinion should not have speculated about the future effects of Guideline errors. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.


[RJR Nabisco v. The European Community (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) and alleged that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. The European Community claimed that Colombian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European countries, where they produced revenue in euros that was then laundered back into the currency of the criminal organizations’ home countries while the euros were sold to cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR’s cigarettes. The lawsuit alleged that RJR controlled this operation and in the course of executing it committed various violations of the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion based on the presumption the U.S. statutes did not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially.


[RJR Nabisco v. The European Community (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
Sections of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute can apply extraterritorially because they rebutted the presumption against extraterritoriality and expressed a clear indication that Congress intended them to apply extraterritorially. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-0 majority. The Court held that some of the relevant substantive provisions of RICO applied extraterritorially because the text clearly defined certain racketeering offenses as ones that can occur outside of the United States. Therefore, the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted for the RICO provisions that are based on predicate offenses that are explicitly extraterritorial. However, not every foreign enterprise would qualify; the foreign enterprise must affect or directly affect commerce involving the United States for RICO to apply. The four-justice majority also held that RICO’s private right of action did not rebut the presumption of extraterritorially, and therefore a plaintiff must allege that there was a domestic injury in order for the lawsuit to proceed. In this case, because the plaintiffs waived their damages claims for domestic injuries, their remaining claims were based on injuries suffered abroad and should be dismissed.
In her opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that Congress’ intent for RICO to apply extraterritorially was clear because the text of the statute explicitly included offenses that encompass activities that could occur abroad. However, Justice Ginsburg also argued the private right of action was not limited to domestic injuries. RICO clearly allowed the government to sue based on injuries that occurred abroad, and there was no reason to read the private right of action differently. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment. Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting in the judgment in which he argued that the U.S. government’s stance that allowing for recovery in U.S. courts for injuries that occurred abroad would create international friction did not hold up against the opposite argument from the European Community and its 26 member states.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Duncan v. Owens (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Ramon Nelson was riding his bike when he suffered a lethal blow to the back of his head with a baseball bat. After two eyewitnesses identified Lawrence Owens from an array of photos and then a lineup, he was tried and convicted for Nelson’s death. Because Nelson was carrying cocaine and crack cocaine potentially for distribution, the judge at Owens’ bench trial ruled that Owens was probably also a drug dealer and was trying to “knock [Nelson] off.” Owens was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years in prison.
Owens filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his constitutional right to due process was violated during the trial. He argued that the eyewitness identification should have been inadmissible based on unreliability and that the judge impermissibly inferred a motive when a motive was not an element of the offense. The district court denied the writ of habeas corpus, and Owens appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial and held that the trial judge’s inference about Owens’s motive violated his right to have his guilt adjudicated solely based on the evidence presented at trial.


[Duncan v. Owens (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
After arguments, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted.


[Utah v. Strieff (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop.


[Utah v. Strieff (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
In the absence of flagrant police misconduct, the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated (weakened) the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to the lawful arrest, which allowed the evidence to be used against the defendant. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protections should not be excluded from evidence when the costs of its exclusion outweighs its benefits. Exclusion is not justified when the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovered evidence is too attenuated. To determine whether the connection is attenuated, courts must examine the temporal proximity of the discovery of the evidence to the unconstitutional conduct, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the police misconduct. Based on the analysis of those factors, when a valid warrant is discovered after an unconstitutional investigatory stop, the connection between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence incident to a lawful arrest based on the warrant is sufficiently attenuated.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule was intended to prevent police officers from taking advantage of their own unconstitutional conduct, which was the case here. Because the initial unconstitutional stop was clearly calculated to procure further evidence, it was not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the connection between the misconduct and the discovery of evidence. Justice Sotomayor also argued that allowing the police such free rein essentially created a group of second-class citizens that could be subjected to police invasion of constitutional rights at a whim. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in all but the last portion of the dissent. In her separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan wrote that the discovery of the evidence was too closely connected to the unconstitutional investigatory stop for the valid warrant to attenuate the connection. Because the two events were closely connected in time, the warrant itself was not an intervening circumstance, and the police conduct was purposeful and flagrant, the exclusionary rule should apply in cases like this one. Justice Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


[Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., et al. (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The plaintiffs, food distributors including Conagra Foods Inc. and Kraft Foodservice, sued Americold Logistics LLC and Americold Realty Trust (Americold) in state court for a breach of contract stemming from a dispute regarding liability for a warehouse fire. Americold sought to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction because of the diversity of the trust’s board. No party challenged the propriety of the removal, and the district court addressed the case solely on its merits. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court found in favor of the defendant.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit raised the issue of potentially improper removal and asked the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue. The appellate court held that Americold did not meet its burden to demonstrate that diversity jurisdiction was appropriate because the inquiry must extend to the trust’s beneficiaries (who are its shareholders), not just the trustees.


[Americold Realty Trust v. Conagra Foods, Inc., et al. (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a trust is based on the citizenship of its members, which includes the shareholder-beneficiaries as well as the trustees. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that, although precedent and statute allow corporations to be considered a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated for the purposes of jurisdiction, the same exception does not exist for other artificial legal entities. For those entities, the general rule has been that their citizenship is defined by that of their members. In a trust, the term “members” includes the beneficiaries of that trust as well as the trustees, and in Maryland, a real estate investment trust is an “unincorporated business trust or association” in which property is held and managed “for the benefit and profit of any person who may become a shareholder.”


[Nebraska v. Parker (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Omaha Tribal members attempted to enforce liquor licenses and taxes on local venders and clubs selling alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska. The plaintiffs, the owners of clubs and venues that sold alcoholic beverages in Pender, Nebraska, joined by the state of Nebraska, sued for injunctive relief and argued that they are not located on federally-recognized Indian reservation land and therefore were not under the jurisdiction of the Omaha Tribe. The plaintiffs and defendants cross-filed for summary judgment, and the trial court found in favor of the defendants. The trial court held that Pender, Nebraska, was under the jurisdiction of tribal law because the U.S. Senate’s passage of an 1882 Act that allowed the Omaha tribe to sell allotments of its tribal land did not diminish the tribal boundaries of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.


[Nebraska v. Parker (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The passage of the 1882 Act did not diminish the Omaha Indian Reservation boundaries. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that only the clear intent of Congress can determine when tribal land is diminished. Because the 1882 Act only allowed for the tribe to sell plots of tribal lands to non-tribal members and there was no clear indication that Congress intended to diminish the reservation, the Omaha Tribe’s boundaries had not been diminished.


[Bank Markazi v. Peterson (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Deborah Peterson and a group of other plaintiffs were seeking to obtain judgments for injury or wrongful death during acts of terrorism by Iran. The Iran Central Bank (Bank Markazi) owned nearly $2 billion worth of bonds that were held in an account in New York City. Based on the Uniform Commercial Code, these assets were not considered assets of Bank Markazi, and therefore could not be attached by the plaintiffs and were immune from attachment under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
While this case was pending, Congress passed the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 of which stated, “[T]he financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., shall be subject to execution...in order to satisfy any judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by an act of [terrorism].” The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based on Section 8772. Bank Markazi argued that Section 8772 violated the United States’ separation of powers because the law was solely directed at this specific case. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and ordered the turnover of the assets. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Bank Markazi v. Peterson (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
A statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case does not violate the separation of powers. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that Section 8772 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 did not violate the separation of powers by directing the distribution of funds to terrorist victims. The fact that Congress passed the act during litigation did not tread onto judiciary “turf”; instead, it only supplied a new law to be applied to undisputed facts. Rather than telling the judiciary branch what to do, Congress passed a law for the judiciary to interpret during the case itself, and therefore did not intrude on the judicial powers of Article III.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Congress violated Article III by passing the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Section 8772 because Congress is not allowed to “pick” the winners of court cases by applying statutes directed at those court cases during litigation. It is a violation of Article III for legislators to determine the outcome of judicial decisions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the dissent.


[Sturgeon v. Frost (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
John Sturgeon regularly hunted on the Yukon-Charley River National Preserve (Yukon-Charley), which is part of the National Park Service (NPS), in Alaska. Sturgeon used a hovercraft to hunt. During one of his hunting trips, he was approached by three NPS enforcement employees and told that NPS regulations prohibited the operation of hovercrafts within all national parks, and therefore he was prohibited from using his hovercraft within the Yukon-Charley boundaries. Sturgeon insisted that the NPS did not have jurisdiction in the area because it was a state-owned river and subsequently sued Bert Frost, the director of the NPS for Alaska. Sturgeon claimed the NPS violated Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA) as applied to his use of hovercrafts on state-owned lands and waters because ANILCA limited the applicability of NPS regulations on land that is not federally owned.


[Sturgeon v. Frost (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 does not allow the National Park Service to regulate all land physically within the boundaries of the National Park System in Alaska. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court, which held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ANILCA would lead to inconsistent Park practices. The result of this interpretation would be that the Park Service may regulate “non-public” lands with national regulations, but it may not regulate Alaska-specific regulations to those lands.


[Heffernan v. City of Paterson (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. When a supervisor confronted him, Heffernan claimed that he was not politically involved, could not vote in the city of Paterson, and was picking up the sign on behalf of his mother. Heffernan was demoted to a walking post because his actions were considered to be “overt involvement in political activities.” Heffernan sued the city of Paterson and claimed that the city had violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The city filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that, since Heffernan had not actually engaged in constitutionally protected speech, the City’s actions had not violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence Heffernan associated himself with the political candidate at issue. Heffernan admitted himself that he was not associated with the candidate, and therefore there is no evidence of a violation of his right to freedom of association. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.


[Heffernan v. City of Paterson (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
A government employee who is demoted because of perceived involvement in protected political activity is entitled to challenge his demotion under the First Amendment even if the demotion was based on a factual mistake. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although there was no First Amendment case that specifically addressed this issue, there was at least one precedential case in which the employer’s motive was what determined whether the action violated the employee’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, when an employer demotes an employee out of a desire the prevent or punish the employee for engaging in protected speech, that action violates the First Amendment, even if the employer made a factual mistake and no protected speech occurred. The Court also held that this rule tracks the language of the First Amendment because it focuses on the harm the government actor committed, which is the same whether or not the employer made a factual mistake, and does not alter the burden that an employee claiming a First Amendment violation must meet, which is to prove that the defendant had an improper motive.
In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Constitution does not provide a cause of action when a plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated. The question of whether or not the employee engaged in constitutionally protected speech is the threshold question to determining whether the employer violated the employee’s constitutional rights by demoting the employee based on that speech. If the employee did not exercise his First Amendment rights, he has no claim based on the employer’s reaction to that speech. Even if the plaintiff is able to establish that the employer attempted to interfere with his constitutional right to speech, a factually impossible attempt does not establish liability. The plaintiff still has to prove that his First Amendment rights were actually violated, which the plaintiff in this case cannot do because everyone agreed that he never exercised his First Amendment rights in this case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Williams v. Pennsylvania (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted the relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and lifted the stay of execution.
The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court’s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution.


[Williams v. Pennsylvania (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when a judge who was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor declined to recuse himself, regardless of whether that judge’s decision as part of a multi-member tribunal was dispositive. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that there was an impermissible of risk of bias that violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a judge was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor who participated in crucial decisions about the case. Especially in the case of a former prosecutor, who likely made critical strategy decisions, the risk of improper, even if inadvertent, bias toward the position the prosecutor advocated for as a member of the adversarial process is so serious as to be unconstitutional. In this case, there is no doubt that the judge was involved in a critical decision as a prosecutor because he played a vital role in deciding to seek the death penalty, which is one of the most significant decisions a prosecutor can make. Additionally, because the deliberations of an appellate panel are confidential, it does not matter whether the potentially biased judge’s decision was dispositive, because it can be assumed that it at the very least influenced the outcome. Even the appearance of such influence undermines the crucial neutrality of the tribunal.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote that the Due Process Clause is only violated when the judge is actually biased by his previous involvement in the case. In this case, there was no evidence that the judge in question had actually been involved in, or formed a decision on, the decision about whether the seek the death penalty, and therefore there was no “objective risk of actual bias” such that it was fundamentally unfair for him to hear the case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the rule in question should be less strict when the matter before the judge was different from what the judge worked on when he was involved in the case. In this case, the criminal conviction was not at issue; instead, the matter is a question of post-conviction relief, which is wholly different from what the judge was involved with as a prosecutor on the case. Justice Thomas argued that historical practice and precedent construe judicial disqualification narrowly and therefore did not require a judge who was involved in a criminal case to recuse himself from the post-conviction proceedings, which are a separate civil matter. Justice Thomas also noted that any concerns about potential bias should be addressed by state legislatures, not the Court.


[Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2008, Luis M. Sanchez Valle was charged in federal for illegally trafficking in weapons and ammunition in interstate commerce and, on substantially the same facts, was charged with several violations of the Puerto Rico Weapons Act. After Sanchez Valle was convicted in federal court, he filed a motion to dismiss the claims under Puerto Rican law and argued that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy meant that he could not be prosecuted in Puerto Rico for the same offenses for which the federal court had already convicted him. The prosecution argued that, pursuant to the precedent the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico established in Puerto Rico v. Castro García, the United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico derive their authority from different sources and therefore can punish substantially the same offenses without implicating the constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
The trial court dismissed the charges against Sanchez Valle and held that he could not be indicted twice for the same offenses by the same sovereign entity, and because Puerto Rico and the United States both derive their authority from the United States Constitution, they are the same sovereign entity. The Court of Appeals consolidated this case with several others presenting the same question and held that, under current law, a person could punished for the same offenses in both federal and Puerto Rican court without implicating the protection against double jeopardy. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed and held that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding double jeopardy was binding on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, and therefore the Puerto Rico v. Castro García precedent was incorrect and the Puerto Rican charges against Sanchez Valle should be dismissed.


[Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The U.S. federal government and the Puerto Rican government are the “same sovereign” for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the concept of “sovereignty” as used in the Double Jeopardy Clause did not have its ordinary meaning, but rather deals with the question of whether the entities in question derive their authority from different sources. Based on this historical analysis, the Court determined that, while the states derived their sovereign power from a separate source than the federal government, territories do not. Although in many ways Puerto Rico functioned as a separate sovereign because the federal government had delegated much of its power to the people of Puerto Rico, the delegation further emphasizes the fact that historically the authority to govern Puerto Rico derived from the U.S. Constitution.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the double jeopardy protection should perhaps not be limited to prosecutions by the same sovereign and argued that the question of the extent of double jeopardy protections warranted further examination. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the concurrence. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he disagreed with the Court’s approach to the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s view of the U.S. Constitution as the source of Puerto Rico’s power to self-govern was an overly simplistic view of the role the Constitution played in creating the sovereignty of other entities, such as the states that were originally territories. Based on a more complex framework that takes into account customs, actions, and attitudes of different governmental entities, Puerto Rico was a separate sovereign entity for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV’s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants.


[Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
The Federal Power Act preempts state regulation that interferes with the national energy market, as the Generation Order does. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that federal law preempts state law when the state law is in an area that Congress has already extensively legislated or when the state law is an obstacle to the objectives of the federal law. In this case, the program at issue invades the regulatory space that Congress has granted to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Although states may regulate in areas incident to FERC’s domain, states may not do so when their regulations intrude on FERC’s ability to regulate interstate wholesale rates. Because the program at issue in this case does so, federal law preempts it.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that preemption analysis in areas in which both the federal government and states collaboratively regulate must examine the purpose of the regulations at issue rather than “talismanic vocabulary.” Because the majority opinion properly looked to the purpose of the Federal Power Act and how the Maryland program interfered with it, Justice Sotomayor joined the majority’s opinion in full. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the issue of preemption in this case should be decided solely by examining the relevant text of the statutes in question rather than by looking at the broader doctrine of implied preemption, as the majority opinion did.


[Fowler v. North Carolina (1976) — Burger Court (1972-1975) — Facts]
A jury found Fowler guilty of murder in the first degree. The trial judge imposed the mandatory sentence of death in the state's gas chamber. Fowler appealed his conviction and sentence. Both were affirmed. Fowler then attacked the mandatory imposition of his sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certioriari.


[Fowler v. North Carolina (1976) — Burger Court (1972-1975) — Conclusion]
The Court deferred action in Fowler's case until it resolved the question of mandatory death sentences in five cases heard and decided in the 1975 Term. One of these cases was Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), which held that the mandatory imposition of the death sentence violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment prohibition of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following Woodson, the Court by memorandum vacated Fowler's mandatory death sentence and returned the case to the North Carolina for further proceedings. Fowler was resentenced to life in prison.


[Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics Inc. (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
Halo Electronics, Inc. (Halo) and Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Pulse) are both suppliers of electronic components. Halo owns three patents regarding surface mount electronic packages; Pulse designs and sells surface mount electronic packages and does its manufacturing in Asia. In 2002, Halo unsuccessfully attempted to license their patents to Pulse. In 2007, Halo sued Pulse for patent infringement. The district court held that Pulse infringed on Halo’s patents with products shipped into the United States, had induced others to infringe on products delivered outside of the U.S. but ultimately imported into the U.S. as finished products, and found that it was highly probable that Pulse’s infringement was willful. The court later found that Pulse’s infringement was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that there was no “willful infringement.” In determining that there was no willful infringement, the appellate court applied a rigid two-part test established in In re Seagate that required that willfulness be proven on both an objective and subjective basis. In this case, the appellate court held that the objective prong was not met. This two-part test is similar to one the Supreme Court struck down last term in Octane Fitness, LLc v. ICON Health & Fitness, which dealt with a test for awarding attorneys fees.
In the consolidated case, Stryker Corporation (Stryker) sued Zimmer, Inc. (Zimmer) over patent infringement of medical equipment. Stryker and Zimmer are both competitors in the market for pulsed lavage devices, which deliver pressurized irrigation for certain medical procedures in orthopedic medicine. Stryker holds three patents for pulsed lavage devices that it claimed Zimmer had infringed. The district court found Zimmer liable for patent infringement. The jury awarded Stryker treble damages as allowed under 35 U.S.C. § 284 on the grounds that Zimmer intentionally violated Stryker’s patents. Zimmer appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which requires that the patent-holder prove the infringement was willful to be eligible for treble damages. Therefore, the appellate court overturned the award for treble damages on the grounds that Zimmer did not intentionally violate Stryker’s patents.


[Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics Inc. (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
The rigid two-part test is not necessary for determining whether a patentee is eligible for enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C §284. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The plain language of Section 284 simply stated that courts “may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” There is no language that creates the kind of test that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied, and precedent had established that the word “may” connotes judicial discretion. While it’s true that the award is typically only granted in extreme cases, the two-part test was overly rigid and could insulate some of worst patent infringers from liability for enhanced damages. Because the language of the section is discretionary, courts should take into account a variety of factors and should not be limited by a rigid test.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that the language of Section 284 encompasses limitations on the use of a court’s discretion to award enhanced damages. Generally, enhanced damages are reserved for particularly egregious cases. Additionally, whether or not the infringer consults counsel should not be relevant to the award decision, nor should the award be used to compensate for the costs of the litigation. Justice Breyer argued that, while enhanced damages served an important purpose, its use must be limited. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the concurrence.


[Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Throughout the 1990s, inventor Gilbert P. Hyatt was involved in litigation with the Franchise Tax Board of California (FTB) based on the FTB’s audits of his 1991 and 1992 tax returns. The FTB claimed that Hyatt had falsified his tax forms by manufacturing a move to Nevada that did not occur until later and therefore failing to file state taxes for time that he was actually living in California. Hyatt protested that the FTB acted in bad faith and eventually sued the FTB in Nevada alleging negligence along with several intentional torts and seeking damages. Before the case went to trial, the FTB argued that it should be immune from the lawsuit based on California law that granted it sovereign immunity. The case eventually went before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that Nevada courts were not bound to grant the FTB full immunity.
At trial, the jury found in favor of Hyatt and awarded him over $300 million in damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which held that the FTB is not immune from the suit because in Nevada governmental entities are not immune from claims for intentional torts. However, because Nevada law does not allow punitive damages against governmental entities, the punitive damage award in this case should be reversed.


[Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt (2016) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The Constitution does not allow Nevada to refuse to extend to other states haled into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada would receive in those courts. The Court was equally divided on the question of whether Nevada v. Hall should be overruled and therefore affirmed the lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over California. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution prohibits a state from adopting a “policy of hostility” towards another state. Because the Nevada rule that does not extend Nevada’s governmental immunity to governmental entities from other states is essentially a “policy of hostility” towards other states, it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in the judgment without writing a separate opinion.
In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote that a “policy of hostility” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is one that has “no sufficient policy considerations” to support it. In this case, Nevada’s application of its own immunity law, which does not protect other states’ governmental entities, is supported by the policy interest in ensuring appropriate redress for its citizens. Nevada is not required to presume that other states are equally committed to the protection of Nevada citizens. Therefore, Nevada’s rule is not an unconstitutional “policy of hostility” towards other states. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Voisine v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm.
Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman, which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute.


[Voisine v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
A reckless domestic violence assault qualifies as misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9). Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the relevant statutory text -- “us[ing] force” -- does not rule out an interpretation that encompasses an act of force carried out recklessly, or with a conscious disregard of the substantial risk of causing harm. Although the statutory language does not apply to true accidents, it certainly does to reckless conduct. The legislative history of the statute also supports this reading, because Congress expressly intended for the statute to prevent those convicted of misdemeanors of domestic assault from being able to purchase firearms. In many states, such misdemeanor offenses are defined as only requiring reckless intent; if these were not included in the statutory prohibition, the statute would not be effective in a majority of jurisdictions.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that term “use of force” required intentional conduct to trigger the statutory firearm prohibition. The Court has traditionally interpreted “use” in ways that make it clear that the conduct must be intentional, which is consistent with its use elsewhere in the statute. In holding otherwise, Justice Thomas argued that the majority opinion conflated recklessly causing force with recklessly causing harm through the intentional use of force. Because the Maine domestic violence statute emcompasses reckless conduct while the federal statute does not, a conviction under the Maine statute should not trigger the firearm prohibition. The majority opinion also extended the sweep of the statute into unconstitutional territory by denying those convicted of a reckless misdemeanor of domestic violence their Second Amendment rights. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent, though not in the part that addressed the Second Amendment.


[Nichols v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
In 2003, Lester Nichols was charged with intent to engage in sex with a minor. In 2006, the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was passed, and the Attorney General issued a rule in 2007 that SORNA applied retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Under this rule, Nichols was required to register with SORNA and update his residency. In 2012, Nichols flew from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his location pursuant to SORNA. Authorities in the Philippines took Nichols into custody and returned him to the United States where he was charged with noncompliance with SORNA regulations regarding updating his residency. Nichols filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the Philippines are outside U.S. jurisdiction, so he was not required to update his location. The trial court dismissed his motion, and Nichols plead guilty. He then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction.


[Nichols v. United States (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Conclusion]
A convicted sexual offender is not required to notify the state under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) when he moves outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that SORNA requires that sexual offenders notify states to which they move or reside. The Court interpreted the present tense of “reside” in the statute to mean that an offender must currently be living in a U.S. jurisdiction for the requirement to take effect. Therefore, a registered sex offender does not violate SORNA by failing to update his registration when he moves from a U.S. jurisdiction to a non-U.S. jurisdiction.


[Husky Electronics v. Ritz (2016) — Roberts Court (2016-2017) — Facts]
Husky International Electronics, Inc. (Husky) sold and delivered electronic equipment to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp. (Chrysalis), headed by Daniel Ritz. Chrysalis owed Husky $163,999.38 in purchases between 2003 and 2007. In 2007, Ritz started transferring funds from Chrysalis to various other ventures in which he owned stock. In 2009 Husky sued Ritz for payment of his outstanding debt, and Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In 2011, Husky filed a complaint against the discharge of Ritz’s debt and argued that Ritz had fraudulently moved funds from Chrysalis to other accounts in order to file for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found that Ritz had not fraudulently filed for bankruptcy and that it could not “pierce the veil” to go after Ritz’s personal finances for the debt Chrysalis owed.
Husky appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination and found that Ritz had not committed “actual fraud” by false representation and that Husky had not proven that Ritz acted “maliciously and willfully.” The United States Appeals Court for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to discharge Ritz’s debt.