[Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On September 26, 1974, William L. Lassiter was born out of wedlock. On May 23, 1975, the state determined that William L. Lassiter was a neglected child in need of protection, and placed him in the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. The state then placed William in foster care.
Abby Gail Lassiter, William’s mother, was convicted of second-degree murder in July of 1976, and began serving her twenty-five to forty year sentence at the North Carolina Correctional Center for Women. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Abby’s parental rights. It alleged that Abby had not contacted William since December 1975, and that she willfully left William in foster care. On August 31, 1978, the state brought Abby from prison to the hearing, which opened with a discussion of whether Abby should have more time to find legal assistance. The court concluded that she had ample opportunity to obtain counsel; Abby did not claim to be indigent, and the court did not appoint counsel for her.
A social worker from the Department testified about Abby’s lack of contact with William, Abby’s mother’s unfitness to care for William, and William’s condition. Abby cross-examined the social worker, but many of her questions were disallowed because they were arguments. She also testified on her own behalf and later cross-examined her mother, who denied saying she could not care for William, contradicting the Department’s allegation. The court held that Abby willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for William’s welfare, and terminated Abby’s status as William’s parent. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that North Carolina was not constitutionally mandated to provide Abby counsel during the hearing. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied her application for discretionary review.


[Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to appoint counsel for Lassiter. Justice Stewart emphasized that due process required fundamental fairness. He wrote, however, that the Court generally only recognized an indigent’s right to appointed counsel where the litigant could lose his physical liberty if he lost the litigation.
Justice Stewart looked to the Court’s due process standard in Mathews v. Eldridge, determining that 1) Lassiter’s interest was important, 2) the state shared with Lassiter a common interest in a correct decision, but also a pecuniary interest and an interest in informal procedures, and 3) the complexity of some proceedings could be great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s rights insupportably high. He refused to hold, however, that indigent parents were entitled to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights. He acknowledged that thirty-three states and the District of Columbia required counsel in termination hearings, but characterized this as wise public policy and not a constitutional requirement.
Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred, implying that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted because the termination proceeding was not punitive.
Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. He argued that the unique importance of a parent’s interest in the care and custody of his or her child could not be constitutionally extinguished through formal judicial proceedings without the benefit of counsel. Justice Blackmun disagreed that physical confinement was the only loss of liberty serious enough to trigger a right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. He also emphasized the risk of error in termination proceedings when a parent lacked counsel.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented separately to take Justice Blackman's reasoning one step further. Justice Stevens opined that the issue raised is one of fundamental fairness, not balancing of pecuniary costs against societal benefits. No benefit to society can justify the state depriving an individual's liberty without due process of law.


[Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk products in non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf Creamery sued to overturn the law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision.


[Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No and no. Writing for the majority in a 7-1 decision, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. maintained that Minnesota's statute was not unconstitutional, acknowledging that the legislature had an interest in promoting resource conservation and resolving solid waste disposal issues. The difference between non-reusable plastic containers and paper or reusable plastic containers was "rationally related" to the legislature's purpose, and therefore not unconstitutional under the rational basis test set forth in New Orleans v. Dukes. The statute banned sale of all milk in the specified containers and did not distinguish by seller, and therefore did not violate the commerce clause. Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[United States v. Will (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Congress enacted legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust the compensation of federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur.


[United States v. Will (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
In two of the years in question, Congress effectively revoked automatic pay increases after the statutes guaranteeing those increases had already taken effect. This amounted to a reduction in salaries for judges and violated the Compensation Clause.


[Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended to include the registration of females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained by a district court.


[Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Congress's decision to exempt women from registration "was not the 'accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females'" and did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women, because of combat restrictions on women, were not "similarly situated" for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress's judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the Military Selective Service Act.


[Michigan v. Summers (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin⎯not the heroin found in the basement⎯that formed the basis of charges against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers’ motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers’ detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to the house when the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court.


[Michigan v. Summers (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a warrant to search for contraband grants police officers the limited authority to detain occupants of a house during the search of the premises. This authority is an exception to the probable cause standard to determine the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures. The law enforcement interests in preventing the flight of occupants of the property named in the search warrant, reducing the risk of harm to officers, and otherwise facilitating the search convinced the Court that the detention of people on the property in question was reasonable. Similarly, the Court held that the exception to the probable cause standard applied to Summers’ detention because it was less intrusive than an arrest and unlikely to be abused by police officers. Finally, the connection between an occupant and the home named in the search warrant gave the officers an easily identifiable and certain basis on which to detain Summers.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized the Court for expanding the scope of the exception to the probable cause standard for Fourth Amendment seizures. Justice Stewart argued that the State failed to offer a justification for the detention that was unrelated to its interest in investigating crimes and apprehending suspects. He further expressed concern that the Court’s holding could be exploited by police officers eager to detain occupants and make them available for arrest in case the search of the property revealed evidence of criminal activity. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Michael M., a 17 and 1/2 year-old male, was found guilty of violating California's "statutory rape" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." The statute thus made men alone criminally liable for such conduct. Michael M. challenged the constitutionality of the law.


[Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a plurality decision, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that "young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse." The Court found that the state had a strong interest in preventing "illegitimate pregnancy." The Court noted that "[i]t is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males."


[Haig v. Agee (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In 1974, Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign "to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating." Over the next several years, Agee successfully exposed a number of CIA agents and sources working in other countries. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig revoked Agee's passport, Agee filed suit claiming that Haig did not have congressional authorization to do so. Agee also claimed that the action violated his right to travel, his First Amendment right to criticize the government, and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.


[Haig v. Agee (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Passport Act of 1926 and other congressional statutes implicitly granted the Secretary of State the power to revoke passports. The Court noted Congress's historical recognition of "Executive authority to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and foreign policy." The Court further held that because the regulations were limited to cases in which there was a likelihood of "serious damage" to foreign policy, Agee's claims concerning the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the right to travel were "without merit."


[Diamond v. Diehr (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Engineers James Diehr and Theodore Lutton invented an improved press that cured rubber by controlled heating. The press contained a temperature probe which measured the temperature rise of the rubber from within the press. By repeatedly calculating the rubber cure time from this temperature measurement and comparing this computed cure time to the actual elapsed time, the computer was able to determine precisely when to open the press and eject the cured rubber, which then emerged perfectly cured. The patent examiner, viewing all computer programs as unpatentable because of the earlier Supreme Court decision Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), rejected their patent application because, he argued, the inventors had simply combined an unpatentable program with a conventional rubber curing press. An appellate court reversed the Examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney argued that the steps of continuously measuring temperature and repeatedly recalculating the rubber cure time and comparing it to the elapsed time were new steps that were worthy of patent protection.


[Diamond v. Diehr (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the court held that a machine which transforms materials physically under the control of a programmed computer is patentable. In addition, and without overruling the earlier Gottschalk v. Benson decision holding that a mathematical procedure cannot be patented, the majority in Diehr said the Benson decision did not render all computer programs unpatentable, contrary to what Justice John Paul Stevens argued in his strong dissenting opinion in Diehr. The Diehr court left undecided the question of whether computer programs standing by themselves could ever be patentable. Immediately following the Diehr ruling, software patent applications began flowing into the Patent Office in a steady stream that remains undiminished today. (Thirteen years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In re Alappat, ruled that virtually all computer programs are patentable.)


[United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In 1974 Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which restructured the retirement system previously established in 1937. Under the old system, employees who were eligible for both railroad benefits and social security benefits received both, along with an additional “windfall” benefit. Since this system threatened to bankrupt the railroad retirement program, the goal of the new Act was to eliminate some of these benefits. The new Act divided employees into different classes based on their employment history as of January 1, 1975. Employees who had worked for the railroad fewer than 10 years would not receive any windfall benefit. Employees who were already retired and receiving the full benefits would continue to do so. Employees who qualified for the full benefits but had not yet retired would receive the full benefits only if they had a current connection to the railroad industry or had served for 25 years or more. Employees who did not meet these requirements received a lesser windfall benefit.
The appellee Gerhard H. Fritz was part of a plaintiff class of former railroad employees who were eligible for the windfall benefits under the old system, but who did not have a current connection to the railroad and had worked fewer than 25 years. Alleging that the Act created an irrational distinction between employees that violated the Due Process Clause, they filed a class action suit in district court. The district court held that such a distinction was not “rationally related” to the goal of ensuring the solvency of the retirement system.


[United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that laws may create classifications that are not elegant or “artfully drawn” but that are not unconstitutional. The Constitution would allow Congress to deny windfall benefits to all employees, therefore it was not unconstitutional to deny them to some. The Court also held that the distinctions were not arbitrary, as Congress was attempting to “protect the relative equities of employees and to provide benefits to career railroad employees.”
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the statute deserved more consideration to determine whether the adverse impact was a deliberate aim or an acceptable cost of the legislation. Since the Act had two conflicting aims — to protect the solvency of the retirement program and to ensure that employees received the benefits they earned — he argued that the statute in question legitimately pursues those goals. Congress had to make cuts in order to ensure the solvency, and length of service was a fair method of drawing distinctions.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that a “principal purpose” of the Act was to ensure that the employees received the benefits that they earned. Since this statute directly conflicts with the stated goal, the classification cannot be rationally based on the legislation. He also disagreed with the Court’s analysis that did not consider the effect of the statute in relation to its purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only "onsite" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment.


[Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for a 6-3 court. The ban's exception allowing "onsite" advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. It allowed businesses in commercial properties to interrupt city motorists so long as it was with their own messages yet barred noncommercial advertisers from causing the same level of interruption. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented and viewed the "onsite" exception to the ban as "essentially negligible" rather than unconstitutional favoritism. However the Court held that affording "a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech" reversed the long-standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech.


[Robbins v. California (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
During the early morning hours of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers pulled over a the driver of a station wagon, Jeffrey Richard Robbins, for driving too slowly at speeds far below the minimum speed limit and drifting across the center lane. Upon smelling marijuana smoke as they approached the car, officers searched the passenger compartment, where they found marijuana. The officers then opened a recessed luggage compartment in the trunk and unwrapped two tightly sealed packages that each contained a pound of marijuana. Robbins was charged with several drug offenses. At trial, he argued that the evidence of the drugs was the product of an illegal search and filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The judge denied the motion, and a jury convicted Robbins. Robbins appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for the appellate court to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Arkansas v. Sanders, which established that officers could not search closed luggage found during a lawful automobile search. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Robbins conviction a second time on that grounds that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the package’s contents could be inferred given the shape, size, and wrapping of the exterior.


[Robbins v. California (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 plurality. The plurality opinion held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment did not extend to closed and opaque containers found during the search. According to the plurality of the Court, the record in the case did not support the appellate court’s finding that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment of the Court. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that the careful manner in which the packages containing the marijuana were wrapped and sealed demonstrated Robbins’s intention to keep their contents private. However, he argued that the plurality opinion imposed too heavy a burden on police officers by requiring them to obtain a warrant to search every closed container found during a lawful, warrantless search of an automobile.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent in which he argued that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement should authorize police officers to seize and search any personal containers found within the vehicle. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun’s proposed rule. He also expressed opposition to the practice of excluding evidence obtained through impermissible means, especially with the Court’s extension of exclusionary rule to state law enforcement agencies in Mapp v. Ohio.
He argued that the harshness of the rule created an unfair advantage for the suspects because it required police officers to not only understand the nuanced case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment, but also to make the correct decision instantly. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the scope a lawful, warrantless search should include any container that a magistrate could authorize by warrant. As the police officers searched the car for evidence of contraband, the fact that the packages were tightly wrapped and sealed was of little consequence.


[Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
A Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an assigned location on the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair.


[Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Using the "valid time, manner, and place" criteria which the Court employs to assess government restrictions of First Amendment activities, the Court held that Rule 6.05 did not violate the Constitution. Since the rule was applied equally to all groups wanting to solicit at the fairgrounds, not making restrictions based on the content of a group's message, and because the state had an important interest in "protecting the safety and convenience" of the fair's patrons, Justice White argued that the rule's restrictions were legitimate. Allowing all religious, nonreligious, and commercial groups to move about the grounds distributing literature and soliciting funds would result in "widespread disorder" which would be potentially dangerous to the fair's visitors.


[Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power.


[Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case.


[Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads.


[Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highway travelers. The safety interest was "illusory." Second, the law was "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States" which did not have similar regulations. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce


[CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (CMPC) requested time for a thirty-minute program from each of the three major television networks on behalf of President Jimmy Carter. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) refused to make the requested time available, emphasizing in part the potential disruption of regular programming. CBS offered to sell the CMPC two five-minute segments instead. The American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) each replied that it had not yet begun to sell political time for the 1980 presidential campaign. On October 29, 1979, the CMPC filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), charging that the networks violated their obligations under the Federal Communications Act.
The Federal Communications Act of 1934, as modified by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, authorized the FCC to revoke broadcasting station licenses for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access or failure to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. On November 26, 1979, the FCC ruled in a four-to-three vote that the networks violated the act, rejecting the networks’ arguments that Congress did not intend the act to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the FCC improperly substituted its judgment for the networks’ in evaluating the CMPC’s request for time.
Following the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran in November 1979, the CMPC decided to postpone the broadcast of its thirty-minute program; it successfully purchased five minutes of time from CBS, and later purchased thirty minutes of time for the full program from ABC and NBC. Throughout these negotiations, however, all parties maintained their rights relating to the appeal to the FCC’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the FCC’s decision. It held that the act created a new, affirmative right of access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office and that the FCC had the authority to evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute.


[CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes, and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the Federal Communications Act created a new, individual right to broadcast access for candidates for federal office. He looked to the language of the Federal Communications Act’s requirement that a broadcaster provide candidates with reasonable access to the airwaves. Justice Burger noted that this section focused on an individual candidate seeking airtime for his/her candidacy, and that a different section of the act already imposed a general, public interest duty on broadcasters to provide time for political programming. Justice Burger looked to the legislative history of the act and the FCC’s past interpretations of the public interest right of access; both indicated that the right of access for federal candidates was a new, separate right.
Turning to the FCC’s decision on the CMPC’s right of access to the airwaves, Chief Justice Burger held that the act authorized the FCC to determine whether a campaign has begun and to assess the specific needs of a candidate. He argued that the FCC did not arbitrarily set the starting date for a campaign; instead, it looked to objective evidence, taking into account the interests of candidates and the networks. Looking to the circumstances of the 1980 presidential election, Chief Justice Burger determined that the FCC did not abuse its discretion in holding that the networks failed to specifically grant the CMPC reasonable access to the airwaves. He noted that when the CMPC made its original request, ten candidates were formally seeking the Republican nomination and that various states had already started the delegate selection process, among other factors.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger held that the First Amendment did not give CBS, Inc. the right to refuse to sell the CMPC thirty minutes of airtime. He argued that Congress intended for the act to protect the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters by securing a forum for candidates’ political speech. Justice Burger emphasized that while the act did not grant the CMPC a general constitutional right of access to broadcast media, the act created a limited right of reasonable access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office.
Justice Byron White dissented, joined by Justices William Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens. Justice White looked to the history of federal regulation of broadcast media, inferring a clearly-defined legislative desire to preserve values of private journalism. He then turned to the legislative history of the act and determined that Congress merely codified the networks’ pre-existing duty to provide access to political broadcasts, attaching the threat of license revocation to give weight to that duty. He argued that the FCC arbitrarily determined that the start of a campaign was the beginning of the networks’ obligations under the act, and that the language of the act itself did not support FCC’s individualized-need approach. Further, this approach essentially destroyed the networks’ editorial discretion.
Justice John Paul Stevens also filed a separate dissent. He argued that the FCC could not adequately evaluate the performance of the networks’ public interest duty by focusing on the needs or requests of particular candidates.


[Watkins v. Sowders (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
John Watkins was charged with attempting armed robbery of a liquor store in Louisville, Kentucky. He was arrested based on the identification of two witnesses. One of those witnesses identified Watkins as the gunman two days later in a lineup, and later that same day, the police took Watkins to the other witness’s hospital bed where he identified Watkins as the shooter. At the trial, both witnesses identified Watkins as the shooter. Watkins, along with two other witnesses, testified he was at a pool hall at the time of the shooting. Watkins was convicted, and on appeal he argued that the trial court had a constitutional obligation to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the identification evidence was admissible, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the argument. Watkins then sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ and held that a failure to hold a pretrial hearing does not require the reversal of a conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Watkins v. Sowders (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state criminal court to conduct a hearing out of the jury’s presence whenever a defendant contends that a witness’ identification was improper. The reliability of the identification evidence determines its admissibility, which can be evaluated under the trial judge’s jury instructions and the Due Process Clause is satisfied when the defendant is given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness to test the reliability of the identification. The Court held that while it is advisable for there to be a judicial determination of admissibility of identification evidence, it is not required.


[Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno (1981) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
(This summary was prepared by Tom Feledy.)
A British company, flying an airplane manufactured by Piper, a Pennsylvania company, equipped with propellers made by Hartzell, an Ohio company, conducted a charter flight in Scotland for five Scottish citizens. When the plane crashed, killing all on board, the next of kin, also Scottish, had a Los Angeles-based lawyer sue Piper and Hartzell for wrongful death. The suit was filed in a California state court, then removed to Federal District Court in California, and finally transferred to Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. There it was dismissed for forum non conveniens under the determination that the case should be tried in Scotland: the crash had occurred, the crash investigation had been conducted there by British authorities, and the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter company were all located there. However, respondents successfully appealed, claiming that substantive law in Scotland would be unfavorable to their case. Scotland, unlike Pennsylvania, had no strict liability law, which, along with negligence, respondents were relying upon in order to prevail.


[Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno (1981) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 4-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the District Court properly weighed private and public interests using the Gulf Oil v. Gilbert test to determine that the trial should be held in Scotland. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate.


[Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a state statute in 1884, MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States.


[Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."


[Washington v. Chrisman (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1978, a Washington police officer stopped a student at the Washington State University after observing the student was carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. The officer asked for identification. The student, accompanied by the officer, then went into his dormitory to retrieve proof of age. After the student had entered his room, the officer noticed that the student's roommate, Chrisman, had marijuana seeds and a pipe on his desk. Chrisman was subsequently charged with the possession of marijuana and LSD.


[Washington v. Chrisman (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permitted law enforcement officers to seize clearly incriminating evidence discovered "in a place where the officer has a right to be." The Court held that the officer had a right to remain at the initial suspect's elbow at all times, and did not waive his right to custodial control because he hesitated briefly in the doorway of the dormitory room before entering. In short, the officer had obtained lawful access to an individual's area of privacy and was free to seize incriminating evidence.


[Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The island of Vieques lay six miles off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. Vieques’ population of 8,000 mostly lived in two coastal towns and in a rural area outside of those two towns. Of a total area of approximately 33,000 acres, the United States Navy owned 25,231.72 acres, slightly more than 76% of the island.
The Navy’s installations on the eastern part of Vieques were part of a large military complex known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. This consisted of four firing ranges; the outer range was a large area of ocean thirty-five miles to the north and twenty miles to the south of Vieques. Two separate inland areas were used for artillery training, strafing, air-to-ground bombing, and simulating close air support; no targets existed in the area between the eastern border of these areas and Punta Este, the easternmost point of Vieques. During air-to-ground training, however, pilots sometimes accidentally discharged ordnance into the navigable waters around Viques.
Carlos Romero-Barceleo was the governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Along with Radamees Tirado Guevara, the mayor of Vieques, and Puerto Rico’s Environmental Quality Board, Romero-Barceleo sought to enjoin the United States Navy from using any part of its lands in Vieques, or in its surrounding waters, to carry out naval training operations. Plaintiffs alleged harm to all residents of Vieques and violations of numerous environmental laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Under the FWPCA, the addition of any pollutant from any point source into the navigable waters of the United States required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency.
The district court acknowledged that the release of ordnance into navigable waters was a discharge of pollutants, but it refused to enjoin Navy operations, instead ordering the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It ordered the Navy to cease operations until it obtained an NPDES permit. It held that the Navy has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until it obtains a permit despite the importance of its operations to the public good.


[Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron White, writing for the Court in an 8-1 decision, held that the district court was not obligated to enjoin the Navy from operating on and around Vieques island. He emphasized the traditional flexibility of equitable remedies and courts’ responsibility to balance plaintiffs’ need for an injunction with the public utility of the enjoined action. He acknowledged that Congress may control the exercise of courts’ discretion by statute, but distinguished the case from TVA v. Hill, where the Court held that the completion of a dam would violate explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act. Here, an injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance, as the FWPCA provides remedies in the form of fines and criminal penalties.
Justice White also looked to the legislative history of the FWPCA, determining that Congress did not intend to take away courts’ discretion in issuing injunctions. He also noted that the district court did not find that the Navy’s operations negatively impacted Vieques’ water quality; hence, requiring the Navy to obtain a permit while continuing its operations would meet the FWPCA’s goal of controlling water pollution.
Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred. He agreed that Congress did not intend to take away courts' discretion in ordering injunctions, but would have remanded the case to the First Circuit with instructions to affirm the district court’s decision.
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He also agreed that the FWPCA does not specifically command courts to issue an injunction for every unpermitted discharge of a pollutant, but he rejected the Court’s characterization of the First Circuit’s opinion. He argued instead that the First Circuit rightly gave weight to the FWPCA’s permitting structure given the Navy’s ongoing violation of the act.


[Edgar v. MITE Corporation (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The MITE Corp, organized under Delaware laws with its principal office in Connecticut, initiated a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of the offer 20 days before the offer becomes effective. During that time, the target company, but not the offeror, is free to disseminate information about the offer to the target company's shareholders. In addition, the Secretary of State could call a hearing, and the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed. Finally, the Secretary of State could deny registration of a takeover offer he or she found inequitable. MITE Corp. sought and won a declaratory judgment holding that the Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), and that it violated the Commerce Clause.


[Edgar v. MITE Corporation (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, with regard to the Commerce Clause. The Illinois Act imposes burdens on interstate commerce that are excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports to further. Among the ways a corporation can be covered by the Act is if 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer is owned by shareholders located in Illinois. Thus Illinois would have the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed even if made for a corporation incorporated and having a principal place of business outside of Illinois, with up to 90% of the shareholders residing outside of Illinois. Illinois's asserted interest in protecting resident security holders is insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois would impose on interstate commerce. In addition, Illinois's asserted interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws not only fails to justify the Act's coverage of foreign corporations, but transfers of stock to a third party do not implicate the internal affairs of a corporation.


[Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc. (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Giles Lugar leased a truckstop from Edmondson Oil Co. and fell behind on his rent payments. Edmondson issued a suit against him in a Virginia state court for failing to repay his debt. Before the court reached a decision, it issued a "writ of attachment" against Lugar. This disabled him from selling any property he owned while the case was open, since Edmondson wanted the property as collateral in case he could not repay his debt. A state trial judge cancelled the "writ of attachment" one month later after finding no statutory justification for its issuance. Lugar claimed that Edmondson worked with the government to deprive him of his property without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He said this caused him financial loss and sought to recover damages from Edmondson in a District Court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This code provides rewards to those who have had their rights violated because of "state action." The District Court rejected Lugar's claim because it deemed that no "state action" had occurred. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected using solely "state action" to validate Section 1983 suits. It claimed that certain instances where private parties acted "under the color of state law" also validated Section 1983 suits. However the Fourth Circuit found that none of these actions occurred in Lugar's case and rejected his suit.


[Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Company, Inc. (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents "state actions" from intruding unlawfully upon the rights of citizens. Section 1983 offers relief to those who have their rights unlawfully abridged by actions occurring "under the color of state law." The Court decided that a state was liable for damages caused by unconstitutional conduct when two conditions were met. First, "the deprivation [of a constitutional right] must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State." Second, "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." This includes both state officials and those whom are significantly aided by them. The Court previously found that the states guaranteed the due process of law when placing holds on disputed pieces of property, and therefore they are responsible for violations of this process. Accordingly, when Edmondson used state mechanisms to unconstitutionally deprive Lugar of his property, the state was responsible for compensating him for damages.


[Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico by Pico (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the "Board"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.


[Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico by Pico (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.


[Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust.


[Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history."


[Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1978, a Seattle school district adopted a mandatory busing plan to integrate its schools. No court or administrative body found the district to be engaged in unlawful segregation. A statewide initiative adopted in 1978 mandated a neighborhood school policy. The policy provided for some exceptions including voluntary busing options and mandatory busing if so ordered by state or federal courts. The initiative blocked the implementation of Seattle's mandatory busing plan. School officials challenged the Washington government in federal court.


[Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. The initiative reordered the educational decisionmaking process by moving the power over busing for purposes of integration to state control. The state explicitly employed "the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process." This kind of state action places an unconstitutional burden on racial minorities within the governmental process.


[Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On April 4, 1977, sixteen-year-old Monty Lee Eddings and several of his friends ran away from home. Before leaving, Eddings took three of his father’s firearms, including a .410 gauge shotgun with a shortened barrel. Before reaching the Turner Turnpike near Tulsa, the group stopped at a Howard Johnson restaurant. As they were leaving, Eddings lost control of the car, briefly sending it over a curb and into a ditch before regaining control. A witness observed this and informed an officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Patrolman Larry Crabtree, who followed their car and pulled it over. When Crabtree was within about six feet of the car, Eddings stuck the shotgun out of the window and fired it, killing Crabtree, then immediately drove the car away.
At trial, the defense presented evidence of circumstances mitigating Eddings’ guilt, including the details of his extensive juvenile record in Missouri. Eddings’ parents divorced when he was five, after which he was shuffled between his mother’s house and his father’s house and also spent some time in a group home. Witnesses testified that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and at a level several years below his age in terms of mental and emotional development. A state psychologist testified that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial personality disorder.
The state provided evidence of aggravating circumstances. Oklahoma alleged 1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, and 3) that there was a probability that the defendant would commit more criminal acts of violence constituting a threat to society. The trial judge found that the state proved all three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge also found that Eddings’ age was a mitigating factor of great weight, but would not consider evidence of Eddings’ “violent background.” The judge then found that the aggravating circumstances proven by the state outweighed the fact of Eddings’ age and sentenced him to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence, also holding that Eddings' death penalty sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.


[Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Louis Powell, the Court held that the trial court erred when it failed to consider mitigating evidence of Eddings’ unhappy childhood and emotional disturbance. Justice Powell looked to the Court’s decision in Lockett v. Ohio, where it held that a sentencer must consider any relevant aspect of a defendant’s character or record as mitigating factors toward imposing a sentence less than death.
Justice Powell then determined that the trial judge refused to consider the mitigating evidence of Eddings’ family history as a matter of law, rather than finding that evidence wanting as a matter of fact. He also determined that the court of appeals limited the evidence of mitigating circumstances to the fact of Eddings’ youth. He emphasized that the undisputed evidence of Eddings’ violent background demonstrated that he was not a normal sixteen-year-old. Justice Powell held that the Oklahoma state courts must consider such evidence when imposing the death penalty, reversing the sentence and remanding the case for further proceedings.
Justice William Brennan concurred, repeating his view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred, agreeing that the trial court incorrectly determined that it could not consider evidence of Eddings’ violent background as a matter of law. She emphasized that the majority’s holding did not change the Court’s opinions establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty; nor did it determine whether the Constitution permits the imposition of the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old.
Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, and William Rehnquist. He pointed out that the Court granted certiorari to answer whether it was constitutional to impose the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old offender, and that Eddings raised the evidentiary question for the first time in his brief to the Court. He argued that both the trial judge and the court of appeals actually weighed the evidence of Eddings’ violent background and found it lacking.


[Rogers v. Lodge (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Eight black citizens of Burke County, Georgia, challenged the at-large system of elections within the county. Although a substantial number of blacks lived within the county, no minority candidate had ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners, the chief governing body. To be elected, candidates had to receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election.


[Rogers v. Lodge (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the at-large system of elections in Burke County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the at-large system was operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination. The Court held that there was extensive historical evidence that the county had impeded the political participation of black citizens and that the at-large system minimized even further the ability of blacks to participate in the political process. The Court also upheld the system of single-member districts established by a district court.


[Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Secretary of Defense closed the Valley Forge General Hospital in an effort to reduce the number of military installations in the country. In accordance with a congressional statute regulating the dispersal of surplus government property, part of the hospital's land was given, free-of-charge, to the Valley Forge Christian College.


[Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that Americans United for Separation of Church and State did not have standing to sue. Justice Rehnquist argued that the group did not pass the first prong of the Court's test for taxpayer standing. Since the source of the group's complaint was not a congressional statute but the decision of a government agency to dispose of a parcel of property, and because the transaction did not involve the taxing and spending power, the group had no standing to sue.


[Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Immediately after Treasure Salvors, Inc. ("Treasure") located a 17th-century Spanish wreck of its coast, Florida claimed ownership of the remains. Treasure contracted with the Florida Division of Archives ("Archives") to salvage the wreck in exchange for 75% of the recovered artifacts' appraised value. Meanwhile, in the unrelated proceedings of United States v. Florida, the United States won a judgment granting it ownership of the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the area of the Spanish wreck's discovery. Upon learning of this ruling, Treasure sought a declaration of title to the wreck. Following a second favorable appellate decision, Treasure sought and received a warrant to seize all artifacts from the Archives. Florida challenged the warrant and its issuing district court's jurisdiction, but lost on both counts. On appeal from an unfavorable appellate ruling, the Supreme Court granted Florida certiorari.


[Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a plurality opinion, the Court first held that while a state enjoys limited immunity from federal process under the Eleventh Amendment, its officers do not. In the present case, the seizure warrant was filed against Florida's officers in the Archives. The Archive officers, although acting in official state capacity and defended by state attorneys, are not immune as the state itself may be from having to pay a judgment against them. Moreover, the Court found that although a profit sharing contract existed between Treasure and Archives, it did not justify Archive's refusal to surrender ownership over the artifacts pursuant to a federal warrant. Finally, the Court ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Florida's interest in the artifacts because these materials were held in a different district court's jurisdiction. As such, the decision was reversed in part and remanded as to its jurisdictional violations.


[Widmar v. Vincent (1981) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Cornerstone was an officially recognized student organization on the campus of the University of Missouri - Kansas City. The avowed purpose of Cornerstone was to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ on the campus. From 1973 to 1977, Cornerstone obtained permission to use university facilities for its weekly meetings and events.
In January 1977, the group sought permission from the university to use two rooms of its Haag Hall Annex for two and a half hours every week. University officials asked for a description of the activities that would be conducted at the proposed meetings. Cornerstone told the university that worship in the form of prayer and biblical teaching would be an important part of the general atmosphere of the meetings. University officials rejected Cornerstone’s application for regular use of the rooms, concluding the meetings would violate several sections of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the University of Missouri. These regulations prohibited the use of university buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching.
On December 11, 1979, the trial court granted summary judgment to Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at the university, and the university’s Board of Curators, rejecting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cornerstone’s members. It concluded that the university’s ban on religious services in its buildings was required by the First Amendment’s establishment clause. It also held that the university did not violate the students’ free exercise rights, and that any violation was outweighed by Missouri’s compelling interest in the separation of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the university’s regulation had the primary effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Instead, the Eighth Circuit suggested that a neutral policy toward religious groups would satisfy the university’s First Amendment obligations.


[Widmar v. Vincent (1981) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Court held that the university’s policy violated Cornerstone members’ First Amendment rights. He reasoned that when the university opened its facilities to student meetings, it created a public forum for those student groups; given no other justification, the university excluded Cornerstone based on the content of its members’ speech. While acknowledging the university’s obligation to comply with its constitutional obligations, Justice Powell agreed with the Eighth Circuit that a neutral policy toward religion would achieve this end.
Justice Powell argued that any religious benefits from an open forum would be incidental because the forum was available to a broad class of both religious and nonreligious speakers and because the university was not showing approval of a particular religious sect or practice. Justice Powell rejected the university’s argument that the Missouri Constitution compelled it to exclude Cornerstone, noting that Cornerstone’s First Amendment interests outweighed this state interest through the supremacy clause.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He rejected the majority’s description of the university’s student meetings policy as the creation of a public forum, but agreed that the university failed to justify its refusal to allow Cornerstone to worship on campus.
Justice Byron White dissented. He rejected the argument that the university created a public forum, but also suggested that the university’s fear of appearing to subsidize religion was too extreme. He balanced the state’s interest in enforcing its regulation with the burden on Cornerstone’s members’ ability to freely exercise their beliefs, concluding that the burden on Cornerstone was minimal.


[Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Furnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter. Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing. School administrators, along with a sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter. Amy’s parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all handicapped students. The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students.
The district court ruled in the Rowleys' favor, holding that while Amy was doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a 6-3 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court decisions. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not require a school to provide a sign language interpreter to a deaf student when she is otherwise receiving personalized instruction and an adequate education. School administrations are allowed to determine what is required to meet a handicapped students individual needs.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a special concurrence, expressing that no interpreter was required because Amy was given the opportunity to learn and participate in the classroom in a way that was substantially equal to her non-handicapped classmates. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the Act requires a school to provide a handicapped student with and education equal to non-handicapped children.


[Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1981, a representative of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party ("Party") died in office. Searching for a replacement, the Governor of Puerto Rico held a "by-election" open to candidates of all parties. The Party challenged the Governor, alleging that under Puerto Rico statutes only candidates and electors affiliated with the Party could participate in the by-election. On appeal from a Superior Court judgment favoring the Party, Puerto Rico's Supreme Court modified the judgment holding that a by-election was only required if the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to name a replacement within 60 days. Before Puerto Rico's Supreme Court could deliver its decision, the Party held an election open only to its members and, then, pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate, swore in a new representative. Rodriguez appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court, in a unanimous opinion, began by noting that the Constitution does not compel a fixed method of selecting state or local representatives. As such, the Puerto Rican Commonwealth legislature could vest exclusive interim appointment power in parties affiliated with the previous incumbent. This scheme is particularly reasonable in light of Puerto Rico's interest in maintaining continuity of party representation until the next general election and insuring its legislature's delicate balance of minority representation.


[Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Nicholas Romeo was a 33-year-old man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child. Following the death of his father, Romeo’s mother was unable to adequately care for Romeo and had him involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State School and Hospital (“Pennhurst”) on a permanent basis. During his time in the state facility, Romeo suffered injuries on numerous occasions and was physically restrained at times. Romeo’s mother became concerned, and after objecting to Romeo’s treatment several times, sued the facility on behalf of Romeo. Romeo’s mother claimed that his treatment violated the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Romeo’s mother claimed Romeo had the right to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and access to habilitation (training or treatment with the goal of eventual release).
At trial, the court instructed the jury that they could only find that Pennhurst violated Romeo’s constitutional rights if the officials had been “deliberately indifferent” to Romeo’s medical and psychological needs, and the jury found in favor of Pennhurst. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable, because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not the involuntarily committed. However, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Romeo had liberty interests in freedom from restraint, safe conditions, and minimally adequate habilitation, which could only be violated if three distinct standards were met. An infringement of the right to safe conditions can only be justified by “substantial necessity,” the right to freedom from bodily restraints can only be infringed for “compelling necessity,” and the access to habilitation must be “acceptable in the light of present medical or other scientific knowledge.


[Youngberg v. Romeo (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes, unanswered. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the involuntarily committed do have liberty interests in safe confinement and freedom from bodily restraint under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a historical right to adequate habilitation was less clear, made especially so by the facts of the case in question. Because no amount of habilitation would allow Romeo to live independently, the Court was unsure what would qualify as adequate habilitation. The Court held that Romeo’s liberty interests required Pennhurst to provide adequate habilitation, but only as it related to Romeo’s right to safe confinement and freedom from undue restraint. The Court declined to answer whether the Fourteenth Amendment includes a stand-alone right to adequate habilitation, or how to determine the level of habilitation required to protect other liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized the need to balance the legitimate interests of both parties involved to determine whether liberty interests were being adequately protected. In the involuntary commitment arena, deference to qualified professionals is necessary because of their specialized knowledge and the specific circumstances and risks inherent in a mental hospital. Therefore, such professionals and institutions can only be held liable for infringements on liberty interests when the decision by a professional is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence emphasizing that the majority opinion had correctly not ruled on whether a state can accept an individual for care and then refuse treatment or whether the right to habilitation required Pennhurst to offer adequate training to preserve Romeo’s original basic self-care skills. He argued that the record was not adequately developed to address these two issues. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment did not contained a separate right to habilitation. Any right to habilitation only arises from other liberty interests, not as a liberty interest in and of itself.


[Engle v. Isaac (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1974, Ohio enacted a statute that stated, while the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense rested on the defendant. From 1974 until 1976, Ohio state courts operated as though this statute did not affect Ohio's traditional rule that a defendant had to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute placed only the burden of production of such evidence — as opposed to the burden of persuasion — on the defendant, and jury instructions were altered accordingly.
The respondents, Lincoln Isaac, Kenneth Bell, and Howard Hughes, each had separate trials that occurred after the 1974 statute was put in place, but before the 1976 decision. At the time of their trials, none of the respondents objected to the jury instructions regarding how the jury should consider evidence of self-defense. The Ohio Criminal Code required defendants to raise any objections to jury instructions at the time the instructions are given. The respondents filed petitions in federal district courts for writs of habeas corpus and used the 1976 decision to challenge the jury instructions trial. The courts denied the writs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and rejected the argument regarding the jury instructions because it had not been made at the time of the trial. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case.


[Engle v. Isaac (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a 7-2 majority, ruled in favor of Engle and stated that the respondents cannot challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio jury instructions in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Court held that the respondents forfeited their right to object to the jury instructions when they did not comply with the Ohio Criminal Code that specified they must make any objections at the time of the trial. The Court also found that the jury instructions themselves were not unconstitutional, as they depend on how a state defines the elements of a particular crime. The jury instructions were consistent with the Ohio state laws regarding to what extent the prosecution must disprove certain affirmative defenses. Thus, the respondents did not have constitutional grounds for the writ.
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with the judgment of the Court that the petition for the writs should be dismissed. However, he argued that such an error in jury instructions would not have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. found that the Court’s dismissal of Isaac’s petition on procedural grounds is illogical, given that Isaac’s claim did not exist when he could have raised the appropriate objection at trial. He also found that the double-pronged standard of cause and prejudice that the Court uses to determine if there are grounds for a habeas claim is too high for any defendant to reasonably meet. He was joined in the dissent by Justice Thurgood Marshall.


[Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial.


[Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is "properly afforded" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, "does not justify a mandatory closure rule" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.


[New York v. Ferber (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.


[New York v. Ferber (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.


[American Tobacco Company v. Patterson (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
American Tobacco Company operated two plants in Richmond, VA. Until 1963, both plants were segregated, and the better job opportunities were reserved for white employees. Between 1963 and 1968, the plants were officially desegregated, but the promotion policies were left mostly to the discretion of the supervisors. The best jobs continued to go to the white employees. In November 1968, the company proposed nine new lines of employment progression that linked bottom jobs with the top job a worker could eventually receive. Four of the lines linked majority-white bottom jobs with majority-white top jobs; two of the lines linked majority-black bottom jobs with majority-black top jobs. The top jobs for the majority-white progression lines were the best jobs in the factories.
On January 3, 1969, John Patterson and two other employees filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1973, alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act, the employees sued the company in district court . The district court held that the lines of progression violated the Act and prohibited the company from using them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the remedy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
On remand, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaints by arguing that the seniority system was exempt from the Civil Rights Act. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision because that the lines of progression are not a seniority system. The Court of Appeals also held that the immunity for seniority systems only extends to those in place before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.


[American Tobacco Company v. Patterson (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the absence of any sort of grandfather clause or explicit distinction between pre- and post-Act systems meant that the section applied to all seniority systems, regardless of when they were put in place. There was no clear legislative history to support the distinction between pre-existing systems and those that were implemented later. The Court also held that such a reading would drastically shift national labor policy away from the balance that Congress intended the section to strike.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. argued that the decision of the Court ignored the crucial distinction between the adoption of a seniority system and its application. The section’s clear use of the language of application on the part of the employer — without any mention of adoption or the union — indicated a more narrow meaning. He also argued that the legislative history showed that Congress meant the Act to have a stronger effect on systems put in place after the effective date of the Act. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he expressed that the Court misread the section as referring to seniority systems both before and after the effective date of the Act. He argued that the purpose of the section was limited to determining which of the pre-Act systems should be considered legal and which should not; the section has no bearing on any post-Act systems.


[National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Company (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1966, at a local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched a boycott of white merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and “threats” to carryout the boycott.


[National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Company (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the nonviolent elements of the protesters’ activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. In this case, the members of the NAACP exercised their First Amendment right of speech, assembly, and petition in a nonviolent way to bring about social change. The NAACP is not liable in damages for the consequences of their nonviolent activity and the damages cannot be recovered because the violence or threats of violence were not a proximate cause of the business losses.
Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


[Larson v. Valente (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1961, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, which established a system of registering charitable organizations that solicit money. All organizations subject to the Act must file extensive annual reports with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Department may deny or withdraw the registration of any organization that engages in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices. From 1961 until 1978, all religious organizations were exempt from the Act. In 1978, the state legislature amended the Act to include religious organizations that received more than fifty percent of their funding from solicitations of nonmembers.
Shortly after the amendment, the Department notified the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) that it must register under the Act. Pamela Valente and other members of the Church responded by suing and alleging that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Magistrate granted a preliminary injunction and held that the Act failed the second part of the Lemon Test, that the primary effect of a law must neither advance nor inhibit religion. Accepting the recommendation of the Magistrate, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the fifty percent rule violated the Establishment Clause, but held that proof of status as a religious organization was required to be exempt from the Act.


[Larson v. Valente (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the fifty percent rule clearly distinguished between denominations and created denominational preferences within the law, and it did not serve a compelling government interest. The Court also held that the Act failed the three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman by fostering the government entanglement in religion.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that, although it is unclear whether or not the Unification Church would be considered a religious organization under the Act before the amendment, the judicial record has assumed it to be, so the majority’s decision to treat it as such is consistent with the orderly administration of justice.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent and argued that the majority erred by examining the case under a different framework than the previous courts, and should have remanded the case. He also argued that the majority should not have rejected the argument that the state has a valid secular purpose in preventing fraudulent charities from preying on the public. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
In a separate dissent, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that it is the Unification Church’s status as a charitable organization that makes it eligible for the registration requirement, not its status as a religious organization under the fifty percent rule, which establishes exemptions. Since it is unclear whether the Unification Church is a religious organization under the Act, he argued it was improper for the majority’s opinion to rule on the constitutionality issue. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


[Northern Pipeline Constr. Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created a system of bankruptcy courts as an adjunct to the federal system of district courts. This case was decided together with United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co.


[Northern Pipeline Constr. Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. A plurality held that Congress had essentially conferred Article III powers to an adjunct system of courts and, consequently, "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial power" from the district courts.


[United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A new collective bargaining agreement increased health benefits for widows of coal miners who were receiving pensions when they died. The agreement did not increase benefits for widows of coal miners who were still working at the time they died, although they were eligible for pensions. These health benefits were paid out of a trust fund financed by the operators. Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager brought this class action on behalf of all similarly situated widows. They alleged that requiring the worker to be receiving a pension at the time of death to qualify for increased health benefits bore no relation to the purpose of the trust. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement failed to meet the reasonable standard set out in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). The LMRA requires pension trusts to be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees...and their families”.


[United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the LMRA does not have a reasonableness requirement. The relevant section of the LMRA is merely meant to protect employees from having their benefit funds used for other union purposes. The collective bargaining agreement did not violate any command of Congress, so the Court had no authority to modify its terms.


[United States v. Lee (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop. He did not pay quarterly social security taxes, and in 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $27,000 in unpaid taxes. Lee paid the portion due for the first quarter of 1973 and sued for a refund. Lee argued that the tax violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. In the Amish religion, it is a sin not to provide for the community’s elderly and needy citizens. Lee argued that paying the federal government for Social Security violates that provision of his religion by giving the responsibility of caring for the elderly and needy to the government. The district court held that the Social Security tax was unconstitutional as applied. The court also noted that §1402(g) provides an exception to the social security tax for certain self employed individuals. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.


[United States v. Lee (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the §1402(g) exemption only applied to self-employed individuals, not employers and employees like those involved in this case. The Court held that the tax was not unconstitutional as applied. By becoming an employer, Lee entered into commercial activity and accepted certain limits on the exercise of his beliefs.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, stating that the tax objector has the burden of showing that there is a unique reason for allowing an exemption from a valid law when the objectors religious obligation and civic obligation are irreconcilable.


[United States v. Ross (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Acting on a tip that Ross was selling drugs from his car in the District of Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, and discovered a bag of heroin. After returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant in each search.


[United States v. Ross (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that since the search was done with probable cause and extended into the realm (Ross's car) of which a magistrate issuing a warrant would have approved, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens defended the search of the vehicle's trunk, arguing that if probable cause justifies a vehicle search, then every part of the vehicle is open to inspection.


[INS v. Chadha (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.


[INS v. Chadha (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.


[Enmund v. Florida (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Earl Enmund and two codefendants were found guilty of the felony murder and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple. Enmund was the getaway driver, who waited in the car during the robbery, did not participate in the killing and had no idea anyone would be killed. Enmund argued that the evidence did not show any intent to kill, so the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment. Despite this, the jury sentenced him to death along with his codefendants. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction.


[Enmund v. Florida (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on someone who aided and abetted but did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. It is unlikely that the death penalty could deter someone who did not intend to kill or attempt to kill, and putting someone to death for two killings they did not commit is disproportionate retribution. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred, writing that the death penalty is cruel and unusual in all circumstances.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision is not supported by prior precedent. The Florida Supreme Court rejected critical factual findings, so the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Lewis F. Powell, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


[United States v. MacDonald (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In May 1970, Jeffrey MacDonald, an army captain living at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was charged with the murders of his wife and two children. However, after an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), the murder charges were dropped, and MacDonald was given an honorable discharge. Following MacDonald’s discharge, the U.S. Justice Department asked the Army CID to continue its investigation into the murders, and in 1972 the CID created a report on the murders that recommended further investigation into MacDonald. After evaluating the report, the Justice Department presented the case to a grand jury in the fall of 1974, which returned an indictment for MacDonald in January of 1975 that charged him again with all three murders.
MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the delay between the original murder charge in 1970 and the grand jury indictment in 1974 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied MacDonald’s motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed the district court by finding that the time-gap between the 1972 CID report to the Justice Department and the 1974 convening of a grand jury infringed on MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded. The Court held that MacDonald could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 6th amendment right to speedy trial until after the trial has been completed. MacDonald was tried and convicted of all three murders. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit again held the indictment violated MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights.


[United States v. MacDonald (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is intended to protect citizens from the extended disruptions that may accompany being charged with a crime, such as social stigma, anxiety, and the financial burden of defending oneself in court. In the current case, these interests were not being infringed during the period between the original dismissal and the re-filing of the murder charges because MacDonald was not under arrest, in custody, or subject to any criminal prosecution. Though the situation may have led to stress or other adverse consequence, once the original charges had been dismissed, MacDonald was in the same position as he would have been if charges had never been filed. The Court held that MacDonald could not claim his Sixth Amendment right was being infringed after the dismissal of the original charges.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial was not suspended during the period between the original dismissal and re-filing. However, the importance of allowing the Government to be cautious before prosecuting MacDonald for such a serious crime meant that the delay did not violate MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the majority opinion failed to take certain facts into account when determining the original charges and the re-filed charges were distinct events between which MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial was not implicated. Not only did the investigation not end when the original charges were dismissed, but MacDonald was also aware the investigation was ongoing. Multiple times between 1972 and 1974, MacDonald requested the Government complete its investigation and even offered to sit for further interviews. Furthermore, the Government never offered any legitimate reason for the delay in re-filing the charges. Neither the language of the Sixth Amendment nor Supreme Court precedent supported the majority’s narrow view of when a criminal prosecution is taking place. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.