[Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment below and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the district court confused jurisdiction with stating a valid cause of action. The district court had jurisdiction to determine whether Romero had stated a valid cause of action under the Jones Act and pendant jurisdiction joins the general maritime law claims. The Court also found that U.S. maritime law does not apply as a matter of law.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a partial dissent, stating that he could not agree with the majority that the court did not have independent jurisdiction over maritime law. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the partial dissent. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, expressing that maritime laws are independently within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and that the Jones Act does apply. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


[First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
These are two consolidated cases concerning property tax exemption under the California Constitution and California Revenue and Taxation Code (CRTC) for real property and buildings used solely for religious worship. The California Constitution requires denial of tax exemption to any person or organization who advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government or the State of California by violent or unlawful means. To enforce this, a provision of the CRTC requires those applying for tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they do not engage in that prohibited activity.
In both cases, the Los Angeles assessor denied tax exemption because the churches refused to agree to the oath. The churches paid their taxes under protest and sued the County of Los Angeles for a refund. The churches argued that requiring them to agree to the oath violated the U.S. Constitution. In 382, the trial court upheld the oath and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. In 385, the court upheld the oath under the U.S. Constitution, but held that it violated the California Constitution because it excluded householders from the requirement. The Supreme Court of California reversed.


[First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgments. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a four justice plurality, followed the same reasoning from his opinion in Speiser v. Randall, a companion case. In that opinion he held that the oath provision denied freedom of speech without due process because it placed the burden of proof of eligibility for tax exemption on the taxpayer.
Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, using his opinion from Speiser where he argued that the First Amendment barred California for imposing what he saw as a tax on belief and expression. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the concurrence. Justice Douglas concurred separately, following his opinion from Speiser, and adding that the oath provision violated the First Amendment freedom of religion. Justice Black joined in the concurrence. Justice Harold Burton concurred in the result.
Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that signing the oath or not does not alone decide tax exempt eligibility, so the burden of proof is not on the tax payer. Chief Justice Earl Warren did not participate.


[Staub v. City of Baxley () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Rose Staub was convicted and fined for attempting to organize a branch of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union at Hazlehurst Manufacturing Company. She violated an ordinance in the neighboring town of Baxley, where many of the Manufacturing Co. workers lived. That ordinance required anyone soliciting members for a union to apply for a permit from the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permits for any reason. Staub argued that the ordinance violated her constitutional right to free speech. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, but did not consider the constitutional question because Staub did not attempt to comply with the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari.


[Staub v. City of Baxley () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion reversing the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated free speech because it made the enjoyment of speech contingent on the will of the mayor and city council. The mayor and city council had too much discretion in granting or denying permits. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent, stating that case should be left to the Georgia Courts. Justice Tom C. Clark joined in the dissent.


[Kent v. Dulles () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Rockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed Kent to submit an affidavit as to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more asked to sign an affidavit concerning his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the Passport Department advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent certiorari.


[Kent v. Dulles () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the right to travel is an inherent element of "liberty" that cannot be denied to American citizens. Although the Executive may regulate the travel practices of citizens, by requiring them to obtain valid passports, it may not condition the fulfillment of such requirements with the imposition of rules that abridge basic constitutional notions of liberty, assembly, association, and personal autonomy.


[Wiener v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
By the War Claims Act of 1948, Congress established the War Claims Commission for the purpose of adjudicating claims for compensating internees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations. Wiener was confirmed as a member of the Commission by President Truman in 1950. In 1953, when President Eisenhower requested Wiener's resignation, Wiener refused. Eisenhower subsequently appointed a substitute to Wiener's post. The Commission was abolished in 1954, and Wiener brought a claim to recover his salary from the time of his removal to the last day of the Commission's existence.


[Wiener v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to remove individuals from the War Claims Commission at will. The Court found that Congress had intended to create a body that was "'entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,' of either the Executive or the Congress." The "intrinsic judicial character" of the Commission's duties required that it be able to adjudicate claims solely on the merits of each claim free of external Executive pressure." Congress did not wish to have hand over the Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choosing."


[Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Byrd, a resident of North Carolina, was employed by a subcontractor of Blue Ridge Electric, a South Carolina company. When he was hurt during his work on power lines, Byrd sued Blue Ridge for negligence in a federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. Blue Ridge defended against his claim based on a South Carolina law providing that employees of sub-contractors should be considered employees of contractors for which the sub-contractor provided work. South Carolina law further provided that the immunity defense needed to be determined by a judge rather than a jury. Byrd contended that his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should trump that provision of the state law.


[Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In diversity cases where the Erie doctrine applies, federal courts must balance their respect for the substance of state laws with the need to preserve the essential characteristics and functions of the federal courts. The Seventh Amendment jury function is one of those essential functions.
In an opinion authored by Justice Willian Brennan, the Court held that South Carolina law was essentially a procedural rule because it determined how immunity should be enforced, rather than affecting the substantive rights and obligations created by the state. The federal court should typically follow this type of rule. In the instant case, however, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was an essential factor in the federal court process, and therefore the amendment prevailed.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
In 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Rock Island Motor Transit, a subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, to purchase the property and rights of the White Line Motor Freight Company between Silvis, Illinois and Omaha, Nebraska. The certificate limited motor operations to service to or from points on the Rock Island Railroad, subject to any restrictions the commission might impose under the Interstate Commerce Act to insure that the service was auxiliary or supplementary to train service. The Act authorized consolidation, merger, acquisition, or lease of common carriers if the commission deemed it to be “consistent with the public interest.” In a separate section, Congress directed the commission not to certify a railroad corporation seeking to operate motor carriers unless it also found that the railroad would use motor vehicle service to public advantage in its operations and would not unduly restrain competition.
In 1944, Rock Island purchased the Frederickson Lines, covering routes between Atlantic, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska. Rock Island filed for permission to provide motor service to points along the Frederickson Lines. The commission granted Rock Island permission, but placed five conditions on motor service for both the White and Frederickson routes. Rock Island challenged the conditions in district court and won, but on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the commission’s power to impose the conditions.
Rock Island then filed for permission to provide unrestricted motor service to points along the White and Frederickson lines. In 1954, the application was substantially granted. American Trucking Associations, Inc., nine other motor carriers, a group of railway trade unions, and several other organizations intervened, arguing that 1) the commission was required to limit motor service by a rail-owned motor carrier to auxiliary or supplementary service, and 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support the commission’s certification order. The district court upheld the certificate as granted.


[American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thomas Clark, the Court held that the “public interest” section of the Act did not prohibit the commission from allowing Rock Island to operate unrestricted motor service along the White and Frederickson lines. Justice Clark noted that Rock Island applied for its broader application under the public interest section of the Act, which did not contain 1) statutory language limiting the provision of motor service by railroad companies or 2) language suggesting that service must be auxiliary or supplementary. He looked to the legislative history of the act, and determined that while congress considered adding an absolute “auxiliary or supplemental” requirement to the public interest section, it did not do so.
Justice Clark then held that there was sufficient evidence to show that Rock Island’s motor transit service along the approved routes served the public interest. Although the evidence did not suggest that allowing Rock Island to provide motor service was the only way to serve public convenience and necessity, Justice Clark reasoned that the generally more profitable motor service helped to pay for the costlier rail service, securing the public’s access to both. He also noted that the commission could impose restrictions or conditions if Rock Island’s unrestricted motor operations became clearly destructive of competition in the future.
Justice William Douglas dissented.


[Beilan v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
On June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, a teacher in the Philadelphia school system for the previous 22 years, presented himself in the Superintendent’s office at the latter’s request. The Superintendent asked if Beilan had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Beilan requested to speak with counsel before answering, and he was allowed to do so. After speaking with counsel, Beilan informed the Superintendent that he would not answer that question or other similar ones. The Superintendent informed Beilan that refusal to answer such questions could lead to his dismissal. On November 25, 1953, the Board of Public Education initiated dismissal proceedings against Beilan and cited Beilan’s failure to answer the Superintendent’s question regarding his 1944 activities as evidence of “incompetency.” There was a formal hearing, at which Beilan did not testify. The charge of incompetency was sustained and Beilan was fired. The administrative appeal upheld the decision of the local Board. Beilan appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which set aside Beilan’s discharge. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.


[Beilan v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Harold Burton delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that public officials such as teachers can be questioned about issues that are relevant to their fitness and suitability for public service. There is no requirement that states that a teacher’s fitness is solely determined by performance in the classroom. By refusing to answer the question, Beilan showed himself to be insubordinate and lacking in frankness, which gave the Board grounds to fire him for incompetency. The Court also held that Beilan was not denied due process because he was given sufficient warning of the consequences of his refusal to answer the question.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that it is not a denial of due process when a state appropriately acts in a way that could be seen as unwise. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against improper state action, and it is not the role of the Supreme Court to censor state action that falls within the bounds of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Board’s decision to dismiss Beilan was the result of Beilan being called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and therefore invalid. In his separate dissent, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the only evidence against Beilan was his refusal to answer a question regarding his membership in an organization that espouses certain ideals. To punish him without any evidence of wrongdoing runs counter to the entire basis of American jurisprudence. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the state action in this case essentially branded a citizen as disloyal, which could have enormously detrimental effects on his life. Because this charge was not properly addressed by a court of law, Justice Brennan argued that Beilan was denied his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Lawn v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
These are two consolidated cases involving several individuals involved in a tax evasion scheme. The petitioners were indicted and testified before a grand jury without being warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the district court dismissed the indictment. The appeals court affirmed the dismissal. While the appeal was pending, the United States initiated a new grand jury proceeding and, at a trial by jury, the petitioners were found guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The petitioners suspected that prosecutors used privileged information gained in the first indictment to aid in the second proceeding, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.


[Lawn v. United States () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion, affirming the convictions. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' Due Process claims because they laid no foundation for holding a hearing on the issue. The Court also held that a copy of a cancelled check obtained at the first indictment did not violate Due Process when prosecutors introduced it into evidence at the second proceeding. The petitioner’s counsel had explicitly waived any objection to that evidence at trial.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that the record does not show that petitioner’s counsel waived their objection to entering the cancelled check into evidence. Justices Felix Frankfurter and William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.


[National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Facts]
Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists.


[National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson () — Warren Court (1957-1958) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.


[Scales v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States ("Party") because it advocated the overthrow of the government "as speedily as circumstances would permit." Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 ("Security Act") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review.


[Scales v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Security Act protects "per se" members of an organization from criminal prosecution. The Smith Act, by contrast, goes beyond "per se" participation by targeting those whose membership in an organization entails their knowing and deliberate participation in criminal activity. In light of this distinction, the Court noted, the two Acts are not conflicted. Since Scales, at the very least, knew, encouraged, and provoked illegal Party activities over the course of his eight year membership, he was guilty under the Smith Act of complicity in the commission of criminal activity.


[Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long as the building was used for “principally” residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The panel affirmed.


[Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the intent of the Act was to provide housing for veterans, which implies a degree of permanency. Previous interpretation by the FHA also understood the Act to exclude transient occupancy. The Court also held that the addition of the exclusion to the Act after the FHA contracted to ensure the mortgages was not unfair to The Darlington, Inc.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent arguing that the majority’s opinion constituted an “unconstitutional retroactive application” of the new exclusions in the Act. He also argued that there was no language in the Act that expressly prohibited The Darlington, Inc. from renting to transients, so the corporation’s actions violated neither the letter nor the intent of the Act. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Charles E. Whittaker joined in the dissent.
In a separate dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter argued that the later changes to the Act did not negate the rights of mortgage companies to rent to transients that existed under the previous construction of the Act.


[Draper v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag.
Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed.


[Draper v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Charles E. Whittaker delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence required to show probable cause is not held to the same standard as evidence required to prove guilt in trial. Despite the fact that information Marsh gained from Hereford would be inadmissible at trial as hearsay, it may still be relied on as probable cause for a search and arrest. The Court also held that, because Marsh was able to personally verify the description Hereford had given, he had “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information regarding the heroin was also correct.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that an arrest made on the word of an informant violates the spirit of the Fourth Amendment because it allows the police latitude to arrest innocent people without sufficient proof. He argued that an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to allow arrests based on suspicion goes against the entire history of American jurisprudence and the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


[Abel v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist’s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “Mark”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel.
FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) a report on Abel as a suspected spy; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel’s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial.
Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel’s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel’s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel’s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant.


[Abel v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes, no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court held that the INS properly arrested Abel even though the FBI suspected him of espionage. Justice Frankfurter noted that the INS was simultaneously investigating Abel’s status in the United States and that it indeed commenced deportation proceedings against him. While acknowledging both that the INS delayed its arrest of Abel and that the FBI searched Abel’s room immediately after INS agents’ search, he did not consider this to be sufficient evidence of unreasonable “bad faith” cooperation between the INS and FBI. He argued that the government had two available ways of dealing with a criminally suspect deportable alien and simply chose to detain Abel for potential deportation first.
Justice Frankfurter also held that the items seized by both the INS and the FBI were properly introduced into evidence at trial. He could discern no constitutional reason to limit the search for materials proving the deportability of a validly arrested alien more than the Constitution limits the search for materials probative of a crime. Noting that INS agents had to apply to the District Director of the INS for a warrant, Justice Frankfurter argued that the differences in procedural protection between criminal and deportation arrests were not of constitutional significance.
Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He warned against allowing administrative officers such as INS agents to enter people’s homes without warrants, especially when the invasion is a front for a criminal investigation. Justice Douglas argued that the FBI were clearly the moving force behind Abel’s arrest and the search of his hotel room, noting that the FBI made no effort during the investigation to obtain a search warrant despite having plenty of time to do so.
Justice William Brennan dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, and Justice William Douglas. While acknowledging that Congress’ power over aliens may be great and that deportation may be described as a civil remedy, he rejected the majority’s notion that the fruits of a deportation warrant may be used in a criminal trial. He noted that there was no independent inquiry over the circumstances of the arrest and seizure, given that only a superior INS officer approved the deportation warrant. Justice Brennan argued that such an administrative search can never be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.


[Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
The radio and television station WDAY, Inc. broadcast the speech of A.C. Townley, a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States Senate race in North Dakota. The speech was broadcast uncensored as a reply to previous speeches made by two other Senate candidates. Townley’s speech accused the other candidates and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to establish “a Communist Farmers Union Soviet.” Farmers Union sued Townley and WDAY, Inc for libel in district court. The court dismissed the complaint against WDAY, Inc. and held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 granted the station immunity from liability for such defamation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.


[Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the censorship prohibited by the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was defined broadly and included the removal of objectionable material from a political speech. Permitting broadcasting stations to engage in this type of censorship would undermine the purpose the Act was meant to serve. The Court also held that holding the station liable for any defamatory statement made during the broadcast of a political speech would allow liability for conduct that the statute requires. While Congress did not explicitly include station immunity in the Act, the Federal Communications Commission, the body in charge of administering the Act, has long upheld the doctrine of station immunity.
Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented and argued that, unless Congress explicitly granted stations immunity from state libel laws, state law trumps any implied federal immunity. Since Congress has not granted any explicit immunity, and the legislative history does not indicate that they intended to do so, the state laws stand. He also argued that the precedent set by the Court supports the state unless federal laws explicitly intercede. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Barenblatt v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
During hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political and religious beliefs along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt of Congress for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation.


[Barenblatt v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
The divided Court found that the Committee's actions did not violate the First Amendment and, thus, upheld Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress. Justice Harlan noted that the First Amendment does not protect a witness from all lines of questioning. As long as the Congressional inquiry is pursued to "aid the legislative process" and to protect important government interests, then it is legitimate.


[Barr v. Matteo () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Linda Matteo and John Madigan created a plan for utilizing $2.6 million in funds from the Office of Housing Expediter. The Office’s commission was coming to an end, and the plan involved firing and rehiring employees on a temporary basis until the life of the Office was extended or ended. William G. Barr, general manager of the Office, vehemently opposed the plan, and several Senators attacked the plan on the Senate floor. Barr decided to suspend Matteo and Madigan. He issued a press release explaining his reasons. Matteo and Madigan sued for libel based on the statements in the press release.
In certain circumstances, government officials are protected from civil suits for actions done in the scope of their official duties though absolute or qualified privilege. The district court ruled in favor of Matteo and Madigan, rejecting Barr’s claim that his statements were protected by privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, considering only absolute privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded so the court of appeals could consider qualified privilege. On remand, the court of appeals held that qualified privilege existed, but was defeated due to Barr’s malice. The court remanded the case to district court for a new trial.


[Barr v. Matteo () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the judgement of the court, reversing the court of appeals. The plurality argued that the statements from the press release were absolutely privileged. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Tom C. Clark, and Justice Charles E. Whittaker joined in the plurality. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the reversal, writing that that the press release was not unauthorized or beyond the scope of Barr’s official business.
Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that absolute privilege should not extend to lower level officials like Barr, and qualified privilege should only apply to statements to the public. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also dissented, arguing that only qualified privilege applied. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that Barr acted beyond the scope of his job duties when he issued the press release, so privilege did not apply.


[Williams v. Lee () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
A non-Native American merchant ran a general store on a Navajo reservation. The merchant filed a collection action against petitioners, Native American customers, for goods sold on credit at the store. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial court's judgment that the state courts had jurisdiction. The Native American customers sought review.


[Williams v. Lee () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that the Arizona state court improperly exercised jurisdiction, because states lack power to regulate Native American affairs on a reservation. The Court reasoned that the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses exercised broad criminal and civil jurisdiction that covered suits by outsiders against Native American defendants. Federal law granted states the power to assume jurisdiction over reservation matters if the state legislature or the people affirmatively accepted the responsibility, and Arizona expressly disclaimed such jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the Navajo Treaty of 1868 controlled, and civil jurisdiction resided with the reservation's courts.


[Brown v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Emanuel Brown was a witness at a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act (FMCA). Brown refused to answer questions asked by the grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The district judge ordered Brown to answer the questions, telling him that the FMCA provided immunity against any prosecution that might arise from Brown’s testimony. Brown still refused to answer. After several failed attempts to make Brown answer the questions, the judge held him in contempt of court and sentenced him to 15 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.


[Brown v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court held that the FMCA clearly provided Brown with immunity from prosecution based on his testimony. Because he could not possibly incriminate himself, he could not invoke the Fifth Amendment. There was no statutory cap on sentencing, so 15 months was not an abuse of discretion.
Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that the district judge denied Brown due process by following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) instead of 49(b). Under 49(b) Brown would be sentenced to prison until he agreed to answer the questions instead of a fixed 15 month sentence. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.


[Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for "first-run" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their "first-run" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed.
The lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.


[Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that a case involving both equitable and legal claims must be tried by jury before the equitable damages can be accessed. Therefore, Beacon Theatre had a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Fox West Coast’s injunction for permanent relief from Beacon could be assessed after the jury verdict.
Justice Potter Stewart (joined by Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Charles E. Whittaker) wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court should have denied the writ of mandamus because the issues of this case were questions of law rather than fact, and that the trial judge should be granted deference.


[Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification.
In March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac.
The hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.


[Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did not properly enjoin the union employees from picketing the resort hotels. The Court held that the strike's status under the National Labor Relations Act did not control the case. Instead, the Court looked to whether or not any violence resulted from the picketers’ activities. It held that none of the district courts made any finding of violence sufficient to merit an injunction from the Florida Supreme Court. The Court determined that it was not necessary to consider whether interstate commerce was involved in the Florida resort hotel industry.


[Dick v. New York Life Insurance Company () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body.
The county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as “suicide.”
New York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.


[Dick v. New York Life Insurance Company () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-2 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in reversing the judgment of the district court. Chief Justice Warren argued that the jury could have determined that William Dick's death was accidental from the evidence Blanche Dick presented at trial, emphasizing that the evidence apparently did not suggest that William had either the motive or intention to commit suicide. He also noted that William was in the middle of his chores when he died, which the jury could have reasonably concluded to be improbable timing for a suicide attempt.
Chief Justice Warren declined to answer whether a state or federal evidentiary standard is proper when jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the parties because both parties assumed the North Dakota standard was proper in their briefs and arguments.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred, agreeing that the district court properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard. Justice Stewart noted that he was not a member of the court when the case was granted a writ of certiorari, and thus refrained from expressing an opinion on whether the Court granted the writ appropriately.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice Charles Whittaker, dissented. He argued that the Court improperly granted a writ of certiorari to Blanche Dick’s case. Justice Frankfurter outlined the history of diversity jurisdiction cases in the circuit courts, emphasizing that congress intended the Court to use its certiorari power sparingly in such cases. He argued that the Eighth Circuit properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard and concluded that Blanche's claim fell short of the North Dakota requirements for submission to a jury.
Justice John Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


[Spano v. New York () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did.
The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Spano v. New York () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the interrogation tactics the police used -- such as questioning Spano for hours without a break and using a childhood friend to manipulate him -- were coercive and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the confession was involuntary, it should not have been admitted into evidence in trial.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the interrogation was also unconstitutional because the police denied Spano access to his lawyer. He wrote that a defendant who has been charged with a crime is entitled to representation by counsel, and that right extends beyond the trial. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence in which he argued that the judgment should be reversed solely due to the fact that the defendant was denied access to counsel during his interrogation. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.


[Abbate v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
In the midst of a labor strike against Southern Bell Telephone Company, Louis Joseph Abbate, Michael Louis Falcone, and Norman McLeod met with James Shelby, a union official, in a Chicago tavern. Shelby requested the others’ assistance in carrying out plans to bomb certain Southern Bell facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Abbate and Falcone did not go through with the plan and instead informed Chicago police when McLeod obtained dynamite and traveled to Mississippi. The State of Illinois subsequently charged all four with the crime of conspiring to destroy the property of another. Abbate and Falcone pled guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison each. Because several of the targeted facilities were used exclusively by the military and federal agencies, federal prosecutors subsequently charged Abbate, Falcone, and Shelby with conspiring to destroy property essential to the U.S. communications systems. At trial in federal district court, McLeod testified against his former co-conspirators, and the jury found them guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments against Abbate and Falcone on appeal. In their petition to the Supreme Court, Abbate and Falcone argued that the federal prosecution subsequent to their convictions under Illinois law violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents someone from being tried more than once for the same crime.


[Abbate v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to a federal prosecution that follows a state prosecution of the same person for the same actions. Rather, the separate prosecutions reflect the concurrent power of the state and federal governments to enforce their separate statutes. Moreover, the Court held that allowing the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar subsequent prosecutions by the other level of government would hinder the law enforcement capability of that entity.
In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan commented on the federal government’s argument in favor of affirming the convictions. He found the implications disturbing as the argument potentially allowed successive prosecutions of the same person by the same level of government. Justice Brennan reiterated that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the notion that individuals should only have to spend money and time defending themselves once for a single crime.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he argued that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, Abbate and Falcone’s subsequent federal prosecution was just as troubling as Illinois imprisoning them twice for their role in the conspiracy. Expressing skepticism towards the concurrent powers theory relied on by the Court, Justice Black noted that foreign nations, unlike state and federal governments, are completely distinct sovereigns, yet many nations refuse to prosecute an individual following a prosecution in another country for the same acts. Additionally, the legislative history of the Double Jeopardy clause showed that language that would have restricted the clause to prohibit only successive prosecutions by the same government had been rejected. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the dissent.


[Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Bowers () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
These are two consolidated cases concerning the tax consequences of importing goods from foreign countries that are then used for manufacturing in the United States.
In 9, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. imported ores for manufacturing, which were stored at its plant in Ohio. Under the U.S. Constitution, imports are not taxed. Youngstown took the ore needed for each day of manufacturing from the storage piles to stock bins. The state of Ohio assessed property tax on the ore because Youngstown had changed the ore from an import to a manufacturing supply. Youngstown argued that the ore kept in storage bins was not taxable because it was held for storage only. Youngstown also argued that the tax violated equal protection because it applied to residents of Ohio, but not to non-residents who had property in the state. After exhausting administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the tax.
In 44, Plywood Corp. imported lumber and veneers for manufacturing. Plywood piled the lumber in a yard in Algoma, Wisconsin for storage and drying. The City of Algoma taxed half of the stored supplies on the theory that at least that amount was destined for manufacturing. Plywood paid the tax and sued for a refund. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the tax.


[Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Bowers () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower courts. The Supreme Court held that because the imported goods became supplies needed for manufacturing, the goods changed their status as imports. It did not matter that the goods were stored away from other taxable property before us. The court also deferred to the Supreme Court of Ohio and rejected Youngstown’s claim that the Ohio tax violated equal protection.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a partial dissent, agreeing with the majority about Youngstown, but disagreeing about Plywood. He found that Plywood’s main purpose for storing the lumber was drying, so it remained an import. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.


[Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
An Illinois law required that trucks and trailers on its highways use a contoured mudguard, while Arkansas required them to have a straight mudguard. All of the other states required one type or the other. Arguing that the Illinois law unduly burdened interstate commerce, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. prevailed in the lower court, which issued an injunction preventing Bibb from enforcing the law.


[Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous opinion authored by William O. Douglas, the Court held that the Illinois requirement placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. While writing that safety measures "carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged," Justice Douglas nevertheless affirmed that if the effect of such measures are "slight or problematical," then the interests of commerce should prevail. No clear benefits of using contoured mudguards could be identified, and they might even lead to additional hazards. Thus, the presumption of validity could be overcome.
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred.


[Aquilino v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
A general contractor defaulted on federal tax payments and payments to subcontractors. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. government claimed priority over the lien on the “property rights to the property” of the general contractor. The subcontractors also claimed priority, because the amounts owed to them were large enough that they constituted “trust funds” under a New York tax law. The subcontractors were the beneficiaries of these “trust funds” so the general contractor had no property rights. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the subcontractor’s motion to for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled in favor of the United States


[Aquilino v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
In a 7-2 decision Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment below. The Supreme Court held that state law controlled the answer to the question presented, while federal law controlled the priority of the competing liens. The Court remanded the case to the New York Court of Appeals to determine the nature of the property rights under state law.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that the majority’s decision was inconsistent with prior case law. Justice Hugo L Black joined in the dissent.


[Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Specialist Second Class James W. Dial of the United States Army and his wife, Joanna Dial, were charged with involuntary manslaughter for the death of their one-year-old child while stationed in Germany. James Dial was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, sentenced to three years in prison, and dishonorably discharged. His wife was not an active member of the military, but because she was a dependent of an active military member, she was tried in military court in Germany. She moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the military court over her case, but the motion was denied. She pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
Mrs. Dial's mother, Alberta Singleton, filed a writ of habeas corpus on her daughter's behalf and argued that civilian dependents of military personnel cannot be tried in a military court. The circuit court judge stated he did not want to grant the writ of habeas corpus but was bound by the Supreme Court case Reid v. Covert, in which the Court held that non-military personnel cannot be court martialed for capital offenses. Nina Kinsella, the warden where Mrs. Dial was serving her time, appealed the writ and argued that the defendant in Reid v. Covert was on trial for a capital offense, whereas Mrs. Dial was on a trial for a non-capital offense. Therefore, the court was not bound by that case.


[Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that civilian dependents of active service members can only be court martialed for capital offenses. The Constitution does not allow for the extension of military power to have jurisdiction over civilians. Therefore, James Dial’s wife had a right to trial in a court protecting her rights as outlined under Article III of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that non-military personnel employed by the military overseas may be under military jurisdiction during peace times. However, Joanna Dial was a dependent of an active military member, and she was not employed by the military, so she should not have been court martialed. Justice Potter Stewart joined the opinion.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the interpretation of military “status” should not automatically exclude non-military personnel. One’s status as non-military personnel should only be a factor while determining jurisdiction, and the relationship of non-military personnel with the military establishment should also be examined. The Constitution allows the Court to consider these factors in determining appropriate jurisdiction. Justice Felix Frankfurter joined the dissent.


[Goett v. Union Carbide Corporation () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Ellen Goett sought recovery for her husband’s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin Paul Goett, drowned while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did not owe a duty of seaworthiness to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were.


[Goett v. Union Carbide Corporation () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No answer. In a per curiam opinion, the court vacated the lower judgment and remanded to determine whether the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act uses the state law or maritime law concept of negligence. On remand, the court of appeals should also consider whether the Act incorporates the doctrine of unseaworthiness. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan wrote in a footnote that they voted with the majority only because of the Court’s recent ruling on this issue in The Tungus v Skovgaard, although he disagreed with that ruling.
Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that there was no reason to remand the case. Justice Felix Frankfurter joined in the dissent. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissent, stating that he would affirm the lower court. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent also agreeing with the lower court decision.


[International Association of Machinists v. Street () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Several labor unions entered into a union shop agreement that authorized spending union funds to support political causes. Many union employees opposed those causes and sued to enjoin enforcement of the union shop agreement. The employees argued that forcing union members to fund political activities they disagree with unconstitutionally restrained free speech. The Superior Court of Bibb County granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.


[International Association of Machinists v. Street () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for a four-judge plurality reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that the lower court did not need to decide the constitutionality of the union shop agreement. The Court remanded the case with suggestions for possible remedies. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence noting reservations about the suggested remedies. Justice Charles E. Whitaker concurred in part, but dissented to the suggestion of remedies.
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the statute authorizing union expenditures over the objection of its members violated the First Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter also wrote a dissent, expressing that the union members were still free to exercise their First Amendment rights.


[Hess v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Located on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called ‘baffles’, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson’s work, but did not have direct control over it.
On August 20, 1954, Larson’s tug ‘Muleduzer’ set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson’s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River’s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters.
Under Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon’s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham’s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess’ case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only the WDA applied to Hess’ claim.


[Hess v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that there was no constitutional impediment to applying Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law to Hess’ claim through maritime law. Justice Stewart cited precedent that wrongful deaths in state territorial waters were not judged under maritime law’s standards of duty, but rather under the substantive standards of state law. He argued that it would be an anomaly to allow states to create a right of action for death, but not to allow them to determine the circumstances under which that right exists. Justice Stewart refused to answer whether a state wrongful death act might offend traditional principles of maritime law, noting that the ELL was in some ways more in consonance with general maritime law principles than the WDA.
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, Justice William Douglas and Justice William Brennan concurred. They argued for the evenhanded application of the Court’s recent ruling in Tungus v. Skovgaard, but took issue with that case’s holding that the federal maritime wrongful death duty depended on the substantive law of a given state.
Justice John Harlan dissented, joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter. Justice Harlan noted that Oregon imposed a higher standard of duty for wrongful deaths on its navigable waters, but that the normal lesser maritime duty applied to injuries short of death. He argued that the Court should not impose a state standard of duty higher than the general maritime duty unless that state explicitly required it.
Justice Charles Whittaker also dissented, joining Justice Harlan’s dissent except for its implication that wrongful deaths on the navigable waters of a state are ever governed by the general substantive tort laws of that state.


[Flemming v. Nestor () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Ephram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and became eligible for old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Flemming v. Nestor () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John M. Harlan delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Social Security system was meant to be a form of long-term social insurance that has to constantly adapt to the demands of a changing workforce, which prevents it from fitting within the framework of the right to accrued property. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only bars government action that is arbitrary or lacking in rational justification, neither of which is true in this case. The Court also held that the termination of benefits was not punitive but rather the “denial of a non-contractual government benefit.”
Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that, because Nestor had been paying into the Social Security fund before he began receiving benefits, the government’s termination of his benefits was effectively depriving him of his property without just compensation. He also argued that both the deportation and termination of Nestor’s benefits, based solely on the fact that he was a member of the Communist Party 20 years previously when it was not illegal to do so, imposes an ex post facto law on him. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that receiving Social Security benefits is a right earned by years of working and paying into the system, which Nestor did. The deprivation of those rights is a punishment that should only be reserved for those convicted of a crime. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the deprivation of Social Security benefits for certain offenses constituted a punishment without judicial trial in violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


[United States v. Republic Steel Corporation () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction....to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.


[United States v. Republic Steel Corporation () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the deposits were an obstruction within the meaning of the act and were not exempt. The Court also held that the district court was authorized to issue an injunction against the steel companies.
Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly interpreted the Rivers and Waters Act. He argued that “obstruction” only referred to certain kinds of obstruction, not including industrial waste. Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.


[Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the testimony of the medical specialists supported the reasonableness of the judgment in favor of Sentilles. The Court noted that the role of the appellate court is not to independently review the evidence, but rather is limited to considering the reasonableness of decisions reached in the lower tribunal.
Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the Court’s opinion. Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the record contained evidence that the accident actually caused the tuberculosis. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Potter Stewart disagreed with the Court’s standard of review and instead reversed the appellate court upon an independent examination of the record. He also argued that the Court should not grant certiorari to cases in which the sufficiency of the evidence is the sole question before the Court.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent in which he agreed with Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the Court should not hear these types of cases. Rather than deciding the case, Justice Frankfurter argued that the Court should have dismissed its writ of certiorari after the parties’ oral arguments.


[Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.


[Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that statutes requiring stores to stay closed on Sundays do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, the statute in question does not prohibit the free exercise of religion. A statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because in practice it results in some inequality. The Court also concluded the statute was not for religious purposes, as the defendants contested.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered a dissenting opinion arguing the Sunday closing statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because one religion is economically disadvantaged by it. In his separate dissent, Justice Potter Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan’s dissent and added that making a citizen chose between his faith and economic survival is a cruel choice as well as unconstitutional.


[Meyer v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
In 1943, Peter Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955.
Peter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment to the bank.
The United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law.
District court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on United States v. Behrens, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a per curiam ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.


[Meyer v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Thomas Whittaker, writing for the majority in a 6-3 decision, held that New York state law controlled the case; New York exempted the net proceeds of insurance policy cash surrenders from attaching to tax liens. There was not clear guidance in federal law on this matter, whereas New York law protected the cash surrender in question. As the priority of liens is then determined by "first in time first in right," the United States did not have a right to marshal the cash surrender to recover its tax lien because the bank's debt had priority.
Justice Byron White, joined by Justices John Harlan and Potter Stewart, dissented. He argued that federal law should control the case to avoid inconsistent results in different states; once a tax lien has attached to a taxpayer's interests, federal law then determines the priority of liens. He also disputed the majority's interpretation of New York law, and did not find a clear, consistent policy of protecting the net proceeds of insurance policies' cash surrenders from creditors.


[Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.


[Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court concluded that the restaurant, as a recipient of assistance by the parking authority, benefited from the city's aid and constituted an financially integral and indispensable part of the state. As such, the Court found that the restaurant and the parking authority were so physically and financially intertwined that the private entity's conduct could be imputed to the government. Thus, it’s discrimination could be considered state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Whittaker, dissented. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissenting opinion.


[Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.


[Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc. () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Charles E. Whittaker, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that because Convertible Top did not patent the fabric top individually, there was no direct patent infringement. With no direct infringement, there could be no contributory infringement. The patent only covered the combination of parts that made up the folding top, not each individual part that made up that top. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, writing that the other concurring opinion and the dissenting opinion were unnecessarily confusing.
Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, arguing that there was no infringement because the cost of the replacement top in comparison with the device as a whole was so small made replacing the top a permissible repair instead of a reconstruction. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, arguing that the replacement of an unpatented part in a patented device is a forbidden reconstruction of the device. This constitutes direct patent infringement. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Chaunt v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt’s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Chaunt v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Government failed to show by “clear, unequivocal and convincing” evidence that Chaunt either concealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship or that their disclosure would have led to the discovery of other facts warranting a denial of citizenship. The arrests did not justify revocation of Chaunt’s citizenship because each arrest occurred outside the statutory requirement of demonstrated good moral character for five years prior to a petition for naturalization, and the charges did not involve moral turpitude. Noting Chaunt’s disclosure of his employment with the International Workers’ Order, an organization purportedly controlled by Communists, the Court declined to find that disclosure of the arrests might have led the INS to discover that Chaunt once served as a district organizer of the Communist Party in Connecticut.
Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act only requires that the Government prove that Chaunt’s conduct blocked an investigation that might have resulted in the rejection of his application. He argued that the Government satisfied this test by showing that Chaunt intentionally concealed his arrest record because the INS could have rejected his application if it had discovered this misconduct prior to the court’s naturalization order. Justice Charles E. Whittaker and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


[Knetsch v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Knetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity payments upon maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create "indebtedness" and, therefore, there was "no commercial economic substance" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Knetsch v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the majority affirming the lower court's decision that the transaction was a sham. The loans the insurance company gave Knetsch were essentially rebates for a substantial portion of the interest payments and the small amount kept by the company was its fee for providing a "façade of loans" to be used to provide tax deductions. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that as long as a transaction is allowed within the limits of insurance policies it should be recognized by the Internal Revenue Service, and any remedy should be left to the legislature.


[Mapp v. Ohio () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.


[Mapp v. Ohio () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
In an opinion authored by Justice Tom C. Clark, the majority brushed aside First Amendment issues and declared that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court. The decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when to apply the exclusionary rule.
Justices Black and Douglas concurred.
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment but agreed fully with Part I of Justice Harlan's dissent and expressed no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, wrote a dissenting opinion.


[Gomillion v. Lightfoot () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.


[Gomillion v. Lightfoot () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
A state violates the Fifteenth Amendment when it constructs boundary lines between electoral districts for the purpose of denying equal representation to African Americans.
The unanimous Court held that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Frankfurter admitted that states are insulated from judicial review when they exercise power "wholly within the domain of state interest." However, in this case, Alabama's representatives were unable to identify "any countervailing municipal function" the act was designed to serve. The Court believed that the irregularly shaped district was drawn with only one purpose in mind: to deprive blacks of political power.


[Wilkinson v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Frank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.


[Wilkinson v. United States () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the subcommittee’s investigation was clearly authorized by Congress. The question of whether Wilkin was a member of the Communist Party was relevant to the inquiry so Wilkinson was obligated to answer. The reasons why Wilkinson was called before the committee were irrelevant to the decision.
Justice Hugo L. Black dissented, arguing that an investigation of those who criticize the Un-American Activities Committee is unconstitutional. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent. Justice Douglas dissented separately, arguing that Congress did not authorize the type of investigation that took place. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan dissented, arguing that the primary purpose of questioning Wilkinson was to expose him for the sake of exposure, rather than to aid lawmaking. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.


[Torcaso v. Watkins () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.


[Torcaso v. Watkins () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that such a requirement places the state of Maryland firmly on the side of those people who believe in God and are willing to state their belief. With this requirement, Maryland effectively aids religions that profess a belief in God at the expense of any other form of belief or disbelief. The First Amendment expressly prohibits a state from taking this position. Although the candidate has the option of not pursuing public office rather than declaring a belief in God, the test is an unconstitutional encroachment on the freedom of religion. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result.


[Monroe v. Pape () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on "open" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney.
Monroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.


[Monroe v. Pape () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes and No. Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the city police officers, in conducting an unreasonable search and seizure, had committed an action which was under the color of law, and that the police could be held liable individually under the Civil Rights Act. However, the majority further held that a municipality could not be liable under the Civil Rights Act. So, the court reversed the lower court's opinion insofar as it dismissed the Civil Rights Act claim against the police officers.
Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote a concurring opinion which Justice Potter Stewart joined. In his opinion, Justice Harlan discussed the difficulties in explaining the distinction between authorized or unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights.
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent arguing that a police officer who acts outside the law loses his authority under the law, making a state tort claim against individual officers more appropriate than a claim under the Civil Rights Act.


[United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Company () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation.
The district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Company () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the land the government was taking for easement had market value, and the Fifth Amendment prevents the government from taking private property without compensation. The Court also held that the district court’s method of determining the value of the land was correct, but the determination of how much of that compensation is due to the Virginia Electric Company was not correct. The district court granted compensation based on the maximum possible value rather than the actual value based on land use.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the owner of the easement did not have rights to anything that gained value from the flow of the stream. However, the owner did have the rights to anything that was considered “property” under the Fifth Amendment and deserved to be justly compensated when the government takes that.
Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that compensation should be based on the value the land the owner had at the time the government took it. Because the Virginia Electric Company only owned that land in the hope that it would gain permission from the government to build a dam, the land had no value to the company when it was taken. He argued that the Fifth Amendment required compensation only based on what value the owner had lost rather than what the government has gained. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent.


[Baker v. Carr () — Warren Court (1958-1962) — Facts]
Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.