[Owens v. Okure (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Tom Okure was arrested for disorderly conduct, and while under arrest, was beaten by the police officers Javan Owens and Daniel Lessard. He sustained multiple injuries, including broken teeth and a sprained finger, and claimed to have suffered great mental anguish and distress as a result of the arrest and actions of the police. Twenty-two months after the incident occurred, Okure sued the two State University of New York (SUNY) police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is one year under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The trial court denied the motion by stating that New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.


[Owens v. Okure (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for unanimous majority. The Court held that, when states have multiple statutes of limitations for intentional torts, the courts should use the state’s general statute of limitations for claims of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 instead of the statute of limitations for individual civil actions.


[United States v. Halper (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Irwin Halper, the manager of a company that provided medical services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits, was charged and convicted in criminal court of submitting 65 separate false Medicare claims. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000.
The United States then brought additional civil charges under the False Claims Act, which authorized it to collect $2000 for each offense in addition to attorney's fees and twice the damages sustained. In this case the actual damages were just $585, but because of the number of offenses the total penalty was more than $130,000. The District Court, however, ruled that the penalty was "entirely unrelated" to the government's actual damages and would therefore be a second punishment for the same offense, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The penalty was therefore limited to double the amount of actual damages and attorney's fees. The government appealed the decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[United States v. Halper (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry Blackmun, on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that while previous cases had held penalties under the Act to be civil in nature, that did not foreclose the possibility of the penalty being so extreme and so unrelated to the actual damages as to constitute "punishment." Because Halper had already been jailed and fined, additional punishment in a separate proceeding would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court remanded the case to the District Court so that the government could challenge the original assessment of its attorney's fees.


[City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized.
Harris sued the city of Canton for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in police custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions.


[City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that municipalities may be liable for inadequate training of employees, but only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of the people with whom the employees will interact. A municipality is then only liable when the failure to train is a deliberate choice on the part of the city.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. makes clear that the Court of Appeals may remand the case for a new trial.
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with the majority’s holding regarding the municipality’s liability for a conscious failure to train. However, she argued that it was unnecessary to remand the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court should simply apply the “deliberate indifference” standard to the facts of the case. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion.


[Graham v. Connor (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry’s car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away.
Graham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry’s car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham’s vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident.
Graham filed § 1983 charges against Connor, other officers, and the City of Charlotte, alleging a violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers, unlawful assault, unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed for a directed verdict, which the district court granted. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, contending that the district court incorrectly applied a four-part substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick that takes into account officers’ “good faith” efforts and whether they acted “maliciously or sadistically”. He instead argued for a standard of “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected this argument, reasoning that concepts such as "good faith" are relevant to determining the degree of force used. It affirmed the directed verdict, holding that a reasonable jury could not have found in Graham’s favor.


[Graham v. Connor (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No and yes. In a unanimous ruling written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that claims of excessive force used by government officials are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. The Court vacated the directed verdict and remanded the case to the district court to be decided by that standard.
Rehnquist noted that § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Rather, the Fourth Amendment stands as one of the two primary sources of protection against physically abusive government conduct, along with the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the validity of Graham’s claim must be judged by reference to the specific rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, not by a generalized “excessive force” standard.
Justice Rehnquist rejected Connor’s argument that “malicious and sadistic” is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable, noting that the subjective motivations of the officers are relevant under the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth. Rather, he explained that the “objective reasonableness” of a use of force should be judged by the perspective of an officer on the scene, and should take into account factors such as the severity of the crime, the threat posed by the suspect, and any attempts by the suspect to resist or evade arrest.
Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall concurred, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun argued that there was not sufficient precedent to hold that claims of use of excessive force will never be subject to Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process review.


[Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1983, the Chase & Sanborn Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida made Paul Nordberg the trustee in bankruptcy. In 1985, Nordberg sued Granfinanciera, S.A. and Medex, Ltda. in district court. Nordberg alleged that they received $1.7 million in fraudulent transfers from Chase & Sanborn’s corporate predecessor a year before the bankruptcy filing. The district court referred the proceedings to bankruptcy court. Five months later, after the Colombian government nationalized Granfinanciera, Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court denied the request because fraudulent transfers were a non-jury issue under English common law. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud claim but found in favor of Nordberg on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The district court affirmed the decision.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Granfinanciera and Medex did not have a statutory right to a jury trial, nor did they have a right under the Seventh Amendment.


[Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment protected the right to a trial by jury in all cases in which a legal right, as opposed to an equitable right, was at issue. Since this case deals with the recovery of money, it is purely a legal issue. Under English common law, such a case would have received a jury trial as well. The Court also held that Congress may only legislate away the right to a trial by jury in cases where “public rights” are litigated. The Court declined to address Nordberg’s argument that Granfinanciera was barred from a jury trial because it was an agent of the Colombian government since the issue was not addressed in the lower courts, and this was not an exceptional case where the Court could overlook the lack of lower court discussion.
Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued that “public rights” can only refer to situations where the government is involved. Because previous Supreme Court decisions had linked the idea of public rights with a waiver of sovereign immunity, which is only available to the government, public rights can only be at issue when the government is involved.
In his dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that the majority’s opinion inappropriately overrules a previous decision that Congress can establish an alternative adjudication to a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Seventh Amendment does not apply to all federal proceedings, specifically bankruptcy, which Congress has assigned to specialized courts. He also argued that there was no evidence to suggest such a case would have received a jury trial rather than a chancery trial according to English common law.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented and argued that Congress has the right to establish alternative adjudication procedures in certain cases. Since a bankruptcy trial often requires expert knowledge, a jury might be detrimental to the proceedings, and therefore Congress had every right to fashion a modern bankruptcy system. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


[Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership. Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year. The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination. Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, 7 were women. The partnership selection process relied on recommendations by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with office staff.
The district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board’s decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination.


[Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes in part. In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the plurality opinion reversing the lower court and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals applied the right test, but should have placed the burden at “preponderance of the evidence” not “clear and convincing evidence”. On remand, Price Waterhouse would escape liability if it shows it would have denied Hopkins partnership even if she were not a woman.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that there was no requirement for the employer to submit objective evidence. The employer’s credible testimony alone was enough. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurrence, expressing that the Court’s opinion was only a supplement to McDonnell Douglas.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent, stating that he would stick with the evidentiary standards from McDonnell Douglas. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


[Massachusetts v. Morash (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) sued Richard N. Morash, the president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). Massachusetts alleged that, by failing to compensate two terminated employees for vacation time they accrued but did not use, Morash violated the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute (Statute). Massachusetts alleged the statute was pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires an employer to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on date of discharge. The trial judge certified the preemption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative and held that the policy constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the statute was pre-empted by ERISA.


[Massachusetts v. Morash (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court which held that a policy of paying discharged employees for their unused vacation time does not constitute an employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, and that ERISA’s provisions do not foreclose a criminal action to enforce that policy. The employment welfare benefit plan is not meant to relate to ordinary vacation pay, but rather to include vacation benefit funds that accumulate over a period of time. The bank payment is not an employee welfare benefit plan just because the employees did not use their vacation days prior to their termination.


[Texas v. Johnson (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court.


[Texas v. Johnson (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."


[DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1984, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney became comatose and then profoundly retarded due to traumatic head injuries inflicted by his father who physically beat him over a long period of time. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services took various steps to protect the child after receiving numerous complaints of the abuse; however, the Department did not act to remove Joshua from his father's custody. Joshua DeShaney's mother subsequently sued the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, alleging that the Department had deprived the child of his "liberty interest in bodily integrity, in violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father's violence."


[DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. The Due Process Clause does not impose a special duty on the State to provide services to the public for protection against private actors if the State did not create those harms. "The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; while it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means."


[Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On February 20, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") announced its decision to include drug screening in all periodic and return-to-duty examinations. Conrail had always enforced Rule G of its agreement with its unionized employees, which forbids the use or possession of "intoxicants, narcotics, amphetamines or hallucinogens" by its employees. Previously, it routinely used drug screening urinalysis as part of return-to-duty medical examinations of employees with drug-related problems and in other examinations where the examining physician suspected drug use.
The Railway Labor Executives' Association ("RLEA")-- comprised of individuals in leadership positions at more than eighteen craft unions-- filed suit against Conrail, alleging that Conrail violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). The RLA, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934, created the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an arbitration board designed to settle minor disputes between railroad companies and labor organizations. Under Sections 5 and 6 of the RLA, major disputes require an extensive mediation and conciliation process.
District court Judge Anthony J. Scirica found that the dispute was "minor" under the Railway Labor Act because Conrail's decision was arguably justified by the terms of its agreement with the unions, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the dispute. Judge Dolores Sloviter of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's conclusion that Conrail's prior use of medical examinations arguably justified unilaterally changing its drug testing policy. The appeals court held that the dispute was "major" because it changed the terms and conditions governing employment relationships.


[Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun held that if Conrail asserts that its agreement with the unions gives Conrail the discretion to change their drug testing policy –assuming that claim is arguably justified by the terms of the agreement-- Conrail may make that change and the courts must defer to the decision of the RLA's arbitration board. Conrail's claim of a right to unilaterally change its drug policy –although based on implied terms of its contract with the RLEA—was not "frivolous or obviously insubstantial." Conrail does not have to wait until the arbitration board makes a decision to change its drug testing policy. The court believed this decision would diminish the risk of interruptions to commerce caused by labor disputes.


[Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
William A. Frazee was laid off from his job with the state of Illinois. Kelly Services, a temp agency, offered him a job at a department store working Wednesday through Sunday. Frazee “as a Christian” refused to work Sundays. The store did not give Frazee the job. Frazee did not claim that he was part of a particular religious sect or church or that working on Sundays violated a tenant of an established religious body. When Frazee applied for unemployment benefits, the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied his claim because he turned down a job offer. The Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit of Illinois affirmed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the free exercise clause does not require accommodations for “personal professed religious belief[s]”.


[Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the lower court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that denying Frazee unemployment benefits violated the free exercise clause. The state had no interest compelling enough to override an individual's exercise of sincerely-held religious beliefs, even though they were not part of an established religious sect.


[Florida v. Riley (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Michael Riley lived in a mobile home situated on five acres of rural land in Florida. Riley owned a greenhouse that was located behind his home; from the ground, the contents of Riley’s greenhouse were shielded from view by its walls and the trees on his property. In 1984, the Pasco County Sheriff’s office received a tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property. The investigating officer tried to see into the greenhouse from the ground but could not, so he circled in a helicopter at 400 feet and saw what he believed to be marijuana growing inside. Acting on this information, the investigating officer obtained a search warrant, searched the greenhouse, and found the marijuana. Riley was charged with possession of marijuana.
Riley filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court granted his motion and held that viewing his property from the air violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the trial court’s decision and denied Riley’s motion to dismiss the evidence. The appellate court also certified the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reinstated the trial court’s order to suppress the evidence.


[Florida v. Riley (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Riley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this case because anyone could view Riley’s property from a helicopter flying in navigable airspace and figure out what was inside. The police officer did not enter Riley’s land or interfere with it in any way. Furthermore, the manner in which he was flying the helicopter was well within the law; therefore, the police officer was within his rights to view Riley’s property from the air. The Court determined that the police action in this case did not violate Riley’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she cautioned the majority against relying on the fact that the helicopter was flying within Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. She argued that the FAA regulations were meant to promote air safety and did not protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, like the police activities in Katz v. United States, the officer’s actions in this case violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that the burden of proving that a defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy should rest with the state.


[Mistretta v. United States (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This Commission was to attack the wide discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. It was to be part of the judicial branch, with members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. John Mistretta (convicted of three counts of selling cocaine) claimed that the Act violated the delegation-of-powers principle by giving the Commission "excessive legislative powers." This case was decided together with United States v. Mistretta.


[Mistretta v. United States (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
The Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. The test of validity is that an "intelligible principle" must be established by the legislature where the agency of the delegated authority must adhere to specific directives that govern its authority. The delegation to the Commission was sufficiently detailed and specific to meet these requirements. The Commission was given substantial authority and discretion in setting the guidelines; however, Congress established a classification hierarchy for federal crimes that the Commission was to use as an outline for its work.


[Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Gerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D. since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole had an adulterous partner, Michael H., who obtained blood tests indicating that he was likely the biological father. When Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court, Gerald argued that Michael had no ground under California law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two years had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal. Evid. Code 621, the child is "presumed to be a child of the marriage" and another man can only challenge this presumption within two years of birth. The court ruled in favor of Gerald and canceled Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by denying him an opportunity to establish his paternity. A California Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Code 621.


[Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment for a 5-4 court. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition, the plurality opinion found that a possible biological father does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights after the presumptive father has exercised significant responsibility over the child. Therefore due process protection does not apply. Code 621 was based on common-law precedent which showed "an aversion to declaring children illegitimate" and supported "the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquility of States and families.'" Restricting Michael's parental rights achieved this by granting Gerald the sole responsibility to play the role of Victoria's father.


[Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Daniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.
Connaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Daniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.
Connaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a public figure plaintiff in a libel case must prove that the libelous statement was false or made without any regard for its truth. The fact that the newspaper failed to interview one of the main witnesses to the supposed bribery strongly indicated a disregard for the truth of the story. Although there were many reasons to doubt the truth of the accusations against Connaughton, the newspaper failed to properly investigate, so the act of publishing the story constituted actual malice.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court did not overstep its bounds by looking at the facts of the case in order to determine whether or not the newspaper exhibited actual malice.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the Court might have looked at the facts of the case differently if the petitioner had not abandoned the defense that Harte-Hanks believed the report to be true. He also wrote that the failure of the majority opinion to mention the actual content of the article in question does not mean that the Court did not consider it relevant.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred with the majority’s decision because he did not feel it inconsistent with the analysis Justice Antonin Scalia provided in his concurrence.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily focuses its analysis on what the trial court jury found in favor of the plaintiff, rather than exercising its own independent judgment.


[City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.


[City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."


[Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data.
At trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.


[Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police to prove that the loss or destruction of evidence was a denial of due process. Requiring the police to retain every potentially useful piece of evidence places an undue burden on the police, while the bad faith restriction limits the police’s duty to what serves the interests of justice. The Court also held that, in this case, the police’s failure to refrigerate the clothing could at worst be negligent, but not in bad faith.
In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, even without the Court’s ruling, the state has a strong interest in properly preserving as much evidence as possible. He also argued that there was no way to definitively say what the evidence might have shown and the jury still ruled in favor of the prosecution, which suggests that the evidence would not have been sufficient to exonerate Youngblood. Justice Stevens also argued that, while he concurred in the judgment, he found the majority’s opinion much broader than necessary to decide this case.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, regardless of the state’s intent, police action that results in the defendant’s failure to receive a fair trial represents a denial of due process. He also argued that there is no bright-line distinction between good faith and bad faith police action, and therefore that guideline does not adequately protect the rights of criminal defendants. Without any way to know what the evidence would have shown, there is no proof that it would not have been enough to exonerate Youngblood, so the police’s failure to preserve the evidence effectively deprived Youngblood of his rights to due process. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.
"


[Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The Kansas City Missouri School District hired lawyers to argue a major desegregation case against the state of Missouri in federal district court. When the lawyers won the case after years of litigation, they sought compensation from Missouri under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The district court calculated the amount owed using current market rates for attorney's fees. Missouri objected to paying the lawyers at current rates for work they performed in the past when rates were lower. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against Missouri. Missouri alleged that the federal courts violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity privileges by forcing it to pay higher rates.


[Missouri v. Jenkins (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No and Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-1 court. The Court referred to its decision in Hutto v. Finney to establish that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply "to an award of attorney's fees against a State." Therefore "it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee." Charging current rates for lawyers compensated for the delay in payment to them. Further, charging current rates for legal assistants rather than their cost to attorneys during litigation took account of the entire service the lawyers provided. This constituted "a reasonable attorney's fee" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.


[United States v. Sokolow (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Drug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine.


[United States v. Sokolow (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
The Court upheld the search and reasoned that the agents had a "reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing." Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the validity of such a stop should be based on the "totality of the circumstances," (United States v. Cortez, 1981), which, in this case, gave agents a clear reason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking.


[Florida Star v. B. J. F. (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
A reporter for the Florida Star wrote and printed an article about Betty Jean Freedman’s rape, including her full name. The reporter obtained all of his information, including the victim’s name, from the police report. The police department did not restrict access to the pressroom or police reports, but there were several signs in the area instructing not to print victim’s names. The newspaper also had a policy of not printing the full names of victims. After the article ran, Freedman and her family received several threatening phone calls, and Freedman sought mental counseling and police protection. Freedman sued, claiming emotional distress. The district court found Florida Star guilty of negligence under a Florida law that prohibits publishing the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instrument of mass communication. The court awarded Freedman compensatory and punitive damages. The district court of appeal affirmed and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review.


[Florida Star v. B. J. F. (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the civil damages imposed on Florida Star violated the First Amendment because the information was lawfully-obtained and truthful. The Court hinted that there may be a situation where a victim’s privacy interest outweighed a newspaper’s First Amendment rights. The Court also held that the Florida law prohibiting the printing of a victim’s name was under-inclusive because it did not limit the spread of a victim’s name through other means. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence, stating that the Florida statute was invalid because it did not protect a state interest of the highest order.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the majority’s decision departs from past precedent. Justice White also rejected the majority’s assertion that the Florida law was under-inclusive. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


[Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
At 17 years old, Kevin Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.


[Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at the given society's evolving decency standards. With respect to American society, there is no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17- or 16-year-old individuals. Of the 37 states which permit capital punishment, 12 prohibit the death penalty for offenders below the age of 17 while 15 states prohibit capital punishment for 16 year olds. Moreover, discrepancies in national opinion polls, interest group views, and professional association studies, all indicate a lack of unanimity concerning the acceptability of death sentences for such relatively young offenders. Thus, the decision whether to subject 17 or 16 year olds to capital punishment must be made locally by the states and cannot be categorically pronounced as cruel and unusual punishment at this time.


[County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.


[County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."


[Murray v. Giarratano (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state’s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The district court found that Virginia’s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia’s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found the availability of attorneys to assist inmates was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[Murray v. Giarratano (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires states to appoint counsel for death row inmates looking for relief. States are not constitutionally obligated to provide relief post-conviction because the Constitution assures the right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The Court also rejected the argument that capital cases require more legal assistance at collateral proceedings than non-capital cases.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that a post-conviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process but is a civil action that does not require the state to provide proceedings. Prisoners were still able to obtain counsel, despite Virginia not adopting procedures that are were as far-reaching as those of other states. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the concurrence.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent that claimed that Virginia’s procedure was unfair and did not provide indigent death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their claims. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


[Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.


[Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."


[City of Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association.


[City of Dallas v. Stanglin (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No, no. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the ordinance was intended to protect the youth of Dallas against corrupting activity, which they may have access to when intermingling with adults. Therefore, the age restrictions on youth activities were reasonable under the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of association and equal protection under the law considering they are enforced to protect the youth from corrupt activities.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the opportunity to socialize was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that this case presented an issue of due process rather than freedom of association. He concurred with the judgment that the city ordinance protects teenagers and allowed them an even greater ability to associate than if the ordinance was not enforced. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.


[Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Wards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had the burden of proof to show that its hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity.


[Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The fact that one class of jobs at a firm has a higher percentage of nonwhites than another class does not by itself prove that the firm practices discriminatory hiring. Comparisons of race percentages among different job classes could wrongfully blame the employer, since what appears to show racial discrimination could in reality reflect the racial differences that exist in the labor market at large. Instead, the Court held that "the proper comparison is generally between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market." If a substantial difference is found, then the claimants must show that it is the result of a hiring practice of the employer.


[Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals.


[Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury (1989) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government "if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Because the Court found no "significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees]," it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on "the source of the pay."


[Lewis v. Jeffers (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave.
A jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona’s standard of an “especially heinous...or depraved” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers’ challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence.


[Lewis v. Jeffers (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No, no. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus relief is not intended to find error in state laws but rather to determine whether a state court’s finding was so arbitrary and capricious that it violates the Eighth Amendment. The reviewing court should use the “rational factfinder” test, which asks whether a rational trier of fact when viewing the evidence as most favorable to the prosecution could find reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a narrow and clearly defined construction of the standard that sufficiently prevented arbitrary and capricious sentencing. Therefore the standard as it applied to Jeffers was not unconstitutionally vague.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the way a court constructs a standard does not change the fact that the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Because the majority’s opinion provided no analysis on how the Arizona Supreme Court had constructed this standard in the past, there was no evidence to support the idea that the standard was being consistently narrowly applied. He also argued that the majority’s opinion incorrectly focuses on federal habeas courts’ review of state law, when there are federal implications as well. The district court has to review habeas corpus cases in light of others in order to determine whether the standards are being consistently and appropriately applied, so the “rational factfinder” test is not solely sufficient. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.
In his dissent, which also applies to Walton v. Arizona, Justice Brennan argued that the death penalty is contrary to the ideals of human dignity upon which the Constitution rests and that the majority’s opinion makes it easier for states to execute individuals with little regard for Eighth Amendment doctrine. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.


[United States v. Eichman (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be "commonly displayed." The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.


[United States v. Eichman (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions.


[Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
A woman called police officers to a residence. She showed signs of having been beaten. She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside. She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day. The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times. She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant. Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder. Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search. The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment. With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court granted the motion. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal.


[Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes, No. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the authority to do so. The case was remanded for consideration of whether the police officers reasonably believed that the woman had authority to consent to their search of the residence.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that police cannot ignore the Fourth Amendment when an individual did not voluntarily give others concurrent authority over their property. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
California law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct and mail-order "evangelistic crusades." After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization ("Board") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.


[Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.


[Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express "religious, political, philosophical, or other content" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.


[Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In distinguishing between "curriculum" and "noncurriculum student groups," the Court held that since Westside permitted other noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a noncurriculum group since no other course required students to become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian club's formation even if its members engaged in religious discussions.


[Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On November 30, 1986, a patrol officer saw Inocencio Muniz and another passenger in a car stopped on the shoulder of a highway. When the officer approached, he could smell alcohol on Muniz’s breath and saw that his eyes were bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer advised Muniz to remain parked, but as he was leaving he saw Muniz drive off. The officer pulled Muniz over and had him perform three field sobriety tests, all of which Muniz failed. Muniz told the officer he failed them because he had been drinking. The officer arrested Muniz and took him to a booking center, where he was told that his actions and voice were being recorded, but no one read him his Miranda rights. Muniz answered a series of questions about himself and stumbled over an answer regarding the year he turned six. Muniz again failed three field sobriety tests and refused a breathalyzer test. The officer then read Muniz his Miranda rights, and Muniz signed a statement waiving them. In subsequent questioning, he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol.
At trial, the video and audio recordings of Muniz’s behavior at the booking center were admitted into evidence, along with the officer’s reports of Muniz’s failure of the field sobriety tests and his incriminating statements. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the evidence of his behavior and statements prior to the Miranda warning should have been excluded from trial. The trial court denied the motion. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed and held that the testimony regarding Muniz’s behavior and the results of the field sobriety tests was physical in nature, not testimonial, but that the audio portion of the recording should have been suppressed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the application for review.


[Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment distinguishes between real or physical evidence and testimonial evidence, of which only testimonial evidence is protected under the Amendment. Based on this analysis, the incriminating evidence drawn from physical evidence is admissible, but evidence drawn from the content of statements that relate factual information is not. The Court also held that the Fifth Amendment does not require the suppression of information not elicited by an officer.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that answers to an officer’s questions should be admissible when the questions are meant to elicit responses to ascertain the suspect’s mental state. In such a case, the questions serve the same purpose as the field sobriety tests, and the answers are not testimonial. Justice Byron R. White, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that creating an exception for routine booking questions and their answers undermined the rights the Miranda warning was meant to protect. He argued that the questions the police asked Muniz were intended to elicit incriminating responses, and because the police asked the questions before reading Muniz his Miranda rights, the evidence of the questions and their answers should be suppressed.


[Illinois v. Perkins (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
While being held in jail, Perkins freely confessed to committing a murder to an undercover police officer who was posing as another inmate.


[Illinois v. Perkins (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
The Court held that conversations between suspects and undercover officers are not afforded Miranda protection since they are not done in a "police-dominated atmosphere" where compulsion to confess is present. "It is the premise of Miranda that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and official interrogation," argued Justice Kennedy. There was no danger of coercion in this case.


[Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In November 1980, Governor James Thompson of Illinois issued an order that prohibited state officials from hiring new employees, promoting state employees, or recalling state employees after layoffs without the approval of the Governor's Office of Personnel. The Office of Personnel based hiring and promotion decisions on factors such as the applicant's contributions to the Republican Party, the applicant's record of service to the Republican Party, and the support of local Party officials. In the jointly decided case of Frech v. Rutan, Cynthia B. Rutan and a number of other potential and current state employees challenged this patronage system, alleging that the Governor was violating their First Amendment rights by practicing unfair political patronage and party-based discrimination.


[Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Governor Thompson's practices amounted to an unconstitutional patronage system. The Court found that employees would feel "a significant obligation to support political positions held by their superiors" in lieu of their true beliefs in order to progress up the career ladder. The Court thus held that "promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliations or support" were impermissible infringements on the right to free expression of public employees. The Court noted that while the First Amendment was not "a tenure provision" protecting employees from "constructive discharge," it nevertheless prevented the government from interfering with its employees' freedom "to believe and associate."


[W.S. Kirkpatrick & Company, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1981, the Republic of Nigeria was interested in building an aeromedical center at Kaduna Air Force Base. Both W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. (Kirkpatrick) and Environmental Tectonics Corporation International (Environmental Tectonics) bid for the contract. Kirkpatrick established a deal with a Nigerian citizen who would attempt to ensure Kirkpatrick received the contract. In exchange, Kirkpatrick would pay two Panamanian companies owned by the Nigerian individual 20% of the contract price, which would be distributed as bribes to Nigerian officials. Kirkpatrick succeeded in obtaining the contract, and Environmental Tectonics brought the issue to the attention of the authorities. The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey brought charges against Kirkpatrick and its CEO, and both pled guilty.
Environmental Tectonics sued Kirkpatrick in district court and sought damages under anti-racketeering acts. Kirkpatrick moved to dismiss the complaint by arguing that the action was barred by state doctrine that prohibited courts from considering cases that would result in embarrassment for a sovereign nation or interfere with US foreign policy. The district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the motion in favor of Kirkpatrick. The district court held that Environmental Tectonics would have to prove that Nigerian officials accepted bribes and allowed the bribes to influence governmental decisions. The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and held that Kirkpatrick had not met its burden to show that the case could not proceed.


[W.S. Kirkpatrick & Company, Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that state doctrine only applies when the case requires a US court to declare an act of a foreign sovereign nation invalid. The Court held that this suit only requires the district court to rule on the motivation underlying an action rather than the validity of the action itself. Since nothing in this case required the court to declare an action by Nigeria’s government invalid, state doctrine does not apply, and the case should be allowed to proceed.


[Florida v. Wells (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On February 11, 1985, a Florida Highway Patrol officer stopped Martin Wells for speeding and smelled alcohol on his breath. Wells was arrested for driving under the influence and taken to the police station for a breathalyzer test. While in custody, police told Wells that his car would be impounded, and he granted permission to the officer to open the trunk. An inventory search of the car at the impoundment revealed two marijuana cigarette butts and a locked suitcase in the trunk. Under the direction of a trooper, impoundment employees opened the suitcase and found a garbage bag of marijuana.
Wells was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the marijuana evidence by arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. Wells pleaded nolo contendere but reserved the right to appeal on the motion to suppress. The Florida District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District reversed the ruling on the motion to suppress, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.


[Florida v. Wells (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for five members of the court. The Supreme Court held that there must be a policy in place that determines whether inventory searches include opening closed containers or not. Such a policy allows the situation to be regulated. Absent such a policy, as in this case, the search is not regulated sufficiently to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment does allow police officers to use discretion in determining whether a container can be opened based on the nature of the search.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that there must be a standard inventory search policy in place that limits police discretion to prevent the abuse of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that the majority opinion went beyond the bounds of the case by allowing individual police discretion to determine whether to open a sealed container in an inventory search. Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that the majority opinion represented blatant judicial activism by granting certiorari to a case that the Florida Supreme Court adequately handled. He also wrote that the majority’s opinion on the issue of police discretion extended beyond the question at hand.
"


[Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Gary Peel, an attorney licensed to practice in three states, received a "Certificate in Civil Trial Advocacy" from the National Board of Trial Advocacy (NBTA). This certificate is earned by compiling extensive trial experience, completing continuing legal education classes, and passing a day-long examination. In addition to listing the three states in which he was licensed to practice, Peel listed his NBTA certification on his letterhead. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois filed a complaint against Peel and argued that he was publicly presenting himself as a certified legal specialist in violation of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. At Peel's disciplinary hearing, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and held that Peel's letterhead was commercial speech that could be governed by the lawyer advertising regulations. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Peel's letterhead amounted to an unwarranted claim of superior quality of service because it could lead the public to believe that his authority to practice trial advocacy was derived from his NBTA certification.


[Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the letterhead was neither actually nor inherently misleading because advertising an NBTA certification did not suggest a greater degree of qualification than could be inferred by evaluating the certification's requirements. Furthermore, the Court held that, whether or not the letterhead was misleading, Illinois' categorical prohibition on providing this type of information was "broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the perceived evil." Additionally, the concern about deception was insufficient to outweigh the "constitutional presumption favoring disclosure over concealment."
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, because the letterhead may be deceiving, Illinois could enact regulations short of a complete ban to make sure the public is not misled by similar representations.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the letterhead could be potentially misleading and that the state should have the power to prevent these types of advertisements when they are not accompanied by a disclaimer aimed at avoiding the misconception. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Illinois rule barring this type of misleading speech is valid and that the public's comparative lack of knowledge justifies the state's interest in controlling this type of speech. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined the dissent.


[Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc. (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1983, the predecessor-in-interest to Eli Lilly & Co. sued Medtronic, Inc. for patent infringement to enjoin Medtronic’s research and marketing of an implantable cardiac defibrillator, a device used to treat heart problems. Medtronic argued that the information was used to develop and submit new information under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and therefore it was exempt from the statutes governing patent infringement. The district court held that there was no such exemption and issued a permanent injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that Medtronic’s actions could not be considered patent infringement if they were reasonably related to obtaining approval under the FDCA.


[Eli Lilly and Company v. Medtronic, Inc. (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of a 6-2 majority. The Court held that, based on the phrasing of the FDCA, the exemption refers to all actions in the process of developing and submitting information to the FDA. Reading the statute in this way prevents distortions of patent law and allows the development of medical technology to logically proceed. The Court held that only the broader interpretation of the statute respects legislative intent.
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent where he argued that the FDCA refers specifically to an exemption for drugs, not medical devices and/or technologies. He argued that to read the statute in any broader manner is to unnecessarily twist Congress’ words from their normal meaning. He also wrote that Congress’ distinction between drugs and devices would be a logical one, as the use of a patent holder’s devices for medical testing would infringe on the patent holder’s sales in a way that the use of a drug would not. Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Sisson v. Ruby (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
On September 24, 1985, a yacht owned by Everett Sisson caught fire while it was moored at a Lake Michigan marina. The fire destroyed the yacht and damaged several others in the vicinity. The owners of the other yachts sued Sisson for $275,000 for the damage to their yachts and the marina. Sisson filed a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief to limit his liability to $800, the value of his yacht after the fire. He argued that the district court had maritime jurisdiction, but the court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Sisson moved for reconsideration, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.


[Sisson v. Ruby (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of seven members of the court. The Court held that the district court has maritime jurisdiction when the incident in question represents a potential hazard to maritime commerce and bears a substantial relationship to maritime activity. In this case, although the fire caused minimal damage, it had the potential to be extremely destructive and disrupt the maritime activity of the marina. The Court held that such a determination should be made based on the nature of the incident rather than its actual result. The fire bore a substantial relationship to maritime activity because it stemmed from the maintenance of a vessel in a marina located on a navigable waterway, which is a part of traditional maritime activity.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the majority’s test is unnecessary because it merely proves that district courts have jurisdiction over all tort cases involving vessels in navigable waterways. He wrote that the use of such a test only adds confusion to an otherwise-settled area of law. Justice Byron R. White joined in the concurring opinion.


[Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Dennis and Francie Burnham were married in 1976 and moved to New Jersey in 1977. In July of 1987, they decided to separate and agreed that Mrs. Burnham would take custody of the children, move to California, and file for divorce citing irreconcilable differences. In October of 1987, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey citing desertion. Mrs. Burnham successfully demanded that Mr. Burnham respect their previous agreement and filed for divorce in California in January 1988. Later that month, Mr. Burnham was in California on business and visited his children. While there, he was served with a California court summons and a copy of the divorce petition. Later that year, Mr. Burnham appeared before the California Superior Court and moved to quash the petition because the court lacked jurisdiction over him, as his only contacts with California were short business trips. The Superior Court denied the motion and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.


[Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that one of the most firmly established precedents in American judicial history is the fact that states have jurisdiction over nonresidents within their borders. As long as the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” are not offended by the state’s assertion of jurisdiction, there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the addition of a subjective jurisdiction determination to be made by a judge would make the process less fair.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. He argued that there is no evidence that the rule allowing states to have jurisdiction over nonresidents had arbitrarily or unfairly violated due process. In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that historical precedent is not the only factor that should determine whether the jurisdictional issue satisfies the Due Process Clause. He argued that, when a person visits a state, they knowingly and willingly avail themselves of the benefits of that state’s laws, and therefore are subject to them as well. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that the majority’s opinion was unnecessarily broad, but he agreed with its conclusion.


[Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that "the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption." The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement.


[Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. In making its case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce argued that it should have been excluded from the act's restrictions since the Chamber was a "nonprofit ideological corporation" which was more analogous to a political association than a business firm. The Court disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventy-five percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the political process.


[Idaho v. Wright (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Laura Lee Wright and her ex-husband Louis Wright had jointly agreed that they would share custody of their daughter, while her half-sister would live with her parents, Laura Lee Wright and Robert Giles. In November 1986, when the girls were five years old and two years old, respectively, the older daughter told Cynthia Goodman, a friend of Louis Wright’s, that Giles had sexually assaulted her while Laura held her down and covered her mouth. The girl also said that she had seen the same thing happen to her younger sister. Goodman reported this information to the police and took the girl to the hospital where Dr. John Jambura examined her. Dr. Jambura found conditions highly suggestive of sexual intercourse that had occurred two or three days previously. Laura Wright and Giles were jointly charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor.
During the trial, the court conducted a voir dire examination of the younger daughter, aged three years at the time of the trial, to determine whether she was capable of testifying. The court found, and the parties agreed, that she was not. Over the objection of the defense, the court allowed Dr. Jambura to testify to certain statements the younger daughter made during the examination. Laura Wright and Giles were convicted on both counts, and they appealed on the conviction regarding the conduct with the younger daughter. They argued that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Dr. Jambura. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the admission of the hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because the testimony did not fall under a hearsay exception and the interview in question lacked procedural safeguards. The Idaho Supreme Court also noted that children are highly susceptible to suggestion and can easily be influenced by leading questions. Because the Idaho Supreme Court was not convinced that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the testimony been excluded, it reversed the conviction.


[Idaho v. Wright (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the state bears the burden of showing that the testimony of a witness who is unavailable for trial is sufficiently reliable to withstand scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Testimony is deemed reliable when it otherwise falls within a hearsay exception or shows “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” In order to meet this high standard of trustworthiness, testimony must be so reliable that adversarial testing under cross-examination would not alter its credibility. Corroborating evidence is not enough to establish the trustworthiness of testimony; it must be inherently reliable. Because the state could neither show that the testimony fit within a hearsay exception nor could they prove that it was inherently trustworthy, it was unreliable and therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion erred in establishing a rule that corroborating evidence is not sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of testimony. Because corroborating evidence is often the most commonly used and effective ways of determining the reliability of testimony, there is no reason for the majority to remove it as a method of determining whether testimony is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


[Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
In 1985 the Ohio legislature passed House Bill 319, which requires a physician to notify the parents of an unmarried minor who is requesting an abortion, unless the situation falls under one of the exceptions. Exceptions include: the minor providing a letter of parental consent; the physician providing the parents with actual notification 24 hours before the procedure or notification by mail 48 hours before the procedure; and a judicial bypass procedure that allows a minor to obtain the approval of a specified relative upon filing an affidavit with a juvenile court or receive a notification waiver from a juvenile court if parental notification would cause the minor emotional, sexual, or physical abuse. Before the law was put into effect, an abortion clinic, one of its doctors, and a minor seeking an abortion sued in federal district court and claimed that the judicial bypass procedures the law required violated a minor’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary injunction preventing Ohio form enforcing the statute. Ohio appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


[Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority in which the Court held that the bill did not violate a minor’s right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because it satisfied the four factors used to determine the constitutionality of this type of consent statutes. Those four factors are whether the minor was allowed to show that she was mature enough to make the abortion decision without her parents’ help, whether she was allowed to show that the abortion is in her best interest, whether the judicial bypass procedure took reasonable measures to ensure the minor’s anonymity, and whether the statute set reasonable time limits for judicial action. The Court ruled that requiring a minor to prove maturity by clear and convincing evidence is a fair evidentiary burden and that the requirement that the treating physician performs the notification is not an undue burden on the doctor or the minor.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he highlighted the importance of leaving abortion statutes such as this one to be decided by the majority-influenced state legislatures instead of by the “lawyerly dissection” of judicial precedent.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the judicial bypass procedure created a system that was a “tortious maze” and lacked the sensitivity required when dealing with such an intimate decision. Justice Blackmun also argued that the state lacked a sufficiently significant interest to interfere with the minor’s right to make this decision. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Two counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization ingested peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The state appellate court reversed the denial of benefits, finding that the denial violated their First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The state supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause. The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.


[Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes, vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.


[United States v. Montalvo-Murillo (1990) — Rehnquist Court (1988-1990) — Facts]
Guadalupe Montalvo-Murillo (Montalvo) was held in pretrial custody on federal criminal charges for attempting to enter New Mexico from Mexico with 72 pounds of cocaine. Montalvo cooperated with authorities and agreed to make a controlled delivery to the intended purchasers in Chicago. The authorities took Montalvo to Chicago where the purchase fell through, so they transferred Montalvo back to New Mexico where the criminal complaint charging him with possession of cocaine was originally filed. Montalvo’s detention hearing was not held until 13 days after his initial arrest in New Mexico because of the need to transfer him, the passage of two weekends, a federal holiday, and the fact that the government attorneys were unprepared. At Montalvo’s detention hearing, the district court determined that the delays violated the timeliness of proceedings required by the Bail Reform Act (Act). The district court also determined that Montalvo did not pose a flight risk and, to remedy the untimeliness of the pre-trial proceedings, released him. Montalvo fled upon his release. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that the government’s failure to uphold the Act’s directions for a timely hearing justified Montalvo’s release.