[North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1972, the United States Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibited federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender and allowed the government to withhold federal funds to non-complying educational institutions. Government agencies tasked with supplying federal funding to educational institutions were authorized to create regulations to enforce Title IX. In 1975, one of these agencies, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) passed regulations that extended the prohibition on gender discrimination to school personnel.
Employees of two Connecticut school districts, North Haven and Trumbull, accused the districts of practicing gender discrimination. HEW opened investigations into both districts and eventually warned both that they were in jeopardy of losing their federal funds. Both districts filed separate suits against HEW, claiming that the regulation went beyond the authority of Title IX, which does not explicitly cover gender-based employee discrimination. In both cases, the district court found for the school districts by holding that Title IX was intended to apply to students, not employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district courts and held that Congress had intended Title IX to apply to both students and employees.


[North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, while Title IX does not expressly include employees, Congress’s choice of words, i.e. “no person” as opposed to “student” or “beneficiary”, implies an intention to broadly cover individuals involved in educational institutions rather than only students. The legislative history of Title IX supports the inference that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit gender discrimination of employees. Additionally, Congress was given the opportunity to view HEW’s regulations and pass a resolution of disapproval if the regulations were inconsistent with Title IX. While such a resolution concerning the employee discrimination regulation was introduced, it was not passed. Therefore, Congress appeared to intend Title IX to apply to employee discrimination, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s regulations were valid.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the language of Title IX, on its face, did not apply to employee discrimination. Legislative history can only override the language of a law if the legislative history is clear and unambiguous that Congress intended Title IX to apply to employee discrimination. In this case, the majority opinion relied primarily on the statements of one congressman when analyzing the legislative history, which is not sufficient to support the majority’s conclusion. Therefore Justice Powell held that Title IX did not apply to employee discrimination. Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent,


[Plyler v. Doe (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. This case was decided together with Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.


[Plyler v. Doe (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children, though not citizens of the United States or Texas, are people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and, therefore, are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of illegal aliens, by denying them the right to an education, and because Texas could not prove that the regulation was needed to serve a "compelling state interest," the Court struck down the law.


[Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion.


[Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity but not absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is only available for specific functions that require a total shield from liability. The Court held that qualified immunity was necessary for the government officials to carry out their jobs and that the courts could adequately determine whether an action falls within the scope of qualified immunity based on whether the official knew or should have known that his/her actions would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the “knew or should have known” standard the majority established would often require discovery to determine what a defendant actually knew. He argued that the issues surrounding discovery of such evidence could be handled by a trial judge pending any motion for summary judgment made on the basis of qualified immunity. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, but emphasized that Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a similar case where they dissented, was wrongly decided.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent where he argued that, based on the Court’s previous decisions that granted absolute immunity to legislative aides, presidential aides should also receive absolute immunity. He argued that the degree of immunity for a government official should depend on that official’s function rather than that official’s place in the hierarchy. Since the President relies on his aides to perform the duties of his office, the aides should be considered “alter egos” for legal purposes and entitled to the same absolute immunity. Without that assurance of immunity for aides, the President’s functionality would greatly diminish.


[Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Two non-profit groups merged to form the group Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR). One of the original groups obtained 501(c)3 status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which allowed donors to make tax-deductible donations to it. Because the other group participated in political lobbying, it did not qualify for 501(C)(3) status and could not offer tax-deductible donations. Since the newly formed TWR also participated in "substantial lobbying," the IRS denied it tax-deduction privileges. TWR alleged in District Court that the IRS's "substantial lobbying" restriction for 501(C)(3) status violated its First Amendment rights by imposing an "unconstitutional burden" on its ability to receive tax-deductible donations. TWR also argued that the restriction violated its Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since veterans' organizations that lobbied extensively could receive tax-deductible donations. The District Court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the "substantial lobbying" restriction did impair TWR's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.


[Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No and no. Justice William H. Rehnquist authored the opinion for a unanimous court. Allowing a non-profit to solicit tax-deductible donations is a form of paying for its operations. Pointing to its decision in Cammarano v. United States, the Court maintained that "Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying." The federal government does not have to sponsor every activity that the First Amendment protects, and its choice to sponsor one type of activity does not force it to sponsor every related type of activity. The federal government can choose to support veterans' lobbying organizations without also having to fund the lobbying of other groups. Non-profit groups interested in offering tax-deductions to donors can separate with the parts of the organization engaged in lobbying.


[United States v. Rodgers (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Phillip Bosco died with a great deal of tax debt, so the government sued his widow, Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers, to force her to sell the house in which she currently resided to pay off his debt. Rodgers, however, was not in debt and under Texas law, had a separate right to the homestead. The district court held Rodgers had a state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a force sale. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[United States v. Rodgers (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does grant the government power to order the sale of a home itself, even if the delinquent taxpayer is not the only one with interest in the property. However, that power is limited by equitable discretion, which means that the district court should consider a number of different variables including the possible competing prejudices and expectation of the parties involved. The Court also held that, if the home is sold, then the nondelinquent spouse is entitled to a portion of the proceeds because taking away the interest of an innocent third party would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the government has the power to sell property not belonging to an indebted taxpayer, but that it should be determined how far the power can extend. The government does not have the power to sell jointly owned property if the nondelinquent co-owner has a right to ban the sale and continue the possession. In this case, Rodgers had a state-protected right to remain in her home, so the government did not have the power to sell her house.


[Solem v. Helm (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Helm was convicted of writing a check from a fictitious account, a crime carrying with it a five-year jail sentence. However, since this was his seventh felony conviction in South Dakota since 1964, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under a state recidivist statute.


[Solem v. Helm (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Since all of Helm's prior offenses, including his current check-writing conviction, had been "relatively minor" and were not crimes against people, Justice Powell held that Helm had "received the penultimate sentence (South Dakota did not have the death penalty) for relatively minor criminal conduct." Powell concluded that Helm was treated more harshly than the state's most violent criminals.


[City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds.


[City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.


[Martinez v. Bynum (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A Texas law permitted public school districts to deny tuition-free admission to minors living apart from their parents if their primary purpose of living in the district was to attend school free of charge. Roberto Morales left his family in Mexico to live with his sister, Oralia Martinez, in Texas. When the school district denied Morales' application for free admission, Martinez challenged the law in court.


[Martinez v. Bynum (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the Constitution permitted states to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to bona-fide residents. The Court found that the Texas requirement was "far more generous" than traditional residency requirements, since it extended benefits to many children even if they did not intend to remain in a school district indefinitely. No violation of the Equal Protection Clause was found.


[Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A California law dictated that before additional nuclear power plants could be built, the state energy commission had to determine that there would be adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods. Two utility companies challenged the law, arguing that its provisions had been preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.


[Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the California law did not impinge upon congressional authority. The Court found that because the rationale for enacting the law was an economic one, it did not interfere with federal regulations governing nuclear safety. The Court held that Congress had left "sufficient authority in the states to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons" and that the courts should not rework the division of regulatory authority created by Congress.


[Exxon Corporation v. Eagerton (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Since 1945, Alabama had imposed a severance tax on oil and gas operations. Exxon Corporation (Exxon), along with other gas and oil producers in Alabama, had contractual agreements regarding the tax with the owners of the land on which operations occurred and with oil and gas purchasers. The owners were paid a royalty on all gas and oil produced, but were contractually assessed a portion of the severance tax, and the purchasers were required to reimburse the producers for any severance tax paid by them. In 1979, the Alabama Legislature passed a statute altering the severance tax. The statute increased the severance tax, exempted royalty landowners from the increase, and prohibited gas and oil operators from passing the tax increase on to oil and gas purchasers.
Exxon and other oil and gas producers sued Ralph Eagerton, the Commissioner of Revenue in Alabama and argued that the National Gas Policy Act, which allowed natural gas producers to take steps to recoup state severance tax, preempted the prohibitions on passing along the costs to purchasers. Furthermore, the oil and gas producers argued that the exemption and the prohibition violated the oil and gas producers’ Constitutional rights under the Contract Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County ruled the new severance tax provisions unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the Contract Clause. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed the lower court’s decision, holding any constraints imposed by the new tax were generally applicable and therefore valid.


[Exxon Corporation v. Eagerton (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes, no, no, no. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that federal law entirely preempts state law either when Congress explicitly declares it or when federal regulation is so pervasive that it is reasonable to infer that there is no space for a state to supplant federal regulation. Specific state laws are preempted to the extent that they stand in conflict or as an obstacle to federal law. The Court held that the National Gas Policy Act preempted the pass-through prohibition as they applied to interstate transactions. The pass-through prohibition could however be applied to intrastate transactions because Congress did not intend the National Gas Policy Act to preempt state regulation of state gas and oil markets. The Court also held that the exemption for royalty landowners did not violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution, because the exemption does not prohibit land owners and oil and gas producers from contractually shifting the tax burden Additionally, the Court held that a statute does not violate the Contract Clause simply because it has an effect on contractual obligations undertaken prior to passage of a statute. Because the pass-through prohibition only created incidental effects on pre-existing contractual obligations, it was not unconstitutional. The Court also held that, the statute only had to pass rational basis review because it did not affect a fundamental interest or create a suspect categorization. Because the royalty landowner exemption and the pass-through prohibition were both rationally related to Alabama’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from excessive prices, neither provision violated the oil and gas producers’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.


[Marsh v. Chambers (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.


[Marsh v. Chambers (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become "part of the fabric of our society." In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. "It is," wrote Burger, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."


[Kolender v. Lawson (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Lawson was a law-abiding black man of unusual deportment (he wore his hair in long dreadlocks). Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment when he walked in white neighborhoods. Lawson challenged the California law "that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer."


[Kolender v. Lawson (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause for an arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone. The majority hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.


[Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which gave the Secretary of Transportation the power to issue motor vehicle safety standards. The Secretary also has the ability to delegate that power to another agency, in this case the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Act also authorizes judicial review to determine whether the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
In 1967, the Department of Transportation first issued Standard 208, which at that point only required all automobiles to have seat belts. By 1975, Standard 208 had been revised multiple times to require passive restraints, such as airbags and seat belts that would operate automatically and not require action on the part of the occupants. Because of the unpopularity of the standard, in 1974 Congress amended the Act to allow alternative safety measures. In 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the passive restraint requirement entirely. The succeeding Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, issued Modified Standard 208, which required passive restraints in large cars of model year 1982 or later and in all cars of model year 1984 or later. In 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis began reconsidering Modified Standard 208. The NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 because it determined that the restraints would not have the expected safety benefits, so the requirement would not be reasonable or practicable.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed for review of the NHTSA’s decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NHTSA’s decision to rescind the standard was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that there was not enough evidence to support the NHTSA’s position and that the NHTSA failed to properly consider alternative possibilities under which the standard could be effective.


[Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the rescission of a standard should be reviewed based on whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Because the removal of a standard often entails the same level of policy changes as the promulgation of a law, it should be reviewed under the same tests. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals, while correctly finding that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious, relied too strongly on an inferred congressional mandate for passive restraints. The Court held that, by rescinding Modified Standard 208 without considering alternatives and consequences, the NHTSA did not provide evidence for its decision and therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the NHTSA did not provide adequate analysis for rescinding the requirements regarding airbags and continuous spool seat belts, but it did explain its decision in regards to detachable belts. He also argued that it is reasonable for an agency to reassess its priorities over time, as happened in this case. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


[United States v. Knotts (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Tristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug-manufacturing lab.
Knotts was convicted in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts’ Fourth Amendment rights.


[United States v. Knotts (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the use of the radio transmitter to track the movements of a suspect in a car falls under the privacy expectations for a vehicle, which are less than those of a house. Since the radio transmitter in this case was used primarily to ascertain where the chloroform traveled and where it stopped, the surveillance did not violate Knotts’ right to privacy in his home. Additionally, the use of the radio transmitter did not serve any function that the police could not have performed visually; the transmitter merely made the process easier.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment and wrote that, while he agreed with the majority’s decision concerning the use of the radio transmitter, he found its original installation to be on shakier constitutional ground. He argued that the installation of the radio transmitter represented a significantly larger intrusion upon a person’s privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun also concurred in judgment and argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily referred to the “open fields” doctrine that was a major issues in two cases the Court had yet to hear. He wrote that he did not wish either side in those two cases to gain legitimacy from this one. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence in judgment.
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment and wrote that the majority opinion’s implication that the this case involved the “open field” doctrine was false. He also argued that the use of technology to augment officers’ abilities was not always automatically constitutionally sound. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the opinion concurring in judgment.


[Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Verlindin B.V., a Dutch Corporation, sued Central Bank of Nigeria in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for breaching a letter of credit. Verlindin alleged that the court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The FSIA grants jurisdiction for actions against foreign parties who are not entitled to immunity. Central Bank moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Central bank had sovereign immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that the entire FSIA exceeded the scope of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.


[Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not violate Article III. The FSIA was a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce. On remand, the court of appeals should consider whether Central Bank is entitled to sovereign immunity.


[Lehr v. Robertson (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Jonathan Lehr, the biological father of Jessica M., filed a petition to vacate an order of adoption. He argued that Jessica was adopted by her mother’s husband in violation of the Constitution because Lehr was never notified of the proceedings. Under New York law, Lehr was not in any of the classes of people entitled to notification of adoption proceedings. Lehr never supported the child financially, had a significant relationship with the child, or entered his name into the state’s father registry. The Ulster County Family Court denied Lehr’s petition and the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Lehr v. Robertson (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the New York courts. The Supreme Court held that due process and equal protection were not violated because Lehr never had a significant personal or financial relationship with Jessica M. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the state cannot deny notice of adoption proceedings to a biological father when the state knows his whereabouts and interest in the child. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


[Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc. (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
From 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's "meeting-competition" defense under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc. (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that section 2(b) is not so inflexible. The Court held that the meeting-competition defense required a seller at least to show the existence of facts that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the seller's lower price would meet the equally low price of a competitor and required the seller to demonstrate that its lower price was a good faith response to a competitor's low price. "Falls City contends that it has established its meeting-competition defense as a matter of law. In the absence of further findings, we do not agree," wrote Justice Blackmun.


[Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.


[Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.


[Michigan v. Long (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution.


[Michigan v. Long (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court, after admitting that it had not developed "a satisfying and consistent approach" regarding lower court references to independent state grounds, held that it had jurisdiction in the case. The Court held that when state court decisions appeared to rest primarily on federal law, it would infer that state courts believed that federal law required them to do so. State courts could expressly state that independent grounds were being used in cases as opposed to constitutional grounds. The Court reasoned that this approach would avoid the rendering of advisory opinions and would decrease the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify decisions to the liking of the Justices. In the case at hand, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the search and affirmed Long's conviction.


[Simopoulos v. Virginia (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Dr. Chris Simopoulos, a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist, performed an abortion for a 17-year-old girl at his clinic in Falls Church, Virginia. The girl was in her second trimester and did not inform her parents about the procedure, despite Dr. Simopoulos’ suggestion. Dr. Simploulous was indicted under a Virginia law prohibiting second trimester abortions outside of a licensed hospital. The Circuit Court of Fairfax County convicted him without a jury and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction.


[Simopoulos v. Virginia (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No, No, No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for an 8-1 majority, affirmed the Virginia court. The Supreme Court held that requiring doctors to perform second trimester abortions in licensed hospitals was a reasonable means of furthering the state’s interest in protecting the mother’s health and safety. The prosecution was not required to prove a lack of medical necessity, and Dr. Simopoulos’ actions clearly caused the death of the unborn fetus. This case is different from past cases where hospitalization requirements were unconstitutional, because the Virginia statute allows abortions in outpatient facilities as long as they are properly licensed.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, expressing that the validity of the Virginia statute did not depend on which trimester was regulated. The statute was not an undue burden on the decision to undergo an abortion, so it was valid. Justice Byron R. White and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing that the Court should vacate the lower decision and remand the case for further consideration of unclear state law.


[Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Sony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the "Betamax" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement.


[Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that "[t]he sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of [Universal's] copyrights." The Court concluded that there was a significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright holders who license their works for free public broadcasts would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers and that Universal failed to show that time-shifting would cause non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "[t]he sale of copying equipment...does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses." For the dissenting minority, Justice Blackmun expressed the views that taping a copyrighted television program is infringement and that the recorder manufacturers were guilty of inducing and materially contributing to the infringement.


[Bob Jones University v. United States (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Bob Jones University was dedicated to "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.


[Bob Jones University v. United States (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a "fundamental national public policy." The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an "overriding governmental interest." Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."


[Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax.


[Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held that while the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of the press, Minnesota had "created a special tax that applie[d] only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment." Noting that there was "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment," the Court held that when states single out the press "the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute." The Court concluded that "recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme."


[United States v. Place (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
(Tom Feledy prepared this summary.)
A traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a "sniff" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio
, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege.


[United States v. Place (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No and no. Seizures pursuant to investigative detentions are lawful only if they are limited in scope, as described in Terry, and evidence resulting from such unlawful seizures must be suppressed. The "sniff" of a properly trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.


[Mueller v. Allen (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.


[Mueller v. Allen (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it "excessively entangle" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued Justice Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.


[Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
On November 14, 1978, a Texas jury in Bell County found Thomas A. Barefoot guilty of the murder of a police officer. A separate sentencing hearing was held before the same jury to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The prosecution called two psychiatrists to the stand who testified that Barefoot was likely to commit further acts of violence and would remain a danger to society. The jury sentenced Barefoot to death. Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and argued that the use of the psychiatrists to testify as to future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatric testimony cannot accurately predict future dangerousness and is likely to produce erroneous convictions. He also argued that this specific testimony was unconstitutional, as neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.
Barefoot’s execution was scheduled for September 7, 1980. A stay of execution was granted by the Supreme Court pending the filing and disposition of a petition of certiorari. The petition was denied, and Barefoot’s execution was rescheduled for October 1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Barefoot’s application for habeas corpus, and he filed a petition for habeas corpus in district court. The district court granted a stay of execution pending action on the petition, and later denied the petition and vacated the stay of execution. The district court also issued a certificate of probable cause that would allow Barefoot to continue the appeals process. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again denied Barefoot’s petition for habeas corpus and motion for a stay of execution. Barefoot appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District for a stay of execution, pending the consideration of his appeal of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion.


[Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No, yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, in denying the stay of execution, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit necessarily examined the decision of the district court on the merits of the case. Although the Court of Appeals may not formally affirm the judgment of the lower court, the denial of the stay of execution serves the same purpose. The Court also held that the psychiatrists’ testimony did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because the testimony falls under precedents that allow for predictions of future behavior to be considered relevant evidence in sentencing hearings. The reliability of such evidence should be weighed according to the rules of evidence by the fact-finder. The Court also held that the testimony of expert witnesses need not rely on personal examination and can be in the form of responses to hypothetical questions.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court of Appeals made procedural errors, but that the Supreme Court reviewed the case on the merits, and he concurred with the majority’s opinion as to the merits of the case.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent in which he argued that a defendant must be afforded a hearing on the merits of his case when he petitions for a writ of habeas corpus unless the case can be dismissed as frivolous. Because a hearing on the merits can often be time-consuming, the Court of Appeals should have granted a stay of execution to allow enough time to properly consider the case. He also argued that death penalty jurisprudence placed an added emphasis on the importance of careful consideration, and the majority opinion’s suggestion of a summary approach goes against those precedents. He also cited his opinion that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, while the possibly specious testimony of psychiatrists would be acceptable in a regular case, in a capital case a higher standard of reliability must be expected. Because unreliable scientific evidence is likely to prejudice the jury, it must be held to a stricter standard of accuracy than psychiatric testimony can be proven to meet. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Karcher v. Daggett (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Democrats in control of the New Jersey Legislature designed a plan for congressional redistricting in the state which the outgoing Democratic governor signed into law. Even though the district populations differed by less than one percent from each other, they were clearly drawn to maximize Democratic power in the state.


[Karcher v. Daggett (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Even though the population differences in the districts were slight, the Court held that they were unconstitutional because they "were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality." Justice Brennan upheld past Court decisions (Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 1973, and Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964) and argued that relying on a strict numerical standard of populations to assess district equality would be misguided.


[Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York-based firm that specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. On March 6, he received insider information that Equity Funding of America, a corporation engaged primarily in selling life insurance and mutual funds, had vastly overstated assets as a result of fraudulent company policies. Dirks did not do any business with Equity Funding, but he decided to investigate and, during the investigation, discussed his information with investors who did hold Equity Funding stock. Some of these people sold their stock based on Dirks’ information. Dirks also urged the Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud allegations, but it would not for fear of the story being libelous. The drop in Equity Funding’s share price caused the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal ran a story that was based largely on Dirks’ information, and the SEC then began investigating Dirks’ role in the affair.
In their investigation of Dirks’ actions, the SEC found that he had aided and abetted the violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by informing other members of the investment community of the fraud allegations. However, because he assisted in exposing the fraud, Dirks was only censured. Dirks appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision.


[Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the duty to disclose information arises from a financial relationship with one of the parties, not just the possession of information. The Court also held that an insider is only liable for inside trading when he makes a profit on the information before disclosing. Because Dirks did not have a financial relationship with Equity Funding, nor did he make a profit from the information, he neither had a duty to disclose nor did he violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that Dirks served as a proxy to provide insider information to people who did have a financial interest in Equity Funding and were able to act on his information. By fulfilling this role, he is liable. He also argued that that the majority’s opinion essentially rewards Dirks for participating in the affair, which is counterproductive for the purposes of enforcing the federal securities acts. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


[Connick v. Myers (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Sheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court. Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney Harry Connick. Before the official transfer took place, Meyers prepared a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors. When Connick learned of the questionnaire, he immediately terminated Meyers. He said he fired her because she refused to accept her transfer. He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination. Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Connick v. Myers (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that speech of public employees is generally only protected when they speak on matters of public concern. Meyers’ speech only dealt with personal and internal office issues. The district court also erred in placing too high of a burden on Connick to show that Meyers’ speech substantially interfered with the operation of the office. It is sufficient to show that the employer reasonably believed Meyers’ speech would interfere with office operations.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing his view that speech concerning the way government is run is protected under the First Amendment. Meyers’ questionnaire addressed that subject and interfered with the operation of the office, so her termination violated the First Amendment. Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


[Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.


[Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. The school board chose to grant exclusive access to the official teachers union in order to facilitate a collective-bargaining agreement. It did not act to suppress the speech of rival teachers unions. The school board entrusted PEA with obligations as the sole representative of teachers that would require the use of the mail system. PLEA did not have these obligations and could communicate effectively though many other channels. Since the mail system was not a "public forum," PLEA had no unassailable right to access it. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. contended that the mail system constituted government property and PLEA lost access privileges because its viewpoints differed from those of the official union.


[Zant v. Stephens (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
A jury in the Bleckly County Superior Court convicted Alpha Stephens of murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on two of three possible statutory aggravating circumstances. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled one of the aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty invalid. After exhausting all post conviction remedies, Stephens filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court certified the Supreme Court of Georgia to answer the question of what state law premises support affirming Stephens death sentence, even though one of the aggravating circumstances was now invalid. The Georgia court responded, holding that the jury used other aggravating circumstances along with the invalid one to sentence Stephens, so his sentence should stand.


[Zant v. Stephens (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice John Paul Stephens wrote the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that where there are other valid aggravating circumstances to substantiate the death sentence, habeas relief is not available. The jury did not rely solely on the invalid factor in making its decision. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that the sentence could stand on a line of cases where convictions are upheld if any of the counts are sustainable. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence emphasizing the application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capitol sentencing cases.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent condemning capital punishment as cruel and unusual. He also felt the aggravating circumstance used in making the sentencing decision was constitutionally defective. Justice William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.


[Brown v. Thomson (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In apportioning its state legislative seats, the State of Wyoming made provisions to allocate to each county at least one state representative. With the state's total population and its sixty-four House seats, the ideal apportionment would have been 7,337 persons per representative. Given the guarantee of county representation, Niobrara County, with a population of less than half the ideal (2,924), was allocated a House seat.


[Brown v. Thomson (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court upheld the Wyoming apportionment scheme and found no Fourteenth Amendment violations. Justice Powell argued that using counties as legislative districts and assuring at least one representative per county supported "substantial and legitimate state concerns." Since the population variations in the Wyoming plan were the result of the consistent application of a nondiscriminatory and legitimate state policy, the plan was consistent with the Constitution. Any dilution of voting strength which the constituents of the other sixty-three representatives may have experienced as a result of Niobrara's relatively small population was minimal and irrelevant given the advantages of the Wyoming scheme.


[Illinois v. Gates (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons.


[Illinois v. Gates (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case.


[Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Company (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL) entered long-term contracts in 1977 governing its purchase of natural gas from the Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a Kansas-based oil company. The contracts contained "price escalator" clauses which provided for gas prices to rise to the levels set by governmental authorities. In 1978, the federal government established a new system for regulating natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act. The Act set maximum lawful prices that could be charged for different types of natural gas and applied these price levels to intrastate gas markets. The Act allowed states to set maximum price levels below federal levels, which Kansas did under the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act). When ERG tried to raise its prices to the higher federal levels using the "price escalator" clause, KPL insisted that it was only legally obligated to buy gas at the lower prices set by the Kansas Act. ERG claimed that KPL violated the contract by refusing to pay federal prices. In response, KPL argued that the Kansas Act clearly prohibited the use of federal price levels to trigger "price escalator" clauses. After a state trial court ruled in favor of KPL, ERG claimed that the Kansas Act violated the Contract Clause by preventing federal price changes from affecting state contracts. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause since it was a legitimate effort by the state of Kansas to protect its economy from rapid price changes.


[Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Company (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court determined that ERG did not have its contractual rights "substantially impaired" and found that the state of Kansas had "significant and legitimate public purpose[s]" for passing the Kansas Act. The contract between ERG and KPL facilitated changes in prices according to governmental price controls, and the new state price controls adhered to federal guidelines. In passing the Kansas Act, the state "exercised its police powers to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices." The Natural Gas Policy Act set maximum price levels for natural gas but explicitly permitted states to lower these levels. Therefore "price escalator" clauses included in intrastate contracts would adhere to lawfully enacted state price levels.


[Bush v. Lucas (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Bush, an aerospace engineer at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (Center), a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), made a series of public comments critical of the Center. Lucas, the Center s director, demoted Bush on the ground that the comments were false and misleading. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority upheld the demotion, but the Civil Service Commission s (CSC) Appeals Review Board later found that the demotion had violated his First Amendment rights. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively, with back pay. While his administrated appeal was pending, Bush brought suit against Lucas in Alabama state court, seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. Lucas removed the action to federal district court, which granted summary judgment for Lucas. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bush had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC regulations.


[Bush v. Lucas (1983) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No; not under the CSC regulations. The federal judiciary, pursuant to its common law authority, has the power to recognize new causes of action in absence of, or to supplement, statutory remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated its relief is to be exclusive. In determining whether judicial relief should be granted, federal courts are (1) to pay particular attention to special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) to ascertain whether the purpose and comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme precludes judicial remedies where statutory relief is available. The administrative scheme in this case reflected Congress_ attempt to balance the competing interests of protecting the First Amendment rights of federal employees and maintaining a disciplined and effective workforce. Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to regulate the employee relations. Grant of supplementary judicial relief would disrupt this balance and is therefore inappropriate.


[Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
After extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in real property could be taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the Act.


[Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Public Use Clause did not preclude Hawaii from taking title in real property, with just compensation, for the purpose of reducing the concentration of ownership. Noting that Hawaii's statute was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court argued that "debates over the wisdom of takings" were best carried out by legislatures, not by federal courts. The Court also held that the fact that the property taken by eminent domain was transferred to private beneficiaries did not condemn the law to having a solely private purpose.


[Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
According to its bylaws, membership in the United States Jaycees was limited to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Females and older males were limited to associate membership in which they were prevented from voting or holding local or national office. Two chapters of the Jaycees in Minnesota, contrary to the bylaws, admitted women as full members. When the national organization revoked the chapters' licenses, they filed a discrimination claim under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. The national organization brought a lawsuit against Kathryn Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, who was responsible for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law.


[Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Jaycees chapters lacked "the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." The Court reasoned that making women full members would not impose any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. The Court thus held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women justified enforcement of the state anti-discrimination law. The Court found that the Minnesota law was not aimed at the suppression of speech and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.


[Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of any otherwise deportable alien if the person has been consistently physically present in the United States for at least seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would represent great hardship to the person and/or family members.
Padrungsi Phinpathya, a citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. She and her husband, a Thai citizen who entered the country in 1968, were granted permission to stay until July 1971. When their visas expired, they chose to stay without the permission of the proper authorities. In January 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) commenced deportation processes on the couple. They applied for a suspension, which an immigration judge granted to Phinpathya’s husband but denied for her because she did not meet the continuous residency requirement. Phinpathya’s own testimony showed that she left the country in 1974 and improperly obtained a visa from the US consular office in Thailand for her return three months later.
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s ruling and held that Phinpathya’s illegal status when she left and returned to the US made the absence “meaningfully interruptive” of her residency and made her ineligible for the suspension of deportation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, despite her absence, Phinpathya’s intent was always to return to the US.


[Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 9-0 court. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of any language or legislative history indicating flexibility in the requirements, the section should be interpreted based on its plain meaning. Other immigration legislation has shown that when Congress intends there to be exceptions, the wording of the relevant statute reflects that intention. The Court also held that Congress intended the requirements to present a high threshold to suspension, and therefore the “continuous presence” requirement should not be interpreted loosely.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that Phinpathya’s unexplained three-month absence from the country was enough to disqualify her from a suspension of deportation without requiring the Supreme Court to address the issue of the meaning of the “continuous presence” requirement. He argued further that Congress did not intend the requirement to be taken literally in situations that would be unreasonable, but rather it was intended to prevent abuses. Legislative and judicial history supported a more flexible reading of the requirement. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.


[Koehler v. Engle (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Tilden N. Engle was an employee of a plant owned and operated by the Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler dismissed him on December 4th, 1972. Engle suffered from alcoholism, and he drank heavily following his dismissal. On December 7th, he consumed four anti-anxiety Librium pills and large quantities of whiskey. That day, he returned to the plant and told his nephew Chrysler employee Renus Engle, that he was going to kill someone. Renus Engle testified that the Tilden had a nervous pitch to his voice and tears in his eyes. According to Renus Engle, the respondent had been drinking but was not drunk.
Engle went to the office of Donald Ambrose, a clerk, and asked for Regis Lantzy, whom Engle believed was responsible for his termination. Ambrose said that Lantzy was not present, and later testified that Engle looked strange, as if something was troubling him. A short time later, Engle found Lantzy in the plant. Engle shot Lantzy with a pistol in front of several workers. Lantzy tried to flee, and Engle shot him several more times. He stood over the body briefly, then returned to Ambrose's office and surrendered to a security guard. The guard smelled alcohol on Engle's breath, but officers who arrived later on the scene did not detect the odor of alcohol. On December 8th, Engle gave a statement to the police. He admitted to purposefully shooting and killing Lantzy, albeit under the influence of alcohol.
On trial for murder in July, 1973, Engle's sole defense was temporary insanity due to the effects of alcohol, Librium, and a dissociative reaction, a temporary mental disorder often accompanied by memory loss. He stated that he remembered nothing between drinking the morning of December 7th and the moment he awoke in jail. He did not remember making a statement to the police.
The trial judge instructed the jury that malice --a necessary element for conviction-- is "implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another person." Regarding Engle's use of a pistol, the trial judge instructed the jury that "a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts." He also instructed the jury to consider the number and location of Lantzy's wounds when considering the issue of malice. Engle was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appealed, arguing the jury instructions constituted reversible error.
A unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed. It rejected Koehler's argument that Engle's failure to make a timely objection prevented him from raising the issue of jury instruction on appeal, noting that Michigan courts do not enforce a contemporaneous objection rule. The court held that the jury could have inferred from the instructions that the burden of proving lack of malice and intent lay with Engle. He also argued that the jury could have presumed from the use of a deadly weapon and the number and location of Lantzy's wounds that these facts alone constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Engle's malice and intent. He held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to conflicting evidence about Engle's state of mind at the time of the shooting.


[Koehler v. Engle (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes and no. In a per curiam opinion delivered by an equally divided Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment without further comment.
Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of the case.


[United States v. Yermian (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. He signed a certificate stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” Government investigators later discovered that Yermian’s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information.
At his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had knowledge that a federal agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction.


[United States v. Yermian (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the language of the statute applied the requirement of knowledge to the act of making false statements, rather than the jurisdiction. The Court also held that there was no legislative history to support the reading that Congress intended intent to deceive the federal government to be an element of the crime.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that there was a great deal of ambiguity in the statute regarding to which element the knowledge requirement applied. He argued that, without any clues in the statute, the majority’s opinion cannot simply decide what the phrase “knowingly and willfully” is meant to modify. He also argued that there was no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to expand the definition of the crime to any false statement that could fall under the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


[National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1981, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered into negotiations with ABC and CBS regarding televising the NCAA football games. Each of those companies had the rights to air 14 live games per season as well as to negotiate individually with the competing schools, and they were required to pay a “minimum aggregate compensation” to the participating schools. The goal of the plan was to televise games in such a way as to not drastically decrease live attendance at the games. The NCAA did not permit any of the schools to negotiate outside of this plan.
The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both members of the College Football Association (CFA), a group within the NCAA that was formed to represent and promote the interests of the major football schools. These schools, along with the other schools in the CFA, negotiated a separate contract with NBC that would allow for more televised games and greater revenues for the schools in question. The NCAA then announced that it would take disciplinary action against any school that complied with the CFA plan as opposed to the NCAA one. The respondent schools took the issue to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which found that the NCAA contract violated the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the lower court.


[National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the NCAA plan creates a structure in which the market cannot be responsive to viewer demands in terms of price and output. Since the viewers of college football games can be defined as a distinct market, a plan that places the NCAA in complete control of the broadcasts that reach this market creates the type of monopoly that the Sherman Act was meant to prevent. By limiting the number of live broadcasts, the Court found that the NCAA was attempting to artificially increase the value of live tickets, in the same way that a monopolist seeks to manipulate the market by limiting output.
In his dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that the Court erred by treating the NCAA as a purely commercial and profit-oriented organization. Because the NCAA is uniquely linked to both amateur athletics and higher education, it has been allowed a great deal of leeway in regulation that would be condemned in a purely business environment. He further argued that the NCAA plan “reflects the NCAA’s fundamental policy of preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and education.” Justice William H. Rehnquist joined Justice White in the dissent.


[Hishon v. King & Spalding (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1972 Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position with King & Spalding (Firm), a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia. During recruitment, Hishon had been told that after five or six years there was a possibility of promotion to partner; associates with “satisfactory evaluations” would be promoted to partner on a “fair and equal basis.” Hishon claimed to have relied on this information when making her decision to accept employment with the Firm. After six years of employment, Hishon was considered for admission to the partnership and was ultimately rejected. One year later Hishon was again considered for admission and again rejected. She was told to begin seeking new employment and was let go in December 1979.
In November 1979, Hishon sued the Firm and filed her claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Hishon claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and that this discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and Hishon sued in federal district court. The district court dismissed her claim, and Hishon appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed that ruling.


[Hishon v. King & Spalding (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against any employee on the basis of their sex. In this case, the Court held that the promise of equal consideration for partnership that went along with Hishon’s employment was contractual in nature and subject to the regulations of Title VII. By preventing Hishon from obtaining partnership because of her sex, the Firm discriminated against her and breached the “terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and therefore the Firm acted in direct violation of Title VII.
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote a concurring opinion noting that the Court’s opinion should be careful to not go to far in interfering with a firm’s ability to make partner decisions.


[Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid to males between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or had not) registered for the draft.


[Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court upheld the law. Since no student is compelled to seek financial aid, requiring an applicant to state whether or not he had registered for the draft would not be equivalent to forcing an individual to incriminate himself.


[Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.


[Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority (1985) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.


[Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single “bubble”. Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.


[Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed. The Supreme Court held that the bubble regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act. Congress did not have a specific intention for the interpretation of that term, and the EPA’s regulation was a reasonable policy choice. The regulation also provided reasonable accommodations for the many competing interests affected by the Act. Justices Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate.


[Michigan v. Clifford (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Early in the morning of October 18, 1980, a fire was reported at the Clifford residence in Detroit, Michigan. The Cliffords were out of town, so the Detroit Fire Department arrived, extinguished the fire, and left by around 7 a.m. An hour later, the fire investigator received a notice to inspect the house for evidence of arson. When he and his partner arrived on the scene at 1 p.m., they found a work crew from the Cliffords’ insurance company that the Cliffords had contacted to secure the house. When the work crew had cleared the basement, the fire investigators began to inspect it without obtaining either consent or a warrant. They determined that the fire had started in the basement, where they found several fuel cans and a crock pot attached to a timer, all of which was seized as evidence.
Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford were arrested and charged with arson. At the preliminary examination held to determine probable cause, they moved to suppress the evidence as the products of an illegal search made without warrant or consent. The motion was denied. Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, and it was admitted because there were exigent circumstances surrounding the search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the search.


[Michigan v. Clifford (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the judgment of the court in an opinion for a four-justice plurality. The Supreme Court held that that a reasonable expectation of privacy remains within a burned building. While the fire department does not need a warrant to fight the fire, any further official presence on the property must have a warrant. Whether the search is to identify the cause of the fire or to look for evidence of criminal activity will determine the type of warrant the fire department needs to obtain and the requirements for doing so. In the case of the fire at the Clifford home, both searches occurred but without the appropriate warrants. The Court also held that there were no exigent circumstances that prevented the investigators from obtaining the warrants.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that once the emergency that has granted the fire fighters authority to enter the premises has ended, the Fourth Amendment requires that notice be given to the property owners before entry. He also argued that if there is probable cause to suspect a crime has occurred, a warrant is required to conduct a search.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the fire fighters initially at the scene suspected arson because an investigator was called, which means the investigation and the fighting of the fire were happening simultaneously. The inspection by the fire investigator was a continuation of one that began when the fire fighters were legally on the premises. He also argued that the public interest in investigating the cause of a fire outweighs the property owner’s right to privacy. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


[Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Court held unanimously that Oklahoma's ban on local cable transmissions of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials violated both the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. While Oklahoma can regulate local cable aspects, such as franchise formation and construction, it cannot tamper with the flow of information from other states. Such tampering violates the Federal Communication Commission's guidelines prohibiting the censorship or alteration of interstate broadcast signals. As such, in the interest of maintaining diverse program offerings and encouraging competition among cable providers, the FCC's guidelines supercede Oklahoma's local regulatory authority. Moreover, despite its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor, the Court held that the federal government retains final authority under the commerce clause to regulate all aspects of interstate liquor commerce. Therefore, Oklahoma's continued ban on interstate alcoholic advertising violated the Commerce Clause.


[Strickland v. Washington (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
David Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.


[Strickland v. Washington (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2) the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr. Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr. Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless.


[INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and "[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing." The BIA also found application of the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.


[INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Conclusion]
No. In both criminal and civil proceedings, the "body" or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an illegal arrest. This alone was sufficient basis to uphold Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order. Moreover, deportation proceedings are civil actions and the protections afforded defendants in the criminal context do not apply. Specifically, Sandoval- Sanchez's appeal to the exclusionary rule in his motion to suppress his admission fails because the purpose the exclusionary rule is designed to serve deterring official misconduct is not served in the context of a deportation proceeding. First, the INS is only required to show identity and alienage to meet its burden in a deportation hearing. Since the defendant's body is not suppressible, the INS must only prove alienage, generally not a difficult task even absent a confession. Further, INS has its own comprehensive oversight program in place to monitor Fourth Amendment compliance internally. The exclusionary rule would do little to enhance these efforts. Finally, deportations hearings, unlike criminal trials, are designed to prevent the continued violation of the law. The social cost of releasing a defendant whose mere presence in the country puts him in continued violation of the law is too high to bear in light of the minimal benefits derived from application of the exclusionary rule in this context.


[United States v. S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) (1984) — Burger Court (1981-1986) — Facts]
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to "promote the safety of civil aircraft" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct "spot-check" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that recovery against the U.S. was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the U.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California "Good Samaritan" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California "Good Samaritan" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.