[Alabama Department of Revenue v. CSX Transportation, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Unanswered, and yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the appellate court correctly examined the railroad's situation in relation to its comparison class of competitors in the transportation industry. The Court also held that, in determining whether discrimination occurred, a court must look at the state's tax scheme as a whole rather than just the challenged provision. A provision may seem discriminatory when examined in isolation, but the tax code as a whole may subject a competitor to a comparable tax. Because the appellate court did not examine the state's justifications for its tax regime, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether discrimination in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1974 occurred.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority opinion's definition of discrimination was overly broad and could lead to inconsistent applications of the statute. Because the railroad was unable to prove that the tax "targets and singles out" the railroad as compared to other taxpayers, there was no discrimination. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


[Heien v. North Carolina (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On April 29, 2010, Sergeant Darisse of the Surry County Sheriff's Department observed Maynor Javier Vasquez driving north on I-77 with a broken brake light. When Darisse pulled over the vehicle, he noticed another man, Nicholas Heien, lying under a blanket in the backseat. Darisse spoke with the two men, felt that their stories did not match up, and was concerned that Heien had not gotten up from the back seat. Darisse asked for permission to search the vehicle. Heien agreed, and Darisse found a bag containing 54.2 grams of cocaine in the car.
A grand jury indicted Heien for two counts of trafficking cocaine. Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his vehicle, and the trial court denied the motion. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable because North Carolina law only required one working brake light. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that when an officer's mistake of the law is reasonable, it may give rise to the "reasonable suspicion" required for a traffic stop of a vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. That North Carolina Supreme Court sent the case back to the state Court of Appeals.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court's judgment. A dissenting judge, however, stated that the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling created "fundamental unfairness" because it held citizens to the traditional rule that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" while allowing police to be ignorant of the law. Based on this dissent, Heien again appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which rejected Heien's appeal.


[Heien v. North Carolina (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when an officer has made a reasonable factual or legal mistake. Because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence turns on the question of reasonableness, governing officials have traditionally been allowed leeway to enforce the law for the community's protection. As long as the mistake of fact or law in question was reasonable, the Fourth Amendment does not hold such mistakes to be incompatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. However, the Court also held that those mistakes must be objectively reasonable; an officer cannot gain the benefits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness through a sloppy or incomplete knowledge of the law.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the majority opinion's analysis was limited to when the mistake of law in question is an objectively reasonable one. Justice Kagan also wrote that the test to determine whether an officer made an objectively reasonable mistake is much more stringent than the one to determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurring opinion.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally focused on the officer's factual conclusions rather than understanding of the law. Expanding leeway allowed to police officers with respect to their factual assessment to the meaning of the laws they are meant to enforce runs the risk of eroding the Fourth Amendment's protections. In the absence of any evidence that holding police officers to this standard would prevent effective enforcement of the law, mistakes of law should not be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.


[Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2002, Manachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to parents who are United States citizens. Manachem's parents requested that the U.S. State Department record his place of birth on his passport as "Israel," in accordance with Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 (Act). The State Department refused and instead issued Manachem a passport that listed "Jerusalem" as his place of birth. His parents sued the Secretary of State on his behalf and sought the enforcement of Section 214(d). The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it presented a non-justiciable political question. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, reversed that holding and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that Section 214(d) "impermissibly intereferes" with the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign states. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed and held that the section goes beyond the scope of Congress's passport power to affect United States foreign policy, which is a realm the Constitution reserves for the executive branch.


[Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority holding that the federal statute unconstitutionally usurped the President’s power to recognize foreign nations as it relates to passports. The Court held that, although the Constitution does not explicitly address the issue of recognition of foreign nations, the Reception Clause in Article II of the Constitution—which states that the President will receive foreign ambassadors—grants the President the power to recognize foreign states. The fact that Article II also vests the President with the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors gives the President further control over recognition decisions. Although Congress has a role to play in other aspects of foreign policy, often by granting the President’s formal recognition practical effect, Congress has no such power to initiate international diplomacy without involving the President. Because the question of whether the American government recognizes a foreign nation must have only one answer, the President’s power is assumed to be exclusive, and therefore Congress cannot act in a manner that contradicts Executive branch policy regarding recognition. The Court also held that precedent and history support the view that the formal recognition power belongs exclusively to the President. Because the Executive branch has maintained a neutral position by not recognizing any nation’s sovereignty over Jerusalem, the federal statute in question unconstitutionally infringes on the President’s recognition power.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that this case presented a political question beyond the purview of the judiciary, but because precedent precluded political resolution, he joined in the majority opinion.
On a second issue -- whether the statute unconstitutionally usurped the President's power to recognize foreign nations in relation to consular reports -- the Court answered 5-4 in the affirmative with Justice Clarence Thomas joining the dissenters arguing that the federal statute in question was an unconstitutional usurpation of the President’s recognition power with regard to passports but not consular reports of birth abroad. The historical record indicates that any residual foreign affairs powers that were not explicitly allocated were assumed to be vested in the President. While passport regulation has traditionally been an executive function and falls squarely within the residual foreign affairs power reserved to the President, the consular reports are part of the naturalization powers that are granted to Congress. Therefore, the enforcement of the statute in question as it relates to passports would violate the separation of powers doctrine, but it may be constitutionally applied to consular reports of birth abroad.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, in order for the President to constitutionally ignore the express will of Congress, the President must be exercising a power that the Constitution “conclusively and preclusively” granted to the Executive branch. Because the history and the precedent regarding the power to recognize foreign states is at best conflicting, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Constitution does not conclusively and preclusively grant the President the power to recognize foreign states. Even if the President did have that power, the statute in question would not be unconstitutional because an optional passport designation does not amount to official recognition. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that, to the extent that the Constitution grants the President the power to recognize foreign states, the power is not exclusive. The Constitution grants Congress such a power in the form of its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Regardless, the statute in question does not implicate the recognition power; it merely directs the State Department to make an accommodation regarding a geographic description that is in line with similar accommodations the State Department already offers. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined in the dissent.


[Holt v. Hobbs (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Gregory Holt (also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad) was an inmate of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and a practicing Salafi Muslim. He sought an injunction and temporary relief from the enforcement of the Arkansas Department of Corrections' grooming policy, which allowed trimmed mustaches and quarter-inch beards for diagnosed dermatological problems but otherwise no facial hair. Holt argued that growing a beard was a necessary part of the practice of his religion, that the grooming policy significantly burdened his ability to do so, and that the grooming policy was therefore a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Holt was willing to limit his beard to a length of one-half inch as a form of compromise with the policy.
The district court granted temporary relief but then dismissed the complaint upon being presented with evidence of the other ways in which Holt was allowed to practice his religion and the extent to which the grooming policy was necessary to maintain prison security. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Holt v. Hobbs (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Arkansas Department of Corrections policy on beards violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The Court held that, while providing substantial protection of religious exercise, RLUIPA allows prison officials to test the sincerity of religious beliefs to prevent these from being used for illicit conduct. In this case, Holt met the standard for accommodation established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. —that an accommodation must be based on a sincerely held religious belief—because he was neither slight nor idiosyncratic with the tenets of Islam. Further, the Court held that the district court erred in suggesting that Holt's other religious privileges demonstrated a reasonable accommodation of Holt's beliefs. The prison officials had the burden to prove that preventing inmates from growing beards furthered a compelling government interest and that this policy was the least restrictive means of interference, but the Court held that prison officials did not satisfy that burden in this case because other steps could be taken to ensure quick identification and an inability to hide contraband.
In her concurring opinion, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, while RLUIPA does not require prison officials to refute every less restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, Arkansas officials responded inadequately to the Holt's objections. However, Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority opinion's dismissal of the explanations of the prison officials. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion in which she objected to the majority opinion's use of the Hobby Lobby decision, because in this case the requested accommodation would not affect the religious beliefs of others.


[Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011.
Countrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the three-year period required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is satisfied when the borrower notifies the lender of his intent to rescind the loan within that period, even if a lawsuit has not yet been filed. The plain language of TILA specifies that a borrower need only notify the creditor of his intent to rescind the loan; it does not require the borrower to file a lawsuit. Although common law recession traditionally requires the borrower to return what was borrowed (as would result from a lawsuit), modern jurisprudence does not require that a statute be interpreted as implementing its common law analog.


[Johnson v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating Samuel Johnson based on his involvement in an organization called the National Social Movement. Later in 2010, Johnson left that group to found the Aryan Liberation Movement. In November of that year, Johnson told an undercover FBI agent that he manufactured napalm, silencers, and other explosives for the Aryan Liberation Movement in addition to possessing an AK-47 rifle, several semi-automatic weapons, and a large cache of ammunition. In April 2012, Johnson was arrested at a meeting with his probation officer and admitted to possessing some of the previously mentioned weapons.
A grand jury charged Johnson with six counts of firearm possession, three of which relied on his classification as an "armed career criminal." This classification was based on the fact that he had three prior felony convictions that the district court designated as "violent felonies"—attempted simple robbery, simple robbery, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Johnson was then subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. Johnson argued that the convictions in question should not be considered violent felonies and that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court held that the felony convictions in question were in fact violent felonies and that Johnson was an armed career criminal for the purposes of the mandatory minimum sentence required by the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.


[Johnson v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the residual clause of the Armed Criminal Career Act (ACCA)—that defines a “violent felony” as one involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”—is unconstitutionally vague. Judicial precedent has held that laws that do not give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is punished or can be enforced arbitrarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because the residual clause of the ACCA gives no guidelines for how the court can assess whether the conduct in question poses a “serious potential risk of physical injury” and therefore qualifies as a violent felony, the residual clause allows for unpredictable and arbitrary enforcement in violation of the Due Process Clause. The Court also held that it was not bound to follow precedent that upheld the residual clause because subsequent cases had shown that the judicial interpretation of the clause was not sufficiently predictable.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague under both a categorical approach and a records-based approach. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the case does not need to be resolved on Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause grounds; instead, the ACCA should not apply in this case because unlawfully possessing a short-barreled shotgun does not constitute a violent felony. Because the elements of the offense and records of convictions for possessing a short-barreled shotgun do not support the contention that the offense is inherently dangerous, the risk of harm is too remote from the conduct for the offense to constitute a violent felony. Therefore, the majority opinion did not need to nullify the residual clause in order to hold that Johnson should not be punished under the ACCA. Justice Thomas also argued that the field of vagueness jurisprudence has expanded to the point where it is used to invalidate democratically enacted laws and is now potentially beyond the bounds of due process jurisprudence.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that a statute is unconstitutionally vague only when it is vague in all of its applications. Because the residual clause of the ACCA can be construed in a manner that makes it constitutional by reading its language in the context of similar language in state and federal laws that direct a court to make fact-specific determination, the residual clause does not violate the Due Process Clause. Additionally, judicial precedent has upheld the residual clause, and this case presents no reason to overturn that precedent. Because the residual clause is constitutional and Johnson’s previous convictions constitute violent felonies, Justice Alito argued that the ACCA can be properly applied to his case.


[Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company LLC v. Owens (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On October 30, 2012, Brandon W. Owens filed a class action petition in state court that alleged that Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company and Cherokee Basin Pipeline underpaid the members on the class on royalties they were owed from wells. The petition alleged that this underpayment constituted a breach of contract and sought damages without specifying an amount.
On December 5, 2012, the defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court and cited that federal jurisdiction existed under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). CAFA requires that three elements be established for a class action case to fall under federal jurisdiction: at least one plaintiff and one defendant must be citizens of different states, the class must consist of at least 100 members, and the amount in controversy must exceed $5 million. The defendants in this case claimed that they met the requirements for removal to federal court under CAFA because the amount in controversy exceeded $8 million, but did not include specific evidence in the notice of removal. The federal district court held that defendants had not provided evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million in the notice of removal and therefore remanded the case back to state court.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the district court should not have remanded the case because requiring the party requesting the removal to produce evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million creates an evidentiary burden. The Court of Appeals held that that such evidence is wholly unnecessary unless the removal is contested. A party requesting that a case be removed to federal court need only allege that the grounds for removal exist and need only prove those allegations if they are contested.


[Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Company LLC v. Owens (2014) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a defendant's notice of removal to federal court must only include a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional threshold, not evidentiary proofs. Because the requirements for a notice of removal track those for a normal pleading, the defendant seeking removal should similarly be allowed to allege in good faith that the amount in controversy is sufficient. Evidence only becomes necessary in response to a plaintiff's contestation of the removal.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that the only issue properly before the Court was whether the appellate court abused its discretion. Because the majority opinion addressed the district court's analysis, it presumed the basis for a lower court's decision, which violates previously established standards of review. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Elena Kagan, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to review the appellate court's decision because the Court can only review "cases" that were before an appellate court. This case does not qualify for such review because it was never before the court seeking a remedy or redress for legal injury; instead, the appellate court denied the application for permission to appeal a remand order.


[Kimble v. Marvel (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1990, Stephen Kimble obtained a patent for a Spider-Man toy that was set to expire in May 2010. Kimble claimed that he discussed the idea with the president of Marvel Enterprises Inc., and that he would be compensated for use of his ideas. Although no agreement was reached, Marvel produced a toy that was similar to Kimble's design. In 1997, Kimble sued for patent infringement, and the parties settled in 2001, with Marvel agreeing to purchase the patent and pay royalties to the petitioner without an expiration date. The case was subsequently dismissed. In 2006, Marvel entered a licensing agreement with Hasbro Inc. that gave it the right to produce the toy. Disagreements arose between Kimble and Marvel concerning the royalty payments, and Kimble claimed that the original patent would be infringed if royalties were not paid. Kimble sued Marvel in Arizona state court, and the case was then removed to the federal district court.
The magistrate judge determined that settlement agreement was a "hybrid" agreement, in which patent and non-patent rights were inseparable, and that the Supreme Court decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. applied. In that case, the Court ruled that, when patents are sold in return for a royalty payment, the purchaser was not obligated to continue these payments beyond the expiration date of the patents because doing so would over-compensate the seller of the patent and improperly extend the patent monopoly beyond the intended time limit. On recommendation of the magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Marvel and ruled that the settlement agreement transferred patent rights, but that it was unclear if non-patent rights were transferred. Kimble appealed and argued that the settlement agreement transferred both patent and non-patent rights and that, while royalty payments ended for the patent, they did not end for the toy itself. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.


[Kimble v. Marvel (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the precedent established in Brulotte v. Thys Co.—that a patentee cannot receive royalty payments after the patent has expired—should be upheld because there was no sufficient reason to overturn it. Patent law jurisprudence has typically struck down statutes that overly limit free access to formerly patented inventions, and the Brulotte decision was in line with these cases. Because no subsequent legal developments have made the rule announced in that decision obsolete and it has remained workable, there is no reason to overturn the decision. The Court also noted that Congress had ample opportunity to enact a statute that forecloses the Brulotte rule but has not done so.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, because the Brulotte rule impermissibly interferes in parties’ abilities to negotiate licensing agreements that reflect the true value of the product, the decision has no precedential weight and should be overturned. The Brulotte rule represents a poor interpretation of the Patent Act and promotes economic inefficiency, so the decision lacks the support of legal standing as well as public policy, and therefore the Court should not uphold it. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


[Jennings v. Stephens (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On July 19, 1988, Houston Police Officer Elston Howard was in the midst of arresting the clerk of an adult bookstore when Robert Mitchell Jennings entered the store intending to rob it. Jennings shot Officer Howard four times and then proceeded to rob the store. The trial court jury subsequently convicted Jennings of capital murder. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of Jennings' long criminal history as an aggravating factor. The defense called the jail chaplain to testify to his opinion that Jennings was not "incorrigible," and the defense did not present any further evidence of mitigating factors.
In 1996, Jennings filed a state habeas petition and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase because his attorneys had failed to contact his family to provide evidence of a disadvantaged background and had failed to find and present a 1978 psychological report that suggested that Jennings had a "mild organic brain dysfunction." The state court held that Jennings' attorneys had conducted a sufficient investigation into his background, and that their decision not to introduce this testimony and evidence was a reasonable trial strategy. The state court recommended that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals deny the request for habeas relief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acted accordingly.
In 2009, Jennings filed a federal habeas petition with the district court. The district court granted the petition and held that Jennings had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys failed to present evidence of his disadvantaged background and possible mental incapacities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that Jennings' counsel's decision not to pursue these avenues of argument was a legitimate trial strategy. The Court of Appeals also held that a federal habeas petitioner must file a certificate of appealability in order to respond to arguments concerning the state's appeal.


[Jennings v. Stephens (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, when an appellee does not cross-appeal, he may urge a defense of his judgment on alternative grounds without filing a certificate of appealability unless doing so would enlarge his rights or lessen those of his adversary as provided by the previous judgment. In this case, allowing Jennings to urge a defense of his judgment did not materially affect either his rights or those of the state. The Court held that this rule provides sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent a proliferation of frivolous habeas claims. Additionally, the statutory language that created the certificate of appealability requirement only dealt with the taking of appeals, not with a defense of a judgment from which an appeal has already been taken. Therefore, that requirement was not relevant in cases such as this one.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that Jennings' argument in defense of a previous judgment constituted a cross-appeal because it altered the grounds on which he could obtain relief. Because the argument was essentially a cross-appeal, a certificate of appealability should be required. Adhering to this standard rule not only aligns with previous habeas corpus jurisprudence but also prevents a rise in the number of frivolous appeals. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Yates v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On August 17, 2007, John L. Yates and his crew prepared his fishing vessel for a commercial fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, Officer John Jones, a field officer with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission who was empowered to enforce federal fisheries laws, boarded the vessel and noticed red grouper fish that appeared to be smaller than the requisite 20 inches. Officer Jones measured the grouper that appeared smaller and found a total of 72 fish that measured under 20 inches. Officer Jones placed these fish in wooden crates, issued Yates a citation, and informed Yates that the National Marine Fisheries Service would seize these fish upon the vessel's return to port. Contrary to Officer Jones' directions, Yates instructed his crew to throw the fish in question overboard and replace them with larger fish. When the vessel returned to port and the fish were measured on August 27, Officer Jones suspected that Yates had disposed of the fish he had measured.
Yates was charged with destruction and falsification of evidence. At trial he argued that the fish thrown overboard were not actually undersized because Officer Jones had measured the fish with their mouths closed, which shortens the length of fish. The district court found Yates guilty of disposing of undersized fish and therefore in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to destroy or conceal "a tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" a governmental investigation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.


[Yates v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The Court noted that the broad dictionary definition of "tangible objects" would cover fish, but held that the term must be read in the financial context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which was enacted as a reaction to the Enron scandal and contained the specific provision Yates was charged with violating. In this context, the Court held that the term was ambiguous because the caption of the section in question, "Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy," and the title of the section in which it was originally placed, "Criminal penalties for altering documents," indicated that Congress was referring only to financial records. Additionally, the section's placement amongst other sections that prohibited specific actions cuts in favor of narrow construction. The Court argued that reading the section to apply to all physical objects would create significant overlap with another section. The words immediately surrounding "tangible object" — "falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document" —indicated that Congress intended to restrict the term to related objects. Finally, the Court held that any statutory ambiguity in criminal proceedings should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the plurality's holding should be narrowly construed. He contended that the statute's list of nouns, its list of verbs, and its title, all working in conjunction, indicated that "tangible object" should be limited to something similar to records or documents.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the term "tangible object" should be given its ordinary meaning and therefore subsumes all things that possess physical form, including fish. She noted that the use of the word "any" before "tangible object" demonstrated a congressional intent for broad application. Justice Kagan also pointed out that the section's language tracked the language in other statutes that had been interpreted to include all physical objects. This section's legislative history showed that it was enacted to close a loophole created by another section and therefore did not create any unnecessary overlap. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined the dissent.


[Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Sandoz, Inc., (Sandoz) and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Mylan) submitted Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDAs) to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to produce and market generic versions of Copaxone, a drug used to treat Multiple Sclerosis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the manufacturer of the original drug, sued Sandoz and Mylan and used two different types of claims that are based on different ways to use molecular weight to distinguish between polymer samples. The district court did not distinguish between the different methods of using molecular weight and held that the claims were not indefinite as Sandoz and Mylan argued. After a bench trial, the district court held that the Sandoz and Mylan products infringed on Teva's patent.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not error in holding that the patents were infringed, but that some of the claims had not been effectively shown to be definite.


[Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that a federal appellate court could only overturn a district court's finding of fact if those findings were determined to be "clearly erroneous." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) established this standard without any exceptions, and there was no reason to create one in this case. Because the construction of a patent claim is essentially a factual determination, it should be governed by this well-established standard. Therefore, while an appellate court may still review a lower court's construction of a claim de novo, to overturn the lower court's ruling, the appellate court must find that the lower court has made a clear error with respect to the findings of fact.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the construction of patent claims deals with questions of law, so Federal Rule of Procedure 52(a)(6), which only applies to questions of fact, is not the controlling standard. Instead, the appellate court was correct to apply a de novo standard of review, which increases uniformity. Justice Thomas wrote that a district court's determination is factual in nature when it deals with the historical fact of the case, as in the case of contracts and deeds, while it is a legal conclusion when it defines rules applicable beyond the specifics of the case at hand, as in the case of statutes. Based on this definition, the construction of patent claims should be considered a question of law. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position.
MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean's actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board's ruling and held that MacLean's actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA.


[Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the language that Congress used in the exception within the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) that allows for prosecution of disclosures "specifically prohibited by law" is significant. Because Congress used the phrase, "law, rule, or regulation" in other places in the WPA, the fact that the exception only addressed disclosures "specifically prohibited by law" indicated that Congress did not intend for the exception to apply to disclosures prohibited by regulations such as the TSA regulation in question. The Court rejected the government's argument that it should prevail because disclosures like MacLean's were specifically prohibited and "gravely endanger[ed] public safety." The Court noted that these concerns were legitimate but held that they must be addressed by Congress or the President.
Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the Homeland Security Act explicitly prohibited the type of disclosure at issue. Therefore, Congress intended to prohibit these types of disclosures because it passed the Homeland Security Act, which required the TSA to enact regulations to prevent such disclosures. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in this dissent.


[Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 focuses on preserving the equal representation of voters in different legislative voting districts. In 2012, the Alabama legislature redrew Alabama’s electoral districts with the goal of creating districts with a population deviation of only 1%, as opposed to the 5% courts traditionally allow when evaluating redistricting efforts. Alabama also tried to maintain the existing percentage of minority voters in each electoral district. Petitioners sued in district court and argued that Alabama’s redistricting violated the Voting Rights Act and amounted to racial gerrymandering that had negative impacts on the equal representation of racial minorities in multiple electoral districts. The district court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that Alabama used race as a “dominant and controlling” factor in redrawing its electoral districts and also that Alabama’s goal of maintaining the minority population percentages in existing districts was “narrowly tailored” to a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to address the district court’s application of existing legal principles.


[Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court improperly considered evidence of statewide racial effects as a claim that the state used race as a factor when redrawing all of the boundary lines, when the actual allegations were that the racial gerrymandering took place in a few select electoral districts. Next, the Court held that the evidence suggested that the Caucus had standing to sue because it appeared to have members in every electoral district in the State of Alabama; the Court directed the Caucus to provide membership information sufficient to support this inference on remand. The district court also erred by considering Alabama’s goal of obtaining a 1% population deviation among districts as a relevant factor to determine whether race was a “predominate” factor in redrawing the electoral districts rather than considering the traditional goals of the Voting Rights Act. Finally, the Court rejected the district court’s holding that Alabama’s gerrymandering satisfied strict scrutiny. In application, Alabama’s interest in maintaining a particular population percentage of minority voters in each district did not equate to the Voting Rights Act’s goal of preventing “retrogression in respect to racial minorities’ ‘ability . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice’; therefore, using a race as a factor to meet Alabama’s extraneous goals was not justified. The Court vacated and remanded the district court’s decision for further consideration consistent with its holding and additional evidence.
Justice Antonin M. Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority decision reached beyond the record because the Caucus’ complaint failed to adequately address the issues of standing and whether the allegations were a statewide claim or a select electoral district claim. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court’s quest to obtain “the best racial quota” was an ill-begotten one, and that Alabama’s task of complying with the convoluted goals of the Voting Rights Act was nearly impossible given all of the competing laws, jurisprudence, policies, and procedures.


[Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Commil USA, LLC (Commil) holds a patent on a method to implement short-range wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco) and alleged that Cisco performed the patented method and induced its customers to infringe by performing the patented method. Cisco argued that Commil's patent was invalid for indefiniteness, non-enablement, and lack of written description. The district court found for Commil and awarded more than $70 million in damages. Cisco appealed and argued that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard for inducement was negligence and precluded the submission of evidence of Cisco's good-faith belief that Commil's patent was invalid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and held that the standard for induced infringement is actual knowledge or willful blindness, and therefore that a good-faith belief of patent invalidity was a defense to claims of induced infringement.


[Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that, although precedent established that liability for induced infringement required knowledge, infringement and validity are separate matters, and the knowledge requirement does not extend to patent validity. To permit a defense of belief in invalidity “would conflate the issues of infringement and validity.” Because a patent is presumed to be valid, if belief in invalidity were a defense to induced infringement, then the force of that presumption would be lessened significantly. Additionally, the Court held that allowing a good-faith belief in the patent’s invalidity to be a defense would burden the courts by creating increased litigation regarding the recognition of such invalidity. Therefore, a defendant’s good-faith belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to a claim of induced infringement.
Justice Antonin Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity is a defense to induced infringement because knowledge of infringement is a requirement for induced-infringement liability, and there can be no infringement (and hence no knowledge of infringement) of an invalid patent. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. joined in the dissent.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Whitfield v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On September 26, 2008, Larry Whitfield and Quanterrious McCoy attempted to rob the Fort Financial Credit Union in Gastonia, North Carolina. After their robbery attempt was foiled by the bank's security system, the two fled. McCoy was later found hiding under a van, while Whitfield entered the Parnell residence and attempted to contact a getaway vehicle. Mary Parnell was subsequently pronounced dead of a heart attack. Whitfield was arrested nearby and signed a confession admitting to breaking into several homes as well as the attempted bank robbery.
A grand jury indicted McCoy and Whitfield on several counts relating to the failed robbery, but only Whitfield was indicted for forcing someone to accompany him and killing that person while trying to avoid being apprehended for the commission of a crime. Whitfield moved to dismiss this charge and argued that it was unconstitutionally vague and that the prosecution was required to prove that he intentionally caused Parnell's death. The district court denied the motion. Prior to the jury's deliberations, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Whitfield guilty of the additional charge, it only needed to find that his actions were the proximate cause of Parnell's death, and it did not include a minimum limit on the degree of accompaniment necessary. Whitfield objected to the instruction and the court overruled the objection. Whitfield was found guilty, but on the additional charge he was found guilty of forcing Parnell to accompany him, not of killing her. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Whitfield's conviction and remanded the case for rehearing on the issue of whether or not the district court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions. On remand, the district court again found Whitfield guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.


[Whitfield v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that forced accompaniment occurs when a person requires another to "go with" him, even when that movement occurs over a short distance such as within the same building. While the word "accompany" indicates movement over distance, that distance needs only be from one place to another, and therefore can be relatively short. The Court held that a plain reading of the word "accompany" does not connote movement over a substantial distance, and the statute should not be read in such a manner.


[Wellness International Network v. Sharif (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Richard Sharif and others entered into distributorship contracts with Wellness International Network (WIN) for the sale of health and wellness products. Sharif and others later sued WIN and claimed that WIN was running a pyramid scheme. The district court granted summary judgment for WIN and awarded $655,596.13 in attorney's fees as a sanction against Sharif and his co-plaintiffs for ignoring some of WIN's discovery requests. WIN attempted to discover Sharif's assets, but Sharif ignored all attempts until he was held in civil contempt for discovery violations and arrested. In 2009, Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. WIN filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court and claimed that Sharif had continuously concealed property and information pertaining to his assets. The bankruptcy court found in favor of WIN and ordered Sharif to pay WIN's attorney's fees along with other sanctions.
Sharif appealed to federal district court, but before he filed his first brief, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, which held that a bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment on a state-law counterclaim against a creditor. Sharif subsequently attempted to advance an argument based on Stern, but the district court did not allow it. Instead, the district court held that such an objection can be waived and that Sharif's failure to bring up to argument earlier constituted an implied waiver. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. The Court of Appeals held that an objection based on Stern cannot be waived and that the bankruptcy court only had the authority to enter a final judgment on some of WIN's claims.


[Wellness International Network v. Sharif (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, and Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, as long as the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, Article III of the Constitution allows bankruptcy courts (which Congress created pursuant to Article I) to adjudicate claims that would normally be heard by an Article III court. Because Congress created the bankruptcy courts for a limited purpose and gave them limited power subject to the control of the judiciary, there is no separation of powers problem with the bankruptcy courts exercising the powers Congress delegated to them, which include the ability to adjudicate non-bankruptcy claims when the parties consent. The Court also held that judicial history regarding the right to an Article III judge clearly states that the right can be waived; therefore a bankruptcy judge can adjudicate the type of state law claim at issue in this case as long as Article III courts retain supervision. Additionally, nothing in the Constitution requires that the waiver of the right to an Article III judge be express. As long as the litigant is aware of the right to an Article III judge, voluntarily trying the case before a non-Article III judge constitutes a waiver.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion did not need to decide the issue of whether consent to non-Article III adjudication may be implied by actions.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion should have decided this case solely based on the fact that a bankruptcy court has the authority to adjudicate the state law claims at issue here because they deal with determining what assets constitute the bankruptcy estate, which is the necessary starting point of any bankruptcy case. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that a litigant cannot consent to adjudication outside of what Article III allows because to do so would violate the constitutional separation of powers. Despite the practicality of allowing more issues to be adjudicated outside of Article III courts, the constitutional protections of the power of the judiciary must be respected. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that, while an individual can waive constitutional rights, an individual cannot consent to violations of the Constitution. Therefore, an individual can waive the right to have a claim heard before an Article III court only if the claim in question is within the jurisdiction of a non-Article III court. Because the state law claims in this case do not fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, an individual cannot consent to have them adjudicated outside of an Article III court.


[T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Telecommunications service provider T-mobile South, LLC (T-mobile) submitted an application to construct a 108–foot cell tower resembling a man-made tree (monopine) in Roswell, Georgia. The location of the site, though planned inside a vacant lot, would be in an area zoned for single-family residences within a well-established residential neighborhood. Following an outpouring of public opposition to the tower, Roswell's Planning and Zoning Division recommended that the Mayor and city council, who ultimately approve applications after a public hearing, impose certain conditions before approving the application. Specifically, the Planning and Zoning Division recommended that T-Mobile should relocate the site to another part of the property, erect a fence around the tower, and plant pine trees to shield it from residential owners' view. At the public hearing, city council members voted to deny the application.
Two days later, Roswell sent T-Mobile a letter notifying the company that the application was denied and referred the company to the minutes of the public hearing. T-Mobile sued Roswell and claimed that the city had not provided substantial evidence that would support a denial of the application. T-Mobile also alleged that, by prohibiting T-Mobile from building the structure, Roswell violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TCA). The district court did not rule on the substantial evidence question and instead held that Roswell had not met the "in writing" component of the TCA, which required the government to state the reason(s) for denying an application. The district court ordered Roswell to grant the permit, and Roswell appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Roswell had met the "in writing" requirement by issuing a written denial and referring to the minutes of the hearing for the reasoning.


[T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not require localities to provide reasons for their denial of construction applications in the written denial notification as long as the reasons appear in some other sufficiently clear written record. While the language of the Act requires localities to provide reasons for the denial of an application, it does not specify how those reasons should be presented. However, the reasons for denial must be made available at essentially the same time as the notice of denial. Because the reasons for denial in this case were issued 26 days after the date of the written denial, the Court held that the City of Roswell did not comply with the requirements of the Telecommunications Act.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that a court should be able to uphold a decision as long as the locality's logic can be reasonably followed, even if all of the reasons are not explicitly stated. If a locality has erred, a court should uphold its decision if the error was harmless, and it should generally remand the case to be reconsidered by the locality.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the City of Roswell fully complied with every requirement of the Telecommunications Act: it issued its decision in writing and provided reasons for that decision in a written record. The majority opinion's timing requirement does not exist in the text of the statute and therefore should not be valid. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent to express his concern that the majority opinion created a requirement that does not exist in the text of the statute.


[Elonis v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the "true threat" exception was created to prevent.


[Elonis v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten . An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed that the prosecution only needed to prove negligence, but he argued that the majority opinion should have addressed what the proper instruction should be. By leaving out what the prosecution did need to show, attorneys and judges are left to guess whether knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate standard. Justice Alito also argued that recklessness should be the standard because a higher standard would effectively change the law rather than clarify it.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals had already addressed this issue and resolved it with a general intent standard. The majority opinion not only overturns their rulings but also leaves the courts uncertain as to whether an intent to threaten is required or whether recklessness will suffice. Justice Thomas also argued that knowledge of posting the relevant threats is enough to establish the intent element because knowledge of those facts is required to make the actions illegal; ignorance of those actions being illegal should not provide shelter from the law.


[Rodriguez v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found.
Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop.


[Rodriguez v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the use of a K-9 unit at the conclusion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it was conducted reasonably, which this one was. Justice Thomas also argued that the rule announced in the majority’s opinion would result in arbitrary enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections and created artificial lines between common police practices at traffic stops. Additionally, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case because the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to continue to hold Rodriguez and use the K-9 unit. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the appellate court did not address the issue of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to use the K-9 unit, and that court should be allowed to do so. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion’s analysis was arbitrary because it relied on the order in which the officer conducted his inquiries.


[Baker Botts, LLP v. ASARCO, LLC (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Baker Botts, LLP, along with Jordan, Hyden, Womber, Culbreth & Holzer, PC, was awarded about $120 million in fees for representing Asarco, LLC in its Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, from which Asarco had emerged in 2009 with a reorganization plan that would pay its creditors in full. Baker Botts then filed for a final fee request, which Asarco contested. The bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts more than $117 million to cover the fees in addition to $5 million for expenses incurred defending the fee claims. The district court affirmed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the firms to recover $5 million spent defending the fee request against Asarco's opposition.


[Baker Botts, LLP v. ASARCO, LLC (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the American rule of attorney fee structure—that each litigant pays for his own attorney’s fees—can only be altered through an explicit statutory provision. The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly depart from this rule; instead it allows for “reasonable compensation” for services rendered, which cannot be properly construed as including litigation regarding a contested fee request. Additionally, the established policy that, absent express statutory language, no attorneys receive compensation for costs incurred litigating fee challenges means that this reading of the statute creates no unfairness in the profession. Therefore, the American rule should still be assumed in force in cases such as this one.
In her opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that, because the statutory language is clear in this case, the majority opinion should not have considered the policy argument.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Bankruptcy Code grants courts a great deal of discretion in determining how to award “reasonable compensation” for services rendered, and therefore the courts can consider situations such as the costs of fee-related litigation in making such a determination. Because the costs of litigating fee challenges can be so high, factoring those costs into fee determinations can be the only way to ensure that the compensation is “reasonable” as the Bankruptcy Code requires. The American rule can only remain in force if not overridden by statute, and the Bankruptcy Code provides a sufficient statutory exception. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[King v. Burwell (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care. The ACA required each state to establish an "exchange" through which people could purchase health care coverage, and if a state elected not to do so, the federal government would establish one through the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The ACA also required people to obtain the minimum essential coverage or pay a tax penalty unless they fell within an unaffordability exemption for low-income individuals. To limit the number of people that would fall into such an exemption, the ACA provided for tax credits that are calculated based on the health plan in which an individual enrolls through the exchange. Although the legislative language of the ACA pertaining to the tax credits only referred to the exchanges established by the states, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a regulation that made the tax credits available to those enrolled in plans through federal as well as state exchanges.
Virginia declined to establish a state-run exchange and has one operated by the federal government. The plaintiffs are a group of Virginia residents who, without the tax credits, would fall under the unaffordability exception and be exempt from having to purchase health insurance. They sued and argued that the IRS regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and is contrary to the law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[King v. Burwell (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Congress did not delegate the authority to determine whether the tax credits are available through both state-created and federally created exchanges to the Internal Revenue Service, but the language of the statute clearly indicates that Congress intended the tax credits to be available through both types of exchanges. When the plain language of the section in question is considered in the context of the statute as a whole, it is evident that the federally-created exchanges are not meaningfully different from those the states created, and therefore federally-created exchanges are not excluded from the language referring to exchanges created by the states. This reading is also in line with the Congressional intent of covering as many qualified individuals as possible, as the alternative would mean that federally-created exchanges do not contain qualified individuals and operate entirely differently from the state-created ones.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent in which he argued that that the plain language of the statute clearly limits the tax credits to state-created exchanges. The majority opinion’s attempt to use context to justify a more expansive reading that is at odds with the clear meaning of the text distorts statutory interpretation and amounts to rewriting the statute. Justice Scalia also argued that reading the language of the section in question to refer to both state-created and federally-created exchanges fails to give effect to the times when Congress explicitly chose to conflate the two types of exchanges as opposed to the times it did not. The reading that some parts of the statute refer to both types of exchanges and other parts do not is more consistent with the statute as a whole and gives better effect to Congress’ intent in enacting it. The majority opinion’s use of Congressional intent to support its holding errs by focusing only on one of the goals of the legislation to the exclusion of others, and in doing so oversteps the bounds of its judicial authority. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


[Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Louis Bullard borrowed $387,000 from Hyde Park Savings to buy his property in Massachusetts. In December 2010, he filed for Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and proposed a plan in which he offered to pay the bank back the value of the property in a loan that was secured by the actual property and then put the rest of the home loan into a pool with other debts that would be paid at a different rate. The bankruptcy court rejected this plan because it believed this hybrid plan was inconsistent with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy appellate panel agreed but stated the order was appealable because Bullard could simply propose another plan. Bullard petitioned for an appeal but the bankruptcy appellate panel denied the petition because the petitioner had already filed his notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction, as courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over "final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees."


[Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, fka Hyde Park Savings (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that a bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of a proposed repayment plan is not a “final” order for the purposes of immediate appeal. The Court noted that, because bankruptcy cases typically involve many controversies that could stand on their own, an order is appealable if it finally disposes of a concrete dispute within the larger case. Because denial of confirmation of a plan indicates that a plan needs further consideration, it is not a final disposition of a concrete issue, unless it results in dismissal of the case. The Court held that the asymmetry of allowing confirmation to be a final order, but not denial of a confirmation, is acceptable because only confirmation alters the legal relationships between the parties by allowing the bankruptcy proceedings to proceed. Additionally, there are other safeguards in place, such as interlocutory appeals, to ensure the system is not unfair to debtors.


[Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In August 2009, the Texas division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (Texas SCV), a non-profit organization that works to preserve the memory and reputation of soldiers who fought for the confederacy in the Civil War, applied to have a new specialty license plate issued by the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (TDMV). The proposed license plate had two confederate flags on it: one in the organization's logo, and one faintly making up the background of the plate. The TDMV had a policy stating that it "may refuse to create a new specialty license plate if the design might be offensive to any member of the public." The board in charge of approving new specialty plates received multiple negative comments from the public regarding this plate and ultimately voted to deny Texas SCV's application.
Texas SCV sued in federal district court claiming their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The TDMV argued that the Free Speech Clause did not apply in this case because license plates are a form of government speech; therefore, they were within their rights to choose which messages and views they wanted to express on the plates. The district court disagreed and held that the plates were private, non-governmental speech, and that the TDMV's denial was a reasonable, content-based restriction of speech in a non-public forum. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that TDMV's denial was a form of viewpoint discrimination that "discriminated against Texas SCV's view that the Confederate flag is a symbol of sacrifice, independence, and Southern heritage."


[Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, no. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the government choosing the content of its speech is not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because that expression is the product of the democratic electoral process. Based on the analysis from Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, Texas’s specialty license plate is an example of such government speech (as opposed to a forum open for private expression) because Texas and other states have long used license plates to convey messages. Moreover, the public associates license plates with the State. Finally, Texas maintains direct control over the messages on its specialty plates from design to final approval.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote a dissent in which he argued that, with over 350 varieties of specialty plates, an observer would think that the plates were the expression of the individual drivers, not Texas. Because the specialty license plates are a limited public forum for private expression, Texas rejecting the confederate flag design because it might be offensive is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent.


[Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The federal Medicaid Act requires that state Medicaid plans contain procedures to ensure that reimbursement rates for healthcare providers "are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers" to meet the need for care and services in the geographic area. Ninth Circuit precedent also requires that reimbursement rates bear a reasonable relationship to Medicaid provider costs, and where rates do not "substantially reimburse providers their costs," a state cannot justify its rates with "purely budgetary reasons." Richard Armstrong, the Director of Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare, and others (the Directors) conducted provider cost studies and recommended increasing reimbursement rates but ultimately did not increase rates for budgetary reasons.
A group of Idaho Medicaid providers (the Providers) sued the Directors and claimed that, based on the new cost information, the Department's failure to raise rates was not consistent with the Ninth Circuit's requirements. The Directors argued that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution does not give providers a private right of action and that the existing rates were consistent with the Medicaid Act's requirements of efficiency, economy, and quality of care. The district court granted the Providers' motion for summary judgment and held that the failure to increase rates led to a failure to substantially reimburse providers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.


[Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc. (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Supremacy Clause instructs courts to defer to federal law when federal and state law contradict each other, but it does not create a private right of action. If the Supremacy Clause were interpreted to include a private right of action, it would mean that the Constitution would require Congress to allow private actors to implement its laws, which would curtail Congress’ ability to guide implementation of federal laws. Although judicial precedent allows for suits to prevent state and federal officers from violating federal laws, that precedent stems from a long history of the jurisprudence of the courts of equity, not the Supremacy Clause. The Court also held that the Idaho Medicaid Providers could not circumvent Congress’ exclusion of a private right of action under the Medicaid Act.
In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote that federal courts may not grant injunctive relief against state officers who violate federal law when the relevant statute does not provide for that kind of relief. In this case, the Medicaid Act does not do so because such relief could result in increased litigation, inconsistent results, and the disorderly administration of complex federal programs, which Congress could not have intended.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that suits to restrain state officials from executing laws contrary to the Constitution have such a long history in American jurisprudence that there needs to be substantial evidence of congressional intent to restrict such suits in a statute, and the language of the Medicaid Act does not provide such evidence. Because such suits argue that state law contravenes federal law, they are essentially constitutional in nature and stem from the Supremacy Clause. Therefore, even if there is no implied right of action in the Supremacy Clause, it can still be the basis for suits similar to the one in this case. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


[Bank of America v. Caulkett (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
David Caulkett’s property was subject to two mortgage liens when he filed for bankruptcy. Because the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the property, the second mortgage, which Bank of America held, was considered “underwater.” When Caulkett filed for bankruptcy, he moved the bankruptcy court to void Bank of America’s lien on the second mortgage and argued that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allowed a debtor filing for bankruptcy to void a second mortgage when the debt owed on the first mortgage exceeded the value of the collateral property. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
This case was consolidated with a similar case, Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona, which had substantially the same facts and an identical procedural history.


[Bank of America v. Caulkett (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, which held that Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to void a mortgage “[t]o the extent that [the] lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim.” Although a straightforward reading of this provision appears to favor the debtors, in Dewsnup v. Timm, the Court held that a “secured claim” is one supported by a security interest in property, regardless of whether the value of that property would be sufficient to cover the claim. Thus, even if the second mortgage is underwater, the debtor cannot void that mortgage in bankruptcy proceedings.


[Reyes Mata v. Lynch (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Noel Reyes Mata, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of assaulting a woman he was dating; he was deported in 2010. His appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed after his attorney failed to file an appellate brief. Mata subsequently moved to reopen his case based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the BIA denied Mata's motion as untimely because it was filed well after the 90 days allowed. Mata appealed the BIA's denial of his motion to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and argued that the BIA should not have enforced the filing period limitation because his attorney's failure to file a brief deprived him of his due process rights. The appellate court held that such a motion was subject to the complete discretion of the BIA, and thus the appellate court lacked the jurisdiction to review the decision.


[Reyes Mata v. Lynch (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that precedent establishes that circuit courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review an alien’s appeal of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision to deny a motion to reopen proceedings. Although Congress has limited the appellate courts’ authority over BIA decisions in other ways, this authority has remained in place. Additionally, while the appellate courts may lack the jurisdiction to decide the merits of whether the case should be reopened, the lack of jurisdiction over that issue does not affect the appellate court’s jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision to deny the motion.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, prior to determining whether it had jurisdiction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit should have construed the ambiguous motion in question as either invoking statutory relief or requesting that the BIA assert its inherent authority to reopen the case.


[Horne v. Department of Agriculture (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In 1949 the U.S. Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order). The Marketing Order authorized the federal government to reserve a percentage of the yearly California raisin crop to stabilize the supply, and thus the price, of California raisins. Under the Marketing Order, farmers are entitled to a share of the proceeds acquired when, or if, the government sells the reserved raisins. Marvin Horne, a farmer and raisin producer, attempted to skirt the Marketing Order by processing his own raisins, which he claimed exempted his raisins from the Marketing Order's reserve requirement. The Department of Agriculture claimed Horne's raisins were still subject to the Market Order, and following administrative proceedings, Horne was fined nearly $700,000.
Horne sued the Department of Agriculture and claimed that the Marketing Order violated his Fifth Amendment rights against uncompensated takings. The district court found in favor of the Department of Agriculture. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked standing to address Horne's claim, because Fifth Amendment takings claims are within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The United States Supreme Court held that the appellate court did have jurisdiction and remanded the case. On remand, the appellate court found for the Department of Agriculture by holding that the reserve requirement did not act as a per se taking because Horne's raisins constituted personal property rather than real property. The appellate court also held that the Marketing Order did not constitute a taking because there was a sufficient nexus, and rough proportionality, between the reserve requirement and the specific interest the government seeks to protect, which in this case is the government's interest in stabilizing raisin prices.


[Horne v. Department of Agriculture (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
No, no, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies with equal force to personal as well as real property; therefore the Marketing Order’s reserve requirement constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment because it deprives the owners of their property rights to “possess, use, and dispose of” the raisins. Because a physical taking has occurred, returning the net proceeds of the sale of the raisins to the owners does not exempt the government from paying just compensation for the taking itself. The Court also held that making the reserve requirement a condition on legally participating in the raisin market effects a per se taking because it cannot be properly characterized as a voluntary exchange for a governmental benefit. Therefore, the government should pay a just compensation for the taking, which the government has already calculated in its attempt to fine the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins at issue, by rescinding the fine it had imposed.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that the Takings Clause only requires the government to pay just compensation when the taking results in a public legal right to the property. Because it is not clear that such a right is being granted when the government enforces the reserve requirement, there is no reason to calculate what such “just compensation” would be in this case.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the Court should remand the case to the appellate court to calculate what “just compensation” should be in this case. If the Marketing Order is determined to afford just compensation, when taking into account the benefit to the market that the reserve requirement confers, then the reserve requirement does not violate the Takings Clause. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissent in which she argued that a per se taking only occurs when the government deprives an individual of every property right regarding the property in question. Because the reserve requirement allows the owner to retain interest in the property in the form of the net proceeds from the disposition of the raisins, the Marketing Order does not deprive the individual of all property rights and therefore is not a per se taking. Justice Sotomayor also argued that precedent establishes that the government may require an individual to give up some property rights as a condition of engaging in regulated commerce.


[McFadden v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Stephen McFadden sold overstocked products on the Internet to augment his income. In 2011, McFadden noticed that a lot of businesses where he lived were selling a product known as "bath salts," an aromatherapy product that emits a stimulating vapor when burned. After confirming that bath salts were not illegal, McFadden began selling them like his other products. He continued to sell them until he learned they had been placed on the list of substances that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) prohibited.
The government prosecuted McFadden under the Controlled Substances Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986, which allows substances not listed as "controlled" to be treated as illegal if the analogue has effects and a chemical make-up that are "substantially similar" to those listed in the CSA. At trial, McFadden argued that the state needed to prove that he was aware, or actively resisted finding out, that the bath salts were substantially similar to a controlled substance and constituted an analogue. Instead, the district court held that the state only needed to prove that the petitioner knew "the products were intended for human consumption." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


[McFadden v. United States (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, in order to fulfill the intent element, the defendant may either know that the substance in question is a controlled substance without knowing what the substance is, or may know what the substance is but not know that it is controlled. In either scenario, the defendant is aware of all he needs to know to fulfill the knowledge element. A complete and thorough knowledge of the law surrounding controlled substances is not necessary to fulfill the knowledge requirement, and even in a case where the defendant does not know of the Analogue Act, he may be found guilty because ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that knowledge of the identity of the substance fell short of satisfying the knowledge element. In this instance, ignorance of the law could be a defense because the individual could lack knowledge of the legal element: the fact that the substance is controlled.


[Harris v. Viegelahn (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
In February 2010, Charles Harris filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The approved plan instructed Harris to make monthly payments to the trustee Mary Viegelahn for sixty months, as well as monthly payments directly to Chase, which held his mortgage. After the mortgage and secured creditors debts were paid off, the payments would go to Harris' unsecured creditors. In October 2010, Chase moved to lift the automatic stay of Harris' home for his failure to make the mortgage payments, and Harris moved out of his house when the stay was lifted in November 2010. At that point, Viegelahn held the portion of the monthly payments intended to go to Chase. After Harris voluntarily converted his bankruptcy case to Chapter 7, Viegelahn distributed those funds to Harris' creditors. Harris sued for that money and argued that Viegelahn had no authority to disburse funds after conversion of the case. The bankruptcy court issued an order compelling the return of the funds and the district court affirmed. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the undistributed payments that the Chapter 13 trustee holds at the time of the case's conversion to Chapter 7 must be distributed to creditors pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan.


[Harris v. Viegelahn (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
The undistributed funds should be returned to the debtor. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy only affects the debtor’s assets from prior to the filing. Assets the debtor acquired after filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, as were the assets in this case, remain the property of the debtor. The Court held that Congress intended to allow a debtor to make a “fresh start” by converting a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to Chapter 7 in good faith, and therefore no penalty should be exacted in the form of requiring the disbursement of assets acquired after the filing date. Therefore, once a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is converted to a Chapter 7 one, unless the conversion is in bad faith, any assets acquired after the filing of the Chapter 13 petition revert back to the debtor.


[Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act require that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) if it finds that such regulation was "appropriate and necessary" after conducting a utility study. In December 2000, the EPA issued a notice that such regulation was necessary based on the results of the utility study, which showed that the mercury emissions from EGUs were a threat to public health. In 2005, the EPA reversed its findings and determined that it was not "appropriate and necessary" to regulate coal-and oil-fired EGUs. States and other groups petitioned for review, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's attempt to reverse its findings was unlawful because it could not remove pollutant sources from the regulation list once they were on it. In 2012, the EPA confirmed that EGU regulation was necessary and promulgated emission standards. State, industry, and labor groups petitioned the appellate court for review of the EPA's interpretation of the "appropriate and necessary" requirement with respect to these regulations. The appellate court denied the petition.


[Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that federal administrative agencies must engage in “reasoned decisionmaking,” which requires the agency to consider all relevant factors. Because the cost to power plants is certainly a relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate electric utility steam generating units (EGUs), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), should have considered the cost to power plants in making its decision. The EPA erred in interpreting the “appropriate and necessary” requirement of the Clean Air Act because it was unreasonable to interpret the phrase as not requiring the EPA to consider all relevant factors, including cost to power plants.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that, although precedent established that the courts grant agencies a great deal of deference when agencies interpret statutes that Congress left ambiguous, such deference might result in courts allowing an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissent in which she argued that the EPA’s decision was reasonable because it fully intended to consider the cost-benefit analysis at a later stage in its decisionmaking process and in fact did so. Therefore, the majority opinion essentially finds the EPA’s decision unreasonable because the EPA did not conduct a thorough cost-benefit analysis as the initial step of its decisionmaking. Because it is reasonable for the EPA to decide to consider costs after determining that regulation was “appropriate and necessary,” the courts cannot interfere in the agency’s regulatory decisions. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


[Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Facts]
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.


[Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) — Roberts Court (2010-2016) — Conclusion]
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.