[Jones v. Wolf (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require Georgia state courts to defer to the Augusta-Macon Presbytery commission’s ruling in the Vineville church property dispute. Justice Blackman examined the history of Georgia’s approach to church property litigation. Georgia eventually arrived at a “neutral principles of law” method for resolving church property disputes. As applied to the PCUS, this required examining the deeds to the properties in question, state statutes dealing with implied trusts, and the Book of Church Order. The trial court would then determine whether there was a basis for a trust in favor of the general church.
Here, the trial court did not discover any language in the Book of Church Order implying a trust in favor of the general church. While acknowledging that the First Amendment severely limits the role civil courts play in resolving property disputes, Justice Blackmun held that Georgia’s approach was constitutional. The neutral principles of law approach required courts to use objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law, leaving courts free from entanglement in religious doctrinal questions.
While Georgia’s approach was constitutional on its face, Justice Blackmun could not determine from the facts whether Georgia courts applied the method constitutionally. While the respondent argued that Georgia applied a presumptive rule of majority representation -- as opposed to a rule of deference to church governments -- neither the Supreme Court of Georgia nor the trial court explicitly stated that it was using this rule. Consequently, Justice Blackmun remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of Georgia could definitively determine whether this rule was the law of Georgia.
Justice Louis Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White. He characterized the dispute not as one over the ownership of property but rather over which faction in Vineville’s congregation has the right to control the use of that property. Justice Powell argued that disputes over church property almost invariably arise out of disagreements regarding doctrine and practice. Consequently, state courts should defer to decisions made within the structure of church governments in any case involving an intrachurch dispute, even when the dispute is over church property.


[Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.


[Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes and yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, although there is no constitutional right to an inmate’s release from prison prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, the specific wording of the Nebraska statute created a constitutionally protected expectation of parole. The Court further held that the Parole Board’s procedures were adequate and reversed the prescribed modifications from the Court of Appeals.
In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reasoned that a state’s establishment of a parole problem, regardless of the specific wording of the statute, triggered a right to procedural due process. Justice Powell agreed that the Court of Appeal’s recommendations were unnecessary, but he argued that the Parole Board should provide inmates with at least 72 hours notice of their hearing date.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a right to due process. In his view, the Parole Board should provide the inmates with reasonable notice of their hearing dates and a written statement of the reasons underlying adverse decisions.


[City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden.


[City of Mobile v. Bolden (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not entail "the right to have Negro candidates elected," and that only purposefully discriminatory denials of the freedom to vote on the basis of race demanded constitutional remedies. The Court also found that multimember legislative districts were not unconstitutional per se; such legislative apportionments only violated the Fourteenth Amendment if they were "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial. . .discrimination." In short, the Court held that facially neutral actions were unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes.


[Duren v. Missouri (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics. The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.


[Duren v. Missouri (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the state court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Duren’s statistical evidence sufficiently proved that Jackson County’s jury selection process violated his constitutional rights. Duren showed an underrepresented “distinctive” group resulting from Jackson County’s practice of exempting women. Also, there was no significant state interest to justify exempting women from jury service. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly used an combination of the Due Process clause and Equal Protection clause to make their decision.


[Vance v. Bradley (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.


[Vance v. Bradley (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Byron R. White, the Court emphasized the distinction between the Civil Service and Foreign Service, and the "special attention" paid to the Foreign Service by Congress. The Court interpreted the purpose of Section 632 to be the encouragement of the "highest performance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities for promotion would be available," a legitimate interest that justified the distinction. The Court also recognized the possibility that service in the Foreign Service would be more rigorous than service in the Civil Service. Given that possibility, Congress had a "reasonable basis" for enacting the statute, satisfying the rationality standard set forth in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.


[New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.


[New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No and no. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Transit Authority's policy was not unconstitutional or illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described Beazer's statistical argument as "weak", as the 81 percent statistic did not relate to methadone users specifically. The Court recognized the public safety interest in keeping narcotics users from working for NYTA. The narcotics rule was an allowable policy choice made by NYTA, and any specific exemption for methadone users from the narcotics rule would have been "costly" and "imprecise." Justice Lewis Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[Dunaway v. New York (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself.
At trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.
The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal.


[Dunaway v. New York (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the police violated Dunaway’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by picking him up and taking him to the police station to be questioned without probable cause. Because picking someone up for questioning involves an intrusion on par with that of an arrest, it is held to the standard of “probable cause” rather than the lower standard of “reasonable suspicion.” The Court also held that the confession stemmed directly from the illegal questioning, and without an intervening event, the confession should have been considered tainted evidence and not allowed into evidence at trial.
Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the key principle of the Fourth Amendment was the balancing of competing interests. He wrote that, while there must be general rules for police conduct, cases should be considered based on their individual facts. In this case, the questioning was too close to an arrest to fit any other criteria.
In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that an illegal arrest is only relevant to determining the voluntariness of a confession if it can be shown that the conduct of the illegal arrest was what motivated the confession.
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that not all interactions between citizens and police officers are seizures of persons. Because Dunaway willingly accompanied officers to the police station, his time at the police station could not be deemed a seizure. He also argued that, because the police acted in good faith and gave Dunaway the Miranda warnings, his statements and drawings should be considered voluntary and admissible. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Southeastern Community College v. Davis (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.


[Southeastern Community College v. Davis (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" specified by the Act meant one who meets all the program's requirements "in spite of his handicap" as opposed to "in every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap." Even with an improved hearing aid, Davis still required lip-reading to understand speech, and therefore was not "otherwise qualified." Since Davis could not be admitted to Southeastern's program without substantial changes to admission requirements, Davis' rejection did not constitute unlawful discrimination.


[Addington v. Texas (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Frank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights.


[Addington v. Texas (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
The standard of proof in a civil confinement case requires a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence, but not as high as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the use of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence standard in a jury instruction in a civil commitment case was proper. Because of the importance of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in criminal proceedings, the Court was weary of requiring the same standard for civil proceedings. Furthermore, this case involved psychiatric evaluation, which was not considered reliable evidence. A “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement in cases involving mental diagnosis may be too high a burden for the state to reach. Therefore, the middle ground of requiring a “clear and convincing” standard of proof was appropriate.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration or or decision of the case.


[Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston’s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader’s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent.
Wolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a “public figure” and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.


[Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that Wolston met neither of the requirements to be considered a public figure. Wolston was not a figure of “persuasive power and influence,” nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of popular controversy. The Court held that an individual does not become a public figure merely by attracting public attention, and such individuals should not lose the protection afforded to private individuals.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the majority’s decision defined “public figure” too narrowly, but the intervening years between Wolston’s publicity and the libelous statement sufficed to consider him a private citizen. Blackmun argued that the timing of the potentially libelous statement relative to the event that brought about public scrutiny of an individual is relevant in libel cases. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent and argued that, because the issue of Soviet espionage remained a relevant issue in 1974, the intervening years did not diminish Wolston’s status as a public figure. He also wrote that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.


[Bellotti v. Baird (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure "for good cause shown."


[Bellotti v. Baird (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
The Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.


[Gannett Company, Inc. v. DePasquale (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an "unabated buildup" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.


[Gannett Company, Inc. v. DePasquale (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
The Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had "an affirmative constitutional duty" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred.


[United States v. Raddatz (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.


[United States v. Raddatz (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren Burger, in a 5-4 decision, wrote the majority opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the FMA did not did not require the district court to independently review disputed testimony. Also, the FMA did not violate the Constitution. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the statute in question does not threaten judicial power or independence in judicial decision making.
Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a partial dissent, stating that a district court must rehear evidence when credibility is at issue. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that the FMA clearly requires a district court to rehear evidence when a party objects to a magistrate’s recommendation. Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a separate dissent, expressing that use of the the FMA was impermissible in this case under the Fifth Amendment and Article III.


[Harris v. McRae (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.


[Harris v. McRae (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that states participating in the Medicaid program were not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions under Title XIX. The Court found that a woman's freedom of choice did not carry with it "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." The Court ruled that because the Equal Protection Clause was not a source of substantive rights and because poverty did not qualify as a "suspect classification," the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions of the statute with tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not constitute an establishment of religion.


[Chiarella v. United States (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.


[Chiarella v. United States (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. A duty to disclose information arises if there is a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to the transaction. Chiarella had no such duty. He was not a corporate insider in the acquiring corporation and he did not receive confidential information from the target company. He also had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the target company: he was not their agent; they placed no trust or confidence in him; indeed, they had no prior dealings with him. A duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.


[Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.


[Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."


[Rush v. Savchuk (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.


[Rush v. Savchuk (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that there must be a certain amount of minimum contacts between the defendant and the state in which the suit occurs. The fact that Rush’s insurance company does business in Minnesota is not a sufficient link between him and the state, especially since he owns no property there and has no other connection. Rush had no reason to suspect that having an insurance contract with State Farm would subject him to the possibility of a lawsuit in all states where State Farm does business.
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the insurance company could be sued in Minnesota under Rush’s policy. As long as it is understood that the Minnesota court has jurisdiction over the policy and State Farm, rather than the defendant, Justice Stevens argued that the suit could be continued.


[Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.


[Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court explained that while natural laws, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, or newly discovered minerals are not patentable, a live artificially-engineered microorganism is. The creation of a bacterium that is not found anywhere in nature, constitutes a patentable "manufacture" or "composition of matter" under Section 101. Moreover, the bacterium's man-made ability to break down crude oil makes it very useful.


[United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by their first case. Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.


[United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No and yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Congress did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers and affirmed the Court of Claims decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun noted a similar situation in Nock v. United States, where a congressional exemption from a judicial bar was ruled not to be in violation of separation of powers and upheld by the Court. Additionally, since Congress "had not made a good-faith effort to give the Sioux the full value of the Black Hills," Congress' 1877 action qualified as use of its eminent domain power under Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States. Therefore, the Sioux were entitled to compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.


[World-Wide Volkwagen Corporation v. Woodson (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state.


[World-Wide Volkwagen Corporation v. Woodson (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court judgment. The Supreme Court held that a state court could only exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state. In this case, the only contact with Oklahoma was the accident. The Volkswagen retailer and distributor had taken advantage of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, had not solicited business in Oklahoma, and did not regularly sell cars that reached Oklahoma directly or indirectly.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent expressing the view that the retailer and distributor had purposely entered their goods into the stream of commerce and had gained benefits from other states through the nature of their product. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that a local car retailer makes itself a part of a national network of retailers and can reasonably expect that its product may cause injury in other states. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent stating that cars were intended for local and long-distance travel, so it was not unreasonable for Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction when the accident happened there.


[Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate that 75 percent of their receipts were applied towards "charitable purposes." Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.


[Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court held that charitable solicitation is not purely commercial speech and is closely related to forms of protected speech such as advocacy. Justice Byron R. White, who authored the majority opinion, argued that "it is clear" that charitable solicitations are protected. While Schaumburg had an interest in preventing fraud, the ordinance did not fully serve that interest, which could be accomplished through alternate means. The ordinance in question also barred legitimate organizations from soliciting contributions. Schaumburg's interest did not justify the ordinance's "interference with protected speech,",which was therefore unconstitutional.


[Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.


[Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Miranda safeguards came into play "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent," noting that the term "interrogation" under Miranda included "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." The Court then found that the officers' conversation did not qualify as words or actions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a response from Innis.


[Walter v. United States (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films.
On April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Walter v. United States (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that projection and viewing of the films constituted a search, and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the lack of a warrant. The fact that the FBI was lawfully in possession of the boxes did not grant them the authority to view the films without a warrant. The Court also held that the fact that the boxes had been opened by a third party, which placed information about the content of the films in plain view, did not alter the owner’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. He argued that even if the films had been viewed by a third party before the FBI viewed them, the government could not consider the films to be in plain view and warrants unnecessary. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment only prevented unlawful searches and seizures by the government. Because the FBI received the films after the boxes had been opened to the point that the suggestive material was visible, the FBI’s viewing of the films did not violate Fourth Amendment rights.


[Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
These are three consolidated cases.
Jasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.
Initially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.


[Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, since none of the parties to the case challenged the Amendment. The opinion referenced Harris v. McCrae, another opinion filed the same day, which upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The Court also held that a state is not obligated to pay for abortions through Medicaid when there will be no federal reimbursement because of the restrictions of the Hyde Amendment.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented and argued that a state’s interest in protecting the life of a fetus could not come at the cost of denying poor women medically necessary abortions. He also argued that, in upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the Court allowed a state to yield undue influence over a woman’s decision whether or not to go through with a pregnancy; this influence disproportionally affects poor women. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.
Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Hyde Amendment essentially denies women in poverty the ability to have a legal abortion that protects their health but not their lives. Because the burden falls exclusively on poor women who cannot afford an abortion, he disagreed with the Court’s finding that the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In his a dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun expressed that the Court refused to recognize the realities of poverty. He argued that such actions by the government wrongfully punish those living in poverty.
Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that, since the government provides Medicaid on the basis of expressed financial and medical need, it could not deny assistance when both of those needs have been shown. If a woman has a constitutional right to choose to protect her own health rather than the potential life of the fetus, the government cannot deny her assistance to which she would otherwise be entitled.


[Martinez v. California (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Richard Thomas was convicted of attempted murder and committed to a mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing the statute of immunization of parole officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


[Martinez v. California (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that a state statute immunizing parole officials from injuries resulting from parole decisions does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute does not condone the killing of a human being, but rather it protects parole officials who are required to make a difficult decision. There is always a risk involved in releasing a prisoner, and the parole officer must use his discretion in making the decision. The state has a parole program to promote rehabilitation and it is the duty of the state legislature, not the courts, to decide if that program is rational. Therefore, the suit against the parole officials by the family of a parolee’s murder victim is not actionable.


[Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. County of Los Angeles and City of Compton (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce.


[Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. County of Los Angeles and City of Compton (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a two-sentence unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.


[Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.


[Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.


[United States v. California (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Rincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding.


[United States v. California (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court held that the special master's determination was correct. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger acknowledged the ambiguity in the Submerged Lands Act. However, since the piers and island in dispute did not provide protection, they did not qualify as "harbor works" that would have extended the coastline.


[Reeves Inc. v. Stake (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.


[Reeves Inc. v. Stake (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. and found that "'[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'" The Court found that South Dakota was acting as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator," and was capable of withdrawing from the interstate market if an in-state shortage arose. The Court rejected arguments that cement was a "natural resource" to which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access.


[Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.


[Fullilove v. Klutznick (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."


[Aaron v. SEC (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
While working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.


[Aaron v. SEC (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that plain language and the legislative history of the statutes required the SEC to establish defendant’s intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud” for violations of Section 10(b) and the part of Section 17(a) that specifically refers to the use of a device, scheme, or artifice with intent to defraud. Employing the same textual and legislative history analysis, the Court further held that the parts Section 17(a) that deal with false statements, omissions of fact, and transactions or practices that operate as fraud do not contain an intent requirement.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he urged those critical of the public policy implications to voice their complaints to Congress. He also argued that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the ruling on the ground that Aaron “intentionally failed” to terminate the fraudulent statements about Lawn-A-Mat stock.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the SEC should not be required to prove the defendants intent to establish a violation of Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, or Section 17(a). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


[Ohio v. Roberts (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute.
After being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.


[Ohio v. Roberts (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to restrict the admission of unreliable hearsay into evidence. Generally, face-to-face confrontation is preferred as it allows the accused to probe the memory of the witness and allows the jury to take the demeanor of the witness into account when assessing the reliability of the testimony. The Court held that the opportunity for face-to-face interaction with, and cross-examination of, the witness at the previous hearing satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation Clause for the later trial. Although Ms. Isaacs was not officially cross-examined, the questions she answered had the proper form and intent to satisfy the purpose of cross-examination and establish the reliability of the testimony. The Court also held that a witness may be declared officially unavailable if a good-faith effort was made to locate her, as was the case with Ms. Isaacs.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the state did not meet its burden to show a diligent effort to locate Ms. Isaacs. The state sent subpoenas to the home of Ms. Isaacs’ parents, although there was evidence that she no longer resided there, and made no further effort to locate her new residence. Without evidence of a diligent effort to locate the witness, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause could not be circumvented. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.


[American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Gilberto Alvez was a seaman on vacation from his regular trade. He was moonlighting for Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. as a harbor worker on the SS Export Builder, a vessel owned by American Export Lines, Inc (“AELI”). On October 13, 1972, while the SS Export Builder was in New York waters, the handle of a defective tension jack struck Alvez in the eye. He completely lost his right eye in the accident. He also suffered from depression as a result of the accident and his injuries.
Alvez sued AELI in New York, claiming damages resulting from AELI’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of their ship. Alvez then moved to add his wife, Juanita Alvez, as a party plaintiff, claiming that his injuries deprived her of the benefits of their marriage.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (“Jones Act”) created several classes of sea workers, allowing a wider breadth of causes of action for those injured within the United States’ territorial waters. It did not, however, specifically provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses. Similarly, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (“DOHSA”) did not create a specific right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. The district court denied the claim for loss of consortium. The appellate court reversed, noting that while such motions were not available in some maritime law cases, the Supreme Court in Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet allowed a decedent’s dependents to recover for loss of society in a wrongful death maritime law claim. Thus, there is no clear precedent prohibiting claims of loss of consortium from nonfatal injuries.
New York’s Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. It rejected AELI’s use of Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques, a U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit decision holding that the spouse of an injured longshoreman had no cause of action for loss of consortium. It noted that most states now allowed a spouse to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. It also reasoned that the heavy burden now placed on Juanita Alvez as a marriage partner justified allowing her to sue for damages.


[American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 decision with two concurrences, Justice William Brennan held that maritime law authorizes Juanita Alvez to maintain an action for damages against AELI resulting from the loss of her husband’s society. He rejected AELI’s argument that the Jones Act and DOHSA represented Congress’ intention to preclude actions for loss of consortium or society. He noted that DOHSA centered on relief for fatal injuries on the high seas, not nonfatal injuries within terrestrial waters, and that the Jones Act does not exhaustively regulate the claims of longshoremen or seamen. Justice Brennan agreed with the lower courts that the Court’s recent maritime law decisions eroded the justification for denying claims used in Igneri. He also pointed to the contemporary state of the law, where a clear majority of states permitted a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium from personal injuries to her husband.
Justice Lewis Powell concurred, writing that there was no rational basis for drawing a distinction between fatal and nonfatal injuries in loss of consortium cases.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and William Rehnquist, dissented. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the federal question at hand would necessarily survive AELI’s appeals in state court. He warned against the practice of granting review to non-final lower court orders, and recommended denying certiorari to such cases in the future.


[PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.


[PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.


[Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Code of Virginia authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate and discipline attorneys. Under this authority, the Virginia court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Bar Code), and the content makes it clear that the Virginia court holds all legislative and regulatory power over the legal profession in the state. The court also adjudicates alleged violations of the Bar Code.
In 1974, Consumers Union of the United States sought to prepare a legal directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions about legal representation. Consumers Union attempted to canvass all of the attorneys of Arlington County, Virginia, for the information for their directory. Many attorneys refused to provide the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code’s prohibition against attorney advertising and providing the type of information the Consumers Union sought to publish.
On February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council sued the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and other individuals. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration and an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant section of the Bar Code.
The district court held that the section of the Bar Code unconstitutionally restricted access to information concerning the attorneys’ initial consultation fees, but did not enjoin the enforcement of the code as it relates to advertising. Consumers Union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the prohibition of attorney advertising violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that the section of the Bar Code was unconstitutional in its entirety and enjoined its enforcement. Consumers Union moved for the awarding of attorneys fees, which the Virginia Court objected to on the grounds that it had judicial immunity. The district court awarded attorneys fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia.


[Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No, no. Justice Byron R. White delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Supreme Court of Virginia was immune to suits in its legislative capacity, just as any other legislative body would be. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has the power to enforce the Code, and this suit was brought against it in its enforcement capacity. The Court held that suits for declaratory and injunctive relief can be brought against the Supreme Court of Virginia in its enforcement capacity. The Court also held that the Supreme Court of Virginia cannot be liable for attorney’s fees because it has legislative immunity. The legislative history surrounding the issue of legislative immunity shows that Congress intended agencies that have legislative immunity to also be immune from attorney’s fees.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or consideration of this case.


[Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On March 1, 1976, an Illinois Circuit Court judge authorized a warrant to search the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern and the person of the bartender Greg for heroin and other drug paraphernalia, based on information the Illinois Bureau of Investigation obtained from an informant. When officers arrived to conduct the search, they also conducted a cursory pat down for weapons on all of the patrons in the bar, pursuant to an Illinois state statute that allows officers to search persons on the premises during the execution of a valid search warrant. During the pat down, an officer found and retrieved a cigarette pouch from the pocket of one of the patrons, Ventura Ybarra, that contained tin foil packets of a substance later confirmed to be heroin.
Ybarra was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the contraband that had been seized from his person during the search at the bar. The trial court denied the motion. Ybarra was found guilty. On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to the facts of this case because it was obvious that there was a connection between Ybarra and the premises being searched. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra’s petition for appeal.


[Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no probable cause to suspect any of the patrons of committing a crime simply because they are on the premises during a search. Without any particular indication that a person is connected to the premises for the reasons the search is being conducted, a police search of the person violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that even an initial pat-down search is unconstitutional without a reasonable belief that the person is armed and dangerous.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an unnecessarily broad reading of the exclusionary rule and ignores the practical needs of law enforcement. He also argued that it was perfectly reasonable for the police to search persons found on the premises of a bar known as a place for the procurement of drugs and that the law must account for the safety of officers in performing their duty. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment calls for specificity regarding the location to be searched and the person or things to be seized, not the persons from whom items will be taken. He argued that it was not practical to prohibit law enforcement from flexibility in the performance of their duty. The courts may consider the reasonableness of an individual search based on the scope of the intrusion and the justification to determine whether it violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent.


[Rummel v. Estelle (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
After being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the sentence.


[Rummel v. Estelle (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the life sentence imposed by Texas law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that Texas had a significant interest in dealing "in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society." The Court also noted that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits to its prisoners," indicating that there was a possibility that Rummel would not be imprisoned for the rest of his life.


[Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In September 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. After Godfrey consumed a number of beers, threatened his wife with a knife, and tore her clothes, she threatened to leave him and then left to stay with relatives. Within a few days, she had secured a warrant against Godfrey for aggravated assault and filed for divorce. On September 20, they argued again, and Godfrey’s wife told him that reconciliation was impossible. Godfrey went to his mother-in-law’s trailer with his shotgun. He shot his wife through the window, struck his daughter with the butt of the gun, and shot his mother-in-law. Godfrey then called the police, explained what had happened, and asked them to come and pick him up.
Godfrey was indicted on two counts of murder, and one count of aggravated assault. He pled not guilty, and argued the defense of temporary insanity. Godfrey was found guilty, and at the sentencing phase of the trial, the same jury sentenced him to the death penalty on both counts of murder. Georgia law states that a person my be convicted of murder and sentenced to the death penalty if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an aggressive battery to the victim.” The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.


[Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia law was unconstitutionally vague and failed to properly distinguish between those cases that would be eligible for the death penalty and those that wouldn’t. Even accepting the law, the Court found no evidence that Godfrey’s crimes contained the elements described in the law.
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion where he argued not only that the law was unconstitutional, but also that a death penalty sentencing requires much more restrictive sentencing guidelines. He also argued that the death penalty itself was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined in the concurrence.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the plurality’s decision leads to death penalty sentences being imposed on a case-by-case basis, which is more arbitrary than the current Georgia law. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White argued that the Georgia law provided strict enough requirements to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate to the crime. He also argued that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court when they are “responsibly and consistently interpreting state law.” Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


[Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute.


[Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary had acted without knowledge that the new standard was necessary to "provide safe and healthful employment" as mandated by the Act. Nothing in OSHA's administrative record indicated that exposure to benzene at 10 ppm would cause leukemia and that exposure to one ppm would not. Since the Secretary had not made a threshold finding that exposure to 10 ppm posed significant health risks, he was powerless to promulgate the new standard.


[Trammel v. United States (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Otis Trammel, Jr. was indicted on federal drug charges. Before his trial, he advised the court that the Government would call his wife as a witness against him. The indictment named Mrs. Trammel as an unindicted co-conspirator and the Government granted her immunity in exchange for her testimony. Otis moved to assert a privilege against adverse spousal testimony to prevent her from testifying against him. The district court denied the motion, and allowed Mrs. Trammel to testify to any act she observed during the marriage and any communication made in the presence of a third party. Only confidential communications between Mr. and Mrs. Trammel remained privileged and inadmissible. Otis was tried and convicted. On appeal, Otis argued that the district court’s ruling violated Hawkins v. United States where the U.S. Supreme Court held that one spouse may not testify against the other unless both consent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the Hawkins did not prevent voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity.


[Trammel v. United States (1980) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for eight members of the court, affirmed the 10th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the rule from Hawkins was modified so that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony vested in the witness spouse alone. A witness may not be compelled to testify or foreclosed from testifying. Information disclosed privately between a husband and wife is still privileged under a separate rule protecting confidential marital communications. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, writing that the foundations for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony disappeared long before Hawkins was ever decided.


[New York v. Belton (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
A New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway. Roger Belton was a passenger in that car. When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana. The officer also found that none of the car’s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car. After asking the four occupants of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside one of the pockets.
At trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband. The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted.


[New York v. Belton (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In a 6-3 vote, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court rejected the previously used case-by-case analysis for whether a search is reasonable in favor of a bright line rule. The Court held that a police officer can always lawfully search a car and any compartments in that car after arresting its occupants. The search in this case was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, stating that he joined in the opinion because the majority was unwilling to overturn Mapp v. Ohio, which held that evidence obtained in unlawful searches and seizures cannot be used in criminal prosecutions. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement clearly gave the police officer authority to conduct the search in this case.
Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the bright line rule adopted by the majority was a departure from prior precedent. He argued that a clear rule will not provide officers in the field with any greater guidance about what searches are permissible. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the new rule permits officers to search luggage, briefcases, or other containers in a car without a warrant or any suspicion that they contain relevant evidence. Justice Marshall also joined in this dissent.


[Flynt v. Ohio (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In July 1976, Ohio charged petitioners, officers of Hustler Magazine, with disseminating obscene materials for their role in publishing an issue of Hustler that contained a political cartoon that Ohio deemed obscene. The trial court dismissed the charge and held that Ohio violated the petitioners’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause by engaging in discriminatory prosecution. Ohio appealed to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eighth District, which reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated the charges. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and argued that Ohio’s decision to prosecute Hustler, instead of other magazines that routinely published similar content, was discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that petitioners did not establish the elements for a prima facie case for unconstitutional discriminatory prosecution. To do so, petitioners had to show that they were singled out for prosecution while there were other magazines similarly situated that were not prosecuted, and that the government’s decision to prosecute them was made in bad faith, based upon race, religion, or the desire to prevent their exercise of First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined the petitioners had not met this burden and remanded the case to the lower courts so that the petitioners could present further evidence to meet this burden.


[Flynt v. Ohio (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. The Court issued a per curium opinion for the 5-4 majority in which it dismissed the previously granted writ of certiorari for a lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that it normally reviews decisions that have received final judgment and that the ruling of the Supreme Court of Ohio was not a final judgment since it returned the case to the lower court and allowed the petitioners to provide further evidence relating to their discriminatory prosecution claim. Although the Court can disregard the final judgment requirement in cases where the refusal to review a lower court’s decision “might seriously erode federal policy;” in this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s ruling did not threaten to erode federal policy to the extent that review was necessary.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a criminal trial of the petitioners under the obscenity statute would undermine their First Amendment rights. Justice Stewart argued that this violation of rights was sufficient to dispose of the final judgment requirement. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the interest in protecting magazine publishers from being prosecuted because their magazines’ content offends state officials is a significant First Amendment interest, sufficient to allow the Court to review.


[Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) required that delegates sent to its National Convention were chosen exclusively by voters affiliated with the party, but the state of Wisconsin allowed non-Democrats to participate in state primaries. In the primary, voters expressed their choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination. Although the Wisconsin Democratic Party (State Party) selected delegates at a caucus occurring after the primary, Wisconsin law required these delegates to allot their votes at the National Convention in accord with the amount of support each candidate received in the primary. The National Party prohibited the State Party delegates from participating in the 1980 National Convention because of non-Democrat influence in the state primary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the National Party must admit the delegates since Wisconsin had a "compelling interest" to maintain the "open" feature of its primary system.


[Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart the Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Referring to its decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, the Court held that the "First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any State." Granting states the power to place delegates in a National Convention over party objections to how they were selected would impair the right of political parties to associate with whom they wish, especially when non-party members could influence the interests of the delegates. Justice Lewis Powell argued in his dissent that Wisconsin's "compelling interest" to involve non-affiliated voters in the primary justified this burden on the freedom of association, although the majority held that this could be accomplished without intruding upon internal party rules.


[Chandler v. Florida (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Two Miami Beach police officers were charged with burglarizing a local restaurant. Their trial gained much media attention. Local television stations televised a small portion of the trial, thanks to a recent Florida Supreme Court decision which permitted (with certain restrictions) electronic media to record judicial proceedings. Officers Chandler and Granger objected to the coverage and were found guilty as charged.


[Chandler v. Florida (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
The Court found no constitutional violation in this case. Chief Justice Burger first denied Chandler's and Granger's claim that the Court's holding in Estes v. Texas (1964) regarded television cameras in the courtroom as offensive to due process. State experimentation with "evolving technology" in the courtroom, as long as it does not infringe on "fundamental guarantees" of the accused, is consistent with the Constitution. Furthermore, Florida's policy was implemented with strict guidelines intended to protect the right of a defendant to a fair trial. For example, the state required its courts to protect certain witnesses from the "glare of publicity" and to hear and consider arguments from a defendant who feels that electronic coverage may bias the jury.


[American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enact mandatory nationwide standards to govern workplace safety. On December 26, 1978, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a proposal to change the federal standard regarding cotton dust exposure. There was a 90-day comment period followed by a series of hearings over the course of two weeks. After the hearings, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond J. Donovan, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health risk that warranted the adoption of the new standard. The new standard required a mix of engineering controls, such as the installation of pieces of equipment, along with work practice controls, and required these changes within four years. The petitioners, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They argued that the Act required OSHA to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the standard. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA had done everything required by the Act.


[American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that that the language of the Act requires OSHA to engage in feasibility analysis but not a cost-benefit analysis. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress understood that new standards would create significant costs for employers but found the costs necessary to create safe working environments. The Court also held that OSHA reasonably evaluated the cost and feasibility of implementing the standards, and that the decision to implement was supported by substantial evidence.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that OSHA did not have substantial evidence to justify its determination of the cost and therefore did not effectively show that the standard was economically feasible. In his separate dissent, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the Act unconstitutionally delegated policy-making authority from the legislative branch of government to an unelected official in the executive branch. He argued that the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress could not decide exactly how much authority OSHA should have in enacting standards, so the feasibility requirement represented a Congressional compromise rather than a decision. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


[Steagald v. United States (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
On January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds of cocaine.
Steagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


[Steagald v. United States (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevents all warrantless searches of homes unless there are clearly exigent circumstances. Although the officers in this case did have a warrant to arrest Lyons, their warrant did not extend to the search of Steagald’s home, and there was no judicial oversight to determine if there were grounds for such an extension.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment.
Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented and argued that, if the police possess a valid search warrant and believe the subject is in a third party’s residence, they can reasonably execute a search to carry out the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant can serve as a search warrant because it functions to limit the scope of the search. He also argued that the state has a compelling interest in a search because of the inherent mobility of the subject. Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.


[Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
The Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). Burdine possessed several years’ experience, was promoted and was often assigned additional duties. Burdine applied for the supervisor’s position of Project Director, however, she never received a response and the position remained vacant for six months. When the PSC learned it would lose funding unless it appointed a permanent Project Director and completely reorganized the PSC staff, a male employee from another division was hired as Project Director. Three employees, including Burdine, were let go, leaving a male as the only professional employee in the division. The TDCA rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where she received the same salary as the Project Director at PSC. Burdine sued the TDCA and alleged that the failure to promote her and the decision to terminate her were gender discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part because the TDCA bore the burden of proof and did not prove it was more likely than not that the male employee hired or promoted was better qualified than Burdine.


[Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Lewis P. Powell, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that the defendant bears the burden of proof to clearly explain the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions in a gender discrimination case and can do so by introducing the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection. In this case, the TDCA was not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Burdine and also was not required to prove by objective evidence that the person hired was more qualified than Burdine. The Court held that employers should have discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based on unlawful criteria; therefore, the TDCA was not required to hire a minority or female applicant when that person’s objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant.


[Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a "good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a "personal philosophical choice" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.


[Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Burger, the Court held that the Review Board's denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana wrongfully used Thomas' struggle to "articulate" his religious beliefs as grounds to call his decision merely "philosophical." The Court's decisions in _ Everson v. Board of Education_ and Sherbert v. Verner had established that "[a] person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program." In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the free exercise clause did not require a "State to provide direct financial assistance to persons solely on the basis of their religious beliefs."


[United States v. Morrison (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Facts]
Hazel Morrison was indicted for distributing heroin and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to the agents about the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.


[United States v. Morrison (1981) — Burger Court (1975-1981) — Conclusion]
Yes. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for the Court unanimously reversing the Third Circuit's decision. For sake of argument, the Court granted that Morrison's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, but held that this did not merit the dismissal of all charges since the conduct of the agents did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. The Court maintained that Sixth Amendment violations should not be remedied beyond the scope of the harm they inflicted upon the defendant.