Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz

Several faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that the procedures leading to the Horowitz’s dismissal for academic deficiencies did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Horowitz was fully informed of the faculty dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the threat of postponing her graduation and continued enrollment. The Court held that a hearing before the school’s decision-making body is not required for dismissals for academic deficiencies.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he added that Horowitz was dismissed for academic deficiencies rather than for disciplinary reasons, and that in these circumstances she was accorded due process.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the various meetings about Horowitz’s academic performance met the standards of procedural due process. However, the procedure of dismissal for academic reasons, rather than disciplinary reasons was arbitrary. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, with whom Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined, wrote that Horowitz received the procedural process due under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Court should not decide what the further appropriate procedures are required in graduate school dismissals.


Carl M. Layman, III
Anthony G. Amsterdam

An Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death.

Yes. The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required, in all but the rarest capital cases, that sentencers not be precluded from considering a range of mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty. These factors included any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense proffered as a reason for a sentence less than death. The Court held that the Ohio statute did not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Constitution.


Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City

Leonard J. Koerner
Daniel M. Gribbon
Patricia Wald

The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as "landmarks" or "landmark sites." Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it.

No. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York's objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to "enhance" the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.


Beth Israel Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board

Robert Chandler
Laurence Stephen Gold
Louis Chandler
Norton J. Come

Beth Israel Hospital, a nonprofit hospital, had a rule that prohibited employees from soliciting and distributing literature except in sanctioned areas such as certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. An employee distributing a pro-union newsletter in the employee cafeteria was informed that she had violated the rule and was warned of possible dismissal if she continued. The union filed a claim against the hospital under the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1974 was extended to employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions. After a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Administrative Law Judge, who resolves disputes between government agencies and persons affected by the decision of the agencies, held that the hospital cannot interfere with the employees' rights and must rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop. The hospital appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the part of the lower court's ruling that called for rescinding the rule that excluded union activity in eating facilities.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, since 1974, the Act provided employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions with the right to self-organize and bargain collectively, including the right to communicate about the topic at the jobsite. However, an employer may curb that right by showing that special circumstances necessitate the prohibition of communication in order to maintain production or discipline. In this case, the Court held that the communication and organizing in the cafeteria and the coffee shop did not interfere with patient care sufficiently to justify enforcement of the hospital's rule.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the Board's broad order may not fully appreciate the delicate nature of a hospital's communal space and the patients' need to recover in a stress-free environment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Justice Powell criticized the Board's use of the precedent case, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, in reaching its decision. He asserted that Republic's holding that solicitation during work hours were presumptively invalid was inapplicable in the context of this case given the distinct nature of a hospital as a recovery place and also that the employees lacked meeting space within the hospital. Chief Justice Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.


Litigation challenging the conditions in the Arkansas prison system began in 1969. In evaluating the diet and sleeping arrangements of the inmates, the physical condition of cells, and the behavior of prison guards (some of whom were inmates who had been issued guns), a District Court called the conditions which inmates were forced to face "a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world." This case involved a challenge to the practice of "punitive isolation" in Arkansas prisons which was often done for indiscriminate periods of time in crowded windowless cells.

The Court held that punitive isolation for longer than thirty days in Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. Justice Stevens conceded that isolation in and of itself was not necessarily unconstitutional and may in fact serve an important, legitimate interest in administering a prison. However, when taken as a whole, continued Stevens, the conditions in Arkansas's prisons, combined with the severe risks to an inmate's health and safety which accompanied confinement in isolation, did constitute cruel and unusual punishment. "A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'gruel' might be tolerated for a few days and be intolerably cruel for weeks or months," Stevens concluded.


Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana

In its licensing system for elk-hunters, the state of Montana required nonresidents to pay a substantially higher fee than residents for a hunting permit.

The Court affirmed the right of Montana to charge higher fees for out-of-state elk hunters. Justice Blackmun found that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only applied to activities which bear "on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity." Since elk hunting is a recreational activity and not fundamental to the survival of nonresidents of Montana, Blackmun argued that it did not fall within the scope of the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. "Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union," he concluded.


Lawrence G. Wallace
D. Dennis Allegretti

A catalytic converter is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (“alarm limits”) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not “wholly pre-empt” the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection.

No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, absent some other novel or inventive concept in the individual’s application for a patent, activity that results from the solution of a formula or algorithm cannot transform the formula from an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that the method for updating alarm limits did not lose its eligibility for patent protection merely because one step in the method was not patentable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined the dissenting opinion.


Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights conditional on the surrender of religious rights and therefore violated the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court hesitated to strike down a statute that had such a long and vital national history, Tennessee could not prove that clergy participation was dangerous to the modern political processes.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Tennessee statute essentially established a test of religious conviction in order to be eligible for office that disqualified anyone with a strong enough belief to join the clergy. Government imposition of the burden to choose between one’s religious beliefs and the desire to seek office is an unconstitutional restriction on the free exercise of religion. He argued that the Establishment Clause does not give the government the power to discriminate against religious persons seeking or holding office. Justice Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.

 Justice Potter Stewart separately concurred in the judgment, and wrote that this case was covered by the ruling in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court held that states may not condition public office on any type of religious belief.

Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He argued that, rather than violating the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the statute is specific to ministers, it implies that ministers are less able to keep outside interests from interfering with their governmental service than anyone else. Tennessee was not able to prove the necessity of this restriction.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


Channel Islands National Monument is a nationally designated area off the coast of California, including Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands. In 1949, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation that extended the boundary of the National Monument within one nautical mile of the islands.

Yes. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart determined that under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 after the 1947 United States v. California decision, Congress specified that the lands in dispute were under California's control.


W. Eric Collins
Robert K. Booth, Jr.
Jerome B. Falk, Jr.

In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant.

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "third party" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been "satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises." The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution "did not forbid warrants where the press was involved."


Estelle Jacobs was accused of threatening to harm a man who owed a substantial gambling debt to her employer, a collections agency. Unbeknownst to her, the phone call in which she made the threat was recorded. The Federal Bureau of Investigations contacted Jacobs and informed of her Miranda rights during questioning about the incident. About nine months later, Jacobs was called before a grand jury via a subpoena regarding the threatening statements she had previously made. She did not have an attorney present, but she was read her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. During her trial, Jacobs denied having made the phone call, the tape of the recorded phone call was played, and she was subsequently indicted. The district court dismissed the indictment and held that a witness in a trial who is a potential defendant should be informed of that potential upon taking the witness stand and is entitled to full Miranda warnings under those circumstances.

Unanswered. In a per curiam decision, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.


Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation

Louis F. Claiborne
Joseph A. Marino
Harry M. Plotkin

During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.

No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."


Kelvin H. Booty, Jr.
William Bennett Turner

KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media.

No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."


Alvin Altman
A. Seth Greenwald
Martin A. Schwartz

On June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she did not settle her account within 10 days.

Ms. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen’s Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the decision of the storage facility to sell the goods could not be considered a state action, and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. To show that they had a claim worthy of relief, the respondents must have given evidence that they were denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and that Flagg Bros., Inc. was operating as the State of New York. The Court held that there was no deprivation of a Constitutional right, as the Constitution only protects against state seizure of property, not that of private actors. The Court also held that the statute that allows the sale to happen does not imply any state action, so Flagg Bros., Inc. was not acting on behalf of the state.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the statute allowed for unconstitutional discrimination against the poor, who were unable to pay the required fee in order to prevent the sale of their belongings. He also argued that the Court’s determination ignored the realities of the state’s role in eviction and subsequent legal procedures.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the company’s right to conduct the sale derived from the state, and not the original property owners, so the sale must be held to the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that state authorization of a “nonconsensual resolution of conflict between debtor and creditor” is the type of action that the Due Process Clause was meant to prevent. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not take part in the consideration or decision of the case.


Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus

In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.

The Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it "substantially altered" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was "severe" as it nullified terms of t he company's obligations to its employees and imposed an "unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.


A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had "overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons."


United States Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission

In 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.

The Court found no constitutional violation. The Compact did not enhance state political power at the expense of the United States; it not confer to states powers which they did not already possess; it did not involve any delegation of state power to the Commission. Furthermore, argued Justice Powell, each state was free to withdraw from the group at any time.


On June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall moved for the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a single lawyer representing multiple defendants does not automatically deprive the defendants of their rights, but it does if there is a conflict of interest. Because Hall showed that a conflict of interest was present, the trial court should have taken steps to appoint separate counsel or ensured that the risk of conflict was not great enough to require such action. The trial court did neither, so the defendants were deprived of their Sixth Amendment rights. The Court also held that, in such situations, the reversal of the conviction is automatic.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that the trial court’s failure to investigate the defense counsel’s claim that the interests of his clients conflict does not rise to level of a constitutional violation requiring reversal of the verdict. He argued that the majority’s opinion is based on the assumption that the jury will be prejudiced rather than on any evidence of a conflict. Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


Regents of the University of California v. Bakke

Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.


City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart

A class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out of the employee’s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men.

The women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Yes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the company’s policy was based on aggregate numbers that are not necessarily true for individuals, which violates the Civil Rights Act prohibition of individual discrimination based purely on gender. Although the department argued that that the policy was based on longevity rather than gender, the Court held that many different factors influence longevity and the payment differential was solely gender-based. The Court held that the department was not liable for back pay because the potential that such a holding would influence other companies to change their policies did not offset the potential negative impact on the economy.

 In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the decision of the majority departed from the precedents set by Geduldig v. Aiello and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert without sufficient reasoning. He concurred in the part of the majority’s decision that held the department not liable for back pay.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that Congress did not intend the Civil Rights Act to impede a business’ ability to create policies based on statistically sound longevity data. Since any individual woman is statistically likely to live longer than any individual man, the policy did not discriminate against individuals solely on the basis of sex but rather based on the likelihood of longevity. He concurred in the majority’s decision that held the department not liable for back pay. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined the dissent.

Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in the majority’s decision that held that the department’s policy violated the Civil Rights Act, but he argued that the department should be held liable for back pay. The district court held the department liable, and the majority’s decision did not find any flaws in the district court’s reasoning.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.


Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan

Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL) allegedly distributed false and misleading press releases regarding its business activities. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised its authority ostensibly under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, suspending the trading of securities of the company for 10 days. The SEC exercised this authority repeatedly, resulting in suspension of the trading of the stock of CJL for over a year.

Samuel H. Sloan owned 13 shares of CJL and was engaged in "substantial" purchases and short sales of the stock when it was suspended. He filed a lawsuit against the SEC alleging, among other claims, that it exceeded its authority under § 12(k) to issue consecutive suspension orders. Notably, Sloan represented himself in the courts below, as well as before the US Supreme Court.

The issue presented is not moot because the source of the injury "is capable of repetition, yet evading review." On the merits, § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not grant the Commission authority to issue a series of summary orders that would suspend trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day period, absent additional circumstances warranting such action. Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion that was unanimous as to the judgment.

As to the question of mootness, the Court's precedent provides that a case is not moot when "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Because of the historic practices of CJL, of which Sloan still owns stock, it remains likely that the SEC will again suspend trading of its shares, creating a "reasonable expectation of recurring injury" to Sloan.

As to the merits, the Court first looked to the language of § 12(k), which provides that the SEC may "summarily to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten days." The Court found that the SEC's interpretation of this provision as permitting redetermination every 10 days under a single set of circumstances was "not the most logical or logical one." Moreover, the power to suspend, effectively indefinitely, the trading of a company's stock is "an awesome power, with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its shareholders, and other investors." Such power may only arise from a "clear mandate from Congress," which § 12(k) does not provide. The Court concluded that "Congress did not intend the Commission to have the power to extend the length of suspensions under § 12(k) at all, much less to repeatedly extend such suspensions without any hearing."

Justice William Brennan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thurgood Marshall joined. Justice Harry Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.


In February 1974, 18-years-olds Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert were seriously injured when an uninsured motorist hit the vehicle McClintock was driving in their hometown of Montville, Ohio. When Albert Ohralik, a local attorney, learned of the accident, he visited McClintock in the hospital and offered to represent her in exchange for a portion of the proceeds collected from her insurer. Ohralik also approached Holbert at her home and obtained her oral assent to representation, which he secretly tape-recorded. Both women eventually discharged Ohralik and filed grievances with the local bar association, which in turn filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Board). The Board found that Ohralik violated provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that banned a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of employment to a non-lawyer and publicly reprimanded him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Ohralik’s claim that his conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and increased the sanction against Ohralik to indefinite suspension.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a state may constitutionally discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person and for financial gain under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent. The Court further held that the state need not show actual harm or injury to the solicited clients to sustain a disciplinary action. Unlike other forms of advertising concerning the terms and availability of legal services, in-person solicitation often exerts pressure upon and requires an immediate response from the recipient, without providing time for comparison or reflection. Because the Court held that a state has a particularly strong interest in preventing aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and overreach, a state may adopt an outright ban in order to maintain standards in the legal profession.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt as to whether the state’s interest in prohibiting even honest, unpressured commercial solicitation justified the restriction on the free flow of information. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that Ohio acted within the limits prescribed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but argued that the Court should grant even greater leeway in the ability of state bar associations to regulate the conduct of their members.


Susan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the statute as "overbroad."

No. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court reversed the District Court and held that states could be justified in barring aliens from certain positions in government. Justice Lewis F. Powell's majority opinion asserted the state's interest in charging teachers with "an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of the subject taught." The statute furthered this interest, in that it affected only non-citizens who did not want to seek citizenship. This interest satisfied the "rational relationship" required by _Foley v. Connelie


On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation.

Brown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment covers all police seizures, even those as brief as preventing a person from walking away. The Fourth Amendment requires that such seizures be based on specific and objective facts that create a compelling public interest in the seizure that outweighs the individual’s expectation of privacy. In this case, the Court held that the police officers lacked any reasonable suspicion based on objective fact to allow them to detain Brown and question him. Since the seizure was not lawful, the Texas statute requiring Brown to identify himself did not apply.


Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program.

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would "substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice," a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; "only reckless error will be discouraged," which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.


Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.

A plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning "the central premise of Argersinger."


A New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the Town Justice, who determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, “the following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation” and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, the store’s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal.

Yes as to the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not permit a search with an open-ended warrant that left the determination of what was obscene fully in the discretion of the officials conducting the search. The Court also held that the search was not justified under the theory that the store owner had no legitimate expectation of privacy because the items were displayed at a store open to the general public. Merely inviting the public to enter does not give consent to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to the Fourth Amendment.


A West Virginia statute made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without approval of juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.

Yes. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that governmental attempts to restrict the publication of truthful information "seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." As long as the information is lawfully obtained, as it was in this case involving a shooting at a junior high school, the state cannot restrict a newspaper from publishing a juvenile offender's name unless the restriction serves a substantial state interest. No such interest was present in this case.


Burch was found guilty by a nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.

The Court found that convictions by the nonunanimous six-member jury violated the Constitution. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by nonunanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This "near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.


Mitchell J. Sikora, Jr.
Robert W. Hagopian

After he collided with a motorcycle in Acton, Massachusetts, Donald Montrym was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). A state court later dismissed the DUI charges, but the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspended Montrym’s driver’s license for ninety days because Montrym had refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the statute that required drivers to submit to breathalyzer tests violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not provide for a pre-suspension hearing. The district court found in favor of Montrym and ordered the Registrar to return the plaintiffs’ licenses. The Registrar appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the lower court erred in finding that the Massachusetts statute deprived Montrym of his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process. In the Court’s view, Massachusetts’ interest in highway safety and administrative efficiency outweighed Montrym’s interest in his driver’s license. Furthermore, the possibility for a prompt, post-suspension hearing before the Registrar minimized the risk of erroneous deprivation.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he characterized the statute as inducing drivers to submit to a breath analysis test, which in turn provided the police with credible evidence of drunk driving. He argued that the interest in preventing drunk driving did not trump an individual’s right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of his driver’s license. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Local police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.

Yes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since "luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects" it is "associated with the expectation of privacy."


New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 6 to 3 majority, held that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." Warrantless arrests and searches went to the core of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in a citizen's dwelling. This protection was too important to be violated on the basis of a police officer's on-the-spot decision regarding probable cause. In the absence of special circumstances, a search of a residence is permissible only after a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate issuing a search warrant. Justice Byron R. White, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissented. White maintained that common law and practice prior to and at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted did not limit a police officer's inherent power to arrest or search.


This case supplements Elkins v. Moreno, in which Juan Carlos Moreno and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Elkins v. Moreno, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown.

On June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given the new resolution.

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the University of Maryland’s resolution effectively changed the constitutional basis for consideration. In the previous case, the issue was linked to whether the nonimmigrant aliens could be domiciled in the state. In view of the new resolution, the domicile issue is no longer paramount. The Court held that there were new issues that must be considered by a district court before the case makes its way to the Supreme Court docket.


Curtis Parham's child and the child's mother were killed in a car accident. Parham was never married to the child's mother, but he signed the child's birth certificate and provided financial support. Parham never legitimated his child as available under Georgia law. After the child's death, Parham attempted to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his illegitimate child. A Georgia statute barred fathers from bringing wrongful death actions on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court held that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, finding that the classification involved was reasonably related to legitimate state interests.

No. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the law does not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process clause. Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority deciding that the statute did not invidiously discriminate because legitimacy is not an immutable characteristic. The law is also rationally related to the state interest in avoiding the difficulties in proving paternity of illegitimate children in wrongful death actions. Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred in the judgment but felt the proper level of scrutiny was that a law must be substantially related to an important governmental interest.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent stating that the statute discriminates on the basis of sex by requiring unmarried fathers to take additional measures not required of unwed mothers in order to prove the legitimacy of his parenthood. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


William and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed.

Yes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court established its jurisdiction over the question and ruled that Alabama's statutes were unconstitutional. In writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. maintained that under the Equal Protection Clause, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives." The Court rejected several objectives proposed by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, holding that gender was not an "accurate proxy" for financial need. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens each wrote concurring opinions.


In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the "nonsense" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss.

No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the legislature's "deliberative process."


Phylis Skloot Bamberger
Mr. Andrew L. Frey

A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.

No. The Court found that that the conditions of confinement did not infringe upon a pretrial detainee's rights. Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that the issue of prison management is ripe with "judgment calls" which rest outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As long as administrative practices are implemented in the genuine interest of "safeguarding institutional security" then they do not warrant judicial scrutiny and are consistent with the Constitution.


The Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse.  The Sims moved to modify the Harris County court order granting custody to the state.  When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed a writ of habeas corpus.  The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County.  Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas’ child custody laws.

The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws.  The court held that abstention under Younger v Harris was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation.  The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision.  Under Younger v Harris, a federal court must abstain from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court.  The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

No.  In a 5-4 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court.  The Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction while the state law claims were pending.  There was no indication that the state court would be unable to reach the constitutional issues themselves.  Also allowing the state case to constitute did not cause any irreparable injury to the Sims, so there was no reason for ignoring Younger.

Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, stating that the Sims clearly did not have the opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims in state court, so there the district court acted properly.  Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney

A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores.

No. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefitted from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that "veteran status is not uniquely male." Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.


Police arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder.  Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses.  Before questioning, policed informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966).  Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available.  Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused.  During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder.

At trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning.  The trial court denied the motion.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney.

No.  In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing the state court.  The Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s request for a probation officer does not invoke the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.  A court must look at the totality of the circumstances in each case to determine whether a juvenile waived that right.  In this case, Michael knowingly waived his right to remain silent, so all evidence obtained during the police questioning is admissible in court.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that Miranda requires police questioning to stop whenever a juvenile requests an adult who represents his interests.  The case-by-case approach does not provide police with adequate guidance for future procedure.  Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.  Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, expressing that police subjected Michael to a coercive interrogation.


Peter Megaree Brown
Earl H. Nemser
Doris Peterson
Elinor Hadley Stillman
Melvin L. Wulf

These are two consolidated cases.  For 77-1546, in 1972, U. S. Attorney William Stafford, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida Stuart Carrouth, and Department of Justice Attorney Guy Goodwin conducted a grand jury investigation into a conspiracy to cause a riot in Florida. Respondents were among the group subpoenaed to appear and testify. During the course of the proceedings, Goodwin stated under oath that there were no government agents in the witness lineup called by respondents’ counsel. Respondents later sued Stafford, Carrouth, Goodwin, and FBI Agent Claude Meadow in their individual and official capacities for falsely testifying and conspiring to deprive the respondents of statutory rights. Respondents sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where Goodwin resided. The petitioners requested a transfer to the Northern District of Florida or a dismissal based on improper venue. The district court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the venue was proper because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia.

For 78-393, from 1953 until 1973, CIA agents regularly opened and photocopied mail going through the International Airport in New York to and from the Soviet Union. In 1975, respondents sued on their behalf and on the behalf of others whose mail had been opened by the CIA. Respondents sued in the district court of Rhode Island and alleged that the interference with their mail constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Petitioners moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. The district court denied these motions but certified the case for an immediate appeal. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions as they relate to petitioners employed by the CIA at the time of filing, but reversed as to the officials who had left their government positions at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals held that the venue was proper because one of the petitioners resided in Rhode Island.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the language of the statute clearly indicated that Congress meant to restrict the applicability of the statute to employees currently employed by the government at the time of filing. Additionally, the legislative history of the statute shows Congress’ desire to restrict civil actions against governmental officials to those acting in their official capacity. Congress only allowed governmental officials to be sued nominally in their individual capacity in order to circumvent some vestiges of sovereign immunity. The Court held that, regardless of the venue, the case must be essentially against the United States government, rather than against officers in their individual capacities.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent and argued that the Act unambiguously allowed civil suits to be brought against government employees in their individual capacities to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity. He argued that the legislative history supported a broader reading of what the Act allows in civil suits against government officers. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.

Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the decision of this case.


A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.


Davis, a former employee of Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman, charged Passman with violating her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Prior to the time of her firing Passman wrote a note explaining that, even though he knew Davis as an "able, energetic, and a hard, hard worker", he preferred a man to work in her position. The Court of Appeals ruled that Davis had no civil remedies under the Fifth Amendment due process requirement.

Yes. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) and Butz v. Economou (1978), the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case, Passman violated Davis's rights through sexual discrimination. The Court added that Passman's actions and words did not constitute protected speech and that a damage remedy provided a ready mechanism for remedial action.


On March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give the police a description of the robber and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her.

In pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protections are only relevant if the individual believes that the government has infringed on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonable expectation of privacy does not apply to the numbers recorded by a pen register because those numbers are used in the regular conduct of the phone company's business, a fact of which individuals are aware. Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to information that is voluntarily given to third parties, the telephone numbers that are regularly and voluntarily provided to telephone companies by their customers do not gain Fourth Amendment protections.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that a person who uses a telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of call. Because the telephone numbers dialed also contain information relating to the content of the call, that information is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority opinion's analysis depends on an individual's choice to voluntarily turn over information, but that choice is not valid if no practical alternative exists. He wrote that no citizen should be forced to accept government monitoring of the phone numbers he dials simply by registering a phone with a telephone company. Such government intrusion on telephone records could impede the exercise of free speech or political affiliation. Therefore phone records should be subject to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Justice Brennan also joined in the dissent.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber

Michael R. Fontham
Michael H. Gottesman
Lawrence G. Wallace
Noyes Thompson Powers

The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.

No. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act "did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.


Lester V. Chalmers, Jr.
R. Gene Braswell

An FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler his rights under Miranda v Arizona after arresting him on a federal warrant.  At Butler’s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an “Advice of Rights” form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood his rights.  Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicated that he would like to talk to the officer.  Butler did not ask for an attorney.  Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced as evidence at trial.  Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion.  The court held that Butler had effectively waived his right to an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that he understood his rights.  The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements made under interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights.

No.  In a 5-3 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that Miranda did not require adopting an inflexible per se rule.  Also, 10 of 11 U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that express waiver is not necessary.  It is up to the lower court to determine whether Butler impliedly waived his rights.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence, stating that he assumed the court did not rely on the “intentional relinquishment of a known right” formula from earlier Supreme Court precedent.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that an express waiver is required under Miranda.  Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.  Justice Lewis F. Powell did not participate.


E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.
Frank C. Jones

Vineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”). Under the PCUS’s hierarchical structure, the actions of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order.

On May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville’s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission’s inquiry.

The minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville’s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia’s “neutral principles of law” approach to church property disputes, found for the majority faction. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction’s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require Georgia state courts to defer to the Augusta-Macon Presbytery commission’s ruling in the Vineville church property dispute. Justice Blackman examined the history of Georgia’s approach to church property litigation. Georgia eventually arrived at a “neutral principles of law” method for resolving church property disputes. As applied to the PCUS, this required examining the deeds to the properties in question, state statutes dealing with implied trusts, and the Book of Church Order. The trial court would then determine whether there was a basis for a trust in favor of the general church.

Here, the trial court did not discover any language in the Book of Church Order implying a trust in favor of the general church. While acknowledging that the First Amendment severely limits the role civil courts play in resolving property disputes, Justice Blackmun held that Georgia’s approach was constitutional. The neutral principles of law approach required courts to use objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law, leaving courts free from entanglement in religious doctrinal questions.

While Georgia’s approach was constitutional on its face, Justice Blackmun could not determine from the facts whether Georgia courts applied the method constitutionally. While the respondent argued that Georgia applied a presumptive rule of majority representation -- as opposed to a rule of deference to church governments -- neither the Supreme Court of Georgia nor the trial court explicitly stated that it was using this rule. Consequently, Justice Blackmun remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of Georgia could definitively determine whether this rule was the law of Georgia.

Justice Louis Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White. He characterized the dispute not as one over the ownership of property but rather over which faction in Vineville’s congregation has the right to control the use of that property. Justice Powell argued that disputes over church property almost invariably arise out of disagreements regarding doctrine and practice. Consequently, state courts should defer to decisions made within the structure of church governments in any case involving an intrachurch dispute, even when the dispute is over church property.


Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex

Ralph H. Gillan
William Alsup
Brian K. Ridenour

The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.

Yes and yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, although there is no constitutional right to an inmate’s release from prison prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, the specific wording of the Nebraska statute created a constitutionally protected expectation of parole. The Court further held that the Parole Board’s procedures were adequate and reversed the prescribed modifications from the Court of Appeals.

In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reasoned that a state’s establishment of a parole problem, regardless of the specific wording of the statute, triggered a right to procedural due process. Justice Powell agreed that the Court of Appeal’s recommendations were unnecessary, but he argued that the Parole Board should provide inmates with at least 72 hours notice of their hearing date.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a right to due process. In his view, the Parole Board should provide the inmates with reasonable notice of their hearing dates and a written statement of the reasons underlying adverse decisions.


J. U. Blacksher
Charles S. Rhyne
James P. Turner
Eric Schnapper
William H. Allen
James U. Blacksher

Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden.

No. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not entail "the right to have Negro candidates elected," and that only purposefully discriminatory denials of the freedom to vote on the basis of race demanded constitutional remedies. The Court also found that multimember legislative districts were not unconstitutional per se; such legislative apportionments only violated the Fourteenth Amendment if they were "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial. . .discrimination." In short, the Court held that facially neutral actions were unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes.


Lee M. Nation
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Nanette Laughrey

A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery.  Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community.  Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request.  While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women.  Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women.  The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics.  The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.

Yes.  Justice Byron R. White, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the state court and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that Duren’s statistical evidence sufficiently proved that Jackson County’s jury selection process violated his constitutional rights.  Duren showed an underrepresented “distinctive” group resulting from Jackson County’s practice of exempting women.  Also, there was no significant state interest to justify exempting women from jury service.  Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly used an combination of the Due Process clause and Equal Protection clause to make their decision.


Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.

No. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Byron R. White, the Court emphasized the distinction between the Civil Service and Foreign Service, and the "special attention" paid to the Foreign Service by Congress. The Court interpreted the purpose of Section 632 to be the encouragement of the "highest performance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities for promotion would be available," a legitimate interest that justified the distinction. The Court also recognized the possibility that service in the Foreign Service would be more rigorous than service in the Civil Service. Given that possibility, Congress had a "reasonable basis" for enacting the statute, satisfying the rationality standard set forth in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.


New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer

Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.

No and no. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Transit Authority's policy was not unconstitutional or illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described Beazer's statistical argument as "weak", as the 81 percent statistic did not relate to methadone users specifically. The Court recognized the public safety interest in keeping narcotics users from working for NYTA. The narcotics rule was an allowable policy choice made by NYTA, and any specific exemption for methadone users from the narcotics rule would have been "costly" and "imprecise." Justice Lewis Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself.

At trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.

The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under Brown. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal.

 Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the police violated Dunaway’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by picking him up and taking him to the police station to be questioned without probable cause. Because picking someone up for questioning involves an intrusion on par with that of an arrest, it is held to the standard of “probable cause” rather than the lower standard of “reasonable suspicion.” The Court also held that the confession stemmed directly from the illegal questioning, and without an intervening event, the confession should have been considered tainted evidence and not allowed into evidence at trial.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the key principle of the Fourth Amendment was the balancing of competing interests. He wrote that, while there must be general rules for police conduct, cases should be considered based on their individual facts. In this case, the questioning was too close to an arrest to fit any other criteria.

In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that an illegal arrest is only relevant to determining the voluntariness of a confession if it can be shown that the conduct of the illegal arrest was what motivated the confession.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that not all interactions between citizens and police officers are seizures of persons. Because Dunaway willingly accompanied officers to the police station, his time at the police station could not be deemed a seizure. He also argued that, because the police acted in good faith and gave Dunaway the Miranda warnings, his statements and drawings should be considered voluntary and admissible. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" specified by the Act meant one who meets all the program's requirements "in spite of his handicap" as opposed to "in every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap." Even with an improved hearing aid, Davis still required lip-reading to understand speech, and therefore was not "otherwise qualified." Since Davis could not be admitted to Southeastern's program without substantial changes to admission requirements, Davis' rejection did not constitute unlawful discrimination.


Frank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights.

The standard of proof in a civil confinement case requires a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence, but not as high as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the use of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence standard in a jury instruction in a civil commitment case was proper. Because of the importance of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in criminal proceedings, the Court was weary of requiring the same standard for civil proceedings. Furthermore, this case involved psychiatric evaluation, which was not considered reliable evidence. A “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement in cases involving mental diagnosis may be too high a burden for the state to reach. Therefore, the middle ground of requiring a “clear and convincing” standard of proof was appropriate.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration or or decision of the case.


Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.

In 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston’s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader’s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent.

Wolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a “public figure” and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that Wolston met neither of the requirements to be considered a public figure. Wolston was not a figure of “persuasive power and influence,” nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of popular controversy. The Court held that an individual does not become a public figure merely by attracting public attention, and such individuals should not lose the protection afforded to private individuals.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the majority’s decision defined “public figure” too narrowly, but the intervening years between Wolston’s publicity and the libelous statement sufficed to consider him a private citizen. Blackmun argued that the timing of the potentially libelous statement relative to the event that brought about public scrutiny of an individual is relevant in libel cases. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent and argued that, because the issue of Soviet espionage remained a relevant issue in 1974, the intervening years did not diminish Wolston’s status as a public figure. He also wrote that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.


Garrick F. Cole
Brian A. Riley
Joseph J. Balliro
John H. Henn

A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure "for good cause shown."

The Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.


Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an "unabated buildup" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.

The Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had "an affirmative constitutional duty" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred.


Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm.  Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers.  The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA).  The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress.  The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress.  A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation.  On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination.  The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.

No.  Chief Justice Warren Burger, in a 5-4 decision, wrote the majority opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit.  The Supreme Court held that the FMA did not did not require the district court to independently review disputed testimony.  Also, the FMA did not violate the Constitution.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the statute in question does not threaten judicial power or independence in judicial decision making.

Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a partial dissent, stating that a district court must rehear evidence when credibility is at issue.  Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that the FMA clearly requires a district court to rehear evidence when a party objects to a magistrate’s recommendation.  Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.  Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a separate dissent, expressing that use of the the FMA was impermissible in this case under the Fifth Amendment and Article III.


In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.

No. The Court held that states participating in the Medicaid program were not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions under Title XIX. The Court found that a woman's freedom of choice did not carry with it "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." The Court ruled that because the Equal Protection Clause was not a source of substantive rights and because poverty did not qualify as a "suspect classification," the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions of the statute with tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not constitute an establishment of religion.