John Watkins was charged with attempting armed robbery of a liquor store in Louisville, Kentucky. He was arrested based on the identification of two witnesses. One of those witnesses identified Watkins as the gunman two days later in a lineup, and later that same day, the police took Watkins to the other witness’s hospital bed where he identified Watkins as the shooter. At the trial, both witnesses identified Watkins as the shooter. Watkins, along with two other witnesses, testified he was at a pool hall at the time of the shooting. Watkins was convicted, and on appeal he argued that the trial court had a constitutional obligation to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether the identification evidence was admissible, but the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected the argument. Watkins then sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ and held that a failure to hold a pretrial hearing does not require the reversal of a conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state criminal court to conduct a hearing out of the jury’s presence whenever a defendant contends that a witness’ identification was improper. The reliability of the identification evidence determines its admissibility, which can be evaluated under the trial judge’s jury instructions and the Due Process Clause is satisfied when the defendant is given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness to test the reliability of the identification. The Court held that while it is advisable for there to be a judicial determination of admissibility of identification evidence, it is not required.


Daniel C. Cathcart
James M. Fitzsimons
Warner W. Gardner

(This summary was prepared by Tom Feledy.)

A British company, flying an airplane manufactured by Piper, a Pennsylvania company, equipped with propellers made by Hartzell, an Ohio company, conducted a charter flight in Scotland for five Scottish citizens. When the plane crashed, killing all on board, the next of kin, also Scottish, had a Los Angeles-based lawyer sue Piper and Hartzell for wrongful death. The suit was filed in a California state court, then removed to Federal District Court in California, and finally transferred to Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. There it was dismissed for forum non conveniens under the determination that the case should be tried in Scotland: the crash had occurred, the crash investigation had been conducted there by British authorities, and the pilot's estate, the plane's owners, and the charter company were all located there. However, respondents successfully appealed, claiming that substantive law in Scotland would be unfavorable to their case. Scotland, unlike Pennsylvania, had no strict liability law, which, along with negligence, respondents were relying upon in order to prevail.

No. In a 4-3 majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the District Court properly weighed private and public interests using the Gulf Oil v. Gilbert test to determine that the trial should be held in Scotland. The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry. Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate.


Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan

Joe Hogan, a registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to the Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing's baccalaureate program on the basis of sex. Created by a state statute in 1884, MUW was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the United States.

Yes. The Court held that the state did not provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-based distinction. The state's primary argument, that the policy constituted educational affirmative action for women, was "unpersuasive" to the Court since women traditionally have not lacked opportunities to enter nursing. If anything, argued Justice O'Connor, the statute "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively women's job."


In 1978, a Washington police officer stopped a student at the Washington State University after observing the student was carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin. The officer asked for identification. The student, accompanied by the officer, then went into his dormitory to retrieve proof of age. After the student had entered his room, the officer noticed that the student's roommate, Chrisman, had marijuana seeds and a pipe on his desk. Chrisman was subsequently charged with the possession of marijuana and LSD.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permitted law enforcement officers to seize clearly incriminating evidence discovered "in a place where the officer has a right to be." The Court held that the officer had a right to remain at the initial suspect's elbow at all times, and did not waive his right to custodial control because he hesitated briefly in the doorway of the dormitory room before entering. In short, the officer had obtained lawful access to an individual's area of privacy and was free to seize incriminating evidence.


The island of Vieques lay six miles off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. Vieques’ population of 8,000 mostly lived in two coastal towns and in a rural area outside of those two towns. Of a total area of approximately 33,000 acres, the United States Navy owned 25,231.72 acres, slightly more than 76% of the island.

The Navy’s installations on the eastern part of Vieques were part of a large military complex known as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility, headquartered at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. This consisted of four firing ranges; the outer range was a large area of ocean thirty-five miles to the north and twenty miles to the south of Vieques. Two separate inland areas were used for artillery training, strafing, air-to-ground bombing, and simulating close air support; no targets existed in the area between the eastern border of these areas and Punta Este, the easternmost point of Vieques. During air-to-ground training, however, pilots sometimes accidentally discharged ordnance into the navigable waters around Viques.

Carlos Romero-Barceleo was the governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Along with Radamees Tirado Guevara, the mayor of Vieques, and Puerto Rico’s Environmental Quality Board, Romero-Barceleo sought to enjoin the United States Navy from using any part of its lands in Vieques, or in its surrounding waters, to carry out naval training operations. Plaintiffs alleged harm to all residents of Vieques and violations of numerous environmental laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Under the FWPCA, the addition of any pollutant from any point source into the navigable waters of the United States required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit from the Environmental Protection Agency.

The district court acknowledged that the release of ordnance into navigable waters was a discharge of pollutants, but it refused to enjoin Navy operations, instead ordering the Navy to apply for an NPDES permit. The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, reversed. It ordered the Navy to cease operations until it obtained an NPDES permit. It held that the Navy has an absolute statutory obligation to stop any discharges of pollutants until it obtains a permit despite the importance of its operations to the public good.

No. Justice Byron White, writing for the Court in an 8-1 decision, held that the district court was not obligated to enjoin the Navy from operating on and around Vieques island. He emphasized the traditional flexibility of equitable remedies and courts’ responsibility to balance plaintiffs’ need for an injunction with the public utility of the enjoined action. He acknowledged that Congress may control the exercise of courts’ discretion by statute, but distinguished the case from TVA v. Hill, where the Court held that the completion of a dam would violate explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act. Here, an injunction is not the only means of ensuring compliance, as the FWPCA provides remedies in the form of fines and criminal penalties.

Justice White also looked to the legislative history of the FWPCA, determining that Congress did not intend to take away courts’ discretion in issuing injunctions. He also noted that the district court did not find that the Navy’s operations negatively impacted Vieques’ water quality; hence, requiring the Navy to obtain a permit while continuing its operations would meet the FWPCA’s goal of controlling water pollution.

Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred. He agreed that Congress did not intend to take away courts' discretion in ordering injunctions, but would have remanded the case to the First Circuit with instructions to affirm the district court’s decision.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He also agreed that the FWPCA does not specifically command courts to issue an injunction for every unpermitted discharge of a pollutant, but he rejected the Court’s characterization of the First Circuit’s opinion. He argued instead that the First Circuit rightly gave weight to the FWPCA’s permitting structure given the Navy’s ongoing violation of the act.


Eugene D. Berman
Stephen M. Shapiro
Richard W. Hulbert
Russell C. Grimes, Jr.

The MITE Corp, organized under Delaware laws with its principal office in Connecticut, initiated a tender offer for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the target company of its intent to make a tender offer and the terms of the offer 20 days before the offer becomes effective. During that time, the target company, but not the offeror, is free to disseminate information about the offer to the target company's shareholders. In addition, the Secretary of State could call a hearing, and the offer could not proceed until the hearing was completed. Finally, the Secretary of State could deny registration of a takeover offer he or she found inequitable. MITE Corp. sought and won a declaratory judgment holding that the Illinois Act was pre-empted by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), and that it violated the Commerce Clause.

Yes, with regard to the Commerce Clause. The Illinois Act imposes burdens on interstate commerce that are excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports to further. Among the ways a corporation can be covered by the Act is if 10% of the class of equity securities subject to the offer is owned by shareholders located in Illinois. Thus Illinois would have the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed even if made for a corporation incorporated and having a principal place of business outside of Illinois, with up to 90% of the shareholders residing outside of Illinois. Illinois's asserted interest in protecting resident security holders is insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois would impose on interstate commerce. In addition, Illinois's asserted interest in regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated under its laws not only fails to justify the Act's coverage of foreign corporations, but transfers of stock to a third party do not implicate the internal affairs of a corporation.


Robert L. Morrison, Jr.
James W. Haskins

Giles Lugar leased a truckstop from Edmondson Oil Co. and fell behind on his rent payments. Edmondson issued a suit against him in a Virginia state court for failing to repay his debt. Before the court reached a decision, it issued a "writ of attachment" against Lugar. This disabled him from selling any property he owned while the case was open, since Edmondson wanted the property as collateral in case he could not repay his debt. A state trial judge cancelled the "writ of attachment" one month later after finding no statutory justification for its issuance. Lugar claimed that Edmondson worked with the government to deprive him of his property without the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He said this caused him financial loss and sought to recover damages from Edmondson in a District Court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. This code provides rewards to those who have had their rights violated because of "state action." The District Court rejected Lugar's claim because it deemed that no "state action" had occurred. On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected using solely "state action" to validate Section 1983 suits. It claimed that certain instances where private parties acted "under the color of state law" also validated Section 1983 suits. However the Fourth Circuit found that none of these actions occurred in Lugar's case and rejected his suit.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents "state actions" from intruding unlawfully upon the rights of citizens. Section 1983 offers relief to those who have their rights unlawfully abridged by actions occurring "under the color of state law." The Court decided that a state was liable for damages caused by unconstitutional conduct when two conditions were met. First, "the deprivation [of a constitutional right] must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State." Second, "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." This includes both state officials and those whom are significantly aided by them. The Court previously found that the states guaranteed the due process of law when placing holds on disputed pieces of property, and therefore they are responsible for violations of this process. Accordingly, when Edmondson used state mechanisms to unconstitutionally deprive Lugar of his property, the state was responsible for compensating him for damages.


Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico by Pico

The Island Trees Union Free School District's Board of Education (the "Board"), acting contrary to the recommendations of a committee of parents and school staff, ordered that certain books be removed from its district's junior high and high school libraries. In support of its actions, the Board said such books were: "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." Acting through his friend Francis Pico, and on behalf of several other students, Steven Pico brought suit in federal district court challenging the Board's decision to remove the books. The Board won; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The Board petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

Yes. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, held that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.


Herbert J. Miller, Jr.
Elliot L. Richardson
John E. Nolan, Jr.

In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust.

Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history."


Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1

In 1978, a Seattle school district adopted a mandatory busing plan to integrate its schools. No court or administrative body found the district to be engaged in unlawful segregation. A statewide initiative adopted in 1978 mandated a neighborhood school policy. The policy provided for some exceptions including voluntary busing options and mandatory busing if so ordered by state or federal courts. The initiative blocked the implementation of Seattle's mandatory busing plan. School officials challenged the Washington government in federal court.

Yes. The initiative reordered the educational decisionmaking process by moving the power over busing for purposes of integration to state control. The state explicitly employed "the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process." This kind of state action places an unconstitutional burden on racial minorities within the governmental process.


On April 4, 1977, sixteen-year-old Monty Lee Eddings and several of his friends ran away from home. Before leaving, Eddings took three of his father’s firearms, including a .410 gauge shotgun with a shortened barrel. Before reaching the Turner Turnpike near Tulsa, the group stopped at a Howard Johnson restaurant. As they were leaving, Eddings lost control of the car, briefly sending it over a curb and into a ditch before regaining control. A witness observed this and informed an officer of the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, Patrolman Larry Crabtree, who followed their car and pulled it over. When Crabtree was within about six feet of the car, Eddings stuck the shotgun out of the window and fired it, killing Crabtree, then immediately drove the car away.

At trial, the defense presented evidence of circumstances mitigating Eddings’ guilt, including the details of his extensive juvenile record in Missouri. Eddings’ parents divorced when he was five, after which he was shuffled between his mother’s house and his father’s house and also spent some time in a group home. Witnesses testified that Eddings was emotionally disturbed and at a level several years below his age in terms of mental and emotional development. A state psychologist testified that Eddings had a sociopathic or antisocial personality disorder.

The state provided evidence of aggravating circumstances. Oklahoma alleged 1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, 2) that the crime was committed to avoid a lawful arrest, and 3) that there was a probability that the defendant would commit more criminal acts of violence constituting a threat to society. The trial judge found that the state proved all three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge also found that Eddings’ age was a mitigating factor of great weight, but would not consider evidence of Eddings’ “violent background.” The judge then found that the aggravating circumstances proven by the state outweighed the fact of Eddings’ age and sentenced him to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed the sentence, also holding that Eddings' death penalty sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Yes. In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Louis Powell, the Court held that the trial court erred when it failed to consider mitigating evidence of Eddings’ unhappy childhood and emotional disturbance. Justice Powell looked to the Court’s decision in Lockett v. Ohio, where it held that a sentencer must consider any relevant aspect of a defendant’s character or record as mitigating factors toward imposing a sentence less than death.

Justice Powell then determined that the trial judge refused to consider the mitigating evidence of Eddings’ family history as a matter of law, rather than finding that evidence wanting as a matter of fact. He also determined that the court of appeals limited the evidence of mitigating circumstances to the fact of Eddings’ youth. He emphasized that the undisputed evidence of Eddings’ violent background demonstrated that he was not a normal sixteen-year-old. Justice Powell held that the Oklahoma state courts must consider such evidence when imposing the death penalty, reversing the sentence and remanding the case for further proceedings.

Justice William Brennan concurred, repeating his view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred, agreeing that the trial court incorrectly determined that it could not consider evidence of Eddings’ violent background as a matter of law. She emphasized that the majority’s holding did not change the Court’s opinions establishing the constitutionality of the death penalty; nor did it determine whether the Constitution permits the imposition of the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old.

Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented, joined by Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, and William Rehnquist. He pointed out that the Court granted certiorari to answer whether it was constitutional to impose the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old offender, and that Eddings raised the evidentiary question for the first time in his brief to the Court. He argued that both the trial judge and the court of appeals actually weighed the evidence of Eddings’ violent background and found it lacking.


Eight black citizens of Burke County, Georgia, challenged the at-large system of elections within the county. Although a substantial number of blacks lived within the county, no minority candidate had ever been elected to the Burke County Board of Commissioners, the chief governing body. To be elected, candidates had to receive a majority of the votes cast in the primary or general election.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the at-large system of elections in Burke County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that the at-large system was operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination. The Court held that there was extensive historical evidence that the county had impeded the political participation of black citizens and that the at-large system minimized even further the ability of blacks to participate in the political process. The Court also upheld the system of single-member districts established by a district court.


Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.

Lee Boothby
C. Clark Hodgson, Jr.
Rex E. Lee

The Secretary of Defense closed the Valley Forge General Hospital in an effort to reduce the number of military installations in the country. In accordance with a congressional statute regulating the dispersal of surplus government property, part of the hospital's land was given, free-of-charge, to the Valley Forge Christian College.

The Court held that Americans United for Separation of Church and State did not have standing to sue. Justice Rehnquist argued that the group did not pass the first prong of the Court's test for taxpayer standing. Since the source of the group's complaint was not a congressional statute but the decision of a government agency to dispose of a parcel of property, and because the transaction did not involve the taxing and spending power, the group had no standing to sue.


Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.

Immediately after Treasure Salvors, Inc. ("Treasure") located a 17th-century Spanish wreck of its coast, Florida claimed ownership of the remains. Treasure contracted with the Florida Division of Archives ("Archives") to salvage the wreck in exchange for 75% of the recovered artifacts' appraised value. Meanwhile, in the unrelated proceedings of United States v. Florida, the United States won a judgment granting it ownership of the lands, minerals, and other natural resources in the area of the Spanish wreck's discovery. Upon learning of this ruling, Treasure sought a declaration of title to the wreck. Following a second favorable appellate decision, Treasure sought and received a warrant to seize all artifacts from the Archives. Florida challenged the warrant and its issuing district court's jurisdiction, but lost on both counts. On appeal from an unfavorable appellate ruling, the Supreme Court granted Florida certiorari.

No. In a plurality opinion, the Court first held that while a state enjoys limited immunity from federal process under the Eleventh Amendment, its officers do not. In the present case, the seizure warrant was filed against Florida's officers in the Archives. The Archive officers, although acting in official state capacity and defended by state attorneys, are not immune as the state itself may be from having to pay a judgment against them. Moreover, the Court found that although a profit sharing contract existed between Treasure and Archives, it did not justify Archive's refusal to surrender ownership over the artifacts pursuant to a federal warrant. Finally, the Court ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Florida's interest in the artifacts because these materials were held in a different district court's jurisdiction. As such, the decision was reversed in part and remanded as to its jurisdictional violations.


Cornerstone was an officially recognized student organization on the campus of the University of Missouri - Kansas City. The avowed purpose of Cornerstone was to promote a knowledge and awareness of Jesus Christ on the campus. From 1973 to 1977, Cornerstone obtained permission to use university facilities for its weekly meetings and events.

In January 1977, the group sought permission from the university to use two rooms of its Haag Hall Annex for two and a half hours every week. University officials asked for a description of the activities that would be conducted at the proposed meetings. Cornerstone told the university that worship in the form of prayer and biblical teaching would be an important part of the general atmosphere of the meetings. University officials rejected Cornerstone’s application for regular use of the rooms, concluding the meetings would violate several sections of the Collected Rules and Regulations of the University of Missouri. These regulations prohibited the use of university buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious teaching.

On December 11, 1979, the trial court granted summary judgment to Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at the university, and the university’s Board of Curators, rejecting a motion for summary judgment filed by Cornerstone’s members. It concluded that the university’s ban on religious services in its buildings was required by the First Amendment’s establishment clause. It also held that the university did not violate the students’ free exercise rights, and that any violation was outweighed by Missouri’s compelling interest in the separation of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. It held that the university’s regulation had the primary effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Instead, the Eighth Circuit suggested that a neutral policy toward religious groups would satisfy the university’s First Amendment obligations.

Yes and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Court held that the university’s policy violated Cornerstone members’ First Amendment rights. He reasoned that when the university opened its facilities to student meetings, it created a public forum for those student groups; given no other justification, the university excluded Cornerstone based on the content of its members’ speech. While acknowledging the university’s obligation to comply with its constitutional obligations, Justice Powell agreed with the Eighth Circuit that a neutral policy toward religion would achieve this end.

Justice Powell argued that any religious benefits from an open forum would be incidental because the forum was available to a broad class of both religious and nonreligious speakers and because the university was not showing approval of a particular religious sect or practice. Justice Powell rejected the university’s argument that the Missouri Constitution compelled it to exclude Cornerstone, noting that Cornerstone’s First Amendment interests outweighed this state interest through the supremacy clause.

Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He rejected the majority’s description of the university’s student meetings policy as the creation of a public forum, but agreed that the university failed to justify its refusal to allow Cornerstone to worship on campus.

Justice Byron White dissented. He rejected the argument that the university created a public forum, but also suggested that the university’s fear of appearing to subsidize religion was too extreme. He balanced the state’s interest in enforcing its regulation with the burden on Cornerstone’s members’ ability to freely exercise their beliefs, concluding that the burden on Cornerstone was minimal.


Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley

Michael A. Chatoff
Raymond G. Kuntz
Elliott Schulder

 Furnace Woods School refused to provide deaf student Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter.  Amy was an excellent lip reading and had minimal residual hearing.  School administrators, along with a sign language expert, determined Amy was able to succeed in school without an interpreter.  Amy’s parents sued the school on her behalf for violation of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.  The Act requires all schools that accept federal funds to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all handicapped students.  The Act also allows schools discretion in deciding what steps to take to accommodate handicapped students.

The district court ruled in the Rowleys' favor, holding that while Amy was doing better in school than the average hearing student, she was not achieving to her full potential because she was unable to understand as much as she would with a sign language interpreter.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

In a 6-3 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court decisions.  The Supreme Court held that the Act does not require a school to provide a sign language interpreter to a deaf student when she is otherwise receiving personalized instruction and an adequate education.  School administrations are allowed to determine what is required to meet a handicapped students individual needs.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a special concurrence, expressing that no interpreter was required because Amy was given the opportunity to learn and participate in the classroom in a way that was substantially equal to her non-handicapped classmates.  Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the Act requires a school to provide a handicapped student with and education equal to non-handicapped children.


In 1981, a representative of Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party ("Party") died in office. Searching for a replacement, the Governor of Puerto Rico held a "by-election" open to candidates of all parties. The Party challenged the Governor, alleging that under Puerto Rico statutes only candidates and electors affiliated with the Party could participate in the by-election. On appeal from a Superior Court judgment favoring the Party, Puerto Rico's Supreme Court modified the judgment holding that a by-election was only required if the party of the legislator vacating the seat fails to name a replacement within 60 days. Before Puerto Rico's Supreme Court could deliver its decision, the Party held an election open only to its members and, then, pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate, swore in a new representative. Rodriguez appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

No. The Court, in a unanimous opinion, began by noting that the Constitution does not compel a fixed method of selecting state or local representatives. As such, the Puerto Rican Commonwealth legislature could vest exclusive interim appointment power in parties affiliated with the previous incumbent. This scheme is particularly reasonable in light of Puerto Rico's interest in maintaining continuity of party representation until the next general election and insuring its legislature's delicate balance of minority representation.


Nicholas Romeo was a 33-year-old man with the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child. Following the death of his father, Romeo’s mother was unable to adequately care for Romeo and had him involuntarily committed to Pennhurst State School and Hospital (“Pennhurst”) on a permanent basis. During his time in the state facility, Romeo suffered injuries on numerous occasions and was physically restrained at times. Romeo’s mother became concerned, and after objecting to Romeo’s treatment several times, sued the facility on behalf of Romeo. Romeo’s mother claimed that his treatment violated the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Romeo’s mother claimed Romeo had the right to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraints, and access to habilitation (training or treatment with the goal of eventual release).

At trial, the court instructed the jury that they could only find that Pennhurst violated Romeo’s constitutional rights if the officials had been “deliberately indifferent” to Romeo’s medical and psychological needs, and the jury found in favor of Pennhurst. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment was inapplicable, because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not the involuntarily committed. However, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Romeo had liberty interests in freedom from restraint, safe conditions, and minimally adequate habilitation, which could only be violated if three distinct standards were met. An infringement of the right to safe conditions can only be justified by “substantial necessity,” the right to freedom from bodily restraints can only be infringed for “compelling necessity,” and the access to habilitation must be “acceptable in the light of present medical or other scientific knowledge.

Yes, yes, unanswered. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the involuntarily committed do have liberty interests in safe confinement and freedom from bodily restraint under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a historical right to adequate habilitation was less clear, made especially so by the facts of the case in question. Because no amount of habilitation would allow Romeo to live independently, the Court was unsure what would qualify as adequate habilitation. The Court held that Romeo’s liberty interests required Pennhurst to provide adequate habilitation, but only as it related to Romeo’s right to safe confinement and freedom from undue restraint. The Court declined to answer whether the Fourteenth Amendment includes a stand-alone right to adequate habilitation, or how to determine the level of habilitation required to protect other liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized the need to balance the legitimate interests of both parties involved to determine whether liberty interests were being adequately protected. In the involuntary commitment arena, deference to qualified professionals is necessary because of their specialized knowledge and the specific circumstances and risks inherent in a mental hospital. Therefore, such professionals and institutions can only be held liable for infringements on liberty interests when the decision by a professional is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence emphasizing that the majority opinion had correctly not ruled on whether a state can accept an individual for care and then refuse treatment or whether the right to habilitation required Pennhurst to offer adequate training to preserve Romeo’s original basic self-care skills. He argued that the record was not adequately developed to address these two issues. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment did not contained a separate right to habilitation. Any right to habilitation only arises from other liberty interests, not as a liberty interest in and of itself.


Simon B. Karas
James R. Kingsley
Richard L. Aynes

In 1974, Ohio enacted a statute that stated, while the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the prosecution, the burden of proof for an affirmative defense rested on the defendant. From 1974 until 1976, Ohio state courts operated as though this statute did not affect Ohio's traditional rule that a defendant had to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. However, in 1976 the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the statute placed only the burden of production of such evidence — as opposed to the burden of persuasion — on the defendant, and jury instructions were altered accordingly.

The respondents, Lincoln Isaac, Kenneth Bell, and Howard Hughes, each had separate trials that occurred after the 1974 statute was put in place, but before the 1976 decision. At the time of their trials, none of the respondents objected to the jury instructions regarding how the jury should consider evidence of self-defense. The Ohio Criminal Code required defendants to raise any objections to jury instructions at the time the instructions are given. The respondents filed petitions in federal district courts for writs of habeas corpus and used the 1976 decision to challenge the jury instructions trial. The courts denied the writs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, and rejected the argument regarding the jury instructions because it had not been made at the time of the trial. The Ohio Supreme Court declined to review the case.

No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a 7-2 majority, ruled in favor of Engle and stated that the respondents cannot challenge the constitutionality of the Ohio jury instructions in federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Court held that the respondents forfeited their right to object to the jury instructions when they did not comply with the Ohio Criminal Code that specified they must make any objections at the time of the trial. The Court also found that the jury instructions themselves were not unconstitutional, as they depend on how a state defines the elements of a particular crime. The jury instructions were consistent with the Ohio state laws regarding to what extent the prosecution must disprove certain affirmative defenses. Thus, the respondents did not have constitutional grounds for the writ.

In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John Paul Stevens agreed with the judgment of the Court that the petition for the writs should be dismissed. However, he argued that such an error in jury instructions would not have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. found that the Court’s dismissal of Isaac’s petition on procedural grounds is illogical, given that Isaac’s claim did not exist when he could have raised the appropriate objection at trial. He also found that the double-pronged standard of cause and prejudice that the Court uses to determine if there are grounds for a habeas claim is too high for any defendant to reasonably meet. He was joined in the dissent by Justice Thurgood Marshall.


Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, County of Norfolk

Mitchell J. Sikora, Jr.
James F. McHugh, III

A Massachusetts law required trial courts to exclude members of the press and public from certain cases involving sexual offenses and testimony of victims less than eighteen years old. In a trial involving a male who was accused of raping three minors, the court, acting in reference to the Massachusetts statute, conducted a closed trial.

The Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the First Amendment. Recalling the Court's holding in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1980), Justice Brennan reviewed important historical and judicial reasons why access to criminal trials is "properly afforded" First Amendment protection. When the court denies access, argued Brennan, the only justification is to serve a compelling state interest. The Court found no such interest here. First, protecting the psychological well-being of a minor, arguably a compelling interest, conceded Brennan, "does not justify a mandatory closure rule" as circumstances can vary greatly in this type of case. Second, there was no convincing empirical or logical evidence to prove that victims would be more likely to come forward if the press and public were excluded from trials of this nature.


A New York child pornography law prohibited persons from knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such performances.

No. In the Court's first examination of a statute specifically targeted against child pornography, it found that the state's interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors was a compelling "government objective of surpassing importance." The law was carefully drawn to protect children from the mental, physical, and sexual abuse associated with pornography while not violating the First Amendment.


Henry L. Marsh, III,
Ronald Rosenberg
David A. Strauss
Henry T. Wickham

American Tobacco Company operated two plants in Richmond, VA. Until 1963, both plants were segregated, and the better job opportunities were reserved for white employees. Between 1963 and 1968, the plants were officially desegregated, but the promotion policies were left mostly to the discretion of the supervisors. The best jobs continued to go to the white employees. In November 1968, the company proposed nine new lines of employment progression that linked bottom jobs with the top job a worker could eventually receive. Four of the lines linked majority-white bottom jobs with majority-white top jobs; two of the lines linked majority-black bottom jobs with majority-black top jobs. The top jobs for the majority-white progression lines were the best jobs in the factories.

On January 3, 1969, John Patterson and two other employees filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). In 1973, alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act, the employees sued the company in district court . The district court held that the lines of progression violated the Act and prohibited the company from using them. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District affirmed and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the remedy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.

On remand, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaints by arguing that the seniority system was exempt from the Civil Rights Act. The district court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision because that the lines of progression are not a seniority system. The Court of Appeals also held that the immunity for seniority systems only extends to those in place before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the absence of any sort of grandfather clause or explicit distinction between pre- and post-Act systems meant that the section applied to all seniority systems, regardless of when they were put in place. There was no clear legislative history to support the distinction between pre-existing systems and those that were implemented later. The Court also held that such a reading would drastically shift national labor policy away from the balance that Congress intended the section to strike.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. argued that the decision of the Court ignored the crucial distinction between the adoption of a seniority system and its application. The section’s clear use of the language of application on the part of the employer — without any mention of adoption or the union — indicated a more narrow meaning. He also argued that the legislative history showed that Congress meant the Act to have a stronger effect on systems put in place after the effective date of the Act. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.

 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he expressed that the Court misread the section as referring to seniority systems both before and after the effective date of the Act. He argued that the purpose of the section was limited to determining which of the pre-Act systems should be considered legal and which should not; the section has no bearing on any post-Act systems.


National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Claiborne Hardware Company

In 1966, at a local meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) attended by several hundred people in Claiborne County, Mississippi, the group launched a boycott of white merchants. The purpose of the boycott was to promote equality and racial justice. The boycott consisted of nonviolent picketing, but some acts and threats of violence also occurred. In 1969, white merchants sued the NAACP for damages as a result of the injuries to their businesses that the boycott caused. These damages included loss of earnings over a seven-year period. The Chancery Court imposed damages liability and the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the imposition of tort liability as well as concluding the entire boycott was unlawful since the NAACP agreed to use force, violence, and “threats” to carryout the boycott.

Yes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the nonviolent elements of the protesters’ activities are entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. In this case, the members of the NAACP exercised their First Amendment right of speech, assembly, and petition in a nonviolent way to bring about social change. The NAACP is not liable in damages for the consequences of their nonviolent activity and the damages cannot be recovered because the violence or threats of violence were not a proximate cause of the business losses.

Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


In 1961, Minnesota passed the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act, which established a system of registering charitable organizations that solicit money. All organizations subject to the Act must file extensive annual reports with the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The Department may deny or withdraw the registration of any organization that engages in fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest practices. From 1961 until 1978, all religious organizations were exempt from the Act. In 1978, the state legislature amended the Act to include religious organizations that received more than fifty percent of their funding from solicitations of nonmembers.

Shortly after the amendment, the Department notified the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) that it must register under the Act. Pamela Valente and other members of the Church responded by suing and alleging that the Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Magistrate granted a preliminary injunction and held that the Act failed the second part of the Lemon Test, that the primary effect of a law must neither advance nor inhibit religion. Accepting the recommendation of the Magistrate, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the fifty percent rule violated the Establishment Clause, but held that proof of status as a religious organization was required to be exempt from the Act.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the fifty percent rule clearly distinguished between denominations and created denominational preferences within the law, and it did not serve a compelling government interest. The Court also held that the Act failed the three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman by fostering the government entanglement in religion.

In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that, although it is unclear whether or not the Unification Church would be considered a religious organization under the Act before the amendment, the judicial record has assumed it to be, so the majority’s decision to treat it as such is consistent with the orderly administration of justice.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent and argued that the majority erred by examining the case under a different framework than the previous courts, and should have remanded the case. He also argued that the majority should not have rejected the argument that the state has a valid secular purpose in preventing fraudulent charities from preying on the public. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

In a separate dissent, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that it is the Unification Church’s status as a charitable organization that makes it eligible for the registration requirement, not its status as a religious organization under the fifty percent rule, which establishes exemptions. Since it is unclear whether the Unification Church is a religious organization under the Act, he argued it was improper for the majority’s opinion to rule on the constitutionality issue. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Byron R. White, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


Northern Pipeline Constr. Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company

Melvin I. Orenstein
John L. Devney
Rex E. Lee

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 created a system of bankruptcy courts as an adjunct to the federal system of district courts. This case was decided together with United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co.

Yes. A plurality held that Congress had essentially conferred Article III powers to an adjunct system of courts and, consequently, "impermissibly removed most, if not all, of the essential attributes of the judicial power" from the district courts.


United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson

A new collective bargaining agreement increased health benefits for widows of coal miners who were receiving pensions when they died.  The agreement did not increase benefits for widows of coal miners who were still working at the time they died, although they were eligible for pensions.  These health benefits were paid out of a trust fund financed by the operators.  Gracie Robinson and Juanita Hager brought this class action on behalf of all similarly situated widows.  They alleged that requiring the worker to be receiving a pension at the time of death to qualify for increased health benefits bore no relation to the purpose of the trust.  The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.  The Court of Appeals held that the collective bargaining agreement failed to meet the reasonable standard set out in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).  The LMRA requires pension trusts to be maintained “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees...and their families”.

No.  Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals.  The Supreme Court held that the LMRA does not have a reasonableness requirement.  The relevant section of the LMRA is merely meant to protect employees from having their benefit funds used for other union purposes.  The collective bargaining agreement did not violate any command of Congress, so the Court had no authority to modify its terms.


Edwin Lee, a member of the Old Order Amish, employed several other Amish workers on his farm and in his carpentry shop.  He did not pay quarterly social security taxes, and in 1978, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed $27,000 in unpaid taxes.  Lee paid the portion due for the first quarter of 1973 and sued for a refund.  Lee argued that the tax violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.  In the Amish religion, it is a sin not to provide for the community’s elderly and needy citizens.  Lee argued that paying the federal government for Social Security violates that provision of his religion by giving the responsibility of caring for the elderly and needy to the government.  The district court held that the Social Security tax was unconstitutional as applied.  The court also noted that §1402(g) provides an exception to the social security tax for certain self employed individuals.  The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

Yes.  In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that the §1402(g) exemption only applied to self-employed individuals, not employers and employees like those involved in this case.  The Court held that the tax was not unconstitutional as applied.  By becoming an employer, Lee entered into commercial activity and accepted certain limits on the exercise of his beliefs.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, stating that the tax objector has the burden of showing that there is a unique reason for allowing an exemption from a valid law when the objectors religious obligation and civic obligation are irreconcilable.


Acting on a tip that Ross was selling drugs from his car in the District of Columbia, police officers pulled Ross over, opened his trunk, and discovered a bag of heroin. After returning to the station, another search uncovered $3200 in cash. Officers acted without a warrant in each search.

The Court held that since the search was done with probable cause and extended into the realm (Ross's car) of which a magistrate issuing a warrant would have approved, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens defended the search of the vehicle's trunk, arguing that if probable cause justifies a vehicle search, then every part of the vehicle is open to inspection.


Alan B. Morrison
Michael Davidson
Eugene Gressman
Rex E. Lee

In one section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress authorized either House of Congress to invalidate and suspend deportation rulings of the United States Attorney General. Chadha had stayed in the U.S. past his visa deadline. Though Chadha conceded that he was deportable, an immigration judge suspended his deportation. The House of Representatives voted without debate or recorded vote to deport Chadha. This case was decided together with United States House of Representatives v. Chadha and United States Senate v. Chadha.

The Court held that the particular section of the Act in question did violate the Constitution. Recounting the debates of the Constitutional Convention over issues of bicameralism and separation of powers, Chief Justice Burger concluded that even though the Act would have enhanced governmental efficiency, it violated the "explicit constitutional standards" regarding lawmaking and congressional authority.


Earl Enmund and two codefendants were found guilty of the felony murder and robbery of Thomas and Eunice Kersey, an elderly couple.  Enmund was the getaway driver, who waited in the car during the robbery, did not participate in the killing and had no idea anyone would be killed.  Enmund argued that the evidence did not show any intent to kill, so the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment.  Despite this, the jury sentenced him to death along with his codefendants.  The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction.

Yes, No.  Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-4 majority, reversed the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty on someone who aided and abetted but did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill, violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments.  It is unlikely that the death penalty could deter someone who did not intend to kill or attempt to kill, and putting someone to death for two killings they did not commit is disproportionate retribution.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred, writing that the death penalty is cruel and unusual in all circumstances.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision is not supported by prior precedent.  The Florida Supreme Court rejected critical factual findings, so the case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Lewis F. Powell, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


In May 1970, Jeffrey MacDonald, an army captain living at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was charged with the murders of his wife and two children. However, after an investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), the murder charges were dropped, and MacDonald was given an honorable discharge. Following MacDonald’s discharge, the U.S. Justice Department asked the Army CID to continue its investigation into the murders, and in 1972 the CID created a report on the murders that recommended further investigation into MacDonald. After evaluating the report, the Justice Department presented the case to a grand jury in the fall of 1974, which returned an indictment for MacDonald in January of 1975 that charged him again with all three murders.

MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment and argued that the delay between the original murder charge in 1970 and the grand jury indictment in 1974 violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The district court denied MacDonald’s motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit reversed the district court by finding that the time-gap between the 1972 CID report to the Justice Department and the 1974 convening of a grand jury infringed on MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed and remanded. The Court held that MacDonald could not appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss on the basis of the 6th amendment right to speedy trial until after the trial has been completed. MacDonald was tried and convicted of all three murders. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit again held the indictment violated MacDonald’s Sixth Amendment rights.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is intended to protect citizens from the extended disruptions that may accompany being charged with a crime, such as social stigma, anxiety, and the financial burden of defending oneself in court. In the current case, these interests were not being infringed during the period between the original dismissal and the re-filing of the murder charges because MacDonald was not under arrest, in custody, or subject to any criminal prosecution. Though the situation may have led to stress or other adverse consequence, once the original charges had been dismissed, MacDonald was in the same position as he would have been if charges had never been filed. The Court held that MacDonald could not claim his Sixth Amendment right was being infringed after the dismissal of the original charges.

In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial was not suspended during the period between the original dismissal and re-filing. However, the importance of allowing the Government to be cautious before prosecuting MacDonald for such a serious crime meant that the delay did not violate MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial.

Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the majority opinion failed to take certain facts into account when determining the original charges and the re-filed charges were distinct events between which MacDonald’s right to a speedy trial was not implicated. Not only did the investigation not end when the original charges were dismissed, but MacDonald was also aware the investigation was ongoing. Multiple times between 1972 and 1974, MacDonald requested the Government complete its investigation and even offered to sit for further interviews. Furthermore, the Government never offered any legitimate reason for the delay in re-filing the charges. Neither the language of the Sixth Amendment nor Supreme Court precedent supported the majority’s narrow view of when a criminal prosecution is taking place. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


Paul E. Knag
Susan K. Krell
Beverly J. Hodgson
Rex E. Lee

In 1972, the United States Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibited federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender and allowed the government to withhold federal funds to non-complying educational institutions. Government agencies tasked with supplying federal funding to educational institutions were authorized to create regulations to enforce Title IX. In 1975, one of these agencies, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”) passed regulations that extended the prohibition on gender discrimination to school personnel.

Employees of two Connecticut school districts, North Haven and Trumbull, accused the districts of practicing gender discrimination. HEW opened investigations into both districts and eventually warned both that they were in jeopardy of losing their federal funds. Both districts filed separate suits against HEW, claiming that the regulation went beyond the authority of Title IX, which does not explicitly cover gender-based employee discrimination. In both cases, the district court found for the school districts by holding that Title IX was intended to apply to students, not employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district courts and held that Congress had intended Title IX to apply to both students and employees.

Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, while Title IX does not expressly include employees, Congress’s choice of words, i.e. “no person” as opposed to “student” or “beneficiary”, implies an intention to broadly cover individuals involved in educational institutions rather than only students. The legislative history of Title IX supports the inference that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit gender discrimination of employees. Additionally, Congress was given the opportunity to view HEW’s regulations and pass a resolution of disapproval if the regulations were inconsistent with Title IX. While such a resolution concerning the employee discrimination regulation was introduced, it was not passed. Therefore, Congress appeared to intend Title IX to apply to employee discrimination, and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s regulations were valid.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the language of Title IX, on its face, did not apply to employee discrimination. Legislative history can only override the language of a law if the legislative history is clear and unambiguous that Congress intended Title IX to apply to employee discrimination. In this case, the majority opinion relied primarily on the statements of one congressman when analyzing the legislative history, which is not sufficient to support the majority’s conclusion. Therefore Justice Powell held that Title IX did not apply to employee discrimination. Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent,


Peter D. Roos
Peter A. Schey
John C. Hardy
Richard L. Arnett

A revision to the Texas education laws in 1975 allowed the state to withhold from local school districts state funds for educating children of illegal aliens. This case was decided together with Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Alien Child.

Yes. The Court reasoned that illegal aliens and their children, though not citizens of the United States or Texas, are people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and, therefore, are afforded Fourteenth Amendment protections. Since the state law severely disadvantaged the children of illegal aliens, by denying them the right to an education, and because Texas could not prove that the regulation was needed to serve a "compelling state interest," the Court struck down the law.


On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S. Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith. Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without issuing an opinion.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity but not absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is only available for specific functions that require a total shield from liability. The Court held that qualified immunity was necessary for the government officials to carry out their jobs and that the courts could adequately determine whether an action falls within the scope of qualified immunity based on whether the official knew or should have known that his/her actions would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the “knew or should have known” standard the majority established would often require discovery to determine what a defendant actually knew. He argued that the issues surrounding discovery of such evidence could be handled by a trial judge pending any motion for summary judgment made on the basis of qualified immunity. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Byron R. White, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, but emphasized that Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a similar case where they dissented, was wrongly decided.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent where he argued that, based on the Court’s previous decisions that granted absolute immunity to legislative aides, presidential aides should also receive absolute immunity. He argued that the degree of immunity for a government official should depend on that official’s function rather than that official’s place in the hierarchy. Since the President relies on his aides to perform the duties of his office, the aides should be considered “alter egos” for legal purposes and entitled to the same absolute immunity. Without that assurance of immunity for aides, the President’s functionality would greatly diminish.


Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington

Two non-profit groups merged to form the group Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR). One of the original groups obtained 501(c)3 status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which allowed donors to make tax-deductible donations to it. Because the other group participated in political lobbying, it did not qualify for 501(C)(3) status and could not offer tax-deductible donations. Since the newly formed TWR also participated in "substantial lobbying," the IRS denied it tax-deduction privileges. TWR alleged in District Court that the IRS's "substantial lobbying" restriction for 501(C)(3) status violated its First Amendment rights by imposing an "unconstitutional burden" on its ability to receive tax-deductible donations. TWR also argued that the restriction violated its Fifth Amendment equal protection rights since veterans' organizations that lobbied extensively could receive tax-deductible donations. The District Court dismissed the complaint but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the "substantial lobbying" restriction did impair TWR's Fifth Amendment equal protection rights.

No and no. Justice William H. Rehnquist authored the opinion for a unanimous court. Allowing a non-profit to solicit tax-deductible donations is a form of paying for its operations. Pointing to its decision in Cammarano v. United States, the Court maintained that "Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying." The federal government does not have to sponsor every activity that the First Amendment protects, and its choice to sponsor one type of activity does not force it to sponsor every related type of activity. The federal government can choose to support veterans' lobbying organizations without also having to fund the lobbying of other groups. Non-profit groups interested in offering tax-deductions to donors can separate with the parts of the organization engaged in lobbying.


L. Lynn Elliott
William D. Elliott
George W. Jones

Phillip Bosco died with a great deal of tax debt, so the government sued his widow, Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers, to force her to sell the house in which she currently resided to pay off his debt. Rodgers, however, was not in debt and under Texas law, had a separate right to the homestead. The district court held Rodgers had a state-created right not to have her homestead subjected to a force sale. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held section 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does grant the government power to order the sale of a home itself, even if the delinquent taxpayer is not the only one with interest in the property. However, that power is limited by equitable discretion, which means that the district court should consider a number of different variables including the possible competing prejudices and expectation of the parties involved. The Court also held that, if the home is sold, then the nondelinquent spouse is entitled to a portion of the proceeds because taking away the interest of an innocent third party would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the government has the power to sell property not belonging to an indebted taxpayer, but that it should be determined how far the power can extend. The government does not have the power to sell jointly owned property if the nondelinquent co-owner has a right to ban the sale and continue the possession. In this case, Rodgers had a state-protected right to remain in her home, so the government did not have the power to sell her house.


Helm was convicted of writing a check from a fictitious account, a crime carrying with it a five-year jail sentence. However, since this was his seventh felony conviction in South Dakota since 1964, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole under a state recidivist statute.

Yes. Since all of Helm's prior offenses, including his current check-writing conviction, had been "relatively minor" and were not crimes against people, Justice Powell held that Helm had "received the penultimate sentence (South Dakota did not have the death penalty) for relatively minor criminal conduct." Powell concluded that Helm was treated more harshly than the state's most violent criminals.


In 1976, police officers of the City of Los Angeles stopped Adolph Lyons for a traffic code violation. Although Lyons offered no resistance, the officers, without provocation, seized Lyons and applied a chokehold. The hold rendered Lyons unconscious and damaged his larynx. Along with damages against the officers, Lyons sought an injunction against the City barring the use of such control holds.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that federal courts were without jurisdiction to entertain Lyons' claim for injunctive relief. The fact that Lyons had been choked once did nothing to establish "a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped. . .by an officer who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness." The Court held that in order to establish an actual controversy, Lyons would have to show either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited to suing the police and the city for individual damages.


A Texas law permitted public school districts to deny tuition-free admission to minors living apart from their parents if their primary purpose of living in the district was to attend school free of charge. Roberto Morales left his family in Mexico to live with his sister, Oralia Martinez, in Texas. When the school district denied Morales' application for free admission, Martinez challenged the law in court.

No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the Constitution permitted states to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to bona-fide residents. The Court found that the Texas requirement was "far more generous" than traditional residency requirements, since it extended benefits to many children even if they did not intend to remain in a school district indefinitely. No violation of the Equal Protection Clause was found.


Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission

Louis F. Claiborne
John R. McDonough
Laurence H. Tribe
John R. Mc Donough

A California law dictated that before additional nuclear power plants could be built, the state energy commission had to determine that there would be adequate storage capacity for spent fuel rods. Two utility companies challenged the law, arguing that its provisions had been preempted by the federal Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the California law did not impinge upon congressional authority. The Court found that because the rationale for enacting the law was an economic one, it did not interfere with federal regulations governing nuclear safety. The Court held that Congress had left "sufficient authority in the states to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons" and that the courts should not rework the division of regulatory authority created by Congress.


Rae M. Crowe
John J. Breckenridge
C. B. Arendall, Jr.

Since 1945, Alabama had imposed a severance tax on oil and gas operations. Exxon Corporation (Exxon), along with other gas and oil producers in Alabama, had contractual agreements regarding the tax with the owners of the land on which operations occurred and with oil and gas purchasers. The owners were paid a royalty on all gas and oil produced, but were contractually assessed a portion of the severance tax, and the purchasers were required to reimburse the producers for any severance tax paid by them. In 1979, the Alabama Legislature passed a statute altering the severance tax. The statute increased the severance tax, exempted royalty landowners from the increase, and prohibited gas and oil operators from passing the tax increase on to oil and gas purchasers.

Exxon and other oil and gas producers sued Ralph Eagerton, the Commissioner of Revenue in Alabama and argued that the National Gas Policy Act, which allowed natural gas producers to take steps to recoup state severance tax, preempted the prohibitions on passing along the costs to purchasers. Furthermore, the oil and gas producers argued that the exemption and the prohibition violated the oil and gas producers’ Constitutional rights under the Contract Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County ruled the new severance tax provisions unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment and the Contract Clause. The state appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed the lower court’s decision, holding any constraints imposed by the new tax were generally applicable and therefore valid.

Yes, no, no, no. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the unanimous court. The Court held that federal law entirely preempts state law either when Congress explicitly declares it or when federal regulation is so pervasive that it is reasonable to infer that there is no space for a state to supplant federal regulation. Specific state laws are preempted to the extent that they stand in conflict or as an obstacle to federal law. The Court held that the National Gas Policy Act preempted the pass-through prohibition as they applied to interstate transactions. The pass-through prohibition could however be applied to intrastate transactions because Congress did not intend the National Gas Policy Act to preempt state regulation of state gas and oil markets. The Court also held that the exemption for royalty landowners did not violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution, because the exemption does not prohibit land owners and oil and gas producers from contractually shifting the tax burden Additionally, the Court held that a statute does not violate the Contract Clause simply because it has an effect on contractual obligations undertaken prior to passage of a statute. Because the pass-through prohibition only created incidental effects on pre-existing contractual obligations, it was not unconstitutional. The Court also held that, the statute only had to pass rational basis review because it did not affect a fundamental interest or create a suspect categorization. Because the royalty landowner exemption and the pass-through prohibition were both rationally related to Alabama’s legitimate interest in protecting consumers from excessive prices, neither provision violated the oil and gas producers’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.


Ernest Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature, challenged the legislature's chaplaincy practice in federal court. This practice involves the offering of a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session by a chaplain chosen by the state and paid out of public funds. The district court supported Chambers on the use of public funds. The appeals court supported Chambers on the prayer practice. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court upheld the chaplaincy practice. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger abandoned the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, which had been the touchstone for cases involving the Establishment Clause. In its place, Burger rested the Court's opinion on historical custom. Prayers by tax-supported legislative chaplains could be traced to the First Continental Congress and to the First Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. As a consequence, the chaplaincy practice had become "part of the fabric of our society." In such circumstances, an invocation for Divine guidance is not an establishment of religion. "It is," wrote Burger, "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country."


Lawson was a law-abiding black man of unusual deportment (he wore his hair in long dreadlocks). Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment when he walked in white neighborhoods. Lawson challenged the California law "that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer."

The law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause for an arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone. The majority hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement.


Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Lloyd N. Cutler
James F. Fitzpatrick
Rex E. Lee

In 1966, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which gave the Secretary of Transportation the power to issue motor vehicle safety standards. The Secretary also has the ability to delegate that power to another agency, in this case the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). The Act also authorizes judicial review to determine whether the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

In 1967, the Department of Transportation first issued Standard 208, which at that point only required all automobiles to have seat belts. By 1975, Standard 208 had been revised multiple times to require passive restraints, such as airbags and seat belts that would operate automatically and not require action on the part of the occupants. Because of the unpopularity of the standard, in 1974 Congress amended the Act to allow alternative safety measures. In 1976, Secretary of Transportation William Coleman suspended the passive restraint requirement entirely. The succeeding Secretary of Transportation, Brock Adams, issued Modified Standard 208, which required passive restraints in large cars of model year 1982 or later and in all cars of model year 1984 or later. In 1981, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis began reconsidering Modified Standard 208. The NHTSA rescinded the passive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 because it determined that the restraints would not have the expected safety benefits, so the requirement would not be reasonable or practicable.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed for review of the NHTSA’s decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the NHTSA’s decision to rescind the standard was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals held that there was not enough evidence to support the NHTSA’s position and that the NHTSA failed to properly consider alternative possibilities under which the standard could be effective.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that the rescission of a standard should be reviewed based on whether the decision was arbitrary or capricious. Because the removal of a standard often entails the same level of policy changes as the promulgation of a law, it should be reviewed under the same tests. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals, while correctly finding that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious, relied too strongly on an inferred congressional mandate for passive restraints. The Court held that, by rescinding Modified Standard 208 without considering alternatives and consequences, the NHTSA did not provide evidence for its decision and therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the NHTSA did not provide adequate analysis for rescinding the requirements regarding airbags and continuous spool seat belts, but it did explain its decision in regards to detachable belts. He also argued that it is reasonable for an agency to reassess its priorities over time, as happened in this case. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


 Tristan Armstrong, a former employee of the 3M Company, which manufactures chemicals in St. Paul, came under suspicion for stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illegal drugs. The company notified a narcotics agent, and further investigation determined that Armstrong had been purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Company in St. Louis. With the consent of Hawkins Chemical Company, narcotics agents installed a radio transmitter in the container of chloroform that Armstrong would receive. By tracking the radio transmitter, officers were able to track Armstrong delivering the chloroform to Darryl Petschen. Petschen drove it to a cabin owned by Leroy Carlton Knotts in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Relying on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant for the cabin and found a fully operable drug-manufacturing lab.

Knotts was convicted in district court after the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction and held that the monitoring of the radio transmitter violated Knotts’ Fourth Amendment rights.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the use of the radio transmitter to track the movements of a suspect in a car falls under the privacy expectations for a vehicle, which are less than those of a house. Since the radio transmitter in this case was used primarily to ascertain where the chloroform traveled and where it stopped, the surveillance did not violate Knotts’ right to privacy in his home. Additionally, the use of the radio transmitter did not serve any function that the police could not have performed visually; the transmitter merely made the process easier.

 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment and wrote that, while he agreed with the majority’s decision concerning the use of the radio transmitter, he found its original installation to be on shakier constitutional ground. He argued that the installation of the radio transmitter represented a significantly larger intrusion upon a person’s privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun also concurred in judgment and argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily referred to the “open fields” doctrine that was a major issues in two cases the Court had yet to hear. He wrote that he did not wish either side in those two cases to gain legitimacy from this one. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence in judgment.

 Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment and wrote that the majority opinion’s implication that the this case involved the “open field” doctrine was false. He also argued that the use of technology to augment officers’ abilities was not always automatically constitutionally sound. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the opinion concurring in judgment.


Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria

Abram Chayes
Paul M. Bator
Stephen N. Shulman

Verlindin B.V., a Dutch Corporation, sued Central Bank of Nigeria in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for breaching a letter of credit.  Verlindin alleged that the court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).  The FSIA grants jurisdiction for actions against foreign parties who are not entitled to immunity.  Central Bank moved to dismiss the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The district court dismissed the case, holding that Central bank had sovereign immunity.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but held that the entire FSIA exceeded the scope of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

No.  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, reversed and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that the FSIA does not violate Article III.  The FSIA was a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate foreign commerce.  On remand, the court of appeals should consider whether Central Bank is entitled to sovereign immunity.


Jonathan Lehr, the biological father of Jessica M., filed a petition to vacate an order of adoption.  He argued that Jessica was adopted by her mother’s husband in violation of the Constitution because Lehr was never notified of the proceedings.  Under New York law, Lehr was not in any of the classes of people entitled to notification of adoption proceedings.  Lehr never supported the child financially, had a significant relationship with the child, or entered his name into the state’s father registry.  The Ulster County Family Court denied Lehr’s petition and the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

No.  Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the New York courts.  The Supreme Court held that due process and equal protection were not violated because Lehr never had a significant personal or financial relationship with Jessica M.  Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the state cannot deny notice of adoption proceedings to a biological father when the state knows his whereabouts and interest in the child.  Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc.

John T. Cusack
Stephen M. Shapiro
Howard Adler, Jr.

From 1972 through 1978, Falls City Industries, Inc. sold beer to Vanco Beverage, Inc., the sole wholesale distributor for Falls City in Indiana at a higher price than Falls City charged its only wholesale distributor in Kentucky. Under Indiana law, brewers were required to sell to all Indiana wholesalers at a single price, Indiana wholesalers were prohibited from selling to out-of-state retailers, and Indiana retailers were not permitted to purchase beer from out-of-state wholesalers. Vanco filed suit, alleging that Falls City's price discrimination violated section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. The Federal Court found that Vanco had established a prima facie case of price discrimination. The court rejected Falls City's "meeting-competition" defense under section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, which provides that a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of illegal price discrimination by establishing that its lower price to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that section 2(b) is not so inflexible. The Court held that the meeting-competition defense required a seller at least to show the existence of facts that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the seller's lower price would meet the equally low price of a competitor and required the seller to demonstrate that its lower price was a good faith response to a competitor's low price. "Falls City contends that it has established its meeting-competition defense as a matter of law. In the absence of further findings, we do not agree," wrote Justice Blackmun.


Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health

Rex E. Lee
Stephan Landsman
Alan G. Segedy

In 1978 the Akron City Council enacted an ordinance which established seventeen provisions to regulate the performance of abortions. Among other things, the ordinance required: all abortions performed after the first trimester to be done in hospitals, parental consent before the procedure could be performed on an unmarried minor, doctors to counsel prospective patients, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and that fetal remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary manner." Some of the ordinance's provisions were invalidated by a federal district court.

The Court affirmed its commitment to protecting a woman's reproductive rights by invalidating the provisions of Akron's ordinance. Generally, Justice Powell's opinion reiterates the Court's findings in Roe and reasons that certain provisions of the ordinance violated the Constitution because they were clearly intended to direct women away from choosing the abortion option. They were not implemented out of medical necessities. The fetal disposal clause was struck down because its language was too vague to determine conduct subject to criminal prosecution.


Louis J. Caruso
David A. Strauss
James H. Geary

David Long was convicted for possession of marijuana found by Michigan police in the passenger compartment and trunk of his car. The police searched the passenger compartment because they suspected Long's vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. After a state appellate court affirmed the conviction, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution.

The Court, after admitting that it had not developed "a satisfying and consistent approach" regarding lower court references to independent state grounds, held that it had jurisdiction in the case. The Court held that when state court decisions appeared to rest primarily on federal law, it would infer that state courts believed that federal law required them to do so. State courts could expressly state that independent grounds were being used in cases as opposed to constitutional grounds. The Court reasoned that this approach would avoid the rendering of advisory opinions and would decrease the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify decisions to the liking of the Justices. In the case at hand, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the search and affirmed Long's conviction.


Dr. Chris Simopoulos, a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist, performed an abortion for a 17-year-old girl at his clinic in Falls Church, Virginia.  The girl was in her second trimester and did not inform her parents about the procedure, despite Dr. Simopoulos’ suggestion.  Dr. Simploulous was indicted under a Virginia law prohibiting second trimester abortions outside of a licensed hospital.  The Circuit Court of Fairfax County convicted him without a jury and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction.

No, No, No.  Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for an 8-1 majority, affirmed the Virginia court.  The Supreme Court held that requiring doctors to perform second trimester abortions in licensed hospitals was a reasonable means of furthering the state’s interest in protecting the mother’s health and safety.  The prosecution was not required to prove a lack of medical necessity, and Dr. Simopoulos’ actions clearly caused the death of the unborn fetus.  This case is different from past cases where hospitalization requirements were unconstitutional, because the Virginia statute allows abortions in outpatient facilities as long as they are properly licensed.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, expressing that the validity of the Virginia statute did not depend on which trimester was regulated.  The statute was not an undue burden on the decision to undergo an abortion, so it was valid.  Justice Byron R. White and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.  Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, writing that the Court should vacate the lower decision and remand the case for further consideration of unclear state law.


Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.

Sony Corporation of America manufactured and sold the "Betamax" home video tape recorder (VTR). Universal City Studios owned the copyrights to television programs broadcast on public airwaves. Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement, alleging that because consumers used Sony's Betamax to record Universal's copyrighted works, Sony was liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by those consumers in violation of the Copyright Act. Universal sought monetary damages, an equitable accounting of profits, and an injunction against the manufacturing and marketing of the VTR's. The District Court denied all relief, holding that the noncommercial home use recording of material broadcast over the public airwaves was a fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. Moreover, the court concluded that Sony could not be held liable as contributory infringers even if the home use of a VTR was considered an infringing use. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held Sony liable for contributory infringement.

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that "[t]he sale of the VTR's to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement of [Universal's] copyrights." The Court concluded that there was a significant likelihood that a substantial number of copyright holders who license their works for free public broadcasts would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers and that Universal failed to show that time-shifting would cause non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works. Justice Stevens wrote for the Court that "[t]he sale of copying equipment...does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses." For the dissenting minority, Justice Blackmun expressed the views that taping a copyrighted television program is infringement and that the recorder manufacturers were guilty of inducing and materially contributing to the infringement.