Southern Union Company is a diversified natural gas company with a storage facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In September of 2004, vandals broke into the facility and found liquid mercury. The vandals spilled the liquid mercury in and around the facility and around a nearby apartment complex. Southern Union did not discover the spill for several weeks, and the apartment residents were displaced for two months during the subsequent cleanup.

On September 19, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Southern Union with illegally storing mercury without a permit. Southern Union was convicted by a jury, but the jury did not determine how many days Southern Union had illegally stored the mercury. At sentencing, the district court applied the penalty provision of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), which provided a maximum fine of $50,000 for each day of violation. The U.S. Office of Probation set the maximum fine for Southern Union's offense at $38.1 million dollars by multiplying $50,000 times 762, the full number of days referred to in the indictment.

Southern Union objected. The company argued that the number of days that Southern Union illegally stored mercury was a fact that should have been determined by a jury, because it increased the maximum criminal penalty. As such, Southern Union believed that the imposition of the $38.1 million dollar fine was a violation of its rights to criminal due process under the Fifth Amendment and to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment.

The district court requested briefs, but it ultimately concluded that a fact which increases a criminal penalty need not be tried by a jury if the penalty is a criminal fine. Southern Union appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected Southern Union's arguments and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded. The Court previously held that under the Sixth Amendment, the determination of any fact that increases a defendant's maximum potential sentence should be left to the jury. While the government challenged this rule's application to cases involving criminal fines, the Court maintained that the rule does extend to such cases. The government argued that fines are not serious criminal sentences like incarceration, and therefore do not require a jury determination. The Court disagreed, reasoning that if a fine were so insubstantial, then the right to a jury trial would not even be triggered.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, finding it sufficient for sentencing judges to determine sentencing facts. Since sentencing facts are not the same facts that determine the elements of a crime, they do not both need to be determined by a jury in all cases. Historically, judges have always determined the punishment for lesser crimes. While the Sixth Amendment allows the jury to determine sentencing for serious offenses, it does not extend so far as to require a jury determination of how much a defendant should be fined. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


On April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States.

Arizona appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the United States had shown that federal law likely preempted: (a) the creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a state-crime for work by unauthorized aliens, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States. Arizona appealed the court's decision.

Yes for provisions 1, 2, and 4; No for provision 3. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Supreme Court held that provision 1 conflicts with the federal alien registration requirements and enforcement provisions already in place. Provision 2 is preempted because its method of enforcement interferes with the careful balance Congress struck with federal laws on unauthorized employment of aliens. Provision 4 is preempted because it usurps the federal government's authority to use discretion in the removal process. This creates an obstacle to carrying out the purposes and objectives of federal immigration laws.

The Court upheld provision 3 as constitutional on its face. This provision merely allows state law enforcement officials to communicate with the federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement office during otherwise lawful arrests. The provision has three limitations that protect individual rights: a detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he/she produces a valid Arizona drivers license; an officer may not consider race, color, or national origin during a check; and the check must be implemented in a manner consistent with federal law. Justice Kennedy noted that this decision did not foreclose any future constitutional challenges to the law on an as applied basis.

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that the Arizona statute does not conflict with federal law, but enforces federal immigration restrictions more effectively. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with Justice Scalia that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that there is no conflict between the ordinary meaning of the federal laws and the Arizona statute. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on provisions 1 and 3, but disagreeing on 2 and 4. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision in the case.


Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.

David C. Frederick
Sarah E. Harrington
Jonathan Hacker

Gloria Gail Kurns and Freida E. Jung Corson brought suit on behalf of the decedent, George M. Corson, asserting a number of state law causes of action related to his alleged exposure to asbestos during his years employed by a railroad company. From 1947 to 1994, George M. Corson worked as a welder, machinist, and supervisor for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pacific Railroad. He was employed at different facilities in Montana and South Dakota. Much of his job involved removing insulation from locomotive boilers and putting brake shoes on the locomotives.

Kurns, the executor of his state, and Jung Corson, the widow, claim that throughout this time period, George Corson was repeatedly exposed to asbestos from the insulation and the brake shoes. After his retirement, he was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma, the only known cause of which is exposure to asbestos. He passed away after the initiation of this litigation, and is represented by both Kurns and Jung Corson. Together they brought claims against multiple defendants including, the Railroad Friction Products Corp. over brake pads they manufactured containing asbestos.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the claims, contending that they were barred by the Locomotive Inspection Act, which provides that a railroad carrier may only use a locomotive that is in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the state law design defect claims and the state law failure to warn claims. The Court emphasized that state law must yield to a Congressional Act, to the extent of any conflict with federal statute, even if there is no express preemption. The Court further determined that the Federal Railroad Safety Act did not change the scope of the Locomotive Inspection Act.

Justice Elena Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan agreed with the result, but emphasized that the notion, established in earlier case law, that Congress intended to occupy the entire field of locomotive equipment regulation was inaccurate.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court's holding that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the claims for defective design. However, she did not think that the Locomotive Inspection Act preempted the claims for failure to warn because those claims were not based on any product's physical compensation, but on a failure to provide adequate instructions or warning.


Leondra R. Kruger
Stephen B. Kinnaird
Charles A. Rothfeld

Carlos Martinez Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, applied to an immigration judge for cancellation of his removal from the United States. The government appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) sustained the government's appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Gutierrez's petition for review of the BIA's decision and remanded to the BIA to allow it to reconsider his case based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mercado Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). That case held that "[f]or purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with the parent."

No and no. Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded. The Court held that the BIA reasonably construed 8 U.S. C. 1229(a) to require each alien seeking cancellation of removal to fulfill the residency requirements on their own. An unemancipated minor cannot use his or her parent's years of residency to fulfill the requirements. The Court did not decide if another construction of the statute is possible because the BIA's construction was permissible.


Bryan A. Stevenson
John C. Neiman Jr.
Kent G. Holt

In July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon's trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Miller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller's petition for writ of certiorari.

In the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

In January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision.

Yes. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Elena Kagan reversed the Arkansas and Alabama Supreme Courts' decisions and remanded. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids the mandatory sentencing of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. While a mandatory life sentence for adults does not violate the Eighth Amendment, such a sentence would be an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for children.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. He argued for an additional determination that the offender actually killed or intended to kill the robbery victim. Without such a determination, the State could not pursue a mandatory life sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. filed a dissenting opinion. He reasoned that the Court's role is to apply the law, not to answer questions about morality and social policy. The majority did not sufficiently characterize the punishment as unusual, therefore the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in the dissent.


When the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office denies an application for a patent, the applicant may seek judicial review of the agency's final action by one of two means. The applicant may obtain direct review of the agency's determination in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alternatively, the applicant may commence a civil action against the director of the PTO in federal district court. The court will decide whether a plaintiff in a civil (§ 145) action may introduce new evidence that could have been presented to the agency in the first instance. The court will also consider whether, when new evidence is introduced under § 145, the district court may decide the factual questions to which the evidence pertains, without giving deference to the prior decision of the PTO.

Gilbert P. Hyatt's patent application and subsequent claims were rejected. Hyatt appealed to the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board reversed most of the examiner's written description rejections, but upheld some. Hyatt filed a request for rehearing on the rejected claims, which the Board dismissed on the basis that it raised new issues that could have been raised to either the examiner or the Board. Hyatt responded by filing a civil action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under §145. He submitted a declaration supporting his new and amended claims. The PTO objected to the declaration, arguing that the district court should not consider the new evidence because Hyatt did not introduce it to either the Board or the examiner. The district court agreed with the PTO, ruling that Hyatt's failure to present the evidence to the PTO constituted a negligent act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

Yes and Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for a unanimous court affirming the lower court's decision. The Court held a patent applicant's ability to introduce new evidence in a civil action against the Patent and Trademark Office was only limited by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court also held that a district court can decide a de novo factual question without giving deference to the prior decision and that it may take both new evidence and the administrative record into account.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion which Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's decision should not foreclose a district court's authority to exclude evidence that was deliberately suppressed or withheld in bad faith.


Knox v. Service Employees International Union

William J. Young
Jeremiah A. Collins
Jeremiah Collins

All California state employees are required to pay a fee to the Service Employees International Union for its representation of them, and the union is required to tell employees how the money is spent and how to object. The union wanted to collect a special assessment for a "Political Fight Back Fund" in 2005. But some nonmembers wanted the union to give them a new notice and a new chance to object. They filed a class-action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and equitable restitution for violations of the nonmembers' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court agreed, siding with the nonmembers. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.

No, No. In his opinion for the 7-2 majority, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., wrote that the structure by which nonmembers of a union have to pay chargeable expenses and must opt out of any others already strains the limits of the First Amendment. The actions of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) went beyond this allowable extension and infringed upon nonmembers' First Amendment rights. By failing to provide a new notice and a new chance to opt out, the union did not abide by the established procedure for handling nonmember payment. In order to respect the First Amendment rights of nonmembers, the special assessment should have come with a notice that allowed nonmembers to opt in. The Court held that, while it can be difficult to determine the yearly dues ahead of time, the union should err on the side of having nonmembers pay too little rather than too much and infringe on their constitutional rights.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in the judgment. She agreed that the union had not satisfied its constitutional obligation to provide nonmembers with notice of the purpose of the special assessment and a chance to opt out. However, she argued that the Court went beyond its authority by specifying that an opt-in system better fits the requirements of the First Amendment when there is no precedent to support such a statement. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the concurring opinion.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented and argued that the basic system that the unions uses to charge dues is both constitutional and fair to members and nonmembers. The union uses each year's ratio of chargeable vs. nonchargeable to determine the next year's fees, so an objecting nonmember might overpay one year, but will underpay the next and ultimately come out even. In the year in question, even with the special assessment, the objecting nonmembers paid less than what the constitution considers their fair share. The First Amendment does not require the union to provide more than one opportunity for a nonmember to object to the yearly fee. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


Anthony T. Falzone
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Section 514 of the act restored U.S. copyright protection to foreign parties whose works had entered the public domain. A group of artists, including musician Lawrence Golan, who made use of the works while they were in the public domain filed a lawsuit in Colorado's federal court to challenge the restoration of copyright, arguing that doing so violated their First Amendment rights.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado held that Section 514 of the URAA does not violate the Copyright Clause or the First Amendment. The district court also rejected Golan's First Amendment challenge, seeing "no need to expand upon the settled rule that private censorship via copyright enforcement does not implicate First Amendment concerns." The United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court agreed that Section 514 of the URAA does not exceed Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause, but it vacated the district court's First Amendment ruling and remanded for further proceedings.

No and no. In a 6-2 decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Court held that congress did have the power to enact Section 514 and the Uruguay Round Agreement. An exhaustive recount of the history of copyright law showed that the public domain is not untouchable, and congress may grant protection to previously unprotected works. The Court soundly rejected Golan's argument that taking works out of the public domain violated the constitutional "limited times" requirement, following the reasoning from Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Court also held that there were sufficient First Amendment protections built into the current copyright law in the form of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.

Justice Steven G. Breyer wrote a dissent, stating that the statutes in question violated the Constitution because they did not promote the production of new works. Justice Beyer also expressed concerns about the difficulty of finding authors of orphaned works in order to gain a copyright license.


Patricia A. Millett
Nicole A. Saharsky
Michael A. McGill
Michael A Mcgill

On August 15, 2006, Rialto firefighter Nicholas B. Delia sustained injuries while working to control a toxic spill. As a result of his injuries, Delia began using sick leave. The City of Rialto suspected that Delia was taking sick leave inappropriately, using his sick days to work on personal home improvement projects. After obtaining video of Delia purchasing home improvement supplies on one of his sick days, the city launched a formal internal affairs investigation. The city retained attorney Steve A. Filarsky to assist with the internal investigation.

On September 18, 2006, the city ordered Delia to appear at an interview conducted by Filarsky. During the course of the interview, Delia stated that the home improvement supplies that he purchased were unused. Filarsky requested that Delia allow a warrantless search of his home in order to confirm that the supplies were unused. Delia refused, prompting Filarsky to order Delia to produce the supplies. Filarsky and some city officials subsequently followed Delia to his home, where Delia produced the supplies.

On May 21, 2008, Delia brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court against the City of Rialto, the City of Rialto Fire Department, and several city officials. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the grounds that Delia failed to establish municipal liability against the city and that the individuals were entitled to qualified immunity. Delia appealed the decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court opinion as to Filarsky only. Filarsky appealed.

No. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision as to Filarsky. Looking at the history of common law and case law on qualified immunity, the Court held that there is no reason to distinguish part time or temporary government workers from full time employees. There is a strong public policy interest in protecting all public employees while they are working on behalf of the government. Denying protection to temporary employees working alongside full time employees would leave the temporary employees "holding the bag" for conduct for which they are not fully responsible.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, noting that qualified immunity is overcome when the government worker knew or should have known that his conduct violated a clearly established right. Justice Ginsburg instructed the lower court to consider this issue carefully on remand. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a separate concurrence, clarifying that not every private individual who temporarily works for the government is protected by qualified immunity in all circumstances.


Paul L. Hoffman
Edwin S. Kneedler
Kathleen M. Sullivan
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., one of the respondents, operated oil production facilities in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria. Esther Kiobel and the other petitioners were Nigerian nationals who alleged that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by the Nigerian government. The petitioners maintain that the respondents, including the Shell Petroleum Development Company were complicit with the Nigerian government's human rights abuses.

The petitioners filed a putative class action against the respondents, under the Alien Tort Statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District Court dismissed claims against the corporate defendants in part and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.

Both parties cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The respondents argued that the law of nations does not attach civil liability to corporations under any circumstances. The petitioners argued that the liability should attach to corporate actors, just as it would to private actors. On September 17, 2010, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the lawsuit with the majority holding that the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over suits against corporations. On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit denied the petitioners' request for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. The petitioners filed a second petition for rehearing en banc and a motion to recall the mandate, which the Second Circuit denied.

Following oral argument, the Court set the case for reargument in the 2012 Term to address whether and when the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.

As to the second question: no. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. delivered a unanimous opinion affirming the Second Circuit’s judgment. The Court held that under the Alien Tort Statute, there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law. This presumption, derived from a traditional canon of interpretation, serves to protect against clashes between U.S. law and the law of other nations. The Court reasoned that nothing within the text, history, or purpose of the statute indicates that it was intended to apply extraterritorially. In order to rebut this presumption, the petitioners’ claim would have to touch and concern the territory of the United States with “sufficient force.” Since the statute is presumed not to apply, the Court did not address the question of whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of nations.


Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.

In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.

A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.

Yes. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that the rule is invalid. While the judgments on administrative agencies are given deference, they must still have a rational reasoning behind them. The BIA posited several legitimate reasons for the comparable grounds rule, but gave no rational basis for them. The current application of discretionary relief in deportation cases is arbitrary and capricious. The case was reversed and remanded.


Jason D. Hawkins
William M. Jay
Evan A. Young

On October 1, 2007, Lubbock police officers arrested Monroe Ace Setser after finding suspected narcotics during a traffic stop. At the time he was arrested, Setser was serving a five-year term of probation stemming from a previous state conviction. State authorities subsequently charged Setser with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in the state court arising from the activities of October 1, 2007. They also filed a motion to revoke his probation in the 2006 state case. Before the state cases could be resolved, the federal government stepped in and charged Setser for his October 2007. Setser pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment and in exchange the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. At sentencing, the federal district court sentenced Setser to 151 months of imprisonment and ordered the sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence might be imposed in the pending state case, and concurrent to whatever sentence might be imposed in the 2007 state case. Neither case had been resolved in state court.

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, affirming the lower court's decision. The Court determined that the federal judge had discretion to order a federal sentence to run consecutively or concurrently with an anticipated state sentence. The Court found nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act which foreclosed the federal judge's authority to make such a decision and noted that judges have traditionally had broad authority to determine whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined. Breyer argued that a federal judge does not have the power to order that a federal sentence run consecutively or concurrently with a state sentence that has yet to be imposed. Breyer noted that nothing in the Sentencing Reform Act explicitly granted federal judges that power. Furthermore, after discussing the history and purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act, Breyer concluded that the Court's decision was contrary to the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act.


Billy Joe Reynolds pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly failing to register and update a registration, in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of SORNA and the legality of the Interim Rule implementing that law. He also argued that his guilty plea should be invalidated because he is "actually innocent" of violating SORNA's registration requirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed the conviction.

Yes and yes. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that without an affirmative action by the Attorney General, pre-act offenders would not be obligated to register under SORNA. Hence, the Interim Rule must be valid for Reynolds to fall within SORNA's authority and there remains a justiciable question. Breyer looked to the relevant text of SORNA, which mandates that sex offenders register with the state and keep their registration current when moving to a different state. The act also stated, however, that the Attorney General has the authority to specify the applicability of SORNA with respect to sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA's enactment. He noted Congress' use of the word "applicability" as opposed to "nonapplicability", inferring that Congress wanted to give the Attorney General the discretion to apply SORNA to pre-act offenders, not the authority to make exceptions to SORNA. He reasoned, in part, that Congress wished to give the Justice Department some leeway with SORNA's applicability, given that the Justice Department is tasked with the act's enforcement. The Court therefore reversed the Third Circuit's decision and remanded the case to determine if the Attorney General's Interim Rule is a valid specification.


Chris Koster
Anthony A. Yang
Emmett D. Queener

Missouri prosecutors offered Galin Edward Frye two deals while seeking his conviction for driving while his license was revoked, but his lawyer never told Frye about the offers. Frye pleaded guilty to a felony charge and was sentenced to three years in prison. He appealed, saying his lawyer should have told him about the previous deals. A Missouri appeals court agreed. Prosecutors contend that not knowing about the deals they offered doesn't mean that Frye didn't know what he was doing when he decided to plead guilty.

Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to communicate formal plea offers from the prosecution. Justice Kennedy looked to Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky ; in both cases, a prisoner claimed his guilty plea was invalid because counsel provided incorrect advice pertinent to the plea. While acknowledging that a defendant has no right to receive a plea offer, Justice Kennedy noted that the vast majority of both federal and state convictions are the result of guilty pleas. Justice Kennedy finally held that Frye must show a reasonable probability he would have accepted the initial plea and that neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented.

Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel Alito, dissented. Justice Scalia argued that Frye was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because counsel's mistake did not deprive him of any substantive or procedural right. He further questioned the speculative nature of the majority's tests for effective counsel in plea bargaining.


Former Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The lower court dismissed Coleman's claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claim was properly dismissed because his employer is a state agency.

No, in a 5-4 decision. In the plurality opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the self-care provision, standing alone, did not validly abrogate Maryland's immunity from suits for damages. Justice Kennedy argued that Congress' evidence failed to show a pattern of state constitutional violations when it wrote the self-care provision; instead, Congress considered evidence that men and women are on medical leave in roughly equal numbers. In contrast, Congress often referred to its concerns about discrimination against women when constructing the family-care portion of the act. Hence, the self-care leave provision was not a congruent and proportional response to discriminatory conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not abrogate Maryland's sovereign immunity.

Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, arguing that Congress also failed to show a pattern of state discriminatory practice when it enacted the family-care provision.

Justice Antonin Scalia agreed in the judgment and wrote a special concurrence, arguing that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment only allows Congress to regulate conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen Bryer and by Justices Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor as to all but Footnote 1, dissented. Looking to the Family and Medical Leave Act's history, Justice Ginsburg argued that the act as a whole was directed at sex discrimination. She argued that Congress presented ample evidence of a pattern of discrimination against pregnant women, by definition discrimination on the basis of sex. By mandating self-care leave for everyone, Congress intended to prevent further discrimination against pregnant women without discriminating against other sick persons.


First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards

Aaron M. Panner
Jeffrey A. Lamken
Anthony A. Yang

Ohio resident Denise Edwards bought title insurance from First American Financial Corp. through a referral from Tower City, the title company that conducted the closing on her home purchase. Edwards later filed a lawsuit against First American Title Insurance Co. and its parent, the First American Corp., under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), alleging that First American improperly paid millions of dollars to individual title companies and in exchange those title companies entered into exclusive referral agreements with First American. Edwards also filed a class action complaint. The district court denied Edwards' motions to certify a nationwide class of customers of First American's captive title agents and a class limited to customers of First American's Tower City subsidiary.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denials of class certification, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification of a nationwide class without allowing discovery and had abused its discretion in denying certification of the Tower City class.

Unanswered. In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.


Credit Suisse Securities LLC v. Simmonds

Christopher Landau
Jeffrey B. Wall
Jeffrey I. Tilden

Vanessa Simmonds alleged in 54 separate complaints that several investment banks shared in the profits of customers who received IPO allocations and sold their shares on the open market at higher prices. The lawsuits also claim the banks strategically allocated IPO shares to customers who would return the favor by giving the banks more business. Simmonds holds stock in the companies that issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She sent those companies letters demanding that they sue the underwriting banks for disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the companies declined, she invoked a provision of the Securities Exchange Act that allowed her to sue the banks herself. The banks argued that the lawsuits should be dismissed because they were filed after a two-year time statute of limitations for bringing an action under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said the suits were not too late because the time limit had been postponed. The court did dismiss 30 of Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds.

Yes and no. In a unanimous decision, Justice Antonin Scalia held that while the limitations period for Section 16(b) is subject to tolling, it is not automatically tolled until the filing of a Section 16(a) statement. Justice Scalia looked to the language of the statute, which specified that the two-year clock started from "the date such profit was realized," without reference to the filing statement. He rejected the Ninth Circuit's concern that persons could avoid the effects of Section 16(b) by failing to file statements and thus depriving prospective plaintiffs of needed information. He also rejected the Ninth Circuit's argument that the background rule of equitable tolling for fraudulent concealment operated to toll the limitations period until a defendant files a 16(a) statement, noting that a plaintiff typically must show that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. He noted that in cases of fraudulent concealment of facts, tolling ceases when a plaintiff discovers or should discover those facts.

The Court divided 4-4 on the question of how the usual rules of equitable tolling apply to the facts of the case, thus affirming without precedential effect the Ninth Circuit's ruling that 16(b) establishes a period of repose subject to tolling. Chief Justice John Roberts did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


A jury found Eric Greene guilty of second-degree murder and other crimes, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment because he participated in a grocery store robbery that left the owner dead. Greene was tried along with four co-defendants, two of whom made pretrial statements that linked Greene to the robbery. The prosecution used redacted versions of these statements as evidence, but because the co-defendants did not testify in court, Greene could not use cross-examination to challenge the statements.

Greene appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Among other arguments, he renewed his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, holding that the codefendants' confessions as redacted did not so clearly implicate Greene as to violate the Confrontation Clause and Greene then filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, again pressing his Confrontation Clause claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition but eight months later dismissed the appeal "as having been improvidently granted."

In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gray v. Maryland that the constitution forbids prosecutors from using redacted statements like those of Greene's co-defendants. Greene asked the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his conviction under a process known as "habeas corpus." By federal statute, habeas relief is allowed only when a state court violates "clearly established Federal law." The district court held that Greene could not rely on Gray because that decision was not "clearly established" when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

No. In a unanimous opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court held that under §2254(d), "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" includes only the Supreme Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court adjudications on the merits. Since the Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision predated the Supreme Court's decision in  Gray  by three months, the Third Circuit correctly held that  Gray  was not "clearly established Federal law" that would allow the federal court to grant Greene's application for a writ of habeas corpus.

Scalia further observed that Greene missed two opportunities to obtain relief under  Gray . Greene could have filed a petition for writ of certiorari after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, which would have likely produced a remand in light of the  Gray  decision. Greene also could have asserted  Gray  in a petition for post-conviction relief.


Stephen E. Eberhardt
Michael R. Dreeben
Miguel A. Estrada

These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.

Yes. In a 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the FSA's lower minimum sentences apply to offenders sentenced after the FSA's passage, even for crimes committed before its passage. In the Court's view, Congress clearly intended for the sentencing guidelines to apply to pre-Act offenders. The FSA is intended to create uniformity and proportionality in sentencing, a goal that would be undermined by applying the old sentencing guidelines after the Act's passage. Instead, applying the old sentencing guidelines would create the exact sentencing disparities that Congress tried to prevent with the FSA.

Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, concerned with the majority's finding of clear congressional intent. Rather than search for congressional intent, Justice Scalia focused on the text of the general saving statute. The saving statute maintains that the repeal of any statute will not extinguish liability or penalties incurred while the statute was still in effect, unless Congress expressly allows otherwise. Justice Scalia found no express showing that Congress intended for the FSA to extend to those who committed crimes under the prior sentencing statute; therefore the defendants should not be subject to the FSA. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.

Stephen M. Shapiro
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.
Richard P. Bress

Prometheus Laboratories Inc. patented steps of testing for proper dosages of drug treatments used to treat gastrointestinal diseases like Crohn's disease, and sued the Mayo Clinic when it attempted to use its own, similar test. A federal judge invalidated the patents, holding that the patent couldn't cover the body's reaction to drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which specializes in patent issues, overturned the lower court order.

No. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Stephen J. Breyer wrote a unanimous opinion reversing the lower court and holding that the processes involved in this test are unpatentable laws of nature. The success of a patent application cannot rely on the art of the drafter. The "steps" Promethus added to their application are merely instructions to apply the laws of nature. Past Supreme Court decisions also support the concern that allowing patents on laws of nature would unnecessarily inhibit further discovery.


Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.

Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy.

Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S

James F. Hurst
Benjamin J. Horwich
Mark A. Perry

Novo Nordisk sued Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for infringement in the wake of Caraco filing an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") for a generic version of the Type 2 diabetes drug Prandin. Caraco and Sun promptly countersued. While the litigation was pending, Novo changed the FDA Orange Book's use code — a description of the scope of the patent —undermining Caraco's argument that patent did not apply to the purpose for which the generic product would be marketed. Caraco filed a counterclaim requesting an order that would require Novo Nordisk to change back the use code.

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 authorized ANDA applicants to assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the brand to correct or delete submitted patent information on the grounds that the patent does not claim 1) the drug for which the brand's new drug application was approved or 2) an approved method of using the drug.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted the counterclaim and issued an injunction ordering Novo Nordisk to change the code. Novo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, arguing that the district court had abused its discretion. The Federal Circuit ruled in favor of Novo, holding that Caraco could only assert a counterclaim if Novo's patent did not claim any approved method of use.

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that the Hatch-Waxman Act allows counterclaims to challenge unpatented uses of generic drugs even if other approved uses are still under patent. Justice Kagan looked to the language and purpose of the statute, focusing on the meaning of the phrase, "the patent does not claim... an approved method of using the drug." While acknowledging that the words "not an" could be interpreted to mean "not any," as Novo suggested, Justice Kagan rejected Novo's argument that the counterclaim right evaporates if Novo has a patent over another use not claimed or contested by Caraco and Sun. She argued that the act's counterclaim provision essentially allows a generic drug marketer to challenge a brand's assertion of rights over whichever use the generic drug marketer wishes to pursue. Justice Kagan noted that if Congress intended Novo's "not any" interpretation, it could have used that exact phrasing.

Justice Kagan also held that Novo's use code was "patent information submitted by the brand under subsection (b) or (c)" for the purposes of the act. She pointed out that the use code describes the methods of use claimed in a patent, and must qualify as "patent information" under any ordinary understanding of that phrase. Looking to the Court's precedent, Justice Kagan determined that information "submitted under" a federal law suggests doing so in furtherance of or in compliance with a comprehensive scheme of regulation. Justice Kagan noted that subsections (b) and (c) provide the basis for the regulation requiring brands to submit use codes and dictate the form of those submissions; thus, a brand use code is "submitted under" sections (b) and (c). She rejected Novo's argument that congress only intended to allow generic drug marketers to correct improperly numbered or listed patents.


On November 6, 2006, Kouichi Taniguchi, a Japanese baseball player, visited the Marianas Resort and Spa in the Northern Mariana Islands. During a tour of the resort, Taniguchi fell through a wooden deck. Immediately after the accident, Taniguchi stated that he did not need medical attention. Two weeks later, he informed Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., the owner of the resort, that he had sustained injuries, which he claimed resulted in various medical expenses and loss of income.

Taniguchi subsequently brought a diversity lawsuit against Kan Pacific alleging negligence and seeking damages for losses suffered because of the accident. After discovery, the district court awarded summary judgment to Kan Pacific and awarded Kan Pacific litigation costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. During litigation, Kan Pacific spent $5,517.20 for the translation of contracts and other documents from Japanese to English. The district court included these costs in the award because it interpreted "compensation of interpreters" in U.S.C. § 1920(6), as including compensation for the translation of documents.

Taniguchi appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the award of $5,517.20 for the document translation. The court denied Taniguchi's petition for rehearing on May 11, 2011, and Taniguchi subsequently appealed.

No. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that Section § 1920(6) did not allow the district court to award Kan Pacific the costs of translating documents. Justice Alito described the history of the Court Interpreters Act, focusing on the original amendment adding the costs of compensating interpreters as a separate category of taxable costs that courts could award. Justice Alito noted that "interpreter" was not defined in the act itself or in any other relevant statutory provision.

Justice Alito then looked to the ordinary meaning of the word "interpreter" as defined by dictionaries in 1978, the year § 1920(6) was amended to its current form. He determined that dictionaries generally defined the term as a person who translates oral communication from one language to another. Legal dictionaries used similar definitions. While Webster's Third New International defined "interpreter" more broadly, its definition specified that the most common meaning was a person who translated orally. Justice Alito also looked to contextual evidence and to references to technical language in the act, concluding that congress intended to limit the term to oral communications.

While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a broader interpretation was more consistent with Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure -which gave broad discretion to courts in awarding costs- Justice Alito wrote that this discretion was limited by the costs allowed by congress. He argued that congress may have limited interpretation costs out of a concern about excessive costs to litigants, and that Kan Pacific failed to show that distinguishing translating from interpreting would be a frequent problem for trial courts.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Ginsburg argued that many dictionaries' definitions of "interpreter" included the translation of written documents. She pointed out that several federal courts also used similar definitions, and that courts have awarded the costs of translating documents for decades. Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of parties' access to translated documents, and that the line between translated and interpreted communications was not a clear one.


CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit card under the brand name Aspire Visa to consumers with low or weak credit scores through massive direct-mail solicitations and the Internet. CompuCredit marketed the card and the cards were issued by Columbus Bank and Trust. Wanda Greenwood and other consumers filed suit against Compucredit and Columbus alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The lawsuit claimed that the CompuCredit and Columbus' promotional materials were deceptive because they mentioned the credit card fees in small print, buried in other information and not in proximity to the representation that no deposit was required.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the credit providers' motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The majority explained that a party must adhere to an agreement to arbitrate claims "unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Accordingly, the "burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies."

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the disclosure provision of the Credit Repair Organizations Act ("CROA") does not supply consumers with a right to bring an action in a court of law. Rather, it merely imposes an obligation on credit repair organizations to give consumers a specific statement of legal rights described in the statute; the only consumer right it creates is the right to receive this statement. Justice Scalia rejected Greenwood's contention that the CROA overrides the Federal Arbitration Act's ("FAA") requirement that courts enforce arbitration agreements. He cited cases where the Court held that a formulation of a cause of action did not establish a congressional command to override the FAA.

Justice Scalia also argued that even if the CROA creates a nonwaivable right to judicial enforcement, this could include a judicial action involving initial adjudication through arbitration. He noted that arbitration agreements were commonplace when the CROA was enacted in 1996, and reasoned that congress would surely have been less obtuse if it intended to override all arbitration agreements with credit repair organizations.

Justice Sonia Sotomayer concurred, joined by Justice Elena Kagan. Justice Sotomayer argued that Greenwood and CompuCredit's interpretations of the CROA were equally compelling given the lack of clear congressional intent. Hence, precedent requires that CompuCredit prevails, because the burden of showing congress disallowed arbitration lies with Greenwood. She also, however, rejected the majority's notion that congress must speak so explicitly to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.

Justice Ruth Ginsburg dissented, rejecting the majority's formalistic interpretation of the CRO; here, congress' intended target was vulnerable consumers likely to read the words "right to sue" to mean the right to litigate in court. She distinguished the case from other decisions holding that a statutory right of action does not preclude arbitration agreements, noting that the CROA specifically refers to a "right to sue", mandates that consumers be informed of this right, and precludes the waiver of any "right" conferred by the act.


Michael B. Elgin, Aaron Lawson, Henry Tucker, and Christon Colby, the petitioners, were all federal employees. Each man was terminated or constructively terminated under 5 U.S.C. § 3328, after the Office of Personnel Management determined that he was ineligible for federal employment under 5 U.S.C. § 3328 for failing to have registered for the selective service between the ages of 18 and 26.

Elgin initially challenged his termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board, which has jurisdiction over challenged terminations of federal employees under certain conditions under the Civil Service Reform Act. On November 16, 2007, the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissed Elgin's appeal because it lacked jurisdiction over appeals where employees were terminated under absolute statutory prohibitions and that it lacked the power to rule on the constitutionality of a statute.

On December 28, 2007, Elgin and the other petitioners joined and brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 5 U.S.C. § 3328 to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They claimed that the statute was an unlawful Bill of Attainder, and that the statute violated the petitioners' rights to equal protection based on sex. Both sides moved for summary judgment as to certain issues, and the court granted the petitioner's motion by finding that the law was a Bill of Attainder and granted part of the respondents' motion by finding that the law was not a violation of the petitioners' rights to equal protection. The government filed a motion for reconsideration as to whether the statute was a Bill of Attainder, and also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The district court held that it did have jurisdiction, but, on reconsideration, determined that the statute was not a Bill of Attainder.

Petitioners appealed the district court's decisions dismissing the equal protection claim and granting the motion for reconsideration on the Bill of Attainder claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Circuit confirmed the lower court's decision as to dismissal of the claims, and a divided court found that the district court did not have jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. The petitioners appealed in order to settle the question of jurisdiction.

The Civil Service Reform Act precludes jurisdiction. Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the First Circuit. The Court held that the Act precluded the federal district courts from hearing Elgin's claim even though Elgin brought a constitutional challenge. There is no textual basis to support Elgin's argument that the Act contains an exception for constitutional challenges to federal statutes. Justice Thomas argued that carving out an exception for constitutional challenges would undermine the act's purpose of creating of an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review for aggrieved federal employees. The Act does not foreclose all judicial review of Elgin's claim. Instead, the Act directs it to the U. S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit..

Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. dissented, arguing that congress did not intend for the MSPB to hear constitutional challenges. The MSPB lacks the authority and ability to properly adjudicate federal constitutional challenges. Also, Congress did not expressly limit the federal courts' ability to hear constitutional challenges related to federal employment. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


Charles Rehberg, a forensic accountant, discovered evidence of unethical billing practices at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital in Albany, Georgia. He publicized his findings by sending a series of anonymous faxes to the hospital. As a "favor" to the hospital, former Georgia District Attorney Kenneth Hodges and Chief Investigator James Paulk began investigating Rehberg for allegedly sending harassing e-mail messages and faxes to hospital administrators. In the course of their investigation, Hodges wrote and issued subpoenas to Rehberg's Internet service provider to obtain copies of Rehberg's e-mails, which were given to private investigators. Hodges and Paulk later secured three grand jury indictments against Rehberg, which were all subsequently dismissed.

Rehberg filed a civil suit against Hodges, Paulk, and specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke alleging, among other things, that they conspired to violate his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining his e-mails through a subpoena. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision.

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court held that a witness in a grand jury proceeding is entitled to the same absolute immunity from a § 1983 action as a witness who testifies at trial. Justice Alito looked to the Court's treatment of immunity in § 1983 suits. He determined that the Court has consistently interpreted § 1983 in the light of common law principles, using those principles to identify the government functions considered so important and vulnerable to interference by litigation that they require some form of absolute immunity. Justice Alito noted that witnesses at trial historically enjoy immunity by this reasoning.

Justice Alito then turned to the Court's ruling in Briscoe v. LaHue, where it held that a trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any § 1983 claim based on the witness' testimony. He reasoned that the justifications for granting trial witnesses absolute immunity apply to grand jury witnesses because in both contexts a witness' fear of retaliatory litigation might deprive the tribunal of critical evidence.

Justice Alito rejected Rehberg's argument that law enforcement witnesses require less protection from litigation because they are less likely to be intimidated by the threat of suit and because their testimony is potentially more damaging. He responded that police officers testify frequently and that potential civil suits could improperly influence decisions on appeal and for collateral relief. Justice Alito also rejected Rehberg's argument that a "complaining witness" is not shielded by absolute immunity. He emphasized that testifying at trial was not a necessary characteristic of the traditional complaining witness, and that no modern grand jury witness plays a similar role in procuring arrests and initiating prosecutions.


Patricia A. Millett
Jonathan F. Mitchell
Ann O'Connell Adams

Raphael Arriaza Gonzalez was convicted of murder in Texas state court on June 14, 2005, and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He filed an appeal to the Texas intermediate court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction on July 12, 2006. Gonzalez's counsel did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals within the 30-day timeframe permitted by state law. 2. On July 19, 2007, Gonzalez filed in Texas state court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied that petition on the merits on November 21, 2007. On January 24, 2008, Gonzalez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Yes and Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote for the majority. The Court held that the fact that the certificate of appealability did not indicate a constitutional issue did not deprive the court of appeals of jurisdiction because Section 2253(c)(3) is a nonjurisdictional rule. The Court further held that the judgment becomes final for the purpose of Section 2244(d)(1) when the time for seeking review by the state's highest court expires.

Justice Antonin Scalia dissented. He stated that the purpose of Section 2253(c) was to prevent appeals from denials of relief in habeas without the clear identification of a constitutional issue.


Timothy T. Coates
Sri Srinivasan
Paul R. Q. Wolfson
Paul Rq Wolfson

Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Curt Messerschmidt prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jerry Bowen's foster mother. Bowen was suspected of assaulting his former girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun. The affidavit requested a night search because Bowen had gang ties, so that a surprise search at night would be safer for the community and the personnel serving the search warrant. The warrant was reviewed by a sergeant, a police lieutenant and a deputy district attorney before it was presented to, and signed by, a judge. Officers executed the warrant in the early morning hours. The homeowner, Augusta Millender, and her family responded by filing suit under for alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, for conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights based on race, and for related state-law claims.

The district court found the warrant valid, Messerchmidt's conduct reasonable and that probable cause existed to believe that Bowen was at the residence and that nighttime service was appropriate. As to the scope of the warrant, however, the district court found it overbroad. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and remanded the action with directions. The court held that law enforcement officers were entitled to qualified immunity where they reasonably relied on a deputy attorney general and a judge to restrict an overbroad search warrant's scope to items supported by probable cause.

Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. delivered the opinion of the court, which reversed the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court held that qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when their conduct does not violate any clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known. The Court further determined that the officers in this instance acted in a reasonable manner.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer wrote separately to emphasize that the multiple facts together made it reasonable for an officer to believe that it was reasonable to search for all firearms and for evidence of gang-related activity.

Justice Elena Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Kagan agreed with the Court's determination that a reasonable police officer could have thought that there was enough probable cause to authorize a search for all firearms. However, she disagreed with the Court's determination that a reasonable police officer could believe that there was enough probable cause to authorize a search for all evidence of gang membership.

Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority's assertion that the conduct of the police officers was objectively reasonable because the officer's search included a search for evidence unrelated to the specific crime the officers were investigating.


Cory Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama jury in 1997. Alabama does not provide death row inmates with lawyers to appeal their convictions and sentences; they must rely on pro bono lawyers to represent them on appeal. Two associates from Sullivan & Cromwell, a New York law firm, agreed to represent Maples without charge. However the two associates subsequently left the firm, and when the Alabama court sent two copies of a ruling in Maples' case to the firm's mailroom it sent them back unopened. The firm had not notified the court or the mailroom that new lawyers had stepped in.

When Maples learned of the missed deadline, he immediately informed his step-mother, who contacted Sullivan & Cromwell. Other attorneys at that firm then sought leave to file an appeal notwithstanding the missed deadline, but that request was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court and later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also declined to waive the deadline for filing an appeal in his case.

No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court reversing the appellate court's holding. After a critical discussion of Alabama's practices regarding post-conviction representation, the Court held that cause for a procedural default exists when something external to a petitioner impedes the petitioner's efforts to comply with a State's procedural rules. The Court noted that attorney negligence generally does not constitute cause, because an attorney is said to be the agent of the attorney's client which means that the client is responsible for the attorney's negligence. However, the court noted that in this case, Maples' attorneys' negligent actions did constitute cause because the attorneys effectively severed the principal agent relationship by abandoning Maples. In the case of the Alabama attorney, the Court determined his role to be so minimal that that it stated that the Alabama attorney never truly began to have an attorney client relationship.

Justice Samuel Alito wrote a concurring opinion. The justice agreed that the petitioner effectively lacked legal representation. However, he emphasized that the Alabama system of relying on out-of-state lawyers for post conviction death penalty appeals was not to blame for Maples' misfortune, but that Maples' misfortune was the result of a unique set of circumstances.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. The Justice agreed with the principal that a court could excuse a procedural default due to abandonment by an attorney and that the two out-of-state attorneys of record abandoned representation of Maples. However, he disagreed with the Court's conclusion that Maples was left unrepresented during the relevant window. Instead, he concluded that Maples continued to be represented by the law firm Sullivan & Cromwell as well as the Alabama attorney John Butler.


Robert D. Bartels
Kent E. Cattani
Jeffrey B. Wall

Luis Mariano Martinez is serving two consecutive terms of 35 years to life, following his conviction for two counts of sexual conduct with a person under 15. On direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Martinez' conviction, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. Martinez then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in the first post-conviction relief proceeding in which he could present a claim of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since there is no right to appointment of counsel during a defendant's post-conviction relief petition there is no right to effective assistance of counsel.

Yes. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court carved out an exception to its holding in Coleman v. Thompson, which held that attorney errors in post-conviction hearings do not qualify as cause to excuse procedural defaults. Justice Kennedy declined to answer whether this exception was required by the Constitution. Instead, he distinguished the initial-review collateral hearing from other postconviction review hearings because in the former an attorney's error will likely preclude state courts at any level from further reviewing a prisoner's claims. Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's ruling does not upset stare decisis because the prisoner in Coleman was not claiming ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral hearing.

Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, dissented. He accused the majority of creating a constitutional right to effective counsel in all collateral hearings.


Steven J. Wells
Benjamin J. Horwich
Susan K. Smith

The National Meat Association contends that the Federal Meat Inspection Act prevents California from imposing its requirements on federally inspected slaughterhouses. In 2008, the state enacted the law after the Humane Society of the United States released a video of so-called downer cows being kicked, electrocuted, dragged with chains and rammed with a forklift at a slaughterhouse. The California law bans slaughterhouses from buying or selling downer cows and from butchering them for human consumption. The measure also requires humane handling of the animals.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to grant a preliminary injunction blocking the law. Although the court said the humane-handling provision probably was pre-empted by federal law, the three-judge panel declined to block it, saying the trade group hadn't shown its members would suffer "irreparable injury."

Yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Elena Kagan, Court reversed the lower court, holding that the Federal Meat Inspection Act's preemption clause applied broadly to any additional or different regulations a state imposes on slaughterhouses. The act prevails even where state law does not conflict with the federal act. The Court rejected arguments that the Act did not apply to animals rendered non-ambulatory before reaching the slaughterhouse. The Court also held that the criminal penalties imposed by the state law were more than a mere incentive to improve humane animal slaughter practices.


On November 28, 2007, Alex Blueford and a friend of his were left in charge of the 20-month-old son of Blueford's live-in girlfriend. Approximately one hour after being left with the child, Blueford's friend called emergency services because the child was having difficulty breathing. The child died two days after being rushed to the hospital. A medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was a close head injury, and the State of Arkansas subsequently brought several charges against Blueford for the death of the child.

The state charged Blueford with capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider each charge one at a time, and to consider the greater offenses before lesser offenses. After over four hours of deliberation, the jury returned. The forewoman stated that the jury was deadlocked. The Judge asked the forewoman about each charge, and she stated that the jury was unanimously against the capital murder charge, unanimously against the first-degree murder charge, and deadlocked on the manslaughter charge. The jury returned for further deliberation but remained deadlocked. The judge released the jury, and the court declared a mistrial.

The state sought to retry Blueford on all charges. Blueford filed a motion to dismiss the capital murder and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the jury had made a decision on those two counts. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the juror's communication to the judge was a casual communication and not an acquittal. Blueford made an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion. After the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford's petition for rehearing, Blueford appealed the decision.

No and yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prohibit Arkansas from retrying Blueford on charges of capital and first-degree murder. Chief Justice Roberts rejected Blueford's argument that the jury actually acquitted him of capital and first-degree murder. He determined that the forewoman's report was not a final resolution of anything, reasoning that the jury instructions left the jury free to reconsider its vote on the capital and first-degree murder charges after the forewoman's report. Unlike cases where acquittal on lesser charges precluded retrial on greater charges, the jury's decision here was not final.

Chief Justice Roberts also held that the trial court's declaration of a mistrial was proper, rejecting Blueford's argument that there was not manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. Blueford conceded that a jury deadlock was the classic basis for declaring a mistrial, and accepted that a second trial on manslaughter and negligent homicide would not pose a double jeopardy problem. Although Blueford argued that the court should have given effect to the jury's unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder, Chief Justice Roberts noted that Arkansas law only allowed for a guilty verdict on one or more charges, or a complete acquittal on all charges.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan. She characterized the forewoman's announcements of unanimous votes on capital and first-degree murder as acquittals, arguing that Arkansas required a jury to acquit on greater charges before considering lesser charges. She also disagreed that the jury was free to reconsider its unanimous votes on the charges. Finally, Justice Sotomayor argued that manifest necessity required trial judges in acquittal-first jurisdictions to honor requests for a partial verdict before declaring a mistrial; moreover, there was no clear necessity for a mistrial.


Lynwood and Brenda Hall filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy and were forced to sell their family farm for $960,000 to settle their bankruptcy debts. That sale brought about capital gains taxes of $29,000. The Halls wanted the taxes treated as part of the bankruptcy, paying part of the debt and having the court discharge the rest. They argued that the taxes were dischargeable as a debt "incurred by the estate". The IRS objected to that plan, saying all of the taxes must be paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the Halls had to pay federal income tax on the gain from the sale of their farm during bankruptcy proceedings.

No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that there is no separately taxable estate in Chapter 12 bankruptcies, so the taxes in question were not "incurred by the estate". The debtor remains liable for these taxes independent of the bankruptcy proceedings. The Court noted that the Hall's position is sympathetic, but the plain language of the statute does not allow a ruling in their favor. Congress is free to amend the statute if they are unhappy with this result.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer dissented, arguing that the majority's decision goes against the purpose of Chapter 12, which is to allow family farmers to reorganize debts without losing their farms. Justice Breyer read the statute's language more broadly to fit this purpose and allow discharge of the tax debt. Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Kagan joined in the dissent.


Michael E. Manely
Nicole A. Saharsky
Stephen J. Cullen

In March 2006, U.S. Army sergeant Jeffrey L. Chafin married United Kingdom citizen Lynne Hales Chafin in Scotland. They had one child, who holds dual citizenship in the United States and the United Kingdom. In February 2010, Lynne Chafin traveled to Alabama with the couple's child and intended to return to Scotland in May 2010 for the child's schooling. Before they could leave the country, Jeffrey Chafin filed a divorce petition in the Alabama courts and sought emergency relief to prevent his wife from leaving the country with the child. The trial court ordered both parties to stay in the country with the child throughout the divorce proceeding. Lynne Chafin filed a motion in federal district court requesting to return to Scotland with the child and citing The Hague Convention ruling on international child abduction. The district court held that the child was being unlawfully detained in the United States and allowed Lynne Chafin to return to Scotland with the child. Jeffrey Chafin appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the issue as moot because the child had already returned to Scotland.

Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., in a unanimous opinion, vacated the Eleventh Circuit decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the controversy is not moot just because the child had already returned to Scotland. Jeffrey Chafin still maintains a valid claim in U.S. courts to have his child returned to the United States. Even though Lynne Chafin has returned to Scotland, U.S. courts continue to have personal jurisdiction over her. Therefore, a court has authority to issue an order for the child's return, regardless of Lynne's location. Even though Lynne may chose to defy the court's order, this does not necessarily render the case moot. Courts adjudicate disputes even where relief may not be likely or practical. A likelihood that Lynne will not comply with the order should not preclude Jeffrey from asserting his claims.


In 1941, the Georgia legislature enacted the Hospital Authorities Law, allowing the creation of hospital authorities as public bodies to oversee the public health needs of Georgia communities. The City of Albany and Dougherty County created the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County ("Authority"). Since its establishment, the Authority acquired hospitals throughout the area and leased the facilities to two non-profit corporations: Phoebe Putney Health System ("PPHS") and Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital ("PPMH"). In December 2010, PPHS presented to the Authority a plan to buy the only remaining hospital in the area, Palmyra Hospital. The Authority approved the plan in April 2011.

Following the approval, the petitioner Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") initiated an administrative proceeding to determine whether the plan would create a monopoly in the hospital services market in Dougherty County and the surrounding area. To ensure that the plan did not come into fruition prior to the FTC's final determination, the FTC filed suit against the respondents: the Authority, PPMH, PPHS, and Palmyra. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the state-action doctrine immunized the Authority and its operation of the hospitals from antitrust liability. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss and the FTC appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the lower court decision, holding that the legislature in its enactment of the Hospital Authorities Law must have anticipated the anti-competitive effects that the FTC alleged.

No. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, delivering a unanimous opinion, reversed the lower court's decision and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that state-action immunity does not apply because the Georgia legislature did not clearly articulate any intent to allow anticompetitive activity through the Hospital Authorities Law. A state legislature is not required to expressly state this intent. State-action immunity applies if the anticompetitive effect was a foreseeable result of the State's legislation. However, the Court found no evidence that the State anticipated, or even contemplated, that hospital authorities would displace competition. While the Hospital Authorities Law grants hospital authorities general powers to participate in the marketplace, it does not allow them to use those powers anticompetitively.


Charles J. Cooper
Theodore B. Olson
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr.

In 2000, the citizens of California passed Proposition 22, which affirmed a legal understanding that marriage was a union between one man and one woman. In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution required the term "marriage" to include the union of same-sex couples and invalidated Proposition 22. Later in 2008, California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that "only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California."

The respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the enforcement of California's marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

No, the petitioners do not have standing. The Court did not reach the question on the merits of the case. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal courts only have the authority to decide cases in which there is an "actual controversy," which means that the complaining party must have suffered a "concrete and particularized injury" that can be redressed through court action. In this case, because the petitioners had only a generalized grievance in the form of a desire to defend Proposition 8, they did not have standing under Article III. The Court also held that the petitioners could not invoke the standing of the state to appeal because a litigant must assert his/her own rights and cannot claim relief through the intervention of a third party. Because the petitioners did not have standing to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that court did not have jurisdiction to reach a decision on the case.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Supreme Court should defer to states' rights in defining what parties may have standing. Because California law allows a third party to assert the state's interest when state officials decline to do so, the California Supreme Court's decision regarding the petitioners' standing is binding. He also argued that the majority's decision does not take into account the particularities of California's initiative system and the dynamics that may lead the state to allow proponents of an initiative to stand in for the state. Article III does not interfere with a state's rights to allow such proponents to support an initiative in court. Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.


Anthony Kebodeaux was a registered sex offender. He served three years in prison in for his offense. After his release Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). When Kebodeaux moved from San Antonio, Texas to El Paso, Texas, he failed to update his residence in the registry within three days, as required, and was charged and convicted under SORNA. He appealed, arguing that the law was unconstitutional as it applied to him because regulating a sex offender's intrastate travel after being released from custody exceeds Congress' powers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that past commission of a federal crime is insufficient to permit the federal government to have unending criminal authority over Kebodeaux. While SORNA was unconstitutional under the circumstances of this case, the court did not question Congress' ability to place restrictions on federal prisoners after release, including requiring sex offenders convicted after SORNA to register intrastate changes of residence.

Yes, yes. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to enact SORNA and apply it in this case, despite the fact that Kebodeaux was convicted and served his time prior to SORNA's enactment. Although SORNA was not in effect when Kebodeaux was sentenced, his release was not conditional. Rather, he was subject to the Wetterling Act, a federal act that entailed similar registration requirements later enacted under SORNA. Because Kebodeaux was subject to federal requirements at the time of his release, it is within Congress' power to modify those requirements through SORNA and apply them to Kebodeaux. The Court also held that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Congress the power to create federal crimes and regulate their punishment, so SONRA did not represent Congress overstepping its bounds.

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate the conduct of members of the military and impose penalties if those regulations are disobeyed. This power, in addition to the Necessary and Proper Clause, gave Congress the authority to act in this case. However, he argued that the majority's opinions analysis of the benefits of the registration requirement are unnecessary to reach the decision in the case and stray too far into justification for a federal police power. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power to require the registration of members of the military who have been convicted of sex crimes as the gap between military and state laws often does not allow the state to do so.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that an act intended to execute a power of Congress is only necessary and proper if the power is as well. Because it is not clear that the Wetterling Act's registration requirement is a valid Congressional power, SORNA's modification and execution of that power is equally unsure. In his separate dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that SORNA's registration requirements are unconstitutional because they do not execute any Congressional powers explicitly granted by the Constitution. Instead, SORNA represents an unconstitutional usurpation of state powers regarding sex offender registration. Although Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of members of the military, once Kebodeaux became a civilian, there is no justification for the involvement of the federal government. Justice Antonin Scalia partially joined in the dissent.


Floyd Perkins was convicted for the murder of Rodney Henderson in Michigan state court. The conviction became final on May 5, 1997 and under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Perkins should have filed a writ of habeas corpus by May 5, 1998, but he did not file until July 13, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. Perkins claimed problems with the sufficiency of evidence, jury instruction, trial procedure, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition as barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations. Perkins objected, arguing that the "new evidence" provision, which extends the statute of limitations to one year from when the "factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence", applied.

In support of his objection, Perkins produced three previously unpresented affidavits that alluded to his innocence. The affidavits were signed in 1997, 1999 and 2002, so the district court denied the writ, holding that the ADEPA statute of limitations extension expired in 2003, one year after the last affidavit was signed. Perkins then asked the court to extend the statute of limitations because he was actually innocent of the crime. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the "new" evidence was not the type needed to pursue an actual innocence claim, and even if it were, Perkins did not pursue his claims with reasonable diligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that tolling the statute of limitations requires parties to be reasonably diligent in pursuit of their claims, no court has analyzed whether actual innocence claims must be pursued in the same way.

No, yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a credible showing of actual innocence allows a petitioner to pursue habeas corpus relief on the merits of the case regardless of any procedural bar, such as a statute of limitations. The miscarriage of justice exception that allows petitioners to pursue cases that would otherwise be dismissed as untimely demonstrates clear congressional intent to allow petitioners arguing actual innocence to do the same. The Court also held that, to prove the actual innocence claim, the petitioner must prove that it is more likely than not that a reasonable juror would not convict in light of the new evidence. Under this burden of proof, unexplained delay may impact the petitioner's credibility but does not necessarily defeat the claim.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congress enacted a valid barrier to habeas corpus relief, and the majority's opinion does not have the authority to overrule Congress. He argued that the Supreme Court does not have the legislative power to create an exception where one does not exist. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.