Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.

The Court found the Maryland law to be invalid. The Court decision reflected a concern that the statute provides the danger of "unduly suppressing protected expression." The board was allowed overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory provisions for judicial participation in the the procedure to prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as adequate safeguards to protect against the "undue inhibition of protected expression." These guidelines are to: (1) place the burden of proving the film is unprotected expression on the censors, (2) require judicial determination to impose a valid determination, and (3) require prompt determination "within a specified time period."


In 1961, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, was under martial law as a result of the riots that  started when groups of Freedom Riders arrived at the Greyhound Bus Station. On May 25, 1961, a military convoy escorted Ralph D. Abernathy, an African-American pastor from Montgomery, and 10 others (both African-American and white) to the bus terminal. The group purchased tickets, and all 11 went to sit at the lunch counter.  There were at least 30 people in the station and several hundred people outside who could see through the plate-glass windows to the lunch counter. Given the tense atmosphere in the city and particularly at the bus station, Colonel Poarch of the National Guard directed the Sheriff of Montgomery County to arrest the eleven men. In his opinion, their actions seemed “calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.”

Abernathy was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on charges of disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly. He appealed the case and argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the judgments of the Court of Appeals of Alabama.

Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


Victor Linkletter was convicted in state court on evidence illegally obtained by police prior to the Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, denying the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. Linkletter argued for a retrial based on the Mapp decision.

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Constitution neither prohibited nor required "an absolute rule of retroaction." Only a case-by-case examination of the rules in question was required. The Court reasoned that police misconduct prior to Mapp had already occurred and would not be corrected by releasing the prisoners involved. The Court also argued that applying the Mapp decision retroactively to all cases would threaten the "delicate state-federal relationship" and would "tax the administration of justice to the utmost." Only cases on direct review at the time of the Mapp ruling or later cases would be subject to retroactive consideration.


After a flood, the Small Business Administration made a disaster loan to Ethel May Yazzel and her husband to cover damages to their shop. The mortgage securing the loan referred to Texas law. When the Yazzel's defaulted on the loan, the U.S. Government sued to collect the balance due. Mrs. Yazzel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Texas law of coverture meant the contract was not enforceable against her personally. Under the law of coverture, a woman's legal rights are subsumed by her husband upon marriage. The Government argued that federal law, which would not recognize coverture, applied because there was an overwhelming federal interest. The district court granted summary judgment and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Texas law. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority holding that there was no overwhelming federal interest. The Government had voluntarily negotiated the contract knowing of the references to Texas law. The Court also noted there was no federal law, regulation, or contractual provision that allowed for application of federal law in this case.

Justice John M. Harlan wrote a special concurrence stating that Texas law applied whether the contract referred to Texas law or not because the state interest in family property arrangement was greater than the federal interest. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent stating that federal law should apply because the loan was from the federal government and is, therefore, a federal matter.


Morris A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a "full investigation" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority. The Supreme Court determined there was not a sufficient investigation prior to the juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction. Kent did not receive a hearing, access to counsel, or access to his record prior to the waiver. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the waiver was proper. Because Kent was 21 years old at the time of this decision, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction if the waiver was proper. In light of this, the Court ordered that the conviction be vacated if the waiver was improper and sustained if proper.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent stating he would vacate the judgment and remand the case for reconsideration in light of two recent decisions by the court of appeals. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice John M. Harlan, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City

Graham v. John Deere Co. was a suit for the infringement of a patent that consisted of a combination of old mechanical elements for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil in order to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way." Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid. The parties in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 37) and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 43) sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on finger-operated sprayers with a "hold-down" cap issued to Cook Chemical. The District Court and the Court of Appeals sustained the patent.

Yes and no. In an opinion delivered by Justice Tom C. Clark, the Court held that the Patent Act of 1952 did not lower the standards required for the patentability of an invention by adding an inquiry into obviousness to the statutory requirements of novelty and utility. The Court found that section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act Congress added the statutory nonobvious subject matter requirement, the determination of which is made after establishing the scope and content of prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. The Court concluded that the patents do not meet the test of the "nonobvious" nature of the "subject matter sought to be patented" to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art and were therefore invalid. This affirmed the decision in Graham v. John Deere Co. and reversed the other two.


On the night of October 10, 1960, Internal Revenue Service agents, along with a state patrol officer, went to the site of the "Apinook Mill" in Jarrett City, Connecticut. Agents gained entrance to the grounds, smelled the distinctive odor of ground mash indicating the presence of a still, and visually confirmed the presence of a column still in building 9A. The federal agents then applied for a warrant, after noting that the Treasury Department had not registered the still in question. The warrant was granted on October 11th.

On October 13th, federal agents entered building 9A by force after demanding entry and hearing no reply. They discovered an operating still inside, and found Frank Romano and John Ottiano standing nearby. Ottiano had the key to the facility on his person. Romano stated that he had been at the site for four days and claimed not to know how long the operation had existed.

Section 5601(b)(1) of the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958 ("ETTCA"), established a presumption of guilt for anyone shown to be at the place or site of an unregistered still. Section 5601(b)(1) was an amendment to Section 5601(a)(1), which defines the crime of possessing an unregistered still.

The United States charged Romano and Ottiano with three counts: possession of an illegal still, the illegal production of distilled spirits, and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Judge T. Emmet Clarie instructed the jury with a verbatim reading of the relevant provisions of the ETTCA. The jury found both men guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Romano and Ottiano to concurrent sentences on all three counts and fined them for possession of the unregistered still.

Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed the sentences for possession and illegal production of spirits. He held that the trial court's application of Section 5601(b)(1) was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment due process rights. He reasoned that the inference of possession did not necessarily follow from a defendant's presence, given that the defendant could be a purchaser of the product or simply a visitor to the site.

No and yes. Writing for a unanimous court with three concurrences, Justice Byron White held that the jury could not simply infer possession from Romano and Ottiano's presence at the still. Romano and Ottiano's presence near the still created a rebuttable presumption; hence, the jury was improperly instructed that presence necessarily required a finding of guilt. Justice White rejected the government's argument that the amendment signified Congress' intention to overrule Section 5601(a)(1), effectively equating presence with possession. He found no evidence of this intention in the legislative history and noted that the government presented no cases where possession of a substance was proven solely by a defendant's presence near that substance.

The Court did not rule on Romano and Ottiano's charge for production of distilled spirits because its sentence was concurrent with the conspiracy charge, which was not at issue. Justice Hugo Black concurred. Referring to his dissent in United States v. Gainey, he held that the statute itself was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment right to due process, right against self-incrimination, and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury because the statute compels defendants to testify in order to rebut a presumption of guilt.

Justice William Douglas also concurred. He referred to his own dissent in Gainey, where he interpreted Section 5601(b)(1) as a description of a rule of evidence allowing but not mandating a jury to infer possession from a defendant's presence near an unregistered still.

Justice Abraham Fortas concurred without comment.


In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari.

Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.


The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, federal examiners were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.

The Fifteenth Amendment is a valid constitutional basis for the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Warren, the Court upheld the Act as constitutional. Noting that the enforcement clause of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress "full remedial powers" to prevent racial discrimination in voting, the Act was a "legitimate response" to the "insidious and pervasive evil" which had denied blacks the right to vote since the Fifteenth Amendment's adoption in 1870.

Justice Black dissented in part. He argued that while he would have upheld most of the Act, he would have struck down certain provisions as beyond the scope of Congress’s power.


Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on federal narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that the new indictment was not barred by the Sixth or Fifth Amendment. The right to speedy trial depends on the circumstances of the case. The Court also held that Ewell and Dennis were not prejudiced by the new indictments. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the result, but expressed his disapproval at the government’s actions.

Justice Abe Fortas dissented, arguing that due process prevents the government from indicting an individual after vacation of that individual’s conviction arising out of the same transaction. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


Standard Oil of Kentucky was charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word “refuse” meant “rejected matter,” which the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the statute was meant to prevent pollution, and therefore must be read in a broader sense. The effect of the oil on the waterway is the same whether it was useable or not, so it should be treated the same way under the statute. The Court also held that there was legislative precedent for not creating a distinction between valuable and valueless substances deposited in waterways.

Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent where he argued that the determination of whether or not the statute should encompass all pollutants is a decision for Congress, not the courts. He argued that the majority’s opinion misconstrued the wording of the statute, which, based on legislative history, was meant to refer to obstructions to navigation rather than pollution. He further argued that when there is doubt as to the exact meaning of a statute, the courts should err on the side of a narrow reading. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board

On November 22, 1950, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order requiring the Communist Party to register under Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) as a Communist-action organization. The Court sustained this order in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board. On May 31, 1962, the Attorney General separately required William Albertson and Roscoe Quincy Proctor, as alleged members of the Communist Party, to fill out two registration forms each. Neither registration form was specifically mandated by the SACA.

Albertson and Proctor did not provide personal information required by the forms, instead asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the board and denying that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization. The Attorney General presented the testimony of paid Federal Bureau of Investigation informers that Albertson and Proctor participated in meetings of the Party and had been elected to Party offices. The board took official note of the proceedings and issued a final order stipulating that petitioners had not properly registered as members of the Communist Party. On appeal, the court held that Albertson and Proctor’s claims of privilege were premature in part because they had not yet been prosecuted for a criminal activity.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held both that the petitioners’ claim of self-incrimination was ripe for decision and that SACA’s registration requirement for individuals violated the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan noted that SACA clearly implied a duty to file registration, in this case the specific form crafted by the Attorney General. He rejected the government’s argument that individuals could choose to incompletely fill out the form, asserting privilege as to some of the questions but not others. Justice Brennan reasoned that such a possibility might be constitutionally adequate if the registration was neutral on its face, but here Albertson and Proctor would be admitting to an element of a crime. Justice Brennan also rejected the government’s assertion that SACA’s immunity provision protected Albertson and Proctor from self-incrimination. He noted that SACA only provided that registration shall not constitute per se evidence of criminal guilt; thus, registration could still be used as evidence of guilt. The Court reversed the lower court’s decision and set aside the Board’s orders.

Justice Byron White concurred. He noted his previous objection to SACA’s registration provisions while serving as Attorney General. Justice White previously cautioned that SACA likely violated individuals’ freedom of speech, of assembly, and the privilege against self-incrimination.


A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts

A special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings against an "obscene" book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. The book, also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750. Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene.

The Court held that the Massachusetts courts erred in finding Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure to be obscene. The Court, applying the test for obscenity established in Roth v. United States, held that the book was not "utterly without redeeming social value." The Court reaffirmed that books could not be deemed obscene unless they were unqualifiedly worthless, even if the books possessed prurient appeal and were "patently offensive."


Frank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer’s performance as Supervisor of the Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt’s appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that there must be evidence that the libelous statements are directed specifically at the public official in question, and not the governmental body in general. Since the trial judge permitted the jury to award damages based on the finding that Baer was one member of a governmental organization that was libeled, the Court held that the jury instructions were erroneous, and the judgment should be overturned. The Court also held that the public official must establish the statements were made with actual malice, according to the definition set out in New York Times v. Sullivan.

Justice Tom C. Clark concurred in the decision.

Justice William O. Douglas concurred and argued that the term “public official” is not one that appears in the Constitution and therefore does not need to be as narrowly defined as the Court makes it. He also argued that the First Amendment should bar Congress from enacting any federal libel laws, so the discussion should be surrounding public issues rather than public officials.

In his concurrence, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the Constitution prevents state defamation laws from being converted into laws against seditious libel. He argued that the ruling protects a private individual’s reputation while upholding a high standard of proof for a public official’s defamation suit.

Justice Black concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that the First Amendment protects speech that is critical of the government and argued that the majority’s opinion in both New York Times v. Sullivan and this case did not go far enough in protecting that right. Justice William O. Douglas joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.

In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the majority opinion’s rule that the jury cannot convert “impersonal” libel to “personal” libel misconstrues tort law. Under conventional tort law, there may be recovery if the group is specific enough to be understood to apply to a specific individual.

Justice Abe Fortas wrote a jurisdictional dissent and argued that certiorari was improvidently granted. He wrote that, because the original trial and decision occurred before the Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, that ruling should have no effect on this case.


The Clayton Antitrust Act ("Clayton Act") was enacted by Congress in 1914 to prevent anticompetitive practices in business. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act halted the running of the statute of limitations on pending claims arising from the act. It also specified a four-year statute of limitations for these causes of action.

On September 28, 1956, Marc D Leh brought an action against General Petroleum Corportation and five other petroleum manufacturers alleging injury to his business caused by a conspiracy or combination to exclude Leh from engaging in wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California. He alleged that this conspiracy began in 1948; all parties agreed that Leh's right to initiate a cause of action began in February of 1954. Leh anticipated a statute of limitations problem under California law, as California's Code of Civil Procedure specified a one-year statute of limitations for penal causes of action, in contrast to the Clayton Act's four-year limit. Hence, Leh cited to United States v. Standard Oil, in which the United States alleged a conspiracy to control prices among a nearly identical set of defendants and successfully applied the Clayton Act's longer limit.

District court Judge William Mathes ruled in favor of General Petroleum, holding that the tripling of damages was a penalty, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations under California law. The court also held that the Clayton Act did not apply to the claim --distinguishing on the facts from Standard Oil -- primarily because Leh did not allege that the defendants combined to control prices, did not name the same set of defendants, and did not allege a similar period of conspiracy. Judge Stanley Barnes of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. Judge Barnes affirmed the lower court's interpretation of California law, and that the application of the Clayton Act used in Standard Oil did not apply here because the facts were not similar enough to justify collateral estoppel.

Yes and yes. Justice Thomas White, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Leh is not required to allege equivalent means, objectives and conspiracy to rely on Standard Oil. Relying on the Court's 1965 decision in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., Justice White emphasized giving effect to the broad terms of the Clayton Act and Congress' belief that antitrust litigation is one of the surest weapons for effective enforcement of antitrust laws. He noted that six of the seven defendants were named in both Leh's claim and the United States' in Standard Oil, and that the United States similarly alleged an intention to eliminate the competition of independent refiners. Thus, Leh's pending case halted the tolling of the statute of limitations under the Clayton Act, and his claim was still valid.

Justices John Harlan and Abraham Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


The Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested "for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an officer."

The divided Court found that the actions of the police violated the Constitution. Justice Fortas argued that states may only regulate the use of public facilities in a "reasonably nondiscriminatory manner, equally applicable to all." Maintaining separate library facilities clearly violated this principle. Fortas also reasoned that the demonstration did not disturb the peace of other library patrons or disrupt the library's activities; the time and method of the sit-in were carefully chosen and executed. Justice Black dissented, joined by three other justices. He argued that the First Amendment "does not guarantee to any person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas."


Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that although circulars themselves may not be obscene, their public mailing offends the federal obscenity statute if they advertise obscene materials. The Court reasoned that where the sole emphasis of an advertisement is the commercial exploitation of erotica for prurient appeal, it shall be deemed "pornographic" communication that lies beyond the scope of First Amendment speech protections. The Court cautioned, however, that the distribution of materials containing sexuality in the context of art, literature, or science is not per se prohibited under the obscenity statute if it can be shown to advance human knowledge or understanding.


Virginia resident Annie Harper could not pay the state-imposed poll tax of $1.50. She filed suit, alleging the poll tax deprived indigent Virginia residents of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court dismissed her claim, based in part on a 1937 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that had ruled poll taxes to be within the powers of the states.

In a 6–3 decision authored by Justice William Douglas, the Court held the poll tax violated the Equal Protection Clause. Overruling its own precedent in Breedlove v. Suttles (1937), the majority reasoned that the eligibility to vote has no rational connection to the wealth of an individual. Thus, the poll tax could not meet the heightened standard of review applied to restrictions on voting, which is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. It is important to note that there was no textual basis for this stark reversal, since the Twenty-fourth Amendment applied only to federal elections. This was an example of a situation in which the changing membership of the Court and changing attitudes in society propelled a change in the law.

Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the poll tax did pass the rational basis test. Harlan found that the state had a legitimate interest in collecting revenue. He felt that it was reasonable to think that people who were willing to pay to vote would have a greater interest in directing the course of state policy. According to Harlan, this type of classification was no less rational than the literacy test that the Court had upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (1959).

Justice Hugo Black also dissented, arguing for a stricter adherence to precedent and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. He articulated a more traditional understanding of the Constitution as susceptible to extension only by the legislative process.


On December 29, 1959, New York City police officers entered the Publishers Outlet, where they seized a number of books and magazines. On January 12, 1960, the police raided the basement below a printing shop belonging to Norman Levenberg. The police discovered, through Levenberg, that a number of books were kept for Edward Mishkin in a storage room. Also that day, officers entered Midget Book Shop, where they seized an additional number of books and magazines. On February 10, 1960, the police confiscated three books from the Main Stern Book Store. Levenberg later testified that Mishkin controlled all of the books, and that he operated both the Publishers’ Outlet and the Main Stern Book Store; officers indeed encountered Mishkin at both stores. In all, the police seized fifty books allegedly possessed by Mishkin.

The seized books were paper-bound “pulps,” and most had jackets with illustrations relating to the fictional subject matter within. The covers of nineteen of the books displayed illustrations of women being whipped, beaten, tortured or abused. Most of the book jackets depicted symbols associated with fetishism, such as leather boots, excessively tight clothing, black gloves, whips, masks and corsets. Some presented incidents of sexual seduction, transvestism, sodomy, rape and masturbation.

The state of New York charged Mishkin with multiple counts of  possessing obscene books, of hiring others to prepare obscene books, and of publishing obscene books. At trial, authors who worked under Mishkin for several years testified that he instructed them to fill the books with strong sexual material. Mishkin was convicted before a three-judge panel of the Court of Special Sessions. He was sentenced to a three-year prison term and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines. The appellate court affirmed Mishkin’s sentence, modifying the judgment to remove charges related to Mishkin’s failure to print the name and address of the publisher or printer on the books; the court held the statute requiring this action to be unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment, holding that the New York law forbidding obscene material itself did not violate Mishkin’s constitutional rights and was not unconstitutionally vague.

No, yes, and yes. The Court upheld Mishkin’s conviction, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Justice Brennan rejected Mishkin’s argument that the New York statute’s use of the terms “sadistic” and “masochistic” was impermissibly vague, because the state’s definition was narrower than used by the Court in Roth v. United States. The Court also rejected Mishkin’s argument that the material did not meet the Roth test’s prurient-appeal requirement in that it did not appeal to the prurient interests of the average person. The Court held that the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of material appeals to the prurient interests of members of a sexual subgroup. It pointed to evidence that Mishkin instructed the books to be specifically conceived and marketed to appeal to “sexually deviant groups”.

The Court also rejected Mishkin’s argument that there was insufficient proof that he knew the material was obscene. The Court noted Mishkin’s instructions to his artists and writers, his efforts to disguise his role in the enterprise by publishing the books anonymously, and the sheer volume of material. According to the Court, this evidence showed Mishkin was aware of the character of the material.

Justice Hugo Black dissented, arguing that the Court and lower federal courts are without power to censor obscene material regardless of its subject matter.

Justice Potter Stewart dissented, arguing that the material in question was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Justice William O. Douglas dissented, in a combined response to the majorities of Mishkin and Ginzburg v. United States. He referenced testimony at trial indicating that several of the books in question have redeeming social value. He also questioned New York's right to limit publishers' ability to cater to nonconformist groups.


After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In an 8-to-1 decision the Court found that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial. Noting that although freedom of expression should be given great latitude, the Court held that it must not be so broad as to divert the trial away from its primary purpose: adjudicating both criminal and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting. The Cleveland television media's repeated broadcasts of Sheppard confessing in detail to crimes he was later charged with, the blatant and hostile trial coverage by Cleveland's radio and print media, and the physical arrangement of the courtroom itself - which facilitated collaboration between the prosecution and present media - all combined to so inflame the jurors' minds against Sheppard as to deny him a fair trial. The Court concluded that the trial judge should have either postponed the proceedings or transferred them to a different venue.


On April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry’s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry’s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation.

Byars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry’s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, “You mean to say we can’t stand here on the sidewalk?” Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry’s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence.

On April 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder’s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars’ initially testified that the group’s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution’s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth’s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth’s applications for certiorari and rehearing.

Yes and yes. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Potter Stewart held that while both portions of the statute were facially constitutional, the trial court unconstitutionally applied the “obstructing free passage” portion of the ordinance. Justice Stewart noted that in Phifer v. City of Birmingham, the Alabama Court of Appeals later interpreted the statute to apply only when a person who obstructs free passage on a sidewalk also refuses to obey a request by an officer to move on. The trial court did not have this interpretation available to it, and it made no findings of fact and rendered no opinion. Justice Stewart inferred from this that the trial court may have applied an unconstitutionally literal interpretation of the statute, where either obstructing free passage on the sidewalk or disobeying a police order to move on would be sufficient for a finding of guilt.

Justice Stewart also held that the trial court unconstitutionally applied the "move on" portion of the ordinance to Shuttlesworth. Justice Stewart again referred to Phifer, where the Court held that the police order in question must be related to directing vehicular traffic because that section of the Birmingham General City Code was related to regulating vehicular traffic. In contrast, the record for Shuttlesworth’s case did not contain any evidence that Patrolman Byars was directing vehicular traffic.

Justice William Douglas concurred. He reasoned that Shuttlesworth could not have been blocking traffic when he was arrested because all other members of his group had left by that point.

Justice Abraham Fortas also concurred, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Justice Fortas would have finally reversed the conviction. While agreeing that the statute is constitutional on its face, he argued that there was no way the facts could be construed to show that Shuttlesworth and his group were actually obstructing the sidewalk. He accused Birmingham of using the statute as a pretext to lock up a notorious civil rights activist.


Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board.

Yes, not addressed, and yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that the indictment properly charged a conspiracy to defraud the United States Government under 18 U.S.C. 371. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Abe Fortas, argued that the conspiracy of filing the false affidavits was intentional and that the events of filing the affidavits and using the NLRB facilities together were a "concert of action" with the purpose of defrauding the Government. The Court refused to hear the question of the constitutionality of 9(h) as the union officers' attempt was to circumvent the law. The relevant standard, according to Fortas, is that the Court will not hear a constitutionality claim to supplant a "voluntary, deliberate, and calculated course of fraud and deceit," as conspiracy to defraud is not an appropriate way to challenge acts of government. The Court also held that the defense should have been allowed access to the grand jury minutes containing the prosecution witnesses' testimonies with an opportunity to question the witnesses regarding their statements. The majority opinion maintained that the union officers exceeded the particularized need standard that is used to evaluate access to grand jury testimony, and thus access should have been granted to the defense, especially as an evaluation is best made by a defense advocate and not a trial judge during in-camera inspection. Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo L. Black joined this part of the majority opinion but dissented from the remainder. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.


On June 21, 1964 Cecil Ray Price, a sheriff’s deputy, detained three civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, in the Neshoba County Jail, in Philadelphia, Mississippi. That night, Price released all three men from custody, and then drove his police cruiser to intercept them on Mississippi Highway 19. Price accosted the three men, placed them in his police car, and then drove them down an unpaved road. There Price and seventeen other men, including both local citizens and members of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department, executed the three men and dumped their bodies in a construction site. All eighteen defendants were subsequently arrested and were indicted by a Grand Jury on January 15, 1965 for violating federal statutes. The first statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 241, dealt with criminal conspiracies. The second statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 242, criminalized anyone acting under the color of law from depriving any of the rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the charges for violating 18 U.S.C.S. 242 against the non-police officer defendants, claiming that the indictment did not state an actual offense against the United States. This appeal followed.

Yes. In a unanimous decision, Justice Abe Fortas reinstated the indictment against all defendants. First, Justice Fortas addressed 18 U.S. C.S. 242 as applied to the non-police officers. Here, he noted that private citizens can act under the color of law where they are joining state officials in engaging in prohibited actions, as they did in this case. Therefore, the “color of law” indictments should be reinstated against all of the defendants, not merely the police officers. Next, Justice Fortas addressed the alleged violation of 18 U.S.C.S. 241, the criminal conspiracy statute. Here, Justice Fortas stated that a criminal conspiracy, perpetrated in part by state officials, constitutes a state action and therefore falls under the United States’ authority granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Fortas then addressed the history of this statute, and the Fourteenth Amendment. To him, this history, including the civil war, racial violence, Klu Klux Klan, and voter intimidation, solidified his conclusion that the conspiracy statute was designed to be read against the backdrop of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in this decision, noting some disagreement with the majority’s use of the case of United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58; United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70; and Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70. This case also inspired the 1988 film, Mississippi Burning.


Al Harris refused to answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the District Court for the Southern District of New York where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority and held that Harris' conduct did not rise to the level of contempt covered under 42(a). The rule is reserved for acts such as threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing. The Court also felt the "real contempt" occurred before the grand jury, not the district court. Because Harris' conduct was not covered, he should be given notice of and a separate hearing for criminal contempt as provided by Rule 42(b). With this decision the court overruled Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959). Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent stating that the issue was resolved in Brown and there is no reason to overrule that decision.


Jack Greenberg
C. Baxter Jones
Frank C. Jones
Louis F. Claiborne

In his will, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon left a piece of real estate to the city of Macon in Georgia. He intended the land to be used as a park that only whites could access. The city, as the named trustee, created a board of managers to operate the park, and it eventually allowed African Americans to use it. Trying to effectuate the Senator's will, individual managers of the park sued to remove the city as trustee because it was constitutionally unable to enforce the racially restrictive component of the will. After the city complied and resigned as trustee, private trustees appointed by a state court resumed excluding African Americans. A group of African Americans then brought an action on the grounds that the racial exclusion still violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state courts upheld the appointment of the private trustees.

A private park operator is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment if the park is municipal in character.

Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice William O. Douglas held that racial discrimination is prohibited under the Fourteenth Amendment in any state-sponsored situation. In this situation, the city maintained and managed the park, which had become an integral part of the city. This makes the operation of the park a public function, despite the fact that it was managed by private trustees. A park provides municipal services, such as mass recreation, so equal protection should apply.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the city’s resignation was based on the false understanding that the city cannot enforce the dictates of the trust but that the private trustees can. Since racial discrimination regarding the use of public property is unconstitutional, the private trustees could not enforce the will any more than the city could.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court unnecessarily overstepped its bounds by hearing a case that should be decided solely according to interpretation of state law by the state courts. Since there is no constitutional reason to prevent a municipality from resigning a trusteeship, the issue is one for the states to decide individually.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan argued that the Court should have dismissed the writ of certiorari because the case had no federal implications.


On July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. The U.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or more individuals conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a specific denial of rights under U.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

If a state participates at all in a conspiracy it has violated the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to any individuals whose rights are infringed, based on the constitutional right to travel.

In an 8-1 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that a criminal conspiracy affecting an individual's right of free interstate passage violated the law. The Court reasoned that the indictment contained an express allegation of state involvement sufficient at least to require denial of a motion to dismiss. If the predominate purpose of the conspiracy is to prevent the exercise of the right of travel, or to oppress a person of that right, as was the case here, then whether or not motivated by racial discrimination, the conspiracy becomes a proper object of federal law under which the indictment was brought. Therefore, the federal indictment was based on an offense under the laws of the United States.

Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, concurred.

Justice Harlan dissented in part and concurred in part.

Justice Brannan, joined by Justices Warrant and Douglas, dissented in part and concurred in part.


Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted.

No. Justice Brennan argued for a 5-4 majority that the protection against self-incrimination applied specifically to compelled communications or testimony. Since the results of the blood test were neither "testimony nor evidence relating to some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not inadmissible on privilege grounds."


Hanna Mining Company v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO

Hanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were "supervisors" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be "employees." The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing.

Hanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.

No. In a 9-0 decision Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority. While a state may not regulate conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, the Supreme Court found that Hanna's engineers were supervisors, not employees, and were not covered under the Act. The NLRA did not preempt Wisconsin's authority in this situation. The Court reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.


John J. Flynn
Victor M. Earle, III
F. Conger Fawcett
Gordon Ringer
Gary K. Nelson
William I. Siegel
Thurgood Marshall
William A. Norris
Telford Taylor
Duane R. Nedrud

This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation.

On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.

The Fifth Amendment requires that law enforcement officials advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to obtain an attorney during interrogations while in police custody.

Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority, concluding that defendant’s interrogation violated the Fifth Amendment. To protect the privilege, the Court reasoned, procedural safeguards were required. A defendant was required to be warned before questioning that he had the right to remain silent, and that anything he said can be used against him in a court of law. A defendant was required to be told that he had the right to an attorney, and if he could not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desired. After these warnings were given, a defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation was not to be used against a defendant at trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly and intelligently waived.

Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion created an unnecessarily strict interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that curtails the ability of the police to effectively execute their duties. He wrote that the state should have the burden to prove that the suspect was aware of his rights during the interrogation, but that statements resulting from interrogation should not be automatically excluded if the suspect was not explicitly informed of his rights. In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that the judicial precedent and legislative history surrounding the Fifth Amendment does not support the view that the Fifth Amendment prohibits all pressure on the suspect. He also argued that there was no legal precedent to support the requirement to specifically inform suspects of their rights. Justices Potter Stewart and Byron R. White joined in the dissent.

Justice White wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the Fifth Amendment only protects defendants from giving self-incriminating testimony if explicitly compelled to do so. He argued that custodial interrogation was not inherently coercive and did not require such a broad interpretation of the protections of the Fifth Amendment. Such an interpretation harms the criminal process by destroying the credibility of confessions. Justices Harlan and Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.


Donald F. Turner
Dennis G. Lyons
Thomas W. Pomeroy, Jr.

Huck Manufacturing Company owned the patent for a certain type of lock bolt.  Huck granted a license to Townsend Company to manufacture the lock bolt on the condition that Townsend sell those bolts at a price set by Huck.  Huck granted no other licenses to manufacture its lock bolt patents.  The United States filed a complaint against Huck and Townsend, alleging Sherman Act violations of  conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade and monopolize interstate commerce in lock bolts.  The district court ruled in favor of Huck and dismissed the complaint.  The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

No answer.  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision by an equally divided court.  Justice Abe Fortas did not participate.


New York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.

No. The Supreme Court held that Section 4(e) is a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that Congress exercised its powers consistent with those afforded it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court then concluded that the Supremacy Clause prevented the enforcement of the New York English literacy requirement.


Wade H. Penny, Jr.
Andrew A. Vanore, Jr.

The State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant.  At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict.  The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a nolle prosequi with leave.  This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future.  Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state’s request.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute.

Yes.  In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that indefinitely suspending a trial violates a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  The Court also held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies the Sixth Amendment to the states.  The Court noted that almost every state has rejected the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reasoning.  Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, but argued that incorporating the Sixth Amendment is not necessary.  He based his decision solely on the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice Potter Stewart also concurred in the result.


Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.

Richard Lipsitz
Ruth V. Iles
John C. Crary, Jr.

Harry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent the appointment and continued employment of “subversive persons.” Because the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the provisions of the New York plan were defined in such uncertain terms that they infringed upon the constitutional rights of public servants. Because the country had an interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of teachers in order for the educational system to be as free and open as possible, such overly broad and vague requirements both violated the teachers’ rights and were detrimental to the profession. The Court held that the government could only regulate First Amendment rights with “narrow specificity.” The Court also held that specific provisions of the Civil Service Law and Educational Service Law were too overly broad because they prohibit membership in the Communist Party without determining whether or not there was any specific intent to overthrow the United States government.

Justice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that the duties of a public servant allow the government to inquire into the employee’s fitness to serve in a particular position. He also argued that the provisions in question are specific to actions that “advocate, advise, or teach” the overthrow of the United States government and are not unconstitutionally vague. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company

Several American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers’ plants in Canada.   Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment.  Later, Canada Packers’ sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable.  The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for the unreasonably low original payment.  The railroads refused to pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the U.S.A.  The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed.

Yes.  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.  The Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) authorizes the ICC to determine reasonable rates where a carrier has entered into a joint through international rate covering transportation in the United States and abroad.  Consequently, the ICC had the authority to order reparations.  Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent citing the ICA, which states the ICC can only regulate “insofar as such transportation...takes place within the United States.


Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.

No. The proceedings of the Juvenile Court failed to comply with the Constitution. The Court held that the proceedings for juveniles had to comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. These requirements included adequate notice of charges, notification of both the parents and the child of the juvenile's right to counsel, opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination at the hearings, and adequate safeguards against self-incrimination. The Court found that the procedures used in Gault's case met none of these requirements.


The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the Attorney General to investigate alleged irregularities in the handling of cases in the municipal courts of certain boroughs. As part of that investigation, police officers were brought in for questioning. They were told that anything they said might be used against them in a state criminal proceeding and that they could refuse to answer, but such refusal might be grounds for dismissal. The appellants represent a group of police officers who answered the questions and were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants were convicted and they appealed by arguing that their statements were coerced by the threat of the loss of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions.

Yes. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the threat of the loss of employment placed the interviewee in the bind of being forced to choose between self-incrimination and the loss of livelihood. In such a situation, there is no chance for the interviewee to reach a free and rational decision. The Court also held that policemen and other public servants are entitled to the same constitutional rights as other citizens, and that there was precedent to establish threat of a loss of employment as a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there should not be an inflexible rule regarding coercion, but rather that each case should be decided based on its individual facts. He argued that the government had a valid interest in ensuring the integrity of its police officers and other public servants, and that the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the state from discharging an employee who refuses to answer questions regarding his job performance and conditions for future employment.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that there was no evidence that the admissions were involuntary, given the fact that all the officers were informed of their rights and had counsel present at their interviews. There is no reason to suspect that they were subject to mental coercion based on any of the techniques that were present in previous coercion cases. He also argued that the statements were admissible as a matter of law because it is constitutionally permissible for a state to establish reasonable qualifications and standards of conduct for its employees. There was no constitutional reason for an employer to be unable to expect an employee to provide information pertinent to his employment. Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.


Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.

The Court found that there were no constitutional violations in this case. The language of the Florida statute was clearly defined and applied, argued Justice Black, which prevented it from imposing broad infringements on speech and expression rights. Furthermore, since the sheriff acted to maintain access to the jail house and not because he "objected to what was being sung . . . or disagreed with the objectives of the protest," there were no First Amendment violations. Black concluded that the state does have the power to control its own property for lawful, nondiscriminatory purposes.


Luke McKissack
Norman H. Sokolow
William E. James
Thomas C. Lynch

Jesse James Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and the murder of a police officer in Alhambra, California. Gilbert refused to answer questions about the robbery charge without the advice of counsel, but later answered questions about a robbery in which the robber, allegedly Gilbert, used a handwritten note demanding the money. He gave the police handwriting exemplars, which were later admitted into evidence. The police also had eyewitnesses identify Gilbert in a line-up that was conducted without notice to his counsel. During the trial, several witnesses identified Gilbert in the courtroom as being a part of multiple robberies, including the Alhambra robbery. No distinction was made as to whether the in-court identifications were independent of the illegal line-ups that occurred before the trial. The jury rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed.

No, yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that taking the handwriting exemplars was constitutional. While the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination, a handwriting exemplar simply identifies a physical characteristic and is therefore outside of its protection. Also, taking exemplars without counsel present would not affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The Court held that the admission of the in-court identifications without determining them to be impartial violates the Constitution. Since the identification line-up was the result of an illegal procedure, the state must establish that the in-court identifications are independent of those conducted illegally.

Justice Hugo L. Black delivered an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the admission of the writing exemplars violated Gilbert’s constitutional rights because his counsel was not present at the time this evidence was obtained. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the general search for evidence did not violate the Constitution.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that there was no need to establish that the in-court identifications were independent from the illegal identification line-up. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.


Jack Greenberg
Earl McBee
J. M. Breckenridge
Louis F. Claiborne

Civil rights activists who planned to march on Good Friday and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated their intention to march anyway, Birmingham obtained an injunction from a state court which ordered them to refrain from demonstrating. Marchers who defied the order, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, were arrested.

The Court upheld the arrests since Walker failed to use proper judicial procedures to test the injunction's validity. Even though, Justice Stewart admitted, the injunction seemed broad and vague, and the marchers may not have enjoyed due process when applying for the permit originally, simply disobeying the injunction was illegitimate as "no man can be judge in his own case . . . however righteous his motives."


United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company

The United States brought an antitrust action against Arnold, Schwinn & Co. and its distributor Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association.  Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers.  The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade.  The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers.  The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal

Sometimes.  In a 5-2 decision, Justice Abe Fortas wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that it is unreasonable for a manufacturer to restrict where its products are sold after it has transferred title and responsibility for loss.  In situations where Arnold retains title, and the dealer acts as an agent or salesperson, those restrictions are not a restraint on trade.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote a partial dissent, expressing disagreement with the majority’s argument that Arnold’s practices become illegal when carried out through a distributor.  Justice John M. Harlan joined in the partial dissent.  Justice Tom C. Clark and Justice Byron R. White did not participate.


On August 23, 1961, Dr. Paul Berheldt was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home. His wife was also injured in the attack. The next day, Theodore Stovall was arrested for the murder and promptly arraigned, but he did not yet have counsel. On August 25, although Stovall had still not retained counsel, police brought him to the hospital room where Mrs. Berheldt’s was recovering from surgery to see if she could identify him. Stovall was the only African-American man in the room and was handcuffed to a police officer. Mrs. Berheldt positively identified him after he was directed to say a few words for voice identification purposes. The prosecution used this identification as evidence in the trial, and Mrs. Berheldt again identified Stovall in court.

Stovall was convicted, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Stovall sought habeas corpus relief in district court on the grounds that Mrs. Berheldt’s identification was inadmissible. The district court dismissed after hearing argument on an unrelated issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

In 1967, the Court issued rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California that excluded identification evidence from trial when identification came from a tainted lineup — one at which the defendants did not have counsel present.

No, No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the decision to retroactively apply rulings of criminal procedure depended on the potential impact of that ruling on the fact-finding at trial. In this case, the identification, while a crucial stage of the investigation and trial, could be conducted well or poorly regardless of the presence of counsel. The Court held that the circumstances of this case were such that, given the uncertainty of Mrs. Berheldt’s medical status, the identification could not have been conducted any other way. Also, the retroactive application of the rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California would greatly disrupt the justice system.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the identification in the hospital room was not constitutionally improper. Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the concurrence.

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the right to have counsel present at an identification should be granted retroactively.

Justice Abe Fortas wrote a dissent and argued that the State’s use of the hospital identification in the trial was prejudicial and violated Stovall’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.

In his dissent, Justice Hugo L. Black argued that people put in prison by evidence that is later found unconstitutional should not be denied the benefit of those rulings. He also argued that the Court’s case-by-case determination of due process granted the Court too much power and failed to give the government a solid constitutional standard.


At attorney Z.T. Osborn’s trial for attempting to bribe a juror in a federal criminal trial, the judge admitted a tape recording of an incriminating conversation between Osborn and a local police officer.  The officer recorded the conversation secretly under authorization of the court.  Osborn argued that the recording violated his right to privacy and he was entrapped.  A jury convicted Osborn and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirmed.

Yes, No, No.  Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 7-1 majority, affirmed the court of appeals' decision.  The Supreme Court held that using the secret recording did not violate Osborn’s rights. The recording was also properly admitted as evidence.  The trial court properly left the question of entrapment to the jury.  Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that recording the conversation violated Osborn’s constitutional right to privacy.  Justice Byron R. White did not participate.


Robert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal.

William Austin owned a retail bookstore and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name –High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial.

Gent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling."

Yes. In a per curiam decision, the court reversed the judgments of the respective lower courts, holding that while members of the majority advocated a variety of legal approaches to obscenity cases, the judgments at hand did not withstand scrutiny under any of the available approaches. The court specified that two of its members argue that the court has no authority to control publications on obscenity grounds, a third member limits the state's authority to a specific and readily identifiable class of material, and other members limit the state's authority to prurient material that is offensive to the specific community and has no redeeming social value. Yet another justice did not view social value as an independent factor. The court held that the judgments failed all of these tests.

Justice John Harlan, joined by Justice Thomas Clark, dissented, noting that Redrup v. New York and Austin v. Kentucky originally raised questions regarding the scienter requirement in obscenity prosecutions; Gent v. Arkansas was granted review to answer questions of vagueness and prior restraint under an Arkansas anti-obscenity statute. He argued that the majority decided a question that was not before it and in doing so avoided the questions of scienter, vagueness and prior restraint actually raised by the cases.


Joseph A. Fanelli
Assistant General Vinson
Nathan Lewin

These are several consolidated cases involving similar circumstances.  In the lead case, a district court in Tennessee tried and convicted James Hoffa, the president of a labor union, for attempting to bribe members of a jury in an earlier trial.  A paid government informer provided substantial evidence in the bribery trial.  The informer was another local union officer who met with Hoffa on several occasions during the first trial.  At that time, the government had not hired the officer as an informant.  Hoffa alleged that the evidence gathered from this informer violated his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

No.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote a plurality opinion for four members of the court affirming the court of appeals.  The plurality held that the government did not procure the evidence deceptively.  Use of the evidence did not violate Hoffa’s Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure or his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.

Justice Tom C. Clark wrote a dissent, stating that the writs should be dismissed as improvidently granted.  Justice William O. Douglas joined in this dissent.  Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent, expressing that this holding strayed from the standards of justice in the federal system.


Billy Joe Wade was arrested and indicted for robbing a federally-insured bank.  Without giving notice to Wade’s counsel, an FBI officer set up a lineup for two bank employees including Wade and several other prisoners.  The officer had each prisoner put strips of tape on their face and say, “Put the money in the bag,” like the robbers did.  The employees identified Wade as the robber.  At trial, the employees identified him again.  Wade’s counsel moved to strike the identifications because the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  The trial court denied the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.

Maybe.  In a 5-4 decision, Justice William J. Brennan vacated the lower judgment and remanded to determine whether the employees based their trial identifications solely on the lineup.  The Supreme Court affirmed that the lineup did not violate Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination.  To decide the Sixth Amendment issue, courts must decide whether counsel’s presence at a pre-trial confrontation of the accused will preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial.  In this case, Wade was entitled to counsel at the lineup.  The Court held that the identifications should not be excluded if they were based on observations other than the lineup.

Justice Hugo L. Black dissented in part and concurred in part, expressing that the lineup violated Wade's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  Justice Black would affirm the conviction, though, because the prosecution did not use evidence of the lineup at trial.  Justice Byron R. White dissented in part and concurred in part, stating that Wade was not entitled to counsel at the lineup.  Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the opinion.  Justice Abe Fortas concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that the lineup violated Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination.  Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the opinion.


In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of The Saturday Evening Post alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in New York Times, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. Associated Press v. Walker concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that New York Times was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case.

In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice John M. Harlan, the Court noted significant differences between the circumstances of these cases and those of New York Times. In particular, criticism of Butts or Walker, unlike a government official, could not be conflated with criticism of public policy. Thus, the Court reasoned that public figures who are not public officials may recover damages for libel stemming from false reports based on "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." The Court concluded that Curtis' investigation of its allegations against Butts failed to meet this standard. The company printed a questionably reliable source's allegations without any attempt to verify his claims, and the story in question was not a pressing event or immediately newsworthy. The Court thus affirmed the lower courts' denial of a retrial. The situation in Butts contrasted with Walker, where the AP relied on a correspondent on the scene of an event that was immediately newsworthy. The Court thus denied Walker's claims to damages.


In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the "established name" of the drug "prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug," on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices.

The act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name every time its corresponding proprietary name is used.

Abbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Abbott Laboratories argued that the "every time" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress.

Chief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's "every time" interpretation. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 other drug manufacturers appealed the decision.

Yes. Writing for the majority in a 5-3 decision, Justice John Harlan wrote that where the legal issue is fit for judicial resolution and a regulation requires an immediate and significant change in plaintiffs' conduct with potentially serious penalties, the law permits access to the courts under the APA and the DJA. The Court found that congress did not intend to forbid pre-enforcement review of regulations like the "every time" rule. The legislature designed the statute's specific review provisions to provide additional remedies for parties in Abbott Laboratories' position, not to cut down traditional channels of review. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals.

Justice Abraham Fortas dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Thomas Clark. He wrote that courts have jurisdiction over challenges to administrative action only when there is a specific statutory provision, when the agency acts unconstitutionally, or when it acts without jurisdiction. Justice Fortas feared that the majority's ruling would give federal district judges a "roving commission to halt the regulatory process." He reviewed the legislative history of the FFDCA and found that congress had consistently reserved judicial review for specific situations not including the present case.

Justice Clark wrote a separate dissent arguing that the commissioner was right to prevent drug manufacturers from misleading the public about the content of their proprietary drugs.

Justice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


Bernard S. Cohen
Philip J. Hirschkop
R.D. McIlwaine III
William M. Marutani

In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."


Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company

Richard B. Hooper
William M. Bennett
Rollin E. Woodbury
Gregory A. Harrison
Daniel M. Friedman
Richard W. Sabin

In an antitrust suit, the U.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock.  Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the district court denied the motions.  The district court approved El Paso’s divestiture plan, under which El Paso would create a new company to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets.  The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor.  The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

Yes.  In a 5-2 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court.  The Supreme Court held that the gas companies had the right to intervene.  The Court also gave guidelines for the district court to follow in its new order for divestiture.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that private parties do not have the right to intervene in government antitrust suits.  Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.  Justice Byron R. White and Justice Abe Fortas did not participate.


After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall "lose" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, overruling Perez v. Brownell (356 US 44), the Court held that Congress has no general power to revoke American citizenship without consent. Noting the special bond between Americans and their government, a bond that protects every citizen against all manner of destruction of their rights, the Court held that only citizens themselves may voluntarily relinquish their citizenship. This sacred principle applies equally to natural and naturalized citizens. As such, Section 401(e) violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.