Marvin E. Frankel
Frederick Bernays Wiener
J. Lee Rankin

Mrs. Covert killed her husband on an airbase in England. Pursuant to a “status-of-forces” executive agreement with England, she was tried and convicted by US court-martial without a jury trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). She petitioned a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the conviction violated her Fifth & Sixth Amendment rights to be tried by a jury after indictment by a grand jury.

U.S. citizen civilians outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States cannot be tried by U.S. military tribunal, but instead retain the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

In a decision authored by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that U.S. citizen civilians abroad have the right to Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment constitutional protections. The Court agreed with the petitioners, concluding that as United States citizens they were entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights, notwithstanding that they committed crimes on foreign soil. Justice Black declared: "The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our government."

While a majority of the Court agreed with the ultimate result, they did so for different reasons. Concurring in the decision, Justice Felix Frankfurter rejected the idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause could prevent Congress from mandating the court martial of civilians in all cases. He opposed what he termed a "recourse to the literal words" of the Constitution. Merely to hold that Mrs. Covert could not stand trial before a military tribunal since she was not a member of the armed forces signified too narrow a review. In his opinion, that determination required the Court to assess the Constitution in its entirety and not simply the single provision granting Congress the power to regulate the nation's land and naval forces. He advocated a balancing test that would require a court to weigh "all the factors involved...in order to decide whether [military dependents] are so closely related to what Congress may allowably deem essential for the effective...regulation of the land and naval forces that they may be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction in...capital cases, when the consequence is loss of [their constitutional] protections."

Also concurring in the judgment, Justice John Marshall Harlan II essentially agreed with Frankfurter. Accordingly, he saw the determination as "analogous to issues of due process." Having first determined that military dependents overseas bear a rational connection to the armed forces such that they could be validly subjected to court martial, he then asserted that the analysis turned on a question of what process was due a military dependent under the "particular circumstances of a particular case." While capital cases such as this one certainly necessitated a full Article III trial, most petty offenses committed by military dependents almost certainly would not. He thus advocated a case-by-case approach, rejecting the sweeping conclusion set forth by the plurality. Since Harlan had originally voted with the majority in the initial decision of this case, his concurrence on rehearing was narrow but significant. Perhaps as a consequence of his earlier vote in the previous term, his opinion on rehearing was considerably less at odds with the arguments set forth in the dissent written by Justice Tom C. Clark and joined by Justice Harold Burton.

In that staunch dissent, Clark gave substantial weight to historical practice. He asserted that the "military has always exercised jurisdiction by court-martial over civilians accompanying armies in time of war," and that for explicit reasons of policy concerning military morale and discipline, none of the Court's relevant precedents had ever questioned that authority. He pointed out several troublesome and practical consequences of the Court's holding. Not least among these were the vast distances between the United States and its various military instillations around the world. By setting forth an overly broad standard, the plurality, argued Clark, had opened the door to a myriad of petty offenses to be tried in the federal court system, thus incurring needless cost, delay, and disruption.

Justice Charles Whitaker took no part in the decision.

Historical Note

Reid v. Covert has the distinction of being the only case in the history of the Supreme Court in which the Court reversed itself on rehearing. In successfully persuading the Court to do so, Mrs. Covert's lawyer, Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, secured for himself a seat among the giants of the legal profession. A seasoned veteran of Supreme Court litigation, Colonel Wiener considered his triumph in Reid v. Covert to be among his greatest professional accomplishments. His oral argument in the case has attained legendary status and remains a preeminent exemplar in the art of persuasion and appellate advocacy.

Matthew Lognion contributed this abstract.


Judson Griffin and James Crenshaw were indicted for armed robbery in Cook County, Illinois. Following their conviction, in preparation for filling for an appeal, Griffin and Crenshaw requested a transcript of their trial proceedings without cost, on the basis that they could not afford the standard fee for the transcript. The lower court dismissed the petition without hearing evidence.

Yes. In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court reasoned that there is "no meaningful distinction" between denying indigent defendants the right to appeal and denying them a trial. Because Illinois conceded that Griffin and Crenshaw could not file for appeal without a transcript, the Court found that their rights to due process and equal protection had been denied.


Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.

An Oklahoma law prohibited persons who were not licensed optometrists or ophthalmologists to fit lenses for eyeglasses. Non-licensed individuals were also prohibited from duplicating optical instruments without written prescriptions from licensed ophthalmologists. The Lee Optical Company challenged the law.

In a unanimous decision authored by William Orville Douglas, the Court held that while the law may have been "needless" and "wasteful," it was the duty of the legislature, not the courts, "to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." That is, Courts should not be able to invalidate state economic regulations on the grounds that they disagree with the theories supporting them. Even if the state law imposes burdens or waste, the legislature has the sole authority over weighing its benefits against its costs. In sum, the opticians could not prove that the law had no rational relationship to legitimate state objectives.


Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (2)

Harold R. Fatzer
Robert L. Carter
Joseph Donald Craven
Louis L. Redding
George E. C. Hayes
James M. Nabrit, Jr.
Milton D. Korman
Spottswood Robinson III
Thurgood Marshall
S. E. Rogers
Robert McCormick Figg, Jr.
Archibald G. Robertson
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.
Richard W. Ervin
Ralph E. Odum
I. Beverly Lake
Thomas J. Gentry
Mac Q. Williamson
C. Ferdinand Sybert
John Ben Shepperd
Burnell Waldrep
Simon E. Sobeloff

After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown I), which declared racial discrimination in public education unconstitutional, the Court convened to issue the directives which would help to implement its newly announced constitutional principle. The cases stemmed from many different regions of the United States with distinctive conditions and problems.

The Brown I decision shall be implemented "with all deliberate speed."

The Court held that the problems identified in Brown I required varied local solutions. Chief Justice Warren conferred much responsibility on local school authorities and the courts which originally heard school segregation cases. They were ordered to implement the principles which the Supreme Court embraced in its first Brown decision. Warren urged localities to act on the new principles promptly and to move toward full compliance with them "with all deliberate speed."


New York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to seek an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the courts to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure, and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the obscene material.

No. In a 5–4 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court concluded that the civil procedure complied with the requirements of due process. Justice Frankfurter noted that the procedural safeguards were not significantly different from many state criminal misdemeanor procedures, nor were the penalties any more severe. The opinion also reaffirmed the existing notion that the constitutional protection of speech does not extend to obscene material.


John H. Griffin’s book <i>The Devil Rides Outside</i> traces the spiritual development of an unnamed American musician as he vacillates between choosing a life in a Benedictine monastery and the lustfulness of the outside world. When Alfred Butler, the Detroit district sales manager of Pocket Books, sold a copy of the book to a police officer, he was arrested and charged with violating a Michigan obscenity statute. At trial, the judge held that the book contained obscene language that could lead to the corruption of minors and that the passages in question lacked redeeming literary value. Butler was convicted and fined $100. Butler appealed and argued that the statute violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court of Michigan denied Butler’s application for leave to appeal.

Yes. Justice Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the Michigan statute unduly restricted the freedom of speech because it took only a single trial judge’s determination that the material could potentially corrupt minors to prohibit its dissemination. The Court noted that, although the State may attempt to protect juvenile innocence as part of its power to promote general welfare, the restrictions should be reasonably related to the evils of obscene material.

Justice Hugo L. Black concurred without writing a separate opinion.


Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co.


E. B. Elfers
John T. McTernan
Holvey Williams
Russell B. Wine
Brandon Alvey

Clinton Jencks, a union leader, was charged with falsely filing an Affidavit of Non-Communist Union Officer with the National Labor Relations Board. Two undercover informants for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified against Jencks, and reported that he had been seen at Communist Party events and working with Communist Party members. The evidence provided against Jencks was entirely circumstantial, and the prosecution's evidence rested largely on the testimonies and reports of the undercover informants. Jencks requested the testimony of the informants to review their credibility and admissibility in court. The trial court denied his request without stating the reasons, and Jencks was found guilty on two counts of communist activity and sentenced to five years imprisonment for each offense. Jencks appealed the lower court's decision on the grounds that the informants' reports should have been provided for review to determine their use in the trial and on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the definitions of political party membership. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that the government's reports should have been produced for review for their admission in court. A concern for national security must be weighed against prosecuting criminal action if the criminal action prosecution relies on documents that, if released, would threaten national security. Based on this weighing test, the documents should have been provided for review of admissibility in a new trial. Criminal action must be dismissed if the government refuses to release information as a matter of national security.

Justice Harold Burton wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed that the accused had the right to review the documents as evidence against him but argued that the disclosure of the documents should not guarantee a new trial. Rather, the documents should be reviewed and, if found to contain information that discredited the FBI informants’ testimony, then there should be a new trial. However, in this case Justice Burton agreed there should be a new trial on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed on the requirements of membership to a political party. Justice John M. Harlan joined in the concurrence.

Justice Tom C. Clark dissented and argued that, if information containing national secrets and issues of national security were available for the accused in criminal prosecutions, then national security would be greatly compromised. Justice Clark also wrote that the jury was properly instructed on the definition of membership to a political party.

Justice Charles E. Whittaker did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


Samuel W. Plauche, Jr.
Perry W. Morton
Charles D. Marshall

In December 1938, Thomas Leiter conveyed approximately 8,711 acres of land in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana to the United States. The deed contained a mineral reservation under which Leiter retained the right to mine and remove all valuable minerals until April 1, 1945. The deed allowed for the extension of this reservation for an additional five years so long as operations were conducted profitably during the previous five years for an average of fifty days a year. If at the end of the original term or an additional extended term the operation had not carried on for fifty days a year, Leiter’s right to mine would terminate, and complete title would become vested in the United States. No mineral operations were conducted on the land in question during the original term.

On March 1, 1949, the United States conveyed the operating rights under lease to Frank J. and Albert Lobrano, who then conveyed those rights to The California Company. The California Company drilled and completed eighty wells, producing $3,500,000 in royalties for the United States. Leiter Minerals, Inc. then filed an action in state court against Allen L. Lobrano and The California Company based on a Louisiana law allegedly making a reservation of mineral rights to the United States “imprescriptible”. The United States was not a party to the suit. Leiter Minerals claimed that it was the fee simple owner of all the oil, gas and mineral rights in or on the land acquired by the United States from Thomas Leiter.

The United States then brought an action in district court; it sought to quiet Leiter Minerals’ title and rights and to enjoin Leiter Minerals from further asserting any claims in state court. The United States argued in part that irreparable injury in the form of lost royalties would result from any dispossession to its lessees. The district court granted the injunction, holding that the action could only be tried in federal court because the United States was not a party to the state court action.

No. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court held that the district court properly granted the injunction. Justice Frankfurter first looked to federal law, which specified that a court of the United States may not enjoin state court proceedings except 1) as expressly authorized by congress, 2) to aid its jurisdiction, or 3) to protect or effectuate its judgments. He also looked to the Court’s past interpretations of the Norris-La Guardia Act, where it determined that statutes generally divesting persons of pre-existing rights and privileges only divest the United States of those rights and privileges when there are expressed words to that effect.

Justice Frankfurter then turned to the purpose behind the restriction of the federal courts’ injunction power, arguing that the interest in restricting this power was strongest when the state court litigation was between private parties. Here, in contrast, the United States was arguably attempting to prevent injury to the national interest. Justice Frankfurter also emphasized that the United States was not a party to the state court action, and that the United States’ position in its claim was essentially defensive. The Court remanded the case to the state court, directing it to interpret and apply the Louisiana statute in question.

Justice William Douglas dissented in part, questioning the majority’s decision to remand the case to Louisiana state court. He argued that Congress tasked the federal courts with deciding mixed questions of state and federal law.


In 1954, John Watkins, a labor organizer, was called upon to testify in hearings conducted by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Watkins agreed to describe his alleged connections with the Communist Party and to identify current members of the Party. Watkins refused to give information concerning individuals who had left the Communist Party. Watkins argued that such questions were beyond the authority of the Committee.

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the activities of the House Committee were beyond the scope of congressional power. The Court held that both the authorizing resolution of the Committee and the specific statements made by the Committee to Watkins failed to limit the Committee's power. The Court found that because Watkins had not been given sufficient information describing the pertinency of the questions to the subjects under inquiry, he had not been accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment thus invalidated Watkins' conviction.


Herdman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company

Joseph P. McNamara
Robert L. Barton
John A. Eckler

On February 1, 1951, Virgil Herdman, a train conductor, was in charge of a freight train traveling from Indiana to Ohio. While passing through Dayton, Ohio, the train braked abruptly to avoid hitting a car stopped on a railroad crossing. Herdman fell and was injured as the train came to a stop.

Herdman sued the railroad company for negligence and claimed that the company was responsible for his fall under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Courts typically apply this doctrine when negligence can be inferred, without actual direct evidence, from the very nature of the accident. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the railroad on the basis that Herdman did not provide enough facts to support his negligence claim, even under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Herdman appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

No. In an 8-1 decision by Justice William J. Brennan, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. To effectively present a negligence claim under res ipsa loquitur Herdman should have shown that sudden stops, like the one that caused his injury, are unusual or extraordinary. Herdman failed to present any such evidence. Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, stating that the Court should not grant certiorari just to reevaluate the facts of certain cases.


Samuel C. McMorris
Warren M. Christopher
Philip E. Grey
Clarence A. Linn

Under Los Angeles Municipal Code Section 52.39, no convicted felon could stay in the city for more than five days without registering. Lambert, a convicted felon, stayed in Los Angeles for seven years without registering and was convicted of violating the ordinance. On appeal, she argued that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment required the ordinance to include some mental state element, and she was not aware of it.

In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice William Douglas, the Court held that the prosecution would need to provide circumstantial evidence showing that the defendant should have been aware of the possibility that registration was required. The Court reasoned that due process requires notice unless the defendant has actual knowledge of the ordinance that has been violated. As there was no circumstantial evidence showing Lambert should have been aware of the ordinance, the Court concluded her due process rights were violated. The Court further held that because the ordinance that forced convicted felons to register was not accompanied by any action, nor were there circumstances that would lead a felon to be aware of his or her duty to register, the ordinance was unconstitutional.

Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker, arguing that mistake of law is usually not a defense to a crime. For example, a person may be convicted of drug possession even if he or she did not know that the particular substance was illegal.

Justice Harold Burton also dissented in a separate opinion.


National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Company

Beginning on October 23, 1950, Lion Oil Company and Oil Workers International Union CIO entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing in detail the wages, hours and conditions for employees of the company. The agreement provided the means to amend its terms: Either party must notify the other in writing of its desire to amend the agreement, after which the company and the union should attempt to agree on the desired amendments. If no agreement was reached within sixty days, either party may terminate the agreement.

On August 24, 1951, the union transmitted a letter to the company notifying the company of its desire to modify the agreement. Representatives of the company and the union first met on August 29, 1951 to discuss the proposed amendments. The two groups held 37 more meetings between that date and April 30, 1952, but no agreement was reached. On April 30, employees of the company went on strike, demanding wage increases and other benefits. Neither the company nor the union notified the other that it intended to terminate the contract. On June 21, 1952, the union offered to return all striking employees to work unconditionally, but the company refused this offer.

The company distributed a letter to the union explaining that there would be no reinstatement of workers unless the employees agreed to work for a period of at least one year without work stoppage. After June 21, the company interviewed individual employees and rehired only those who assured the company that they would continue to work daily throughout the strike. On August 3, 1952, a new agreement was executed between the company and the union; employees were reinstated the next day.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provided that where there is a collective bargaining contract, employees may not go on strike until sixty days after either party provides written notice of its intent to terminate or modify the contract or until the contract expires, whichever occurs later. Employees who go on strike before this point lose the protection of the NLRA.

During the negotiations for the new agreement, the union filed a charge of unfair labor practices against the company with the National Labor Relations Board, based on the company’s response to the employees’ offer to return to work. The five member Board held in a split decision that the company was guilty of unfair labor practices under the NLRA, rejecting the company’s defense that the strikers lost the protection of the act because the contract was still in effect. The company appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which set aside the Board’s ruling. The Eighth Circuit held that a strike would violate the terms of the contract until the contract expired or was cancelled in the manner provided for in the NLRA. As the contract had not expired when the employees went on strike, those employees violated the terms of the NLRA and lost its protection.

While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Lion Oil Company was merged into Monsanto Chemical Company. By order of the Court, Monsanto was made a party in the case.

No and no. In a decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the union did not violate the terms of the National Labor Relations Act by going on strike. Chief Justice Warren rejected the Eighth Circuit’s narrower, more literal interpretation of the Act. He looked to the legislative history of the NLRA and concluded that while Congress recognized a duty to bargain over modifications when the contract itself contemplates such bargaining, it would make little sense to deprive unions’ of the threat of strike, a force depended upon to facilitate settlements with companies.

Chief Justice Warren investigated the relevant language of the NLRA, determining that Congress intended “expiration date” to encompass both notice of a party’s desire to terminate or modify the contract and the date when the contract would normally expire. Hence, the union was not obligated to wait to strike until the contract’s actual expiration date. This conclusion was based in part on the Court’s ruling in Mastro Plastics Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board. There, the Court recognized a dual purpose in the Act: to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare and to protect the right of employees to engage in concerted activities -- like strikes -- for their own benefit. Otherwise, the Chief Justice argued, unions would be wary of entering into long-term contracts at all. Chief Justice Warren thus concluded that the notice and waiting requirements of the Act were fully satisfied, as the strike did not occur until long after the union delivered notice of proposed amendments to the company.

Chief Justice Warren also rejected the company’s contention that the strike was a breach of contract, holding that where a contract does not contain an express waiver of the right to strike, that waiver cannot be inferred.

Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part, taking issue only with the majority’s breach of contract ruling. He noted that the Eighth Circuit did not reach that issue because of its decision to set aside the Board’s ruling, and that the Board did not raise the issue on appeal.

Justice John Harlan also concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the majority’s construction of the Act, but took issue with the majority’s ruling on the unfair labor practice charge. He also noted that the issue was not taken up by the Eighth Circuit, and strongly objected to the Court ruling on issues not decided by lower courts.

Justice William Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


David Rein
Joseph Forer
Carl H. Imlay
Oscar H. Davis

Charles Rowoldt, a German citizen living in the United States, received an order of deportation under the Internal Security Act of 1950 because of his membership in the Communist Party. Rowoldt admitted to joining the Party for about a year and working at a Communist bookstore. However, he contended that he should not be deported because he joined the Party to "fight for his daily needs" and get "something to eat and something to crawl into." The Internal Security Act contained an exception for those who joined the Party to obtain food, employment, or other necessities of living. Rowolt also indicated that he was not aware that anyone in the Party supported violent overthrow of the government. Rowoldt sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of Minnesota, but his writ was denied because there was enough evidence to support his membership in the Party. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Felix Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the court, holding that Rowoldt did not have a "meaningful relationship" with the Communist Party as required by the Internal Security Act. The record was insufficient to support the order of deportation and the Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision. Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented stating that he believed the record indicated that Rowoldt joined the Party knowing of its active political nature, regardless of whether he believed in violent overthrow of the government.


Federal criminal information was filed in district court against Ludenia Howard, representing Stokes Fish Company, for violating the Federal Black Bass Act. The Act forbids any person to transport black bass or other fish across state lines if doing so is prohibited by the laws of the state. In Florida, such issues are governed by the regulations of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission. The district court held that the regulations were not “laws” of Florida under the meaning of the Black Bass Act and quashed the information. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice Stanley Reed delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that precedent has established that rulings of state administrative agencies should be considered laws of the state. In the case of fish and game legislation, the majority of state legislatures vest regulatory authority in commissions. The Court held that the congressional intent behind the Black Bass Act was to enforce the fishing regulations of individual states regardless of whether those regulations came from commissions or state legislatures.


Andrew Mallory was arrested by federal officers on charges of rape. Upon arresting Mallory, the officers questioned him until he confessed roughly seven hours later. After the confession, the police officers sought to reach a United States Commissioner for the purpose of arraigning Mallory.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the arraignment of Mallory was not accomplished "without unnecessary delay," violating the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court noted that Mallory was not told of his rights to counsel or to a preliminary examination before a magistrate, nor of his right to remain silent. "Not until he had confessed, when any judicial caution had lost its purpose, did the police arraign him." The Court held that it was not the function of the police to arrest people at large and interrogate them at police headquarters in order to determine whom they should charge before approaching a commissioner.


On April 24, 1953 in Selma, Alabama, an intruder broke into the apartment of the daughter of the city mayor. The daughter and the intruder struggled through several rooms until she was able to seize his knife, and he fled. The assailant had a towel over his head, so the victim could not identify the defendant during the trial. The police apprehended William Earl Fikes on the basis of a call from a private citizen and held him “on an open charge of investigation.” The police questioned Fikes for hours, placed him in jail, and limited his access to anyone familiar. After nearly a week of this treatment, Fikes confessed in the form of answers to the interrogator’s leading questions. Five days later, Fikes confessed under questioning a second time. When these confessions were admitted into the trial as evidence, Fikes did not testify regarding the events surrounding his interrogation because the judge had ruled he would be subjected to unlimited cross-examination. The jury convicted Fikes and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.

Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the circumstances surrounding Fikes’ confession were coercive and unduly influenced him. Because the confessions were gained through coercion, their use in trial constituted a denial of due process.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that mental and emotional coercion achieve the same result as physical coercion and should be considered equally detrimental to the interests of justice. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.

Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the questioning that led to the confessions was not definitively coercive. He also argued that, without evidence that shows the questioning was unconstitutional, the majority opinion overstepped the Court’s bounds by reversing the decision. Justice Stanley Reed and Justice Harold Burton joined in the dissent.


Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) required union officers to file non-communist affidavits to gain the protections of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  The NLRA also made filing a false affidavit a crime.  The NLRB found that an officer of the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelt workers had filed a false affidavit.  The NLRB issued a decompliance order ceasing all protections.  The union sued to enjoin the order.  The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.

No.  In a unanimous decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that the criminal penalty imposed by NLRA is the only valid remedy for filing false affidavits.


Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery.  Each filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence found at the time of arrest.  The district court granted the motions, citing a lack of probable cause.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of evidence was appealable.

No.  In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion, reversing the court of appeals.  The Supreme Court held that the United States had no right to appeal the suppression order.  The order was sufficiently separate from the criminal trial to be final and not appealable under statutes relating to criminal cases.


On August 12, 1954, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics ("FBN") and the Chicago Police Department met twice with Albert Roviaro near the intersection of 75th Street and Prairie Avenue in Chicago. According to Agent Norris Durham of the FBN, after the second meeting, Detective Byson of the Chicago police climbed into the trunk of a Cadillac sedan owned and driven by "John Doe," an informant for the government. The trunk was propped open slightly to preserve Byson's line of sight. John Doe drove the car to 74th Street and St. Lawrence Avenue, where Alberto Roviaro got out of a Pontiac sedan. Roviaro entered the Cadillac sedan and took a seat next to the driver, John Doe.

Durham followed the Cadillac, which took a circuitous rote to Champlain Avenue and 74th Street. He observed Roviaro leave the Cadillac and walk to a nearby tree, where he picked up a small package. Byson confirmed this from his vantage point in the Cadillac's trunk. Roviaro then walked to the car's open right front door and motioned as if he was leaving the package inside. A chemist working for the United States later identified the package's contents as heroin.

The government charged Roviaro with trafficking heroin, in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. He was convicted, and the district court denied his motion for a new trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, affirmed the ruling. Judge Walter Lindley, writing for a unanimous court, held that because John Doe was not a participant in Roviaro's actual possession of heroin, Roviaro is not entitled to full disclosure of his identity.

No. Justice Harold Burton, writing for a majority in a 6-1 decision, held that Roviaro's interest in preparing his defense outweighed the public interest in protecting John Doe's identity. The Court focused on the fundamental requirements of fairness, reasoning that where the identity of an informant or the contents of an informant's communications are relevant and helpful to a defense, the government's privilege must give way. Justice Burton also noted that the charge in question required more than mere possession of heroin; Roviaro had the burden of justifying this possession, which underlined his need for access to material witnesses. John Doe was his only material witness.

Justice Thomas Clark dissented. He wrote that the majority's decision jeopardizes the government's privilege in cases involving informants, especially in drug cases where informants are often necessary to the proper administration and prosecution of narcotic laws. He also suggested that Roviaro was attempting to win on a technicality --as he likely already knew the informant's identity-- rather than on the merits of the case.

Justices Hugo Black and Charles Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


Roth operated a book-selling business in New York and was convicted of mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book in violation of a federal obscenity statute. Roth's case was combined with Alberts v. California, in which a California obscenity law was challenged by Alberts after his similar conviction for selling lewd and obscene books in addition to composing and publishing obscene advertisements for his products.

In a 6-to-3 decision written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court held that obscenity was not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court noted that the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance or form of expression, such as materials that were "utterly without redeeming social importance." The Court held that the test to determine obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." The Court held that such a definition of obscenity gave sufficient fair warning and satisfied the demands of Due Process. Brennan later reversed his position on this issue in Miller v. California (1973).


Fourteen leaders of the Communist Party in the state of California were tried and convicted under the Smith Act. That Act prohibited willfully and knowingly conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the government by force. This case was decided in conjunction with Richmond v. United States and Schneiderman v. United States.

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases to a District Court for retrial. The Court interpreted the Smith Act in the following manner: First, the term "organize" was construed to mean the creation of a new organization, making the Act inapplicable to subsequent organizational acts. Second, the Court drew a distinction between the "advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle" and the "advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the Government." The Court recognized that instances of speech that amounted to "advocacy of action" were "few and far between."


Osmond K. Fraenkel
Oscar H. Davis
J. Lee Rankin

In 1944, United States Army private Albert Trop escaped from a military stockade at Casablanca, Morocco, following his confinement for a disciplinary violation. A day later, Trop willingly surrendered to an army truck headed back to Casablanca. Despite testifying that he "decided to return to the stockade" when he was picked up, a general court martial convicted Trop of desertion and sentenced him to three years at hard labor, loss of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. In 1952, Trop applied for a passport. His application was rejected under Section 401(g) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act, on the ground that he lost his citizenship due to his conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion. After failing to obtain a declaratory judgment that he was a US citizen, from both a district and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Trop appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.

Yes. After finding that Section 401(g) of the amended Act was penal in nature, since it punished convicted deserters with denationalization, the Court held that expatriation was barred by the Eighth Amendment as a cruel and unusual penal remedy. Citizenship, the Court stated, is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. Rather, it can only be voluntarily renounced by express language and, or, conduct. Since Trop did not involve himself in any way with a foreign state, so as to demonstrate disloyalty to the United States, his court martial conviction of desertion did not justify his expatriation.


United States v. Shotwell Manufacturing Company

Shotwell Manufacturing, along with several employees, was convicted of evading income taxes.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction because the district court had denied Shotwell’s motion to suppress evidence of certain disclosures.  Shotwell allegedly made these disclosures in good faith, thinking they would shield them from liability.  After the government petitioned for certiorari, they moved to remand the case to the district court in light of new evidence.  If true, this new evidence could prove Shotwell lied while testifying about making the disclosures in good faith.

Yes.  In a 6-3 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority, vacating the court of appeals' decision and remanding the case to the district court.  The Supreme Court would not review the case with a record challenged as being “tainted with perjury and fraud”.  Because Shotwell, et al. were found guilty, there was no double jeopardy issue.  The district court was the proper venue for the remand because there were questions about the integrity of the record.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, stating that the Court should have denied certiorari and let the case take its regular course back to the district court for a new trial based on the decision by the court of appeals.  Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company v. Illinois

R. K. Merrill
Charlie H. Johns, Jr.
Harry R. Begley
S. Ashley Guthrie

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) passed an order making intrastate passenger fares for the Milwaukee Road’s Chicago suburban commuter line higher than the fares the state commission had authorized. The state of Illinois, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Milwaukee Road Commuters’ Association sued the ICC in district court and sought to enjoin the enforcement of the order. The district court held that the ICC had failed to show that the fares authorized by the state commission caused undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, and therefore the order was not justified. The ICC appealed the case directly to the Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held that there must be clear justification for an agency of the federal government to interfere in states’ interests. In this case, the ICC interfered based on a single line of a commuter train system running at a deficit, which does not provide justification to require alteration of the rates throughout the state.


During police interrogation for a murder, Cicenia and his counsel repeatedly requested to see one another but they were refused their requests. By the time Cicenia saw his attorney, he had made and signed a written confession to the murder. Cicenia moved the state trial court for an order requiring the state to produce his written confession. The trial court denied the motion and the state supreme court affirmed the decision. Cicenia commenced a federal habeas corpus proceeding and the lower court discharged the writ, holding that Cicenia had failed to establish the involuntariness of his confession and that the state's refusal to permit petitioner to communicate with counsel during the inquiry did not deprive him of due process. The appellate court affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court reasoned that Cicenia had failed to substantiate the charge that his confession was coerced. The Court also found that Cicenia did not have a constitutional right to confer with counsel during police questioning and, therefore, there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The Court also found that in the absence of a showing of prejudice to Cicenia, it was not a due process violation for the state to deny counsel the opportunity to inspect the confession before trial.

Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Warren and Black, dissented, arguing that the majority ruling was out of line with the constitutional requirement of fair criminal proceedings against a citizen.


On July 5, 1955, John Russell Crooker was arrested for the murder of his boss with whom he had been having an illicit relationship. For the next fourteen hours, Crooker was sporadically questioned and interrogated in his home and in the West Los Angeles Police Station; he repeatedly asked to meet with an attorney and was told that he could call only after the investigation was over. After fourteen hours of detainment and periodic interrogation, Crooker wrote a full confession to the murder. The next morning, Crooker was asked to orally repeat his confession, but he refused and again asked to speak with an attorney. Crooker was permitted to call his attorney at that point, and from then forward, he was represented by his counsel.

At trial, Crooker argued that his confession was obtained in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because his confession was coerced by state authorities, and even if it was given voluntarily, he was denied the right to counsel. The issue of whether Crooker’s confession was voluntary was presented to the jury, which resolved the question against Crooker and convicted him. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.

No. Justice Tom C. Clark delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the coercion that might occur from a denial of a specific request for counsel can be negated by factors such as the defendant’s age, intelligence, and education. In this case, Crooker had knowledge of his rights based on the fact that he was a law student and that he refused to answer some questions during interrogation. Additionally, Crooker was informed by the police officer that he didn’t have to answer anything he didn’t want to. Therefore, Crooker’s confession was not coerced. The Court also held that, although Crooker’s confession was made without counsel being present, his awareness of his rights meant that the absence of counsel did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the repeated denial of counsel to Crooker was a violation of his Due Process right. Justice Black also argued that the preservation of Due Process should also be applied to pre-trial investigation and therefore that the accused who wants counsel should have one at any time after the arrest. Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Black Hugo L. Black, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell

On July 18, 1951 the International Automobile Union called a strike against Wolverine Tube, Inc., a subsidiary of the Calumet and Hecla Consolidated Copper Company, located in Decatur, AL.   As a result of this strike, Mr. Paul Russell, a non-union employee at the plant, was prevented from working when members of the picket line made violent threats against him and physically blocked the only entrance into the plant.  The strike lasted until August 22, 1951.

Russell sued the union in Alabama state court, claiming that the union unlawfully invaded his right to engage in a lawful occupation free from unlawful interference.  The Union argued that the Labor Management Act of 1947 removed jurisdiction from the state court to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  When the trial court decided for the union, Russell appealed. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for trial.

At trial, a jury returned a $10,000.00 verdict for Russell.  The union appealed, arguing that the jury verdict was excessive and reiterating its argument that the state court had no jurisdiction to hear this case.  The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Yes and no.  Justice Harold Burton, writing for a 6-2 majority, reiterated the Supreme Court’s decision in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., which held that Congress did not give the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over a common-law tort for damages.  Justice Burton noted that, although the National Labor Relations Board had the authority to award back pay to Russell, that authority did not remove Russell’s right to sue the union for damages in state court.  The Court held that cutting off an employee’s right to sue a union would, in effect, grant unions substantial immunity from any consequences resulting from mass picketing or coercion.  Finally, the Court held that the $10,000.00 verdict was not excessive in this case.

Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, stating that, when Congress passed the Labor Management Act, it was attempting to balance the competing interests of employees, unions, and management.  By allowing additional remedies, Justice Warren argued that the Supreme Court upset that balance.  Justice William O. Douglas joined in this dissent.  Justice Hugo Black did not participate in this decision.


Romero v. International Terminal Operating Company

Narciso Puente, Jr.
Silas B. Axtell
John L. Quinlan
Sidney A. Schwartz

While the Spanish ship S.S. Guadalupe was docked in Hoboken, NJ, a cable struck Francisco Romero and seriously him.  He sued for negligence under the Jones act and maritime law.  The Jones Act provides jurisdiction for claims under the Constitution and treaties of the U.S. for persons of diverse citizenship.  Both Romero and his employer were aliens, so there was no diversity of citizenship.  Also, the maritime laws did not arise from the Constitution or treaties of the U.S..  The district court dismissed all claims for lack of jurisdiction.  The district court also held that Romero could receive adequate remedies under Spanish law.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

Yes, yes. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion vacating the judgment below and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that the district court confused jurisdiction with stating a valid cause of action.  The district court had jurisdiction to determine whether Romero had stated a valid cause of action under the Jones Act and pendant jurisdiction joins the general maritime law claims.  The Court also found that U.S. maritime law does not apply as a matter of law.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote a partial dissent, stating that he could not agree with the majority that the court did not have independent jurisdiction over maritime law.  Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the partial dissent.  Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent, expressing that maritime laws are independently within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and that the Jones Act does apply.  Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.


First Unitarian Church for Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles

These are two consolidated cases concerning property tax exemption under the California Constitution and California Revenue and Taxation Code (CRTC) for real property and buildings used solely for religious worship.  The California Constitution requires denial of tax exemption to any person or organization who advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government or the State of California by violent or unlawful means.  To enforce this, a provision of the CRTC requires those applying for tax exemption to sign an oath declaring that they do not engage in that prohibited activity.

In both cases, the Los Angeles assessor denied tax exemption because the churches refused to agree to the oath.  The churches paid their taxes under protest and sued the County of Los Angeles for a refund.  The churches argued that requiring them to agree to the oath violated the U.S. Constitution.  In 382, the trial court upheld the oath and the Supreme Court of California affirmed.  In 385, the court upheld the oath under the U.S. Constitution, but held that it violated the California Constitution because it excluded householders from the requirement.  The Supreme Court of California reversed.

Yes.  The Supreme Court reversed the lower court judgments.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a four justice plurality, followed the same reasoning from his opinion in Speiser v. Randall, a companion case.  In that opinion he held that the oath provision denied freedom of speech without due process because it placed the burden of proof of eligibility for tax exemption on the taxpayer.

Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, using his opinion from Speiser where he argued that the First Amendment barred California for imposing what he saw as a tax on belief and expression.  Justice William O. Douglas joined in the concurrence.  Justice Douglas concurred separately, following his opinion from Speiser, and adding that the oath provision violated the First Amendment freedom of religion.  Justice Black joined in the concurrence.  Justice Harold Burton concurred in the result.

Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that signing the oath or not does not alone decide tax exempt eligibility, so the burden of proof is not on the tax payer.  Chief Justice Earl Warren did not participate.


Rose Staub was convicted and fined for attempting to organize a branch of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union at Hazlehurst Manufacturing Company.  She violated an ordinance in the neighboring town of Baxley, where many of the Manufacturing Co. workers lived.  That ordinance required anyone soliciting members for a union to apply for a permit from the mayor and city council.  The mayor and city council had unlimited discretion to grant or deny the permits for any reason.  Staub argued that the ordinance violated her constitutional right to free speech.  The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, but did not consider the constitutional question because Staub did not attempt to comply with the ordinance.  The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari.

Yes.  In a 7-2 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion reversing the conviction.  The Supreme Court held that the ordinance violated free speech because it made the enjoyment of speech contingent on the will of the mayor and city council.  The mayor and city council had too much discretion in granting or denying permits. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a dissent, stating that case should be left to the Georgia Courts.  Justice Tom C. Clark joined in the dissent.


Rockwell Kent applied for and was refused a passport to visit England. In addition to informing him that his application refusal rested on his Communist Party affiliations, the Passport Office Director told Kent that in order for a passport to be issued a hearing would be necessary. The Director instructed Kent to submit an affidavit as to whether he was a current or past Communist. Upon the advice of counsel, Kent refused to sign the affidavit but did participate in a hearing at which he was once more asked to sign an affidavit concerning his Communist affiliations. When he refused the affidavit, the Passport Department advised Kent that no further action would be taken on his passport request until he satisfied the affidavit requirement. On appeal from consecutive adverse rulings in both district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted Kent certiorari.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the right to travel is an inherent element of "liberty" that cannot be denied to American citizens. Although the Executive may regulate the travel practices of citizens, by requiring them to obtain valid passports, it may not condition the fulfillment of such requirements with the imposition of rules that abridge basic constitutional notions of liberty, assembly, association, and personal autonomy.


By the War Claims Act of 1948, Congress established the War Claims Commission for the purpose of adjudicating claims for compensating internees, prisoners of war, and religious organizations. Wiener was confirmed as a member of the Commission by President Truman in 1950. In 1953, when President Eisenhower requested Wiener's resignation, Wiener refused. Eisenhower subsequently appointed a substitute to Wiener's post. The Commission was abolished in 1954, and Wiener brought a claim to recover his salary from the time of his removal to the last day of the Commission's existence.

In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the President did not have the authority to remove individuals from the War Claims Commission at will. The Court found that Congress had intended to create a body that was "'entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,' of either the Executive or the Congress." The "intrinsic judicial character" of the Commission's duties required that it be able to adjudicate claims solely on the merits of each claim free of external Executive pressure." Congress did not wish to have hand over the Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own choosing."


Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.

Byrd, a resident of North Carolina, was employed by a subcontractor of Blue Ridge Electric, a South Carolina company. When he was hurt during his work on power lines, Byrd sued Blue Ridge for negligence in a federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. Blue Ridge defended against his claim based on a South Carolina law providing that employees of sub-contractors should be considered employees of contractors for which the sub-contractor provided work. South Carolina law further provided that the immunity defense needed to be determined by a judge rather than a jury. Byrd contended that his Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should trump that provision of the state law.

In diversity cases where the Erie doctrine applies, federal courts must balance their respect for the substance of state laws with the need to preserve the essential characteristics and functions of the federal courts. The Seventh Amendment jury function is one of those essential functions.

In an opinion authored by Justice Willian Brennan, the Court held that South Carolina law was essentially a procedural rule because it determined how immunity should be enforced, rather than affecting the substantive rights and obligations created by the state. The federal court should typically follow this type of rule. In the instant case, however, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was an essential factor in the federal court process, and therefore the amendment prevailed.


American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States

Peter T. Beardsley
Edward J. Hickey, Jr.
Robert W. Ginnane
A. B. Howland

In 1938, the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized Rock Island Motor Transit, a subsidiary of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, to purchase the property and rights of the White Line Motor Freight Company between Silvis, Illinois and Omaha, Nebraska. The certificate limited motor operations to service to or from points on the Rock Island Railroad, subject to any restrictions the commission might impose under the Interstate Commerce Act to insure that the service was auxiliary or supplementary to train service. The Act authorized consolidation, merger, acquisition, or lease of common carriers if the commission deemed it to be “consistent with the public interest.” In a separate section, Congress directed the commission not to certify a railroad corporation seeking to operate motor carriers unless it also found that the railroad would use motor vehicle service to public advantage in its operations and would not unduly restrain competition.

In 1944, Rock Island purchased the Frederickson Lines, covering routes between Atlantic, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska. Rock Island filed for permission to provide motor service to points along the Frederickson Lines. The commission granted Rock Island permission, but placed five conditions on motor service for both the White and Frederickson routes. Rock Island challenged the conditions in district court and won, but on appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the commission’s power to impose the conditions.

Rock Island then filed for permission to provide unrestricted motor service to points along the White and Frederickson lines. In 1954, the application was substantially granted. American Trucking Associations, Inc., nine other motor carriers, a group of railway trade unions, and several other organizations intervened, arguing that 1) the commission was required to limit motor service by a rail-owned motor carrier to auxiliary or supplementary service, and 2) the evidence was not sufficient to support the commission’s certification order. The district court upheld the certificate as granted.

No and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thomas Clark, the Court held that the “public interest” section of the Act did not prohibit the commission from allowing Rock Island to operate unrestricted motor service along the White and Frederickson lines. Justice Clark noted that Rock Island applied for its broader application under the public interest section of the Act, which did not contain 1) statutory language limiting the provision of motor service by railroad companies or 2) language suggesting that service must be auxiliary or supplementary. He looked to the legislative history of the act, and determined that while congress considered adding an absolute “auxiliary or supplemental” requirement to the public interest section, it did not do so.

Justice Clark then held that there was sufficient evidence to show that Rock Island’s motor transit service along the approved routes served the public interest. Although the evidence did not suggest that allowing Rock Island to provide motor service was the only way to serve public convenience and necessity, Justice Clark reasoned that the generally more profitable motor service helped to pay for the costlier rail service, securing the public’s access to both. He also noted that the commission could impose restrictions or conditions if Rock Island’s unrestricted motor operations became clearly destructive of competition in the future.

Justice William Douglas dissented.


Beilan v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia

On June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, a teacher in the Philadelphia school system for the previous 22 years, presented himself in the Superintendent’s office at the latter’s request. The Superintendent asked if Beilan had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Beilan requested to speak with counsel before answering, and he was allowed to do so. After speaking with counsel, Beilan informed the Superintendent that he would not answer that question or other similar ones. The Superintendent informed Beilan that refusal to answer such questions could lead to his dismissal. On November 25, 1953, the Board of Public Education initiated dismissal proceedings against Beilan and cited Beilan’s failure to answer the Superintendent’s question regarding his 1944 activities as evidence of “incompetency.” There was a formal hearing, at which Beilan did not testify. The charge of incompetency was sustained and Beilan was fired. The administrative appeal upheld the decision of the local Board. Beilan appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which set aside Beilan’s discharge. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.

No. Justice Harold Burton delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that public officials such as teachers can be questioned about issues that are relevant to their fitness and suitability for public service. There is no requirement that states that a teacher’s fitness is solely determined by performance in the classroom. By refusing to answer the question, Beilan showed himself to be insubordinate and lacking in frankness, which gave the Board grounds to fire him for incompetency. The Court also held that Beilan was not denied due process because he was given sufficient warning of the consequences of his refusal to answer the question.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that it is not a denial of due process when a state appropriately acts in a way that could be seen as unwise. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against improper state action, and it is not the role of the Supreme Court to censor state action that falls within the bounds of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Board’s decision to dismiss Beilan was the result of Beilan being called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and therefore invalid. In his separate dissent, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the only evidence against Beilan was his refusal to answer a question regarding his membership in an organization that espouses certain ideals. To punish him without any evidence of wrongdoing runs counter to the entire basis of American jurisprudence. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the state action in this case essentially branded a citizen as disloyal, which could have enormously detrimental effects on his life. Because this charge was not properly addressed by a court of law, Justice Brennan argued that Beilan was denied his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.


Milton Pollack
Joseph Leary Delaney
Roger Fisher

These are two consolidated cases involving several individuals involved in a tax evasion scheme.  The petitioners were indicted and testified before a grand jury without being warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the district court dismissed the indictment.  The appeals court affirmed the dismissal.  While the appeal was pending, the United States initiated a new grand jury proceeding and, at a trial by jury, the petitioners were found guilty.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  The petitioners suspected that prosecutors used privileged information gained in the first indictment to aid in the second proceeding, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

No.  In a 6-3 decision, Justice Charles E. Whittaker wrote the majority opinion, affirming the convictions.  The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' Due Process claims because they laid no foundation for holding a hearing on the issue.  The Court also held that a copy of a cancelled check obtained at the first indictment did not violate Due Process when prosecutors introduced it into evidence at the second proceeding.  The petitioner’s counsel had explicitly waived any objection to that evidence at trial.

Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent, stating that the record does not show that petitioner’s counsel waived their objection to entering the cancelled check into evidence.  Justices Felix Frankfurter and William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.


National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson

Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists.

In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.


The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States ("Party") because it advocated the overthrow of the government "as speedily as circumstances would permit." Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 ("Security Act") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the Security Act protects "per se" members of an organization from criminal prosecution. The Smith Act, by contrast, goes beyond "per se" participation by targeting those whose membership in an organization entails their knowing and deliberate participation in criminal activity. In light of this distinction, the Court noted, the two Acts are not conflicted. Since Scales, at the very least, knew, encouraged, and provoked illegal Party activities over the course of his eight year membership, he was guilty under the Smith Act of complicity in the commission of criminal activity.


Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc.

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long as the building was used for “principally” residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The panel affirmed.

No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the intent of the Act was to provide housing for veterans, which implies a degree of permanency. Previous interpretation by the FHA also understood the Act to exclude transient occupancy. The Court also held that the addition of the exclusion to the Act after the FHA contracted to ensure the mortgages was not unfair to The Darlington, Inc.

Justice John M. Harlan wrote a dissent arguing that the majority’s opinion constituted an “unconstitutional retroactive application” of the new exclusions in the Act. He also argued that there was no language in the Act that expressly prohibited The Darlington, Inc. from renting to transients, so the corporation’s actions violated neither the letter nor the intent of the Act. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Charles E. Whittaker joined in the dissent.

In a separate dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter argued that the later changes to the Act did not negate the rights of mortgage companies to rent to transients that existed under the previous construction of the Act.


John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag.

Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed.

Yes. Justice Charles E. Whittaker delivered the opinion of the 6-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that evidence required to show probable cause is not held to the same standard as evidence required to prove guilt in trial. Despite the fact that information Marsh gained from Hereford would be inadmissible at trial as hearsay, it may still be relied on as probable cause for a search and arrest. The Court also held that, because Marsh was able to personally verify the description Hereford had given, he had “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information regarding the heroin was also correct.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that an arrest made on the word of an informant violates the spirit of the Fourth Amendment because it allows the police latitude to arrest innocent people without sufficient proof. He argued that an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to allow arrests based on suspicion goes against the entire history of American jurisprudence and the intentions of the framers of the Constitution.

Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice Felix Frankfurter did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist’s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “Mark”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel.

FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) a report on Abel as a suspected spy; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel’s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial.

Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel’s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel’s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel’s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant.

Yes, no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court held that the INS properly arrested Abel even though the FBI suspected him of espionage. Justice Frankfurter noted that the INS was simultaneously investigating Abel’s status in the United States and that it indeed commenced deportation proceedings against him. While acknowledging both that the INS delayed its arrest of Abel and that the FBI searched Abel’s room immediately after INS agents’ search, he did not consider this to be sufficient evidence of unreasonable “bad faith” cooperation between the INS and FBI. He argued that the government had two available ways of dealing with a criminally suspect deportable alien and simply chose to detain Abel for potential deportation first.

Justice Frankfurter also held that the items seized by both the INS and the FBI were properly introduced into evidence at trial. He could discern no constitutional reason to limit the search for materials proving the deportability of a validly arrested alien more than the Constitution limits the search for materials probative of a crime. Noting that INS agents had to apply to the District Director of the INS for a warrant, Justice Frankfurter argued that the differences in procedural protection between criminal and deportation arrests were not of constitutional significance.

Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He warned against allowing administrative officers such as INS agents to enter people’s homes without warrants, especially when the invasion is a front for a criminal investigation. Justice Douglas argued that the FBI were clearly the moving force behind Abel’s arrest and the search of his hotel room, noting that the FBI made no effort during the investigation to obtain a search warrant despite having plenty of time to do so.

Justice William Brennan dissented, joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo Black, and Justice William Douglas. While acknowledging that Congress’ power over aliens may be great and that deportation may be described as a civil remedy, he rejected the majority’s notion that the fruits of a deportation warrant may be used in a criminal trial. He noted that there was no independent inquiry over the circumstances of the arrest and seizure, given that only a superior INS officer approved the deportation warrant. Justice Brennan argued that such an administrative search can never be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.


Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.

Edward S. Greenbaum
Harriet F. Pilpel
Harold W. Bangert

The radio and television station WDAY, Inc. broadcast the speech of A.C. Townley, a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States Senate race in North Dakota. The speech was broadcast uncensored as a reply to previous speeches made by two other Senate candidates. Townley’s speech accused the other candidates and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to establish “a Communist Farmers Union Soviet.” Farmers Union sued Townley and WDAY, Inc for libel in district court. The court dismissed the complaint against WDAY, Inc. and held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 granted the station immunity from liability for such defamation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.

Yes, yes. Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the censorship prohibited by the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was defined broadly and included the removal of objectionable material from a political speech. Permitting broadcasting stations to engage in this type of censorship would undermine the purpose the Act was meant to serve. The Court also held that holding the station liable for any defamatory statement made during the broadcast of a political speech would allow liability for conduct that the statute requires. While Congress did not explicitly include station immunity in the Act, the Federal Communications Commission, the body in charge of administering the Act, has long upheld the doctrine of station immunity.

Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented and argued that, unless Congress explicitly granted stations immunity from state libel laws, state law trumps any implied federal immunity. Since Congress has not granted any explicit immunity, and the legislative history does not indicate that they intended to do so, the state laws stand. He also argued that the precedent set by the Court supports the state unless federal laws explicitly intercede. Justice John M. Harlan, Justice Charles E. Whittaker, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


During hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political and religious beliefs along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt of Congress for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation.

The divided Court found that the Committee's actions did not violate the First Amendment and, thus, upheld Barenblatt's conviction for contempt of Congress. Justice Harlan noted that the First Amendment does not protect a witness from all lines of questioning. As long as the Congressional inquiry is pursued to "aid the legislative process" and to protect important government interests, then it is legitimate.


Linda Matteo and John Madigan created a plan for utilizing $2.6 million in funds from the Office of Housing Expediter.  The Office’s commission was coming to an end, and the plan involved firing and rehiring employees on a temporary basis until the life of the Office was extended or ended.  William G. Barr, general manager of the Office, vehemently opposed the plan, and several Senators attacked the plan on the Senate floor.  Barr decided to suspend Matteo and Madigan.  He issued a press release explaining his reasons.  Matteo and Madigan sued for libel based on the statements in the press release.

 In certain circumstances, government officials are protected from civil suits for actions done in the scope of their official duties though absolute or qualified privilege. The district court ruled in favor of Matteo and Madigan, rejecting Barr’s claim that his statements were protected by privilege.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, considering only absolute privilege.  The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded so the court of appeals could consider qualified privilege.  On remand, the court of appeals held that qualified privilege existed, but was defeated due to Barr’s malice.  The court remanded the case to district court for a new trial.

Yes.  Justice John M. Harlan delivered the judgement of the court, reversing the court of appeals.  The plurality argued that the statements from the press release were absolutely privileged.  Justice Felix Frankfurter, Justice Tom C. Clark, and Justice Charles E. Whittaker joined in the plurality.  Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the reversal, writing that that the press release was not unauthorized or beyond the scope of Barr’s official business.

Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that absolute privilege should not extend to lower level officials like Barr, and qualified privilege should only apply to statements to the public.  Justice William O. Douglas joined in the dissent.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also dissented, arguing that only qualified privilege applied.  Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that Barr acted beyond the scope of his job duties when he issued the press release, so privilege did not apply.


A non-Native American merchant ran a general store on a Navajo reservation. The merchant filed a collection action against petitioners, Native American customers, for goods sold on credit at the store. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial court's judgment that the state courts had jurisdiction. The Native American customers sought review.

In a unanimous decision by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that the Arizona state court improperly exercised jurisdiction, because states lack power to regulate Native American affairs on a reservation. The Court reasoned that the Navajo Courts of Indian Offenses exercised broad criminal and civil jurisdiction that covered suits by outsiders against Native American defendants. Federal law granted states the power to assume jurisdiction over reservation matters if the state legislature or the people affirmatively accepted the responsibility, and Arizona expressly disclaimed such jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the Navajo Treaty of 1868 controlled, and civil jurisdiction resided with the reservation's courts.


Emanuel Brown was a witness at a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act (FMCA).  Brown refused to answer questions asked by the grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination.  The district judge ordered Brown to answer the questions, telling him that the FMCA provided immunity against any prosecution that might arise from Brown’s testimony.  Brown still refused to answer.  After several failed attempts to make Brown answer the questions, the judge held him in contempt of court and sentenced him to 15 months in prison.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.

No.  Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed the conviction.  The Supreme Court held that the FMCA clearly provided Brown with immunity from prosecution based on his testimony.  Because he could not possibly incriminate himself, he could not invoke the Fifth Amendment.  There was no statutory cap on sentencing, so 15 months was not an abuse of discretion.

Chief Justice Earl Warren dissented, arguing that the district judge denied Brown due process by following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) instead of 49(b).  Under 49(b) Brown would be sentenced to prison until he agreed to answer the questions instead of a fixed 15 month sentence. Justice Hugo L. Black, Justice William O. Douglas, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.


Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for "first-run" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their "first-run" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed.

The lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.

Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that a case involving both equitable and legal claims must be tried by jury before the equitable damages can be accessed. Therefore, Beacon Theatre had a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Fox West Coast’s injunction for permanent relief from Beacon could be assessed after the jury verdict.

Justice Potter Stewart (joined by Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Charles E. Whittaker) wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court should have denied the writ of mandamus because the issues of this case were questions of law rather than fact, and that the trial judge should be granted deference.


Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc.

Arthur J. Goldberg
David E. Feller
Marion E. Sibley
Thomas H. Anderson

In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification.

In March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac.

The hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the Florida Supreme Court did not properly enjoin the union employees from picketing the resort hotels. The Court held that the strike's status under the National Labor Relations Act did not control the case. Instead, the Court looked to whether or not any violence resulted from the picketers’ activities. It held that none of the district courts made any finding of violence sufficient to merit an injunction from the Florida Supreme Court. The Court determined that it was not necessary to consider whether interstate commerce was involved in the Florida resort hotel industry.


William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body.

The county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as “suicide.”

New York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.

No. In a 6-2 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in reversing the judgment of the district court. Chief Justice Warren argued that the jury could have determined that William Dick's death was accidental from the evidence Blanche Dick presented at trial, emphasizing that the evidence apparently did not suggest that William had either the motive or intention to commit suicide. He also noted that William was in the middle of his chores when he died, which the jury could have reasonably concluded to be improbable timing for a suicide attempt.

Chief Justice Warren declined to answer whether a state or federal evidentiary standard is proper when jurisdiction is based on the diversity of the parties because both parties assumed the North Dakota standard was proper in their briefs and arguments.

Justice Potter Stewart concurred, agreeing that the district court properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard. Justice Stewart noted that he was not a member of the court when the case was granted a writ of certiorari, and thus refrained from expressing an opinion on whether the Court granted the writ appropriately.

Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice Charles Whittaker, dissented. He argued that the Court improperly granted a writ of certiorari to Blanche Dick’s case. Justice Frankfurter outlined the history of diversity jurisdiction cases in the circuit courts, emphasizing that congress intended the Court to use its certiorari power sparingly in such cases. He argued that the Eighth Circuit properly applied North Dakota’s evidentiary standard and concluded that Blanche's claim fell short of the North Dakota requirements for submission to a jury.

Justice John Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.


On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did.

The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.

Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the interrogation tactics the police used -- such as questioning Spano for hours without a break and using a childhood friend to manipulate him -- were coercive and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the confession was involuntary, it should not have been admitted into evidence in trial.

In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the interrogation was also unconstitutional because the police denied Spano access to his lawyer. He wrote that a defendant who has been charged with a crime is entitled to representation by counsel, and that right extends beyond the trial. Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence in which he argued that the judgment should be reversed solely due to the fact that the defendant was denied access to counsel during his interrogation. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.