Michael O. Freeman
Richard H. Seamon
Peter W. Gorman

On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.

Yes and No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court recalled that a police officer may seize contraband when it is in plain sight, and "its incriminating character is immediately apparent". It held that instances in which an officer uses the sense of sight to discover illegal goods are analogous to those involving the sense of touch. The Court also reasoned that the tactile detection of contraband during a lawful pat-down search does not constitute any further invasion of privacy, therefore warrantless seizure was permissible. The Court also concluded that the police officer frisking Dickerson stepped outside the boundaries outlined in Terry v. Ohio which requires a protective pat-down search to involve only what is necessary for the detection of weapons. In fact the officer was already aware that Dickerson's jacket pocket did not contain a weapon, when he detected the cocaine through further tactile investigation.


Between January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence "in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection." The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that Deal's second through sixth convictions in a single proceeding arose "in the case of his second or subsequent conviction" within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), finding that the statute was not ambiguous. The Court rejected that the rule of lenity applied because Deal's "105-year sentence 'is so glaringly unjust.'" Writing for the court, Justice Scalia said the 105 years sentence for the gun offenses was not unjust "simply because [Deal] managed to evade detection, prosecution and conviction for the first five offenses and was ultimately tried for all six in a single proceeding." Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Harry A. Blackmun joined.


From 1975 to 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court determined that regardless of the fact that the Federal Government reimburses WBEC for its taxes, the private company is still the taxpayer. And, the taxpayer had its opportunity to go to court and challenge the state taxes imposed upon it, and accepted the result. The Court found that the Federal Government does not have a separate right to do so.


Maurice M. Cahillane, Jr.
John R. Dunne
Robert B. Gordon

Hazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years.  Biggins’ pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service.  Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and “willfully” violated the ADEA.  The willful violation gave rise to liquidated damages.  The district court judge granted Hazen’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing a “reckless disregard” for the matter.

Yes, no.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for a unanimous court, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded for further proceedings.  The Supreme Court held that interfering with an employee’s pension does not automatically violate the ADEA, though it is a clear ERISA violation.  While older employees may have more years of service, age and years of service are independent of each other.  On remand, the court of appeals should reconsider whether there is sufficient evidence to support an ADEA violation independent of the pension interference.  The Court also held that the court of appeals applied the proper definition of willfulness.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred, noting that nothing in the majority opinion should be read as supporting the “disparate impact” theory of Title VII.  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.


A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures.

No. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky's procedures for involuntarily committing mentally retarded persons did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. With Justice Anthony M. Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that because retarded persons are not a suspect classification, Kentucky's statute warranted only rational basis scrutiny – the Court's lowest level of scrutiny. Consequently, the Court concluded that the state met its burden that its procedures were rationally related to a legitimate government purpose and were constitutional.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. She argued, in contrast to the majority, that Kentucky's commitment procedures were irrational. Justice Harold A. Blackmun also dissented. He argued that laws that discriminate against the mentally retarded warrant heightened scrutiny by the Court. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, and in part by Justice O'Connor, dissented. He argued that Kentucky's commitment procedures were not supported by any rational justification.


Cal J. Potter, III
David F. Sarnowski
Amy L. Wax

Richard Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself.  He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court.  After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial.  Two and a half months later, Moran told the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty.  Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence.  After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran’s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas.  The court sentenced him to death.  The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders.

After sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court.  The court rejected Moran’s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations.  The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal.  Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court.  The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a “reasoned choice” among the alternatives given.  The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of making a reasoned choice.

No.  Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that pleading guilty and waiving a right to counsel do not require a higher level of competency that standing trial.  There is no reason to believe waiving these rights requires a higher mental capacity than waiving other constitutional rights.  Whether a defendant is able to adequately defend himself without an attorney is irrelevant to this decision.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that using the same competency standard for pleading guilty without counsel and standing trial with counsel does not violate due process.  Justice Antonin Scalia joined in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented, arguing that courts should conduct a specific inquiry to determine whether a defendant can proceed without counsel when the accused’s competency to stand trial has already been questioned.  Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District

William B. Ball
William C. Bryson
John C. Richardson

James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the school district from providing the requested interpreter. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, the presence of an interpreter is not linked to the state and is the result of the private decision of individual's parents. "The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.


On May 13, 1981, 17-year-old Gary Graham accosted Bobby Grant Lambert in the parking lot of a Safeway grocery store in Houston, Texas, and attempted to steal his wallet. When Lambert refused to hand it over, Graham shot and killed him. Graham was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.

Graham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by arguing that the sentencing jury should have considered the mitigating circumstances of his youth and troubled family life. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, and a panel reversed the district court’s ruling. Upon an en banc review, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s decision

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that a decision in favor of Graham would create a new constitutional rule by extending beyond the reasoning of the precedents that were in place at the time of the conviction. Unless a jurist at the time of Graham’s conviction could have found reasonable precedent to decide the case in his favor, to do so now would extend beyond the Court’s purview. Since the precedent at the time would not have provided a valid reason to overturn Graham’s sentence, the Court found that it must uphold it.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that he fully supported the Court’s decision. He also wrote that the case Graham chiefly relied on, Penry v. Lynaugh, was wrongly decided. He argued that the specific questions a sentencing jury is asked to consider before sentencing a defendant to death make the consideration of mitigating factors redundant.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he argued that the consideration of mitigating factors by a sentencing jury is a crucial safeguard against discriminatory sentencing. He strongly disagreed with Justice Clarence’s view that Penry v. Lynaugh was wrongly decided.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice David H. Souter argued that a decision in favor of Graham would not create a new constitutional rule in this case because such a decision would not impose a new burden on the prosecution in sentencing hearings. He also found that the jury instructions did not allow the jury to fully consider the implications of mitigating factors. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Jeffrey Caminsky
Seth P. Waxman
John G. Roberts, Jr.

During his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted.

Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went further, ruling that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument.

No. In an opinion written by Justice David H. Souter, the Supreme Court held that the decision in Stone had been one of prudence rather than one of jurisdiction. In Stone, the Court had decided against using the "exclusionary rule" in federal habeas cases dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures (the exclusionary rule prevents evidence discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search from being introduced in Court). The Court's decision had been based on an expectation that, even in the unlikely case that a state court had erred in its consideration of the constitutionality of a given search, that procedural error was not likely to produce a wrongful conviction. In Fifth Amendment involuntary testimony cases, though, it was possible that a suspect would given false statements about his own guilt because of confusion or fear. The question was not merely a procedural one, therefore, and the prudential concerns of Stone did not apply.


Robinson O. Everett
Edwin S. Kneedler
H. Jefferson Powell
Janet Reno

The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Yes. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. The unusual district, while perhaps created by noble intentions, seemed to exceed what was reasonably necessary to avoid racial imbalances. After concluding that the residents' claim did give rise to an equal protection challenge, the Court remanded - adding that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the District Court would have to decide whether or not some compelling governmental interest justified North Carolina's plan.


The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) allows public employers to give employees compensatory time off instead of overtime pay in some situations.  The employees of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department had a union representative who dealt with workers' compensation and filing grievances, but Texas law prohibited collective bargaining agreements.  Each employee had an individual employment agreement with the Sheriff’s Department. These agreements provided that employees would receive 1 1⁄2 hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.

Lynwood Moreau, president of the union, sued the Sheriff’s Department for giving compensatory time instead of overtime pay.  He argued that where there is a designated union representative, the FLSA requires a collective bargaining agreement to authorize this kind of compensation.  The Sheriff’s Department argued that, because Texas prohibited collective bargaining agreements, there was no properly designated union representative, and the individual employment agreements were effective.  The district court ruled in favor of the Sheriff’s Office and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

In a unanimous decision, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court.  The Court held that the individual employment agreements authorized compensatory time.  The union representative did not qualify under the FSLA because, under Texas law, he could not enter into a collective bargaining agreement.


James E. Doyle
Michael R. Dreeben
Lynn S. Adelman

On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.

No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court found that the Wisconsin statute paralleled antidiscrimination laws which had been found to comply with the First Amendment. It also determined that the consequences for the victim and the community tended to be more severe, when the victim of a crime was chosen on account of his or her race. Thus, when the Wisconsin statute increased the sentence for such crimes, it was not punishing the defendant for his or her bigoted beliefs or statements, but rather the predicted ramifications of his or her crime. Finally, the Court concluded that the Wisconsin statute did not violate the right to free speech because the occasion in which an average person's racist comments would be used against him or her in a court of law would arise so rarely that he or she would not feel forced to suppress them.


Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District

A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court.

Yes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the District violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the District's restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the District's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.


Talbot D'Alemberte
Margaret P. Griffey
Paul J. Larkin, Jr.

On September 29, 1981, Officers Enrique Carrisalez and David Rucker were shot within several minutes of each other in a rural part of Texas along the Mexico border known as “the Valley.” Enrique Hernandez, who was riding along in Officer Carrisalez’s squad car, was an eyewitness to Carrisalez’s shooting. The shootings led to a massive hunt for the killer across the Valley. The police arrested Leonel Herrera on October 4, 1981 near Edinburg and took him to the police station. During a heated exchange, Herrera struck a police officer and was restrained. When defense counsel arrived several hours later, Herrera was badly beaten, unconscious, and partly paralyzed; he was subsequently transported to a hospital emergency room. Officer Carrisalez died soon thereafter.

The police discovered evidence at the scene of arrest implicating Herrera in both murders. The car pulled over by Carrisalez was registered in the name of Herrera’s live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had a set of keys to that car when he was arrested. The police found drops of Type A blood on jeans recovered from a laundry room and in Herrera’s wallet. They also found a letter in Herrera’s pocket with Herrera’s fingerprints; the letter contained apparent confessions to both murders. Hernandez could not specifically identify Herrera from an array of six photographs, but later identified him as the shooter when presented with a mug shot. Herrera was convicted of the murder of Officer Carrisalez, and pleaded guilty to the murder of Trooper Rucker.

Herrera filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming actual innocence and alleging that various Valley police officials were involved in the drug trade and were working with the person actually responsible for the murders, Raul Herrera. The trial court denied relief. Herrera filed another petition, presenting the affidavit of Raul Herrera’s son that he witnessed the killings and that Herrera did not commit them. The district court dismissed most of Herrera’s claims, but granted a stay of execution as to his claim of innocence. The Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, vacated the stay of execution, agreeing with Texas that innocence was irrelevant to Herrera’s petition.

No. In a 6-3 opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that the rejection of Herrera’s petition did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that evidence of Herrera’s actual innocence was not relevant to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus absent some constitutional violation by the state of Texas. This rule was grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts existed to ensure that individuals were not unconstitutionally imprisoned, not to correct errors of fact. Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Court sometimes examined the sufficiency of evidence in death penalty cases, but only to determine whether there was an independent constitutional violation.

Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected Herrera’s argument that the federal courts’ failure to accept Herrera’s petition violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined the history of American principles of justice in criminal trials, determining that Texas’ refusal to entertain Herrera’s newly discovered evidence did not violate traditional notions of fundamental fairness. Moreover, Herrera could still avail himself of Texas’ procedures for requesting clemency. Chief Justice Rehnquist also questioned the evidentiary value of Herrera’s affidavits.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy. She rejected the notion that the question before the Court was whether a state may constitutionally execute an innocent person, and emphasized that the evidence strongly suggested Herrera’s guilt.

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. He argued that there was no basis in text, tradition, or contemporary practice for finding a constitutional right to demand consideration of new evidence of innocence.

Justice Byron White concurred, arguing that Herrera would only be entitled to relief if he proved that no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter. He wrote that executing an innocent person was contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Justice Blackmun argued that Herrera should have been granted relief if he showed both a reasonable doubt about his guilt and that he was actually innocent. He also expressed doubts about the constitutionality of the death penalty.


James D. Vail
Jeffrey M. Shohet
Robert A. Long, Jr.

Shirley and Larry McQuillan were the southwest distributors for products made with sorbothane, a patented elastic polymer.  They had an agreement with the manufacturer to be one of five regional distributors.  Gradually, the manufacturer began to take away the McQuillan’s right to distribute certain types of products, eventually revoking their rights altogether.  The manufacturer only allowed one national distributor, Spectrum Sports, Inc., which was co-owned by the president of the manufacturer’s son.  When the McQuillan’s business failed, they sued Spectrum for violations of the Sherman Act.  The Sherman Act makes it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of the interstate commerce.

The district court instructed the jury to infer specific intent and dangerous probability of monopolization if they found that Spectrum engaged in predatory conduct.  The jury found Spectrum guilty.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was enough evidence to show specific intent and a dangerous probability of monopolization even if the jury only considered Spectrum’s predatory conduct.

No.  In a unanimous decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion of the court reversing the lower judgment.  The Supreme Court held that Spectrum is not liable without proof of a dangerous probability of monopolization and specific intent.  The Court held that although predatory conduct may be enough to prove intent, a dangerous probability of monopolization requires an analysis of the product involved, and the offender’s power in its geographic market.


Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.

Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.


William P. Barr
Allen E. Shoenberger
Sally L. Wellman

Todd Brecht was charged with murder for shooting his brother-in-law. During his trial, he testified that the shooting was an accident. In addition to presenting other evidence, the prosecution pointed out his silence (both prior to his receiving the Miranda warnings and after) in an attempt to discredit his testimony. Brecht was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.

Brecht appealed, claiming that the prosecution's reference to his post-Miranda silence violated his right to due process according to Doyle v. Ohio. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reinstated it. They found that the mention of post-Miranda silence was impermissible under Doyle, but was also harmless error according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard from Chapman v. California.

Brecht sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court upheld his Doyle claim and found that the violation was not harmless error under Chapman. Brecht's conviction was thus overturned again, only to be reinstated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

The Seventh Circuit held that Chapman was not the appropriate standard under which to review Doyle error in federal habeas petitions. Rather than adhering to the Chapman standard, the court applied the Kotteakos v. United States test, which requires that the Doyle error have a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict. Brecht's Doyle claim did not meet this standard, and the Seventh Circuit denied the writ.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the "substantial and injurious effect" test was preferable to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test in requests for habeas corpus relief. Habeas proceedings are not to be the primary avenue for resolving disputes; Rehnquist called the writ "an extraordinary remedy", reserved for the victims of grave injustice. The Kotteakos standard, then, was sufficient to determine whether Brecht deserved habeas relief.


Frankie Sue Del Papa
Cornish F. Hitchcock
John J. Roberts, Jr.

William McKinney, a Nevada state prisoner, sued his warden and several other prison officials for violating his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unhealthy levels of second-hand smoke. McKinney shared a cell with a man who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. He claimed that his health - both current and future - was being harmed by the smoke, and that the prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" to the risk in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294. After a federal magistrate ruled that he did not have an Eighth Amendment right to a smoke-free environment and that he had failed to prove any "serious medical needs," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that he should have been given another opportunity to prove that the smoke levels were sufficient to constitute an unreasonable danger to his future health.

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that McKinney's suit stated a reasonable claim that, if proven, could be grounds for relief under the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Byron White, in the majority opinion, rejected the government's argument that the "deliberate indifference" test established by the Court in Wilson (which held that withholding medical care from prisoners only violated the Eighth Amendment if it was done with "deliberate indifference" to serious health risks) only applied to current medical conditions. If McKinney could prove that the second-hand smoke posed a serious threat to his future health and that the prison officials had deliberately ignored that threat, White wrote, McKinney would be entitled to relief.


Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Florida

In 1984, the Minority Business Enterprise Participation ordinance was passed in Jacksonville, Florida which set aside 10 percent of the budget for city contracts to hire minority-owned businesses. On April 4, 1989, the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, an association of individuals and companies that worked in construction in Jacksonville, filed an action against the city and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in favor of the association, but when the city appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the association lacked standing to file the action because it did not demonstrate that one or more of its members would have received a reserved city contract but for the ordinance.

No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that, in order to file an action, the petitioner must have demonstrated that, as a result of the challenged ordinance, its members suffered injury or that injury was imminent, and that a favorable ruling could have been expected to rectify the injury. The majority determined that the association members' possible lack of fair opportunity as a consequence of the ordinance would have constituted injury. Since the association members would have competed for the reserved city contracts in the absence of the ordinance, the Court found that they did have standing and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.


Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.

Section 602(7)(B) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving "only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such...facilities use any public right-of-way." When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way, Beach Communications, Inc. and other SMATV operators petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Among other things, the appellate court found that section 602(7) violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and SMATV systems linking separately owned and managed buildings.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that section 602(7)(B)'s common-ownership distinction is constitutional because the statutory classification neither proceeded along suspect lines nor infringed fundamental constitutional rights. "As we have indicated," Justice Thomas concluded, "there are plausible rationales unrelated to the use of public rights-of-way for regulating cable facilities serving separately owned and managed buildings. The assumptions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but the very fact that they are 'arguable' is sufficient, on rational-basis review, to 'immunize' the congressional choice from constitutional challenge." Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion.


Richard Lyle Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota’s drug laws. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years in jail. The United States then filed an in rem action, seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop under federal statutes that provide for forfeiture of property that is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, or related materials. Austin argued that forfeiture of his property would violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected Austin’s argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem actions for forfeiture of property to the government.

Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for five members of the court, reversed the Eighth Circuit and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment did apply because the forfeiture was a punishment for an offense and did not only serve a remedial purpose. On remand, the Eighth Circuit should consider whether the forfeiture was constitutionally “excessive.”

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the proper question for determining whether the forfeiture is excessive is whether the property had a close enough relationship to the offense, rather than how much the property is worth. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing that the majority should not have decided whether in rem forfeitures always amount to a punishment of the owner. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in Kennedy’s opinion.


Cardinal Chemical Company v. Morton International, Inc.

Acting upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical ("Cardinal") violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton International ("Morton") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of its validity counterclaim and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that two questions of law do not always necessarily cancel each other out when only one is resolved. The Court observed that in matters of patent law, noninfringement and invalidity are two separate questions. Therefore, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may find that a patent has not been infringed but it may not rely on such a determination as a per se basis for vacating a judgement holding the same patent invalid. Although the Court of Appeals' dogmatic practice existed since 1987, it was unsupported by the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, and imposed undue burdens on those who remained convinced of the disputed patent's invalidity.


John Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, to an undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a "machinegun", if a defendant "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm." A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, authored by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court ruled that a criminal who trades his or her firearm for drugs "uses" it "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime," which is within the bounds of the sentence enhancement. Justice O'Connor wrote that Congress intended to make the word "use" as broad as possible when it wrote the law. The law does not require proof that a defendant used the gun as a weapon.


Alvin J. Dixon was arrested on second-degree murder charges and released on bond with an order not to commit any criminal offense.  Violation of the order would result in prosecution for contempt of court.  While awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.  The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Dixon guilty of contempt.  Dixon moved to dismiss a subsequent indictment for cocaine possession, arguing that it violated the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy.  The Superior Court granted the motion.

Michael Foster’s wife obtained a civil protection order requiring that he not “molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse” her, or he would face prosecution for contempt of court.  Foster’s wife later moved to have him held in contempt for threatening her.  Foster was found guilty of contempt on two occasions, but acquitted on three others.  Foster was later indicted on several counts of assault arising out of those same threats.  He moved to have the charges dismissed arguing that it violated double jeopardy.  The trial court denied the motion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases, holding that the subsequent prosecutions were barred by Grady v. Corbin, which held that subsequent prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause if the two prosecutions require proof of the same “essential element.”

Yes.  Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment of the court.  Though not agreeing on an opinion, five justices agreed that the proper test was whether the offense in the second prosecution contained the same elements as the offense in the first.  Five justices also agreed that double jeopardy did not bar the subsequent prosecutions in either case.  Justice Scalia noted that Grady was wrongly decided and must be overruled.  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the judgment.

Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that the subsequent prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy under the same elements test.  Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas joined in the opinion.  Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing that double jeopardy bars prosecution for an offense if the accused has already been held in contempt for its commission.  Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice David H. Souter joined in the opinion.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, writing that none of the subsequent prosecutions were barred because the interests served by contempt proceedings were fundamentally different from the interests served by criminal prosecution.  Justice Souter concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, arguing that the same elements test was inadequate and Grady had been correctly decided.  Justice Stevens joined in the opinion


On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr., who was 19, shot Jack Huddleston in the course of a convenience store robbery by telling Huddleston to get on the ground and then shooting Huddleston in the back of the neck. A few weeks later, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted murder. At that time he confessed to the murder of Jack Huddleston.

Johnson was tried and convicted of capital murder. After a jury determined that he was guilty, a separate proceeding was held to determine whether Johnson would be sentenced to death or to life in prison. Pursuant to the Texas capital sentencing statute, the court instructed the jury to determine two special issues, whether Johnson caused the death of Jack Huddleston intentionally and whether Johnson was likely to constitute a continuing threat to society. Under Texas law, if the jury answered yes to both questions Johnson would be sentenced to death. The court further instructed the jury that it may consider any aggravating or mitigating evidence. However, the jury was given no special instruction to consider Johnson's youth. A unanimous jury found that the answer to both special issues was yes, and the trial court sentenced Johnson to death.

Johnson appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. Johnson later filed a motion for rehearing arguing that the special issues did not allow for adequate consideration of Johnson's youth. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's argument concluding that the jury was able to express a reasoned and moral response to Johnson's mitigating evidence. Johnson then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

No. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the majority and held that the procedure set forth by the Texas capital sentencing statute was constitutional with respect to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a lengthy discussion of past decisions regarding the constitutional requirements regarding the consideration of mitigating circumstances in capital cases, the Court ultimately held that the Texas capital sentencing statute allowed adequate consideration of Johnson's youth because the jury was instructed to determine the probability that the petitioner would be a continuing threat to society and to consider any mitigating evidence with which they were presented.

Justice Antonin Scalia filed a concurring opinion. He emphasized that the sentencer's consideration of relevant mitigating evidence ought to be channeled. He stated that the kind of channeling of mitigating discretion practiced in Texas should not merely be permitted, but required.

Justice Clarence Thomas also filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the ruling, but added that he believed the Court wrongly decided Penry v. Lynaugh.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissented, joined by Justices Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and David Souter. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that the jury was not allowed to give full effect to the mitigating evidence of Johnson's youth and stated that the sentence should have been remanded.


According to Executive Order No. 12807 signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, the Coast Guard was required to force the return of all passengers discovered illegally traveling by sea from Haiti to the United States before reaching its borders without determining whether they qualify as refugees. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a collection of organizations representing illegal Haitian aliens and Haitians detained at Guantanamo, requested that the District Court for the Eastern District of New York delay the implementation of the order. The council argued that the order violated section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential prosecution from forced repatriation. The District Court denied the council's request, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.

No. In a majority opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court observed that Acts of Congress do not generally have application outside of United States territory, unless explicitly noted. And, it found that both section 243(h) and Article 33 are silent regarding extraterritorial application. In fact, the language of both suggests that only individuals who have already arrived on United States soil are protected, and their use throughout history confirms this interpretation. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.


Ferris Alexander was the owner of a chain of stores and theaters in Minnesota that distributed sexually explicit media. He was charged with violating federal obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal District Court in Minnesota found him guilty of both charges. The court ordered him to forfeit his businesses, sentenced him to a six-year prison term, and fined him $100,000.

Alexander appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores for his dealings in obscene material amounted to 'prior restraint' on his subsequent distribution of adult materials, and therefore violated his First Amendment rights. He also claimed that the seizure of his business violated his Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment on the First Amendment claim, and declined to review the Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that no sentence less severe than life imprisonment without parole could justify an Eighth Amendment review.

No and undecided. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote for a 5-4 majority that the application of RICO in Alexander's case was neither a 'prior restraint' on speech, nor a criminalization of speech typically protected under the Constitution. His sentence established no conditions on his behavior after its completion; once he paid the fine, surrendered his business and went to prison, he could theoretically distribute adult media without prejudice from the government. "To accept petitioner's argument," Rehnquist wrote, "would virtually obliterate the distinction [...] between prior restraints and subsequent punishments."

In a separate and unanimous vote, the Court ruled that the forfeiture did in fact merit Eighth Amendment review. The case was returned to the Eighth Circuit for an analysis under the Excessive Fines Clause.


Kenneth W. Starr
David Overlock Stewart
David O. Stewart

Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute.

No. A unanimous Court held that the question of whether or not the Senate rule violated the U.S. Constitution was nonjusticiable since the Impeachment clause expressly granted that the "Senate shall have sole Power to try any impeachments." The clause laid out specific regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines were observed the courts would not rule upon the validity of other Senate procedures regarding impeachments. Chief Justice William Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the "ultimate intrepreter of the Constitution," a matter would be deemed nonjusticiable when there was "a constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department."


Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty Woman" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman." The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice David H. Souter, the Court held that a parody's commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the presumption that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair, as no such evidentiary presumption was available to address either the character and purpose of the use or the market harm. Justice Souter wrote that the appellate court "erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily copied excessively from the Orbison original, considering the parodic purpose of the use." Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.


Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet

Julie S. Mereson
Nathan Lewin
Jay Worona

In 1989, the New York legislature passed a school districting law that intentionally drew its boundaries in accordance with the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim who practice a strict form of Judaism. Shortly before the new district commenced operations, the taxpayers and the association of state school boards embarked on a lawsuit claiming that the statute created a school district that limited access only to residents of Kiryas Joel.

Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the statute's purpose was to exclude all but those who lived in and practiced the village enclave's extreme form of Judaism. This exclusionary intent failed to respect the Establishment Clause's requirement that states maintain a neutral position with respect to religion, because it clearly created a school zone which excluded those who were non-religious and/or did not practice Samtar Hasidism. Indeed, the very essence of the Establishment Clause is that government should not demonstrate a preference for one religion over another, or religion over non-religion in general.


Florence County School District Four v. Carter

Peter W. D. Wright
Amy L. Wax
Donald B. Ayer

After Shannon Carter was classified as a learning disabled student, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Unhappy with the IEP developed by the school district, Shannon's parents challenged its appropriateness and enrolled her in a private school while their challenge was pending.

When state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents sued in Federal District Court, claiming the school district had failed to provide a "free appropriate public education" as required by IDEA and demanding reimbursement for Shannon's education at the private school. The school district argued that the private school did not meet all the requirements of IDEA and therefore did not meet the "appropriate" standard. Because of it was not "appropriate," the school district argued, reimbursement was not required.

The District Court and the Fourth Circuit of Appeals both ruled against the school district, requiring it to reimburse Shannon's parents.

Yes. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Supreme Court unanimously held that parents have a right to withdraw their child from a public school providing an inappropriate education under the meaning of IDEA and enroll them in a private school, as long as the private school provides an "appropriate" education. The Court further held that the specific requirements of the Act need not be met when a student is placed in a private school by his or her parents, because the IDEA requirements were not intended to apply to parental placements.


National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler

Miguel A. Estrada
Fay Clayton
G. Robert Blakey

The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a "racketeering enterprise" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The unanimous Court held that organizations without an economic motive can detrimentally "affect interstate or foreign commerce," satisfying the RICO definition of a racketeering enterprise. An "enterprise" does not have to be an economic organization or a principally criminal organization to trigger the RICO act. Consequently, the Court reversed the appeals court decision which allowed the original case to proceed.


John H. Bisbee
James G. Sotos
Leon Friedman
Steven R. Shapiro
John A. Powell
Harvey Grossman
Richard Ruda

Illinois police obtained a warrant to arrest Kevin Albright after he was seen selling a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law.

Albright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.

No. The Court ruled that Section 1983 relief for prosecution without probable cause is only valid if the prosecuted party claims Fourth Amendment (pretrial rights) violations. In a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the Courtt reaffirmed its commitment not to extend substantive due process indefinitely and held that substantive due process does not guarantee non-interference by criminal investigations.


Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court noted that the Commerce Clause prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce, and a regulation is discriminatory if it "taxes a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines." The majority determined that the surcharge was clearly discriminatory because waste disposal companies were required to pay three times more to dispose of waste produced out-of-state. Thus, for the surcharge to comply with the Commerce Clause, the Department of Environmental Quality needed to demonstrate that it had no choice but to use discriminatory means to serve some local purpose, but it failed to do so. Consequently, the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court was reversed.


Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall

William L. Myers, Jr.
J. Michael Farrell
Ralph G. Wellington

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were "genuine and severe." The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury.

Conrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle.

No. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 7-2 Court. The Court categorized FELA emotional stress claims closely with common law treatments of emotional stress claims. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's assertion that common law tests were arbitrary and could be disregarded. Instead, common law standards should be used to verify claims filed under FELA. The Court adopted the "zone of danger test" from common law, which limits relief to those employees who sustain physical injury resulting from emotional stress caused by employer negligence. The Court held that this test would best distinguish between genuine and fraudulent claims, and provide relief in the case of injury. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's holding that employers were liable for causing foreseeably stressful conditions, reasoning that this would extend to many types of everyday employment.


C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance." The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C & A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.

Yes. Tthe Court held 6-3 that the Commerce Clause invalidates local laws that discriminate against interstate commerce, disrupt the flow of articles of commerce, and grant municipalities disproportionate market gains. In an opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court found that "the article of commerce...is the service of processing and disposing of [waste]." The Court held that the flow ordinance was discriminatory because "[i]t hoards solid waste...for the benefit of the preferred processing facility." For the ordinance to be constitutional, the municipality would have had to prove that its effects on commerce are nondiscriminatory and justified by a "legitimate local interest."


Ronald J. Mann
Michael R. Sment
Roy B. Woolsey

BFP, a partnership formed by two private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the home was valued at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive "reasonably equivalent value" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed "reasonably equivalent value" was equal to the market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

No. In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, The Court ruled 5-4 that the value received for a property at a foreclosure sale can be reasonable even if it is different from the "fair market value." A foreclosure sale alters market conditions and can lower a property's selling price. If a foreclosure sale is necessary to settle a debt, the price at which the property is sold is reasonable so long as "all the requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with."


Stanley M. Chernau
Jeffrey P. Minear
Irwin Venick
Robert E. Williams
Douglas S. McDowell
Ann Elizabeth Reesman

Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an "abusive work environment" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a "close case" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision.

No. In an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court found that the district court had been wrong to focus on whether or not the harassment had caused "concrete psychological harm." Instead, Justice O'Connor wrote that the court should have focused on whether the conduct was hostile or abusive. "Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive... there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious (in order to find that it violates Title VII)."


Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the provisions of the federal statute in question do not apply to suspects being held solely on state charges. The Court explained that no delay is said to occur until the suspect is arrested and detained for a federal crime. The six-hour period only begins to expire from the point of a suspect's federal arrest and charging. In this case, Alvarez-Sanchez was presented before a federal judge within six hours of his arrest on a federal counterfeit charge. The fact that he was held for some two and a half days prior has no bearing on his federal status under the statute since he was detained on state and local charges only during this time.


Central Bank of Denver , N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , N. A.

Edwin S. Kneedler
Tucker Karl Trautman
Miles M. Gersh

In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds’ outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds.

First Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.

No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Securities Exchange Act only prohibits manipulative or deceitful actions, and it can only be used to prosecute such actions. Since the charge of aiding and abetting is not directly covered in the statute, companies cannot be liable for such actions. The Court also held that if Congress intended the statute to be used in such a way, it would have added a section that specifically addressed the issue.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the judicial history of similar cases showed that those who aid and abet in violations of the Securities Exchange Act are considered liable. He also argued that, given the liberal background to the construction of the Act, it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended it to have a broad applicability. Justices Harry A. Blackmun, David H. Souter, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the dissent.


Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman

Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide "use tax," the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.

Yes. The Court held that the use tax was discriminatory in those localities where it exceeded the local sales tax. Such discrepancies, between certain localities' sales taxes and the state use tax, prevented the latter tax from being a valid "compensatory" tax, since it obviously did not impose a "substantially similar" burden on the interstate and intrastate commerce of such localities. The Court added that in those localities where the use tax did not exceed the local sales tax, no discriminatory treatment resulted and so the use tax's application would not be struck down in its entirety. Instead, the Court remanded the case back to Missouri for a decision on how to best correct certain of its localities' existing tax discrepancies.


Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause ("Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's "choice of law clause," which states that "What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm.

The District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to "any conviction," it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.

No. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court applied the choice of law clause to the exemption clause and reasoned that no rights could be restored unless by the jurisdiction that first barred the rights. The Court ruled that though the federal government did not currently have any procedures in place to restore the civil rights of felons, only the federal government had jurisdiction over federal convictions. Therefore, Beecham's state-law restoration of civil rights was insufficient to restore his right to possess a firearm in light of 18 U.S.C. 922(g).


Dee Farmer, a biological male, underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants and underwent unsuccessful sex reassignment surgery.  Farmer was convicted and sentenced to prison on federal criminal charges. Prison medical personnel diagnosed Farmer as a transsexual.  Farmer was generally kept separate from the general male population, in part because of Farmer’s misconduct, but also because of safety concerns.

Farmer was transferred to the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute and placed in the general male population in accordance with prison policy.  Within two weeks, a cellmate allegedly beat and raped Farmer.  Farmer sued in federal district court, alleging that prison officials deliberately and indifferently failed to protect a prisoner.  This violated Farmer’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.  Farmer sought damages and an injunction against future incarceration in any prison.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, noting that Farmer never complained or expressed any safety concerns prior to the incident.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Maybe.  Justice David H. Souter, writing for seven members of the court, vacated the lower court judgment and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that prison officials may be liable if they showed “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm when the official was subjectively aware of the risk and disregarded it.  The Court remanded the case for further consideration of whether prison officials were aware of the risk to Farmer.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that inhumane prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment regardless of a prison official’s state of mind.  Justice John Paul Stevens also concurred writing that he agreed with Justice Blackmun, but joined in the majority because it followed prior precedent.  Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment arguing that conditions of confinement do not violate the Eighth Amendment unless they are imposed as part of a sentence.


Lawrence S. Robbins
Kenneth I. Sidle
Jonathan A. Marshall
William G. Pecau
Jon R. Stark
Stephen P. Fox
Roland I. Griffin
Jack E. Brown
Chris R. Ottenweller
Charles A. Blanchard

After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that while attorney's fees are awarded from time to time to prevailing defendants or plaintiffs, this practice is entirely subject to the deciding court's discretion. Indeed, the Court observed, that the statute in question emphasizes such discretion by stating in relevant part that a court "may" award attorney's fees. The Court concluded that such discretion is to be applied evenhandedly between victorious defendants and plaintiffs.


Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc.

After Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the "right not to go to trial" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy rationale, the denial of which had been held immediately appealable.

No. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of immunity - while cause for concern - does not automatically create a right to immediate appeal. It is important to have final judgments before appeals are made, Justice David H. Souter wrote for the Court, and exceptions should only be made in particularly important cases. A "right not to go to trial," while significant, is rarely the key factor in a settlement agreement, and cannot compare in importance to the right to be free from "double jeopardy" in criminal court or the encroachment on public duties caused by a denial of immunity to public officials.


Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy

Silvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards—a private organization—to use the designation Certified Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of "false, deceptive, and misleading" advertising. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First Circuit, affirmed.

Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that Ibanez's use of her CPA and CFP designations constituted commercial speech, which can only be restricted if it can be proven to be false or misleading and the state has a substantial interest in restricting it. Because Ibanez is fully licensed, her use of the designations was neither false nor misleading. Without evidence that the commercial speech caused "real harms" and that limiting it would restrict those harms, the Board did not meet its burden to show a substantial state interest.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which she argued that Ibanez's use of the CFP designation was misleading. Because it appears in conjunction with the CPA designation, Justice O'Connor argued that the average consumer would be led to believe that a state licensing board controlled the use of both titles, which is not the case. Without listing the agency that regulates the use of the CFP title, the average consumer would be unable to verify this information. Because this designation is potentially misleading, the Board properly disciplined Ibanez with regard to the CFP designation. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.


Robert Edward Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was taken to the Pomona Police Department for questioning as a potential witness in the investigation of the death of a 10-year-old girl.  Stansbury was not a suspect in the death, and did not receive Miranda warnings, but during questioning, made a statement that put him under suspicion.  After further questioning, Stansbury admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation.  At this point the interrogating officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights and Stansbury refused to make any further statements.  Stansbury requested an attorney and was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.  The trial court held that Stansbury was not truly in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings until suspicion focused on him.  The court refused to suppress Stansbury’s statements made prior to the warning.  Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.  The Supreme Court of California affirmed.

No.  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and remanded.  The Court held that an officer’s subjective view is irrelevant to the determination of whether a person being interrogated is “in custody.”  On remand, the Supreme Court of California should consider whether the objective circumstances showed that Stansbury was in custody during his entire interrogation.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of the Constitution.


Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards.

Yes. The denial of judicial review creates the possibility that juries might make arbitrary and excessive awards without offering a way to adjust them. The common-law practice of allowing judicial review for jury awards is important in ensuring that juries do not ignore guidelines.


ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

John V. Jansonius
Lawrence G. Wallace
Deputy Solicitor General Wallace
James D. Holzhauer
Timothy S. Bishop
Daniel R. Barney
E. Carl Uehlein, Jr.
Joseph E. Santucci, Jr.
Stephen A. Bokat
Robin S. Conrad
Mona C. Zeiberg

After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.

ABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act gave the Board broad authority to adopt laws regarding the reinstatement of employees. The Court called perjury "intolerable in a formal proceeding," but ruled that the National Labor Relations Board was under no obligation to adopt a blanket rule against reinstating employees who have perjured themselves. Reducing the Board's discretion in making rules for employee reinstatement "might force the Board to divert its attention from its primary mission and devote unnecessary time and energy to resolving collateral disputes about credibility."


Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." The district court interpreted the phrase "original sentence" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing "lenity," the court agreed with Granderson that "original sentence" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held 7-2 that the U.S. Code's section 3565 refers to the original sentence range set by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the minimum revocation sentence for drug possession while on probation is one third the maximum of the Guidelines range of imprisonment; the maximum revocation sentence is the Guidelines maximum. The Court pointed out that the statute differentiates between "sentence of probation" and "original sentence." Moreover, the history of the language shows that Congress may not have given it careful attention and that it "may have been composed with an obsolete federal sentencing regime in the drafter's mind." In "circumstances, where the text, structure, and statutory history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct, the rule of lenity... resolve[s] the statutory ambiguity in Granderson's favor."

Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy concurred separately. Dissenting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, with whom Justice Clarence Thomas concurred, argued that "original sentence" should be interpreted as the term of probation.


On January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.

Yes. In a majority decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court determined that the pricing order violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The majority found that while the pricing order taxed all dealers, the benefit of the tax was reserved exclusively for in-state dairy farmers and outweighed the tax they were required to pay. Thus, the Court concluded that, in effect, the pricing order functioned like a tariff, and was clearly unconstitutional. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was reversed.


In July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution’s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of “life imprisonment” in this case, and the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons’ request.

Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the lack of a specific instruction regarding the actual consequences of the jury’s decision led to Simmons being sentenced on the basis of essentially false information. The Due Process Clause grants defendants the right to “deny or explain” the evidence against them, and Simmons was not given the opportunity to do so regarding his potential future danger to society. Because evidence of future dangerousness often plays an important role in sentencing, preventing the jury from having access to the relevant information does not conform to the precedents established in Due Process jurisprudence. The Supreme Court also held that the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were sufficient. The instructions the trial judge gave did nothing to dispel any misunderstanding the jury members might have had regarding the meaning of the possible sentences.

Justice David H. Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the trial judge has a responsibility to dispel jury misunderstandings of sentencing terms, particularly when the jury explicitly requests such guidance. Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the concurrence. In her separate concurrence, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that the most basic right the Due Process Clause protects is the right to be heard, which was denied to Simmons when he was prevented from clarifying his parole situation. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in judgment in which she argued that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant’s right to rebut the prosecution’s evidence against him. In a sentencing trial in which the prosecution bases its argument on the defendant’s future dangerousness, the Constitution requires that the defendant have the opportunity to provide evidence to the contrary. Proof that the defendant will not be released is sometimes the only way to rebut the prosecution’s evidence. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Anthony Kennedy joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an overbroad reading of the Due Process Clause’s power to override state law regarding the admissibility of parole information. Such an issue should be left to the states to decide individually, as there is no indication in the Constitution that the Due Process Clause requires such a strict national standard. Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent.


On the Charleston Naval Base, Keith Shackleton lost a game of pool and a $30 wager to Robert L. Davis.  Shackelton refused to pay, and was later found behind the pool club beaten to death with a pool cue.  The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) questioned Davis after finding a bloodstain of one of the pool cues Davis owned.  Before questioning, Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel both orally and in writing.  About an hour and a half into questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”  The interviewing agents attempted to clarify the statement and reminded Davis he could remain silent and/or speak to counsel, but Davis said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.”  Questioning continued for another hour before Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.”  At this point questioning ceased.

At trial, Davis was convicted on one count of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to confinement for life and dishonorable discharge.  Davis appealed, arguing that the NIS investigators violated his right to counsel, as laid out in Edwards v. Arizona, when they continued questioning after Davis indicated he “maybe” should talk to a lawyer.  The U.S. Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that Davis’ statements were ambiguous and the NIS appropriately clarified Davis’ wishes before continuing questioning.

No.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for five members of the court, affirmed.  The Supreme Court held that, assuming Edwards applies in military proceedings, investigators do not need to cease questioning when an accused makes an ambiguous statement like “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.”  The Court noted that, while it was proper for the investigators to clarify Davis’ intentions, the Court does not require investigators to adopt that practice in future interrogations.  Justice Antonin Scalia concurred, writing that the Court should consider the federal statute governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions the next time a similar case comes before the court.

Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment, but expressed that investigators have a legal obligation to clarify ambiguous statements that could reasonably be understood as a request to consult with a lawyer.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the concurrence in the judgment.


Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.

No. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming. Congress recognized that the public television stations had an intrinsic value to the American public and were in economic peril of disappearing due to the cable television industry's monopoly. The rules do not force the cable companies to alter their message.