The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded, and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional.

Lemon and others challenged the district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year.

No. Announcing the Judgment of the Court, Justice Warren E. Burger affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Court held that permitting payment of allocated funds for 1970-1971 school year would not substantially undermine constitutional interest at stake. The Court also recognized that the denial of payment would have serious financial consequences on private schools which relied on the statute and the funds allocated for the 1970-1971 school year.

Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment. Justice William O. Douglas, joined by Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Potter Steward, dissented. The dissent held that the First Amendment was violated whether the payment from public funds to religious schools involved the prior year, the current year, or the next year. Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in consideration of this case.


United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno

A. Raymond Randolph, Jr.
Ronald F. Pollack

Jacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who were denied benefits under Section 3 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the District Court and maintained that amended Section 3 violated the Fifth Amendment in creating two types of households – one in which all members were related and one in which at least one member was unrelated. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, acknowledged the interest of Congress in preventing abuse of the Food Stamp program. However, the statute did not fulfill Congress' stated purpose of preventing "hippies" and "hippie communes" from enrolling the food stamp program. Additionally, there existed other measures within the Food Stamp Act that were specifically aimed at preventing abuse of the program. Since the statute "simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud," the distinction between households with related members and households with unrelated members did not further the state interest and therefore violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.


State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were "legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity," including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law.

The Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in Miller v. California. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.


McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission

Richard B. Collins
Harry R. Sachse
James D. Winter
Robert B. Collins

Rosalind McClanahan was a member of the Navajo Indian nation who lived on the Navajo Reservation in Apache County, Arizona. Her employer withheld $16.20 in 1967 for Arizona state income taxes. McClanahan sought the return of her withheld income. She claimed that since she was a Navajo Indian residing on the reservation and since her income was derived completely on the reservation, she was exempt from state taxation. When her request was denied, she filed suit in Apache County Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed her claim. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected her petition for review.

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals and held that Arizona did not have the right to tax McClanahan. In an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized the long-standing status of Indian reservations as exempt from state authority. While the Navajo Treaty signed between the Navajo nation and the United States did not explicitly exempt the nation from state laws, Arizona entered the Union on the explicit condition that it would lose its authority over Indian tribes and reservations within the state, including taxation powers. Consistent with its decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, the Court ruled that Arizona "had no jurisdiction to impose" state income tax on McLanahan.


San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez

In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.

No. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states, it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education, "the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."


Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was a mechanic working for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company’s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green’s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests.

Green filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial discrimination charge.

No, yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the findings of the EEOC could not bar a suit that meets the jurisdictional requirements for suing in federal district court. The Court also held that Congress meant to prevent discriminatory hiring practices, not guarantee jobs, so that the complainant in an employment discrimination lawsuit carries the initial burden to present a prima facie case for racial discrimination. The burden then shifts to the company to prove that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring and/or firing practice. In this case, while Green presented a prima facie case, the Court held that McDonnell Douglas Corporation was not compelled to rehire him after his deliberately unlawful activities. On remand, Green must show that the corporation’s reasons regarding the unlawful activity were merely a pretext.


In October 1970, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application for a wiretap with a federal judge. According to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act), every application for the interception of wire or oral communications had to be authorized by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. The application in this case apparently contained all of the proper authorizations and signatures, was approved, and was used to arrest and charge Dominic Giordano with a drug crime. At Giordano’s pre-trial hearing, it came to light that the Assistant Attorney General had allowed an Executive Assistant in his office to authorize this and other applications. The district court granted Giordano’s motion to suppress the government’s evidence because it had misidentified the approving officer. The government appealed and argued that the court should not have suppressed the evidence because the Assistant Attorney General’s delegation to the Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the Act and because the government’s conduct did not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the Executive Assistant’s approval violated the Act, which required the suppression of the evidence in question.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended only the Attorney General or a specifically designated Assistant Attorney General to have the power to authorize wiretap applications. Consequently, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act required the Court to suppress any evidence obtained from a wiretap that was issued in response to an application with insufficient authorization. Additionally, because the original wiretap application was invalid, the government could not rely on any contested evidence obtained from the properly authorized extension of the original wiretap.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he maintained that the Court should not have suppressed the evidence obtained from the extension of the original wiretap orders. Justice Powell argued that the probable cause for the properly authorized extensions was only partially obtained form the illegal wiretap; therefore, the Court did not need to suppress the evidence gathered from the extensions. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


Leon Jaworski
Philip A. Lacovara
James D. St. Clair

A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.

No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.


Robert H. Bork
Frank J. Kelley
William M. Saxton
Nathaniel R. Jones
J. Harold Flannery

A suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that "[w]ith no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect," the district court's remedy was "wholly impermissible" and not justified by Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that desegregation, "in the sense of dismantling a dual school system," did not require "any particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or classroom.'" The Court also emphasized the importance of local control over the operation of schools.


Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived.  Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct a search.  A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside.  The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash.

At trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search.  He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal.  At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room.  This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search.  The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed.

Yes, No.  Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that police can obtain consent for a search from a third party if that third party has common authority over the premises.  The woman’s statements should not have been excluded at the suppression hearing because evidentiary burdens are lower for suppression hearings than the actual trial.  On remand, the court must determine whether the woman had authority to consent to the search.

Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the search was invalid because police officers failed to obtain a warrant when they had multiple opportunities to do so.  The woman letting police officers into the house violated Matlock’s and her parents' privacy.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, writing that, on remand, the court should determine whether the woman knew she did not have to consent to the search of the house.  Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


In 1972, the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party, wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party’s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied the motion.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that states may not interfere with the right to associate with the political party of one’s choice without proof that the political party was inciting immediate lawless action. Such action on the parts of the states prevented the effective casting of ballots, which violated basic civil and political rights, and was not in the best interests of the states.

In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the facts of the case showed that Indian did not require affidavits from the two main political parties. Because the policy represented a discriminatory preference without any justification, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.


Melvin Kent Kammerlohr
Robert H. Bork
Douglas F. Duchek

An inmate of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit also objected to the prison's inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail.

Yes. In a 6-3 vote Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority reversing in part and affirming in part. The Supreme Court held that while prisoners are not entitled to full due process protections, disciplinary proceedings must include written notice to the defendant of the charges, a written statement of evidence, and the opportunity for an inmate to call witnesses and present evidence. The Court allowed for discretion by officials to deny a prisoner the right to present evidence or call witnesses if it would be "unduly hazardous to institutional safety." The Court also held that prison official's opening of privileged letters in the presence of other inmates was not unconstitutional.

Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented in part, stating that the inmate's right to present evidence and call witnesses is constitutionally protected and should not be abridged. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. joined. Justice Douglass wrote a dissent, saying that prisoners are entitled to all due process protections when they are faced with an substantial deprivation of liberty in the prison.


Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.

No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and upheld the statute. In an opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court accepted California's interest in keeping the Disability Fund program solvent and maintaining the low contribution rate from program members. Insuring disability resulting from pregnancy complications would be "extraordinarily expensive" and make the program "impossible to maintain." As in Dandridge v. Williams, California was not obligated by the Equal Protection Clause to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Therefore, California could constitutionally choose which disabilities to insure through the Disability Fund in order to maintain the solvency and contribution level of the program.


A federal grand jury questioned John P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities.  The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra’s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company.  Calandra refused to answer any questions, arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment.  The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search.  The district court granted the suppression order and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied.  Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding.

No.  Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings. The purpose of a grand jury is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether to charge someone in connection with that crime.  Using the exclusionary rule would interfere with that purpose. The exclusionary rule is also meant to deter police misconduct, not provide a new constitutional right.

Justice William J. Brennan dissented, writing that application of the exclusionary rule should not depend on whether it deters police misconduct. The exclusionary rule gives meaning to the Fourth Amendments protection against unlawful search and seizure. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.


Richardson, a taxpayer interested in activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, sued the government to provide records detailing the CIA's expenditures.

The Court held that Richardson did not have standing to sue. Using the two-pronged standing test of Flast v. Cohen (1968), Chief Justice Burger found that there was no "logical nexus between the status asserted [by Richardson as a taxpayer] and the claim sought to be adjudicated." It was clear to Burger that Richardson was not "a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power" on this issue.


An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film "Carnal Knowledge." The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret.

A unanimous Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court misapplied the obscenity test announced in Miller v. California (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that Miller did not give juries "unbridled discretion" to determine what is patently offensive. Only material that displays "hard core sexual conduct" is prohibited. Since "Carnal Knowledge" did not contain scenes of that nature it merited constitutional protection.


Philip J. Hirschkop
Samuel W. Hixon, III
Jane M. Picker

Carol Jo LaFleur was a teacher at Patrick Henry Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio. She was forced to discontinue her duties on March 12, 1971 because the Cleveland School Board required every teacher to take maternity leave without pay five months before the expected date of birth. The board also ruled that a teacher could not return from maternity leave until 1) the next school semester began, 2) the teacher obtained a certificate from her physician showing good medical health, and 3) the newborn child was three months old.

Ann Elizabeth Nelson was a French teacher at Central Junior High School, also in Cleveland. She reported her pregnancy to the school's principal on January 29, 1971, and applied for maternity leave. Both LaFleur and Nelson wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year, but were forced to leave in March 1971. LaFleur and Nelson filed separate suits in district court challenging the constitutionality of the school boards' maternity leave rules; the court tried their cases together, and held that the board's policies were constitutional. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, concluding that the mandatory leave policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.

Susan Cohen was a social studies teacher at Midlothian High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Cohen notified the Chesterfield School Board that she was pregnant on November 2, 1970. The board's rule required pregnant teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth month, but allowed re-employment the next school year upon submission of a medical certificate from the teacher's physician. Cohen's obstetrician believed that she was fit to continue working, but the school board denied Cohen's request for an extension. Cohen challenged the constitutionality of Chesterfield County's rule in district court, which held that the regulation violated the equal protection clause. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but on rehearing en banc, the court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation.

Yes, yes and no. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Potter Stewart held that the school boards' regulations requiring pregnant teachers to stop working after the fifth month of their pregnancies violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Justice Stewart emphasized that the Court extends strong protection to individuals' freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life. He pointed to both boards' requirements that pregnant teachers provide advance notice of their condition, arguing that this was in itself sufficient to preserve continuity in classroom instruction.

Justice Stewart then turned to the school boards' claim that the rules were required because some pregnant teachers became physically incapable of teaching. He reasoned that these rules amounted to an irrebuttable presumption that every teacher in her fourth or fifth month of pregnancy was incapable of teaching. He also rejected the boards' argument that the rules were necessary for administrative convenience, concluding that administrative efficiency was not a sufficiently important interest to validate what was otherwise a violation of due process.

Justice Stewart also held that the Cleveland School Board's eligibility restriction based on the age of the newborn child violated the due process clause because the board failed to show a reasonable justification for this regulation. In contrast, the Chesterfield School Board only required that teachers demonstrate good health, guaranteeing them re-employment by the beginning of the next school year. This was a reasonable and narrow method of protecting the school's interest in teacher fitness.

Justice Louis Powell concurred in the result. He questioned the majority's conclusion that some of the maternity leave requirements amounted to an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness. Instead, Justice Powell argued that the board's classifications violated the female teachers' right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they were not rationally related to the school's legitimate interest in fostering continuity of teaching.

Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger, dissented. He argued that while the school boards' rules may have been arbitrary in particular cases, this was not enough to show that the rules themselves were unconstitutional. He noted that both parties conceded that the probability of physical impairment increased as a pregnancy advanced, and suggested that the line drawn by the boards was not irrational.


Sydney H. McKenzie, III
Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Since 1941, Florida has granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows but no similar exemption for widowers. Widower Mel Kahn applied to the Dade County Tax Assessor’s Office for the property tax exemption, which was denied. He sued in circuit court and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court held that the statute was gender-based and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that the gender classification had a “fair and substantial relation” to the purpose of the legislation.

No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that single women face significantly more hardship in the job market than single men, and the disparity is particularly true for surviving spouses. While widowers can generally continue in the job they held previously, many widows find themselves entering the job market for the first time or after an extended absence. Based on these differences, the Court held that the gender classification in the Florida statute has a “fair and substantial relation” to the legislation’s purpose of softening the financial impact of the loss of a spouse.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued classifications based on characteristics over which individuals have no control, such as gender, must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. In such cases, the government must prove not only that such classifications serve a compelling government interest, but also that the interest cannot be served by any other classification. In this case, he argued that the purpose of the legislation could be achieved without gender-based discrimination. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Byron R. White wrote that gender-based classifications require significant justification that Florida did not provide.


On October 8, 1970, Richard Guy Steffel and other individuals were distributing flyers protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War on the exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Employees asked them to stop, but they did not, so the employees called the police. The police informed them that they would be arrested under a Georgia criminal statute if they did not stop, so they left. The next day Steffel and another individual returned to hand out flyers. The police were called again, and Steffel left to avoid arrest. The other individual, however, was arrested.

Steffel sued and argued that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because his fear of being arrested kept him from distributing flyers. The district court dismissed the action and denied all relief after it found no evidence that the state acted in bad faith and therefore there was no active controversy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes, yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the case presented an actual controversy, as the Georgia statute could interfere with Steffel’s exercise of his constitutional rights even if he was not arrested. Because the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, which Steffel was protesting, was reduced, the issue of whether or not the case still presented an active controversy would be decided by the lower court on remand. The Court also held that awarding declaratory relief would not interfere with the state’s prosecution, and therefore is not precluded.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion and argued that plaintiffs in such constitutional cases must prove that the state’s actions represented a “genuine threat” to their constitutional liberties, which he predicts will be rare. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurrence.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that it would not be improper to issue declaratory or injunctive relief in state courts on issues that have already been decided by federal courts. He also argues that such measures should not be necessary because the decisions of federal courts carry more weight than precedents in state courts.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion and argued that issuing declaratory relief does not allow a plaintiff to avoid prosecution under state law. He also argued that this opinion does not provide support for the ability of federal courts to grant injunctive relief just because declarative relief was appropriate. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurrence.


Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company and fell behind on payments. W. T. Grant sued Mitchell in state court to recover the $574.17 balance. Pursuant to Louisiana law, W. T. Grant offered proof that it had a vendor's lien on the property and that Mitchell owed a balance and asked the court to issue a writ of sequestration to retain and hold the property pending the outcome of the suit. The trial court approved the writ without notifying Mitchell or allowing him an opportunity to defend his right to the property at a hearing. Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration and argued that seizing his property without notice or an opportunity to defend his interest in the property violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's argument and held that W. T. Grant's course of conduct ensured Mitchell's due process by proceeding according to Louisiana law.

No. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Louisiana's procedure for sequestering property provided both the buyer and the seller with a fair opportunity to secure and defend their respective interests in the challenged property. W. T. Grant Company provided a sworn statement documenting proof of the debt, the lien, and delinquency, all of which showed the judge that Mitchell's title to the property was encumbered. Additional safeguards in the Louisiana law required creditors to place a bond down at the time of sequestration to secure the buyer's interests should the proceedings show that sequestration was wrongful. The Court held that these safeguards, coupled with Louisiana's interest in preventing the buyer from transferring or concealing the property to the detriment of the creditor, justified sequestration without notice or a hearing.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion overturned the rule established in Fuentes v. Shevin. In that case, the Court held that procedural due process required "an adversary hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived of any possessory interest in . . . property." Justice Powell argued that the Fuentes rule was unnecessarily broad and that the narrower grounds the majority set forth represented a better balance of the interests of creditors and debtors.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court should adhere to the Fuentes rule. According to this rule, the Louisiana procedures violated due process by allowing the government to deprive a person of property with no advance notice or opportunity to be heard. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.


Harry R. Sachse
Harris D. Sherman
Gene E. Franchini

Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

No and no. The Court reversed the District Court. The 1972 Act did not explicitly repeal Section 472. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, cited the long history of Indian employment preference as exceptions to prohibitions against employment discrimination. Congress had also passed two Indian preference statutes after the 1972 Act, showing that Congress did not intend implicitly to repeal Section 472. In addition, the Court held that Section 472 did not constitute discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Again, Justice Blackmun cited the history of "special treatment" granted to Indians. The preference for Indians in Section 472 was not "a 'racial' preference", but rather "an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government." Section 472 went towards the "fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation towards the Indians," and was therefore not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.


American Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah

Jesse R. O'Malley
Gerard R. Miller
Gerald R. Miller

In 1964, the federal government sued several corporations for rigging prices of concrete and steel pipes in violation of the Sherman Act. That case reached a final judgment in May 1968, when all parties agreed to terms that prevented the companies from engaging in future violations of anti-trust laws. Eleven days short of one year after this agreement, the State of Utah, on behalf of several agencies and local governments, filed a class action lawsuit against the same corporations. The lawsuit claimed that the corporations’ previous price fixing schemes had directly injured the State and other plaintiffs. Six months later, the corporations successfully argued that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the lawsuit could not be maintained as a class action because it was not impractical for the plaintiffs to each have individual representation. Eight days following this ruling, over 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts within the State of Utah immediately filed motions to intervene in the lawsuit. The court denied their motions because they had failed to argue them within the one-year time statute of limitations required under federal law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, that court held that, by filing lawsuit as a class action, all of the claims were adequately before the trial court before the statute of limitations was reached. However, because the judge dismissed the class action after the statute of limitations ran, the parties were unable to re-file their claims against the corporations. That court held that the trial judge could not leave the plaintiff’s without recourse after the time to file the lawsuit had passed. Instead, the plaintiffs should have the eleven days that remained under the statute of limitations when the initial lawsuit was filed in order to intervene or otherwise file individual claims. The corporations appealed.

No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Ninth Circuit.The Supreme Court held that commencing a class action suspends all applicable statutes of limitations against members of that class who would have been parties had the suit been allowed to continue as a class action. Justice Stewart noted that the policies behind statutes of limitations are to ensure fairness to defendants by “preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Those policies, however, are satisfied when a plaintiff initiates a class action lawsuit because defendants know a named plaintiff and the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs. Finally, the Court noted that eleven days remained under the statute of limitations when the class action was initially filed. Therefore, the motions to intervene that were filed within eight days of the judge’s dismissal were valid.


Joseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed "acceptable for service" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' case was not impacted by Gutknecht. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in United States v. Fox. Fox involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Davis asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Fox changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that Davis could challenge his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart quoted the government's acknowledgment that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was "not consonant with this Court's holding in Sanders v. United States." The Court rejected the government's suggestion that Section 2255 did not apply because Davis' challenge was not grounded in the Constitution. Since "new law has been made...since the trial and appeal" through the Ninth Circuit's later holding in Fox, Davis was entitled to a challenge under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part.


Harold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA.  When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed.  Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction.  The state supreme court rejected Spence’s argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague.

Yes.  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that that statute, as applied, violated the First Amendment right to free speech.  Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that Spence’s display was symbolic speech entitled to constitutional protection.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that each state should decide how the American flag should be protected.  Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, expressing that states have an interest in protecting the American flag as an important symbol of national unity.  Chief Justice Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.


Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo

Daniel P. S. Paul
Jerome A. Barron
Dan P. S. Paul

Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision.

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and held that Florida's "right to reply" statute violated the freedom of press found in the First Amendment. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court recognized the risks posed to the "true marketplace of ideas" by media consolidation and barriers to entry in the newspaper industry. However, even in that context, "press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and...cannot be legislated." The statute was an "intrusion into the function of editors," and imposed "a penalty on the basis of the content." Chief Justice Burger relied on New York Times v. Sullivan in that the "right to reply" statute "limits the variety of public debate," and was therefore unconstitutional. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. authored a concurring statement. Justice Byron R. White authored a concurring opinion.


Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling.

The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state libel laws involving private individuals and the news media.


The Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute’s meaning of “family” was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in violation of the Village’s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare.

An ordinance restricting land use to “one-family” dwellings did not involve a procedural disparity, did not deprive any group of a fundamental right, and is rationally related to a permissible government objective. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Village of Belle Terre’s ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not arbitrary, did not unreasonably apply to some individuals and not others, and was reasonably related to a rational state objective. The Court also held that the ordinance did not violate the Due Process Clause because it did not deny anyone a fundamental right such as the rights to travel, association, and privacy.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that this case was moot because the unrelated tenants to whom the homeowners leased were no longer living in the house when this case was decided. There was no case or controversy as Article III of the Constitution requires. Justice Brennan explained that he would vacate and remand the judgment, and if the lower court determined that the case was moot, as he suggested, then the case should be dismissed. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the ordinance “unnecessarily burdens” the lessor appellees’ right to privacy and First Amendment right to freedom of association. The Village’s legitimate interests in controlling land use could be fulfilled by limiting the number of people dwelling in a single residence without specifying that they need to be related or unrelated.


A police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.

The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.


Leonard Mellon
Raymond L. Marky
Bruce S. Rogow
Paul L. Friedman

Robert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances.

Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court certified the class and held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of the district court’s prescribed procedures.

Yes, yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for a unanimous court affirmed in part and reversed in part remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information to a timely preliminary hearing on probable cause. The prosecutor’s decision to file an information does not provide sufficient protection. Five members of the court agreed that the district court’s prescribed procedures were not required by the Fourth Amendment. The case was remanded for reconsideration of these procedures.

Justice Potter Stewart concurred, writing that it was unnecessary to specify which procedural protections do not need to be provided to suspects awaiting trial. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.


Robert Martinez was a prisoner in the California State Prison in San Quentin, California. The California Department of Corrections had regulations which censored mail and which prohibited law students and legal paraprofessionals from conducing interviews with the inmates.

Martinez and other prisoners in the California corrections system filed suit against officials in the California Department of Corrections in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the aforementioned regulations. The district court decided in favor of the prisoners, and the officials from the department of corrections appealed.

No and Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote for a unanimous Court and affirmed the lower court's opinion. The Court held that it was proper for the district court to refuse to abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the regulations. The Court further held that the censorship of direct personal correspondence created incidental restrictions on the right to free speech for both prisoners and their correspondents. Therefore, the speech could only be restricted if it furthered a substantial government interest and was narrowly tailored to further that interest. Under this rule, the policy censoring mail was unconstitutional.

Justice Thurgood Marshall filed a concurring opinion, which Justice William J. Brennan joined. Justice Marshall emphasized his opinion that the prison authorities did not have a general right to open and read all incoming and outgoing prison mail.

Justice William O. Douglas wrote separately that prisoners were still entitled to all constitutional rights which were not curtailed by procedures that satisfied all the requirements of due process.


Harry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision.

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Ohio and found no violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice Harry A. Blackmun asserted that "no First Amendment forum is here to be found," as the streetcars did not qualify as a "public thoroughfare." Accordingly, the city "need not accept every proffer of advertising." The city could reject certain types of advertising as long as the policies were not "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious." Given the "reasonable legislative objectives" of minimizing "chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience," Shaker Heights' policy was not unconstitutional.


Edward H. Steinman
J. Stanley Pottinger
Thomas M. O’conner

In 1971, the San Francisco, California school system was integrated. As a result, the San Francisco school system absorbed over 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who were not proficient in English. Of these students, the school system only provided about 1,000 with supplemental English language courses. Classes were taught exclusively in English.

Lau and other students of Chinese descent who did not speak English and received no supplemental English courses brought a class action suit against the officials in the San Francisco Unified School District. The students claimed that the failure to provide supplemental English classes constituted an unequal educational opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The district court denied relief, holding that the policies of the school system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and a hearing en banc was denied. The students appealed the appellate court's decision.

Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for a unanimous court. The Court determined that the school system's failure to provide supplemental English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who spoke no English constituted a violation of the California Education Code in the SFUSD Handbook and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it deprived those students of an opportunity to participate in the public education program.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring with the result, which was joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun. He discussed the appropriateness of the statutory guidelines mandating affirmative remedial efforts for linguistically deprived children.

Justice Harry Blackmun also wrote an opinion concurring with the result, which was joined by Justice Burger. The justice stressed that 1,800 children were being deprived of meaningful schooling in this matter. He limited the Court's holding by stating that, if only a few children spoke a language other than English, the Court's decision would not necessarily require supplemental language instruction.


Daniel M. Friedman
Charles Barnhill, Jr.

Wayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.

In a plurality opinion written by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court held that the procedures established for the purpose of determining whether there is "cause" for Kennedy's dismissal satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The court also held that standard of employment protection imposed by was not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees. The statute in question was not unconstitutional on its face.


Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin

Mozart G. Ratner
Stephen M. Kapral
Parker E. Cherry

In the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the Branch’s monthly newsletter published a list of those who had not yet joined the union under the heading “List of Scabs.” After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.

Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal law such as the National Labor Relations Act supports an environment for robust labor debate that allows for “intemperate, abusive, or insulting language” if it effectively makes a point. The Court also held that such language could not be interpreted as a false representation of fact and so maintained their First Amendment protection.

In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the First Amendment and its application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit both the states and the federal government from limiting speech in federal labor disputes.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority unnecessarily extended the reach of federal labor law. He wrote that state libel laws represented the overriding state interest in allowing individuals redress for harms to their reputations. In this case, the individuals in question did not represent an economic threat to the union, so the speech should not be protected from state libel laws. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school.

In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that because the University of Washington Law School had agreed to allow DeFunis to enroll and to earn a diploma, the case in question was moot. DeFunis would be able to complete his legal studies irrespective of any Supreme Court decision. The controversy between parties had thus "clearly ceased to be 'definite and concrete' and no longer 'touch[ed] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'"


Respondents alleged that a section the New York welfare statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Social Security Act.  The New York statute required recipients to cooperate in a support action against a missing parent or they would not receive benefits.  The Social Security Act contained no such requirement.  A three-judge district court in the Northern District of New York agreed and ruled in favor of the respondents.  The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal.

Yes.  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court.  The court noted that since the district court's decision, the Social Security Act was amended to almost mirror that section of the New York welfare statute.  The amendment would become effective just over three months after the Supreme Court's decision so the Court declined to deliver an extended opinion.  Justices Lewis F. Powell and William Rehnquist dissented.


Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims.

The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship."


John C. Lowe
D. Patrick Lacy, Jr.
Melvin L. Wulf

A Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions.

The Court held that the Virginia law infringed upon Bigelow's First Amendment rights and violated the Constitution. Citing prior holdings such as New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Justice Blackmun denied the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling that commercial speech is not afforded First Amendment protection. Furthermore, the advertisement in question contained important information in the "public interest" which went beyond merely informing readers of a commercial service. Finally, the Court feared that the Virginia statute had the potential to "impair" national and interstate publications which might choose to carry similar advertisements.


Colonial Pipeline Company is a Delaware corporation that operates a pipeline running from Texas to New York carrying petroleum.  Colonial challenged a Louisiana corporation franchise tax, stating that all of their business in Louisiana was interstate.  Colonial maintained no offices in Louisiana and delivered no petroleum intrastate, but they did have several employees in Louisiana.  The Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as a state regulation on interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the tax was not on interstate commerce, but on corporate business done in Louisiana.

No.  Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court 7-1.  The Supreme Court held that the tax was justified because Colonial had voluntarily qualified to do business in Louisiana, and gained benefits and protections from Louisiana.  The Court also held that the tax was not discriminatory or unfairly apportioned.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence stating that the tax did not threaten state commerce by being discriminatory.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, asserting that Louisiana’s tax was solely on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, making it unconstitutional.  Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.


Robert H. Bork
Charles S. Rhyne
Calvin L. Rampton
Talmadge R. Jones

In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.

Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.


In 1970, Jack Roland Murphy was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit robbery while armed and/or assault, and was sentenced to life in prison. Murphy filed for change of venue because of media coverage of his previous crimes. Murphy was made famous by his involvement in the 1964 jewel heist of the “Star of India,” a rare precious sapphire that was housed at the New York Museum of Natural History. Murphy was given the nickname “Murph the Surf” in national media coverage. Murphy had also been arrested and indicted for the double murder of two women in Florida, which was nationally known as the “Whiskey Creek Murders.” Murphy contends that the national publicity surrounding these two convictions tainted the jury and that his right to fair trial was violated. The motion was denied, and Murphy was convicted. After his conviction, Murphy petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the denial of his request to change venue resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. The district court held that the jury was properly screened for prejudice and dismissed his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

National news coverage of the defendant’s previous crimes was not sufficient to establish a presumption of jury prejudice in violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that because the jury selection process was sufficiently thorough to exclude prejudice of the jurors, the petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not violated. The Court looked at other cases involving jury prejudice because of previous media attention and determined that they did not control the outcome in this case, as the jury members who were selected only had brief exposure to Murphy’s previous crimes and stated that they did not think the previous crimes influenced his guilt in this case. Although there was precedent that stated that certain circumstances could create a high potential for prejudice, the Court determined that precedent applied only in federal courts as an exercise of the Court’s supervisory powers over federal courts rather than as a constitutional rule that applied to state courts as well.

In his concurrence in the judgment, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that, while the trial judge should have shown more discretion in jury selection, the circumstances of the trial in this case did not rise to the level of violating the defendant’s rights to fair trial and due process.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Murphy’s request for venue change should have been granted because some of the jurors did show prejudice regarding Murphy’s previous convictions, and therefore that he had been denied a fair trial.


Anthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but later called Faretta back in to question him about his knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta’s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge’s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.

No.  Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the state court judgment and remanded the case.  The Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to defend himself when he voluntarily and intelligently wants to do so.  In this case, Faretta was deprived of that constitutional right.  Farretta’s knowledge of the hearsay rule and court procedure was irrelevant to whether he voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the Constitution provides no basis for a right to self-representation.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.  Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the text of the Sixth Amendment does not support the right to self-representation, and such a right will lead to procedural confusion without providing any benefit to the accused.  Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


A juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult.  After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult.  Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy.  The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ.  The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree.

Jones again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court.  The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before juvenile court and criminal trials are so different that double jeopardy did not apply.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.  The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts.  The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system.

Yes.  In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the court vacating the lower court decision and remanding.  The unanimous Supreme Court held that the criminal trial put Jones in jeopardy for a second time.  The Court suggested that juvenile courts make determinations about whether to try a juvenile as an adult at a preliminary hearing before any adjudication is made.  This would avoid any double jeopardy and allow juveniles to be tried as adults when appropriate.


Michael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling obscene magazines in violation of a city ordinance.  The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale.  Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk’s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding.  When Maness’ client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to 10 days in jail and a $200 fine.

Another state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time.  The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment.  Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition.  The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the Fifth Amendment applied.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction.

No.  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the unanimous majority opinion, holding that Maness could not be held in contempt for giving advice in good faith.  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the client should have produced the magazines and then appealed the decision to let them in as evidence.  The Court noted that sometimes it is impossible to “unring the bell” and Maness took the proper course to protect his client.  The Court also noted that the record showed no evidence of willfully disobedient conduct by Maness or his client.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence, stating that punishing an attorney for acting in good faith would violate due process as an arbitrary interference with a client’s right to the advice of counsel.  Justice Bryon R. White also wrote a concurrence, noting that the trial court gave no assurance that the client would not be convicted based on the magazines.  Justice White would have vacated the contempt judgment and given the client another opportunity to answer the questions with those assurances.


Julian Vella, a seaman on the SS Robert MacNamara, suffered a severe head injury while doing a repair on the ship.  This caused damage to Vella’s inner ear, making it difficult for him to balance.   Doctors ruled the condition permanent and incurable.   A jury awarded Vella maintenance and cure for his injury.  The district court denied the ship owner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The ship owner argued that because the injury was permanent, maintenance and cure was not permissible.  The appellate court reversed.

Yes.  In a unanimous decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that the ship owner must pay maintenance and cure from the time of the injury through the time the injury was deemed permanent.  The Court felt that not requiring payment would lead to unwanted situations where a worker had to pay back maintenance and cure once his injury was diagnosed as incurable.


On March 11, 1973, border patrol agents stopped Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce’s car based on the fact that the occupant’s appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning the passengers, the agents determined that they were illegal immigrants. The agents arrested everyone, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. At trial, Brignoni-Ponce moved to suppress the statements of the passengers as the fruits of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted.

While Brignoni-Ponce’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment prevents roving patrols from searching vehicles without warrant or probably cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to this case and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment required there to be reasonable suspicion for border patrol agents to stop a vehicle and question its occupants. This requirement allows the government to act in the public interest of ensuring legal immigration without infringing on the rights of legal immigrants and others. Because the border patrol agents in this case did not have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing when they stopped Brignoni-Ponce’s vehicle, the motion to suppress any testimony gained from that illegal seizure should have been suppressed.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision only pertains to roving patrols and that there are many other cases in which stopping a vehicle would not be constitutionally suspect. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment required the police to show probable cause to stop a vehicle, and any lower standard unreasonably weakened the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the idea of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment must take all the circumstances into account when weighing the public interest against the rights of the individual. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority’s opinion strains the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in an attempt to solve the immigration problem that could be better handled by legislative action. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.


These are two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the U.S. to work.  The practice granted the aliens “special immigrant” status and authorized them to be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” even though the workers did not intend to reside in the U.S. permanently.  This “special” status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements.  The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice.  The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for daily workers, but not for seasonal workers.

Yes.  In a 5-4 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority affirming the lower court as to daily workers, but reversing as to seasonal workers.  The Supreme Court held that even if workers did not intend to reside in the U.S., they were still entitled to the ability to do so.  The Court noted that the practice was longstanding and had since Congress had impliedly approved it.  Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the plain meaning of the statute did not allow foreign commuters to be considered “permanent residents”.  Justice White felt the statute was not ambiguous so the administrative practice was not authoritative.


Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.

William L. Patton, Jr.
Charles S. Rhyne
Phineas Stevens

These are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States.  The ICC rejected all but three applications.  Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than initially set out in their application.  The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate.  The district court found the ICC’s actions arbitrary and capricious.  The court voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them.  The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

No.  In a unanimous decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that the ICC based its decisions on consideration of relevant factors.  While the ICC could have explained its reasoning more clearly, the Court did not feel the decisions were arbitrary and capricious.  The Court also remanded the case to determine whether Bowman should receive the excess authority the ICC granted.


United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi

The Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations.  The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations.  The MTC sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could face criminal charges.  The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.  The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government.  The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax.  The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded.  On remand, the district court held that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government.  Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government.

Yes.  In a 7-2 decision Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court.  The Supreme Court held that the legal responsibility for the tax fell on the military and so upon the U.S. federal government.  This made the tax unconstitutional per McCulloch v. Maryland.  The Court also held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not abolish federal immunity from taxes on the sale of liquor.  Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that both the Twenty-First Amendment and the Buck Act authorized the regulation.  Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore

Edward J. Landry
C. Anthony Friloux, Jr.
John G. Gilleland

The Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts.  This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms.  The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection and state constitutional violations.  Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial.  A three-judge federal district court held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed some officials but not others.  The court did not decided the state constitutional issue.

No answer.  In an 8-1 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding to the district court.  The Supreme Court held that the district court should have answered the state law questions and abstained from the federal question.  Because of the unsettled nature of the state law question, the Court felt it was possible to modify or avoid the equal protection issue depending on how the court interpreted the state constitution.  Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that the question of whether to decide the state law issues should have been left to the district court.


American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Assn., Inc.

Howard Schulman
Frank McRight
Alex F. Lankford, III,

Six maritime unions, including American Radio Association, picketed docks in Mobile, Alabama, asking the public not to patronize foreign vessels docked there.  The unions were opposed to the low wages paid to foreign seamen.  Mobile Steamship Association sued to enjoin the picketing because it prevented the loading and unloading of ships.  The circuit court granted a temporary injunction and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.  The courts held that the picketing did not “affect commerce” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), so the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not have jurisdiction.  The courts also held that enjoining the picketing did not violate the First Amendment because the picketing resulted in a work stoppage, not just the expression of ideas.

No, No.  In a 5-4 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion affirming the injunction.  The Supreme Court held that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction because the affected ship was not “in” or “affecting” commerce as defined by the NLRA.  This case was not distinguishable from Windward v. American Radio Assn., which involved owners of the foreign ships.  The Court also held that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment.

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, agreeing with Justice Stewart and emphasizing the importance of the public interest in keeping marine traffic safe.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that this dispute was within the sole jurisdiction of the NLRB.  Justices Douglas, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Tom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance.  The court fined each man $10.  Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a harsher punishment, the men sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.  They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records.  The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith prosecution.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion.

Maybe.  In a 6-3 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit relied on a rule that the Supreme Court later overturned.  Since the district court ruling, the Supreme Court held that pending or bad faith prosecution was not necessary for declaratory relief.  The Court remanded for the district court to reassess the case based on the new precedent.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, asserting that it was correct to remand the case to the district court.  Justice Byron R. White wrote a partial concurrence, stating that he would affirm the dismissal of Ellis and Love’s request for equitable relief.

Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, stating that equitable relief was barred by the nolo contendere pleas and the deliberate choice to forgo state appellate remedies.  Justice Potter Stewart joined in this part of the dissent.  Justice Powell also expressed that he would affirm the dismissal of the constitutional challenge to the ordinance.  Justice Stewart and Justice Warren Burger joined in this part of the dissent.


Billy J. Taylor was indicted on kidnapping charges by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish. The day before his trial was supposed to start, he filed a motion to quash the petit jury that was selected for his trial because he argued that women were systematically excluded, which denied him a right to trial by a jury of his peers. Although 53% of eligible jurors in his district were female, only 10% of the jury wheel was female. This discrepancy was due to an article of the Louisiana Constitution that specifies that a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously submitted a written declaration of her desire to serve. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and he was tried and found guilty. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the article regulating women’s jury service did not violate federal law.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that a jury made up of a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment. The article, while not actively disqualifying women from serving on the jury, systematically prevented many women from serving. Given the passage of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 that guarantees a fair cross-section of the population for juries in federal courts, the Court held that Congress clearly considered a representative jury necessary for a fair trial.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the result.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the Sixth Amendment only prevented the use of jury selection procedures that were likely to result in an unfair or biased jury. Since there was no evidence that the article in the Louisiana state constitution undermined jury fairness or that Taylor’s trial was biased, the Court should not overturn the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court.


Nine students at two high schools and one junior high school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The school principals did not hold hearings for the affected students before ordering the suspensions, and Ohio law did not require them to do so. The principals' actions were challenged, and a federal court found that the students' rights had been violated. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because Ohio had chosen to extend the right to an education to its citizens, it could not withdraw that right "on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct ha[d] occurred." The Court held that Ohio was constrained to recognize students' entitlements to education as property interests protected by the Due Process Clause that could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the Clause. The Court found that students facing suspension should at a minimum be given notice and afforded some kind of hearing.


Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund

Herbert J. Miller, Jr.
Nancy Stearns
Jeremiah S. Gutman

In an effort to investigate the "administration, operation, and enforcement" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War took place. The Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership.

The Court held that the Senate Subcommittee's actions were legitimate and did not violate the Fund's First Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger argued that the power to investigate, even through a compulsory mechanism like a subpoena, is "inherent in the power to make laws." Furthermore, the investigation was related to and aided in furthering a "legitimate task of Congress," namely, the investigation of the Internal Security Act. Burger disregarded the Fund's claim that the investigation was being conducted to expose its beliefs, many of which were "unorthodox or unpopular." He reasoned that the legitimacy of a congressional investigatory action is not derived from the motives of the members or by the information that the investigation uncovers.


Connell Constr. Company, Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO

Joseph F. Canterbury, Jr.
David R. Richards

Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor.  The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members.  Connell sued to enjoin the picketing.  Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations.  The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act.  Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Maybe.  Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote the 5-4 majority opinion affirming on state law pre-emption, but reversing on federal antitrust exemption.  The Supreme Court held that the agreement was not exempt because it imposed a direct restraint on competition.  The Court remanded because the question of whether the agreement violated the Sherman Act was not fully briefed or argued.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that Congress did not intend to impose antitrust sanctions for this type of activity.  Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.  Justice William O. Douglas also wrote a dissent, asserting that only federal labor law applied because Connell based its argument on the fact that they were coerced into signing the agreement.