Franklin Goldstein
Albert R. Turnbull
Ralph S. Spritzer

Around 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden’s room.

Hayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had “evidential value only” and was improperly admitted into evidence at trial.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the language and purpose of the Fourth Amendment does not support such a distinction. Because the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect the privacy of citizens from being violated by the government, the type of property that is the subject of the search is irrelevant to the protection provided. Justice Hugo L. Black concurred in the judgment.

Justice Abe Fortas wrote a partial concurrence in which he argued that the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of searches to those items which can be directly tied to the commission of a crime. He also argued that the protection against general searches is a fundamental aspect of the Fourth Amendment, and the majority’s opinion damages that protection. Chief Justice Earl Warren joined in the partial concurrence.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment provides protection of both privacy and property. He argued that not all evidence discovered in a lawful search is admissible, particularly if it serves a testimonial purpose that would violate the Fifth Amendment rights of the defendant.


The New York Bar charged Samuel Spevack, an attorney from New York, with professional misconduct because he refused to produce financial records and testify at a judicial inquiry. In his defense, Spevack claimed his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and stated that the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The New York appellate court rejected Spevack's defense and ordered Spevack disbarred, holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not available to attorneys against states.

Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the plurality opinion of the Court reversing the lower court's decision. Writing for himself and three other justices, Douglas maintained that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable against states because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from interfering with the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, including the right to remain silent without suffering a penalty. This protection extends to lawyers, and Spevack should have been able to assert his right against self-incrimination without being penalized by the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of his livelihood.

Justice Abe Fortas voted with the majority but wrote a special concurrence distinguishing between a lawyer's right to remain silent, which he acknowledged, and that of a public employee, who could be questioned about his official duties without the self-incrimination protection.

Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, joined by Justices Tom Clark and Potter Stewart. Harlan wrote that the State of New York had the authority to impose valid conditions on the authority to practice law and to assess qualifications for continued practice. He concluded that the plurality improperly invalidated New York's rules by reversing Spevack's disbarment and determined that protection from disbarment for failure to provide information to a judicial inquiry went beyond the scope of the right against self-incrimination.


Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison.  At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, actually shot the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting.  Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another.  Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Yes, Yes.  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for eight members of the court, reversed the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is so fundamental that it is incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Washington was denied that right in this case.  Justice John M. Harlan concurred in the result, writing that Washington’s right to due process was violated, but the compulsory process clause played no role in his decision.


Berenyi v. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Kalman Berenyi applied for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After a hearing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the application, finding that Berenyi gave false testimony to facilitate his naturalization, so he was not a person of “good moral character.” In Berenyi’s application, he denied membership in the Communist Party, but two witnesses testified that Berenyi often spoke of his Party membership and lead a study group on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Berenyi appealed, arguing that the government failed to show that he had a “meaningful association” with the Communist Party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.

No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the First Circuit. The Supreme Court held that it could not review a factual finding by two lower courts without an obvious and exceptional showing of error. The record gave no indication that the district court or the court of appeals made such an error. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous based on other evidence presented at the naturalization hearing. Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


This is a companion case to United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis’ passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, the U.S. government did not allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.

No. Justice Abe Fortas, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that area restrictions on an otherwise valid passport are not criminally enforceable under the Immigration and Nationality Act.


Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards.  Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “defense facility”.  The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party.  The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Yes.  In a 6-2 decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the majority holding that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association even if it applied only to active Party members.  The Supreme Court held that the provision was overbroad and the war power does not give Congress a blank slate to do whatever it wants. Justice William J. Brennan concurred in the judgment, writing that Congress’ delegation of authority in designating defense facilities to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because they provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the Communist Party’s goal of government overthrow justified the ban on employment in defense facilities.  Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent.  Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


On May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During the trial, the bailiff stated to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, “Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.” Misses Inwards and Drake, both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court.

After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs’ statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror who was sure of the bailiffs’ statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff’s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman’s.

Parker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff’s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff’s statements did not violate Parker’s state or federal constitutional rights.

Yes. In a per curiam decision with one dissent, the Court held that the bailiff's statements violated Parker’s right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to trial by an impartial jury. The Court noted that there was no dispute over what the bailiff said, nor any dispute over whether he was subjected to confrontation, cross-examination or other constitutional safeguards. The Court held that the bailiff’s speech was private talk tending to reach the jury by outside influence. The Court rejected the government’s argument that no prejudice was shown because ten members of the jury testified that they did not hear the bailiff’s statement, pointing to one juror’s testimony that she was prejudiced by the bailiff’s statements. The Court also noted the official character of the bailiff's role with the court.

Justice John Harlan dissented, disagreeing that the Sixth Amendment was directly applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. He rejected the Court’s assumption that jurors must be absolutely insulated from all expressions of opinion on the merits of cases, citing cases where the Court refused to overthrow a verdict despite jury contact with outside information. He also questioned the evidence of Mrs. Inwards’ prejudice, ascribing her claims of prejudicial influence to post-conviction guilt.


Until about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers.

In 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940’s, Sealy’s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories.

The Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.’s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.’s price fixing violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.’s licensing structure.

Yes. In a 6-1 decision written by Justice Abraham Fortas, the Court held that Sealy’s licensing structure was a horizontal restraint of trade, a per se violation of the Sherman Act. He noted that the licensees controlled the day-to-day business of Sealy through the board of directors and the executive committee, including the grant, assignment, reassignment, and termination of exclusive territorial licenses. Justice Fortas held that Sealy’s behavior was an aggregation of trade restraints, reasoning that Sealy’s territorial restraints were a part of its admittedly unlawful price fixing scheme. While acknowledging that the territorial limitations served other purposes, he reasoned that their connection to price fixing was enough to require they be condemned as an unlawful restraint of trade.

Justice John Harlan dissented. He argued that Sealy’s territorial licensing structure was a vertical arrangement not prohibited by the Sherman Act. He described the main purpose of Sealy’s licensing structure as the proper exploitation of the Sealy name and trademarks by licensed bedding manufacturers. Justice Harlan argued that the territorial restrictions were secondary or ancillary to that purpose. He rejected the majority’s theory that Sealy’s actions were an aggregation of trade restraints, noting that the district court did not address the reasonableness of Sealy’s territorial arrangements.

Justices Tom Clark and Byron White took no part in the decision of the case.


Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco

Marshall Warren Krause
Albert W. Harris, Jr.

An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence.  The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor.  The search was a routine annual inspection.  Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant.  The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away.  About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection.  Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.

Yes.  Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the lower judgment.  The Supreme Court held that Camara had a constitutional right to insist that the inspector obtain a warrant before searching his home.  He also cannot be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection.  This decision overruled Frank v. Maryland<./i>

Justice Tom C. Clark dissented, arguing that Frank v. Maryland settled the question and must be followed.  Justice John M. Harlan and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent


Morris Lavine
Thomas C. Lynch
Doris H. Maier
Raymond M. Momboisse

On October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club’s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman’s general description and Adcock stood in front of the club’s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door.

The next day, the Spot Club’s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body’s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found.

Officers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman’s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting.

Chapman and Teale were charged with the first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman’s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants’ failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. State of California that California’s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants’ silence against them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

No and no. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court affirmed that there may be some constitutional errors so unimportant and insignificant that they are harmless. Justice Black noted that all fifty states have harmless error statutes or rules, and that Congress established a longstanding rule for federal courts that judgments should not be reversed for errors that do not affect parties’ substantial rights.

Justice Black determined that federal law must govern the application of a state harmless error rule; the Court cannot leave the formulation of rules protecting individuals from invasion by the states to those very same states. Justice Black then cited the holding from Fahy v. State of Connecticut, where the Court determined that an error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Here, the prosecution repeatedly told the jury that by their silence Chapman and Teale had served as irrefutable witnesses against themselves; absent these comments, reasonable jurors might well have returned a not-guilty verdict. Thus, the state had not demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutions’ comments did not contribute to Chapman and Teale’s conviction, and the error was harmful.

Justice Potter Stewart concurred, noting that the Court previously reversed all convictions of guilt when defendants had given involuntary confessions at trial. Justice Stewart rejected the notion that such constitutional violations could ever be harmless.

Justice John Harlan dissented, arguing that the state appellate court reasonably applied California’s harmless error rule to sustain Chapman and Teale’s conviction, and that California’s harmless error rule was consistent with the guarantee of fundamental fairness in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Harlan rejected the majority’s assumption of a general supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues, finding no source for that power in the Fourteenth Amendment.


Witherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with "conscientious scruples" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment.

Witherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no constitutional violation took place.

Yes. In an opinion delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held 6-3 that Witherspoon's death sentence was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that a jury composed after the dismissal of all who oppose the death sentence was biased in favor the death sentence; such a jury was not impartial and thus violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that while jurors who say they will not impose the death sentence can be dismissed, jurors who simply oppose the death sentence as a personal belief may not. Justice William Douglas, concurring, argued that it also unconstitutional to dismiss prospective jurors who say they will never impose the death sentence.

Justice Hugo Black, with whom Justices John Harlan and Byron White joined, dissented. Douglas argued that the Constitution allows the dismissal of all jurors who oppose the death penalty personally, because they will be necessarily biased against the death penalty. In a separate dissent, White argued that the Illinois legislature was allowed to exclude "those with doubts" about "one of the punishments among which the legislature sought to have them choose...."


Wayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper’s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper’s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to the search. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.

No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, for a search to be lawful under the Fourth Amendment, the consent must have been freely and voluntarily given. A search that relies on a warrant cannot be justified on the basis of consent if the warrant turns out to be faulty, regardless of the police officer’s knowledge of the faultiness of the warrant. Therefore, the evidence obtained during the search in this case should not have been admitted into evidence.

In his concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan wrote that, because the introduction of the rifle into evidence was not harmless error in the sense that Bumper’s guilt was not adjudicated based solely on constitutionally admissible evidence, not in the sense that he was improperly convicted.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissent in which he highlighted the fact that Leath testified that her consent “was all [her] own free will.” The fact that the police did not have a warrant does not negate the fact that Mrs. Leath wanted the police to search her premises to show her innocence; therefore, her consent was freely and voluntarily given. Justice Black also argued that, while all evidence found in the illegal search must be thrown out, Bumper should still have been found guilty without a mandatory retrial. In his separate dissent, Justice White dissented and argued that not every search conditionally consented to must be deemed invalid. The fact that the evidence was discovered illegally and without a warrant does not mean that the evidence should not be deemed legal if a valid warrant is eventually presented.


On October 12, 1964, Wainwright, a student at Tulane University Law School, was out walking around midnight. Two New Orleans Police Department officers stopped him because, in their opinion, he fitted the description of a man suspected of murder. Wainwright told the officers he had identification at home, but not on his person. The officers then asked Wainwright to remove this jacket so that they could search him for a tattoo that the suspected murdered had on his left arm. Wainwright ultimately refused to do so after trying to walk away and some mild verbal sparing. The officers then arrested him on a charge of vagrancy by loitering and frisked him. After Wainwright continued to refuse to remove his jacket at the police station, officers used force to remove it and discovered that he had no tattoo.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.


The petitioners were convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the government had relied on illegally obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing.

The United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed in camera by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term.

Yes and Yes. In a majority opinion speaking for himself and four other members of the Court, Justice Byron R. White held that "conversations as well as property are excludable from the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home." Moreover, continued White, "surveillance records as to which any petitioner has standing to object should be turned over to him without being screened in camera by the trial judge.


Jerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa’s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa’s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition.

Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the legal right to counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, extends to the post-trial proceeding for revocation of probation and deferred sentencing. The right of counsel at this stage ensures that the conviction and sentence are read correctly without misinterpretation of record. Counsel also assists the defendant in asserting his rights, such as the right to appeal, at the deferred sentencing stage.


A Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an occupational tax for accepting wagers.  Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment.  He argued that the requirements to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.

No.  In a 7-1 decision, Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the majority reversing the lower court opinion.  The Supreme Court held that the registration and occupational tax provisions were constitutional, but using the related information to prosecute someone did violate privilege.  Marchetti’s claim of privilege was a proper defense and should have been sufficient to avoid conviction.  Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissent stating that this decision frustrates the purpose of the tax and opens the door to many other similar challenges.


First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company

Gerald Waldron filed an anti-trust action against Cities Service Co. and six other large oil companies.  Waldron sought treble damages alleging a conspiracy by the oil companies to boycott Iranian oil.  The trial judge limited Waldron’s discovery to depositions of certain Cities employees.  After an extended period of depositions, the trial judge granted Cities summary judgment because there was no material evidence that Cities took any part in the conspiracy.  The court denied Waldron’s motion of additional discovery because the court felt it would be a fishing expedition and constitute harassment.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.

No, Yes.  In a 5-3 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the opinion affirming the lower court decision.  The Supreme Court held that Waldron failed to show that the additional discovery would have been fruitful, so he was not prejudiced by the limitations.  Also, on the facts shown, summary judgment was proper.  Waldron failed to produce any facts that raised a genuine issue for trial.


David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.

No. The 7-to-1 majority, speaking through Chief Justice Earl Warren, established a test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. The formula examines whether the regulation is unrelated to content and narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest. "[W]e think it clear," wrote Warren," that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."


James A. Watts, a schoolteacher in Alaska, held private conversations with other teachers to obtain their support to remove the superintendent from his position. His further language included words to the effect of ‘we are unable to get rid of the superintendent, so let’s get rid of the school board.’ The Seward School Board considered Watts' conduct to be “immoral,” defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect” under the relevant Alaska statute, so Watts was dismissed from his teaching job.

Watts' dismissal was upheld in both the Alaska Superior Court and the Alaska Supreme Court. The Alaska Supreme Court held that Watts' conduct “had a tendency to bring the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Watts then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and argued that his dismissal violated his First Amendment right because the school board was attempting to limit his freedom of political speech. He also argued a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right because he should have the same equal protection for expression as any other private individual. After Watts filed his petition, Alaska amended the relevant state statute to reflect the rights of teachers to comment and criticize school administrators just as any private individual would have the right to do. Under the amended statute, Watts would not have been dismissed from his job.

Yes. In a per curiam decision, the eight-justice majority held that the change in Alaska’s statute was directly relevant to this case. Therefore, it was necessary that the case be reversed and remanded to the Supreme Court of Alaska for further consideration.

While Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Hugo L. Black concurred with the reverse and remand decision in this case, they said they would have reversed the decision outright for reasons Justice Douglas stated in his concurring opinion in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District. In that case, a teacher was dismissed from his job for sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing financial decisions of the board and the superintendent of his school. In his opinion, Justice Douglas highlighted that it is not reason enough to limit free speech because words are “malicious” or have a “reckless disregard for the truth.”

Justice White dissented without writing a separate opinion.


Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.

Yes. The Court ruled that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was unnecessary to bring the Amendment into play. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court. A concurring opinion by John Marshall Harlan introduced the idea of a 'reasonable' expectation of Fourth Amendment protection.


Robert H. Marquis
William R. Stanifer
Malcolm Y. Marshall

Dixie Power and Light Company provided service to several locations in Claiborne County, Tennesee, including the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell. Kentucky Utilities Company (KU) held a non-exclusive county franchise to occupy county roads. In 1954, Dixie Power and Light transferred its assets to KU and dissolved, giving KU control over the vast majority of the market in Tazewell and New Tazewell.

The Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended in 1959, barred the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from expanding its sales outside the area for which the TVA or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957. On that date, the area of Claiborne County had 3,564 users of TVA power compared to 1,839 users of KU power; the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell, however, had 28 TVA users and 561 KU users. KU’s retail rates for electricity in the towns were approximately two-and-one-half times higher than those offered by TVA. Citizens in Tazewell and New Tazewell responded to this rate disparity by demanding access to the TVA’s cheaper power. After three years of complaints, planning and consultations, the towns’ governments contracted to hook up a new municipal system to TVA’s power grid.

KU filed suit against TVA, the mayors of Tazewell and New Tazewell, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor. KU charged the defendants with conspiracy to destroy its business in Tazewell and asked the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system. Shortly before trial, the TVA Board of Directors determined that TVA was the primary source of power for Claiborne County on July 1, 1957, and that Claiborne County was the relevant area for the purposes of the act. The district court upheld the board’s decision, but the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed. Comparing the number of customers served by KU and TVA in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the Sixth Circuit held that the two towns and KU’s original county road corridor were an ‘area’ for the purposes of the act and that TVA was barred from extending its service to that area.

Yes and yes. In a 6-1 decision written by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that Kentucky Utilities Company had standing to sue because one legislative purpose of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was to protect private power suppliers’ competitive interests. He noted that the petitioners conceded this point, and that congress was only able to secure funding for the TVA by agreeing to limit its territorial expansion, thereby also limiting unfair competition with private suppliers.

Justice Black further held that the courts should only set aside the TVA’s area determinations if those determinations lacked reasonable support in relation to the statutory purpose of controlling the TVA’s territorial expansion. Hence, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit should have upheld the TVA Board’s determination that Claiborne County was the relevant area under the act. Justice Black rejected KU’s argument that the act prohibited the TVA from extending its services to privately-served customers, noting that the act did not make the existence of a private supplier in an area an automatic bar to TVA expansion in that area. He also emphasized that Tazewell and New Tazewell were practically surrounded by areas already served by the TVA.

Finally, Justice Black rejected KU’s argument that the act prohibited the TVA from providing service to the area in question because KU was the primary supplier on July 1, 1957. Justice Black noted that the act only made the existence of a private supplier an absolute bar to TVA activity if the TVA’s activities extended up to five miles beyond the area it originally served. Given the TVA Board’s ruling that Tazewell and New Tazewell fell within TVA’s primary service area, this restriction did not apply.

Justice John Harlan dissented. He argued that Congress intended the TVA to limit the TVA Board’s discretion as to the expansion of its area of service. He noted that neither the statute nor the legislative history provided a formula for the precise measurement of the TVA’s service area, and that the Sixth Circuit’s emphasis on the number of customers served by TVA and KU in the villages on July 1, 1957 was a sensible and practical standard.

Justices William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case


Don L. Davis
David Robinson, Jr.
Peter Barton Hutt

Police arrested Leroy Powell for public intoxication.  He was tried, convicted, and fined $20 in the Corporation Court of Austin Texas.  On appeal, Powell argued that criminal punishment for public intoxication is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because he had chronic alcoholism.  Under this theory, he appeared in public drunk as a compulsive symptom of the disease, not his own choice.  The County court of Travis County held that alcoholism is not a defense to the charge and affirmed the conviction.

No.  Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a four justice plurality, affirmed the lower court.  The plurality found that the record did not prove that alcoholics were totally unable to control their alcohol consumption.  The law prohibiting public intoxication did not punish Powell for his alcoholism, but for his being drunk in a public location.  Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Hugo L. Black, and Justice John M. Harlan joined in the plurality.

Justice Hugo L. Black concurred, writing that the Eighth Amendment does not require states to decide what part of a defendant’s personality is responsible for their actions.  Justice John M. Harlan joined in this concurrence.  Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment, writing that he would not punish a chronic alcoholic just for being drunk, but supports the punishment for being drunk in public.  The record did not support the argument that Powell had no control over being in public.

Justice Abe Fortas dissented, writing that criminal penalties are not proper for people with conditions that they have no power to change.  The record showed that Powell could not control the constant excessive consumption of alcohol and did not appear in public of his own volition.  Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, and Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent.


Sam Umans was a certified public accountant. Between 1959 and 1961, the Internal Revenue Service audited six couples represented by Umans. According to Louis R. Deitsch, an IRS employee, Umans approached Deitsch before each audit to “work something out together on it”. They agreed upon a disallowance for each audit and Umans gave Deitsch an envelope containing $50 for each case. Five other IRS employees described similar transactions between the years 1961 and 1963, wherein smaller disallowances were given during audits followed by cash payments to the auditing IRS employees.

Umans and the six IRS employees, including Deitsch, were indicted in August 1964. Umans was charged with aiding and abetting IRS employees in receiving illegal fees.  He was also charged with giving money to government officials. On March 25, 1965, Umans and the six IRS employees were re-indicted.  The grand jury additionally charged Umans with giving money to government officials with the intent to influence their actions. The evidence before the grand jury consisted solely of an IRS agent summarizing statements made by witnesses who would later testify at Umans’ trial. At trial, Umans requested access to statements made by the IRS employees that they took bribes from persons other than Umans; the court denied this request and sealed the documents in question. The government’s case was based almost entirely on the testimonies of three of the IRS employees, including that of Deitsch.

Judge Sterry R. Waterman, writing for a unanimous United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of Umans’ charge for aiding and abetting IRS employees, but that this instruction was not in plain error. He held that the instruction was not sufficiently prejudicial, noting that it was not objected to at trial. Judge Waterman did, however, reverse the sentence for giving money to officials, holding that this sentence could not be concurrent with the sentence for giving money to officials with intent to influence their actions. He noted that the charges were identical but for the higher requirement of proof in the latter charge. Looking to the statute itself, Judge Waterman determined that Congress intended to make the charge for giving money to officials a lesser, included offense.

Judge Waterman held that the trial court properly excluded the IRS employees’ statements about taking bribes from other persons from the record. He reasoned that it would have been within the court’s discretion to prevent Umans from cross-examining the IRS employees on this subject for impeachment purposes, as the government did not broach the subject during the employees’ direct examination. Judge Waterman also held that the government properly indicted Umans with hearsay evidence, holding that this evidence was competent. He dismissed Umans’ concerns about inconsistencies between the evidence presented to the grand jury and evidence presented at trial. He noted that Umans had access to affadavits used by the government to indict him; thus, he could have objected to any inconsistencies at trial, but did not do so.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court dismissed the United States’ writ of certiorari as improvidently granted without further comment.

Justice John Harlan would have granted certiorari to affirm the court of appeals' judgment for the reasons given by Judge Waterman in his opinion.

Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

On December 18, 1967, the Court denied Umans petition for a rehearing, with Justice Marshall again taking no part in the consideration or decision of the petition.


Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in criminal cases was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," and that the states were obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide such trials. Petty crimes, defined as those punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, were not subject to the jury trial provision.


Florence Flast and a group of taxpayers challenged federal legislation that financed the purchase of secular textbooks for use in religious schools. Flast argued that such use of tax money violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A district court held that the federal courts should defer when confronted with taxpayer suits directed against federal spending programs.

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court rejected the government's argument that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers barred taxpayer suits against federal taxing and spending programs. In order to prove a "requisite personal stake" in such cases, taxpayers had to 1) establish a logical link between their status as taxpayers and the type of legislative enactment attacked, and 2) show the challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of Congressional taxing and spending power. The Court held that Flast had met both parts of the test.


Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called “girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and “Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct.

Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It defined “harmful to minors” as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.

Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

No and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that Section 484-h did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a restriction on expression. Justice Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area of protected speech or press. He acknowledged that the magazines were not obscene for adults, but emphasized that Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg from selling the magazines in question to persons seventeen years of age or older.

Justice Brennan focused on Ginsberg’s argument that the scope of the constitutional freedom to read material concerned with sex did not depend upon whether that person was an adult or a minor. He rejected Ginsberg’s contention that Section 484-h was a violation of minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms, characterizing Section 484-h as New York’s attempt to adjust the assessment of obscenity in terms of the sexual interests of minors. Justice Brennan wrote that New York had an interest in the well-being of its children, and that this subject was within New York’s constitutional power of regulation.

Justice Brennan also held that Section 484-h was not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. He rejected Ginsberg’s argument that Section 484-h failed to give adequate notice of what was prohibited. The New York Court of Appeals previously read Section 484-h to prohibit knowingly selling obscene material to minors, and the Court also read a knowledge requirement into other similar state statutes. Justice Brennan also rejected Ginsberg’s argument that the statute was impermissibly vague, as Section 484-h expressly stated that a defendant must be acquitted if he proved that he made a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor in question.

Justice Potter Stewart concurred. He argued that while the First Amendment protected men’s freedom to decide what they will read and listen to, government regulation could extend to settings where a person lacked the capacity to make a choice. New York was free to determine that children were not possessed of a full capacity for individual choice.

Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice Hugo Black. He acknowledged that the act was not a violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but disagreed that obscene material was excluded from First Amendment protection.

Justice Abraham Fortas dissented, arguing that the majority avoided the essence of the case’s problem by failing to define obscenity for the purposes of the censorship of material sold to minors.


Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school taxes.  The letter complained about the board’s handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics.  The school board felt the letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools” and opted to terminate Pickering’s employment.  Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment.  The court ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.

Yes.  Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the 8-1 majority opinion holding that Pickering’s dismissal violated his First Amendment right to free speech.  The Supreme Court noted that similar speech is not protected if it contains false statements knowingly or recklessly made.  There was no evidence that Pickering’s statements were knowingly false or reckless.

Justice William O. Douglas concurred, but took an even broader view of protected free speech.  Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence.  Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, agreeing that the letter may be protected speech, but preferring to remand the case for further proceedings to decide whether the statements in the letter were knowingly or recklessly false.


Russell J. Schonekas
Robert L. Kleinpeter

On June 27, 1962, Phil St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a television speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.  During this speech, St. Amant accused his political opponent of being a Communist and of being involved in criminal activities with the head of the local Teamsters Union.  Finally, St. Amant implicated Herman Thompson, an East Baton Rouge deputy sheriff, in a scheme to move money between the Teamsters Union and St. Amant’s political opponent.

Thompson successfully sued St. Amant for defamation.  Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Thompson did not show St. Amant acted with “malice.”  Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana.  That court held that, although public figures forfeit some of their First Amendment protection from defamation, St. Amant accused Thompson of a crime with utter disregard of whether the remarks were true.  Finally, that court held that the First Amendment protects uninhibited, robust debate, rather than an open season to shoot down the good name of anyone who happens to be a public servant.

No.  Justice Byron R. White wrote for an 8-1 majority.  First, he reiterated the test established in New York Times v. Sullivan.  That test required public officials bringing a defamation lawsuit to show that the statement in question was made with “malice” -- that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.  Here, although the statements were false, Thompson did not present evidence that St. Amant ever entertained “serious doubts” about the truth of his statement.  Without evidence of either knowledge or such serious doubts, a public official could not succeed on a defamation claim.

Justice Hugo L. Black and Justice William O. Douglas each concurred by reiterating their concurring opinions in  New York Times v. Sullivan  and  Garrison v. Louisiana .  In those concurring opinions, Justices Black and Douglas argued that defamation laws threaten robust speech and debate about public officials and public issues.  Unless an individual engages in unprotected speech, such as obscenity or fighting words, neither the federal nor state governments should restrict speech.

Justice Abe Fortas dissented and argued that St. Amant acted with reckless disregard for the truth of his statements.  He wrote that the First Amendment does not create a shelter for character assassination of public officials.  Because St. Amant did not perform a good-faith check on the truth of his statement, Justice Fortas argued that the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court should be affirmed.


After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: "You know what I am after," Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court began by noting that although states may grant police officers great latitude in making arrests, all search and seizures are subject to constitutional limitations. In Sibron's case, the Court noted that officer Martinez never actually heard any of the conversations between Sibron and the narcotics addicts. As such, the inference that Sibron engaged in narcotics trafficking merely because he spoke with drug addicts did not constitute probably cause for a warrantless search. Moreover, Martinez's actions could not be justified as a self-protective search for weapons since he admitted that he had no reason to suspect Sibron of concealment. With respect to Peters, the Court upheld his conviction since it flowed from a lawful stop-and-frisk search. The arresting officer observed Peters prowling furtively in a building hallway and had to chase him down before capture. Such suspicious conduct justified the ensuing stop-and-frisk search of Peter's person that, in turn, revealed the incriminating burglar tools.


Jones, a black man, charged that a real estate company in Missouri's St. Louis County refused to sell him a home in a particular neighborhood on account of his race.

The Court sided with Jones and held that Section 1982 of the congressional act was intended to prohibit all discrimination against blacks in the sale and rental of property, including governmental and private discrimination. Furthermore, the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement section empowered Congress to eliminate racial barriers to the acquisition of property since those barriers constituted "badges and incidents of slavery."


Case-Swayne Company, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.

Since 1958, Sunkist Growers, Inc. organized as an agricultural collective, and about 12,000 growers of citrus fruit belonged to this collective. Sunkist grouped these growers into local associations, each with a designated packing house for preparing fruit for market. Most of these associations were comprised entirely of fruit growers operating under a cooperative structure, but about five percent were corporate growers with their own packing houses. An additional fifteen percent of the associations were private for-profit corporations and partnerships; these associations operated by marketing contracts, not by the cooperative structure.

Sunkist controlled approximately seventy percent of all oranges produced in Southern California and Arizona. This control manifested in several ways. Each grower in a cooperative local association agreed to market all fruit through his association, to appoint the association as the marketing agent for all his fruit, and to contract with one packing house. While each association reserved the right to decide its prices and markets, Sunkist had sole discretion to pool products for exports, and could set maximum supplies for a given area.

The Capper-Volstead Act privileged collective activity in processing and marketing in the production of agricultural products. It was enacted to provide an exception to the Sherman Act’s prohibition against combinations in restraint of trade. Case-Swayne manufactured orange juice and other blended juices as an independent operator. It alleged that the Sunkist system was a conspiracy of trade in violation of the Sherman Act and sought treble-damages under the Clayton Act. The district court granted Sunkist’s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed in part. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sunkist engaged in monopolistic practices, but also held that the participation of non-producers in Sunkist’s system did not destroy its exempt status under the Capper-Volstead Act.

No. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that non-producers cannot legally participate in an agricultural collective organized under the Capper-Volstead Act. Justice Marshall looked to the legislative history of the act. While acknowledging that Congress’ principal concern was to prohibit predatory middlemen from participating in agricultural collectives, he noted that the act makes no mention of non-producers except with respect to cooperatives issuing capital stock. He rejected Sunkist’s argument that non-producers’ participation in the collective had no economic significance, pointing to the non-producers’ role in the control and policy making of Sunkist. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Justice John Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. While agreeing that congress did not intend that non-stock organizations with non-producer members should qualify for a Capper-Volstead antitrust exemption, he feared the possible effects of subjecting Sunkist to broad antitrust liability. He noted that the record contained no evidence that Sunkist intended to evade the act’s mandate. Justice Harlan would have held that Sunkist was not liable under the Sherman Act for past acts.

Justice Byron White concurred, joined by Justice Potter Stewart. He agreed that the scope of Capper-Volstead’s exemption was limited to the cooperative efforts of producers, but argued that Sunkist did not lose its antitrust immunity completely. He noted that the bulk of Sunkist’s local associations appear to qualify as exempt organizations, and that the improperly organized associations had no direct authority to conduct Sunkist’s affairs.

Justice William Douglas issued a dissenting opinion. He argued that the nature and extent of the non-producers’ participation in Sunkist had not been fully explored; thus, Justice Douglas would have reserved questions of the scope of Sunkist’s immunity for a later date.


Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen

A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.

No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test constructed in Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the First Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools."


Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the search undertaken by the officer was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the weapons seized could be introduced into evidence against Terry. Attempting to focus narrowly on the facts of this particular case, the Court found that the officer acted on more than a "hunch" and that "a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing [Terry] was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was investigating his suspicious behavior." The Court found that the searches undertaken were limited in scope and designed to protect the officer's safety incident to the investigation.


Green v. County School Board of New Kent County

Samuel W. Tucker
Jack Greenberg
Frederick T. Gray
Louis F. Claiborne

New Kent County had two schools that taught students elementary through high school.  Prior to 1965, New Kent school taught all white students, while George W. Watkins school taught all African American students.  After Brown v. Board of Education, the school district implemented a “freedom of choice” plan, where all students could choose which school they wanted to attend.  While the school district did not prevent anyone from attending the school they wanted to, only a few African American students transferred to New Kent and no white students transferred to George W. Watkins.  Several students and parents from the school district brought this action against the school district, arguing that the plan did not adequately integrate the school system.  The district court upheld the plan.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case for a more specific order concerning desegregation of teachers.

Yes.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a unanimous court, reversed the court of appeals to the extent it affirmed the district court.  The Supreme Court held that the “freedom of choice” plan was not a sufficient step to bring about a desegregated unitary school system.  While the freedom of choice plan may work in some situations, school districts must provide a plan that works to dismantle the segregated system in their district.


Daniel P. Reardon, Jr.
Erwin N. Griswold

George William Bruton and William James Evans were tried together for robbing a jewelry store that also operated as a U.S. Postal Service contract station.  At trial, the judge admitted in to evidence Evans’ confessions, made to the postal inspector and later to police.  In the confession, Evans names Bruton as his accomplice.  The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession for Evans’ guilt or innocence, but to disregard it as inadmissible hearsay for Bruton’s charges.  The jury convicted both men.  Evans and Bruton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  That court set aside Evans’ conviction, finding that the confession to the postal inspector should not have been received into evidence.  The court upheld Bruton’s conviction because the district court properly instructed the jury not to use the confession when considering Bruton’s charges.

Yes.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for a 6-2 majority, reversed the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that Bruton was substantially prejudiced against because of the high risk that the jury considered Evans’ confession when deciding Bruton’s guilt.  Admitting Evans’ confession into evidence violated Bruton’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination.  This decision expressly overruled Delli Paoli v. United States.   Justice Potter Stewart concurred, expressing that certain kinds of hearsay are so damaging that jurors cannot be trusted to give that evidence the minimal weight it deserves.  Justice Hugo L. Black also concurred, writing that a jury instruction to use a confession as evidence against one defendant but not the other in the same trial is ineffective.

Justice Byron R. White dissented, stating that juries can be reasonably relied upon to follow jury instructions and disregard certain evidence.  Justice John M. Harlan joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.


The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) requires every employer to pay each of his employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce a minimum hourly wage and a higher rate for exceeding a maximum number of hours per week. The Act excluded the federal government or any state government or political subdivision from the definition of "employer." In 1961, the Act was amended to include employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production of commerce, such as the operation of a hospital or any place that cares for the sick, a school, or an institution of higher education. The Act also removed the exemption for the state governments and their political subdivisions.

The state of Maryland and twenty-seven other states sued W. Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to prevent the enforcement of the Act as it applied to schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions. The states argued this expansion of the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment's protection of states' sovereign immunity. A three-judge district court held that the extension of the Act's coverage to commercial enterprise and state institutions did not exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause because it did not transgress the sovereignty of the states. However, the court declined to consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Maryland appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

No. Justice John Marshall Harlan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the inclusion of commercial enterprises is constitutional because otherwise commercial enterprises that utilize substandard wages and excessive hours would have an advantage over other companies. Substandard labor conditions also lead to labor disputes and strikes, which Congress wanted to avoid. Furthermore, the Court held that the Act did not interfere with states' sovereignty by telling them how to perform medical and educational functions; rather it subjected a state that employs people performing such functions to the same restrictions as other employers whose activities affect commerce. Therefore, the Court held that minimum wage amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act extending to non-professional, non-executive and non-administrative employers of state public schools, hospitals, and related institutions was also constitutional.

Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that bringing employees of state-owned enterprises under the auspices of the Fair Labor Standards Act was an invasion of state sovereignty. Requiring states to pay employees minimum wage would force them to increase taxes, lower the standard of services in these institutions, reduce services in other government activities, and refrain from entering into new governmental fields needed for social change. The Act therefore affected the states fiscally and was a clear invasion of state sovereignty. Justice Potter Stewart joined the dissent.

Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.


Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen-year-old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy the state's one-year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code.

Yes. The Court held that since the regulation touched "on the fundamental right of interstate movement," it must promote a compelling state interest. Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Washington DC, all failed to advance any compelling administrative or social reasons for their requirements. The goal of simply preventing indigents from moving to these states was constitutionally impermissible, argued Justice Brennan, given the value the United States has historically placed on the freedom to travel.


On November 3, 1961 William L. Maxwell was arrested and charged with raping a woman in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The jury convicted him of rape but did not render a verdict of life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial court imposed the death penalty, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Maxwell sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and claimed that his conviction and punishment were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury had determined the guilt and the penalty in a single proceeding. Additionally, he argued that the jury was not given any standards or direction regarding the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. The district court denied the writ, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial.

Yes, yes. In a per curiam opinion, the 7-1 majority held that the case should be remanded to the district court for consideration of whether the defendant's due process rights were violated. The Court compared the treatment of the jurors in this case to that in Witherspoon v. Illinois , a case in which the Court held the jury selection process violated the right to due process because some potential jurors were excluded from the jury simply for voicing general objections to, or religious beliefs against the death penalty. A potential jury member must have the ability to follow the instructions of the trial judge and consider all possible penalties. The Court held that further hearing on this matter was necessary before any further action could be taken, and that a local court would be better equipped to handle these issues.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that potential jury members who are opposed to capital punishment may be properly disqualified from the jury in a capital case.

Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.


Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him.

No. The Court noted that the proceedings against Powell were intended to exclude and not expel him from the chamber. That is an important distinction to recognize since the House does have the power under Article I, Section 5 to expel members. However, expulsion was not the purpose of the proceedings in this case. After analyzing the Framers' debates on this issue, Chief Justice Warren concluded that since Powell had been lawfully elected by his constituents and since he met the constitutional requirements for membership in the House, that the chamber was powerless to exclude him.


Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company

Edward A. Kaier
Arthur J. Cerra
Carl E. Sanders
Howard J. Trienens

The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company operated in the “Official territory,” along with several other railroad companies (Northern lines). Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company and several other railroad companies (Southern lines) operated within the “Southern territory." Beginning on July 17, 1947, the Northern lines tried to obtain new divisions of the freight rates that applied between the Official territory and Southern territory from the Interstate Commerce Commission. These proposed divisions would be based on actual, relative costs of service.

The Commission determined that the existing divisions violated the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which directed the Commission to set aside inequitable divisions of joint rates and to prescribe equitable divisions. In determining the relative costs that controlled the divisional formula, the Commission frequently relied on unadjusted average costs incurred by the railroads on the average of all traffic in their territories, and not on actual costs incurred by the Northern and Southern lines. The Commission found that the existing divisions violated the ICA because they allocated a lesser share of revenues to the Northern lines based on relative costs.

The Administrative Procedure Act required that courts set aside agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. On appeal from the Commission’s decision, the district court set aside the Commission’s decision. It held that the Northern lines failed to prove that the Commission relied on substantial evidence about the relative costs of handling north-south freight traffic, noting that the burden of proof lay with the Northern lines. It also rejected the Commission’s finding that the divisions required adjustment due to the greater revenue needs of the Northern lines.

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice William O. Douglas, the Court held that the district court properly set aside the Commission’s ruling due to a lack of substantial evidence. Justice Douglas argued that deferring to the Commission’s decision -- despite the lack of solid evidence on record regarding North-South traffic -- would in effect give final deference to the Commission’s expertise and allow no room for review. He explored the Commission’s findings of fact, questioning the Commission’s seemingly contradictory conclusions about the effect of suburban passenger operations on freight service costs. Justice Douglas rejected the petitioners’ argument that these costs must be considered to keep railroads solvent because the present question was about costs, not revenue.

Justice Douglas acknowledged that the Northern lines generally return more empty shuttle boxcars per year than the Southern lines, and that Detroit requires shipments of 800,000 carloads of automobile parts each year. He pointed, however, to the Commission’s failure to clearly connect the costs associated with returning empty cars with this higher volume of traffic.


Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission

The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. The district court dismissed the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that Congress granted sole authority over contracts for services at national parks to the Secretary of the Interior. Any alternative interpretation of the statute would require a dual authority scheme that has no evidence of congressional intent.

In his dissent, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Supreme Court should not interfere in matters of local law in the District of Columbia. He argued that this case did not present a constitutional issue but rather an issue of local law that should not have been reviewed by the Supreme Court. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissenting opinion.

Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


California's Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism. John Harris, a socialist, was indicted under the statute. Harris claimed the law had a "chilling effect" on his freedom of speech. After a California state court upheld Harris' conviction, a federal district court struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth.

In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that "settled doctrines" of federalism narrowly confined the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. Specifically, the Court found that a federal court could not properly enjoin enforcement of a statute "solely on the basis of showing that the statute 'on its face' abridges First Amendment rights." The Court referred to "the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence," under which federal courts were required to show proper respect for state functions and notions of comity.


Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham

Joyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was evicted after being elected president of the building’s Parents Club.  The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction.  When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered.  The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe’s eviction.  Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the eviction.

While the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction.  The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular.  The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively.  Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment.

No.  Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the unanimous majority, holding that the Housing Authority must follow the HUD circular procedure in Thorpe’s eviction.  Since Thorpe had not physically been evicted from her apartment, the court saw no distinction between eviction proceedings that began after the circular was issued and Thorpe’s case.  The Court also decided that the circular was mandatory, not advisory, and it was not an unconstitutional impairment of the Housing Authorities lease agreement.  Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a special concurrence stating that because the Housing Authority admitted to following the circular nothing needed to be decided other than that the circular applied in this case.


M. Michael Cramer
Edward F. Borgerding
Francis B. Burch
Peter L. Strauss

Benton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the grounds that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him were selected unconstitutionally. The case was remanded and Benton chose to confront a new grand jury. It indicted him for larceny and burglary; the petit jury found him guilty of both charges. Benton then appealed arguing that that re-indicting him on the larceny charge after he had been acquitted amounted to double jeopardy. The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed, following the U.S. Supreme Court's Palko decision, which held that the double-jeopardy clause did not apply to state court criminal proceedings.

Yes. The Court -- in a 7-2 decision -- overruled Palko, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states is an element of liberty protected by Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, Benton's larceny conviction was overturned. Justice Thurgood Marshall authored the majority opinion.


Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest.

Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.

Yes. Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the armbands represented pure speech that is entirely separate from the actions or conduct of those participating in it. The Court also held that the students did not lose their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech when they stepped onto school property. In order to justify the suppression of speech, the school officials must be able to prove that the conduct in question would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the school. In this case, the school district's actions evidently stemmed from a fear of possible disruption rather than any actual interference.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that children are not necessarily guaranteed the full extent of First Amendment rights. Justice Byron R. White wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he noted that the majority's opinion relies on a distinction between communication through words and communication through action.

Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school district was well within its rights to discipline the students. In his separate dissent, Justice John M. Harlan argued that school officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest.


Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15

Section 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim.

Yes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court accepted Kramer's argument that all district residents share substantial interest in school meeting decisions. While the statute purported to limit voting rights to those who were "primarily interested" in the election's outcome, the Court found the structure of the law too broad to achieve this goal. The Court concluded that such restrictions must be tailored to achieve the stated goal, and the current classifications "permit inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions."


United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.

Warren Christopher
Samuel W. Murphy, Jr.

After World War II, the United States made funds available through the ‘Marshall Plan’ to many countries to pay for commodities sold by American companies and shipped from the United States and other free-world sources. Congress made foreign aid funds available to bring commodities to the Republic of Korea, beginning with the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

In 1961, the Concentrated Phosphate Export Association (CPEA) organized to act as an export-selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its member corporations. CPEA organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which Congress passed to help American firms compete with foreign cartels. The process began when Congress allocated funds to various Agency for International Development (AID) programs. The United States thus directly financed the purchase of commodities allocated to Korea, approved via a complicated, tightly regulated application procedure. The United States assigned two of the CPEA contracts, and the Republic of Korea assigned the other nine, subject to detailed regulation by AID. The contracts only circulated in the United States.

The United States filed an action to enjoin price fixing and business allocation activities among the CPEA’s five major member corporations. The district court held that CPEA’s sales were ‘export trade’ for the purposes of the Sherman Act; hence, although CPEA conceded that its members were coordinating their sales actions, CPEA did not violate the Sherman Act. On January 1, 1967, the State Department amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on contracts where the procurement was limited to United States suppliers; in response, the CPEA dissolved on December 28, 1967, despite the district court’s favorable ruling.

No and no. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the case was not moot. Although CPEA itself was no longer in operation in that form, the government sought injunctive relief against each of its individual members as well. Justice Marshall also noted that the new AID regulations did not apply to all contracts that the former members of CPEA might bid on. Moreover, the Court could not simply rely on the appellees’ statement that joint operations would no longer be economically advantageous.

Justice Marshall also held that the CPEA did not fall within the Webb-Pomerene Act’s ‘export trade’ exemption. He looked to the legislative history of the Act, noting that the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and the Act’s two main sponsors specified that the Webb-Pomerene Act was not intended to injure American consumers. Hence, Congress did not mean its exemption to insulate transactions initiated, controlled, and financed by the American government. Justice Marshall rejected the CPEA’s argument that they competed for contracts with foreign suppliers, noting that the governing statute required a preference for American procurement and that none of the major trading nations were allowed to compete for contracts.

Justice Byron White dissented, joined by Justice Potter Stewart. He argued that the goods sold by the CPEA were exported from the United States in any ordinary sense of the word ‘export’. He noted that AID regulations referred to receiving countries as ‘importers’ and to the transactions as ‘exports’.

Justice John Harlan took no part in the decision of the case.


Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.

The Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited making private possession of obscene materials a crime. In his majority opinion, Justice Marshall noted that the rights to receive information and to personal privacy were fundamental to a free society. Marshall then found that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." The Court distinguished between the mere private possession of obscene materials and the production and distribution of such materials. The latter, the Court held, could be regulated by the states.


Voters and candidates in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and candidates filed direct appeals, and the cases were consolidated.

Yes, Yes, Yes. And Yes. The Supreme Court held that § 5 authorized a private right of action based on the remedial aims of the Voting Rights Act. The Court also interpreted the Act to provide that litigants bring these suits in their local district courts, and that three-judge district courts be convened (as was true at that time in constitutional challenges).

As to the substantive issue in the case, Chief Justice Earl Warren explained that the Voting Rights Act was "aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race." Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress intended that "all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to §5 scrutiny." The judgments were reversed, and all four cases were remanded to the district courts with instructions to issue injunctions restraining further enforcement of the enactments until such time as the states adequately demonstrated compliance with the approval requirements of the Act.

Justice John Marshall Harlan II, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the language of § 5 referred only to laws by which voters registered to vote and had their ballots counted, and he therefore agreed that several of the disputed voting changes at issue were covered by the Act but disagreed as to several others. Justice Hugo Black dissented on the ground that § 5, in his view, is unconstitutional.


Plaintiffs, several African American residents of Chicago, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a number of Officials of Cook County and Chicago for the enforcement of a number of Illinois Statutes and Chicago ordinances prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and intimidation. Plaintiffs contended that the officials violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech by threatening enforcement of the statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the case in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A three-judge court upheld all of the statutes except for one subsection that prohibited "the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act" and one subsection a statute that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to commit any criminal offense. The court enjoined the officials from enforcing these two subsections. Defendants appealed the decision as to the intimidation statute.

No. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Hugo L. Black delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court held that Plaintiffs were not in danger of any irreparable injury from threatened use of the statute in question. The plaintiffs had never been arrested, prosecuted, or charged under the statute in question. Furthermore, the complaint did not mention any specific threats made by Defendant. It looked as though Plaintiffs had searched state statutes and city ordinances in order to pick out the ones that police could potentially use in bad-faith prosecutions. Justice Black held that it is not proper to block state criminal prosecutions based on speculation about the future. Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the result. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, saying that although the plaintiffs had not been prosecuted under the statute, officials were using it to harass the plaintiffs, causing irreparable injury.


Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."

The Court's Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law violated Brandenburg's right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution.