On May 1, 1981, pursuant to company procedure, employees at the FedEx office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport opened a package that had been damaged by a forklift. The package was an ordinary-looking cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside, they found a tube that contained four plastic bags inside one another, and the innermost bag contained a white substance. They notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the contents of the box. When the DEA agents arrived, they removed a small amount of the white powder to conduct a field test that determined the powder was cocaine. The DEA agents obtained a warrant for the address on the package and searched the location, where they arrested Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen for possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute.

After they were indicted, the respondents filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal search. The motion was denied, and the defendants were tried and convicted in district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision and held that the warrant was the product of the test of the powder, for which a warrant was required.

No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the decision of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the initial inspection by the DEA agent did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it remained within the scope of the previous search conducted by private agents. Once the agents gained enough information about the package to believe it contained contraband, the warrantless seizure of the package and its contents was not unreasonable. The Court also held that the test did not compromise any legitimate privacy interest. Either the test would be positive, which meant that the respondents had no legal right to posses the substance, or the test would be negative, which meant the agents knew nothing more about the powder than they knew after the visual examination.

 Justice Byron R. White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Court unnecessarily dwelled on the fact that the DEA agent’s initial inspection of the contraband was allowed by the Fourth Amendment. Since the Court of Appeals agreed that the evidence was in plain view when the agents arrived, there was no reason for the Court to consider the issue. He also disagreed with the Court’s analysis and argued that the government cannot duplicate a private search without a warrant.

 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that the condition in which the DEA agents found the contents of the box was not clear enough to make a ruling. If the contents of the box were in plain view, the agents did not need a warrant, but if the contents were not, the agents required a warrant to replicate the private search. He also argued that the Court erred by not taking into account the context in which agents find an item as evidence of an expectation of privacy that the search violates. In this case, the packaging clearly indicated that the substance was illegal. Therefore the respondents had no expectation of privacy, and the search was legal.


On January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April 16, 1973, about two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.

No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to self-representation completely free from the presence of standby counsel. Rather, the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant’s right to “control the organization and content of his own defense.” The Court held that Wiggins was afforded all appropriate rights and that the presence of standby counsel did not interfere with the exercise of these rights.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Sixth Amendment protected a defendant’s right to present his case entirely without the mediation of a court-appointed attorney. Although Wiggins’ standby counsel was appointed in a purely advisory capacity, the attorneys regularly intervened and could have undermined Wiggins’ defense strategy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


William F. Mc Mahon
Amato A. De Luca
Rex E. Lee
William F. McMahon
Amato A. DeLuca

The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the Holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."


In 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address.  He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for a 6-3 majority, held that pretrial detention of juveniles does not violate the right of Due Process. The pretrial detention serves the legitimate purpose of protecting both the state and the juvenile from further crimes. Since the state has more responsibilities in the case of a juvenile than in the case of an adult, the pretrial detention not only protects society from potential crime, but it also protects the juvenile from the potential physical and psychological harm that can happen in the commission of a crime. The Court also found that the FCA put in place enough procedural safeguards that the juveniles are not denied Due Process. They are afforded notice, a hearing, and a statement of facts before any detention takes place, as well as an additional hearing to determine probable cause if the fact-finding hearing is not scheduled within three days.

 Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and wrote that the standard of “serious risk” was too vague and easily satisfied given the limited information in the possession of the judge or the juvenile’s lawyer at the time of the initial hearing. Additionally, the conditions of juvenile detention centers are often such that the psychological harms of subjecting a juvenile who has not been found guilty to that environment far outweigh the abstract benefits to society. Given the near-impossibility of predicting whether or not a juvenile will commit a crime in the near future, Justice Marshall found that drastic measures such as pretrial detention could not be justified and represented a violation of Due Process. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Shirley Jones was a professional actress and California resident whose television career was also based in California. Marty Ingels, her husband, was also a professional entertainer. On October 9, 1979, the National Enquirer published an article about Jones. John South wrote the first draft of the article, and his byline appeared on it. Shortly before publication, South called Ingels to read him the article and elicit his comments on it. Ian Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, declined to print a retraction.

National Enquirer, Inc. was a corporation that published a national newspaper with a total circulation of over five million, 600,000 copies of which were sold in California. John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. He was a resident of Florida, but frequently travelled to California on business. Ian Calder was a Florida resident and he exerted close control over the functions of the Enquirer; he had traveled to California only twice and had no other relevant contacts with that state.

Jones filed an action in California state court against Calder and South, alleging that the article was untrue, libelous, and that it damaged their reputations and good names. The superior court ruled that although the injury occurred in California, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claim because of the potential chilling effect from requiring editors and reporters to appear in remote jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals reversed because the defendants intended to cause tortious injury to Jones and Ingels in California. A timely petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied, but the Supreme Court of the United States treated it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granting review.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that Calder's and South’s contacts with California were sufficiently strong to give California state courts jurisdiction over Jones’ libel claim. Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only permits personal jurisdiction when a defendant has certain minimum contacts with a state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Looking to the facts of Jones’ claim, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident, and that Jones’ television career was based in California. In addition, the alleged injury to Jones’ career was suffered in California. Thus, jurisdiction was proper because of the effects of Calder and South’s Florida activities in California. Unlike a welder who helps create a boiler in one state that is sold in another state and that subsequently malfunctions, Calder and South allegedly intentionally directed their actions at California.

Justice Rehnquist noted that courts must evaluate each defendants’ contacts with a given state to determine if they’re sufficient, even if defendants work for the same organization. He rejected Calder and South’s argument that extending jurisdiction over writers and editors in remote states would have a chilling effect on speech; First Amendment concerns about that effect are already taken into account in the constitutional limits on the substantive law of libel.


During a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic’s counsel withdrew and the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government’s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the government. The jury found Cronic guilty and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Cronic’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by inferring that the less-than-ideal circumstances leading up to the trial negatively influenced the lawyer’s performance. The Sixth Amendment protects the right for an accused to receive effective assistance of counsel in order to protect the adversary process. Therefore, the test to determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred must rely on evidence that the adversary process itself suffered. In this case, there was no evidence of specific instances of failure of counsel during trial. Also, the circumstances prior to the trial were not such that effective assistance would have been impossible.

 Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment.


Donna L. Zeegers
Wayne S. Moss
Frank E. Haddad, Jr.
Alan I. Horowitz

These are two consolidated cases involving the discovery of open marijuana fields as the result of unwarranted searches of privately owned land.

In the first case, Kentucky State police searched Ray E. Oliver's farm, acting on reports that marijuana was grown there. A gate marked with a "No Trespassing" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the field about a mile from Oliver's home. Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open fields.

In the second case, police searched the woods behind Richard Thornton's property after an anonymous tip. Police found two marijuana patches on Thornton's land. The Maine Superior Court granted Thornton's motion to suppress evidence found in the search for the same reasons as the Oliver case. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Main affirmed.

Yes. In a 6-3 vote, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority, stating that the open field doctrine applies to both cases. Individuals cannot legitimately expect privacy for activities conducted out in the open except in the area immediately surrounding their house. Also, the act of police officers entering a privately owned field is not automatically a search for Fourth Amendment purposes even if it is a common law trespass. Oliver's case was affirmed, and Thornton's was reversed and remanded.

Justice Byron White wrote a special concurrence, saying that there was no need for the majority to deal with the expectation of privacy issue because a field is clearly not a "house" or an "effect" under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, contending that the law should protect private land that is marked as such against unreasonable searches and seizures. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice John P. Stevens joined Justice Marshall's dissent.


In January 1980, Richmond Allen was arrested for allegedly using abusive and insulting language, which is a Class 3 misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of $500. Gladys Pulliam, the state magistrate for Culpeper County, Virginia set bail at $250 and, when Allen was unable to make bail, Pulliam committed him to the Culpeper County Jail for 14 days.  Allen was tried, found guilty, fined, and released. The trial judge reopened his case and reversed the judgment. Allen sued Pulliam in district court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief for incarcerating him while waiting for trial on non-jailable offenses.

Jesse Nicholson was arrested four times in a two-month period for public intoxication, a Class 4 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $100 fine. Like Allen, Nicholson was incarcerated for failure to make bail, and he intervened in Allen’s suit as a party plaintiff.

This district court held that Pulliam’s practice of incarcerating persons for not making bail on non-jailable offenses violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court enjoined the practice and found Allen and Nicholson entitled to costs, including attorneys’ fees. Pulliam appealed the finding regarding costs and argued that, as a judicial officer, she was granted judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the judicial immunity argument and affirmed the district court’s decision.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the precedent set by British common law relied on the issuance of writs, rather than the imposition of judicial immunity, to protect judicial independence. The United States never had a doctrine of judicial immunity from prospective relief, and there was no evidence that the lack of that protection created a chilling effect on judicial independence. The Court held that there was no reason to assume such immunity was necessary. There was no legislative history to indicate that Congress intended to insulate judges from injunctive relief.  The Civil Rights Acts and their interpretations illustrate that Congress intended all state actors to be subject to such remedies to ensure the protection of Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that judicial immunity from all types of relief and damages in civil suits is essential to protect judicial independence. He wrote that the majority’s opinion misinterprets British common law, which does rely on judicial immunity to protect judges from suit arising from a judge acting in her official capacity. He argued that the potential for the awarding of attorneys’ fees greatly increases the risk of harassing litigation because attorneys will recommend such action to clients. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice William H. Rehnquist, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to embrace his family is "a matter of great importance" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that Central Jail's policies worked to further the government's reasonable and legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of jail officials and visitors. The Court cited the extensive precedent that gave discretion to prison officials in enacting policies and procedures that they deem necessary to preserve internal order and security.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed with the approval of Central Jail's policies but disagreed with the majority's willingness to grant judicial deference to jail officials rather than to perform a careful analysis of the inmates' constitutional claims.

Justice Thurgood Marshall authored a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the jail officials could not show that allowing low-risk inmates to see their family would "frustrate the achievement of any substantial state interest." Furthermore, Justice Marshall cautioned against the Court's quick deference to the "expertise" of prison administrators and their blanket acceptance of "established state procedure[s]," at the cost of the depriving inmates of their private property. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.


Richard H. Munzing
Paul McGrath
J. Paul Mc Grath
J. Paul McGrath

Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) establishes a four-step review process of disputed disability benefit claims. First, a state agency determines if a claimant has a disability and when the condition began or ended. Second, state agencies' disability determinations can be reviewed upon the claimant's request. Third, if upon review the claimant suffers an adverse finding he or she may demand an evidentiary hearing by an administrative law judge. Fourth, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, they may appeal to the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Claiming delays in excess of 90 days, during steps two and three, Leon Day sued on behalf of several similarly aggrieved Vermont claimants alleging a violation of the "reasonable time" hearing limitation. On appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling upholding a district court's imposition of disability hearing deadlines, the Supreme Court granted HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler certiorari.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 opinion, the Court held that Congress already considered and expressly rejected the imposition of mandatory disability dispute-resolution deadlines. Such deadlines, according to congressional reports, would subordinate quality of service to timeliness. The Court cautioned that pervasively regulated areas, such as the Social Security Act in general and its dispute resolution mechanisms in particular, should be left free of judicial intervention that is far less attuned to the needs of the constituencies served by such legislation.


Kathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the longest in the United States had not run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The Court of Appeals also found the application of the "single publication rule," which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire.

Yes. Hustler's regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire is sufficient to support an assertion of personal jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the magazine. In analyzing whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to permit personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court should focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Hustler has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market and therefore it must reasonably anticipate being hauled into court there. Keeton did not need to have minimum contacts with the forum state in order for that state to have asserted personal jurisdiction over Hustler. New Hampshire had a sufficient interest in adjudicating the dispute. Moreover, even though most of the harm done to Keeton occurred outside New Hampshire, the same would be true in most libel cases brought anywhere other than plaintiff's state of domicile.


United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company

In 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a private firm planned to inspect a plant owned by Stauffer Chemical Co. (Stauffer) in Tennessee. Before granting entry, Stauffer requested that the employees of the private firm sign an agreement promising not to disclose any trade secrets they might learn during the inspection. The employees refused, and Stauffer denied them entry. The EPA and private firm returned with a warrant to enter the premises, but Stauffer again denied them entry.

The EPA began a civil contempt proceeding against Stauffer to gain entry. The district court ruled in favor of the EPA and Stauffer appealed. On appeal, Stauffer argued that the employees of the private firm did not qualify as “authorized representatives” under the Clean Air Act, and therefore Stauffer was not required to grant them entry. Stauffer had used this argument before in a similar case from Wyoming, which involved the same parties. Stauffer argued that this previous case precluded the government from re-litigating this issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with Stauffer and reversed.

Yes. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion in which the Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied in this case. This doctrine prevents re-litigation of issues that were “conclusively determined in a prior action involving the same parties.” While, the government conceded that the facts and question in this case were the same as those already ruled upon in the Wyoming case, it argued that this case could proceed because it involved unrelated subject matter. Additionally, the government argued that it had a duty to re-litigate issues of public importance. The Court found these arguments unpersuasive and concluded that this case involved the same parties, issues of law, and virtually identical fact scenarios.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he warned of taking the doctrine of collateral estoppel too far.


Robert H. Kapp
Rex E. Lee
William J. Landers, II

In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.

The Court found that the circumstances involved in this case did not warrant federal-court adjudication. Justice O'Connor's opinion argued that the Court could not act since the injuries that the suit identified were not "judicially cognizable" and because they were not "fairly traceable to the assertedly unlawful conduct of the IRS." Citing past precedents, O'Connor found that, by itself, an assertion that the government is not acting in the bounds of the law is not enough to bring a suit to a federal court. To allow so would open the door to a myriad of legal challenges in which the courts would become buried by the minutiae of governing, acting as "continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action."


Paul M. Bator
John S. Baker, Jr.
Ronnie L. Williams

An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.

Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.


City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. submitted a permit application to operate a home for the mentally retarded. The city council of Cleburne voted to deny the special use permit, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance.

In a unanimous judgment, the Court held that the denial of the special use permit to Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. was premised on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, and hence unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court declined to grant the mentally retarded the status of a "quasi-suspect class," it nevertheless found that the "rational relation" test for legislative action provided sufficient protection against invidious discrimination.


Mr. Andrew L. Frey
Jerrold M. Ladar
Andrew L.Frey

An indictment issued by a grand jury charged James Miller with fraud. The indictment alleged he conspired with a burglar and overstated the value of the stolen items so his insurer would pay him more in damages recovery. The prosecution presented evidence proving that Miller had overstated the value of the items but did not try to establish that he had conspired with the burglar. The jury found his overstatement of value sufficient to convict him of fraud. Miller argued that by convicting him despite the fact that the prosecutors only addressed part of the indictment, the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on a grand jury indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction.

No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the decision for an 8-0 court. The Court maintained that an indictment is valid so long as it "clearly set[s] out the offense for which [the accused] was ultimately convicted." In this case, the defense clearly understood that Miller could be convicted for fraud solely because he overstated the value of the stolen items. Failing to convict him on other grounds did not annul his proven criminal conduct. The allegation of conspiring with a burglar constituted another "means of committing the same crime" and could be "treated as a useless averment that may be ignored" once the prosecution dropped it.


On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney’s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell.

Carney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Carney pleaded no contest, was convicted, and placed on probation. He appealed, and the California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds that the motor home fell under the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied a lesser degree of protection to motor vehicles based on the ability to easily and quickly move them before a warrant can be obtained. Also, the regulation surrounding automobiles affords them a lesser expectation of privacy and therefore less protection under the Fourth Amendment. Since Carney’s motor home was not in an area traditionally used for residence and was licensed to operate as a vehicle on public streets, the Court held that it should receive the level of constitutional protection of a motor vehicle rather than a residence. The Court also held that the officers had probable cause and that the search itself was reasonable.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent where he argued that the Court should have relied on the ruling of the California Supreme Court to establish precedent for that state. He also argued that the majority’s decision overemphasized the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. Since the motor home was neither in motion nor was there any indication that Carney would quickly move it, there were no circumstances to prevent the officers from obtaining a warrant. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.


Gary Garcia alleged that in 1979 he was unlawfully arrested, beaten, and tear-gassed by the petitioner, Richard Wilson, who was a New Mexico State Police officer. Garcia also alleged that Martin Vigil, the Chief of the State Police, knew Wilson had attacked citizens on several occasions but had failed to take action. Garcia sued for a violation of Section 1983 of the United State Code, a civil rights statute that creates a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights. The petitioners argued that this Section 1983 claim should be subject to the two-year statute of limitations that applied to a similar cause of action found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act). If that statute of limitations were applied, this case could not proceed because the complaint was not filed until two years and nine months after the alleged beating. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations recommended by petitioners did not apply because it was not sufficiently related to the nature of the right being enforced by Garcia's claim. Instead, the district court held that a different cause of action in the Act was more closely related to this Section 1983 claim and applied that cause of action's four-year statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling but held that actions brought under Section 1983 are essentially an injury to personal rights; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations that applies to all personal injury actions in New Mexico should apply to Section 1983 claims.

Yes, yes, yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 7-1 majority. The Court held that, in situations where a federal action does not have a statute of limitations, the practice has been to adopt a local limitation as long as that limitation is not inconsistent with a federal law or policy. Looking at the language of Section 1983, the Court determined that Congress intended to create a federal cause of action; therefore, it is up to the federal courts to determine the proper statute of limitation. The Court also determined that the importance of consistency and the diversity of Section 1983 causes of action required a uniform limitation for all causes of action to prevent uncertainty and quarrels over which limitation to apply. Finally, the Court agreed with the appellate court that the three-year personal injury limitation was the best available because of the nature of the remedy afforded by Section 1983.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that there need not be a uniform application of limitations to all Section 1983 claims. Rather, each claim should be evaluated individually and assigned a limitation that is most analogous to the specific claim that is brought before the court.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.


Stephen M. Kristovich
Kenneth Steven Geller

Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.

Yes, they are presumptively unreviewable. Refusals of administrative agencies to exercise enforcement authority involve a complicated balancing of factors, including agency allocation of scarce resources, which are not suitable for judicial review. Thus, they are presumptively "committed to agency discretion by law" under Section 701(a)(2). This presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. In the instant case, the presumption of unreviewability was not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA. The FDCA's prohibition on "misbranding" of drugs and introduction of "new drugs," absent agency approval, does not supply relevant guidelines. Neither does the FDA's "policy statement" indicating that the agency considered itself "obligated" to take certain investigative actions nor the FDCA's provision that the Secretary need not report for prosecution minor violations of the Act supply relevant guidelines.


In October 1977, Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. The government’s two principal witnesses were James F. O’Connor and Donald E. Mitchell, private security guards. Between April and June 1977, they assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) in conducting an undercover investigation of Bagley. In response to a discovery request for information about any deals, promises or inducements made to O’Connor or Mitchell, the government produced only affidavits from each man stating that each spoke without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward. Bagley waived his right to a jury trial. At trial, O’Connor and Mitchell testified about the firearms and narcotics charges. On December 23, 1977, the court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not the firearms charges.

In mid-1980, Bagley filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Privacy Act of 1974. He received copies of ATF form contracts, each entitled, “Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.” These contracts indicated that O’Connor and Mitchell provided information to the ATF and promised a future payment of $300 to each informer. Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that the government’s failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The motion came before the same district judge who presided at Bagley’s trial. At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate found that neither informant expected payment for his testimony. In contrast, the district judge found that O’Connor and Mitchell probably expected to receive compensation for their assistance, and that the government suppressed evidence favorable to Bagley. He also concluded, however, that the disclosure would not have had an effect on the court’s verdict. He emphasized that Bagley’s counsel did not seek to discredit O’Connor or Mitchell on cross-examination. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed, reasoning that the government’s failure to disclose required automatic reversal because it impaired Bagley’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through effective cross-examination.

No. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the government’s failure to disclose the contacts in discovery did not violate the Due Process Clause. Justice Blackmun wrote that the state was required by due process to disclose evidence that was both favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment, and that impeachment evidence fell within this requirement. He rejected, however, the Ninth Circuit’s argument that the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence required automatic reversal. The Court was concerned with undisclosed impeachment evidence that directly restricted the scope of cross-examination; here, Bagley’s counsel was free to cross-examine the informants on any relevant subject.

Relying on United States v. Agurs, Justice Blackmun held that undisclosed evidence was material if there was a reasonable possibility that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been disclosed. He acknowledged that the government’s failure likely lead the defense counsel to believe that the informants could not be impeached on the basis of bias or inducements offered by the government. Nonetheless, the district court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome would have been the same if the government had disclosed the evidence in question. Justice Blackmun reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration.

Justice Byron White concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist. He would have simply held that the proper standard was one of reasonable probability and that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the standard necessities reversal.

Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that a failure to disclose cannot be considered harmless when the government withholds evidence that might impeach the prosecution’s only witnesses. He wrote that the majority’s standard encouraged prosecutors to withhold potentially dispositive evidence.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He noted that the analysis in Agurs was restricted to the context where the defense made either a general request for evidence or no request at all, not a specific request for impeachment evidence. He rejected the majority’s results-based test for materiality.

Justice Louis Powell took no part in the decision of the case.


Mr. Wayte was required by a 1980 Presidential Proclamation to register with the Selective Service system. Instead, he wrote letters to various government officials stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Wayte's letters were added to a file kept by the Selective Service of men who had informed the government that they were not complying with the proclamation.

The Selective Service later adopted a policy of passive enforcement, in which it would prosecute only men who had either reported to the government that they were not registering or whom other people had reported to the government for not registering. After a long series of requests by the government that Wayte register (all of which he failed to respond to), the government eventually indicted Wayte in federal district court for violating the Military Selective Service Act.

The district court, however, dismissed the indictment, holding that the government's passive enforcement policy was unconstitutional because it amounted to selective prosecution of only those men who took an outspoken stance against the Selective Service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wayte had failed to show that the government focused its attention on him because of his protest activities.

No. The Supreme Court held, 7-to-2, that the government's passive enforcement policy was constitutional. In the majority opinion, Justice Lewis Powell found that the government's policy was not unconstitutional selective enforcement (in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection clause) because men who had not taken an outspoken stance against the Selective Service, but who were merely reported by others for failing to register, were treated the same as those men who had notified the government of their own refusal to register. Justice Powell wrote, "In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities. Absent such a showing, his claim of selective prosecution fails."

To decide the First Amendment challenge, Justice Powell cited four requirements for incidental government regulation of speech laid out in United States v. O'Brien: the regulation must be within the government's constitutional power, must further an important or substantial government interest, must have an interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and must restrict only as much speech as is necessary to meet the government interest. Powell found that the passive enforcement policy satisfied all these requirements, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment.


Paul Gerwitz
Nathan Lewin
Joseph I. Lieberman
Paul Gewirtz

Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.

Yes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut Sabbath observance statute was void, saying its "unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law "provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath." Burger said the state law "thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath."


In July 1981, David Smith sued Robert McDonald in state court.  Smith alleged that, while he was being considered for the position of U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina, McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan that contained libelous falsehoods about him. Smith claimed that McDonald knew the accusations in the letters were false and that he mailed the letters with malicious intent to undermine the prospect of Smith’s appointment as U.S. Attorney. Smith’s complaint alleged that the letters had their intended effect—he was not appointed to the position, and he suffered damage to his career and reputation—so he sought compensatory damages.

McDonald removed the case to the district court on the basis of diverse citizenship and moved for judgment on the pleadings by arguing that the Petition Clause granted him absolute immunity. The district court held that the Petition Clause granted general immunity but not absolute immunity from liability for libel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that, while the Petition Clause was an important foundation for the ideas of self-government, there is no evidence that the Framers intended it to allow the unchecked expression of false information. Previous cases have also shown that the right to petition is not without limits; baseless litigation is not protected under the Petition Clause. The Court also held that damages may not be recovered without proof that the defendant acted with actual malice.

In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the Framers intended the Petition Clause to be a part of the overlapping First Amendment protections of free expression. Since the other parts of the First Amendment do not grant absolute immunity, he argued that there was no reason to assume that the Petition Clause should. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took not part in the discussion or decision of this case.


Part of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorized local institutions to receive funds to assist educationally deprived children from low-income families. Since 1966, New York City had used portions of its Title I funding to pay salaries of employees who teach in parochial schools.

Yes. Even though the Court acknowledged that the efforts of the City of New York were well-intentioned, it found that the funding practices violated the Constitution. As part of New York's program, teachers were directed to avoid involvement in religious materials and activities in their classrooms. This, as well as the actions of school administrators and field supervisors who monitored classroom activities for religious content, posed constitutional problems for the majority. Involving agents of the city in extensive monitoring increased the potential for "divisiveness along religious lines" and violated the intent of the Establishment Clause which is to prevent the intrusion of church and state on each other's respective domain.


Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises

In 1977, former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. to publish his memoirs. Harper & Row negotiated a prepublication agreement with Time Magazine for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's account of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. Before Time released its article, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford manuscript. Subsequently, The Nation, using approximately 300 words from the manuscript, scooped Time. Harper & Row sued The Nation, alleging violations of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. The District Court held that The Nation's use of the copyrighted material constituted infringement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Nation's use of the copyrighted material was sanctioned as a fair use.

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that The Nation's use of verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use. The Court reasoned that the unpublished nature of a work is a key, though not necessarily determinative, factor tending to negate a defense of fair use. "Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use," wrote Justice O'Connor. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the four statutory factors relevant to determining whether the use was fair were not satisfied. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., argued that the Court was advancing the protection of the copyright owner's economic interest "through an exceedingly narrow definition of the scope of fair use."


Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.

Wayne Alan Cross
Benjamin Rodriguez-Ramon
Jerrold J. Ganzfried

These are two consolidated cases involving claims and counterclaims between the same parties.  Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese corporation that manufactures automobiles in Japan.  The sales agreement provided for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association of all disputes arising out of certain articles of the agreement.  A dispute did arise from slowing automobile sales.  When the dispute could not be resolved, Mitsubishi sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel arbitration.  Soler filed counterclaims, including Sherman Act antitrust violations.  The district court ordered arbitration of all claims, holding that the international nature of the dispute required enforcement of the arbitration clause.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed as to the antitrust claims.

Yes.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that claims arising under the Sherman Act and encompassed in a valid arbitration clause in an international commercial transaction are arbitrable under the federal Arbitration Act.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that a fair construction of the arbitration clause does not encompass antitrust claims.  An arbitration clause should be construed to cover a remedy it does not expressly identify, and congress did not intend the federal Arbitration Act of apply to antitrust claims.  Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.  Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in all but part II of the dissent.


Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force

The National Gay Task Force filed a facial constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma Statute that allowed schools to fire teachers who engage in “public homosexual activity” or “public homosexual conduct”.  Public homosexual activity encompassed physical sexual acts while public homosexual conduct included advocating for or encouraging public or private homosexual activity.  The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, holding that the statute did not inhibit First Amendment freedoms, and the right of privacy did not include the activities prohibited by the statute.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed in part, holding that the part of the statute that prohibited public homosexual conduct was unconstitutionally broad and attempted to regulate speech.  The court upheld that part of the statute prohibiting public homosexual activity.

No answer.  In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower judgment by an equally divided court.


Peter Marvin Horstman
Mr. Andrew L. Frey

Customs officials stopped Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez at the Los Angeles Airport, where she arrived after a flight from Bogota, Columbia.  Montoya de Hernandez’s passport revealed eight recent trips from Bogota to Miami or Los Angeles.  After further questioning, officials detained Montoya de Hernandez under suspicion that she was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal.  After 16 hours of detention where Montoya de Hernandez did not speak or use the bathroom, officials obtained a court order for an x-ray and other tests.  At the hospital, a doctor removed a balloon filled with cocaine from her rectum.  Over the next four days, Montoya de Hernandez passed 88 balloons filled with cocaine, totaling 528 grams.  At trial, the district court admitted the cocaine into evidence and convicted Montoya de Hernandez on federal drug charges.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Montoya de Hernandez’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment because customs officials did not have a “clear indication” that she was smuggling drugs.

Yes.  Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals.   The Supreme Court held that detention of a traveler at an international border is justified if customs agents reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling illegal drugs in their body.  The facts in this case supported that reasonable suspicion.  Given the manner in which the drugs were concealed, Montoya de Hernandez’s detention was not unreasonably long.  Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the judgment, writing that the detention was justified because Montoya de Hernandez refused to consent to the x-ray.

Justice William J. Brenan dissented, arguing that government officials should not have a lower standard for detaining someone at an international border than in the interior of the United States.  Indefinite detentions are only reasonable with approval of a magistrate, and that approval can only be given if there is probable cause.


Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City

Robert L. Estes
Edwin S. Kneedler
G. T. Nebel

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City owned of a tract of land in Williamson County Tennessee and intended to develop it into a residential subdivision. When Hamilton Bank attempted to get a layout of the subdivision approved, the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission denied it because the layout violated certain zoning regulations. Hamilton Bank sued the Commission alleging that the zoning laws constituted a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 as compensation for the taking. The court issued an injunction against the Commission and awarded judgment notwithstanding the verdict denying money damages because the "taking" was only temporary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the zoning laws denied Hamilton Bank all "economically viable" use of the land and that damages were required to compensate for the temporary taking.

No decision. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote for the majority, reversing and remanding to the lower court. The Supreme Court held that even if there was a temporary taking, a decision on money damages was premature because Hamilton Bank had not obtained a final administrative decision on the subdivision layout. The claim was premature under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the same reason. Justice Byron R. White dissented from the holding that the issues in the case were not ripe for decision.

The Court in 2019 overturned this case in Knick v. Township of Scott, holding there that a government violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at that time.


Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Laurence H. Tribe
Stephen M. Shapiro
Rex E. Lee

Certain bank holding companies located principally in either Connecticut or Massachusetts applied to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to obtain approval for acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies (banks) in the other state. If a bank from one state seeks to acquire a bank, or substantially all of a bank's assets, from another state, the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. Section 1842(d), allows the Board to approve the acquisition only if it "is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such [acquired] bank is located." Massachusetts and Connecticut have substantially similar laws allowing out-of-state banks to buy in-state banks only if the out-of-state banks (1) have their principal place of business in another New England State, and (2) the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges. Certain banks from outside of New England opposed the acquisitions, but the Board found that the Douglas Amendment did not prevent their authorization, and approved them.

Yes to part 1; no to part 2. Though the Douglas Amendment's language does not specifically indicate that a state may partially lift the ban on out-of-state banks acquiring in-state banks, the Amendment's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to allow each state such flexibility. Moreover, the Massachusetts and Connecticut laws favoring out-of-state banks from New England are consistent with the broader purpose underlying the BHCA: to retain local control over banking. As for the constitutionality of these state laws, there is no violation of the dormant Commerce Clause because Congress exercised its commerce power by enacting the BHCA and the Douglas Amendment. There is no violation of the Compact Clause because Massachusetts and Connecticut did not form a compact, and even if they did, they do not pose a threat to federal supremacy. Finally, there is no violation of the Equal Protection Clause because our country has traditionally favored widely dispersed control of banking, and so the concerns Massachusetts and Connecticut had with preserving the local nature of banking meet the traditional rational basis for judging equal protection claims.


School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts

David Berman
David W. Rosenberg
Ellen L. Janos

Under the provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act, state and local education agencies must provide handicapped children and their parents or guardians with access to the appropriate safeguards to ensure free and appropriate public education. Such safeguards include the right of the parents and guardians to participate in the development of an individual education program (IEP) and a procedure for the review of a proposed IEP if there is disagreement.

In the spring of 1979, Michael Panico, who was considered to be “handicapped” under the meaning of the Act, was attending Memorial School, a public school in Burlington. His continued poor performance and the school’s inability to handle his needs led to a discussion between the school district and Michael’s parents about what changes needed to be made to his IEP. In June of 1979, the town presented the Panicos with an IEP that called for Michael to be placed at Pine Glen School. In the meantime, the Panicos had met with specialists at the Massachusetts General Hospital who recommended that Michael’s needs could best be served at the Carroll School in Lincoln, Massachusetts. The Panicos enrolled Michael at the Carroll School at their own expense.

The Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) held several hearings on the issue and determined that the town’s proposed placement was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was most adequately equipped to meet Michael’s needs. The BSEA ordered the town to pay for Michael’s tuition and transportation, as well as reimburse the Panicos for money already spent. The town sought judicial review in district court under federal and state statutes. The district court granted summary judgment against the town on the state law claim and set a date for trial on the federal claim. Because the town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the Panicos and the state moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment in regards to the state law claim and held that none of the parties were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because none could show irreparable injury. On remand, the district court found in favor of the town that the proposed IEP was appropriate and that the town should not be required to compensate the Panicos. The case was transferred to a different district judge to rule on the issue of whether or not the town should be required to pay the Panicos for costs incurred while the case was pending. The district court held that the Panicos’ decision to place Michael in the Carroll School without the town’s consent absolved the town of financial responsibility while the case was pending and ordered the Panicos to reimburse the town. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in conducting an entirely new trial, gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and did not properly evaluate the IEP in question.

Yes, no. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the unanimous court. The Supreme Court held that the Education of the Handicapped Act grants the courts broad discretion in overseeing the administrative proceedings of IEP disputes that includes the ability to order reimbursement. Because the courts must ensure appropriate placement for the children in question, there may be situations in which all of the public school options are deemed inappropriate for the needs of a particular child. The Court also held that a reading of the Act that forces parents to waive their right to reimbursement if they place their child in an alternative school from the one recommended in the IEP would defeat the purpose of the Act. Parents who unilaterally change their child’s placement do so at their own financial risk, but they may be reimbursed if the placement is deemed to be the most appropriate available option.


Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee

Charles Nevett Steele
Robert R. Sparks, Jr.
Steven B. Feirson

In 1975, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) was accused by both the Democratic Party of the United States and the Federal Election Commission of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act stipulated that independent political action committees could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential candidate. This case was decided together with Democratic Party v. NCPAC.

Yes. The Court held that the expenditures prohibited by the Federal Election Campaign Act were "at the core of the First Amendment" and could not be restricted by the government. The Court rejected the notion that the PACs' form of organization diminished their entitlement to First Amendment protection. The Court drew a distinction between contributions to candidates-- which were open to corruption--and contributions to independent organizations in support of candidates.


Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub

Bruce M. Kuhlik
David A. Epstein
Bruce Neil Kuhlik

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint against the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. CDCB was going through bankruptcy at the time and a trustee was appointed At a deposition related to the Commission's lawsuit, Gary Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, refused to answer certain questions, citing attorney-client privilege. The Commission obtained a waiver of attorney-client privilege from the CDCB's bankruptcy trustee. The district court directed Weintraub to answer the questions, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive attorney-client privilege for communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy trustee does have the power to waive attorney client privilege for communications that occurred before filing the bankruptcy petition. This power is held by the management of a corporation, and a bankruptcy trustee is merely a new form of management. If the power to waive attorney-client privilege remained with the corporation's directors, it would frustrate the goal of the trustee, to uncover fraud and misappropriated corporate assets. Justice Lewis F. Powell did not participate.


Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill

James Loudermill stated on his application for employment with the Cleveland Board of Education that he had never been convicted for a felony. After hiring him as a security guard, the board discovered that he had been convicted for grand larceny and without further consideration fired him for providing false information on his application. Since Loudermill qualified as a "classified civil servant" under Ohio law, he obtained a property right to his employment. This meant he could only be dismissed for cause and could obtain an administrative review of the causes for his termination. The Cleveland Civil Service Commission granted him an administrative review after his termination and found it valid. Loudermill filed suit in District Court alleging that the review system was unconstitutional because it only allowed him to respond to the charges against him after his termination. He argued that the board removed his property without giving him a chance to defend himself in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court agreed that the Ohio statute gave Loudermill a property right to his job, but ruled that the board did not violate his due process rights because it followed the procedures specified by the same statute for removing the property right. In a similar case, Richard Donnelly alleged that post-dismissal hearings violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases together and ruled that the board violated both defendants' due process rights by removing their property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for them to respond to charges against them.

No. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Ohio statute clearly grants civil servants property rights to their employment. In order to lawfully remove this property, the Due Process Clause requires a procedure that carefully weighs the interests of the government in removing the property against the interests of the private party in retaining the property. This procedure must incorporate the "essential requirements of due process," which "are notice and an opportunity to respond." There was no strong reason to delay the opportunity to respond until after termination. The Court found that "affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays." Accordingly, the significant interests of the employees to retain their jobs outweighed the interests of the state to remove employees quickly.


W. J. Michael Cody
Henry I. Klein
Steven L. Winter
Wj Michael Cody
Henry L. Klein

These are two consolidated cases against different defendants involving the same incident. During a chase, police officer Elton Hymon shot 15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner with a hollow tip bullet to prevent Garner from escaping over a fence. Garner was suspected of burglarizing a nearby house. Hymon admitted that before he shot he saw no evidence that Garner was armed and "figured" he was unarmed. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to the hospital where he died a short time later.

Garner's father sued seeking damages for violations of Garner's constitutional rights. The district court entered judgment for the defendants because Tennessee law authorized Hymon's actions. The court also felt that Garner had assumed the risk of being shot by recklessly attempting to escape. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that killing a fleeing suspect is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and such a seizure would only be reasonable if the suspect posed a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority affirming the court of appeals decision. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force unless it is necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of violence to the officer or the community. The Tennessee statute was unconstitutional as far as it allowed deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed fleeing felon.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a dissent stating that the majority went too far in invalidating long-standing common law and police practices contrary to the holding. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. At trial, his behavior was so abnormal that the court ordered a prolonged mental examination to determine his competency to stand trial. After six months of examination, a state psychiatrist declared Ake unfit for trial and in need of a “maximum security facility.” Six weeks after this declaration, the same psychiatrist found that, when Ake was on his anti-psychotic medication, he was stable and competent to stand trial; the state resumed proceedings.

Ake intended to assert the insanity defense, so a psychiatrist had to determine Ake’s mental state at the time of the killings. Because Ake could not afford to hire a psychiatrist, his attorney requested that the state provide him one. The court refused and rejected Ake’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. Without a psychiatrist, Ake was unable to provide any evidence as to his mental state at the time of the offense. Absent this evidence, jurors were instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake’s insanity defense and convicted him on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, Ake—still unable to afford a psychiatrist—could not provide expert testimony to mitigate his offense and was sentenced to death. Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and held that the government was not responsible for providing psychiatric help to indigent defendants charged with capital crimes.

Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that, when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense will be at issue during the trial, the Constitution requires the government to provide psychiatric assistance if the defendant cannot afford it. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state-provided assistance in cases where there is a private interest that will be affected by the state’s actions, value that will be derived from the additional safeguards, and when providing the assistance will only be a minimal burden to the state. All three of these factors were present in this case. Furthermore, both justice and the Fourteenth Amendment require a defendant to be able to participate meaningfully in the judicial proceedings, which is impossible if the government were to deny this type of assistance to Ake and similar defendants.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that the Court’s decision applies only to capital cases.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he, like Justice Burger, argued that this decision should apply only to capital cases. Furthermore, he argued that this rule should provide for an independent psychiatric evaluation, not a comprehensive defense consultant.


On October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert’s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who “acting under color of state law” deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused by a municipal “policy,” but a single, unusually excessive use of force could support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle’s estate $1.5 million in damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality held that the district court’s instructions to the jury improperly allowed a plaintiff to impose liability on the city without proof of a single action taken by a municipal policy maker. The plurality further concluded that proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability on a city for a policy that is not in and of itself unconstitutional.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that Section 1983 does not permit a city to be held liable on a theory of strict responsibility for its non-policy-making employees. Instead, municipalities are liable for constitutional deprivations caused by an official policy or custom. Because the jury could have found the city liable solely because the police officer’s actions were so excessive and out of the ordinary, Justice Brennan concurred with the judgment reached by the Court. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that cities should be held liable under Section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their agents that are performed in the court of their official duties.


In 1981, John Abel was indicted for robbing a bank in California. During Abel’s trial, the prosecution called one of his accomplices, Kurt Ehle, to testify that Abel had participated in the robbery. To counter Ehle’s testimony, Abel called a mutual friend, Robert Mills, to the stand. Mills, Abel, and Ehle knew each other from the time they spent in prison together and their involvement in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Mills testified that, in prison, Ehle had talked about his plans to rob the bank and blame it on Abel. To discredit Mills, the prosecution re-called Ehle to the stand to expose the three men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and the gang’s strict code of protection, which required members to lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect a fellow member. Ehle testified that this code of conduct explained why Mills testified in defense of Abel. Abel’s counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant, but the district court allowed it into evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have on Abel. Abel lost and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed because admitting evidence that Mills belonged to a perjurious organization, to suggest he was committing perjury this time, unfairly prejudiced him by association absent any evidence of his individual willingness to lie.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the unanimous opinion, in which the Court held that the evidence of bias introduced for purposes of impeachment is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Relevant evidence is that which has the tendency to make the existence of any fact more or less probable. The Court determined that a showing of bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which they testify less probable and is therefore relevant. Furthermore, the district court ensured the admission of only the highly probative evidence about the men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and sustained objections relating to the punishment of unfaithful members and other topics that might have been prejudicial.


Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that while Miranda required that unwarned admissions must be suppressed, subsequent statements, if made knowingly and voluntarily, need not be. The Court held that ". . .the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion." The Court also noted that police officers were ill-equipped to determine when "custody" legally begins. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, argued that the holding "in no way retreat[ed] from the bright-line rule of Miranda."


Kathryn Piper was a resident of Lower Waterford, Vermont, which is about 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied to take the 1980 New Hampshire Bar Examination and submitted her statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Piper passed the New Hampshire Bar and was informed she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire before being sworn in. In May 1980, Piper requested a dispensation from the residency requirement due to special circumstances and the fact that she met all of the other requirements. When her request was denied, she formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to become a member of the bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied her petition on December 31, 1980.

On March 22, 1982, Piper sued the New Hampshire Supreme Court in district court and argued that the residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted Piper’s motion for summary judgment and found that the requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to create one economic union out of a collection of states, and so it was relevant to employment and business regulations. Specifically the legal profession plays a crucial rule in the national economy, and therefore the ability to practice should be considered a “fundamental right” that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court also held that, because a lawyer is not an officer of the State, there is no substantial reason for New Hampshire to exclude non-residents from the bar.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion and argued that, other than the location of Piper’s home, there was nothing to distinguish her from any other New Hampshire lawyer. He found that the residency requirement should not apply in her case, but he did not think the majority’s opinion needed to reach any finding regarding the Constitutional validity of the residency requirement in general.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the practice of law differed from other professions in that it does not always readily translate across state lines, as laws and their enforcement often differ in different localities. He also argued that the state had substantial reasons to exclude out-of-state lawyers from the bar.


School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball

Michael W. McConnell
Kenneth F. Ripple
A. E. Dick Howard

In the 1976-1977 school year, the school district of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs, Shared Time and Community Education, that provided secular classes to private school students at public expense. The Shared Time program offered classes during the school day that were intended to “supplement the core curriculum” of the private schools. The Shared Time teachers were full-time public school teachers, and many had previously worked in private schools. The Community Education program was offered for children and adults at many different sites, but the classes at issue took place after the school day in private elementary schools. The Community Education teachers were part-time public school employees, and many also held jobs at private schools. The classrooms for both programs were leased from the private schools. The vast majority of the participating private schools were religious, and there was no evidence that a public school student ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class held in a private school.

 Six taxpayers filed suit against the school district and state officials and alleged that they violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by using public funds to pay for private (and religious) education. The district court applied the Lemon test and determined that, although the aim was secular, the effect of the programs conferred benefits to religious institutions and entangled the affairs of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the statute failed the Lemon test because it had the effect of advancing religious agendas and it unnecessarily entangled the government and religion. The statute advanced religion in three ways: the teachers may inadvertently or intentionally instruct from a religious perspective; the programs themselves may serve as a symbolic link between the government and religion in the eyes of impressionable children; and the programs essentially serve as a government subsidy for religious instruction. The Court recognized that the intent of the programs was to provide secular education, but there was too great a risk of the religious environment influencing the children’s instruction.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the Court’s decision on the Community Education program, but dissented regarding the Shared Time program. He argued that there was no way to completely eliminate contact between the government and religion, and to attempt to do so in this case would come at the cost of children’s education.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented in part. She argued that there was no evidence to indicate a link between the Shared Time program and religion other than the fact that the classes were taught in private schools. In the case of the Community Education program, she agreed with the majority.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent where he argued that the Court has long engaged in an unnecessarily narrow reading of the Establishment Clause. He held that this decision and others like it were “contrary to the long-range interests of the country.”

 Justice William H. Rehnquist also dissented and argued that the Establishment Clause was never meant to establish a “wall” between the government and religion but merely to prevent the establishment of a national religion, which these programs do not come close to doing. He also argued that there was no basis for the assumption that teaching secular topics in a religious school would effectively link the government and religion in the minds of schoolchildren.


Stacy F. Garrett, III
Joseph Ryland Winston

Around 1 a.m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson was locking up his shop when he saw a figure with a gun approaching him. Watkinson drew his own weapon, and the two fired at each other. Watkinson was hit in the legs, and the other shooter was wounded on his left side and managed to run away. About 20 minutes later, the police found Rudolph Lee, Jr., bleeding from his left side, eight blocks away from Watkinson’s shop. The police took Lee to the same hospital Watkinson was in, and Watkinson identified Lee as his shooter. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony.

The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion in state court to compel Lee to submit to surgery to recover the bullet still lodged in his side. The court granted the motion based on testimony that the surgery would be relatively noninvasive and accomplished without use of general anesthetic. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal. Lee sued in district court on the ground that the surgery constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction. After presenting evidence that the surgery would be much more serious than the court originally thought, Lee asked for a rehearing in the state court, which was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Lee brought the case back to the district court, which ruled against the surgery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that below-the-skin surgery represented such an infringement on the expectation of privacy that it must be justified by a compelling need for the evidence that might be produced. Since the state could not demonstrate a compelling need for the bullet in order to make the case against Lee, the Court held that the intrusion on Lee’s privacy vastly outweighed any state interest. Therefore, the surgery would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred in the judgment.

In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that he did not read this decision as preventing the police from detaining a suspect whose body they believed to contain evidence that would be naturally revealed.


City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.

The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of "any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school." Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." The Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues of communication."


Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days.

No. The Court found that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive language. Chief Justice Burger distinguished between political speech which the Court previously had protected in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) and the supposed sexual content of Fraser's message at the assembly. Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech since such discourse was inconsistent with the "fundamental values of public school education."


Jane M. Gootee
Alan I. Horowitz
Miss Jane M. Gootee

Dow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site inspection of its facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it filed suit in District Court alleging that EPA conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow's "expectation of privacy" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling on the ground that Dow only expected pivacy with respect to its indoor property.

No. Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The Court maintained that the EPA's statutory jurisdiction "carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally employed or useful to execute the authority granted." Fourth Amendment protection involves the invasion of areas where intimate activities occur, whereas "the open areas of an industrial complex are more comparable to an 'open field' in which an individual may not legitimately demand privacy." The fact that EPA could take aerial photographs of the facilities from public airspace with the standard photographic equipment employed by mapmakers confirmed that the area was not subject to strict protection from observation.


Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing

Scott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board’s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful.

In August of the following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing’s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment grants citizens a substantive right to own property free from arbitrary state interference. The Court held that, even if Ewing had a property interest in his admission, the careful consideration that went into his dismissal made this interference with his property anything but arbitrary. The Court determined that Ewing’s dismissal was reasonable based on all the available evidence.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. filed a concurring opinion in which he argued that the classification of Ewing’s continued admission was not a constitutional property right deserving the protection of substantive due process, but rather a state issue requiring, at most, procedural due process protection.


After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a "hostile working environment" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.

The Court held that the language of Title VII was "not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination," finding that Congress intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment. . ." The Court noted that guidelines issued by the EEOC specified that sexual harassment leading to noneconomic injury was a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The Court recognized that plaintiffs could establish violations of the Act "by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." The Court declined to rule on the degree to which businesses could be liable for the conduct of specific employees.


J. David Niehaus
Rickie Leon Pearson
Lawrence G. Wallace

Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.

The Court found that the prosecutor's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Relying heavily on precedents set in Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) and Swain v. Alabama (1965), Justice Powell held that racial discrimination in the selection of jurors not only deprives the accused of important rights during a trial, but also is devastating to the community at large because it "undermines public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." Without identifying a "neutral" reason why the four blacks should have been excluded from the jury, the prosecutor's actions were in violation of the Constitution.