Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association

The United States Forest Service was considering building a paved roadway that would cut through the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. It was also considering timber harvesting in the area. A study commissioned by the Forest Service reported that harvesting the Chimney Rock area would irreparably damage grounds that had historically been used by Native Americans to conduct religious rituals. After the Forest Service decided to construct a road, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association took action against Secretary of Agriculture Richard Lyng.

No. In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Forest Service was free to harvest the lands. Though the government's actions would have severe adverse effects on the Indians' practice oftheir religion, those effects were only incidental and did not constitute an attempt to coerce Native Americans to act in violation of their beliefs. The Court reasoned that government could not operate "if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires," and that the First Amendment did not give any one group veto power over public programs that did not actually prohibit the free exercise of religion.


Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of the State of Oregon v. Smith

Alfred Smith and Galen Black worked at a private drug rehabilitation clinic. The clinic fired them because they used a hallucinogenic drug called peyote for religious purposes while worshipping at their Native American Church. The Oregon Employment Division denied them unemployment compensation because it deemed they were fired for work-related "misconduct." The Oregon Court of Appeals ruled that this violated their religious free exercise rights provided by the First Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.

Undecided. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for a 5-3 court. The Court instructed the Oregon Supreme Court to determine whether peyote usage for religious purposes is prohibited under Oregon law, or only by the employer. The Court required this information to consider the constitutionality of the denial of benefits.


John Coy was tried in an Iowa court for sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. When the girls were testifying against Coy, the court placed a large screen in front of him so that the girls would not have to see him. The jury proceeded to convict him. Coy argued that Iowa Code 910A, which provides for the use of a screen in child sexual abuse cases, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers face-to-face. He also claimed that the code violated his right to due process, since having a screen placed between him and the girls made him appear guilty before he was properly tried. The trial court dismissed these claims and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of a 6-2 court. The Sixth Amendment explicitly states that the accused has the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The Court maintained this "confrontation is essential to fairness." The screen clearly disrupted this confrontation in a way that could have biased the trial. While acknowledging that "face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child," the Court insisted that "by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." A trial court cannot abridge the right to confrontation using a generalized law, and in Coy's case no specific reason was given for using a screen.


John Doe, an unnamed defendant, was subpoenaed by a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas for possible fraudulent manipulation of oil cargoes and receipt of unreported income. As part of the grand jury’s investigation, Doe was directed to produce records from bank holdings in the Cayman Islands and Bermuda. Doe proceeded to disclose some records but invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination regarding any other documents.

The United States then served subpoenas on three of Doe’s foreign banks, ordering them to release Doe’s information. The banks refused to release this information without Doe’s consent. The government then sought to have the district court order Doe to sign the bank forms authorizing his banks to release the information.

The district court refused, stating that Doe had not been indicted for any crime and that forcing him to disclose this information would amount to a “fishing expedition” for incriminating evidence; precisely the kind of action that the 5th Amendment sought to prevent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered that Doe be held in contempt if he did not consent to the release of records. Doe refused and appealed. The Fifth Circuit again affirmed.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for an 8-1 majority, held that such a court order does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. First, he noted that it is undisputed that the contents of foreign bank accounts are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment only protects individuals from being incriminated by their “own compelled testimonial communications.” The foreign bank statements, and the requisite authorization document, do not fit into this definition.

The Court made further analogies to situations where a defendant may be required to give “incriminating” information without invoking the Fifth Amendment. These include: blood samples, lineups, handwriting samples, voice samples, or wearing particular clothing. Finally, the authorization in this case did not list specific information that the government needed for the case. Rather, this authorization simply gave the government the ability to search for the evidence without providing any information on any accounts, documents, banks, or other incriminating evidence.

Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, made an argument distinguishing this situation from the other situations discussed by the Court. Unlike lineups, fingerprints, or blood samples, this case forced the defendant to use his mind in assisting the government’s case. Therefore, Justice Stevens felt that this action violated the Fifth Amendment.


At the age of 15 years Thompson was tried as an adult, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Thompson certiorari.

Yes. After noting that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the execution of a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional. In noting the uniform ban among all relevant state statutes against the execution of one under the age of 16, the Court explained that such an act would violate the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." The case was reversed and remanded.


Thomas S. Martin
Alexia Morrison
Charles Fried
Michael Davidson

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and, if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of federal criminal laws.

The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the Executive Branch.


United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.

Kevin T. Baine
Marshall Beil
Alan I. Horowitz

Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. and a collection of tax-paying and tax-exempt abortion rights supporters (ARM) sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the United States Catholic Conference, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (Conferences). ARM alleged that the Conferences participated in political activities in violation of U.S. laws governing tax-exempt organizations and that this participation created an unfair advantage over other, rule-abiding tax-exempt groups and infringed upon the plaintiffs’ ability to participate in the political process as voters. After the court granted the Conferences motion to be dismissed as parties to the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ARM sought financial documents and other information from the Conferences to support their claims against the remaining defendants. When the Conferences refused to comply, the district court held them in civil contempt. On appeal, the Conferences contended that ARM lacked standing to bring its case against the government officials and, therefore, the court did not have the power to issue the contempt citation under Article III. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and held that witnesses may challenge a contempt citation only on the grounds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute.

Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority in which the Court reversed and remanded the appellate court’s ruling. The Court held that a nonparty witness may challenge the court’s jurisdiction over the underlying lawsuit in defense of a civil contempt citation. The Second Circuit’s jurisdiction standard impermissibly expanded the reach of judicial power because it permitted a court to act in issues without an actual case or controversy, as required by Article III of the Constitution. The Court also held that, because the judiciary may impose sanctions for the abuse of court processes, restricting a nonparty’s right to appeal a civil contempt citation is unnecessary.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall stated that he agreed with the Second Circuit’s concern that allowing a witness to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges while appealing a contempt citation invited collusion with defendants who, unlike witnesses, lack a right to appeal interlocutory orders prior to a final judgment in the action. allowing a witness to raise subject matter jurisdiction challenges while appealing a contempt citation invited collusion with defendants who, unlike witnesses, lack a right to appeal interlocutory orders prior to a final judgment in the case.


In 1980 Congress enacted a continuing disability review (CDR) process to ensure that the only people who were receiving disability benefits under the Social Security Disability Act (Act) were those who had medical conditions sufficient to warrant such benefits. This program led to a massive increase in the number of people who were denied continuance of their benefits. The respondents were three of those people who, in addition to pursuing remedies through the uniform appeal process, sued three high-ranking administrators of the CDR process in district court. The respondents argued that the government violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process by adopting illegal polices that led to the wrongful termination of their benefits. Despite the Act’s explicit provision of a means for remedy, the respondents sought monetary damages for their emotional distress and loss of food. The district court dismissed the case and held that the government officials were protected from paying monetary damages by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that there might be enough facts to prove a violation of due process warranting monetary damages.

No. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the respondents were not entitled to monetary damages because they were not mentioned in the extensive remedial options provided in the Social Security Disability Act (Act). The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that this case was analogous to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, a case in which the Court ruled that, when a government actor violates a citizen’s legal right, federal courts may use any available remedy to make the wronged party whole. In Bivens there were no special circumstances preventing monetary damages, and Congress provided no legal redress in the statute. In this case, the Act provides an extensive remedial program in which Congress carefully considered the possibilities for remedy and specifically left out monetary damages.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which he disagreed with the majority opinion’s decision to ignore the Solicitor General’s argument that Congress had enacted a statute expressly requiring dismissal of this complaint.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that Congressional silence on the monetary damages issue does not mean that the explicitly stated remedial process was intended to be the only source of remedy. He argued that legislators of “normal sensibilities” would have wanted some form of remedy for citizens wronged to the extent that respondents were. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


Local police suspected Billy Greenwood was dealing drugs from his residence. Because the police did not have enough evidence for a warrant to search his home, they searched the garbage bags Greenwood had left at the curb for pickup. The police uncovered evidence of drug use, which was then used to obtain a warrant to search the house. That search turned up illegal substances, and Greenwood was arrested on felony charges.

Voting 6 to 2, the Court held that garbage placed at the curbside is unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. The Court argued that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy for trash on public streets "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." The Court also noted that the police cannot be expected to ignore criminal activity that can be observed by "any member of the public."


Janet Benshoof
Michael W. McConnell
Charles Fried

The Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA") provided federal funding for organizational services and research in the area of premarital teenage sexuality. Among other requirements, AFLA beneficiaries had to involve religious and governmental agencies in dealing with the problems they faced. Over time, AFLA benefited several organizations with institutional ties to religious denominations. Chan Kendrick, on behalf of several federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish Congress, challenged AFLA's constitutionality. On appeal from a ruling favoring Kendrick, the Supreme Court granted Bowen certiorari.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "advancement of religion" was not AFLA's primary effect. Although it funded religious and other institutions without expressly prohibiting the use of such funds for religious purposes, AFLA required potential recipients to reveal what services they intended to provide and how they would provide them. Thus, the government could protect against the misuse of its funds. At the same time, however, such oversight did not create an "excessive entanglement" between church and state because AFLA merely authorized funding of religiously affiliated, rather than pervasively sectarian, organizations. Finally, the Court remanded the matter to the district court for further determination of whether AFLA violated the establishment clause "as applied."


New York State Club Association Inc. v. City of New York

The City of New York amended its Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in public places to include certain social clubs that were not "distinctly private." Particularly, the amendment applied anti-discrimination laws to social clubs and institutions that hosted dining regularly, retained more than four hundred members, and received funding from non-members in order to promote business interests. The amendment did not apply to religious, charitable, and education organizations because the city deemed that they were not centers of business activity. The New York State Club Association, a group of 125 clubs, contended in a state trial court that the new law violated its associational rights provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court ruled in favor of the city. A state appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed, finding that the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination justified the restrictions on associational rights.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court examined the clubs subjected to anti-discrimination laws closely and found "no evidence of any club, let alone a substantial number of clubs, for whom the Law impairs the ability to associate or to advocate public or private viewpoints." In addition, many of the clubs showed characteristics of a public nature. Often strangers attended club functions, partook in meals, and made financial contributions. So long as the clubs were sufficiently open to this type of exposure to outsiders, the clubs could not be closed to certain types of people on account of their race, sex, or religion. Prohibiting this type of discrimination did not impair a club's ability to advance a viewpoint because clubs could still select people for membership based on whether they shared similar beliefs.


Roger J. George, Jr.
Harriet D. Burke
Roger James George, Jr.

The state of Texas offered a tax exemption to religious publications during a 3-year period. Texas Monthly, Inc, a nonreligious publisher, claimed that this promoted religion in violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Texas Monthly filed suit in a state court seeking to recover the taxes it had paid in 1985. The court ruled that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause by advancing religion and the Free Press Clause by discriminating based on the content of publications. Since the court did not have the authority to rewrite tax statutes, it instead invalidated taxes levied on nonreligious publications and ordered the state to refund Texas Monthly's tax payments. A state appeals court reversed the decision.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the judgment for 6-3 court a wrote a plurality opinion joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Thurgood Marshall. In the Brennan's view, the Texas government "directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations" by providing the exemption. The Court referred to its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which required legislation affecting religion to have a secular purpose. In this case, the exemption did not have a secular purpose since it could not "reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion." Since taxing religious publications did not inhibit the exercise of religion, a state could not singularly remove taxes for religious publications while still taxing nonreligious publications. This would use state mechanisms to give religious publishers an advantage over nonreligious publishers in violation of the Establishment Clause.


Major Gerald E. Mansell and Gaye M. Mansell were married for 23 years until their marriage ended in 1979. Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay and, pursuant to a portion of that pay, disability benefits. Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, military retirement payments were considered community property that were to be divided evenly between the spouses based on the extent of military service performed during the marriage. Major Mansell asked the California Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision asking him to share his retirement pay. That court denied the request without opinion. Major Mansell appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and Major Mansell appealed.

No. The Court reversed the judgement and held that the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act exempted that portion of the retirement pay that a service member waived in order to receive disability benefits from the amount divisible upon divorce. While recognizing potential inequities to former spouses, the Court reasoned that the clear language of the statute could not be ignored.


Penry, a man with the mental age of barely seven years, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During the trial's proceedings, the jury was not instructed that it could consider the mitigating circumstances of Penry's intellectual disability in imposing its sentence.

The Court partially affirmed and partially reversed the lower court's decision. Justice O'Connor argued that the jury was improperly instructed and should have been told that it could have considered Penry's mental deficiencies when imposing its sentence. However, she rejected Penry's blanket claim that generally the Eighth Amendment does not allow death sentences for defendants who are intellectually disabled ("retarded" in the Court's words).


National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab

In 1986, the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program for certain employees who either carry firearms, are involved in intercepting drugs as they enter the country, or are in high level positions involving classified information.

No. The Court held that the "substantial interests" of the government in stifling the drug trade justified "departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements" associated with searches. The fact that customs personnel are the country's "first line of defense" against drug smugglers and they are exposed to a sometimes aggressive criminal element, places them in a unique and important position in which they have a "diminished expectation of privacy."


Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.

In 1976, Bonito Boats, Inc. (Bonito), a Florida corporation, developed a design for a fiberglass recreational boat and made a model to produce the finished fiberglass boats for sale. No patent application was ever filed for protection. In 1983, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute making it unlawful to use a direct modeling process to duplicate and sell a vessel or part of a vessel. In 1984, Bonito sued Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. (Thunder Craft), a Tennessee corporation, in the Florida district court for violating the statute. Thunder Craft successfully argued that the Florida statute conflicted with federal patent laws and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment. The Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the Florida law interfered with federal patent laws.

Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that, under the Federal Constitution’s Supremacy Clause of the Eleventh Amendment, the federal patent system prevents the Florida statute. The Florida statute offered patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the federal patent system. This protection restricted the public’s ability to use unpatented designs, which conflicted with the free competition in ideas without patent protection that the federal patent system supported. Therefore, this Florida statute entered into a field of regulation that the patent laws have reserved for Congress, and Congress had declined to exercise.


Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press

CBS requested the criminal identification records of Charles Medico from the FBI. When the FBI refused the request, a CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) challenged the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). RCFP claimed that since Medico was an identified organized crime figure with corrupt ties to a United States Congressman, Medico's criminal record was a matter of "public record" and "interest." On appeal from an unfavorable appellate decision, the Supreme Court granted the U.S. Department of Justice certiorari.

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that an individual's interest in nondisclosure of any criminal records that the FBI might have on him or her is precisely the sort of "personal privacy" that Congress intended to protect when it enacted FOIA exemptions. Balancing public knowledge interests against privacy considerations, the Court explained that RCFP's request was overly broad. The request sought access to all FBI records on Medico, rather than specific information concerning his file. Moreover, the Court stated that public interest in criminal record information is not increased simply because the requesting party is a news agency.


On October 23, 1984, William James Caldwell died when the stolen car he was driving crashed into a police roadblock. He had been driving at high speeds in an effort to elude the police. The police placed an 18-wheel truck across both lanes of a highway and behind a blind curve so that Caldwell could not see it as he approached.

After Caldwell’s death, his heirs—including Georgia Brower, the administrator of his estate—sued the police in district court and alleged that such a roadblock constituted excessive force and violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the police intentionally acquire physical control of a person or possessions. In this case, the violation occurred because Caldwell clearly intended to continue driving, and the police actions intended to forcibly stop his car.

Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in judgment. He argued that the majority’s opinion established a test for Fourth Amendment violations based on police intent. However, since not every Fourth Amendment violation is intentional, this test could not be used to decide all Fourth Amendment cases. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.


Frank Susman
Charles Fried
William L. Webster

In 1986, the state of Missouri enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortions. The statute's preamble indicated that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception," and the law codified the following restrictions: public employees and public facilities were not to be used in performing or assisting abortions unnecessary to save the mother's life; encouragement and counseling to have abortions was prohibited; and physicians were to perform viability tests upon women in their twentieth (or more) week of pregnancy. Lower courts struck down the restrictions.

In a controversial and highly fractured decision, the Court held that none of the challenged provisions of the Missouri legislation were unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the preamble had not been applied in any concrete manner for the purposes of restricting abortions, and thus did not present a constitutional question. Second, the Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require states to enter into the business of abortion, and did not create an affirmative right to governmental aid in the pursuit of constitutional rights. Third, the Court found that no case or controversy existed in relation to the counseling provisions of the law. Finally, the Court upheld the viability testing requirements, arguing that the State's interest in protecting potential life could come into existence before the point of viability. The Court emphasized that it was not revisiting the essential portions of the holding in Roe v. Wade.


Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association

Recognizing the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse by railroad employees, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) implemented regulations requiring mandatory blood and urine tests of employees involved in certain train accidents. Other FRA rules allowed railroads to administer breath and urine tests to employees who violate certain safety rules.

No. The Court held that the government's interest in assuring safety on the nation's railroads constituted a "special need" which justified a departure from standard warrant and probable-cause requirements in searches. Preventing accidents, the goal of most railroad regulations including the one in this case, argued Justice Kennedy, was such a significant concern that it warranted reduced "expectations of privacy" for railroad employees.


Howard B. Eisenberg
Michael R. Lazerwitz
David Michael Wallman

When first questioned by police about the stabbing of a woman, suspect Gary Eagan did not make incriminating statements after signing a waiver and being told he would be provided a lawyer "if and when you go to court." The following day, after Eagan was questioned again and signed a different waiver, he confessed to the stabbing and revealed physical evidence of the crime. Eagan later claimed that the language of the first waiver made his confession inadmissible.

In a closely divided decision, the Court held that informing Eagan that an attorney would be appointed for him "if and when you go to court" did not render the Miranda warnings inadequate. The Court reasoned that officers did not have to use the specific language of the Miranda decision so long as they reasonably conveyed to suspects their constitutional rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the instructions given to Eagan accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in Indiana.


Sable Communications of California v. Federal Communications Commission

In 1988, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones.

The Court upheld the District Court's ruling. Since the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected. Thus, banning adult access to indecent messages "far exceeds that which is necessary" to shield minors from dial-a-porn services.


Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid

Joshua Kaufman
Lawrence S. Robbins
Robert Alan Garrett

The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) made an oral agreement with James Reid, a sculptor, to produce a statue depicting the plight of the homeless for display at a 1985 Washington D.C. Christmas pageant. Upon completion, delivery, and joining of the work to a base that it prepared separately, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the agreed-upon price. Shortly thereafter, the parties filed competing copyright claims over the sculpture. Holding, in accordance with the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"), that the statue was a "work made for hire," a district court ruled in favor of CCNV. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted CCNV certiorari.

No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the statue's preparation was not a "work for hire" as defined by the Act because Reid was not a CCNV employee. Instead, CCNV hired Reid as an independent contractor. Reid's independent status was evident because he supplied his own tools, worked in his own studio in another city, was retained for less than two months, decided his own work schedule, received salary that was contingent on the sculpture's completion, and had sole discretion over hiring and paying assistants. Moreover, CCNV did not pay social security taxes for Reid nor did it provide him any employee benefits.


Thomas W. Merrill
Robert D. Joffe
Raymond P. Fitzpatrick, Jr.
James P. Alexander

As a result of a lawsuit in 1974, the Jefferson County Personnel Board in Birmingham, Alabama, entered into consent decrees that included hiring blacks as firefighters and for promoting them. The decrees were approved by a federal district court. Years later, Robert K. Wilks, a white firefighter, challenged the decrees and alleged that whites were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks. Wilks argued that such practices violated Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The personnel board agreed that it was making race-conscious decisions but argued it was doing so pursuant to the original decrees. The Court combined arguments in two companion cases: Personnel Board v. Wilks and Arrington v. Wilks.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because "a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party," the white firefighters were not precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant to the consent decrees. The Court argued that "[t]he parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action" and that they were better suited to intervene when their rights were immediately threatened. Conversely, the Court noted that "[n]o one can seriously contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier suit."


American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith

A. Raymond Randolph Jr.
Mr. Andrew L. Frey

In 1983, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) challenged the flat tax portion of Arkansas' Highway Use Equalization (HUE) tax, alleging that it violated the Commerce Clause. The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim. Subsequently, on June 23, 1987, the Supreme Court decided American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987), which held that state application of flat highway use taxes was unconstitutional. Pending re-hearing in the Arkansas Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun ordered, in August 1987, that all new taxes collected be kept in escrow. Subsequently, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that HUE was unconstitutional, but that Scheiner did not apply retroactively. The court went on to decide that taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, could remain in the state treasury, but that those funds placed in the escrow account ordered by Justice Blackmun should be refunded, as they had not been spent or budgeted for future spending.

No and no. A plurality of the Court held that Scheiner did not apply retroactively, and that state collection of taxes for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, before the establishment of the escrow account, was unconstitutional. Applying the test of non-retroactivity articulated in Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court found that Scheiner clearly established a new principle of law; that the purpose of the Commerce Clause did not support retroactive application; and that equitable considerations weighed heavily against retroactivity. The Court went on to reverse the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision not to refund taxes already collected for the tax year beginning July 1, 1987, reasoning that the conduct to which Scheiner applied prospectively was the use of the highway, not the payment of money therefor. Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but disagreed with the plurality's retroactivity analysis. He found that the only reason to follow Scheiner, which he believed to be wrongly decided, was the doctrine of stare decisis, which only applies prospectively.


Tom Okure was arrested for disorderly conduct, and while under arrest, was beaten by the police officers Javan Owens and Daniel Lessard. He sustained multiple injuries, including broken teeth and a sprained finger, and claimed to have suffered great mental anguish and distress as a result of the arrest and actions of the police. Twenty-two months after the incident occurred, Okure sued the two State University of New York (SUNY) police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution is one year under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The trial court denied the motion by stating that New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.

Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion for unanimous majority. The Court held that, when states have multiple statutes of limitations for intentional torts, the courts should use the state’s general statute of limitations for claims of liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983 instead of the statute of limitations for individual civil actions.


Irwin Halper, the manager of a company that provided medical services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits, was charged and convicted in criminal court of submitting 65 separate false Medicare claims. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000.

The United States then brought additional civil charges under the False Claims Act, which authorized it to collect $2000 for each offense in addition to attorney's fees and twice the damages sustained. In this case the actual damages were just $585, but because of the number of offenses the total penalty was more than $130,000. The District Court, however, ruled that the penalty was "entirely unrelated" to the government's actual damages and would therefore be a second punishment for the same offense, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The penalty was therefore limited to double the amount of actual damages and attorney's fees. The government appealed the decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice Harry Blackmun, on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court, wrote that while previous cases had held penalties under the Act to be civil in nature, that did not foreclose the possibility of the penalty being so extreme and so unrelated to the actual damages as to constitute "punishment." Because Halper had already been jailed and fined, additional punishment in a separate proceeding would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court remanded the case to the District Court so that the government could challenge the original assessment of its attorney's fees.


Officers of the Canton Police Department arrested Geraldine Harris on April 26, 1978 and brought her to the police station. Upon arrival, the officers found Harris sitting on the floor of the patrol wagon. They asked if she needed medical attention, and she responded incoherently. Inside the station, Harris twice slumped to the floor, and the officers eventually left her lying on the floor. She received no medical care. An hour later, Harris was released and taken to a nearby hospital in an ambulance her family provided. Harris was diagnosed with various emotional conditions and hospitalized.

Harris sued the city of Canton for violating her Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process by denying her medical attention when she was in police custody. At the jury trial in federal district court, evidence indicated that the decision to provide medical attention is left to the discretion of shift managers who had not received adequate training on this subject. The jury found in favor of Harris. The city appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case because of unclear jury instructions.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that municipalities may be liable for inadequate training of employees, but only when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of the people with whom the employees will interact. A municipality is then only liable when the failure to train is a deliberate choice on the part of the city.

In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. makes clear that the Court of Appeals may remand the case for a new trial.

In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with the majority’s holding regarding the municipality’s liability for a conscious failure to train. However, she argued that it was unnecessary to remand the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court should simply apply the “deliberate indifference” standard to the facts of the case. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in Justice O’Connor’s opinion.


On November 12, 1984, Dethorne Graham, a diabetic, had an insulin reaction while doing auto work at his home. He asked a friend, William Berry, to drive him to a convenience store in order to purchase some orange juice to counter his reaction. When they arrived at the store, Graham rapidly left the car. He entered the store and saw a line of four or five persons at the counter; not wanting to wait in line, he quickly left the store and returned to Berry’s car. Officer M.S. Connor, a Charlotte police officer, observed Graham entering and exiting the store unusually quickly. He followed the car and pulled it over about a half mile away.

Graham, still suffering from an insulin reaction, exited the car and ran around it twice. Berry and Officer Connor stopped Graham, and he sat down on the curb. He soon passed out; when he revived he was handcuffed and lying face down on the sidewalk. Several more police officers were present by this time. The officers picked up Graham, still handcuffed, and placed him over the hood of Berry’s car. Graham attempted to reach for his wallet to show his diabetic identification, and an officer shoved his head down into the hood and told him to shut up. The police then struggled to place Graham in the squad car over Graham’s vigorous resistance. Officer Connor soon determined, however, that Graham had not committed a crime at the convenience store, and returned him to his home. Graham sustained multiple injuries, including a broken foot, as a result of the incident.

Graham filed § 1983 charges against Connor, other officers, and the City of Charlotte, alleging a violation of his rights by the excessive use of force by the police officers, unlawful assault, unlawful restraint constituting false imprisonment, and that the City of Charlotte improperly trained its officers in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The City of Charlotte filed for a directed verdict, which the district court granted. Graham appealed the ruling on the use of excessive force, contending that the district court incorrectly applied a four-part substantive due process test from Johnson v. Glick that takes into account officers’ “good faith” efforts and whether they acted “maliciously or sadistically”. He instead argued for a standard of “objective reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, rejected this argument, reasoning that concepts such as "good faith" are relevant to determining the degree of force used. It affirmed the directed verdict, holding that a reasonable jury could not have found in Graham’s favor.

No and yes. In a unanimous ruling written by Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that claims of excessive force used by government officials are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. The Court vacated the directed verdict and remanded the case to the district court to be decided by that standard.

Rehnquist noted that § 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a means for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Rather, the Fourth Amendment stands as one of the two primary sources of protection against physically abusive government conduct, along with the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, the validity of Graham’s claim must be judged by reference to the specific rights conferred by the Fourth Amendment, not by a generalized “excessive force” standard.

Justice Rehnquist rejected Connor’s argument that “malicious and sadistic” is merely another way of describing conduct that is objectively unreasonable, noting that the subjective motivations of the officers are relevant under the Eighth Amendment, not the Fourth. Rather, he explained that the “objective reasonableness” of a use of force should be judged by the perspective of an officer on the scene, and should take into account factors such as the severity of the crime, the threat posed by the suspect, and any attempts by the suspect to resist or evade arrest.

Justices Harry Blackmun, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall concurred, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun argued that there was not sufficient precedent to hold that claims of use of excessive force will never be subject to Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process review.


Laurence H. Tribe
Adam Lawrence
Laurence Tribe

In 1983, the Chase & Sanborn Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida made Paul Nordberg the trustee in bankruptcy. In 1985, Nordberg sued Granfinanciera, S.A. and Medex, Ltda. in district court. Nordberg alleged that they received $1.7 million in fraudulent transfers from Chase & Sanborn’s corporate predecessor a year before the bankruptcy filing. The district court referred the proceedings to bankruptcy court. Five months later, after the Colombian government nationalized Granfinanciera, Granfinanciera and Medex requested a jury trial. The bankruptcy court denied the request because fraudulent transfers were a non-jury issue under English common law. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court dismissed the actual fraud claim but found in favor of Nordberg on the constructive fraud claim in the amount of $1,500,000 against Granfinanciera and $180,000 against Medex. The district court affirmed the decision.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that Granfinanciera and Medex did not have a statutory right to a jury trial, nor did they have a right under the Seventh Amendment.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment protected the right to a trial by jury in all cases in which a legal right, as opposed to an equitable right, was at issue. Since this case deals with the recovery of money, it is purely a legal issue. Under English common law, such a case would have received a jury trial as well. The Court also held that Congress may only legislate away the right to a trial by jury in cases where “public rights” are litigated. The Court declined to address Nordberg’s argument that Granfinanciera was barred from a jury trial because it was an agent of the Colombian government since the issue was not addressed in the lower courts, and this was not an exceptional case where the Court could overlook the lack of lower court discussion.

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He argued that “public rights” can only refer to situations where the government is involved. Because previous Supreme Court decisions had linked the idea of public rights with a waiver of sovereign immunity, which is only available to the government, public rights can only be at issue when the government is involved.

In his dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that the majority’s opinion inappropriately overrules a previous decision that Congress can establish an alternative adjudication to a jury trial in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Seventh Amendment does not apply to all federal proceedings, specifically bankruptcy, which Congress has assigned to specialized courts. He also argued that there was no evidence to suggest such a case would have received a jury trial rather than a chancery trial according to English common law.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun dissented and argued that Congress has the right to establish alternative adjudication procedures in certain cases. Since a bankruptcy trial often requires expert knowledge, a jury might be detrimental to the proceedings, and therefore Congress had every right to fashion a modern bankruptcy system. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years before being proposed for partnership.  Although Hopkins secured a $25 million government contract that year, the board decided to put her proposal on hold for the following year.  The next year, when Price Waterhouse refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued under Title VII for sex discrimination.  Of 622 partners at Price Waterhouse, 7 were women.  The partnership selection process relied on recommendations by other partners, some of whom openly opposed women in advanced positions, but Hopkins also had problems with being overly aggressive and not getting along with office staff.

The district court held that Price Waterhouse had discriminated, but Hopkins was not entitled to full damages because her poor interpersonal skills also contributed to the board’s decision.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but held that the employer is not liable if it can show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination.

Yes in part.  In a 6-3 decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the plurality opinion reversing the lower court and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals applied the right test, but should have placed the burden at “preponderance of the evidence” not “clear and convincing evidence”.  On remand, Price Waterhouse would escape liability if it shows it would have denied Hopkins partnership even if she were not a woman.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that there was no requirement for the employer to submit objective evidence.  The employer’s credible testimony alone was enough.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurrence, expressing that the Court’s opinion was only a supplement to McDonnell Douglas.

Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissent, stating that he would stick with the evidentiary standards from McDonnell Douglas.  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia joined in the dissent.


The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) sued Richard N. Morash, the president of the Yankee Bank for Finance and Savings (Bank). Massachusetts alleged that, by failing to compensate two terminated employees for vacation time they accrued but did not use, Morash violated the Massachusetts Payment of Wages Statute (Statute). Massachusetts alleged the statute was pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA requires an employer to pay a discharged employee his full wages, including holiday or vacation payments, on date of discharge. The trial judge certified the preemption question to the Massachusetts Appeals Court. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case to its docket on its own initiative and held that the policy constituted an employee welfare benefit plan and that the statute was pre-empted by ERISA.

No, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court which held that a policy of paying discharged employees for their unused vacation time does not constitute an employee welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, and that ERISA’s provisions do not foreclose a criminal action to enforce that policy. The employment welfare benefit plan is not meant to relate to ordinary vacation pay, but rather to include vacation benefit funds that accumulate over a period of time. The bank payment is not an employee welfare benefit plan just because the employees did not use their vacation days prior to their termination.


In 1984, in front of the Dallas City Hall, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag as a means of protest against Reagan administration policies. Johnson was tried and convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the case went to the Supreme Court.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."


DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services

Donald J. Sullivan
Mark J. Mingo
Donald B. Ayer
Donald James Sullivan

In 1984, four-year-old Joshua DeShaney became comatose and then profoundly retarded due to traumatic head injuries inflicted by his father who physically beat him over a long period of time. The Winnebago County Department of Social Services took various steps to protect the child after receiving numerous complaints of the abuse; however, the Department did not act to remove Joshua from his father's custody. Joshua DeShaney's mother subsequently sued the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, alleging that the Department had deprived the child of his "liberty interest in bodily integrity, in violation of his rights under the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene to protect him against his father's violence."

No. The Due Process Clause does not impose a special duty on the State to provide services to the public for protection against private actors if the State did not create those harms. "The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; while it forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means."


Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives' Association

John B. O'Clarke, Jr.
Dennis J. Morikawa

On February 20, 1987, Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") announced its decision to include drug screening in all periodic and return-to-duty examinations. Conrail had always enforced Rule G of its agreement with its unionized employees, which forbids the use or possession of "intoxicants, narcotics, amphetamines or hallucinogens" by its employees. Previously, it routinely used drug screening urinalysis as part of return-to-duty medical examinations of employees with drug-related problems and in other examinations where the examining physician suspected drug use.

The Railway Labor Executives' Association ("RLEA")-- comprised of individuals in leadership positions at more than eighteen craft unions-- filed suit against Conrail, alleging that Conrail violated Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). The RLA, passed in 1926 and amended in 1934, created the National Railroad Adjustment Board, an arbitration board designed to settle minor disputes between railroad companies and labor organizations. Under Sections 5 and 6 of the RLA, major disputes require an extensive mediation and conciliation process.

District court Judge Anthony J. Scirica found that the dispute was "minor" under the Railway Labor Act because Conrail's decision was arguably justified by the terms of its agreement with the unions, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the dispute. Judge Dolores Sloviter of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit reversed. Judge Sloviter rejected the district court's conclusion that Conrail's prior use of medical examinations arguably justified unilaterally changing its drug testing policy. The appeals court held that the dispute was "major" because it changed the terms and conditions governing employment relationships.

No. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun held that if Conrail asserts that its agreement with the unions gives Conrail the discretion to change their drug testing policy –assuming that claim is arguably justified by the terms of the agreement-- Conrail may make that change and the courts must defer to the decision of the RLA's arbitration board. Conrail's claim of a right to unilaterally change its drug policy –although based on implied terms of its contract with the RLEA—was not "frivolous or obviously insubstantial." Conrail does not have to wait until the arbitration board makes a decision to change its drug testing policy. The court believed this decision would diminish the risk of interruptions to commerce caused by labor disputes.


Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security

William A. Frazee was laid off from his job with the state of Illinois.  Kelly Services, a temp agency, offered him a job at a department store working Wednesday through Sunday.  Frazee “as a Christian” refused to work Sundays.  The store did not give Frazee the job.  Frazee did not claim that he was part of a particular religious sect or church or that working on Sundays violated a tenant of an established religious body.   When Frazee applied for unemployment benefits, the Illinois Department of Employment Security denied his claim because he turned down a job offer.  The Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit of Illinois affirmed.  The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the free exercise clause does not require accommodations for “personal professed religious belief[s]”.

No.  Justice Byron R. White, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the lower court and remanded.  The Supreme Court held that denying Frazee unemployment benefits violated the free exercise clause.  The state had no interest compelling enough to override an individual's exercise of sincerely-held religious beliefs, even though they were not part of an established religious sect.


Michael Riley lived in a mobile home situated on five acres of rural land in Florida. Riley owned a greenhouse that was located behind his home; from the ground, the contents of Riley’s greenhouse were shielded from view by its walls and the trees on his property. In 1984, the Pasco County Sheriff’s office received a tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property. The investigating officer tried to see into the greenhouse from the ground but could not, so he circled in a helicopter at 400 feet and saw what he believed to be marijuana growing inside. Acting on this information, the investigating officer obtained a search warrant, searched the greenhouse, and found the marijuana. Riley was charged with possession of marijuana.

Riley filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search. The trial court granted his motion and held that viewing his property from the air violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, reversed the trial court’s decision and denied Riley’s motion to dismiss the evidence. The appellate court also certified the case to the Supreme Court of Florida, which reinstated the trial court’s order to suppress the evidence.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Riley had no reasonable expectation of privacy in this case because anyone could view Riley’s property from a helicopter flying in navigable airspace and figure out what was inside. The police officer did not enter Riley’s land or interfere with it in any way. Furthermore, the manner in which he was flying the helicopter was well within the law; therefore, the police officer was within his rights to view Riley’s property from the air. The Court determined that the police action in this case did not violate Riley’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which she cautioned the majority against relying on the fact that the helicopter was flying within Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. She argued that the FAA regulations were meant to promote air safety and did not protect citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, like the police activities in Katz v. United States, the officer’s actions in this case violated Riley’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that the burden of proving that a defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy should rest with the state.


Paul M. Bator
Alan B. Morrison
Charles Fried

Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. This Commission was to attack the wide discrepancies in sentencing by federal court judges by creating sentencing guidelines for all federal offenses. It was to be part of the judicial branch, with members appointed by the President and approved by the Senate. John Mistretta (convicted of three counts of selling cocaine) claimed that the Act violated the delegation-of-powers principle by giving the Commission "excessive legislative powers." This case was decided together with United States v. Mistretta.

The Court found the Act to be valid because although Congress cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. The test of validity is that an "intelligible principle" must be established by the legislature where the agency of the delegated authority must adhere to specific directives that govern its authority. The delegation to the Commission was sufficiently detailed and specific to meet these requirements. The Commission was given substantial authority and discretion in setting the guidelines; however, Congress established a classification hierarchy for federal crimes that the Commission was to use as an outline for its work.


Gerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D. since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole had an adulterous partner, Michael H., who obtained blood tests indicating that he was likely the biological father. When Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court, Gerald argued that Michael had no ground under California law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two years had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal. Evid. Code 621, the child is "presumed to be a child of the marriage" and another man can only challenge this presumption within two years of birth. The court ruled in favor of Gerald and canceled Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by denying him an opportunity to establish his paternity. A California Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Code 621.

No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment for a 5-4 court. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition, the plurality opinion found that a possible biological father does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights after the presumptive father has exercised significant responsibility over the child. Therefore due process protection does not apply. Code 621 was based on common-law precedent which showed "an aversion to declaring children illegitimate" and supported "the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquility of States and families.'" Restricting Michael's parental rights achieved this by granting Gerald the sole responsibility to play the role of Victoria's father.


Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton

Daniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.

Connaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Daniel Connaughton ran against the incumbent for the office of Municipal Judge of Hamilton, Ohio, in an election set for November 8, 1983. About a month before the election, the incumbent’s Director of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery charges. On November 1, 1983, the Journal News, a local newspaper owned by Harte-Hanks Communications, published a front-page story about the grand jury investigation. The story quoted a grand jury witness who accused Connaughton of using “dirty tricks” and offering her bribes in exchange for her assistance with the investigation. The Journal News also endorsed the incumbent Municipal Judge.

Connaughton sued Harte-Hanks Communications and alleged that the article was false, that it damaged his professional reputation, and that it was published maliciously. The district court ruled in favor of Connaughton, and that United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that a public figure plaintiff in a libel case must prove that the libelous statement was false or made without any regard for its truth. The fact that the newspaper failed to interview one of the main witnesses to the supposed bribery strongly indicated a disregard for the truth of the story. Although there were many reasons to doubt the truth of the accusations against Connaughton, the newspaper failed to properly investigate, so the act of publishing the story constituted actual malice.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court did not overstep its bounds by looking at the facts of the case in order to determine whether or not the newspaper exhibited actual malice.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the Court might have looked at the facts of the case differently if the petitioner had not abandoned the defense that Harte-Hanks believed the report to be true. He also wrote that the failure of the majority opinion to mention the actual content of the article in question does not mean that the Court did not consider it relevant.

Justice Anthony M. Kennedy concurred with the majority’s decision because he did not feel it inconsistent with the analysis Justice Antonin Scalia provided in his concurrence.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that the majority’s opinion unnecessarily focuses its analysis on what the trial court jury found in favor of the plaintiff, rather than exercising its own independent judgment.


City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Company

In 1983, the City Council of Richmond, Virginia adopted regulations that required companies awarded city construction contracts to subcontract 30 percent of their business to minority business enterprises. The J.A. Croson Company, which lost its contract because of the 30 percent set-aside, brought suit against the city.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that "generalized assertions" of past racial discrimination could not justify "rigid" racial quotas for the awarding of public contracts. Justice O'Connor's opinion noted that the 30 percent quota could not be tied to "any injury suffered by anyone," and was an impermissible employment of a suspect classification. O'Connor further held that allowing claims of past discrimination to serve as the basis for racial quotas would actually subvert constitutional values: "The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."


On October 29, 1983, 10-year-old David was abducted from a church carnival. The abductor molested and sodomized the boy, then returned him to the carnival an hour and a half later. David’s mother took him to the Kino Hospital, where a doctor examined him and used a sexual assault kit to collect evidence. The police collected the kit and the boy’s clothes. The evidence from the kit was refrigerated, but the clothing was not. Nine days after the attack, David positively identified Larry Youngblood as the abductor from a photo lineup. The next day, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and determined that sexual contact had occurred, but he did not test the clothing at that time. Youngblood was indicted on charges of sexual assault, kidnapping, and child molestation. The state moved to compel him to provide samples to compare with those from the sexual assault kit, but the trial court denied the motion because there was not enough sample material in the kit to make a valid comparison. In January 1985, the police criminologist tested the boy’s clothing for the first time and received inconclusive data.

At trial, police witnesses testified as to what the tests might have shown had they been conducted closer to the time the evidence was gathered. The court instructed the jury to consider the facts “against the state’s interests” if they found the state had lost or destroyed evidence by conducting the tests later. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that, when identity is an issue at trial, the loss or destruction of evidence that could remove the defendant from suspicion is a denial of due process. The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the petition for review.

No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police to prove that the loss or destruction of evidence was a denial of due process. Requiring the police to retain every potentially useful piece of evidence places an undue burden on the police, while the bad faith restriction limits the police’s duty to what serves the interests of justice. The Court also held that, in this case, the police’s failure to refrigerate the clothing could at worst be negligent, but not in bad faith.

In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, even without the Court’s ruling, the state has a strong interest in properly preserving as much evidence as possible. He also argued that there was no way to definitively say what the evidence might have shown and the jury still ruled in favor of the prosecution, which suggests that the evidence would not have been sufficient to exonerate Youngblood. Justice Stevens also argued that, while he concurred in the judgment, he found the majority’s opinion much broader than necessary to decide this case.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that, regardless of the state’s intent, police action that results in the defendant’s failure to receive a fair trial represents a denial of due process. He also argued that there is no bright-line distinction between good faith and bad faith police action, and therefore that guideline does not adequately protect the rights of criminal defendants. Without any way to know what the evidence would have shown, there is no proof that it would not have been enough to exonerate Youngblood, so the police’s failure to preserve the evidence effectively deprived Youngblood of his rights to due process. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.

"


The Kansas City Missouri School District hired lawyers to argue a major desegregation case against the state of Missouri in federal district court. When the lawyers won the case after years of litigation, they sought compensation from Missouri under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The district court calculated the amount owed using current market rates for attorney's fees. Missouri objected to paying the lawyers at current rates for work they performed in the past when rates were lower. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled against Missouri. Missouri alleged that the federal courts violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity privileges by forcing it to pay higher rates.

No and Yes. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the opinion for a 7-1 court. The Court referred to its decision in Hutto v. Finney to establish that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply "to an award of attorney's fees against a State." Therefore "it follows that the same is true for the calculation of the amount of the fee." Charging current rates for lawyers compensated for the delay in payment to them. Further, charging current rates for legal assistants rather than their cost to attorneys during litigation took account of the entire service the lawyers provided. This constituted "a reasonable attorney's fee" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.


Drug Enforcement Administration agents stopped Sokolow in Honolulu International Airport after his behavior indicated he may be a drug trafficker: he paid $2,100 in cash for airline tickets, he was not traveling under his own name, his original destination was Miami, he appeared nervous during the trip, and he checked none of his luggage. Agents arrested Sokolow and searched his luggage without a warrant. Later, at the DEA office, agents obtained warrants allowing more extensive searches and they discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine.

The Court upheld the search and reasoned that the agents had a "reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged in wrongdoing." Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the validity of such a stop should be based on the "totality of the circumstances," (United States v. Cortez, 1981), which, in this case, gave agents a clear reason to suspect Sokolow of drug trafficking.


A reporter for the Florida Star wrote and printed an article about Betty Jean Freedman’s rape, including her full name.  The reporter obtained all of his information, including the victim’s name, from the police report.  The police department did not restrict access to the pressroom or police reports, but there were several signs in the area instructing not to print victim’s names.  The newspaper also had a policy of not printing the full names of victims.  After the article ran,  Freedman and her family received several threatening phone calls, and Freedman sought mental counseling and police protection.  Freedman sued, claiming emotional distress.  The district court found Florida Star guilty of negligence under a Florida law that prohibits publishing the name of a victim of a sexual offense in any instrument of mass communication. The court awarded Freedman compensatory and punitive damages.  The district court of appeal affirmed and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review.

No.  In a 6-3 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that the civil damages imposed on Florida Star violated the First Amendment because the information was lawfully-obtained and truthful.  The Court hinted that there may be a situation where a victim’s privacy interest outweighed a newspaper’s First Amendment rights.  The Court also held that the Florida law prohibiting the printing of a victim’s name was under-inclusive because it did not limit the spread of a victim’s name through other means.  Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence, stating that the Florida statute was invalid because it did not protect a state interest of the highest order.

Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the majority’s decision departs from past precedent.  Justice White also rejected the majority’s assertion that the Florida law was under-inclusive.  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


Frederic J. Cowan
Nancy A. McKerrow
John M. Morris, III
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Nancy A Mckerrow

At 17 years old, Kevin Stanford was convicted by a Kentucky jury of murder, sodomy, robbery, and the receipt of stolen property. Stanford was sentenced to death under a state statute which permitted juvenile offenders to receive the death penalty for Class A felonies or capital crimes. Stanford appealed his sentence and his case was consolidated with that of Wilkins v. Missouri, involving a 16 year old's appeal of his death sentence following a conviction for murder in Missouri. Both Stanford and Wilkins alleged that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders as young as themselves violated their constitutional rights.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision the Court held that in weighing whether the imposition of capital punishments on offenders below the age of eighteen is cruel and unusual, it is necessary to look at the given society's evolving decency standards. With respect to American society, there is no national consensus regarding the imposition of capital punishments on 17- or 16-year-old individuals. Of the 37 states which permit capital punishment, 12 prohibit the death penalty for offenders below the age of 17 while 15 states prohibit capital punishment for 16 year olds. Moreover, discrepancies in national opinion polls, interest group views, and professional association studies, all indicate a lack of unanimity concerning the acceptability of death sentences for such relatively young offenders. Thus, the decision whether to subject 17 or 16 year olds to capital punishment must be made locally by the states and cannot be categorically pronounced as cruel and unusual punishment at this time.


County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter

Peter Buscemi
Roslyn M. Litman
Nathan Lewin

Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization, outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of Greater Pittsburgh.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the creche inside the courthouse unmistakably endorsed Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause. By prominently displaying the words "Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ," the county sent a clear message that it supported and promoted Christian orthodoxy. The Court also held, however, that not all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."


The respondents, a class of indigent Virginia death row inmates who did not have counsel to pursue post conviction proceedings, sued various state officials and argued that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution required that they be provided with counsel at the state’s expense for the purpose of pursuing collateral proceedings related to their convictions and sentences. The district court found that Virginia’s policy of either allowing death row inmates time in the prison law library or permitting them to have law books in their cells did not do enough to satisfy Virginia’s obligation to provide them some form of relief. That court also found the availability of attorneys to assist inmates was inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

No. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause requires states to appoint counsel for death row inmates looking for relief. States are not constitutionally obligated to provide relief post-conviction because the Constitution assures the right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The Court also rejected the argument that capital cases require more legal assistance at collateral proceedings than non-capital cases.

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that a post-conviction proceeding is not part of the criminal process but is a civil action that does not require the state to provide proceedings. Prisoners were still able to obtain counsel, despite Virginia not adopting procedures that are were as far-reaching as those of other states. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the concurrence.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent that claimed that Virginia’s procedure was unfair and did not provide indigent death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their claims. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.


New York City, responding to complaints of high-decibel concerts adjoining residential neighborhoods, mandated the use of city-provided sound systems and technicians for concerts in Central Park. Members of rock group claimed that the inability to use their own sound equipment and technicians in a concert in a public forum interfered with their First Amendment rights of expression.

No. The Court upheld the ordinance, giving broad deference to the government's interest in maintaining order. As long as "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest," a regulation will not be invalidated because a court concludes that the government's interest "could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative."


Daniel J. Sheehan, Jr.
Craig Lee Hopkins

The city of Dallas, Texas passed an ordinance regulating the ages of admitted patrons and the hours of operation for dance halls. Charles M. Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight Skating Rink in Dallas, in compliance with this ordinance, split his skate rink into two sections: one section for patrons ages 14-18 and the other for anyone who pays the cost of admission. Stanglin sued the city to be able to un-divide the Twilight Skating Rink and argued that the ordinance placing age restrictions on dance halls violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court held that the ordinance did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments and that the ordinance's purpose was to benefit the welfare of teenagers in Dallas by limiting their exposure to illicit activities. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protections Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but that the ordinance unconstitutionally infringed on the First Amendment right to freedom of association.

No, no. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the ordinance was intended to protect the youth of Dallas against corrupting activity, which they may have access to when intermingling with adults. Therefore, the age restrictions on youth activities were reasonable under the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of association and equal protection under the law considering they are enforced to protect the youth from corrupt activities.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the opportunity to socialize was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that this case presented an issue of due process rather than freedom of association. He concurred with the judgment that the city ordinance protects teenagers and allowed them an even greater ability to associate than if the ordinance was not enforced. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.


Wards Cove Packing Company, Inc. v. Atonio

Wards Cove Packing Co. employed primarily nonwhite workers for unskilled seasonal jobs canning fish. A group of nonwhite workers filed suit in federal district court alleging that Wards Cove practiced discriminatory hiring in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As evidence, the group compared the high percentage of nonwhites in unskilled work with the high percentage of whites in skilled work. The District Court rejected this claim because it found that Ward received unskilled workers through a hiring agency that enrolled primarily nonwhites. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Ward had the burden of proof to show that its hiring practices were not discriminatory after the claimants presented evidence of racial disparity.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for a 5-4 court. The fact that one class of jobs at a firm has a higher percentage of nonwhites than another class does not by itself prove that the firm practices discriminatory hiring. Comparisons of race percentages among different job classes could wrongfully blame the employer, since what appears to show racial discrimination could in reality reflect the racial differences that exist in the labor market at large. Instead, the Court held that "the proper comparison is generally between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market." If a substantial difference is found, then the claimants must show that it is the result of a hiring practice of the employer.


Davis v. Michigan Department of the Treasury

Paul S. Davis
Michael K. Kellogg
Thomas L. Casey

Paul Davis, a resident of Michigan, worked for the federal government and upon retirement received benefits. Michigan law exempts state retirement benefits from state taxes. Smith unsuccessfully petitioned for a refund on the state taxes he paid on his federal retirement benefits. He then filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims arguing that the state's tax policy violated 4 U.S.C. 111 by taxing benefits paid to federal employees but not to state employees. The court dismissed his suit and so did the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for an 8-1 court. The Court emphasized the principles of intergovernmental tax immunity, which work to keep one part of the government from hindering the operations of another part. Section 111 allows a state to tax income paid by the federal government "if the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or compensation." Because the Court found no "significant differences between the two classes [federal and state employees]," it held that the Michigan tax distinguished between employees solely on "the source of the pay."


In May of 1976, Jimmy Wayne Jeffers and his girlfriend, Penelope Cheney, were arrested for possession of narcotics and receipt of stolen property. Jeffers posted bond for Cheney but was unable to post bond for himself. While in jail, Jeffers learned that Cheney was cooperating with the police. He offered another inmate money to kill Cheney, but a detention officer seized the note. Jeffers was released on bond in October of 1976. He quickly contacted Cheney and invited her to his motel room to give her heroin. When Doris Van der Veer, the woman with whom Jeffers had been living since his release from prison, entered the room a few hours later, she saw Cheney comatose on the bed and Jeffers injecting liquid into her arm. Van der Veer reported seeing Jeffers choke Cheney to death and then beat her body while calling her dirty names. Van der Veer and Jeffers then wrapped the body in newspapers and plastic bags and buried it in a shallow grave.

A jury convicted Jeffers of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the court found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors, so Jeffers was sentenced to death under Arizona state law. On direct review, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the death sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On a second direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the evidence and affirmed the death sentence. Jeffers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus and argued that Arizona’s standard of an “especially heinous...or depraved” aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected Jeffers’ challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the standard was unconstitutionally vague as it applied to Jeffers and struck down the death sentence.

No, no. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal habeas corpus relief is not intended to find error in state laws but rather to determine whether a state court’s finding was so arbitrary and capricious that it violates the Eighth Amendment. The reviewing court should use the “rational factfinder” test, which asks whether a rational trier of fact when viewing the evidence as most favorable to the prosecution could find reasonable doubt. The Court also held that the Arizona Supreme Court applied a narrow and clearly defined construction of the standard that sufficiently prevented arbitrary and capricious sentencing. Therefore the standard as it applied to Jeffers was not unconstitutionally vague.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the way a court constructs a standard does not change the fact that the standard is unconstitutionally vague. Because the majority’s opinion provided no analysis on how the Arizona Supreme Court had constructed this standard in the past, there was no evidence to support the idea that the standard was being consistently narrowly applied. He also argued that the majority’s opinion incorrectly focuses on federal habeas courts’ review of state law, when there are federal implications as well. The district court has to review habeas corpus cases in light of others in order to determine whether the standards are being consistently and appropriately applied, so the “rational factfinder” test is not solely sufficient. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.

In his dissent, which also applies to Walton v. Arizona, Justice Brennan argued that the death penalty is contrary to the ideals of human dignity upon which the Constitution rests and that the majority’s opinion makes it easier for states to execute individuals with little regard for Eighth Amendment doctrine. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.


In 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act which made it a crime to destroy an American flag or any likeness of an American flag which may be "commonly displayed." The law did, however, allow proper disposal of a worn or soiled flag. Several prosecutions resulted from the Act. Eichman set a flag ablaze on the steps of the U.S. Capitol while protesting the government's domestic and foreign policy. Another prosecution (United States v. Haggerty) resulted from a flag-burning in Seattle protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act.Both cases (Eichman's and Haggerty's) were argued together.

In a 5-to-4 decision, coming on the heels of a similar holding in Texas v. Johnson (1989), the Court struck down the law because "its asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression and concerned with the content of such expression." Allowing the flag to be burned in a disposal ceremony but prohibiting protestors from setting it ablaze at a political protest made that clear, argued Justice Brennan in one of his final opinions.


Joseph Claps
James W. Reilley
Michael R. Dreeben

A woman called police officers to a residence.  She showed signs of having been beaten.  She led police to another residence, where she said Edward Rodriguez was asleep inside.  She alleged that he had beaten her earlier in the day.  The woman had a key to the residence and referred to it as “our apartment” several times.  She consented to a search of the residence and police entered without a warrant.  Once inside, police found drug paraphernalia and containers filled with a white powder.  Police arrested Rodriguez and he was later charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.  At trial, Rodriguez attempted to suppress evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the woman did not have authority to consent to the search.  The woman had moved out a few weeks before the incident and no longer lived at the apartment.  With no valid consent, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.  The court granted the motion.  The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal.

Yes, No.  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding.  The Supreme Court held that a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the police reasonably believed that the person who consented to the search had the authority to do so.  The case was remanded for consideration of whether the police officers reasonably believed that the woman had authority to consent to their search of the residence.

Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that police cannot ignore the Fourth Amendment when an individual did not voluntarily give others concurrent authority over their property.  Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California

California law required retailers to pay a 6 percent sales tax on in-state sales of tangible personal property and residents to pay a 6 percent use tax on such property if purchased out of state. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, incorporated in Louisiana, sold religious materials to California residents through several direct and mail-order "evangelistic crusades." After auditing his ministry, the California Board of Equalization ("Board") told Swaggart that under California law he had to register his ministry as a seller so the Board could collect the appropriate sales and use taxes. After paying the taxes, Swaggart petitioned the Board for a refund. When his petition was rejected, Swaggart challenged the Board in state court. Following two unfavorable rulings below, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Swaggart's petition for certiorari.

No. Basing its unanimous decision on the fact that California's sales and use tax was not a flat tax, affected only a small portion of retail sales, and was neutrally applied, the Court found the taxes constitutional. Moreover, since the taxes were not imposed as a precondition to spreading any given message and were due regardless of registration, the Court rejected Swaggart's claim that California's no-fee registration requirement acted as a prior restraint on his religious organization. Finally, the Court held that any administrative burdens associated with the payment of taxes did not give rise to an establishment conflict since they did not cause excessive entanglement between the government and Swaggart's organization.


Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens By and Through Mergens

Kenneth W. Starr
Jay Alan Sekulow
Allen E. Daubman

The school administration at Westside High School denied permission to a group of students to form a Christian club with the same privileges and meeting terms as other Westside after-school student clubs. In addition to citing the Establishment Clause, Westside refused the club's formation because it lacked a faculty sponsor. When the school board upheld the administration's denial, Mergens and several other students sued. The students alleged that Westside's refusal violated the Equal Access Act, which requires that schools in receipt of federal funds provide "equal access" to student groups seeking to express "religious, political, philosophical, or other content" messages. On appeal from an adverse District Court ruling, the Court of Appeals found in favor of the students. The Supreme Court granted Westside certiorari.

No. In distinguishing between "curriculum" and "noncurriculum student groups," the Court held that since Westside permitted other noncurricular clubs, it was prohibited under the Equal Access Act from denying equal access to any after-school club based on the content of its speech. The proposed Christian club would be a noncurriculum group since no other course required students to become its members, its subject matter would not actually be taught in classes, it did not concern the school's cumulative body of courses, and its members would not receive academic credit for their participation. The Court added that the Equal Access Act was constitutional because it served an overriding secular purpose by prohibiting discrimination on the basis of philosophical, political, or other types of speech. As such, the Act protected the Christian club's formation even if its members engaged in religious discussions.