Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60-day period prior to an election. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) ran a series of television advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose judicial filibusters. WRTL anticipated that the ads would probably run afoul of BCRA and sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking an order barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against the ads. WRTL's suit alleged that BCRA is unconstitutional as it applies to the ads, which it claimed are "grassroots lobbying advertisements" unrelated to electoral campaigning. The FEC argued that the Supreme Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) had ruled out all "as-applied" challenges to BCRA. The U.S. District Court for D.C. agreed and denied WRTL's motion.

Yes. The unanimous per curiam opinion reversed the District Court's judgment, allowing WRTL to proceed with its as-applied challenge. The opinion explained that the District Court had misinterpreted a footnote in McConnell that seemed to foreclose such challenges. The Justices instructed the lower court to consider the larger question of whether the BCRA is constitutional as applied to WRTL's ads.


Carter G. Phillips
Malcolm L. Stewart
Howard W. Foster

A group of current and former employees of Mohawk Industries brought suit against Mohawk in federal district court under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). They claimed that Mohawk had conspired with third-party employment recruiters to bring illegal immigrants into Georgia to work for the company, and that the resulting competition for jobs hurt the legal workers. Mohawk asked the court to dismiss the case because, it argued, the plaintiffs had not shown that there were two distinct entities involved in the illegal activity as required under RICO. The only parties involved were the Mohawk corporation and the third-party recruiters, which were acting as its "agents." Mohawk argued that, because the recruiters were working on behalf of the corporation rather than in cooperation with (but distinct from) it, they should not be considered separate entities. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that the recruiters and the corporation were distinct and that RICO could therefore apply.

Not answered. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the case as improvidently granted. They sent it back to the Eleventh Circuit to be considered in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Corporation, another RICO case decided while Mohawk was pending before the Court.


Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer
Dan Himmelfarb
Cindy S. Lee
Edwin S. Kneedler

Richard Ceballos, an employee of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, found that a sheriff misrepresented facts in a search warrant affidavit. Ceballos notified the attorneys prosecuting the case stemming from that arrest and all agreed that the affidavit was questionable, but the D.A.'s office refused to dismiss the case. Ceballos then told the defense he believed the affidavit contained false statements, and defense counsel subpoenaed him to testify. Seeking damages in federal district court, Ceballos alleged that D.A.s in the office retaliated against him for his cooperation with the defense, which he argued was protected by the First Amendment. The district court ruled that the district attorneys were protected by qualified immunity, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled for Ceballos, holding that qualified immunity was not available to the defendants because Ceballos had been engaged in speech that addressed matters of public concern and was thus protected by the First Amendment.

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that speech by a public official is only protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen, not if it is expressed as part of the official's public duties. Ceballos's employers were justified in taking action against him based on his testimony and cooperation with the defense, therefore, because it happened as part of his official duties. "The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or write," Justice Kennedy wrote, "does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance." Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.


Paul D. Clement
Robert Moorehead Atkinson

In 1994 Oregon enacted the Death with Dignity Act, the first state law authorizing physicians to prescribe lethal doses of controlled substances to terminally ill patients. Attorney General John Ashcroft declared in 2001 that physician-assisted suicide violated the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA). Ashcroft threatened to revoke the medical licenses of physicians who took part in the practice. Oregon sued Ashcroft in federal district court. That court and, later the Ninth Circuit, held Ashcroft''s directive illegal. The courts held that the CSA did not authorize the attorney general to regulate physician-assisted suicide, which was the sort of medical matter historically entrusted to the states.

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that Congress intended the CSA to prevent doctors only from engaging in illicit drug dealing, not to define general standards of state medical practice. Moreover, the CSA did not authorize Attorney General John Ashcroft to declare a medical practice authorized under state law to be illegitimate.


David B. Salmons
William H. Hurd
Gregory G. Garre

The parents of Brian Schaffer, a disabled child, sued their public school district under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Schaffer's parents claimed the Individualized Education Program that the school system devised for their son, and which IDEA required for each disabled student, was inadequate. The district court ruled for the Schaffers, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the school system. Because IDEA was silent on whether the parents or the school system bear the burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held, the general rule that the party initiating the suit bears that burden should be applied.

In a 6 to 2 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the party bringing the suit bears the burden of proof, whether that party is the parents or the school system. In the majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that "absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, ... we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."


Paul D. Clement
Timothy A. Stoepker
M. Reed Hopper

John Rapanos sought to fill in three wetland areas on his property in order to build a shopping center. Rapanos ignored warnings from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality that the area was protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. After Rapanos also ignored cease-and-desist orders from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the government brought a civil suit against him. Rapanos argued before the District Court that the CWA gives the government jurisdiction to regulate only traditionally navigable waters. The government countered that Rapanos's lands were covered by the CWA as "adjacent wetlands" under the Corps's interpretation of the Act; the sites drained into man-made drains which eventually emptied into navigable rivers and lakes. The District Court rejected Rapanos's argument and upheld the Corps's regulations including the wetlands as "waters of the United States." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "hydrological connection" of the wetlands to the navigable waters qualifies them as "waters of the United States" under the Act.

The Carabells sought to fill in a wetland on their property in order to build a condominium, but were denied a permit because the wetland was protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA allows the government to regulate the discharge of any pollutant (including dirt or sand) into "navigable waters," which the Act defines as "the waters of the United States." Under regulations issued by the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), wetlands are covered by the CWA as long as they are adjacent to traditionally navigable waters or tributaries of such waters. Carabell's site is separated from a nearby ditch by a 4-foot-wide berm (earthen barrier), but the Corps's regulations specify that the wetland is nevertheless adjacent to the waterway. The ditch empties into another ditch, which in turn empties into a creek and ultimately into Lake St. Clair, a navigable water. After exhausting administrative appeals, Carabell sued in District Court. Carabell argued that the government lacked jurisdiction under the CWA to regulate the relatively isolated wetland as part of the "waters of the United States." The District Court disagreed, and upheld the Corps's expansive interpretation of the CWA. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also ruled for the Corps, holding that as long as wetlands are "adjacent" to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a "significant nexus" with such waters, the wetlands qualify as "waters of the United States" for purposes of the CWA.

Unanswered. The closely-divided Court split 4-1-4, with Justice Anthony Kennedy providing the crucial fifth vote to reject the Sixth Circuit's decision.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by three other Justices. The plurality rejected the argument that only actually-navigable waters can be regulated by the Clean Water Act, but also held that the word "navigable" in the Act cannot be divested of all meaning. The plurality held that the definitional term "waters of the United States" can only refer to "relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water," not "occasional," "intermittent," or "ephemeral" flows. Furthermore, A mere "hydrological connection" is not sufficient to qualify a wetland as covered by the CWA; it must have a "continuous surface connection" with a "water of the United States" that makes it "difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."

Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, which disagreed with much of the plurality's reasoning. In Justice Kennedy's view, wetlands need not have a continuous surface connection to a continuously flowing body of water to be covered under the CWA, but mere adjacency to a tributary of a navigable water is not sufficient. Instead, Wetlands that are not adjacent to a traditionally navigable water must have a "significant nexus" with a one. This requirement is satisfied if the wetland has a significant effect on the water quality of navigable waters. Justice Kennedy suggested that Rapanos's wetlands may be covered under the CWA if more evidence of a significant nexus were presented.

Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The dissent argued that the Corps's regulations should be upheld as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. The inclusion of all wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters was most consistent with the CWA's purpose of eliminating pollution in the nation's waters.

Though the Court failed to obtain a majority on most of the legal issues presented by the case, the plurality and Justice Kennedy agreed to send the case back to the Sixth Circuit for a new decision based on a different analysis.


Kenneth W. Ravenell
James A. Feldman
Kathryn Grill Graeff

Following his arrest for murder, Leeander Blake invoked his right to speak with a lawyer. Before Blake's attorney arrived, however, an officer and a detective approached Blake to give him a copy of the charges against him. The statement of the charges included "DEATH" as a possible penalty, although Blake was 17 years old and therefore too young to face the death penalty. The officer said to Blake "I bet you want to talk now, huh!" The detective then said "No, he doesn't want to talk to us. He already asked for a lawyer. We cannot talk to him now." A half hour later Blake decided to speak to the police without his lawyer, and he proceeded to make incriminating statements about the murder. At trial, Blake argued that the incriminating statements were the product of an illegal interrogation, and therefore inadmissible. (Under Edwards v. Arizona, police must cease interrogating a suspect after he requests an attorney, unless the suspect waives his previous request.) A county circuit court agreed with Blake, and ruled the statement inadmissible. On appeal, Maryland argued that Blake's interaction with the officer and the detective did not constitute an interrogation, because the officer's statement was a mere rhetorical question, and in any case was quickly corrected by the detective. An intermediate state appeals court agreed and allowed the statement to be admitted as evidence. However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed that decision, holding that the detective's correction did not reduce the severity of the officer's inappropriate statement. Since the officer's statement was ruled an illegal interrogation in violation of Blake's Miranda rights, the incriminating statement could not be used as evidence at trial.

Unanswered. Shortly after oral argument, the Court dismissed the case. The anonymous Per Curiam opinion stated simply: "The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted."


The Martins filed a class action lawsuit against the defendant companies in New Mexico state court in 1996, alleging illegal conduct with regard to auto financing and insurance contracts the parties had entered into. The defendants removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. The Martins did not object or seek remand until over a year later, when they argued that their claims did not meet the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, agreeing with defendants' arguments that the punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and monetary relief for the named plaintiffs at issue in the case each exceeded the $50,000 threshold. The Martins requested that the district court certify its order denying remand so that they could seek interlocutory review, and the court denied their motion. The plaintiffs next requested that the district court grant judgment against them so that they could appeal the decision regarding jurisdiction, and the court granted their request.

The plaintiffs then appealed to the 10th Circuit, and in a 2001 ruling, the appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling, rejecting the arguments that the amounts sought by the plaintiffs satisfied the diversity jurisdiction requirement. The court remanded the case with instructions to send it back to state court.

Back in district court, the Martins moved for attorney's fees and expenses under § 1447(c), which provides for judicial discretion to make such an award in cases of improper removal. The district court denied this request on the grounds that the defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal at the time. The Martins again appealed to the 10th Circuit.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling, explaining that the district court had applied the proper standard under 10th Circuit precedent, stating that even in cases where removal was later found to be improper, if it was deemed to be objectively reasonable at the time, the court had discretion to deny an award of attorney's fees and expenses under § 1447(c); other circuits had employed a different standard. The appellate court also agreed with the district court's conclusion that the removal had an objectively legitimate basis at the time it occurred.

In a unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court ruled that "absent unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal." The Court admitted that Section 1447 is unclear on when attorney's fees should be added. The Court's reading of the statute detected no strong textual bias for or against awarding fees. Considering the likely motives of Congress, the Court ruled that attorney's fees should only be awarded when a party sought removal without an objectively reasonable basis. Since Franklin had such a basis, Martin was not entitled to any fees.


Paul House was sentenced to death for murder based on circumstantial evidence. House then submitted a habeas petition in federal court, claiming that he had new evidence demonstrating his innocence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his petition, finding he had failed to show that it was "more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence," the standard of review established for habeas petitions in Schlup v. Delo. Even though the evidence cast some doubt on the original evidence, it was not sufficient to warrant a habeas petition.

Yes, and unanswered. In a 5-3 decision, the Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was wrong to deny House's habeas petition. The opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy held that though the standard in Schlup v. Delo was "demanding," House's case was so extraordinary that it could be granted review despite his failure to present his new evidence in state court. This was because House's new evidence, while not necessarily proving his innocence, was sufficiently compelling that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court sent the case back to the lower courts with instructions to hear House's new claims.

The Justices declined to clarify the "persuasive demonstration of actual innocence" standard in Herrera v. Collins, except to note that since House's evidence just barely met the high standard in Schlup, it did not meet the "extraordinarily high" threshold in Herrera.

Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. The dissent argued that under Schlup it was not enough for new evidence to cast doubt on House's conviction; the totality of the evidence had to prove "that House was actually innocent." The dissenters also stressed that the Court should defer to the District Court and not simply take the new evidence "at face value." Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.


J. Brett Busby
Christopher M. Kise
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier

Patrick Day was convicted of murder in state court. After a long delay, he filed a petition for federal review, arguing that his counsel was inadequate. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, federal habeas corpus petitions must be filed within a one-year time limit. Day's petition was late, but the state of Florida failed to notice the untimeliness of the petition and instead addressed only the merits of Day's argument. Later a Federal Magistrate Judge did notice Day's failure to meet the deadline, and recommended to the District Court that the petition be dismissed. Day argued that by responding to the petition without disputing the timeliness, the state had forfeited the statute-of-limitations defense. The District Court disagreed and dismissed the petition. Day appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming that the District Court had acted unfairly when it ruled against him based on an argument that the state had not made. The Circuit Court rejected Day's argument and affirmed the District Court, ruling that the state's erroneous concession of the timeliness of the petition did not prevent the court from dismissing it.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it dismissed Day's petition. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that "if a judge does detect a clear computation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision commands the judge to suppress that knowledge." The majority held that federal courts are not obligated to dismiss petitions for untimeliness if the state does not raise the issue, but they may as long as they give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to dispute the timeliness. Justice Stevens joined the Court's opinion but dissented from the judgment. Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent joined by Justices Thomas and Breyer.


After Reginald Chavis was convicted of murder, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in California court. After the California Court of Appeal denied Chavis' petition, he waited more than three years before appealing the decision to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition without explanation.

Having exhausted his state-court remedies, Chavis then sought to file a habeas petition in federal court. The district court, however, dismissed Chavis' petition. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act there is a one-year period in which a habeas petition must be filed. Chavis' three-year delay, the court ruled, had exceeded that period, and Chavis' petition was therefore untimely. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Chavis' state-court petition had been "pending" for the entire three years. Because the one-year statute of limitations did not apply to time during which state court petitions were pending, Chavis' petition in federal district court was timely under the AEDPA.

Yes. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the California Supreme Court's summary denial was not necessarily an indication that the petition was timely under state law. The petition was in fact untimely because the three-year delay could not be considered a "reasonable time," which is the timeliness standard for filing a petition under California law. If the state petition was untimely, it could not be considered "pending" between the time of the lower court's denial and the filing of the state habeas petition. Therefore, the Court held that the three-year filing delay did count towards the AEDPA's one-year limitation, meaning the federal habeas petition was also untimely.


Michael T. Kirkpatrick
Carter G. Phillips
James A. Feldman

In 1993, Gary Jones moved out of his house and into an apartment, while his wife continued to live in the house. Jones failed to notify the state of his new address, however, and after several years of unpaid property taxes the tax authority sent a letter by certified mail to the house notifying him that, if the taxes went unpaid, the house would be sold. The letter was returned as "unclaimed" (because Jones was not living at the house and no one was present to sign for its receipt) and the Arkansas Commissioner of State Lands sold the property in a private sale to Linda Flowers.

Jones sued in state court, claiming that the sale violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was never actually notified of the sale. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dusenberg v. United States actual notice is not required as long as the state makes a reasonable effort to notify the party of his rights.

Yes. In a 5-3 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court overruled the Arkansas Supreme Court, ruling that "additional reasonable steps" are required after a mailed notice is returned undelivered. The Court noted that the Due Process Clause does not require that every property owner receive actual notice, but the government must make a sincere effort. In this case, the government knew that its first effort to notify Jones had failed. Therefore, the Court ruled that the government should have taken additional steps, such as remailing the notice or posting a notice on the house's door. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the decision.


Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.

Miguel A. Estrada
Thomas G. Hungar
Jonathan S. Franklin

In the 1980s, research scientists at University Patents, Inc. (UPI) discovered that high levels of the amino acid homocysteine in the body are correlated with dangerously low levels of two B vitamins. UPI filed for a patent, seeking to license both the method of testing for the amino acid, and the correlation of the amino acid levels with B vitamin levels. UPI's successor licensed Metabolite Laboratories, which in 1992 sub-licensed the patent to Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (LabCorp). When in 1998 LabCorp started using another company's test and stopped paying Metabolite royalties, Metabolite sued. A jury found LabCorp guilty of patent infringement and breach of contract and awarded damages to Metabolite. In an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, LabCorp argued that the patent was invalid. Natural phenomena themselves are not patentable, but new applications of them normally are. LabCorp argued that Metabolite had impermissibly patented a relationship that already existed in nature. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument, however, ruling that Metabolite could patent its discovery of the correlation and that any association of homocysteine levels with B vitamin deficiency could constitute patent infringement. LabCorp appealed its case to the Supreme Court.

Unanswered. By a vote of 5-3, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The decision of the Federal Circuit was left in place, as if the Supreme Court had never agreed to hear the case at all. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the order. The dissent argued that the Court should have taken the case in order to lend necessary clarity to an important issue in patent law. In the dissenters' view, a natural correlation between two substances in the body is a "natural phenomenon" that cannot be patented.


John McDonald was the president and sole shareholder of JWM Investments. After Domino's terminated its contract with JWM, McDonald brought suit under a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. Section 1981). McDonald claimed that Domino's had ended its contract because he was black, and that he therefore had a right to sue under the Civil Rights Act, which gives all citizens, regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts. Domino's moved to dismiss the case, arguing that McDonald had not been a party to the contract (it had been between Domino's and JWM) and therefore did not have standing to sue. The district court sided with Domino's, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that McDonald had suffered injuries separate from those of JWM and therefore had standing to sue.

No. The Court ruled in a unanimous decision (Justice Alito not participating) that only an actual or would-be party to a contract may sue under Section 1981. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that if Section 1981 were not limited to the party to the contract, it "would become a strange remedial provision designed to fight racial animus in all of its noxious forms, but only if the animus and the hurt it produced were somehow connected to somebody's contract. We have never read the statute in this unbounded--or rather, peculiarly bounded--way."


Michael Lee Marsh II was convicted of murdering a mother and her young daughter. During the sentencing phase of the trial, jurors found that the mitigating factors and aggravating factors were in equipoise (i.e., of equal weight). The Kansas capital punishment statute specifically provided for the imposition of the death penalty in that circumstance, so Marsh was sentenced to death. After Marsh's sentencing, however, the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Kleypas found fault with the concept of the death penalty as a "tie-breaker." The ruled in Kleypas that "fundamental fairness requires that a 'tie goes to the defendant' when life or death is at issue." The State argued that while the prosecution has the burden of proof during the trial, the burden can be shifted to the defendant during the sentencing phase, so that the defendant must show that he deserves less than a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, and overturned Kansas's death penalty statute as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.

No and Yes. By a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the Kansas death penalty statute. The Court found that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision had necessarily rested on a federal constitutional issue, so the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear the case. The opinion by Justice Thomas drew a comparison with a similar death penalty statute in Arizona that was upheld in Walton v. Arizona. The Court decided to let the Walton precedent stand and uphold the Kansas statute as well. Even apart from the Walton precedent, however, the Court would have upheld the statute as "consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements." As long as juries are allowed to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence, states are allowed to require the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating factors are equally balanced. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's opinion. Justice Souter wrote that various death penalty precedents suggested that the statute could not stand up to "reasoned moral judgment." He called the Kansas death penalty statute "morally absurd," "a moral irrationality," and "obtuse by any moral or social measure." Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent arguing that the Court should never have agreed to hear the case.


Paul D. Clement
Randall M. Howe
David I. Goldberg

Eric Clark shot and killed a police officer during a traffic stop. At trial in Arizona state court, Clark, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic who believed his town had been taken over by aliens, introduced expert evidence about his mental state. He wanted to use this evidence not only to prove that he was insane (a claim on which he bore the burden of proof) but also to show that he could not form the criminal intent that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge, however, ruled that Arizona law confined the use of the expert evidence to his insanity claim and did not permit him to use it to show he could not form the necessary criminal intent. The court ruled that he had not sufficiently proved his insanity defense, and Clark was convicted and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.

No. In a 5-to-4 decision by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court held that Arizona could constitutionally limit the use of expert evidence about a defendant's mental state to his insanity defense. A defendant is presumed sane until he proves otherwise, but Justice Souter argued that allowing a defendant to use evidence of insanity to show that he could not form the necessary criminal intent would enable him to get around that presumption. "Clark presses no objection to Arizona's decision to require persuasion to a clear and convincing degree before the presumption of sanity and normal responsibility," Justice Souter wrote. "But if a State is to have this authority in practice as well as in theory, it must be able to deny a defendant the opportunity to displace the presumption of sanity more easily when addressing a different issue in the course of the criminal trial."


The Security Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) states that class action lawsuits involving more than 50 plaintiffs alleging untruth or manipulation "in connection with the purchase or sale" of certain securities may be moved from state court to federal district court. In this case, several class action suits, each involving more than 50 investors in covered securities, were brought in various state courts over the devaluation of the plaintiffs' investments by Putnam Funds Trust and other mutual funds. The mutual funds asked to have the cases heard in federal court, and the state courts agreed. The federal district court sent the cases back to the state courts, however, finding that SLUSA does not cover suits over devaluation, only those related to purchases or sales. When the mutual funds appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs objected to the appeal because 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) prohibits appeals court review of federal district court decisions to remand cases to state court for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court, however, found that the district court's decision had been substantive, not jurisdictional, and was therefore not covered by 1447(d). The appeals court then ruled that the plaintiff's claims could not be brought under SLUSA.

No. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the district court's decision had been jurisdictional and that the appeals court's review was therefore barred by 1447(d). Quoting Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, Justice Souter wrote that "where the order is based on one of the [grounds enumerated in 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)], review is unavailable no matter how plain the legal error in ordering the remand."


Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County

Miguel A. Estrada
R. Jonathan Hart
Dan Himmelfarb

James Ludwig's yacht was damaged when it collided with a drawbridge. Ludwig's insurance company, Northern, sued Chatham County to recover its costs. The county claimed that it was immune from civil suits due to its sovereign immunity under common law. The District Court agreed and ruled for the county. The court held that the county had sovereign immunity as a local government exercising power delegated by the state. Under Supreme Court precedent, sovereign immunity does not apply to local governments, but only to states and "arms of the state." Although the county did not qualify as an arm of the state under those precedents, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The Circuit Court held that common law nevertheless guaranteed the county a "residual immunity."

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Chatham County was not entitled to immunity from suit. The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas held that since the county was not acting as an "arm of the state," it could not claim 11th Amendment immunity. The Court also refused to recognize a less expansive form of "residual" immunity for counties under common law.


Bobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to death after he was convicted of murder and several other crimes. At trial, he was not permitted to introduce evidence suggesting that another person had committed the crimes.

Under South Carolina law, defendants "seeking to present evidence of third-party guilt must [limit the evidence] to such facts as are inconsistent with his own guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to his own innocence." Evidence that merely casts a bare suspicion on another person is not admissible. Using this standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision not to allow the evidence.

In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito - his first as a Supreme Court Justice - held that evidence of third-party guilt brought by the defense could not be excluded only on the basis of the strength of the prosecution's case. Although the Constitution is not violated by the exclusion of evidence based on "certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury," the Court held that exclusion of a defendant's evidence based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence denies the defendant his constitutional right to "'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'"


Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.

The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 983(b)(1), withholds some federal funding from colleges and universities that deny U.S. military recruiters the same access to students that other employers are given. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights challenged the law, arguing that it violated the schools' First Amendment rights to expressive association by requiring them to assist in military recruitment. The district court rejected the suit, but a Third Court of Appeals panel reversed. It held that, while the schools still had the right to forfeit funds so as to avoid unwanted endorsement of military policy under the amendment, forcing the schools to make such a decision was unconstitutional. Congress could not require them to forfeit a constitutional right in order to receive federal funds.

No. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held that the Solomon Amendment regulated conduct, not speech, and was therefore constitutional. Including military recruiters in receptions and interviews does not necessarily indicate university endorsement of the recruiters, so requiring their inclusion does not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. This would be true even if Congress had decided to make the requirement direct, rather than making it indirect as a condition for receiving federal funds. Roberts wrote, "Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment's access requirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds."


Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn

Herbert David Blair
Patricia A. Millett
Lori Freno
H. David Blair

Heidi Ahlborn was injured and permanently disabled in a car accident. She received Medicaid payments totaling $215,645 through the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) to pay for her medical treatment. In order to be eligible for the Medicaid payments, Arkansas law required Ahlborn to give the ADHS the "right to any settlement, judgment, or award" she might receive because of the accident, up to the amount Medicaid had paid for her treatment.

Several years after the accident, Ahlborn received $550,000 in a settlement with the parties liable for her injuries. The sum covered her medical treatment as well as pain and suffering, lost earnings, and her lost earning potential in the future. Only $35,581 of the settlement was earmarked for her medical treatment, however. When the ADHS demanded that she repay the full $215,645, therefore, Ahlborn refused, and the issue went to a federal district court in Arkansas. The judge sided with the ADHS, ruling that it was not unreasonable for Arkansas to require Ahlborn to agree to repay them fully from any settlement she might receive in order to be eligible, even if the portion specifically allocated for medical treatment was less than the amount demanded by Medicaid.

An 8th Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, however, finding that seizing money from her settlement that had not been earmarked for medical treatment would violate federal Medicaid regulations, which forbid state governments from seizing the property of Medicaid recipients in order to recover money spent on treatment. The panel therefore ordered that Ahlborn repay just $35,581 to the ADHS.

Yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that federal Medicaid statutes only allow a state to recover the part of a third-party settlement earmarked for medical expenses. The Justices agreed with the Circuit Court that the statutes do not permit Arkansas to require Ahlborn to repay Medicare expenses from the non-medical portions of the settlement. The Court found Arkansas's arguments to the contrary unconvincing due to "internal inconsistency with a conscious disregard for the statutory text."


On federal trial for possessing child pornography, Grubbs asked the judge to suppress evidence officers seized from his home. Grubbs said the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers showed him an "anticipatory warrant," something valid only after triggering events take place, with no mention of the triggering conditions. The condition set on this warrant was that officers could search Grubbs' house only after he received a pornographic video in the mail. The judge denied Grubbs' motion because the trigger was set forth in an affidavit that the officers carried during the search and that the warrant referenced. The Ninth Circuit reversed and said officers had to show the triggering events for an anticipatory warrant to the person being searched.

No. Justice Antonin Scalia, in the majority opinion, wrote that under the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement a warrant need not set out the conditions that trigger it, only the place to be searched and the persons or things to be searched for. The fact that the triggering conditions were included in the affidavit, even if they were never showed to Grubbs, was therefore sufficient.


Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.

Roy T. Englert, Jr.
Carter G. Phillips
Thomas G. Hungar

Reeder, a Volvo truck dealership, sued Volvo for violating the Robinson-Patman Act (RPA), which prohibits forms of discriminatory pricing that reduce competition. When retail customers take bids from dealers such as Reeder, the dealers ask manufacturers for price concessions, which dealers factor into their bids. Reeder accused Volvo of offering better price concessions to other Volvo dealers bidding for different customers. Reeder cited four instances in which it had received a comparatively low concession from Volvo, but it claimed that its losses due to discriminatory pricing went beyond those four instances. District Court allowed the case to go to a jury, and the jury awarded damages to Reeder. On appeal, Volvo argued that no competition was present, as would be required by the RPA, because Reeder was not actually bidding against the other Volvo dealers that allegedly got favorable concessions. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the Volvo dealers - though they did not bid against each other - "competed at the same functional level." Volvo's price discrimination would therefore fall under the RPA.

No. In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that for a manufacturer to be liable under the RPA, dealers must be in actual competition with each other. The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that Volvo's pricing decisions did not fall under the Act, because "in none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did Reeder compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer." In declining to interpret the RPA more expansively, the Court hoped to maintain the "broader policies of the antitrust laws," which are designed to protect competition itself rather than individual competitors. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas joined.


Paula K. Smith
Michael R. Dreeben
Thomas C. Goldstein

Scott Randolph was arrested for drug possession after police found cocaine in his home. The police did not have a warrant to search the home, but Randolph's wife consented to the search. Randolph was also present at the time of the search, however, and objected to the police request. At trial, his attorney argued that the search was unconstitutional because of Randolph's objection, while the prosecution argued that the consent of his wife was sufficient. The trial court ruled for the prosecution, but the appellate court and Georgia Supreme Court both sided with Randolph, finding that a search is unconstitutional if one resident objects, even if another resident consents.

No. In a 5 to 3 decision, the Supreme Court held that when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a search while the other refuses, the search is not constitutional. Justice David Souter, in the majority opinion, compared the reasonableness of such a search to a more casual interaction. Souter wrote, "it is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, 'stay out.' Without some very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions." A police search in such circumstances, Souter wrote, would therefore not meet the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry

R. Ted Cruz
Nina Perales
Paul M. Smith
Gregory G. Garre

In 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000.

The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but while it was pending the Court decided Vieth v. Jubelirer, another redistricting case from Pennsylvania. Justice Anthony Kennedy, the deciding vote in that case, wrote that the Court could hear claims of partisan discrimination in redistricting cases, but left open the question of the test those claims would be subjected to.

The three-district panel in this case then affirmed its earlier decision, finding that the Texas redistricting plan was not substantively unfair.

The Supreme Court held that the Texas Legislature's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the justices, stated that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy also wrote, however, that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from redrawing its electoral boundaries as many times as it wanted, so long as it did so at least once every ten years.


Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy

Raymond G. Kuntz
David C. Vladeck
David B. Salmons

Using the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Joseph Murphy's parents brought legal action to require the Arlington Central School District to pay for their son's private school tuition. After they prevailed, they sought reimbursement from the school district for fees they had paid to an educational consultant during the proceedings. They relied on an IDEA provision that allows courts to "award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs" to prevailing parents. The school district argued that under Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, and West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, expert fees can only be reimbursed when there is explicit authorization in the statute. Because the statute made no specific mention of expert fees, the school district argued, the fees could not be reimbursed. The federal district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, however, finding that a Congressional Conference Committee Report and a footnote in Casey referencing it showed that IDEA was intended to authorize reimbursement of expert fees.

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that IDEA did not authorize reimbursement of expert fees. "While authorizing the award of reasonable attorney's fees, the Act contains detailed provisions that are designed to ensure that such awards are indeed reasonable," Justice Alito wrote. "The absence of any comparable provisions relating to expert fees strongly suggests that recovery of expert fees is not authorized." Justice Alito went on to write that the case was made even simpler by the fact that, as an exercise of Congress's Spending Clause power, any provision requiring reimbursement of expert fees would have had to be "unambiguous," which it clearly was not. Justice Ginsburg, who joined the majority in finding that expert fees were not covered, wrote separately to disagree with that portion of the opinion.


Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England

After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow.

The federal district court agreed, rejecting the argument of New Hampshire's Attorney General that the judicial bypass procedure included in the law, in which a judge could approve an abortion without parental notification for a minor who showed she was mature enough to make the decision on her own, could be used to permit abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother. The judge also rejected New Hampshire's argument that the law could not be challenged until it had actually been implemented. A First Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously affirmed the decision.

In a rare unanimous decision regarding abortion, the Supreme Court sidestepped the most contentious questions of the case and focused instead on the proper remedy when a portion of a statute is found unconstitutional. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application."

O'Connor warned, however, that a court should be wary of upholding an act while strike down some of its applications when it was obvious that a legislature would prefer the entire act be declared unconstitutional. Because of some disagreement about which course the legislature would have preferred - wholesale nullification or narrower individual rulings - the Court remanded the case to lower court to determine legislative intent.


Gregory C. Link
James M. Whisman
Patricia A. Millett

Arturo Recuenco was convicted of second degree assault in Washington state court after the jury found that he had attacked his wife "with a deadly weapon." The trial court then applied a 3-year enhancement to his sentence based on its own finding that a firearm had been involved, even though the jury never specifically found that a gun was used. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that the enhancement was unconstitutional under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, a 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision that held that only those factors found by a jury, not a judge, may be considered for sentencing enhancements. The court disagreed with Washington state's argument that, while a Sixth Amendment violation under Blakely had indeed occurred, that violation could be found legally harmless.

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations do not "necessarily render[] a criminal trial unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1) As such, the defendant is not entitled to an automatic reversal and the prosecution may attempt to argue that the jury would have returned the same result if the error had not occurred.


G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.
Deanne E. Maynard
Kent L. Richland

Vickie Lynn Marshall (a.k.a. Anna Nicole Smith) was involved in a dispute in Texas Probate Court over the estate of her late husband, J. Howard Marshall. While the state-court proceedings were ongoing, Ms. Marshall filed for bankruptcy in federal court. E. Pierce Marshall, J. Howard's son, filed a claim alleging that Ms. Marshall had defamed him, and she filed a counterclaim alleging that E. Pierce had interfered with a gift she expected from her late husband's estate. The bankruptcy court ruled for Ms. Marshall and awarded her a large monetary award. Later, the probate court found J. Howard's will valid and ruled for his son. Under the judicially-created "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not interfere with state-court judgments concerning wills and estates. E. Pierce Marshall appealed the bankruptcy court decision (awarding Ms. Marshall a large monetary award) to federal district court, invoking the probate exception to argue that the court had no jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and ruled for Ms. Marshall, holding that since her claim did not require invalidating the will, the probate exception did not apply. The Ninth Circuit reversed, broadly interpreting the probate exception as covering any question that would normally be handled in probate court.

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the probate exception did not apply. The Court's opinion stressed the "distinctly limited scope" of the exception. The Justices explained that while the probate exception was intended to preserve state-court control over wills and estates, it does not remove from federal jurisdiction every suit arising out of probate matters. In Ms. Marshall's case, her claim did not directly involve the validation of J. Howard Marshall's will or the administration of his estate, so the exception did not apply and the federal courts had jurisdiction.


A California trial court sentenced Sanders to death for murder. The jury was told to consider four special aggravating circumstances during sentencing. On appeal, however, the state supreme court invalidated two of these circumstances, but still upheld Sanders's sentence. Sanders then filed a federal habeas petition, which was rejected by the district court but granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In overturning Sanders's sentence, it held that the sentence had been substantially affected by jury instructions to consider invalid aggravating circumstances. The Ninth Circuit faulted the state supreme court for its standard of review: The court should have determined whether the invalid circumstances were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in affecting the jury's sentence.

No. The Court upheld the sentence in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia. The Court established a new rule: invalidated sentencing factors make a sentence unconstitutional if they added aggravating weight to the jury's weighing process, " unless one of the other sentencing factors enables the sentencer to give aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances." In Sanders's case, the two remaining valid special circumstances were sufficient to make him eligible for the death penalty. Furthermore, the two invalided circumstances did not add any improper aggravating weight, because another valid sentencing factor - an omnibus "circumstances of the crime" factor - gave aggravating weight to the same facts. Therefore, the Court ruled, "the erroneous factor could not have 'skewed' the sentence, and no constitutional violation occurred." Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, which Justice Souter joined. Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined.


Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.

Andrew J. Pincus
Kathleen M. Sullivan
Thomas G. Hungar

Independent Ink manufactured printing ink that was compatible with the printheads manufactured by (and patented by) Trident, a company owned by Illinois Tool Works. Trident, however, required that anyone who used their printheads also use their ink, which was not patented. Independent Ink brought suit in federal district court under the Sherman Act, which forbids companies from tying a license to use one product (in this case Trident's printheads) to a customer's agreement to use another product (Trident's ink). The district court ruled in favor of Trident, finding that Independent Ink had failed to show that Trident's control of the printhead allowed them to raise prices above the competitive market rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, however, finding that when the product for which a license is granted is under patent, the ability to raise prices of that product above market rates must be assumed, and the burden is on the defendant to show that such power did not exist.

No. The Supreme Court unanimously decided that the burden was on the party claiming an anti-trust violation to show that the defendant had the power to raise prices above market rates. Justice John Paul Stevens, who wrote the opinion, rejected the rule used in International Salt Company v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, that the assumption should be made that such power existed. Stevens wrote, "The question presented to us today is whether the presumption of market power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law despite its demise in patent law. We conclude that the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support such a presumption."


Jere Krakoff
Jonathan L. Marcus
Louis J. Rovelli

Pennsylvania houses "incorrigible, recalcitrant" prisoners in the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Ronald Banks was one of about 40 prisoners in level 2 of the LTSU, which is reserved for the most dangerous, worst-behaved inmates. It is the policy of the LTSU to impose severe restrictions on the privileges of level 2 inmates. In particular, level 2 prisoners are the only ones denied newspapers, magazines, and photographs. Beard, the Secretary of the PA Department of Corrections, argued that this policy was necessary to promote rehabilitation and ensure prison safety. Banks brought a suit challenging the policy as a violation of the First Amendment. On the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court ruled in favor of Beard. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Circuit Court found that the prison's policy failed to meet the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley. The Third Circuit held that the First Amendment rights of the prisoners took precedence, because the policy was unrelated to the goal of rehabilitation, and an ineffective method of increasing prison safety.

No. In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the Third Circuit and upheld the prison's policy. The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer held that Banks had failed to present sufficient evidence that the prison had acted unreasonably in denying newspapers, magazines, and photographs to its most troublesome inmates. The Court found that the policy met the four-part test established in Turner v. Safley : (1) it was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of motivating good behavior; (2) though prisoners had no alternate means of exercising their rights, they could potentially graduate to the less-restrictive level 1; (3) accommodating prisoners' rights could result in negative consequences (worse behavior); and (4) there was no alternate means of accomplishing the prison's goals without restricting the prisoners' rights. Justice Thomas concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that "This case reveals the shortcomings of the Turner framework." Justices Stevens and Ginsburg both wrote dissents. Justice Stevens called the policy "perilously close to a state-sponsored effort at mind control," while Justice Ginsburg criticized the high evidentiary burden the plurality placed on the prisoners. Justice Alito took no part in the decision of this case.


Paul J. McNulty
Michael Patrick Studebaker
Jeffrey S. Gray

Responding to a complaint about a loud party, police arrived at a house where they saw minors drinking alcohol outside and heard shouting inside. As they approached the house, they saw a fight through the window involving a juvenile and four adults, one of whom was punched hard enough to make him spit blood. The officers announced their presence, but the people fighting did not hear them so they entered the home. They arrested the men for contributing to the delinquency of a minor and other related offenses. The trial court judge, however, refused to allow the evidence collected after the police entered the home because it was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the government argued that the search was covered by the "emergency aid doctrine" because the officers were responding to seeing the man be punched. The Supreme Court of Utah disagreed, however, ruling that the doctrine only applies when there is an unconscious, semiconscious, or missing person who is feared injured or dead. The Court also gave weight to the fact that the officers acted exclusively in a law enforcement capacity, not to assist the injured man.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that police may enter a building without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an occupant is "seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Quoting from Mincey v. Arizona, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency."

Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


William Moore sued six postal inspectors in federal court, alleging that they had brought criminal charges against him in retaliation for lobbying efforts he undertook on behalf of his company. The inspectors claimed that they had qualified immunity (that is, because they filed the charges in their official capacity on good faith, they could not be sued) and also that the case should be dismissed because they had probable cause to charge Moore. The district court sided with Moore, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed, finding that, even with probable cause, they must show that that the prosecution was not motivated by a desire for retaliation.

No. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the postal inspectors, overruling the Court of Appeals. The opinion by Justice David Souter held that plaintiffs alleging retaliatory prosecution must prove that the law enforcement agents lacked probable cause. Probable cause, the Court ruled, is a crucial component of the "chain of causation" needed to evaluate retaliatory prosecution charges. Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent, which Justice Breyer joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.


Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal

O Centro Espirita Benficiente Uniao do Vegetal (UDV), a religious organization, brought suit in federal court to prevent the government from interfering with UDV's use of hoasca, a substance used during religious ceremonies that contains a drug prohibited by the Controlled Substances Act. UDV argued that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which prohibits substantial imposition on religious practices in the absence of a compelling government interest, established their right to use hoasca.

The district court sided with UDV and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the government had not sufficiently proved the alleged health risks posed by hoasca and could not show a substantial risk that the drug would be abuse recreationally. In response to the Attorney General's argument that prohibiting the drug was required by an international treaty, the court ruled that the government had failed to "narrowly tailor" its prohibition of the drug.

Yes. In a unanimous 8-0 decision (Justice Alito not participating), the Court held that the government had failed to prove a compelling interest in regulating the UDV's use of drugs for religious purposes. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the government's argument that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. On the contrary, Justice Roberts wrote, the Court is required by the RFRA to examine individual religious freedom claims and grant exceptions to generally-applicable laws where no compelling government interest can be shown.

The Court also rejected the argument that an exception for UDV was precluded by international treaty. The government failed to submit "evidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV," instead citing "the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs." The Court held that such general government interests were not sufficient to satisfy the compelling interest standard.


Jennifer G. Perkell
Dan Himmelfarb
Meir Feder

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), prisoners must exhaust any available administrative remedies for resolving disputes within the prison system before they can bring suit in federal court. Viet Mike Ngo filed a grievance with the California prison system, but it was dismissed because he had waited too long to file it. He then brought suit in federal district court. California objected, arguing that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the fact those remedies were no longer available to him because of his delay in filing was immaterial. The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that all of Ngo's administrative remedies were "exhausted" because they were no longer available to him.

No. In a 6-to-3 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner must properly exhaust any available administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. This understanding of the PLRA's exhaustion provision mirrors that of the traditional exhaustion provision in administrative law and is "substantively similar" to that of habeas corpus law. An alternative ruling, Justice Alito wrote, would allow prisoners to circumvent the obvious purpose of the act (channeling initial appeals through the administrative system rather than the courts) by simply waiting until their administrative appeals were no longer timely.


Christophe and Juanita Roche leased an apartment in Virginia managed by Lincoln Property Company. The Roches sued Lincoln, which they identified as a Texas company, and other defendants in state court, alleging a variety of problems that arose from their exposure to toxic mold in their apartment. Lincoln moved the litigation to a federal district court, citing diversity of citizenship, which arises when opposing parties are from different states. The Roches then asked that the case be sent back to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship. Rather, one of the partners in the Lincoln-owned subsidiary partnership resided in Virgina. The court denied the motion and held that Lincoln was a Texas citizen. The Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Lincoln failed to show complete diversity of citizenship, because it did not disprove the exsistence of an affiliated Virginia entity that was a real party in interest.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Lincoln did not need to negate the existence of a potential defendant whose presence in the action would destroy diversity. To remove the suit to federal court, Lincoln only needed to show complete diversity between all named plaintiffs and all named defendants.


William E. Thro
Mark T. Stancil
Peter Gartlan
Gregory G. Garre
Mary H. Williams

Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty to which the U.S. is a party, any person detained in a foreign country has the right to notify the consulate of his home country of his detention.

Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, was arrested for his role in a shootout with the police. He was given a Miranda warning, but not informed of his right under Article 36 to notify his consulate. After Sanchez-Llamas made incriminating statements to the police, he was charged with attempted murder. Sanchez-Llamas moved to dismiss the charge. He argued that he had a right under Article 36 which had been violated, and that his confession should consequently be inadmissible as evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court both affirmed, holding that the Vienna Convention does not create individual rights, but only rights of countries.

Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was arrested for murdering a man with a baseball bat. He was not informed that Article 36 would allow him to notify his consulate of his arrest. At trial, Bustillo's counsel brought witnesses testifying that another man had committed the crime. Nevertheless, Bustillo was convicted of first-degree murder, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Bustillo then filed a petition for review in state habeas court. He argued for the first time that his conviction should be thrown out because his Article 36 right to notify his consulate had been violated. The state habeas court denied the petition. The court ruled that the petition was "procedurally barred" under state law because he had failed to raise the issue at trial. The Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal.

Unanswered, and no. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Oregon Supreme Court and ruled that evidence obtained in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention need not be excluded from trial. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts held that it would be "startling" if the Vienna Convention required suppression of evidence as a penalty for its violation, since the United States is the only country to have the "exclusionary rule" for illegaly-obtained evidence. Absent any language in the Convention requiring suppression, the Court could not impose it on states. Furthermore, the Court ruled that an Article 36 violation was not the type of evidence-related violation that normally requires the exclusionary rule. The Court declined to decide the larger issue of whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights that are enforcable in court. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissenters would have decided that the Convention did create individual rights. Justice Breyer also thought that "suppression may sometimes provide an appropriate remedy" for Article 36 violations.

With respect to state law, the Court ruled that states are allowed to have procedural rules that require courts to deny Article 36 claims if they are not raised at the proper time. The opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the Convention provides that Article 36 "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." In an adversarial system like that of the United States, the Court ruled, this means that states must be allowed to decide when claims need to be raised. The Justices also ruled that rulings of the International Court of Justice are not binding on U.S. courts. Justice Breyer wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent took exception to the absolute language of the majority opinion, arguing that " sometimes state procedural default rules must yield" to the Convention's requirement that domestic laws give it "full effect."


Timothy A. Baughman
David A. Moran
David B. Salmons

Booker T. Hudson was convicted of drug and firearm possession in state court after police found cocaine and a gun in his home. The police had a search warrant, but failed to follow the Fourth Amendment "knock and announce" rule which requires police officers to wait 20-30 seconds after knocking and announcing their presence before they enter the home. The trial judge ruled that the evidence found in the home could therefore not be used, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed based on two Michigan Supreme Court cases that created an exception to the suppression of evidence when the evidence in question would have inevitably been found.

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that evidence need not be excluded when police violate the "knock-and-announce" rule. The opinion by Justice Scalia reaffirmed the validity of both the knock-and-announce rule and the "exclusionary rule" for evidence obtained by police in most cases of Fourth Amendment violation. However, the majority held that the exclusionary rule could not be invoked for evidence obtained after a knock-and-announce violation, because the interests violated by the abrupt entry of the police "have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence." Justice Scalia wrote that the knock-and-announce rule was meant to prevent violence, property-damage, and impositions on privacy, not to prevent police from conducting a search for which they have a valid warrant. The Court also found that the social costs of the exclusionary rule as applied to the knock-and-announce rule outweighed any possible "deterrence benefits," and that alternative measures such as civil suits and internal police discipline could adequately deter violations. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. The dissent noted the Court's long history of upholding the exclusionary rule and doubted that the majority's cited precedents supported its conclusion. The dissent also expressed doubt that knock-and-announce violations could be deterred without excluding the evidence obtained from the searches.

Learn more about the Roberts Court and the Fourth Amendment in Shifting Scales, a nonpartisan Oyez resource.


Paul D. Clement
Gregory A. Castanias
Gregory Andrew Castanias
Samuel R. Bagenstos
Gene C. Schaerr

Goodman, a paraplegic held in a Georgia state prison, sued Georgia in federal court for maintaining prison conditions that allegedly discriminated against disabled people and violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Georgia claimed the 11th Amendment provided the state immunity from such suits. The district court ruled for Georgia, but the 11th Circuit reversed.

Before the 11th Circuit ruled in the case, the United States sued Georgia, arguing that the ADA's Title II abolished state sovereign immunity from monetary suits. Congress could do this, the U.S. argued, by exercising its 14th Amendment power to enforce equal protection.

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity in cases where violations of the 8th Amendment are alleged. The 14th Amendment incorporates the 8th Amendment (that is, applies it to the states). Congress can enforce the 14th Amendment against the states "by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations" of its provisions, which can involve abrogating state sovereign immunity. However, the Court did not address the question of whether Title II validly abrogates sovereign immunity when the 8th Amendment is not involved.


Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh

Thomas J. Stock
Sri Srinivasan
Anthony F. Shelley

In accordance with the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA), the Office of Personnel Management has negotiated a health insurance plan for federal employees with the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association. The plan requires the administrator to make a reasonable effort to recoup amounts paid for medical care from beneficiaries if those beneficiaries receive recoveries from another source (for example, a law suit or settlement against a third party that caused injury). In New York State, the plan is administered by Empire Healthchoice Assurance (Empire).

Empire brought suit in federal district court against the estate of Joseph McVeigh, a former federal employee who was injured in an accident and eventually won a settlement with the third party allegedly responsible for his injuries. Empire sought reimbursement for the money spent on McVeigh's medical care. Denise McVeigh, the administrator of Joseph McVeigh's estate, argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case under FEHBA and that it should be heard instead by the state court. The district court and Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In a 5-to-4 decision authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that jurisdiction for this case lay in state court. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that while FEHBA stated that any claims against the United States would be heard in federal district court, it made no provisions for suits brought by insurers seeking to recoup medical expenses from private beneficiaries. Absent that specific provision, a significant conflict with an identifiable federal interest, or the need to resolve a substantial question of federal law in order to establish the insurer's right to recovery, there was no reason to depart from the ordinarily-governing state law. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter and Alito dissented.


Humberto Fernandez-Vargas entered the United States illegally and was deported in 1981. He illegally re-entered in 1982 and lived in the U.S. until 2001, when he married a U.S. citizen and applied to adjust his status to permanent resident. While applying, Fernandez-Vargas was arrested and eventually deported pursuant to Section 241(a)(5) (the "reinstatement statute") of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The reinstatement statute, which became effective in 1997, allows prior deportation orders to be reinstated against aliens who re-enter the country illegally, and denies those aliens any form of relief under the INA. Fernandez-Vargas petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review, arguing that Section 421(a)(5) was not intended to reinstate deportation orders that were issued prior to its enactment. The Circuit Court denied the petition. It held that Fernandez-Vargas' application for permanent resident status was a form of relief not allowd by the reinstatement statute. It also held that Congress did intend the reinstatement statute to apply to deportation orders, such as Fernandez-Vargas', that were issued before the statute went into effect. Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that this application of the law was not impermissibly retroactive, because Fernandez-Vargas had no "protectable expectation of being able to adjust his status."

Yes and no. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice David Souter, the Court ruled that the reinstatement statute does apply to illegal aliens who re-entered the U.S. before the effective date of the statute, and that the application to such aliens was not impermissibly retroactive. The Court held that the purpose of Section 421(a)(5) was most consistent with a broad application, and "Common principles of statutory interpretation fail to unsettle the apparent application [...] to any reentrant present in the country, whatever the date of return." The majority opinion affirmed the presumption against retroactive statutes, but found the reinstatement statute permissible under a test set out in Landgraf v. USI Film Products. The main weakness in Fernandez-Vargas's argument was that his offense was not a "past act that he is helpless to undo," but rather the "continuing violation" of remaining in the country illegally.

In a lone dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens disagreed with both of the Court's conclusions. He wrote that Fernandez-Vargas "legitimately complains that the Government has changed the rules midgame."


Jeffrey L. Fisher
Michael R. Dreeben
James M. Whisman

Davis was arrested after Michelle McCottry called 911 and told the operator that he had beaten her with his fists and then left. At trial, McCottry did not testify, but the 911 call was offered as evidence of the connection between Davis and McCottry's injuries. Davis objected, arguing that presenting the recording without giving him the opportunity to cross-examine McCottry violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the call was not "testimonial" and was therefore different from the statements at issue in Crawford.

Yes. In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, does not apply to "non-testimonial" statements not intended to be preserved as evidence at trial. Although McCottry identified her attacker to the 911 operator, she provided the information intending to help the police resolve an "ongoing emergency," not to testify to a past crime. The Court reasoned that under the circumstances, McCottry was not acting as a "witness," and the 911 transcript was not "testimony." Therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not require her to appear at trial and be cross-examined. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that though McCottry's statements were not testimonial, the Court should not "guess" at the primary motive behind the statements. This case was decided with Hammon v. Indiana.


Injured workers sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging that federal mine inspectors' negligence helped cause a mine accident. The FTCA authorized private tort actions against the U.S. when the federal government, if a private person in similar circumstances, would be liable according to the law of the place where the incident occurred. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the allegations failed to show Arizona law would have imposed liability on a private person in like circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding federal mine inspections were a governmental function with no private analogue. In such cases, the Ninth Circuit held, the FTCA waived sovereign immunity if a state or municipal entity would be held liable under the law where the activity occurred.

No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that the United States waived sovereign immunity only where local law would make a "private person" liable in tort, not where local law would make a "state or municipal entity" liable. Nothing in the FTCA's "context, history, or objectives" supported the Ninth Circuit's holding that the act waived sovereign immunity where the United States, if a state or municipal entity, would be liable. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit treated the act's requirement that there be "like circumstances" to require the "same circumstances." Private analogies did, in fact, exist for the federal mine inspectors' conduct.


Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of the defendant's arrest or first appearance in court. The Act includes a list of delays which do not count toward this 70-day period, and one of these acceptable delays occurs when a federal district court finds on the record that the "ends of justice" served by granting a delay outweigh the public's and defendant's interest in a speedy trial. In this case, Zedner was a defendant in a criminal trial and twice asked the district court to issue such an order. The third time he requested one, the district court judge suggested that he sign a waiver of his right to a speedy trial under the Act for all time. Zedner signed the form, and accordingly the next time he asked for a delay the judge did not make on-the-record findings exempting the 91-day delay. Four years later, Zedner filed a motion to dismiss based on the failure to comply with the Act's 70-day period that resulted from that 91-day delay. The district court rejected the motion because of the waiver, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Zedner appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the waiver he signed was invalid under the Act.

No, yes, and no. In an opinion by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a defendant may not simply waive his right to a speedy trial under the Act. The list of acceptable reasons for an "ends-of-justice" order by the judge includes specific mention of the defendant's need for time to obtain counsel and prepare his case. If the defendant could simply waive his rights under the Act in order to meet these needs, the judge would not need to give them special consideration.


At Collins' state-court drug trial, he alleged that the prosecutor had used a peremptory challenge to strike a juror on account of her race. The prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations for the strike, which the trial court accepted. Upon being convicted, Collins appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which upheld the conviction. According to the Court of Appeal, the juror's youth and demeanor were both valid reasons for striking her. The California Supreme Court denied review. The Federal District Court denied Collins' habeas petition, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to a state-court finding of fact unless it is an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the trial court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ninth Circuit had acted correctly.

No. In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. The Court ruled that the state court did not act unreasonably when it determined that the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were credible. Although there might have been some evidence that could be interpreted as undermining the prosecutor's credibility, the trial court was in a better position to determine those facts. The Court faulted the Ninth Circuit for substituting "its own debatable interpretation of the record" for the trial courts findings, and for "misapplying settled rules that limit [the Circuit Court's] role and authority."


Victor S. Haltom
Ross C. Moody
Patricia A. Millett

After extraordinarily long deliberations, a jury convicted John Fry of two counts of first degree murder. Near the end of the trial, the defense attempted to bring a witness who would testify that her cousin rather than Fry had committed the murders. The trial judge refused to let the witness testify. After exhausting his state court appeals, Fry petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.

The District Court held that the trial judge had been wrong to exclude the witness, but it ruled that the decision was harmless error and upheld the conviction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the judge's decision met the test for harmless error in  Brecht v. Abrahamson . Under the Brecht test, evidence is held to be harmless unless it has a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Fry argued that the standard for harmless error in habeas cases should instead be the one defined in  Chapman v. California . The Chapman test requires the state to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held unanimously that a federal court "must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the 'substantial and injurious effect' standard set forth in Brecht, [...] whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman." The opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that neither the Court's previous precedents nor the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 required courts to use the more stringent Chapman standard in such cases. As the government conceded during the proceedings, the State would bear the burden of persuasion on the question of injurious influence. A 5-4 majority declined to decide the question of whether the exclusion of the witness in Fry's trial was harmless error under the Brecht standard. This question was deemed to be not included in the petitioner's question presented. The dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens would have held the exclusion prejudicial to the fairness of the trial and reversed the Ninth Circuit.


Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted of first degree murder. During sentencing, Landrigan's counsel attempted to call witnesses to testify to Landrigan's disadvantaged upbringing and good character. However, Landrigan opposed his lawyer's decision to present this mitigating evidence, and the witnesses were never called. Landrigan was sentenced to death. He appealed, arguing that his counsel had been ineffective. Landrigan claimed that he had wanted the lawyer to present mitigating evidence showing Landrigan's genetic predisposition to violence.

After state courts rejected the claim as frivolous, Landrigan filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal District Court. The District Court ruled against Landrigan, but he finally prevailed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Despite the high degree of deference to state courts required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court had been unreasonable to uphold Landrigan's death sentence. Landrigan's lawyer should have presented the mitigating evidence, the Court ruled, and the omission had rendered counsel ineffective.

Yes and no. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that the District Court was within its discretion when it upheld Landrigan's sentence without granting him a new evidentiary hearing. The Justices split 5-4 with Justice Clarence Thomas writing the opinion for the majority. The Court rejected the Ninth's Circuit's holding that the District Court took out of context statements Landrigan made during his trial. Instead, the Court held that those statements clearly indicated that Landrigan had been aware of the mitigating evidence that could have been presented, but had simply chosen not to have it presented. The District Court could have reasonably concluded that Landrigan would refuse all mitigating evidence, rendering Landrigan's counsel's investigation ineffectual no matter how thorough it might have been. The dissenters noted that Landrigan's counsel's investigation had been inadequate, and argued that Landrigan might have agreed to present the evidence if his lawyer had investigated his case more thoroughly.


Harold C. Becker
H. Bartow Farr, III
David B. Salmons

Long Island Care at Home (Long Island) employed Evelyn Coke as a "home healthcare attendant" for the elderly. Coke sued her employer, claiming rights to overtime and minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The District Court ruled for Long Island, holding that Coke fell under the FLSA's exemption for employees engaged in "companionship services." The court gave deference to the Department of Labor's regulation 29 CFR Section 552.109(a), which applies the exemption to employees in "companionship services" who are "employed by an employer or agency other than the family or household using their services."

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It ruled that the regulation was a misinterpretation of the statute, and was therefore unenforceable. The Second Circuit declined to give the Department's regulation any of the judicial deference normally due to administrative regulations. No Chevron deference ("strong deference") was due, because the regulation was under a section titled "Interpretations." Regulations that are interpretive rather than legislative are not entitled to Chevron deference. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the regulation was "unpersuasive in the context of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme," and thus not entitled to Skidmore deference ("weak deference") either.

Yes and yes. A unanimous Court ruled that the Department of Labor's regulation was "valid and binding" and therefore entitled to all of the deference courts normally give to administrative regulations. The opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer considered the regulation a normal instance of an agency "filling a statutory gap," and rejected each of the lower court's arguments that it was unlawful. The regulation was intended to be legally binding even though it was under a section titled "Interpretations." This was evidenced by the importance of the regulation and the fact that the Department went through full public notice-and-comment procedures. The "Interpretations" heading may have simply referred to that section's more detailed focus, which interpreted the more general regulations of the previous section. Since the regulation was valid and proper, the Court held, the FLSA's "companionship services" exemption continues to apply to workers paid by third-party agencies.


When Alphonso James was convicted of firearm possession after having been convicted of a felony, the government sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The ACCA allows for a minimum 15-year sentence if the convicted criminal has three prior convictions for serious drug offenses or violent felonies. A "violent felony" under the ACCA includes burglary and "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." James had previously been convicted once for attempted burglary and twice for drug trafficking, so the government argued that he had the necessary three "countable" convictions for the increased sentence. James argued that one of his drug-related convictions did not count as a serious drug offense, and that attempted burglary did not count as a violent felony. A federal District Court held that attempted burglary was a violent felony, but also that James's drug offense was not serious. Therefore, James had only two countable offenses and could not be sentenced under the ACCA.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that James's drug-trafficking offense was serious. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that attempted burglary counted as a violent felony, a ruling that put it at odds with other Circuits. The Circuit Court ruled that attempted burglary is a violent felony because it presents as much risk of violence as a successful burglary.

Yes. The Court ruled 5-3 that attempted burglary is a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is included in the residual provision of the ACCA governing "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." The Court rejected James's argument that attempted burglary should be excluded because the example crimes listed before the residual provision included only completed - as opposed to attempted - crimes. Instead, the Court held that the common element in the list was that "these offenses, while not technically crimes against the person, nevertheless create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury." Since the risk associated with attempted burglary was comparable to the risks caused by the listed crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives, attempted burglary was included in the definition of "violent felony."


Sinochem International Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.

Gregory Andrew Castanias
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier
Ann-Michele G. Higgins

Malaysia International Shipping Corporation (MISC) owned a vessel carrying steel coils for Sinochem International, a Chinese company. Sinochem brought an action in Chinese Admiralty Court, alleging that MISC had backdated documents pertaining to the loading of the cargo, and seeking to have the ship detained in China. MISC filed suit in a Pennsylvania district court, accusing Sinochem of fraudulent misrepresentation. Sinochem argued that the U.S. had no personal jurisdiction over the Chinese company, but the District Court declined to rule on the issue. Instead the court dismissed the suit on grounds of "forum non conveniens," which means that the case could be more conveniently tried in another forum, in this case the Chinese Admiralty Court.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, ruling that the lower court should have first ruled on the jurisdictional issue. The Third Circuit acknowledged the inconvenience of determining jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway, but nevertheless sent the case back to the District Court.

No. The Court ruled 9-0 that "a court need not resolve whether it has [...] personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that [...] a foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case." The opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that while the first step of a court is normally to determine whether it has jurisdiction, a court can dismiss a case for forum non conveniens without establishing subject-matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court held that determination of jurisdiction is only important when there is a chance that the court will rule on the merits of the case. When it is clear that the case would be more conveniently tried in a foreign court, a court should immediately dismiss for forum non conveniens rather than undergo a burdensome and unnecessary determination of jurisdiction before dismissing the case anyway.