Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.

No. A duty to disclose information arises if there is a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to the transaction. Chiarella had no such duty. He was not a corporate insider in the acquiring corporation and he did not receive confidential information from the target company. He also had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the target company: he was not their agent; they placed no trust or confidence in him; indeed, they had no prior dealings with him. A duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.


Marshall Coleman
J. Marshall Coleman
Laurence H. Tribe

After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.

In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."


Edward H. Borkon
Oscar C. Adamson, II
Edward H. Borkonz

On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.

No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that there must be a certain amount of minimum contacts between the defendant and the state in which the suit occurs. The fact that Rush’s insurance company does business in Minnesota is not a sufficient link between him and the state, especially since he owns no property there and has no other connection. Rush had no reason to suspect that having an insurance contract with State Farm would subject him to the possibility of a lawsuit in all states where State Farm does business.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the insurance company could be sued in Minnesota under Rush’s policy. As long as it is understood that the Minnesota court has jurisdiction over the policy and State Farm, rather than the defendant, Justice Stevens argued that the suit could be continued.


Edward F. McKie, Jr.
Lawrence G. Wallace

After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court explained that while natural laws, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, or newly discovered minerals are not patentable, a live artificially-engineered microorganism is. The creation of a bacterium that is not found anywhere in nature, constitutes a patentable "manufacture" or "composition of matter" under Section 101. Moreover, the bacterium's man-made ability to break down crude oil makes it very useful.


United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians

In the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by their first case. Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.

No and yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Congress did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers and affirmed the Court of Claims decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun noted a similar situation in Nock v. United States, where a congressional exemption from a judicial bar was ruled not to be in violation of separation of powers and upheld by the Court. Additionally, since Congress "had not made a good-faith effort to give the Sioux the full value of the Black Hills," Congress' 1877 action qualified as use of its eminent domain power under Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States. Therefore, the Sioux were entitled to compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.


World-Wide Volkwagen Corporation v. Woodson

New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York.  On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma.  A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident.  The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court.  The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction.  The trial court rejected this claim.  The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction.  The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state.

No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court judgment.  The Supreme Court held that a state court could only exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state.  In this case, the only contact with Oklahoma was the accident.  The Volkswagen retailer and distributor had taken advantage of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, had not solicited business in Oklahoma, and did not regularly sell cars that reached Oklahoma directly or indirectly.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent expressing the view that the retailer and distributor had purposely entered their goods into the stream of commerce and had gained benefits from other states through the nature of their product.  Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that a local car retailer makes itself a part of a national network of retailers and can reasonably expect that its product may cause injury in other states.  Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent stating that cars were intended for local and long-distance travel, so it was not unreasonable for Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction when the accident happened there.


Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment

Jack M. Siegel
Milton I. Shadur
Adam Yarmolinsky

The Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate that 75 percent of their receipts were applied towards "charitable purposes." Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court held that charitable solicitation is not purely commercial speech and is closely related to forms of protected speech such as advocacy. Justice Byron R. White, who authored the majority opinion, argued that "it is clear" that charitable solicitations are protected. While Schaumburg had an interest in preventing fraud, the ordinance did not fully serve that interest, which could be accomplished through alternate means. The ordinance in question also barred legitimate organizations from soliciting contributions. Schaumburg's interest did not justify the ordinance's "interference with protected speech,",which was therefore unconstitutional.


John A. MacFadyen, III
Dennis J. Roberts, II

After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Miranda safeguards came into play "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent," noting that the term "interrogation" under Miranda included "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." The Court then found that the officers' conversation did not qualify as words or actions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a response from Innis.


Glenn Zell
Elliott Schulder
W. Michael Maylock

On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films.

On April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that projection and viewing of the films constituted a search, and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the lack of a warrant. The fact that the FBI was lawfully in possession of the boxes did not grant them the authority to view the films without a warrant. The Court also held that the fact that the boxes had been opened by a third party, which placed information about the content of the films in plain view, did not alter the owner’s legitimate expectation of privacy.

Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment.

Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. He argued that even if the films had been viewed by a third party before the FBI viewed them, the government could not consider the films to be in plain view and warrants unnecessary. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment only prevented unlawful searches and seizures by the government. Because the FBI received the films after the boxes had been opened to the point that the suggestive material was visible, the FBI’s viewing of the films did not violate Fourth Amendment rights.


William A. Wenzel, III
Victor G. Rosenblum
Robert W. Bennett
Wade H. McCree, Jr.

These are three consolidated cases.

Jasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions.  They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.

Initially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.

No, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, since none of the parties to the case challenged the Amendment. The opinion referenced Harris v. McCrae, another opinion filed the same day, which upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The Court also held that a state is not obligated to pay for abortions through Medicaid when there will be no federal reimbursement because of the restrictions of the Hyde Amendment.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented and argued that a state’s interest in protecting the life of a fetus could not come at the cost of denying poor women medically necessary abortions. He also argued that, in upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the Court allowed a state to yield undue influence over a woman’s decision whether or not to go through with a pregnancy; this influence disproportionally affects poor women. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.

Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Hyde Amendment essentially denies women in poverty the ability to have a legal abortion that protects their health but not their lives. Because the burden falls exclusively on poor women who cannot afford an abortion, he disagreed with the Court’s finding that the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In his a dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun expressed that the Court refused to recognize the realities of poverty. He argued that such actions by the government wrongfully punish those living in poverty.

 Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that, since the government provides Medicaid on the basis of expressed financial and medical need, it could not deny assistance when both of those needs have been shown. If a woman has a constitutional right to choose to protect her own health rather than the potential life of the fetus, the government cannot deny her assistance to which she would otherwise be entitled.


Jeffrey T. Miller
Donald McGrath, II
Jeffery T. Miller

Richard Thomas was convicted of attempted murder and committed to a mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing the statute of immunization of parole officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that a state statute immunizing parole officials from injuries resulting from parole decisions does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute does not condone the killing of a human being, but rather it protects parole officials who are required to make a difficult decision. There is always a risk involved in releasing a prisoner, and the parole officer must use his discretion in making the decision. The state has a parole program to promote rehabilitation and it is the duty of the state legislature, not the courts, to decide if that program is rational. Therefore, the suit against the parole officials by the family of a parolee’s murder victim is not actionable.


Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. County of Los Angeles and City of Compton

Andrew S. Garb
James Dexter Clark
Ernest J. Brown

The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses.  Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States.  These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California.  Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.  The court granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund.  The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods.  This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce.

Yes.  In a two-sentence unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.  Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.


Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York

The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.


Rincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding.

No. In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court held that the special master's determination was correct. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger acknowledged the ambiguity in the Submerged Lands Act. However, since the piers and island in dispute did not provide protection, they did not qualify as "harbor works" that would have extended the coastline.


The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. and found that "'[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'" The Court found that South Dakota was acting as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator," and was capable of withdrawing from the interstate market if an in-state shortage arose. The Court rejected arguments that cement was a "natural resource" to which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access.


Robert G. Benisch
Robert J. Hickey
Drew S. Days, III

In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.

No. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."


While working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.

Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that plain language and the legislative history of the statutes required the SEC to establish defendant’s intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud” for violations of Section 10(b) and the part of Section 17(a) that specifically refers to the use of a device, scheme, or artifice with intent to defraud. Employing the same textual and legislative history analysis, the Court further held that the parts Section 17(a) that deal with false statements, omissions of fact, and transactions or practices that operate as fraud do not contain an intent requirement.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he urged those critical of the public policy implications to voice their complaints to Congress. He also argued that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the ruling on the ground that Aaron “intentionally failed” to terminate the fraudulent statements about Lawn-A-Mat stock.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the SEC should not be required to prove the defendants intent to establish a violation of Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, or Section 17(a). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute.

After being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

No. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to restrict the admission of unreliable hearsay into evidence. Generally, face-to-face confrontation is preferred as it allows the accused to probe the memory of the witness and allows the jury to take the demeanor of the witness into account when assessing the reliability of the testimony. The Court held that the opportunity for face-to-face interaction with, and cross-examination of, the witness at the previous hearing satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation Clause for the later trial. Although Ms. Isaacs was not officially cross-examined, the questions she answered had the proper form and intent to satisfy the purpose of cross-examination and establish the reliability of the testimony. The Court also held that a witness may be declared officially unavailable if a good-faith effort was made to locate her, as was the case with Ms. Isaacs.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the state did not meet its burden to show a diligent effort to locate Ms. Isaacs. The state sent subpoenas to the home of Ms. Isaacs’ parents, although there was evidence that she no longer resided there, and made no further effort to locate her new residence. Without evidence of a diligent effort to locate the witness, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause could not be circumvented. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.


Gilberto Alvez was a seaman on vacation from his regular trade. He was moonlighting for Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. as a harbor worker on the SS Export Builder, a vessel owned by American Export Lines, Inc (“AELI”). On October 13, 1972, while the SS Export Builder was in New York waters, the handle of a defective tension jack struck Alvez in the eye. He completely lost his right eye in the accident. He also suffered from depression as a result of the accident and his injuries.

Alvez sued AELI in New York, claiming damages resulting from AELI’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of their ship. Alvez then moved to add his wife, Juanita Alvez, as a party plaintiff, claiming that his injuries deprived her of the benefits of their marriage.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (“Jones Act”) created several classes of sea workers, allowing a wider breadth of causes of action for those injured within the United States’ territorial waters. It did not, however, specifically provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses. Similarly, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (“DOHSA”) did not create a specific right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. The district court denied the claim for loss of consortium. The appellate court reversed, noting that while such motions were not available in some maritime law cases, the Supreme Court in Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet allowed a decedent’s dependents to recover for loss of society in a wrongful death maritime law claim. Thus, there is no clear precedent prohibiting claims of loss of consortium from nonfatal injuries.

New York’s Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. It rejected AELI’s use of Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques, a U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit decision holding that the spouse of an injured longshoreman had no cause of action for loss of consortium. It noted that most states now allowed a spouse to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. It also reasoned that the heavy burden now placed on Juanita Alvez as a marriage partner justified allowing her to sue for damages.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision with two concurrences, Justice William Brennan held that maritime law authorizes Juanita Alvez to maintain an action for damages against AELI resulting from the loss of her husband’s society. He rejected AELI’s argument that the Jones Act and DOHSA represented Congress’ intention to preclude actions for loss of consortium or society. He noted that DOHSA centered on relief for fatal injuries on the high seas, not nonfatal injuries within terrestrial waters, and that the Jones Act does not exhaustively regulate the claims of longshoremen or seamen. Justice Brennan agreed with the lower courts that the Court’s recent maritime law decisions eroded the justification for denying claims used in Igneri. He also pointed to the contemporary state of the law, where a clear majority of states permitted a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium from personal injuries to her husband.

Justice Lewis Powell concurred, writing that there was no rational basis for drawing a distinction between fatal and nonfatal injuries in loss of consortium cases.

Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and William Rehnquist, dissented. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the federal question at hand would necessarily survive AELI’s appeals in state court. He warned against the practice of granting review to non-final lower court orders, and recommended denying certiorari to such cases in the future.


Elinor Hadley Stillman
Philip L. Hammer
Max L. Gillam, Jr.

High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.

Yes. Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.


Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.

The Code of Virginia authorizes the Supreme Court of Virginia to regulate and discipline attorneys. Under this authority, the Virginia court promulgated the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility (Bar Code), and the content makes it clear that the Virginia court holds all legislative and regulatory power over the legal profession in the state. The court also adjudicates alleged violations of the Bar Code.

In 1974, Consumers Union of the United States sought to prepare a legal directory designed to assist consumers in making informed decisions about legal representation. Consumers Union attempted to canvass all of the attorneys of Arlington County, Virginia, for the information for their directory. Many attorneys refused to provide the requested information for fear of violating the Bar Code’s prohibition against attorney advertising and providing the type of information the Consumers Union sought to publish.

On February 27, 1975, Consumers Union and the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council sued the Virginia Supreme Court, the Virginia State Bar, the American Bar Association, and other individuals. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to gather, publish, and receive factual information concerning attorneys practicing in Arlington County. The plaintiffs sought a declaration and an injunction against the enforcement of the relevant section of the Bar Code.

The district court held that the section of the Bar Code unconstitutionally restricted access to information concerning the attorneys’ initial consultation fees, but did not enjoin the enforcement of the code as it relates to advertising. Consumers Union appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the prohibition of attorney advertising violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case. On remand, the district court held that the section of the Bar Code was unconstitutional in its entirety and enjoined its enforcement. Consumers Union moved for the awarding of attorneys fees, which the Virginia Court objected to on the grounds that it had judicial immunity. The district court awarded attorneys fees against the Supreme Court of Virginia.

No, no. Justice Byron R. White delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Supreme Court of Virginia was immune to suits in its legislative capacity, just as any other legislative body would be. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia has the power to enforce the Code, and this suit was brought against it in its enforcement capacity. The Court held that suits for declaratory and injunctive relief can be brought against the Supreme Court of Virginia in its enforcement capacity. The Court also held that the Supreme Court of Virginia cannot be liable for attorney’s fees because it has legislative immunity. The legislative history surrounding the issue of legislative immunity shows that Congress intended agencies that have legislative immunity to also be immune from attorney’s fees.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or consideration of this case.


On March 1, 1976, an Illinois Circuit Court judge authorized a warrant to search the premises of the Aurora Tap Tavern and the person of the bartender Greg for heroin and other drug paraphernalia, based on information the Illinois Bureau of Investigation obtained from an informant. When officers arrived to conduct the search, they also conducted a cursory pat down for weapons on all of the patrons in the bar, pursuant to an Illinois state statute that allows officers to search persons on the premises during the execution of a valid search warrant. During the pat down, an officer found and retrieved a cigarette pouch from the pocket of one of the patrons, Ventura Ybarra, that contained tin foil packets of a substance later confirmed to be heroin.

Ybarra was subsequently indicted for possession of a controlled substance. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the contraband that had been seized from his person during the search at the bar. The trial court denied the motion. Ybarra was found guilty. On appeal, the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the statute as it applied to the facts of this case because it was obvious that there was a connection between Ybarra and the premises being searched. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Ybarra’s petition for appeal.

Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that there was no probable cause to suspect any of the patrons of committing a crime simply because they are on the premises during a search. Without any particular indication that a person is connected to the premises for the reasons the search is being conducted, a police search of the person violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that even an initial pat-down search is unconstitutional without a reasonable belief that the person is armed and dangerous.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority’s opinion creates an unnecessarily broad reading of the exclusionary rule and ignores the practical needs of law enforcement. He also argued that it was perfectly reasonable for the police to search persons found on the premises of a bar known as a place for the procurement of drugs and that the law must account for the safety of officers in performing their duty. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment calls for specificity regarding the location to be searched and the person or things to be seized, not the persons from whom items will be taken. He argued that it was not practical to prohibit law enforcement from flexibility in the performance of their duty. The courts may consider the reasonableness of an individual search based on the scope of the intrusion and the justification to determine whether it violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in the dissent.


After being convicted of three felonies over a period of fifteen years, William James Rummel was given a life prison sentence as mandated by a Texas recidivist statute. Rummel's offenses involved approximately $230, and all of the offenses were nonviolent. Lower courts rejected Rummel's challenge to the sentence.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the life sentence imposed by Texas law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that Texas had a significant interest in dealing "in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society." The Court also noted that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits to its prisoners," indicating that there was a possibility that Rummel would not be imprisoned for the rest of his life.


J. Calloway Holmes, Jr.
John W. Dunsmore, Jr.

In September 1977, Robert Franklin Godfrey and his wife had a heated argument. After Godfrey consumed a number of beers, threatened his wife with a knife, and tore her clothes, she threatened to leave him and then left to stay with relatives. Within a few days, she had secured a warrant against Godfrey for aggravated assault and filed for divorce. On September 20, they argued again, and Godfrey’s wife told him that reconciliation was impossible. Godfrey went to his mother-in-law’s trailer with his shotgun. He shot his wife through the window, struck his daughter with the butt of the gun, and shot his mother-in-law. Godfrey then called the police, explained what had happened, and asked them to come and pick him up.

Godfrey was indicted on two counts of murder, and one count of aggravated assault. He pled not guilty, and argued the defense of temporary insanity. Godfrey was found guilty, and at the sentencing phase of the trial, the same jury sentenced him to the death penalty on both counts of murder. Georgia law states that a person my be convicted of murder and sentenced to the death penalty if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense committed was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of the mind, or an aggressive battery to the victim.” The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia law was unconstitutionally vague and failed to properly distinguish between those cases that would be eligible for the death penalty and those that wouldn’t. Even accepting the law, the Court found no evidence that Godfrey’s crimes contained the elements described in the law.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion where he argued not only that the law was unconstitutional, but also that a death penalty sentencing requires much more restrictive sentencing guidelines. He also argued that the death penalty itself was unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined in the concurrence.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the plurality’s decision leads to death penalty sentences being imposed on a case-by-case basis, which is more arbitrary than the current Georgia law. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Byron R. White argued that the Georgia law provided strict enough requirements to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty was not disproportionate to the crime. He also argued that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court when they are “responsibly and consistently interpreting state law.” Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.


Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute

George H. Cohen
Charles F. Lettow
Edward W. Warren
William Alsup
William H. Alsup

Acting under authority of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor, after having demonstrated a link between exposure to benzene and leukemia, set a standard reducing the airborne concentrations of benzene to which workers could be exposed. The standard reduced the allowable amount from 10 parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. This case was decided together with Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute.

Yes. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Secretary had acted without knowledge that the new standard was necessary to "provide safe and healthful employment" as mandated by the Act. Nothing in OSHA's administrative record indicated that exposure to benzene at 10 ppm would cause leukemia and that exposure to one ppm would not. Since the Secretary had not made a threshold finding that exposure to 10 ppm posed significant health risks, he was powerless to promulgate the new standard.


Otis Trammel, Jr. was indicted on federal drug charges. Before his trial, he advised the court that the Government would call his wife as a witness against him. The indictment named Mrs. Trammel as an unindicted co-conspirator and the Government granted her immunity in exchange for her testimony. Otis moved to assert a privilege against adverse spousal testimony to prevent her from testifying against him. The district court denied the motion, and allowed Mrs. Trammel to testify to any act she observed during the marriage and any communication made in the presence of a third party. Only confidential communications between Mr. and Mrs. Trammel remained privileged and inadmissible. Otis was tried and convicted. On appeal, Otis argued that the district court’s ruling violated Hawkins v. United States where the U.S. Supreme Court held that one spouse may not testify against the other unless both consent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the Hawkins did not prevent voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant of immunity.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for eight members of the court, affirmed the 10th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the rule from Hawkins was modified so that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony vested in the witness spouse alone. A witness may not be compelled to testify or foreclosed from testifying. Information disclosed privately between a husband and wife is still privileged under a separate rule protecting confidential marital communications. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, writing that the foundations for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony disappeared long before Hawkins was ever decided.


Paul J. Cambria, Jr.
James R. Harvey
Mr. Andrew L. Frey

A New York State police officer stopped a car speeding on the New York State Thruway.  Roger Belton was a passenger in that car.  When the officer spoke with the driver he smelled marijuana and saw an envelope he believed contained marijuana.  The officer also found that none of the car’s occupants owned the car or were related to the owner of the car.  After asking the four occupants of the car to get out, the officer searched the car and found a leather jacket belonging to Belton with cocaine zipped inside one of the pockets.

At trial for criminal possession of a controlled substance, Belton argued that the officer seized the cocaine in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The trial court denied his motion to suppress that evidence.  The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the search was constitutional, reasoning that after the officer validly arrested Belton, he could reasonably search the immediate area for more contraband.  The Court of Appeals of New York reversed, holding that because Belton had no way of gaining access to the cocaine at the time the officer searched the car, the officer needed a warrant for the search he conducted.

Yes.  In a 6-3 vote, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court.  The Supreme Court rejected the previously used case-by-case analysis for whether a search is reasonable in favor of a bright line rule.  The Court held that a police officer can always lawfully search a car and any compartments in that car after arresting its occupants.  The search in this case was incident to a lawful arrest and did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, stating that he joined in the opinion because the majority was unwilling to overturn Mapp v. Ohio, which held that evidence obtained in unlawful searches and seizures cannot be used in criminal prosecutions.  Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement clearly gave the police officer authority to conduct the search in this case.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the bright line rule adopted by the majority was a departure from prior precedent.  He argued that a clear rule will not provide officers in the field with any greater guidance about what searches are permissible.  Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in this dissent.  Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, expressing that the new rule permits officers to search luggage, briefcases, or other containers in a car without a warrant or any suspicion that they contain relevant evidence.  Justice Marshall also joined in this dissent.


Herald Price Fahringer
Bruce A. Taylor
Andrew J. Levander

In July 1976, Ohio charged petitioners, officers of Hustler Magazine, with disseminating obscene materials for their role in publishing an issue of Hustler that contained a political cartoon that Ohio deemed obscene. The trial court dismissed the charge and held that Ohio violated the petitioners’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause by engaging in discriminatory prosecution. Ohio appealed to the Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Eighth District, which reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated the charges. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and argued that Ohio’s decision to prosecute Hustler, instead of other magazines that routinely published similar content, was discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that petitioners did not establish the elements for a prima facie case for unconstitutional discriminatory prosecution. To do so, petitioners had to show that they were singled out for prosecution while there were other magazines similarly situated that were not prosecuted, and that the government’s decision to prosecute them was made in bad faith, based upon race, religion, or the desire to prevent their exercise of First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court of Ohio determined the petitioners had not met this burden and remanded the case to the lower courts so that the petitioners could present further evidence to meet this burden.

No. The Court issued a per curium opinion for the 5-4 majority in which it dismissed the previously granted writ of certiorari for a lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted that it normally reviews decisions that have received final judgment and that the ruling of the Supreme Court of Ohio was not a final judgment since it returned the case to the lower court and allowed the petitioners to provide further evidence relating to their discriminatory prosecution claim. Although the Court can disregard the final judgment requirement in cases where the refusal to review a lower court’s decision “might seriously erode federal policy;” in this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s ruling did not threaten to erode federal policy to the extent that review was necessary.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a criminal trial of the petitioners under the obscenity statute would undermine their First Amendment rights. Justice Stewart argued that this violation of rights was sufficient to dispose of the final judgment requirement. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the interest in protecting magazine publishers from being prosecuted because their magazines’ content offends state officials is a significant First Amendment interest, sufficient to allow the Court to review.


Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette

Ronald E. Eastman
Robert H. Friebert
Bronson C. La Follette
Ronald D. Eastman
Bronson C. Lafollette

The Democratic Party of the United States (National Party) required that delegates sent to its National Convention were chosen exclusively by voters affiliated with the party, but the state of Wisconsin allowed non-Democrats to participate in state primaries. In the primary, voters expressed their choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination. Although the Wisconsin Democratic Party (State Party) selected delegates at a caucus occurring after the primary, Wisconsin law required these delegates to allot their votes at the National Convention in accord with the amount of support each candidate received in the primary. The National Party prohibited the State Party delegates from participating in the 1980 National Convention because of non-Democrat influence in the state primary. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the National Party must admit the delegates since Wisconsin had a "compelling interest" to maintain the "open" feature of its primary system.

No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart the Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Referring to its decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, the Court held that the "First Amendment freedom to gather in association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any State." Granting states the power to place delegates in a National Convention over party objections to how they were selected would impair the right of political parties to associate with whom they wish, especially when non-party members could influence the interests of the delegates. Justice Lewis Powell argued in his dissent that Wisconsin's "compelling interest" to involve non-affiliated voters in the primary justified this burden on the freedom of association, although the majority held that this could be accomplished without intruding upon internal party rules.


Two Miami Beach police officers were charged with burglarizing a local restaurant. Their trial gained much media attention. Local television stations televised a small portion of the trial, thanks to a recent Florida Supreme Court decision which permitted (with certain restrictions) electronic media to record judicial proceedings. Officers Chandler and Granger objected to the coverage and were found guilty as charged.

The Court found no constitutional violation in this case. Chief Justice Burger first denied Chandler's and Granger's claim that the Court's holding in Estes v. Texas (1964) regarded television cameras in the courtroom as offensive to due process. State experimentation with "evolving technology" in the courtroom, as long as it does not infringe on "fundamental guarantees" of the accused, is consistent with the Constitution. Furthermore, Florida's policy was implemented with strict guidelines intended to protect the right of a defendant to a fair trial. For example, the state required its courts to protect certain witnesses from the "glare of publicity" and to hear and consider arguments from a defendant who feels that electronic coverage may bias the jury.


American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan

George H. Cohen
Robert H. Bork
Kenneth Steven Geller

In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the Act), which authorized the Secretary of Labor to enact mandatory nationwide standards to govern workplace safety. On December 26, 1978, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published a proposal to change the federal standard regarding cotton dust exposure. There was a 90-day comment period followed by a series of hearings over the course of two weeks. After the hearings, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond J. Donovan, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health risk that warranted the adoption of the new standard. The new standard required a mix of engineering controls, such as the installation of pieces of equipment, along with work practice controls, and required these changes within four years. The petitioners, representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the standard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. They argued that the Act required OSHA to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the standard. The Court of Appeals held that OSHA had done everything required by the Act.

No. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that that the language of the Act requires OSHA to engage in feasibility analysis but not a cost-benefit analysis. The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress understood that new standards would create significant costs for employers but found the costs necessary to create safe working environments. The Court also held that OSHA reasonably evaluated the cost and feasibility of implementing the standards, and that the decision to implement was supported by substantial evidence.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that OSHA did not have substantial evidence to justify its determination of the cost and therefore did not effectively show that the standard was economically feasible. In his separate dissent, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the Act unconstitutionally delegated policy-making authority from the legislative branch of government to an unelected official in the executive branch. He argued that the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress could not decide exactly how much authority OSHA should have in enacting standards, so the feasibility requirement represented a Congressional compromise rather than a decision. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.


On January 14, 1978, a confidential informant contacted the Detroit police with information that wanted-drug dealer Ricky Lyons was at a residence in Atlanta, Georgia.  Atlanta police responded to the residence and, without a warrant, searched the home of petitioner Gary Steagald. Although the police did not find Lyons, they did find what appeared to be cocaine. At this point, the police obtained a warrant and completed their search, in which they found 43 pounds of cocaine.

Steagald was arrested and brought to trial. He moved to suppress the evidence that police found prior to the warrants, and the district court denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevents all warrantless searches of homes unless there are clearly exigent circumstances. Although the officers in this case did have a warrant to arrest Lyons, their warrant did not extend to the search of Steagald’s home, and there was no judicial oversight to determine if there were grounds for such an extension.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment.

Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented and argued that, if the police possess a valid search warrant and believe the subject is in a third party’s residence, they can reasonably execute a search to carry out the arrest warrant. The arrest warrant can serve as a search warrant because it functions to limit the scope of the search. He also argued that the state has a compelling interest in a search because of the inherent mobility of the subject. Justice Byron R. White joined the dissent.


Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine

The Texas Department of Community Affairs (TDCA) hired Joyce Burdine as an accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers Division (PSC). Burdine possessed several years’ experience, was promoted and was often assigned additional duties. Burdine applied for the supervisor’s position of Project Director, however, she never received a response and the position remained vacant for six months. When the PSC learned it would lose funding unless it appointed a permanent Project Director and completely reorganized the PSC staff, a male employee from another division was hired as Project Director. Three employees, including Burdine, were let go, leaving a male as the only professional employee in the division. The TDCA rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where she received the same salary as the Project Director at PSC. Burdine sued the TDCA and alleged that the failure to promote her and the decision to terminate her were gender discrimination that violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part because the TDCA bore the burden of proof and did not prove it was more likely than not that the male employee hired or promoted was better qualified than Burdine.

Yes. Justice Lewis P. Powell, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, which held that the defendant bears the burden of proof to clearly explain the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions in a gender discrimination case and can do so by introducing the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection. In this case, the TDCA was not required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Burdine and also was not required to prove by objective evidence that the person hired was more qualified than Burdine. The Court held that employers should have discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based on unlawful criteria; therefore, the TDCA was not required to hire a minority or female applicant when that person’s objective qualifications were equal to those of a white male applicant.


Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division

Blanca Bianchi de la Torre
William E. Daily
Mrs Blanca Bianchi De La Torre

Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a "good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a "personal philosophical choice" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.

Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Burger, the Court held that the Review Board's denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana wrongfully used Thomas' struggle to "articulate" his religious beliefs as grounds to call his decision merely "philosophical." The Court's decisions in _ Everson v. Board of Education_ and Sherbert v. Verner had established that "[a] person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program." In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the free exercise clause did not require a "State to provide direct financial assistance to persons solely on the basis of their religious beliefs."


Hazel Morrison was indicted for distributing heroin and obtained private counsel for her defense. Without her counsel's knowledge two agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conversed with her regarding a related investigation. During this conversation the agents advised that she have a public defender represent her instead of her private counsel. They also told her that the severity of her punishment would depend on how well she cooperated with them. Morrison notified her counselor immediately and did not speak to the agents about the investigation. She unsuccessfully petitioned the District Court to dismiss her indictment on the ground that the agents had violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morrison then entered a guilty plea to one count of the indictment. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Morrison's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated and ruled to drop all charges against her.

Yes. Justice Byron White authored the opinion for the Court unanimously reversing the Third Circuit's decision. For sake of argument, the Court granted that Morrison's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated, but held that this did not merit the dismissal of all charges since the conduct of the agents did not prejudice the outcome of the trial. The Court maintained that Sixth Amendment violations should not be remedied beyond the scope of the harm they inflicted upon the defendant.


Lassiter v. Department of Social Services

Leowen Evans
Steven Mansfield Shaber
Thomas Russell Odom

On September 26, 1974, William L. Lassiter was born out of wedlock. On May 23, 1975, the state determined that William L. Lassiter was a neglected child in need of protection, and placed him in the custody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. The state then placed William in foster care.

Abby Gail Lassiter, William’s mother, was convicted of second-degree murder in July of 1976, and began serving her twenty-five to forty year sentence at the North Carolina Correctional Center for Women. In 1978, the Department petitioned the court to terminate Abby’s parental rights. It alleged that Abby had not contacted William since December 1975, and that she willfully left William in foster care. On August 31, 1978, the state brought Abby from prison to the hearing, which opened with a discussion of whether Abby should have more time to find legal assistance. The court concluded that she had ample opportunity to obtain counsel; Abby did not claim to be indigent, and the court did not appoint counsel for her.

A social worker from the Department testified about Abby’s lack of contact with William, Abby’s mother’s unfitness to care for William, and William’s condition. Abby cross-examined the social worker, but many of her questions were disallowed because they were arguments. She also testified on her own behalf and later cross-examined her mother, who denied saying she could not care for William, contradicting the Department’s allegation. The court held that Abby willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for William’s welfare, and terminated Abby’s status as William’s parent. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that North Carolina was not constitutionally mandated to provide Abby counsel during the hearing. The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied her application for discretionary review.

No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to appoint counsel for Lassiter. Justice Stewart emphasized that due process required fundamental fairness. He wrote, however, that the Court generally only recognized an indigent’s right to appointed counsel where the litigant could lose his physical liberty if he lost the litigation.

Justice Stewart looked to the Court’s due process standard in Mathews v. Eldridge, determining that 1) Lassiter’s interest was important, 2) the state shared with Lassiter a common interest in a correct decision, but also a pecuniary interest and an interest in informal procedures, and 3) the complexity of some proceedings could be great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a parent’s rights insupportably high. He refused to hold, however, that indigent parents were entitled to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights. He acknowledged that thirty-three states and the District of Columbia required counsel in termination hearings, but characterized this as wise public policy and not a constitutional requirement.

Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred, implying that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted because the termination proceeding was not punitive.

Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. He argued that the unique importance of a parent’s interest in the care and custody of his or her child could not be constitutionally extinguished through formal judicial proceedings without the benefit of counsel. Justice Blackmun disagreed that physical confinement was the only loss of liberty serious enough to trigger a right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause. He also emphasized the risk of error in termination proceedings when a parent lacked counsel.

Justice John Paul Stevens dissented separately to take Justice Blackman's reasoning one step further. Justice Stevens opined that the issue raised is one of fundamental fairness, not balancing of pecuniary costs against societal benefits. No benefit to society can justify the state depriving an individual's liberty without due process of law.


Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company

Leonard J. Keyes
Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr.
Harlon L. Dalton

Minnesota enacted a statute prohibiting the sale of milk and milk products in non-refillable, non-returnable plastic containers. Clover Leaf Creamery sued to overturn the law. A Minnesota District Court found that the statute did not fulfill the legislature's purpose. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the decision.

No and no. Writing for the majority in a 7-1 decision, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. maintained that Minnesota's statute was not unconstitutional, acknowledging that the legislature had an interest in promoting resource conservation and resolving solid waste disposal issues. The difference between non-reusable plastic containers and paper or reusable plastic containers was "rationally related" to the legislature's purpose, and therefore not unconstitutional under the rational basis test set forth in New Orleans v. Dukes. The statute banned sale of all milk in the specified containers and did not distinguish by seller, and therefore did not violate the commerce clause. Justice Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


Congress enacted legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s to adjust the compensation of federal employees, including judges, which provided automatic annual pay raises. However, from 1976 to 1979 Congress intervened and blocked cost-of-living increases which were scheduled to occur.

In two of the years in question, Congress effectively revoked automatic pay increases after the statutes guaranteeing those increases had already taken effect. This amounted to a reduction in salaries for judges and violated the Compensation Clause.


After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in early 1980, President Jimmy Carter reactivated the draft registration process. Congress agreed with Carter's decision, but did not enact his recommendation that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) be amended to include the registration of females. A number of men challenged the constitutionality of the MSSA, and the challenge was sustained by a district court.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that Congress's decision to exempt women from registration "was not the 'accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females'" and did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Court found that men and women, because of combat restrictions on women, were not "similarly situated" for the purposes of draft registration. The Court also upheld Congress's judgment that the administrative and military problems that would be created by drafting women for noncombat roles were sufficient to justify the Military Selective Service Act.


Bruce J. Ennis, Jr.
Timothy A. Baughman
Elliott Schulder
Gerald M. Lorence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable seizure of a person by the government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies that prohibition to the states. On October 10, 1974, George Summers was leaving his house in Detroit, Michigan, as local police officers arrived with a warrant to search the property for narcotics. The officers requested that Summers help them gain entry to the house, and they detained him while they searched the premises. After finding two packages of heroin in the basement, the officers arrested Summers and searched his person. In his coat pocket, they found an envelope containing heroin, and it was this discovery of heroin⎯not the heroin found in the basement⎯that formed the basis of charges against Summers. At trial, Summers argued that the search of his person was illegal because the officers had no authority to detain him during their search of the house. The trial judge agreed and granted Summers’ motion to suppress the heroin evidence. On appeal, the State argued that Summers’ detention was reasonable, given his close proximity to the house when the officers arrived to perform the search. The State also contended that the concealable nature of the narcotics described in the warrant implicitly authorized the search of people found on the property. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Michigan, which affirmed the ruling of the lower court.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that a warrant to search for contraband grants police officers the limited authority to detain occupants of a house during the search of the premises. This authority is an exception to the probable cause standard to determine the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment seizures. The law enforcement interests in preventing the flight of occupants of the property named in the search warrant, reducing the risk of harm to officers, and otherwise facilitating the search convinced the Court that the detention of people on the property in question was reasonable. Similarly, the Court held that the exception to the probable cause standard applied to Summers’ detention because it was less intrusive than an arrest and unlikely to be abused by police officers. Finally, the connection between an occupant and the home named in the search warrant gave the officers an easily identifiable and certain basis on which to detain Summers.

Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized the Court for expanding the scope of the exception to the probable cause standard for Fourth Amendment seizures. Justice Stewart argued that the State failed to offer a justification for the detention that was unrelated to its interest in investigating crimes and apprehending suspects. He further expressed concern that the Court’s holding could be exploited by police officers eager to detain occupants and make them available for arrest in case the search of the property revealed evidence of criminal activity. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County

Michael M., a 17 and 1/2 year-old male, was found guilty of violating California's "statutory rape" law. The law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." The statute thus made men alone criminally liable for such conduct. Michael M. challenged the constitutionality of the law.

No. In a plurality decision, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that "young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse." The Court found that the state had a strong interest in preventing "illegitimate pregnancy." The Court noted that "[i]t is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males."


In 1974, Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, announced a campaign "to fight the United States CIA wherever it is operating." Over the next several years, Agee successfully exposed a number of CIA agents and sources working in other countries. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig revoked Agee's passport, Agee filed suit claiming that Haig did not have congressional authorization to do so. Agee also claimed that the action violated his right to travel, his First Amendment right to criticize the government, and his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that Passport Act of 1926 and other congressional statutes implicitly granted the Secretary of State the power to revoke passports. The Court noted Congress's historical recognition of "Executive authority to withhold passports on the basis of substantial reasons of national security and foreign policy." The Court further held that because the regulations were limited to cases in which there was a likelihood of "serious damage" to foreign policy, Agee's claims concerning the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the right to travel were "without merit."


Robert E. Wichersham
Robert E. Wickersham
Lawrence G. Wallace

Engineers James Diehr and Theodore Lutton invented an improved press that cured rubber by controlled heating. The press contained a temperature probe which measured the temperature rise of the rubber from within the press. By repeatedly calculating the rubber cure time from this temperature measurement and comparing this computed cure time to the actual elapsed time, the computer was able to determine precisely when to open the press and eject the cured rubber, which then emerged perfectly cured. The patent examiner, viewing all computer programs as unpatentable because of the earlier Supreme Court decision Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), rejected their patent application because, he argued, the inventors had simply combined an unpatentable program with a conventional rubber curing press. An appellate court reversed the Examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney argued that the steps of continuously measuring temperature and repeatedly recalculating the rubber cure time and comparing it to the elapsed time were new steps that were worthy of patent protection.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the court held that a machine which transforms materials physically under the control of a programmed computer is patentable. In addition, and without overruling the earlier Gottschalk v. Benson decision holding that a mathematical procedure cannot be patented, the majority in Diehr said the Benson decision did not render all computer programs unpatentable, contrary to what Justice John Paul Stevens argued in his strong dissenting opinion in Diehr. The Diehr court left undecided the question of whether computer programs standing by themselves could ever be patentable. Immediately following the Diehr ruling, software patent applications began flowing into the Patent Office in a steady stream that remains undiminished today. (Thirteen years later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In re Alappat, ruled that virtually all computer programs are patentable.)


United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

In 1974 Congress passed the Railroad Retirement Act, which restructured the retirement system previously established in 1937. Under the old system, employees who were eligible for both railroad benefits and social security benefits received both, along with an additional “windfall” benefit. Since this system threatened to bankrupt the railroad retirement program, the goal of the new Act was to eliminate some of these benefits. The new Act divided employees into different classes based on their employment history as of January 1, 1975. Employees who had worked for the railroad fewer than 10 years would not receive any windfall benefit. Employees who were already retired and receiving the full benefits would continue to do so. Employees who qualified for the full benefits but had not yet retired would receive the full benefits only if they had a current connection to the railroad industry or had served for 25 years or more. Employees who did not meet these requirements received a lesser windfall benefit.

The appellee Gerhard H. Fritz was part of a plaintiff class of former railroad employees who were eligible for the windfall benefits under the old system, but who did not have a current connection to the railroad and had worked fewer than 25 years. Alleging that the Act created an irrational distinction between employees that violated the Due Process Clause, they filed a class action suit in district court. The district court held that such a distinction was not “rationally related” to the goal of ensuring the solvency of the retirement system.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that laws may create classifications that are not elegant or “artfully drawn” but that are not unconstitutional. The Constitution would allow Congress to deny windfall benefits to all employees, therefore it was not unconstitutional to deny them to some. The Court also held that the distinctions were not arbitrary, as Congress was attempting to “protect the relative equities of employees and to provide benefits to career railroad employees.”

In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the statute deserved more consideration to determine whether the adverse impact was a deliberate aim or an acceptable cost of the legislation. Since the Act had two conflicting aims — to protect the solvency of the retirement program and to ensure that employees received the benefits they earned — he argued that the statute in question legitimately pursues those goals. Congress had to make cuts in order to ensure the solvency, and length of service was a fair method of drawing distinctions.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent where he argued that a “principal purpose” of the Act was to ensure that the employees received the benefits that they earned. Since this statute directly conflicts with the stated goal, the classification cannot be rationally based on the legislation. He also disagreed with the Court’s analysis that did not consider the effect of the statute in relation to its purpose. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


The city of San Diego banned most outdoor advertising display signs in order to improve the city's appearance and prevent dangerous distractions to motorists. Only "onsite" billboards with a message relating to the property they stood on would be permitted. Upon petition by a coalition of businesses owning advertising signs, a trial court ruled that the ban was an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police powers and hindered First Amendment rights of the businesses. The California Court of Appeals affirmed that the city had exceeded its police powers, but the California Supreme Court reversed this judgment.

Yes. Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for a 6-3 court. The ban's exception allowing "onsite" advertising discriminated against noncommercial speech. It allowed businesses in commercial properties to interrupt city motorists so long as it was with their own messages yet barred noncommercial advertisers from causing the same level of interruption. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented and viewed the "onsite" exception to the ban as "essentially negligible" rather than unconstitutional favoritism. However the Court held that affording "a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech" reversed the long-standing Court precedent to show greater deference to noncommercial speech.


Marshall Warren Krause
Ronald E. Niver
Mr. Andrew L. Frey

During the early morning hours of January 5, 1975, California Highway Patrol officers pulled over a the driver of a station wagon, Jeffrey Richard Robbins, for driving too slowly at speeds far below the minimum speed limit and drifting across the center lane. Upon smelling marijuana smoke as they approached the car, officers searched the passenger compartment, where they found marijuana. The officers then opened a recessed luggage compartment in the trunk and unwrapped two tightly sealed packages that each contained a pound of marijuana. Robbins was charged with several drug offenses. At trial, he argued that the evidence of the drugs was the product of an illegal search and filed a motion to suppress the evidence. The judge denied the motion, and a jury convicted Robbins. Robbins appealed, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case for the appellate court to consider in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in <i>Arkansas v. Sanders</i>, which established that officers could not search closed luggage found during a lawful automobile search. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Robbins conviction a second time on that grounds that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because the package’s contents could be inferred given the shape, size, and wrapping of the exterior.

No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 plurality. The plurality opinion held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment did not extend to closed and opaque containers found during the search. According to the plurality of the Court, the record in the case did not support the appellate court’s finding that Robbins did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the judgment of the Court. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that the careful manner in which the packages containing the marijuana were wrapped and sealed demonstrated Robbins’s intention to keep their contents private. However, he argued that the plurality opinion imposed too heavy a burden on police officers by requiring them to obtain a warrant to search every closed container found during a lawful, warrantless search of an automobile.

Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent in which he argued that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement should authorize police officers to seize and search any personal containers found within the vehicle. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun’s proposed rule. He also expressed opposition to the practice of excluding evidence obtained through impermissible means, especially with the Court’s extension of exclusionary rule to state law enforcement agencies in Mapp v. Ohio.

He argued that the harshness of the rule created an unfair advantage for the suspects because it required police officers to not only understand the nuanced case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment, but also to make the correct decision instantly. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the scope a lawful, warrantless search should include any container that a magistrate could authorize by warrant. As the police officers searched the car for evidence of contraband, the fact that the packages were tightly wrapped and sealed was of little consequence.


Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

A Minnesota law allowed the Minnesota Agricultural Society to devise rules to regulate the annual state fair in St. Paul. Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 required organizations wishing to sell or distribute goods and written material to do so from an assigned location on the fairgrounds. In other words, walking vendors and solicitors were not allowed. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness challenged the rule, arguing that it restricted the ability of its followers to freely exercise their religious beliefs at the state fair.

Using the "valid time, manner, and place" criteria which the Court employs to assess government restrictions of First Amendment activities, the Court held that Rule 6.05 did not violate the Constitution. Since the rule was applied equally to all groups wanting to solicit at the fairgrounds, not making restrictions based on the content of a group's message, and because the state had an important interest in "protecting the safety and convenience" of the fair's patrons, Justice White argued that the rule's restrictions were legitimate. Allowing all religious, nonreligious, and commercial groups to move about the grounds distributing literature and soliciting funds would result in "widespread disorder" which would be potentially dangerous to the fair's visitors.


Thomas G. Shack, Jr.
C. Stephen Howard
Eric M. Lieberman
Rex E. Lee

In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981, Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames & Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of presidential power.

The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the case.


Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware

An Iowa law restricted the length of vehicles traveling on its highways. Iowa justified the law as a reasonable use of its police power to assure safety on the state's roads.

The Court held that the law violated the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, Iowa could not prove that the vehicles it targeted posed potential danger to highway travelers. The safety interest was "illusory." Second, the law was "out of step with the laws of all other Midwestern and Western States" which did not have similar regulations. This placed significant burdens on the flow of interstate commerce


CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

On October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee (CMPC) requested time for a thirty-minute program from each of the three major television networks on behalf of President Jimmy Carter. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) refused to make the requested time available, emphasizing in part the potential disruption of regular programming. CBS offered to sell the CMPC two five-minute segments instead. The American Broadcasting Companies (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) each replied that it had not yet begun to sell political time for the 1980 presidential campaign. On October 29, 1979, the CMPC filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), charging that the networks violated their obligations under the Federal Communications Act.

The Federal Communications Act of 1934, as modified by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, authorized the FCC to revoke broadcasting station licenses for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access or failure to permit the purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office. On November 26, 1979, the FCC ruled in a four-to-three vote that the networks violated the act, rejecting the networks’ arguments that Congress did not intend the act to create a new right of access to the broadcast media and that the FCC improperly substituted its judgment for the networks’ in evaluating the CMPC’s request for time.

Following the seizure of American embassy personnel in Iran in November 1979, the CMPC decided to postpone the broadcast of its thirty-minute program; it successfully purchased five minutes of time from CBS, and later purchased thirty minutes of time for the full program from ABC and NBC. Throughout these negotiations, however, all parties maintained their rights relating to the appeal to the FCC’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the FCC’s decision. It held that the act created a new, affirmative right of access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office and that the FCC had the authority to evaluate whether a campaign has begun for purposes of the statute.

Yes, yes, and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the Federal Communications Act created a new, individual right to broadcast access for candidates for federal office. He looked to the language of the Federal Communications Act’s requirement that a broadcaster provide candidates with reasonable access to the airwaves. Justice Burger noted that this section focused on an individual candidate seeking airtime for his/her candidacy, and that a different section of the act already imposed a general, public interest duty on broadcasters to provide time for political programming. Justice Burger looked to the legislative history of the act and the FCC’s past interpretations of the public interest right of access; both indicated that the right of access for federal candidates was a new, separate right.

Turning to the FCC’s decision on the CMPC’s right of access to the airwaves, Chief Justice Burger held that the act authorized the FCC to determine whether a campaign has begun and to assess the specific needs of a candidate. He argued that the FCC did not arbitrarily set the starting date for a campaign; instead, it looked to objective evidence, taking into account the interests of candidates and the networks. Looking to the circumstances of the 1980 presidential election, Chief Justice Burger determined that the FCC did not abuse its discretion in holding that the networks failed to specifically grant the CMPC reasonable access to the airwaves. He noted that when the CMPC made its original request, ten candidates were formally seeking the Republican nomination and that various states had already started the delegate selection process, among other factors.

Finally, Chief Justice Burger held that the First Amendment did not give CBS, Inc. the right to refuse to sell the CMPC thirty minutes of airtime. He argued that Congress intended for the act to protect the First Amendment rights of candidates and voters by securing a forum for candidates’ political speech. Justice Burger emphasized that while the act did not grant the CMPC a general constitutional right of access to broadcast media, the act created a limited right of reasonable access to broadcast media for candidates for federal office.

Justice Byron White dissented, joined by Justices William Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens. Justice White looked to the history of federal regulation of broadcast media, inferring a clearly-defined legislative desire to preserve values of private journalism. He then turned to the legislative history of the act and determined that Congress merely codified the networks’ pre-existing duty to provide access to political broadcasts, attaching the threat of license revocation to give weight to that duty. He argued that the FCC arbitrarily determined that the start of a campaign was the beginning of the networks’ obligations under the act, and that the language of the act itself did not support FCC’s individualized-need approach. Further, this approach essentially destroyed the networks’ editorial discretion.

Justice John Paul Stevens also filed a separate dissent. He argued that the FCC could not adequately evaluate the performance of the networks’ public interest duty by focusing on the needs or requests of particular candidates.