William T. Coleman, Jr.
William B. Ball
William G. McNairy
William Bradford Reynolds

Bob Jones University was dedicated to "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the University's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The University claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting for the most part only Caucasian students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.

The Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a "fundamental national public policy." The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an "overriding governmental interest." Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."


Minneapolis Star & Tribune Company v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue

From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax.

The Court held that while the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of the press, Minnesota had "created a special tax that applie[d] only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment." Noting that there was "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment," the Court held that when states single out the press "the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute." The Court concluded that "recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme."


James Dexter Clark
Alan I. Horowitz
The Clerk

(Tom Feledy prepared this summary.)

A traveler at an airport alerted the suspicions of drug agents, who, based upon his behavior and discrepancies in his luggage tags, believed he was carrying narcotics. They relayed this information to fellow agents at his destination airport. There, the agents met him and seized his bags without his consent. Ninety minutes after the seizure, his bags were subjected to a "sniff" test by a drug-detection dog. The dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in one of the bags. The agents then obtained a warrant for that suitcase, which turned out to contain cocaine, and the man was convicted of the drug offense. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the ground that the ninety minutes exceeded the investigative stop permitted by _Terry v. Ohio

, and thus violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure privilege.

No and no. Seizures pursuant to investigative detentions are lawful only if they are limited in scope, as described in Terry, and evidence resulting from such unlawful seizures must be suppressed. The "sniff" of a properly trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.


A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.

No. The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it "excessively entangle" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued Justice Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.


Douglas M. Becker
Jack Greenberg
William E. Gray, Jr.

On November 14, 1978, a Texas jury in Bell County found Thomas A. Barefoot guilty of the murder of a police officer. A separate sentencing hearing was held before the same jury to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. The prosecution called two psychiatrists to the stand who testified that Barefoot was likely to commit further acts of violence and would remain a danger to society. The jury sentenced Barefoot to death. Barefoot appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and argued that the use of the psychiatrists to testify as to future conduct was unconstitutional because psychiatric testimony cannot accurately predict future dangerousness and is likely to produce erroneous convictions. He also argued that this specific testimony was unconstitutional, as neither psychiatrist had personally examined Barefoot. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Barefoot’s execution was scheduled for September 7, 1980. A stay of execution was granted by the Supreme Court pending the filing and disposition of a petition of certiorari. The petition was denied, and Barefoot’s execution was rescheduled for October 1981. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Barefoot’s application for habeas corpus, and he filed a petition for habeas corpus in district court. The district court granted a stay of execution pending action on the petition, and later denied the petition and vacated the stay of execution. The district court also issued a certificate of probable cause that would allow Barefoot to continue the appeals process. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals again denied Barefoot’s petition for habeas corpus and motion for a stay of execution. Barefoot appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District for a stay of execution, pending the consideration of his appeal of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

No, yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that, in denying the stay of execution, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit necessarily examined the decision of the district court on the merits of the case. Although the Court of Appeals may not formally affirm the judgment of the lower court, the denial of the stay of execution serves the same purpose. The Court also held that the psychiatrists’ testimony did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because the testimony falls under precedents that allow for predictions of future behavior to be considered relevant evidence in sentencing hearings. The reliability of such evidence should be weighed according to the rules of evidence by the fact-finder. The Court also held that the testimony of expert witnesses need not rely on personal examination and can be in the form of responses to hypothetical questions.

 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Court of Appeals made procedural errors, but that the Supreme Court reviewed the case on the merits, and he concurred with the majority’s opinion as to the merits of the case.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent in which he argued that a defendant must be afforded a hearing on the merits of his case when he petitions for a writ of habeas corpus unless the case can be dismissed as frivolous. Because a hearing on the merits can often be time-consuming, the Court of Appeals should have granted a stay of execution to allow enough time to properly consider the case. He also argued that death penalty jurisprudence placed an added emphasis on the importance of careful consideration, and the majority opinion’s suggestion of a summary approach goes against those precedents. He also cited his opinion that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, while the possibly specious testimony of psychiatrists would be acceptable in a regular case, in a capital case a higher standard of reliability must be expected. Because unreliable scientific evidence is likely to prejudice the jury, it must be held to a stricter standard of accuracy than psychiatric testimony can be proven to meet. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


Democrats in control of the New Jersey Legislature designed a plan for congressional redistricting in the state which the outgoing Democratic governor signed into law. Even though the district populations differed by less than one percent from each other, they were clearly drawn to maximize Democratic power in the state.

Even though the population differences in the districts were slight, the Court held that they were unconstitutional because they "were not the result of a good-faith effort to achieve population equality." Justice Brennan upheld past Court decisions (Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 1973, and Wesberry v. Sanders, 1964) and argued that relying on a strict numerical standard of populations to assess district equality would be misguided.


Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission

In 1973, Raymond Dirks was an officer of a New York-based firm that specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities to institutional investors. On March 6, he received insider information that Equity Funding of America, a corporation engaged primarily in selling life insurance and mutual funds, had vastly overstated assets as a result of fraudulent company policies. Dirks did not do any business with Equity Funding, but he decided to investigate and, during the investigation, discussed his information with investors who did hold Equity Funding stock. Some of these people sold their stock based on Dirks’ information. Dirks also urged the Wall Street Journal to publish an article on the fraud allegations, but it would not for fear of the story being libelous. The drop in Equity Funding’s share price caused the New York Stock Exchange to halt trading on March 27 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation. On April 2, the Wall Street Journal ran a story that was based largely on Dirks’ information, and the SEC then began investigating Dirks’ role in the affair.

In their investigation of Dirks’ actions, the SEC found that he had aided and abetted the violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by informing other members of the investment community of the fraud allegations. However, because he assisted in exposing the fraud, Dirks was only censured. Dirks appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the SEC’s decision.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the duty to disclose information arises from a financial relationship with one of the parties, not just the possession of information. The Court also held that an insider is only liable for inside trading when he makes a profit on the information before disclosing. Because Dirks did not have a financial relationship with Equity Funding, nor did he make a profit from the information, he neither had a duty to disclose nor did he violate the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that Dirks served as a proxy to provide insider information to people who did have a financial interest in Equity Funding and were able to act on his information. By fulfilling this role, he is liable. He also argued that that the majority’s opinion essentially rewards Dirks for participating in the affair, which is counterproductive for the purposes of enforcing the federal securities acts. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.


George M. Strickler, Jr.
William F. Wessel

Sheila Meyers worked as an Assistant District Attorney for just over five years when her boss transferred her to a different section of the criminal court.  Meyers strongly opposed this transfer, and made her feelings known to several supervisors, including District Attorney Harry Connick.  Before the official transfer took place, Meyers prepared a questionnaire asking for her co-workers views on the transfer policy, office morale, and the level of confidence in supervisors.  When Connick learned of the questionnaire, he immediately terminated Meyers.  He said he fired her because she refused to accept her transfer.  He also said that distributing the questionnaire was insubordination.  Meyers sued, alleging that her termination violated her First Amendment right to free speech.  The district court ruled in favor of Meyers and ordered her reinstatement, payment of back pay, damages, and attorney fees.   The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

No.  In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that speech of public employees is generally only protected when they speak on matters of public concern.  Meyers’ speech only dealt with personal and internal office issues.   The district court also erred in placing too high of a burden on Connick to show that Meyers’ speech substantially interfered with the operation of the office.  It is sufficient to show that the employer reasonably believed Meyers’ speech would interfere with office operations.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, expressing his view that speech concerning the way government is run is protected under the First Amendment.  Meyers’ questionnaire addressed that subject and interfered with the operation of the office, so her termination violated the First Amendment.  Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.


Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association

The Perry Education Association (PEA) won an election against the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA) to serve as the sole union representing teachers in Perry Township, Indiana. As part of the collective-bargaining agreement reached between PEA and the Board of Education of Perry Township, PEA obtained exclusive rights to use the internal school mail system and PLEA was denied access. PLEA contended that denying their members use of the mail system violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A Federal District Court ruled against PLEA but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.

No. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion of a 5-4 court. The school board chose to grant exclusive access to the official teachers union in order to facilitate a collective-bargaining agreement. It did not act to suppress the speech of rival teachers unions. The school board entrusted PEA with obligations as the sole representative of teachers that would require the use of the mail system. PLEA did not have these obligations and could communicate effectively though many other channels. Since the mail system was not a "public forum," PLEA had no unassailable right to access it. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan Jr. contended that the mail system constituted government property and PLEA lost access privileges because its viewpoints differed from those of the official union.


A jury in the Bleckly County Superior Court convicted Alpha Stephens of murder and sentenced him to the death penalty based on two of three possible statutory aggravating circumstances.  While Stephens’ appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled one of the aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty invalid.  After exhausting all post conviction remedies, Stephens filed a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court.  The district court denied relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.

On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court certified the Supreme Court of Georgia to answer the question of what state law premises support affirming Stephens death sentence, even though one of the aggravating circumstances was now invalid.  The Georgia court responded, holding that the jury used other aggravating circumstances along with the invalid one to sentence Stephens, so his sentence should stand.

No.  In a 7-2 decision, Justice John Paul Stephens wrote the majority opinion reversing the court of appeals.  The Supreme Court held that where there are other valid aggravating circumstances to substantiate the death sentence, habeas relief is not available.  The jury did not rely solely on the invalid factor in making its decision.  Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurrence, stating that the sentence could stand on a line of cases where convictions are upheld if any of the counts are sustainable.  Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence emphasizing the application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capitol sentencing cases.

Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent condemning capital punishment as cruel and unusual.  He also felt the aggravating circumstance used in making the sentencing decision was constitutionally defective.  Justice William J. Brennan joined in the dissent.


In apportioning its state legislative seats, the State of Wyoming made provisions to allocate to each county at least one state representative. With the state's total population and its sixty-four House seats, the ideal apportionment would have been 7,337 persons per representative. Given the guarantee of county representation, Niobrara County, with a population of less than half the ideal (2,924), was allocated a House seat.

The Court upheld the Wyoming apportionment scheme and found no Fourteenth Amendment violations. Justice Powell argued that using counties as legislative districts and assuring at least one representative per county supported "substantial and legitimate state concerns." Since the population variations in the Wyoming plan were the result of the consistent application of a nondiscriminatory and legitimate state policy, the plan was consistent with the Constitution. Any dilution of voting strength which the constituents of the other sixty-three representatives may have experienced as a result of Niobrara's relatively small population was minimal and irrelevant given the advantages of the Wyoming scheme.


Paul P. Biebel, Jr.
James W. Reilley
Rex E. Lee
Paul B. Biebel Jr.

The Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an anonymous tip that Lance and Susan Gates were selling drugs out of their home. After observing the Gates's drug smuggling operation in action, police obtained a warrant and upon searching the suspects' car and home uncovered large quantities of marijuana, other contraband, and weapons.

The Court found no constitutional violation and argued that the lower court misapplied the test for probable cause which the Court had announced in Spinelli v. United States (1969). Justice Rehnquist argued that an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are important in determining probable cause, but that those issues are intertwined and should not be rigidly applied. He argued that the "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach to probable cause was the correct one to glean from Spinelli, and that the law enforcement officials who obtained a warrant abided by it in this case.


Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Company

The Kansas Power & Light Company (KPL) entered long-term contracts in 1977 governing its purchase of natural gas from the Energy Reserves Group (ERG), a Kansas-based oil company. The contracts contained "price escalator" clauses which provided for gas prices to rise to the levels set by governmental authorities. In 1978, the federal government established a new system for regulating natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Policy Act. The Act set maximum lawful prices that could be charged for different types of natural gas and applied these price levels to intrastate gas markets. The Act allowed states to set maximum price levels below federal levels, which Kansas did under the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act (Kansas Act). When ERG tried to raise its prices to the higher federal levels using the "price escalator" clause, KPL insisted that it was only legally obligated to buy gas at the lower prices set by the Kansas Act. ERG claimed that KPL violated the contract by refusing to pay federal prices. In response, KPL argued that the Kansas Act clearly prohibited the use of federal price levels to trigger "price escalator" clauses. After a state trial court ruled in favor of KPL, ERG claimed that the Kansas Act violated the Contract Clause by preventing federal price changes from affecting state contracts. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Kansas Act did not violate the Contract Clause since it was a legitimate effort by the state of Kansas to protect its economy from rapid price changes.

No. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. The Court determined that ERG did not have its contractual rights "substantially impaired" and found that the state of Kansas had "significant and legitimate public purpose[s]" for passing the Kansas Act. The contract between ERG and KPL facilitated changes in prices according to governmental price controls, and the new state price controls adhered to federal guidelines. In passing the Kansas Act, the state "exercised its police powers to protect consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices." The Natural Gas Policy Act set maximum price levels for natural gas but explicitly permitted states to lower these levels. Therefore "price escalator" clauses included in intrastate contracts would adhere to lawfully enacted state price levels.


William Harvey Elrod, Jr.
Kenneth Steven Geller

Bush, an aerospace engineer at the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (Center), a facility operated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), made a series of public comments critical of the Center. Lucas, the Center s director, demoted Bush on the ground that the comments were false and misleading. The Federal Employee Appeals Authority upheld the demotion, but the Civil Service Commission s (CSC) Appeals Review Board later found that the demotion had violated his First Amendment rights. NASA accepted the Board_s recommendation that Bush be restored to his former position retroactively, with back pay. While his administrated appeal was pending, Bush brought suit against Lucas in Alabama state court, seeking to recover damages for violation of his First Amendment rights. Lucas removed the action to federal district court, which granted summary judgment for Lucas. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Bush had no cause of action for damages under the First Amendment in view of the available remedies under the CSC regulations.

No; not under the CSC regulations. The federal judiciary, pursuant to its common law authority, has the power to recognize new causes of action in absence of, or to supplement, statutory remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated its relief is to be exclusive. In determining whether judicial relief should be granted, federal courts are (1) to pay particular attention to special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, and (2) to ascertain whether the purpose and comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme precludes judicial remedies where statutory relief is available. The administrative scheme in this case reflected Congress_ attempt to balance the competing interests of protecting the First Amendment rights of federal employees and maintaining a disciplined and effective workforce. Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to regulate the employee relations. Grant of supplementary judicial relief would disrupt this balance and is therefore inappropriate.


After extensive hearings in the mid-1960s, the Hawaii legislature discovered that while Federal and State governments owned nearly 49 percent of the land in Hawaii, another 47 percent was owned by only 72 private landowners. To combat this concentration of ownership, the legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967. The Act adopted a method of redistribution in which title in real property could be taken from lessors and transferred to lessees. Frank E. Midkiff, a landholder, challenged the Act.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Public Use Clause did not preclude Hawaii from taking title in real property, with just compensation, for the purpose of reducing the concentration of ownership. Noting that Hawaii's statute was rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court argued that "debates over the wisdom of takings" were best carried out by legislatures, not by federal courts. The Court also held that the fact that the property taken by eminent domain was transferred to private beneficiaries did not condemn the law to having a solely private purpose.


According to its bylaws, membership in the United States Jaycees was limited to males between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. Females and older males were limited to associate membership in which they were prevented from voting or holding local or national office. Two chapters of the Jaycees in Minnesota, contrary to the bylaws, admitted women as full members. When the national organization revoked the chapters' licenses, they filed a discrimination claim under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. The national organization brought a lawsuit against Kathryn Roberts of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, who was responsible for the enforcement of the anti-discrimination law.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Jaycees chapters lacked "the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women." The Court reasoned that making women full members would not impose any serious burdens on the male members' freedom of expressive association. The Court thus held that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against women justified enforcement of the state anti-discrimination law. The Court found that the Minnesota law was not aimed at the suppression of speech and did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.


Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Phinpathya

The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney General the power to suspend the deportation of any otherwise deportable alien if the person has been consistently physically present in the United States for at least seven years, is of good moral character, and whose deportation would represent great hardship to the person and/or family members.

Padrungsi Phinpathya, a citizen of Thailand, first entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. She and her husband, a Thai citizen who entered the country in 1968, were granted permission to stay until July 1971. When their visas expired, they chose to stay without the permission of the proper authorities. In January 1977, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) commenced deportation processes on the couple. They applied for a suspension, which an immigration judge granted to Phinpathya’s husband but denied for her because she did not meet the continuous residency requirement. Phinpathya’s own testimony showed that she left the country in 1974 and improperly obtained a visa from the US consular office in Thailand for her return three months later.

The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the judge’s ruling and held that Phinpathya’s illegal status when she left and returned to the US made the absence “meaningfully interruptive” of her residency and made her ineligible for the suspension of deportation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, despite her absence, Phinpathya’s intent was always to return to the US.

Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 9-0 court. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of any language or legislative history indicating flexibility in the requirements, the section should be interpreted based on its plain meaning. Other immigration legislation has shown that when Congress intends there to be exceptions, the wording of the relevant statute reflects that intention. The Court also held that Congress intended the requirements to present a high threshold to suspension, and therefore the “continuous presence” requirement should not be interpreted loosely.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment where he argued that Phinpathya’s unexplained three-month absence from the country was enough to disqualify her from a suspension of deportation without requiring the Supreme Court to address the issue of the meaning of the “continuous presence” requirement. He argued further that Congress did not intend the requirement to be taken literally in situations that would be unreasonable, but rather it was intended to prevent abuses. Legislative and judicial history supported a more flexible reading of the requirement. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.


Tilden N. Engle was an employee of a plant owned and operated by the Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler dismissed him on December 4th, 1972. Engle suffered from alcoholism, and he drank heavily following his dismissal. On December 7th, he consumed four anti-anxiety Librium pills and large quantities of whiskey. That day, he returned to the plant and told his nephew Chrysler employee Renus Engle, that he was going to kill someone. Renus Engle testified that the Tilden had a nervous pitch to his voice and tears in his eyes. According to Renus Engle, the respondent had been drinking but was not drunk.

Engle went to the office of Donald Ambrose, a clerk, and asked for Regis Lantzy, whom Engle believed was responsible for his termination. Ambrose said that Lantzy was not present, and later testified that Engle looked strange, as if something was troubling him. A short time later, Engle found Lantzy in the plant. Engle shot Lantzy with a pistol in front of several workers. Lantzy tried to flee, and Engle shot him several more times. He stood over the body briefly, then returned to Ambrose's office and surrendered to a security guard. The guard smelled alcohol on Engle's breath, but officers who arrived later on the scene did not detect the odor of alcohol. On December 8th, Engle gave a statement to the police. He admitted to purposefully shooting and killing Lantzy, albeit under the influence of alcohol.

On trial for murder in July, 1973, Engle's sole defense was temporary insanity due to the effects of alcohol, Librium, and a dissociative reaction, a temporary mental disorder often accompanied by memory loss. He stated that he remembered nothing between drinking the morning of December 7th and the moment he awoke in jail. He did not remember making a statement to the police.

The trial judge instructed the jury that malice --a necessary element for conviction-- is "implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another person." Regarding Engle's use of a pistol, the trial judge instructed the jury that "a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts." He also instructed the jury to consider the number and location of Lantzy's wounds when considering the issue of malice. Engle was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appealed, arguing the jury instructions constituted reversible error.

A unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed. It rejected Koehler's argument that Engle's failure to make a timely objection prevented him from raising the issue of jury instruction on appeal, noting that Michigan courts do not enforce a contemporaneous objection rule. The court held that the jury could have inferred from the instructions that the burden of proving lack of malice and intent lay with Engle. He also argued that the jury could have presumed from the use of a deadly weapon and the number and location of Lantzy's wounds that these facts alone constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Engle's malice and intent. He held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to conflicting evidence about Engle's state of mind at the time of the shooting.

Yes and no. In a per curiam opinion delivered by an equally divided Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment without further comment.

Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of the case.


In 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. He signed a certificate stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” Government investigators later discovered that Yermian’s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information.

At his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had knowledge that a federal agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the language of the statute applied the requirement of knowledge to the act of making false statements, rather than the jurisdiction. The Court also held that there was no legislative history to support the reading that Congress intended intent to deceive the federal government to be an element of the crime.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that there was a great deal of ambiguity in the statute regarding to which element the knowledge requirement applied. He argued that, without any clues in the statute, the majority’s opinion cannot simply decide what the phrase “knowingly and willfully” is meant to modify. He also argued that there was no evidence to suggest that Congress intended to expand the definition of the crime to any false statement that could fall under the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma

Frank H. Easterbrook
Andy Coats
Rex E. Lee

In 1981, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered into negotiations with ABC and CBS regarding televising the NCAA football games. Each of those companies had the rights to air 14 live games per season as well as to negotiate individually with the competing schools, and they were required to pay a “minimum aggregate compensation” to the participating schools. The goal of the plan was to televise games in such a way as to not drastically decrease live attendance at the games. The NCAA did not permit any of the schools to negotiate outside of this plan.

The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both members of the College Football Association (CFA), a group within the NCAA that was formed to represent and promote the interests of the major football schools. These schools, along with the other schools in the CFA, negotiated a separate contract with NBC that would allow for more televised games and greater revenues for the schools in question. The NCAA then announced that it would take disciplinary action against any school that complied with the CFA plan as opposed to the NCAA one. The respondent schools took the issue to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which found that the NCAA contract violated the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, held that the NCAA plan creates a structure in which the market cannot be responsive to viewer demands in terms of price and output. Since the viewers of college football games can be defined as a distinct market,  a plan that places the NCAA in complete control of the broadcasts that reach this market creates the type of monopoly that the Sherman Act was meant to prevent. By limiting the number of live broadcasts, the Court found that the NCAA was attempting to artificially increase the value of live tickets, in the same way that a monopolist seeks to manipulate the market by limiting output.

In his dissent, Justice Byron R. White argued that the Court erred by treating the NCAA as a purely commercial and profit-oriented organization. Because the NCAA is uniquely linked to both amateur athletics and higher education, it has been allowed a great deal of leeway in regulation that would be condemned in a purely business environment. He further argued that the NCAA plan “reflects the NCAA’s fundamental policy of preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and education.” Justice William H. Rehnquist joined Justice White in the dissent.


Emmet J. Bondurant, II
Paul M. Bator
Charles Morgan, Jr.

In 1972 Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position with King & Spalding (Firm), a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia. During recruitment, Hishon had been told that after five or six years there was a possibility of promotion to partner; associates with “satisfactory evaluations” would be promoted to partner on a “fair and equal basis.” Hishon claimed to have relied on this information when making her decision to accept employment with the Firm. After six years of employment, Hishon was considered for admission to the partnership and was ultimately rejected. One year later Hishon was again considered for admission and again rejected. She was told to begin seeking new employment and was let go in December 1979.

In November 1979, Hishon sued the Firm and filed her claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Hishon claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and that this discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and Hishon sued in federal district court. The district court dismissed her claim, and Hishon appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed that ruling.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against any employee on the basis of their sex. In this case, the Court held that the promise of equal consideration for partnership that went along with Hishon’s employment was contractual in nature and subject to the regulations of Title VII. By preventing Hishon from obtaining partnership because of her sex, the Firm discriminated against her and breached the “terms, conditions or privileges of employment,” and therefore the Firm acted in direct violation of Title VII.

Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote a concurring opinion noting that the Court’s opinion should be careful to not go to far in interfering with a firm’s ability to make partner decisions.


Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group

Part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid to males between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or had not) registered for the draft.

The Court upheld the law. Since no student is compelled to seek financial aid, requiring an applicant to state whether or not he had registered for the draft would not be equivalent to forcing an individual to incriminate himself.


Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

William T. Coleman, Jr.
Theodore B. Olson
Laurence Stephen Gold
Rex E. Lee

The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the guiding principles of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery were unworkable and that SAMTA was subject to Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. The Court found that rules based on the subjective determination of "integral" or "traditional" governmental functions provided little or no guidance in determining the boundaries of federal and state power. The Court argued that the structure of the federal system itself, rather than any "discrete limitations" on federal authority, protected state sovereignty.


Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants.  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single “bubble”.  Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant.  Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.

Yes.  Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a unanimous court, reversed.  The Supreme Court held that the bubble regulation was a reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act.  Congress did not have a specific intention for the interpretation of that term, and the EPA’s regulation was a reasonable policy choice.  The regulation also provided reasonable accommodations for the many competing interests affected by the Act.  Justices Thurgood Marshall, William H. Rehnquist, and Sandra Day O’Connor did not participate.


Janice M. Joyce Bartee
K. Preston Oade, Jr.

Early in the morning of October 18, 1980, a fire was reported at the Clifford residence in Detroit, Michigan. The Cliffords were out of town, so the Detroit Fire Department arrived, extinguished the fire, and left by around 7 a.m. An hour later, the fire investigator received a notice to inspect the house for evidence of arson. When he and his partner arrived on the scene at 1 p.m., they found a work crew from the Cliffords’ insurance company that the Cliffords had contacted to secure the house. When the work crew had cleared the basement, the fire investigators began to inspect it without obtaining either consent or a warrant. They determined that the fire had started in the basement, where they found several fuel cans and a crock pot attached to a timer, all of which was seized as evidence.

Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford were arrested and charged with arson. At the preliminary examination held to determine probable cause, they moved to suppress the evidence as the products of an illegal search made without warrant or consent. The motion was denied. Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, and it was admitted because there were exigent circumstances surrounding the search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the search.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the judgment of the court in an opinion for a four-justice plurality. The Supreme Court held that that a reasonable expectation of privacy remains within a burned building. While the fire department does not need a warrant to fight the fire, any further official presence on the property must have a warrant. Whether the search is to identify the cause of the fire or to look for evidence of criminal activity will determine the type of warrant the fire department needs to obtain and the requirements for doing so. In the case of the fire at the Clifford home, both searches occurred but without the appropriate warrants. The Court also held that there were no exigent circumstances that prevented the investigators from obtaining the warrants.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in judgment where he argued that once the emergency that has granted the fire fighters authority to enter the premises has ended, the Fourth Amendment requires that notice be given to the property owners before entry. He also argued that if there is probable cause to suspect a crime has occurred, a warrant is required to conduct a search.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that the fire fighters initially at the scene suspected arson because an investigator was called, which means the investigation and the fighting of the fire were happening simultaneously. The inspection by the fire investigator was a continuation of one that began when the fire fighters were legally on the premises. He also argued that the public interest in investigating the cause of a fire outweighs the property owner’s right to privacy. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined in the dissent.


Michael W. McConnell
Robert L. McDonald
Brent N. Rushforth
Robert L. Mc Donald

In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Court held unanimously that Oklahoma's ban on local cable transmissions of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials violated both the Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. While Oklahoma can regulate local cable aspects, such as franchise formation and construction, it cannot tamper with the flow of information from other states. Such tampering violates the Federal Communication Commission's guidelines prohibiting the censorship or alteration of interstate broadcast signals. As such, in the interest of maintaining diverse program offerings and encouraging competition among cable providers, the FCC's guidelines supercede Oklahoma's local regulatory authority. Moreover, despite its broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor, the Court held that the federal government retains final authority under the commerce clause to regulate all aspects of interstate liquor commerce. Therefore, Oklahoma's continued ban on interstate alcoholic advertising violated the Commerce Clause.


Carolyn M. Snurkowski
Richard E. Shapiro
Calvin L. Fox

David Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.

The Supreme Court held that: (1) counsel's performance must be deficient; and (2) the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. With Justice Sandra Day O'Connor writing for the majority, the Court counseled that in making a showing of deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness." The Court also noted that to show prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a "reasonable probability" that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Here, the Court reasoned that Mr. Washington's counsel was not unreasonable. Moreover, the Court stated that even if counsel was unreasonable, counsel's conduct did not cause sufficient prejudice to Mr. Washington to warrant setting aside his death sentence.

Justice William J. Brennan wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He viewed the death sentence as per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, he would not have upheld Mr. Washington's sentence. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote separately, dissenting. He disagreed with the majority's holding in that in its attempt to make a uniform standard, it created one so malleable as to be virtually useless.


Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and "[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing." The BIA also found application of the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.

No. In both criminal and civil proceedings, the "body" or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an illegal arrest. This alone was sufficient basis to uphold Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order. Moreover, deportation proceedings are civil actions and the protections afforded defendants in the criminal context do not apply. Specifically, Sandoval- Sanchez's appeal to the exclusionary rule in his motion to suppress his admission fails because the purpose the exclusionary rule is designed to serve deterring official misconduct is not served in the context of a deportation proceeding. First, the INS is only required to show identity and alienage to meet its burden in a deportation hearing. Since the defendant's body is not suppressible, the INS must only prove alienage, generally not a difficult task even absent a confession. Further, INS has its own comprehensive oversight program in place to monitor Fourth Amendment compliance internally. The exclusionary rule would do little to enhance these efforts. Finally, deportations hearings, unlike criminal trials, are designed to prevent the continued violation of the law. The social cost of releasing a defendant whose mere presence in the country puts him in continued violation of the law is too high to bear in light of the minimal benefits derived from application of the exclusionary rule in this context.


United States v. S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)

The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to "promote the safety of civil aircraft" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct "spot-check" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that recovery against the U.S. was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the U.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California "Good Samaritan" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California "Good Samaritan" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

No. Government liability under the FTCA is limited by the discretionary function exception of 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides that the federal government may not be held liable for "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused." The FAA's decision to institute the "spot-check" program to monitor compliance with its minimum safety standards was clearly discretionary and protected by Section 2680(a). It was a calculated decision which took into account the objectives of the certification process in light of practical considerations such as funding and staffing. Judicial intervention in such a decision would be precisely what the discretionary function exception was designed to prevent.


Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.

Gordon Lee Garrett, Jr.
Thomas F. Heilmann

Dun and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, mistakenly reported to some of its subscribers that the construction contractor Greenmoss Builders had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. The president of Greenmoss quickly learned about the erroneous report, requested Bradstreet to correct its error, and asked for the list of subscribers who received the report. Bradstreet refused to release the names on the list, but issued a correction to its five subscribers who received the original report. The correction stated that actually a former employee of Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss Builders "continued in business as usual." Greenmoss was dissatisfied with the correction and again asked for the list. When Bradstreet refused a second time, Greenmoss filed suit against it for defamation in a Vermont state court. The court discovered that a 17-year-old high student interning for Bradstreet had caused the error and the jury awarded $350,000 to Greenmoss in compensatory and punitive damages. Bradstreet claimed that contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, the trial judge told the jury that it could award punitive damages even if Bradford did not make mistakes intentionally or out of recklessness. The court granted Bradstreet's motion for retrial, but the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that Gertz only applied to cases involving defamation by the media.

Yes. Justice Lewis Powell authored the opinion for a 5-4 court. Although the trial court correctly perceived that the trial judge's instructions did not satisfy the requirements of Gertz, the Court held that Gertz did not apply since the present case did not involve public speech. Instead the Court looked to apply the logic of Gertz to situations concerning private speech. The Court reasoned that laws regulating defamation suits aimed to "balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type [Bradstreet's] of expression." Because the First Amendment offers less protection to private speech than to public speech, and especially less to speech "being solely motived by a desire for profit," damages caused by it can result in heavier penalties and broader conditions for convictions. Therefore states can allow the recovery of punitive damages in defamation cases involving private speech even when the perpetrator does not demonstrate "actual malice."


Steven J. Rappaport
David A. Strauss
Steven J. Hyman

After receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.

No. The Court held that there is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that officers issue Miranda warnings to suspects. Since the police officer's request for the location of the gun was prompted by an immediate interest in assuring that it did not injure an innocent bystander or fall into the hands of a potential accomplice to Quarles, his failure to read the Miranda warning did not violate the Constitution.


Congress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 amendments included a "pension offset" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision.

The unanimous Court upheld the law. Justice Brennan granted that the 1977 amendments temporarily revived gender-based eligibility requirements, but maintained that they served a legitimate government interest, namely, they protected individuals who had planned for their retirements relying on the law as it stood before the Court's Califano decision. The resurrected eligibility criteria were narrowly drawn, applying to those individuals who were eligible for spousal benefits prior to 1977 who retired by 1982. Since many individuals who are planning for retirement rely on the law in making investment and spending decisions, changing the law (as Califano did) without giving some leeway to people who had already planned for the future would place an unreasonable burden on many who were close to retirement.


Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

Sure-Tan Inc. and Surak Leather Company were two small leather processing firms in Chicago who were considered a single employer for the purposes of this case. Of the 11 laborers both companies employed, several were illegal immigrants. In July 1976, eight workers from both companies authorized the Chicago Leather Workers Union to act as their collective bargaining representative. On December 10, 1976, the Union prevailed in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. The companies filed complaints with the NLRB and alleged that many of the voting members were illegal immigrants. When the NLRB certified the union anyway, the president of Surak Leather Company sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to request a check on the immigration status of the employees in question. INS agents discovered five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and deported them.

The NLRB’s Acting Regional Director filed complaints alleging that the companies engaged in unfair labor practices, and the charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to order the petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and substituted backpay for the recommendation of reinstatement.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first part of the Board’s order. However, the Court of Appeals held that, because backpay could only be given for periods of time when the employees were legally eligible but unable to work, the companies should be required to pay a minimum amount of six months worth of backpay.

Yes. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that that the NLRB can act to protect the labor rights of illegal immigrants because it serves the broader purpose of labor to have all workers represented, regardless of immigration status. Precedent establishes that the Board can protect the rights of any employee. The petitioners’ actions illegally discouraged union activity and caused the deportation of their employees. The Court also held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit impermissibly expanded its authority by modifying the order of the NLRB in regards to backpay.

Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that the majority erred in remanding the case to the Court of Appeals, as the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed in its entirety. Since the NLRB acquiesced to the remedy provided by the Court of Appeals, no purpose was served by reconsideration. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part where he argued that illegal aliens are not considered employees under the National Labor Rights Act. Since illegal aliens are actively violating United States criminal laws, the Act does not afford them protection. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.


Frank H. Easterbrook
William David Dexter

The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii.

The Court found that the Hawaii Liquor Tax violated the Constitution. Justice White reaffirmed what he called a "cardinal rule of Commerce Clause jurisprudence" in arguing that states are prohibited from imposing taxes which discriminate in the traffic of interstate commerce. Since the law was originally enacted to support local industries in Hawaii, and the alcoholic products which the law exempted competed with different beverages produced outside the state, Justice White concluded that there were clear constitutional violations in this case.


Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.

Bose Corporation, a loudspeaker manufacturer, brought a product disparagement action against Consumer Union for publishing a negative review of Bose products. Among other comments, Consumer Union's article mistakenly said that Bose loudspeakers caused sounds of individual musical instruments to wander "about the room" when they in fact merely wandered "along the wall[s]." Ruling in favor of Bose, the District Court found that the article's statements were factually wrong and made with "actual malice." On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed as it found the lower court's ruling to be clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court granted Bose certiorari.

No. The Court held that while the record revealed that the article's author mistakenly described the sound path of Bose speakers, he did not do so with actual malice. A review of the author's testimony showed that he heard the Bose speaker sounds as tending to wander "along the wall" between speakers, rather than "about the room." Despite this disparity, the Court held that the description of Bose speaker sounds as wondering "about the room," though a misconception, was not written with actual malice since its author was not aware of his mischaracterization in time to remedy the error. Therefore, his speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.


Robert Bartels
Ms. Kathryn A. Oberly
Brent R. Appel

Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.

No. The Court relied on the "inevitable discovery doctrine," as it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the child's body as evidence since it was clear that the volunteer search teams would have discovered the body even absent Williams's statements.


T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools.

After the original oral argument in March of 1984, the Supreme Court restored the case to the calendar for reargument. In addition to the previously argued question, the Court requested that the parties brief and argue the additional question of whether the assistant principal violated the Fourth Amendment in opening T.L.O's purse.

The Court heard reargument on October 02, 1984.  The Court held that while the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials, they may conduct reasonable warrantless searches of students under their authority notwithstanding the probable cause standard that would normally apply to searches under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court held that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was reasonable under the circumstances.


Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no "good-faith exception" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant.

Yes. Justice Byron White delivered the opinion for a 7-2 court. The Court maintained that trial courts can use evidence seized by officers who have an "objectively reasonable basis" for mistakenly believing they have obtained valid warrants. Upon a factual inquiry, the Court found that "the officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them" to secure a valid warrant. Lawmakers did not enact rules for excluding evidence to invalidate evidence because of clerical errors by judges but to deter police from conducting unlawful searches.


On March 31, 1980, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper C.J. Williams observed Richard McCarty’s vehicle weaving back and forth on Interstate Highway 270. He followed the car, pulled McCarty over, and asked him to exit the vehicle. Williams noticed that McCarty had trouble standing, and thus determined that he would charge McCarty with a traffic offense and that McCarty was no longer free to leave the scene. McCarty failed a balancing test.

Williams then asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants, and McCarty responded that he had consumed two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before. Williams placed McCarty under arrest. At the county jail, however, a breathalyzer test did not detect any alcohol in McCarty’s system. Williams resumed questioning McCarty, asking him if he was under the influence of alcohol and whether the marijuana had been treated with any chemicals. Williams responded, “I guess, barely,” to the first question, but denied that the marijuana he smoked had been treated. At no point did Williams or any other officer tell McCarty that he had a right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, or to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.

McCarty was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor under Ohio law punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to six months. McCarty moved to exclude the incriminating statements he made to Trooper Williams both on the scene of the arrest and in jail, on the grounds that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The trial court denied the motion; McCarty pled ‘no contest’ and was found guilty. On appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that the Miranda rule does not apply to misdemeanors, relying on a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s appeal for failing to present a substantial constitutional question. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s writ of habeas corpus, but the United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals accused of misdemeanor traffic offenses prior to custodial interrogation, but did not clearly apply this rule to McCarty’s statements made at the scene of his arrest.

Yes and no. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that arrestees in custody and under suspicion for a misdemeanor traffic offense must be informed of their constitutional rights or subsequent statements are inadmissible. Justice Marshall rejected Berkemer’s argument that the Court should carve out an exception to the Miranda rule for lesser offenses. He noted that the police are often unaware when they arrest a person whether that person has committed a felony or a misdemeanor, and that seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalate into more serious investigations. He reasoned that carving out an exception to the Miranda rule for misdemeanor traffic offenses would undermine Miranda’s simplicity and effectiveness given the rule’s widespread, customary use by police.

Justice Marshall then distinguished between the statements McCarty made at the scene of the arrest and at the jail. He held that McCarty was in custody as of the moment he was formally placed under arrest for driving under the influence, and that statements made after this point were inadmissible. He also held, however, that McCarty was not put in custody for purposes of the Miranda rule before this point. Justice Marshall reasoned that a routine traffic stop was more akin to a non-custodial ‘Terry stop’, and generally ended with a motorist’s release. He noted that McCarty was not told he could not leave prior to his arrest, and was only asked a few questions and told to perform a balancing test. Consequently, Justice Marshall held that the Ohio State Highway Patrol was not obligated to give Miranda warnings to persons detained pursuant to routine traffic stops.

Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He argued that the majority should have limited its decision to the question presented in Berkemer’s petition for certiorari: Whether law enforcement officers must give ‘Miranda warnings’ to individuals arrested for misdemeanor traffic offenses. He argued that the Court failed to follow the course of judicial restraint by answering a question not passed upon by the lower courts.


Rex E. Lee
Barry Tarlow
Roger L. Cossack

The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial.

Yes, there is such an exception. The justices held that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant could be introduced at trial. The exclusionary rule, argued the majority, is not a right but a remedy justified by its ability to deter illegal police conduct. In Leon, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits. The exclusionary rule is costly to society: Guilty defendants go unpunished and people lose respect for the law. The benefits of the exclusionary rule are uncertain: The rule cannot deter police in a case like Leon, where they act in good faith on a warrant issued by a judge.


Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle

Marvin K. Collie
Carter G. Phillips
Thomas J. Donnelly

Fred and Mary Engle filed a joint federal income tax return in 1975. During that year, Fred Engle acquired two oil and gas leases covering a total of 240 acres in Wyoming. The Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction on advance royalties from the oil and gas leases, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected their claim because the deduction was not based on average daily production from the property’s oil and gas leases, as required by the Commissioner’s interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 613A of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, with one dissent. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed, holding that § 613A authorized depletion allowances on advance royalties so long as there was eventual production from the property.

Also in 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg, joint owners of 46,515 acres of land in Irion County, Texas, leased their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under these leases, the Farmars and Suggs received royalties and annual cash bonuses from the lessees. The bonuses were payable even when the property produced no oil or gas. The Farmars and Suggs claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the royalties and bonuses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the royalties because they were not based on average daily production from the property. In a consolidated suit, the Court of Claims held that Congress only allowed for depletion deductions from actual production during the taxable year.

 In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress eliminated percentage depletion deductions for major oil producers. § 613A(d), however, authorized any qualified independent gas or oil producer or royalty owner to compute the allowance for percentage depletion in accordance with gross income from the property. The act stipulated that the allowance was tied to the taxpayer’s average daily production so as not to exceed the taxpayer’s depletable quantity. The Farmars and Suggs and the Commissioner filed petitions for writs of certiorari; the Supreme Court of the United States granted their petitions and consolidated their cases.

Yes. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court held that the act allowed independent lessors to claim percentage depletion deductions on advance royalties from oil and gas leases. Justice O’Connor first described the history of percentage depletion deductions from oil and gas income, noting that prior to 1975, the Commissioner allowed such deductions on any advance royalty or bonus whether there was current production of the underlying minerals or not. These deductions only had to be attributed to actual production during the life of the lease.

While acknowledging that the Commissioner’s interpretation was plausible given the language of the act, Justice O’Connor argued that Congress eliminated the percentage deductions for large producers to subsidize the combined efforts of small producers and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the nation’s oil and gas resources. Under the Commissioner’s interpretation of § 613A, however, lessors and lessees would devote fewer resources to development of the nation’s energy resources. Justice O’Connor also looked to the legislative history of the act, noting that a complete repeal of the percentage deduction was never suggested during committee consideration of the act.

Finally, Justice O’Connor held that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the act was unreasonable. She wrote that holders of interests in oil and gas deposits had been consistently entitled to percentage deductions for the past fifty years. She noted that the Commissioner’s interpretation denied percentage deductions to all parties when congress clearly intended to grant them to at least some parties.

Justice Harry Blackmun dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan, Justice Byron White and Justice Thurgood Marshall. He emphasized that the Commissioner’s interpretation was consistent with the language of the statute, and that the act specifically tied the calculation of percentage deductions to average daily production during a given taxable year. Justice Blackmun disagreed that congressional silence on the availability of percentage deductions was dispositive.


Mr. Andrew L. Frey
Charles P. Roberts, III
Charles Louis Roberts

Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants.

No. The Court found that although the cans of ether may have contained an unknown and unwanted object, no meaningful interference with the defendants' interest in their possessions occurred, as the tracking device was installed before the defendants obtained the ether. This case was an expansion of the holding announced in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). (Abstract by Blaine Schmidt.)


Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence

In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request.

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the regulations did not violate the First Amendment. The Court noted that expression is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that the manner of the protest was at odds with the government's interest in maintaining the condition of the parks. The Court argued that the Park Service did not attempt to ban all sleeping in public parks (only in certain areas), and that the protesters had alternative means of communicating their message.


Irving Independent School District v. Tatro

Henri and Mary Tatro’s three-and-a-half year old daughter Amber had spina bifida. As a result, Amber suffered from a neurogenic bladder, which required the use of a catheter every three or four hours each day to avoid kidney injury. The preferred method of catheterization was called clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). Amber was unable to perform this method herself because of her age, but a layperson could easily learn to perform the procedure.

In 1979, Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber as required by the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This law required Texas to provide handicapped children with a free public education including ‘related services’. It only required ‘medical services’ for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. Amber’s individualized education program provided that she would attend early childhood development classes and receive physical and occupational therapy. Her program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Tatros unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services during school hours.

In October 1979, the Tatros filed an action against the district, the Texas State Board of Education, and others. They sought an injunction requiring the district to provide Amber with CIC. They also sought damages and attorneys’ fees through the Rehabilitation Act (RA), which forbade programs receiving federal aid from excluding handicapped people from participation and allowed prevailing parties to recover attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the Tatros' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that CIC was not a ‘related service’ under the EHA because it did not arise from an effort to educate. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that CIC was indeed a ‘related service’ under the EHA, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then ruled that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA because a doctor was not needed to administer the procedure. It found that CIC was a ‘related service’ and ordered the defendants to modify Amber’s individualized education program accordingly. It also held that the Tatros had proved a violation of the RA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both holdings.

Yes and no. In a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that the provision of CIC was a ‘related service’ and not a ‘medical service’ under the Education of the Handicapped Act. He looked to the text of the EHA, which defined ‘related service’ as that which is required for a handicapped child to benefit from special education. Chief Justice Burger noted that Amber would not be able to attend school and benefit from special education without CIC. He cited the Court’s previous holdings on the act, where it determined that congress intended to give handicapped children meaningful access to public education.

Chief Justice Burger held that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA. He deferred to the regulations of the Department of Education, which defined ‘medical services’ as those provided by a licensed physician. As CIC could be performed by a layperson and was required for Amber to attend school, it fell within both Congress’ and the Department of Education’s definitions of ‘related services’.

Chief Justice Burger also held that the Tatros were not entitled to relief under the Rehabilitation Act because relief was available under the EHA. Hence, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that the Tatros were entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Justice William Brennan concurred in part, but dissented from the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees under the Rehabilitation Act. He referred to his dissent in Smith v. Robinson, where he similarly objected to that majority’s interpretation of a conflict between the EHA and the RA as an implicit repeal of parties’ right to seek attorneys’ fees.

Justice Stevens concurred in part but also dissented to the majority’s holding on the awarding of attorneys’ fees. He noted that the district's petition for certiorari did not challenge the award of attorneys’ fees.


David A. Strauss
Robert H. Lynn
Mark S. Wernick

In 1974, Marshall Murphy was questioned by Minneapolis police about the rape and murder of a teenage girl, but he was never charged.  In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in an unrelated criminal sexual conduct case and was sentenced to a 16-month suspended prison sentence and three years probation.  During probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders at Alpha House and to see a probation officer.  While at Alpha House, Murphy admitted to the 1974 rape and murder.  An Alpha House counselor contacted Murphy’s probation officer about the admission and the officer called Murphy in for a meeting.  During the meeting Murphy became angry and said he “felt like calling a lawyer” but still admitted to the rape and murder.  The probation officer relayed the information from the meeting to the police, and Murphy was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.

At trial, Murphy tried to suppress testimony about the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession, and the confession was not compelled or involuntary.  The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the confession violated the Fifth Amendment because Murphy’s parole officer knew that Murphy’s answers were likely to be incriminating.

No.  Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower court.  The Supreme Court held that admissions made to a probation officer about a crime unrelated to the probation are admissible in subsequent prosecution.  A state may require a probationer to meet with his officer and discuss matters that may affect his probationary status, but this does not create an exception to the rule that one must assert the privilege against self-incrimination.  Murphy could have asserted that privilege when his officer asked the questions that led to the incriminating answers, but he failed to do so.

Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing that the state should have to prove that Murphy knew his rights and knowingly waived them.  The facts of this case did not warrant application of the principle that one waive their privilege against self-incrimination unless they asserted it in a timely fashion.  Justice John Paul Stevens, and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.


Grove City College, a private, coeducational liberal arts school, sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. The College did, however, enroll a large number of students who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) through a Department of Education-run program. The DOE concluded that this assistance to students qualified the College as a recipient of federal assistance and made it subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. When the College refused to comply with the requirements, the DOE attempted to terminate assistance to the student financial aid program. The College challenged the DOE's actions.

The Court held that there was no "substantive difference" between institutional assistance and aid received by a school through its students; Title IX coverage, the Court found, was triggered by the BEOG's. The Court noted that the assistance did not trigger institutionwide coverage under the Amendments, however. Only the College's financial aid program was subject to the federal requirements. The Court concluded that prohibiting discrimination as a condition for federal assistance did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of the College and that the school was free to end its participation in the grant program.


Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California

Frederic D. Woocher
Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
Fredric D. Woocher

The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to "engage in editorializing."

Yes. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, "since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity," Congress must use the First Amendment to "inform and give shape" to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which "lies at the heart of First Amendment protection."


Anthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while ethnic prejudices did exist in society, those private biases were not permissible considerations for the removal of an infant child from the custody of its mother. "Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." The Court thus held that the decision of the lower courts was an unconstitutional denial of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.


Charles R.B. Kirk
John F. De Meo
Charles R. B. Kirk
Deputy Attorney General
John F. DeMeo
George L. Schraer
Lisa Short

In 1980 and 1981, in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a “breathalyzer test”) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that the test results be excluded from all the trials.

No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that due process rights do not extend to the point of compelling law enforcement to preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants. The state’s duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. Such evidence must possess an apparent exculpatory value before it is destroyed, and it must be of such a nature that the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. States are also prohibited of not taking breath samples did not violate the Due Process Clause because the breathalyzer tests were reliable and the exculpatory value of breath samples was very low. Additionally, defendants could have used alternate means to disprove the test results.


Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State.

The Court held that the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches did not apply "within the confines of the prison cell." Noting that privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance, the Court found that "the paramount interest in institutional security" outweighed all privacy concerns. The Court further held that "random and unauthorized" deprivations of property did not violate the Due Process Clause, so long as postdeprivation remedies were available.


Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to suppression hearings. The Court found that the "aims and interests" of public trials were "no less pressing in a hearing to suppress wrongfully seized evidence." The Court noted that the presumption of openness for trials could be overcome only by overriding interests based on findings that closure was absolutely necessary to preserve higher values and was narrowly tailored to serve those interests.